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Norms and Rationality in Electoral Participation and in the Rescue of Jews in WWII

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Abstract

The rescue of Jews in WWII and electoral participation both constitute prominent puzzles for rational choice theories of human behavior and have given rise to lengthy debates about norms and rationality. To explain both phenomena, we apply the Model of Frame Selection. This theory of action provides an integrated account of norms and rationality, where cost-benefit calculus is replaced by unconditional norm conformity if actors hold strongly activated normative convictions. In support of this hypothesis, our empirical analyses show that strong feelings of social responsibility led actors to disregard the risks of helping. Likewise, intense norms of civic duty can make electoral participation independent of the incentive to express political preferences and the expectation to influence the election outcome. At the same time, the real strength of calculated incentives is revealed by identifying the actors who indeed seem to engage in a reflecting-calculating mode of decision-making.

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... Zahlreiche empirische Studien konnten relativ starke Effekte von Normen nachweisen (u.a. Tittle et al. 2010;Beck & Ajzen 1991;Cochran 2016;Sattler et al. 2013a, b;Sattler 2007;Graeff 2014;Mehlkop & Becker 2004;Grasmick & Bursik 1990;Kroneberg et al. 2010b;Nagin & Paternoster 1994). Die Wirkung von Normen wird jedoch in verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen thematisiert, z.B. in der Social Learning Theory als Definitionen einer Handlung oder einer Situation, in der Social Bonding Theory als moralische Vorstellung oder, wie bereits dargelegt, im RC-Kontext als psychische Kosten. ...
... Bei der Interpretation von Normeffekten ist daher bislang unklar, ob sie innerhalb oder außerhalb des Rationalitäts-Paradigmas erklärt werden können ). (Kroneberg et al. 2010b). Ein Unterschied der SAT zum MFS besteht darin, dass bei der SAT im Entscheidungsprozess die Abschreckungsmechanismen stärker thematisiert werden als die Vorteile der Handlungsalternativen. ...
... Laut dem MFS ist die rationale Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägung nur einer von mehreren Mechanismen, auf denen individuelles Verhalten beruht (z.B. Kroneberg et al. 2010b;Kroneberg 2010;. Falls Menschen im Zuge der Definition der Situation eine handlungsrelevante Norm identifizieren, dann kann diese Norm bei einer starken Verinnerlichung ein mentales Modell für diese Situation aktivieren. ...
Article
Die vorliegende Studie verfolgt das Ziel, kriminelles Handeln ausgehend von einer weiten Version des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes als das Ergebnis eines zweistufigen Entscheidungsprozesses situationsbezogen theoretisch und empirisch zu analysieren. In theoretischer Hinsicht steht dabei die Relevanz des Nutzens, der mit kriminellem Handeln realisiert werden kann, im Vordergrund, während in empirischer Hinsicht die systematische statistische Modellierung zweistufiger Entscheidungsprozesse im Mittelpunkt steht. Die empirische Analyse erfolgt auf der Basis von Daten einer postalischen Befragung (n = 2.383) einer disproportional geschichteten Zufallsstichprobe von Bewohnern einer ostdeutschen Großstadt. Die statistische Analyse der Untersuchungshypothesen wird anhand eines der Klasse der Discrete Choice Modelle (Hensher et al. 2005; Train 2009) zurechenbaren sequentiellen Logit-Modells vorgenommen, welches die simultane Schätzung beider Stufen des Entscheidungsprozesses ermöglicht (Buis 2011; 2017). Die Ergebnisse der Studien weisen darauf hin, dass Aspekte des Nutzens auf beiden Stufen des Entscheidungsprozesses handlungsrelevant werden. Diese Befunde werden abschließend unter methodologischen, methodischen und theoretischen Gesichtspunkten diskutiert.
... 16 E.g., Lichbach (1987), Wintrobe (1998Wintrobe ( , 2007, Moore (2000), Verwimp (2003a), Ferrero (2013Ferrero ( , 2017a, Anderton (2014). Relatively few formal theoretical models have been applied to interveners, including rescuers (but see Kroneberg, Yaish, and Stocké 2010), or to victims (but see Vargas 2016). Brauer and Caruso (2016) provide guidance for how this work can unfold with applications to five pre-Holocaust genocides. ...
... Second, standard theory alone cannot adequately explain the how and why of mass atrocities; broader, more comprehensive explanations require the whole gamut of approaches. Third, scholars' predominant interest still lies in the actions of perpetrators, certainly more so than in the (in)actions of bystanders (including potential mass atrocity interveners), and one finds an almost complete absence of formal models for studying the feasible choice set of rescuers and victims and how their constraints may be lessened (important exceptions include Kroneberg, Yaish, andStocké 2010 andVargas 2016). Fourth, tightening constraints on perpetrators may not loosen those of victims, and may worsen them (backfire effects of intervention). ...
