Recently, Meder, Mayrhofer, and Waldmann (2009, 2014) have proposed a model of causal diagnostic reasoning that predicts an interference of the predictive probability, Pr(Effect|Cause), in estimating the diagnostic probability, Pr(Cause|Effect), specifically, that the interference leads to an underestimation bias of the diagnostic probability. The objective of the experiment reported in the
... [Show full abstract] present paper was twofold. A first aim was to test the existence of the underestimation bias in individuals. Our results indicate the presence of an underestimation of the diagnostic probability that depends on the value of the predictive probability. Secondly, we investigated whether this bias was related to the type of estimation strategy followed by participants. We tested two main strategies: abductive inference and defeasible deduction. Our results reveal that the underestimation of diagnostic probability is more pronounced under abductive inference than under defeasible deduction. Our data also suggest that defeasible deduction is for individuals the most natural reasoning strategy to estimate Pr(Cause|Effect).