... Second, standard theory alone cannot adequately explain the how and why of mass atrocities; broader, more comprehensive explanations require the whole gamut of approaches. Third, scholars' predominant interest still lies in the actions of perpetrators, certainly more so than in the (in)actions of bystanders (including potential mass atrocity interveners), and one finds an almost complete absence of formal models for studying the feasible choice set of rescuers and victims and how their constraints may be lessened (important exceptions include Kroneberg, Yaish, andStocké 2010 andVargas 2016). Fourth, tightening constraints on perpetrators may not loosen those of victims, and may worsen them (backfire effects of intervention). ...
Article
Counting conservatively, data show about 100 million mass atrocity-related deaths since 1900. A distinct empirical phenomenon, mass atrocities are events of enormous scale, severity, and brutality, occur in wartime and in peacetime, are geographically widespread, occur with surprising frequency, under various systems of governance, and can be long-lasting in their effects on economic and human development, wellbeing, and wealth, more so when nonfatal physical injuries and mental trauma also are considered. As such, mass atrocities are a major economic concern. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the subject matter, the pertinent conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literatures are voluminous and widely dispersed, and have not been synthesized before from an economics point of view. We address two gaps: a “mass atrocities gap” in the economics literature and an “economics gap” in mass atrocities scholarship. Our goals are, first, to survey and synthesize for economists a broad sweep of literatures on which to base further work in this field and, second, for both economists and noneconomists to learn how economic inquiry contributes to understanding the causes and conduct of mass atrocities and, possibly, to their mitigation and prevention. In drawing on standard, behavioral, identity, social network, and complex systems economics, we find that the big puzzles of the “how” and “why” of mass atrocities, and mass participation therein, are being well addressed. While new research on such topics will be valuable, work should also progress to develop improved prevention approaches. (JEL D72, D74, K38, N40, Z13)
... Zahlreiche empirische Studien konnten relativ starke Effekte von Normen nachweisen (u.a. Tittle et al. 2010;Beck & Ajzen 1991;Cochran 2016;Sattler et al. 2013a/b;Sattler 2007;Graeff 2014;Mehlkop & Becker 2004;Mehlkop & Graeff 2010;Grasmick & Bursik 1990;Kroneberg et al. 2010b;Hirtenlehner & Kunz 2016;Nagin & Paternoster 1994). Die Wirkung von Normen wird jedoch in verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen thematisiert, z.B. in der Social Learning Theory als De nitionen einer Handlung oder einer Situation, in der Social Bonding Theory als moralische Vorstellung oder, wie bereits dargelegt, im RC-Kontext als psychische Kosten. ...
... Allerdings ist bei dieser Sichtweise nicht leicht erklärbar, warum es zu Normverletzungen kommt und wie Menschen auf konigierende Erwartungen und Vorgaben reagieren. Kroneberg et al. 2010b;Kroneberg 2010;Kroneberg 2014). Beide Ansätze gehen davon aus, dass es zwei Prozesse gibt (d.h. ...
... Es wird angenommen, dass nur eine Subgruppe von Menschen, die sich nicht an internalisierte Normen gebunden fühlt, rational die Vor-und Nachteile einer Handlung kalkuliert, während die anderen unkonditional internalisierte Normen befolgen und Kriminalität als Handlungsoption nicht wahrnehmen. 5 Diese Ansätze nehmen folglich eine variable Rationalität und ein normatives Framing krimineller Handlungen an (Kroneberg et al. 2010b). Ein Unterschied der SAT zum MFS besteht darin, dass bei der SAT im Entscheidungsprozess die Abschreckungsmechanismen stärker thematisiert werden als die Vorteile der Handlungsalternativen. ...
... a is the accessibility of script j given frame i, a j is the availability of script j and | k j a is the degree to which script j regulates action k. In such case, the activation weight of action k ( ) Although not explicitly stated by Stocké, his argumentation seems to represent a truncated and somewhat altered version of the typical decision-theoretic specification of the conditions for the switch from an as-to an rc-mode: (Kroneberg 2005;2006;Kroneberg et al. 2010 ...
... Inequality (5) is our own interpretation of Stocké's (2004;2007) argument brought together with the more general decision-theoretic specification of Kroneberg (2005;2006;Kroneberg et al. 2010). While it is typically difficult to operationalize the degree of mismatch (1 c m − ), we can state that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a deliberate SD response increases with motivation (the second bracketed parameter in Inequality (5)). ...
Conference Paper
Sensitive questions result in misrepresented responses and identifying those questions is a crucial task to get straight answers to sensitive topics. Using paradata as non-reactive data should reflect the uncertainty and the perceived social desirability while answering the questionnaire. By tracking response change and page change in addition to item non-response and response latencies, the researcher has a powerful tool to reveal exceptional response patterns in web surveys. In pretests these methods can also help to cut costs of further surveys that are usually used to identify sensitive questions and they can also show problems with wording and too high cognitive effort in earlier stages. Non-reactive methods such as measuring response latencies and event tracking adds information to be analyzed without adding load to the respondents. Such events while filling in the questionnaire can be, for example, changing the page and selecting or changing an answer option. Tracking these events not only by time, but with multiple answers over time per item, view the process of completing the questionnaire instead of leaving the black box untouched, which is between handing out the form and getting the (final) responses. In this way it is possible to reveal answers of first choice, response change and page change as event types besides response latencies and the order of completion. The paradata from a web survey is compared to data from a questionnaire about the perceived social desirability and threat of disclosure of the questions used in the former one. The response patterns uncovered by the event tracking should correlate with these sensitivity measurements. Sensitive questions should have, in addition to the occurrence of non-response, a) higher response latencies, b) multiple page views, c) more response changes and d) lower intra-item correlation between the first and final answer.
... dazu Lazarsfeld 2008, S. 457) oder der Abgabe einer Stimme bei einer politischen Wahl (vgl. dazu Kroneberg et al. 2010) dadurch unterscheidet, dass die initiale Entscheidung zur Hilfe den Beginn einer langen Kette von Hilfshandlungen darstellte und eine Erklärung, die den finalen Tatbestand ("ein Jude wurde gerettet") zum Gegenstand hat, nur dann als zufriedenstellend betrachtet wer-1 3 den kann, wenn alle (kausalen) Faktoren, die dazu einen Beitrag geliefert haben, in der Erklärung Berücksichtigung finden? Da eine soziologische Erklärung stets darauf zielt, nicht nur einen Fall zu erklären (oder zu verstehen), sondern Häufigkeiten einer Merkmalskonfiguration festzustellen oder Typen von Handlung(skett)en zu identifizieren, müssen identifizierbare Gemeinsamkeiten im Vordergrund des erklärenden Bemühens stehen. ...
... Vgl.Kroneberg et al. (2010) undKroneberg (2011a, b). Die Anwendung der Handlungsoption "Veröffentliche stets die kleinste publizierbare Einheit" mag durchaus Folge der Selbstbindung an eine Handlungstheorie sein, in deren Zentrum die Idee der Nutzenmaximierung steht. ...
Article
Full-text available
Abstract Clemens Kroneberg suggested in his paper (Cologne Journal of Sociology and Social Psychology, 64:37–65, 2012) that based on the Model of Frame Selection rational choice theory would offer a sound explanation of pro-social behavior which is demonstrated in the case of the rescue of Jews. This criticism argues that this attempt fails both because the explanandum is insufficiently formulated and the data from the Altruistic Personality and Prosocial Behavior-Institute (Oliner and Oliner, The altruistic personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe 1988) are highly selective and do not allow far reaching conclusions. Therefore the proposed explanation can be rejected because the data do not fit.
... The automatic mode has the advantage of being fast and energy saving; however it is potentially more error-prone. To fully exploit the potential of the dual-process framework it is crucial to specify conditions under which each mode prevails (Fazio 1990;Kroneberg et al. 2010;Kroneberg 2011). Besides motivation and opportunity to reflectively calculate information the decisive condition for our purposes is the degree of availability and accessibility of the mental schemata involved in the automatic process. ...
... In that way it is better able to grasp a large variety of human decision making. This kind of integrative theory also proved successful in other domains of complex social action like the rescue of Jews in WWII, political voting, or environmental behavior (Kroneberg et al. 2010;Best/Kneip 2011). However, the theoretical model introduced here is quite preliminary. ...
... which derives (Kroneberg, 2005;2006;Kroneberg et al., 2010) where (1 − ) is the degree of mismatch between the situation and the default frame (in this case of cooperation). ...
... Inequality (5) is our own interpretation of Stocké's (2004;2007) argument brought together with the more general decision-theoretic specification of Kroneberg (2005;2006;Kroneberg et al., 2010). While it is typically difficult to operationalize the degree of mismatch (1 − ), we can state that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a deliberate SD response increases with motivation (the second bracketed parameter in Inequality (5)). ...
Article
Full-text available
Social desirability describes the tendency of respondents to present themselves in a more positive light than is accurate and is a serious concern in surveys. If researchers are better able to understand the underlying mechanisms responsible for social desirability bias, they may be able to devise ways to identify and correct for it. One possibility involves determining whether social desirability is more of a deliberate 'editing' of responses or an automatic, perhaps 'self-deceptive', act. Then researchers could potentially flag conspicuously fast or slow responses to improve data quality. We outline dual-process-related theoretical arguments for both scenarios and test their plausibility using data gathered in a tablet-based CASI survey of pre-service teachers in Germany that were asked to assess their suitability for their chosen profession. Our analysis involves the use of fixed-effects multilevel models that enable us to control for unobserved differences between respondent-and item-characteristics while also examining cross-level interactions between the predictors at various levels. Specifically, we examine the classic respondent- (i.e. need for social approval) and item-related characteristics (i.e. trait desirability) associated with social desirability bias, as well as the speed at which the respondents gave their answers. Doing so allows us to observe under what circumstances the respondents tended to overstate positive characteristics as well as understate negative ones. We find evidence for social desirability as an automatic as well as a deliberate response behaviour. However, the mechanism responsible for determining whether social desirability occurs automatically or deliberately seems to be whether the item content is desirable or undesirable. Desirable traits seem to elicit faster socially desirable responses whereas undesirable traits seem to elicit slower socially desirable responses.
... Social norms are impossible to deny as a motivational force, but the underlying mechanisms have to be theorized (Kroneberg et al., 2010;Rossano, 2012;Suhay, 2015). It is at the root of the theory proposed here, that communities use rituals to make their morality binding (Durkheim, 1995(Durkheim, [1912). ...
... 4. Collins's argument overlaps with recent rational choice models that emphasize variable rationality in a dual-process framework (e.g. Kroneberg et al., 2010), although it would be misleading to equate, as Wollschleger (2017) does, EE maximization with system 1 and instrumental rationality with system 2 processing. For Collins, individual 'choices' generally reflect EE maximization, but ritual-based emotions can be so strong that people do not even consider alternatives (Collins, 1993: 223-225). ...
Article
Political behaviour research is divided into several explanatory approaches. They have in common that they disregard, to varying extents, the social bases of their explanatory concepts. To fill this void, the present article explores the theoretical advantages of applying Randal Collins’s ritual theory to political behaviour. The central claim is that any cognitive factor, such as interests, values, norms or identities has to be infused with emotional resonance in concrete social interaction in order to become a relevant motivation for political behaviour. Based on this argument, the article develops four testable propositions and discusses how they relate to existing approaches. The article concludes that ritual-based emotions are a unified motivational basis for political behaviour, which help understand which cognitive factor becomes politically relevant in a specific situation. The theoretical discussion is complemented with suggestions of how to study political rituals empirically.
... In our simulations, punishment is not carried out based on a strict cost-benefit analysis, but rather based on the fact whether or not the respective interaction partner behaves contrary to ego's behavior or preference. In this sense, our simulation simplifies punishment as an unconditional, normative act, comparable to the notion of the Kantian categorical imperative or the notion of unconditional normative behavior in the framing literature [109]. It also fits the literature on learning models with an unconditional punishment of norm violations [77,91]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Social norms are known to establish social order and cohesion if actors commonly agree on them. In heterogeneous populations, however, normative conflict may result and social order may collapse. In this article, we show by means of a computational simulation model that homogeneous social norms may even come about in heterogeneous societies consisting of groups with competing interests. We demonstrate that punishment oriented at conformity can set off enforcement cascades leading to one generally accepted norm. In our model, agents put pressure on others to perform the same public behavior as they show themselves, even if they privately disapprove it. Interestingly, this type of punishment is more effective to form norms than pressuring others to meet their own private preferences. We conclude that group pressure and punishment may be interrelated phenomena, which can lead to homogeneous behaviors even in well diversified societies.
... Gender-role norms are embodied in a set of stereotypical beliefs about how women and men should be, and how they should behave in different spheres of life (Sagebiel and Vá zquez-Cupeiro, 2010). Following Elster and others (Kroneberg, Yaish and Stocké, 2010), we need to consider the possibility that when people are very committed to their gender stereotypes and identities, their decision is primarily based on social gender norms and stereotypes rather than on rational calculus alone. This suggests that gender norms, stereotypes, and beliefs might interact with rational calculation. ...
Article
Full-text available
Although gender inequalities in education have greatly changed in recent decades with young women outpacing young men, girls and boys continue to study in gender-typical fields of study. Recognizing that boys and girls might have different educational preferences, we conceptualized gender differentiation as an outcome of both socialization processes and rational choice factors. Using a data set from an original survey of curricular choices of high school students in Tel Aviv-Jaffa in Israel, we employed nested logit regression models using the KHB method to examine the determinants of the gender differentiation in advanced course-taking. We found that socialization mechanisms (significant other influences) and rational choice motivations (utility considerations and failure expectations) explain up to 40 percent of the gender-typical curricular choice in our data. The implications of these results for future research are discussed.
... The possible scope of the frame selection account extends far beyond experiments on label framing of games. For instance, Kroneberg et al. (2010) applied their model of frame selection to account for real-life phenomena such as electoral participation and the rescue of Jews in the second world war. ...
Article
Full-text available
It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e.g., "The Teamwork Game") can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled "The Teamwork Game" tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.
... Another approach is the Model of Frame Selection, which is grounded in social psychology and offers an extension of common rational choice models (Esser 2010;Kroneberg 2005;Kroneberg et al. 2010). This approach argues that individuals will deliberately calculate costs and benefits only in certain situations; in other situations, they will act unconditionally by abiding with social norms they have previously internalized (Kroneberg et al. 2010, 4). ...
... Je besser hingegen die Passung (m i ) zwischen mentalen Situationsmodellen und signifikanten Symbolen der Situation und je stärker die mentale Verankerung eines passenden Handlungsskripts, desto wahrscheinlicher wird Handeln im as-Modus, 4 welches definitionsgemäß unter Ausblendung von Handlungsanreizen und -kosten erfolgt. Derartiges normgesteuertes Handeln umfasst im Extremfall zunächst irrational erscheinende Verhaltensweisen wie Satisfaktion (Kroneberg 2005) oder riskantes prosoziales Verhalten in totalitären Regimes (Kroneberg et al. 2010b /Hill 2010;Esser 1993aEsser , 2002aEsser , 2002bHunkler/Kneip 2008), wobei allerdings in den genannten Studien von Esser lediglich ein sehr indirekter Theorietest mit nicht auf das MFS zugeschnittenen Operationalisierungen und ohne die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Normen und Anreizen vorgenommen wird. In der unseres Wissens bislang einzigen Anwendung auf Fertilitätsentscheidungen zeigt Eckhard (2014), dass Opportunitätskosten -operationalisiert über das Abitur der Frau -in kindorientierten Partnerschaften keinen negativen Effekt auf die Neigung zur Familiengründung haben. ...
Chapter
Seit der Entstehung der Soziologie hat es zahlreiche mikro- und makrosoziologische Erklärungsversuche des demographischen Handelns gegeben (Kopp/Richter 2015). Jedoch hat sich mit den theoretischen Beiträgen von James Coleman (1990) und Hartmut Esser (1993b) zunehmend die Erkenntnis durchgesetzt, dass reine Makroerklärungen ohne handlungstheoretische Fundierung problematisch sind, da sie letztlich kein Verstehen ermöglichen und damit auch empirische Ausnahmen nicht erfassen können (Kroneberg 2011: 20). Aus der Perspektive des methodologischen Individualismus kann eine vollständige Erklärung nur über die Berücksichtigung individueller Wahrnehmungen und Handlungen gelingen (Braun 2008).
... Labels attributed to the game (i.e., calling the same game differently, such as the "wall-street" vs. the "community game") have also been argued to influence behaviour through diverse mechanisms (Liberman et al. 2004;Eriksson and Strimling 2014;Yamagishi et al. 2013). Labels might influence choices by influencing which mental representation of the situation is selected as a real-life resemblance of this situation (Kroneberg et al. 2010;Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006). Dufwenberg et al. (2011) collect both firstand second-order beliefs in their label framing experiments, and find that labels impact beliefs, though not contributions, significantly. ...
Article
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This study analyses the sensitivity of public goods contributions through the lens of psychological motives. We report the results of a public goods experiment in which subjects were induced with the motives of care and anger through autobiographical recall. Subjects’ preferences, beliefs, and perceptions under each motive are compared with those of subjects experiencing a neutral autobiographical recall control condition. We find, but only for those subjects with the highest comprehension of the game, that care elicits significantly higher contributions than anger, with the control treatment in between. This positive influence of the care motive on unconditional giving is accounted for partly by preferences for giving and partly by beliefs concerning greater contributions by others. Anger also affects attention to own and other’s payoffs (measured by mouse tracking) and perceptions of the game’s incentive structure (cooperative or competitive).
... While in the reflecting-calculating mode, actors attempt to maximize their subjectively expected utility, in the automatic-spontaneous mode the choice of a specific frame depends on i) the mental anchoring of the frame, ii) the availability of objects significant for the frame in the current situation and iii) the strength of the connection between the objects and the frame (Kroneberg 2005). The MFS has been used to explain diverse phenomena, including childlessness ( Eckhard 2014), trust (Rompf 2015), electoral participation and the rescue of Jews in WWII (Kroneberg et al. 2010). ...
Book
Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorien gelten als erfolgversprechende Ansätze zur Erklärung sozialen und politischen Handelns. Handeln wird dabei als das Ergebnis eines Prozesses gesehen, bei dem Akteure aus verschiedenen verfügbaren Handlungsalternativen diejenige auswählen, die bei gegebenen Rahmenbedingungen und erwarteten Handlungen anderer Akteure ihre Ziele am besten zu verwirklichen verspricht. Band 11 des Jahrbuchs vereint innovative Beiträge zur Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, die sich mit der gesamten Breite des Feldes befassen. Die Themen reichen von Arbeiten, die sich mit räumlichen Modellen der Politik befassen und die Muster von Wahlverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb sowie legislatives Verhalten analysieren, bis hin zu Beiträgen, die sich auf experimentelle Methoden konzentrieren und sie auf Fragen von Fairness und Gerechtigkeit in Verhandlungen auf der einen sowie auf die Untersuchung von Risikoverhalten von Männern und Frauen auf der anderen Seite anwenden. Der Inhalt • Aufsätze • Kurzanalysen Die Zielgruppen Studierende und Dozierende der Sozial- und Politikwissenschaft sowie Ökonominnen und Ökonomen. Die Herausgeber Dr. Marc Debus ist Professor für Vergleichende Regierungslehre an der Universität Mannheim und Direktor des Mannheimer Zentrums für Europäische Sozialforschung. Dr. Markus Tepe ist Professor für das politische System Deutschlands an der Universität Oldenburg und Leiter des Oldenburger Labors für experimentelle Sozialforschung (OLExS). Dr. Jan Sauermann ist Akademischer Rat (auf Zeit) am Lehrstuhl für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft des Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, Universität zu Köln.
... Third, dual-process and framing theories suggest that situational cues (e.g., others' observed recycling participation) define mental representations of a situation and thus lead to those behavioral choices deemed appropriate (Chaiken & Trope, 1999;Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). A popular formulation distinguishes a deliberative mode of cost-benefit calculation from an automatic-spontaneous mode more strongly patterned by moral obligations (Best & Kneip, 2011;Kroneberg, Yaish, & Stocké, 2010). The latter frame's activation-which pushes incentive-based reasoning to the background-becomes more likely for the highly concerned as situational cues match their personal convictions. ...
Article
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According to the 'low-cost hypothesis' (LCH), attitudes explain behavior only if complying with personal convictions requires little effort. Environmental research has seized this argument to explain moderate participation in pro-environmental action against a backdrop of rising environmental awareness. However, evidence for the LCH remains ambiguous and recent studies have reported contradictory results. Here, we reconcile prior findings on household waste recycling and argue that many environmental behaviors evolved into every day, 'normal' practices increasingly encouraged by social norms, and thus slip out of the LCH's scope. We combine a natural experiment exploiting households' variation in geocoded walking distances to drop-off recycling sites in Munich, Germany (N =754) with an independent online survey (N =640) measuring local intensities of recycling norms for two distinct waste categories, plastics and glass. Our results suggest that normative change narrows the LCH's scope to include only environmental action for which normative expectations are weak.
... Empirical research, and further theoretical refinement, based on an integrative theory of social behaviour outlined above is already getting underway (Esser & Kroneberg, 2015). The theory has been applied and empirically corroborated in studying criminal acts (Kroneberg, Heintze, & Mehlkop, 2010), electoral participation and the historical rescuing of Jews in World War II (Kroneberg, Yaish, & Stocké, 2010), and protest participation (Opp, 2017). There are important, if ultimately reconcilable, differences between the various specific models employed. ...
Article
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Most sociologists are not content with merely relating macrosocial phenomena to preceding macrosocial causes in their causal explanations of social phenomena. Instead they are seeking to provide (non‐reductive) microfoundations with which they can corroborate and make understandable the connection between macrosocial phenomena. In order to do so a theory (or theories) of human action is required. One such theory, rational choice theory (RCT), has long been viewed with strong suspicion in sociology. I show such suspicion to be partially justified. RCT cannot be a general theory of social behaviour. Nonetheless, there are important insights in various versions of RCT that should not be discarded. In order to improve upon RCT and move toward a more unified or integrative theory of action social‐psychological research has to be taken note of. I demonstrate how dual‐process theories and the research on heuristics can help sociologists move beyond RCT without contradicting some of its more basic insights.
... Demnach offeriert System 1 automatisch eine Definition der Situation und auch 5 In der empirischen Forschung zum MFS steht in aller Regel ein zweites grundlegendes handlungstheoretisches Prinzip im Fokus (z. B. Kroneberg et al. 2010). Dem Prinzip der Suppression zufolge sollten (antizipierte) reine Konsequenzen des Handelns, also Aspekte von Entscheidungssituationen, die nicht in der "assoziativen Maschinerie" (Kahneman 2011) von System 1 verankert sind, einen stärkeren Einfluss auf das Handeln ausüben, wenn dieses Handeln im Rahmen von Typ-2-Prozessen zustande kommt. ...
Article
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Zusammenfassung Das Gros der Wahlforschung und insbesondere der empirischen Forschung zur Frage, wie sich die Wahlabsicht für die Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) erklären lässt, berücksichtigt zwar den Einfluss kultureller Orientierungen, aber nur in Form expliziter Einstellungen, welche vermöge evaluativer Verbaläußerungen erhoben werden. In diesem Beitrag wird vor dem Hintergrund der Dual-Process-Perspektive argumentiert, dass neben expliziten Einstellungen auch implizite Einstellungen, welche assoziative Verknüpfungen von mental repräsentierten Einstellungsobjekten und ihrer Bewertung darstellen, für die Wahlabsicht der AfD von Bedeutung sind. Dem Prinzip der Katalysation nach schlagen sich implizite Einstellungen stärker in expliziten Einstellungen und auch im overten Verhalten nieder, wenn sich die Artikulation der expliziten Einstellungen oder das Verhalten im Rahmen eines eher intuitiven als reflektierten kognitiven Prozesses vollzieht. Diese handlungstheoretischen Ideen werden im Rahmen einer explorativen Studie mit 960 Befragten überprüft. Es zeigt sich, dass beide, implizite und explizite Einstellungen zum Populismus und zum Rassismus, die Wahlabsicht der AfD bedingen, wobei der Einfluss der impliziten Einstellungen, wie vom katalytischen Prinzip vorhergesagt, davon abhängt, ob die Befragten eher zu intuitiven oder aber eher zu reflektierten kognitiven Prozessen neigen.
... Ciascuna di queste selezioni può essere compiuta attraverso un processo di tipo razionale-calcolista o una sorta di procedimento automatico. Il grado di razionalità che verrà esercitato, così come il frame, lo script e l'azione che verranno selezionati, dipendono da quattro fattori: opportunità e motivazioni per eseguire una deliberazione di tipo calcolista, lo sforzo richiesto in una data situazione per svolgere tale attività e l'accessibilità di modelli mentali «pronti all'uso», frames e scripts, che si adattano a tale contesto (Kroneberg et al. 2010). ...
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While the study of cooperation has a long tradition in the social sciences, the current emergency caused by the SARS-COVID19 pandemics has made it even more important to understand cooperation, because the efficacy of the measures enacted to stop the diffusion of the virus rests on the ability to obtain large-scale cooperation (implementing behaviours which are costly for individuals, although they are necessary for collectivity). This study analyzes factors that influence prosocial behavior, focusing on the role of frames, meant as mental models that emerge in given circumstances leading individuals to define the situation in which they have to make their decisions (Kroneberg 2014) and how different incentives – monetary and non-monetary – affect the decision process. The results show that the exposure to elements that stimulate subjects to think about prosocial norms can influence individual behavior in the direction that is consistent with the norm elicited. Furthermore, the individual behavior does not differ significantly according to the incentive adopted, even though we register situations in which the incentive adopted could contribute to social norms salience, increasing cooperation levels.
... In order to model end-users, we utilize Kroneberg's Model of Frame-Selection (MFS) and adapt it to electricity-related feedback and consumption behavior. The MFS has been applied to and empirically tested in various contexts, for example altruism, crime, fertility decisions, juvenile violence, voting behavior, and waste recycling (see for example [56][57][58][59]). ...
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This paper presents an agent-based model (ABM) for residential end-users, which is part of a larger, interdisciplinary co-simulation framework that helps to investigate the performance of future power distribution grids (i.e., smart grid scenarios). Different modes of governance (strong, soft and self-organization) as well as end-users’ heterogeneous behavior represent key influential factors. Feedback was implemented as a measure to foster grid-beneficial behavior, which encompasses a range of monetary and non-monetary incentives (e.g., via social comparison). The model of frame selection (MFS) serves as theoretical background for modelling end-users’ decision-making. Additionally, we conducted an online survey to ground the end-user sub-model on empirical data. Despite these empirical and theoretical foundations, the model presented should be viewed as a conceptual framework, which requires further data collection. Using an example scenario, representing a lowly populated residential area (167 households) with a high share of photovoltaic systems (30%), different modes of governance were compared with regard to their suitability for improving system stability (measured in cumulated load). Both soft and strong control were able to decrease overall fluctuations as well as the mean cumulated load (by approx. 10%, based on weekly observation). However, we argue that soft control could be sufficient and more societally desirable.
... Surprisingly, it is not then reported how this state-dependency of incentives and costs could be included in the functions of RCT. It is also not mentioned that framing effects occur empirically even in the case of high costs, as has already been demonstrated through the example of moral actions undertaken even at greatest risk [Kroneberg et al. 2010] and through experiments with the effects of punishment, to which Gintis himself refers [Fehr and Gächter 2000;Fehr and Gintis 2007]. This is probably the most serious inconsistency in Gintis's proposal: presuming the importance of the unquestioned validity of moral virtues on the one hand and the inevitable volatility of action if there were a trade-off and choice rather than categorical unconditionality. ...
Article
Der Beitrag antwortet auf die Kritik von Christian Fleck und Albert Müller an meinem Artikel „Die Rettung von Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Eine handlungstheoretische und empirische Analyse“ (KZfSS 64/2012). Ich verdeutliche zunächst die Bedeutung der von mir betrachteten initialen Entscheidung zur Hilfeleistung: Sie bestimmte, ob potenzielle Helfer „bystander“ blieben, und beeinflusste so das Ausmaß verfügbarer Hilfe. Meine Analyse hilft zu verstehen, welche Bedingungskonstellationen eine Hilfeleistung auch in Hochkostensituationen begünstigen. Anhand der von Fleck und Müller zu Rate gezogenen methodologischen Prinzipien von Robert K. Merton zeige ich, warum ihre Kritik teils unangemessen, teils nicht nachvollziehbar ist. Das Explanandum wird in meinem Beitrag expliziert und theoriegeleitet spezifiziert, um ungeklärte Forschungsfragen zu beantworten (Mertons „specified ignorance“). Die verwendeten Sekundärdaten weisen zwar Begrenzungen auf, sind aber insgesamt von strategischem Wert für die Analyse von Altruismus in Hochkostensituationen (Mertons „strategic research material“). Dass Fleck und Müller den Forschungsstand, theoretischen Hintergrund und die Fragestellung meines Beitrags unberücksichtigt lassen, macht es ihnen unmöglich, die von mir verwendete Datenbasis adäquat zu diskutieren. Mein Beitrag schließt mit einer Anmerkung zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Geschichte.
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This paper deals with three problems of the model of frame selection (MFS): (1) The vagueness of the basic concepts and distinctions is illustrated with an example. (2) An alleged difference between the MFS and the theory of rational action is supposed to be in explaining the effects of norms and other incentives on behavior. It is argued that these differences do not exist. (3) In contrast to proponents of the MFS, it is held that the MFS is not an alternative but an extension of a wide version of the theory of rational action. In a final section, some open questions are discussed.
Article
This contribution connects the model of frame selection with the various paradigms and approaches within the social sciences as a whole as well as with attempts to meet the incompleteness, deficiencies and anomalies of the single approaches. It demonstrates that by integrating important aspects of the various approaches into one single model being comprehensive in content and formally consistent, the model of frame selection could show a way out of these dead ends and boundaries. Moreover, the contribution illustrates that the model of frame-selection represents by no means a (complicated) special case of one of the paradigms and least of all a variant of the (broader) Rational Choice Theory.
Article
Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag wird aufgezeigt, dass mit den axiomatischen Theorien begrenzter Rationalität (Rubinstein 1998) dasselbe Ziel wie mit der neueren soziologischen Handlungstheorie verfolgt wird: Die Entwicklung einer deskriptiv gehaltvollen Entscheidungstheorie. Ferner wird argumentiert, dass die neuere soziologische Handlungstheorie einer axiomatischen Fundierung bedarf. Die mögliche Gestalt derartiger Charakterisierungen wird am Beispiel des wohl einflussreichsten Vertreters der neueren soziologischen Handlungstheorie in Deutschland demonstriert, dem Modell der Frame-Selektion von Esser (2001) und Kroneberg (2005).
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Dual-process theories explain behavior as well as cognitive processes. They thus compete with other theories which explain, at least in part, the same phenomena. The question then is how the theories differ and which theory is to be preferred. This article focuses on the comparison of two dual-process theories with a wide version of rational choice theory. The dual-process theories are the MODE model and the model of frame selection. The wide version of rational choice theory assumes, among other things, that all kinds of motives must be considered when a behavior is explained, that beliefs matter and that individuals do what they think is best for them (subjective utility maximization). One major result of the analyses is that basic assumptions of dual-process theories in general and the two dualprocess theories discussed, namely the MODE model and the model of frame selection, do not contradict RCT but complement it.
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In analytical sociology, and in sociology more generally, a theory of action should meet the three requirements: wide applicability; heuristic/hypothesis-generating power; and modularity. The chapter discusses the model of frame selection (MFS) as a theory of action that fulfills the requirements. MFS is based on the assumption of adaptive or “variable” rationality that is taken from dual-process/systems models in social psychology. It allows construction of highly simplified models of individual behavior in applications that focus on complex social dynamics. The chapter shows how MFS can be and has been used to derive new hypotheses in a wide range of sociological fields. To further illustrate its explanatory power, the chapter presents an application to the case of voter participation. In the final sections, the chapter shows how the MFS can provide flexible microfoundations for analytical sociology.
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The study of mechanisms has received increased attention in recent years and contributed to the formation of so-called ‘analytical sociology’ that has put the idea of social mechanisms at its core. We discuss the crucial characteristics of mechanism-based explanations and their relation to the longstanding tradition of explanatory sociology. Looking at the widespread and growing number of references to ‘mechanisms’ in the current research literature, we identify typical deviations from the ideal of a mechanism-based explanation. Many references come down to mechanism talk insofar as it is not explicated in detail how and why particular inputs tend to result in particular outputs. To this end, researchers have to give a detailed verbal account of how exactly a mechanism is thought to unfold under specified conditions, or to specify a formal generative model which can be analysed analytically or by simulation. This agenda has been at the core of methodological individualism, sociological rational choice theory, and explanatory sociology for some time, but has received a new coat of whitewash by analytical sociology. This more recent theoretical movement offers a fresh problem-centred agenda based on the well-known macro-micro-macro model and could inspire a new generation of research that places greater weight on analysing social dynamics than on developing theories of action. However, we submit that, rather than constituting a competing approach, these impulses should be located within the longstanding and multifaceted explanatory agenda in sociology. Avoiding any form of mechanism cult and choosing from the full toolbox of explanatory/analytical sociology will be crucial to answer key questions in established areas of sociological research.
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The rescue of Jews in WWII was in many respects extraordinary. For theories of action in the social sciences, these acts pose the challenge to explain pro-social behavior in the face of great risks. Whereas the overwhelming bulk of the literature points towards a specific altruistic personality or identity, rational choice explanations emphasize the significance of incentives and opportunities to help. Based on the Model of Frame Selection, the article develops an integrative explanation that allows resolution of this debate and that identifies constellations of causal factors conducive to helping. To empirically test this explanation, the empirical analyses use data that were collected retrospectively in the 1980s by the Altruistic Personality and Prosocial Behavior Institute (Oliner and Oliner 1988, The altruistic personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, 1988). Statistically, I employ Boolean probit models, a statistical method hardly known in sociology which allows reconstruction of complex patterns of causal interaction. The analyses corroborate the developed explanation. Acts of help could result either spontaneously, in reaction to being asked for help and based on strong pro-social orientations, or deliberatingly, depending on the constellation of incentives and opportunities.
Article
When people need help, what is the process through which they decide whom in their network to turn to? Research on social support has described a process that is deliberative in nature: people determine their needs, assess who in their network has the needed attributes—such as skill, trustworthiness, intimacy, and accessibility—and then activate that tie. Nevertheless, research in behavioral economics and other fields has shown that people make many decisions not deliberatively but intuitively. We examine this possibility in the context of social support by focusing on one factor: accessibility. Although researchers have argued that people weigh the accessibility of potential helpers as they do any other attribute, accessibility may be not only an attribute of the helper but also a condition of the situation. We develop a framework to make this question tractable for survey research and evaluate competing hypotheses using original data on an analytically strategic sample of ∼2000 college students, probing concrete instances of social support. We identify and document not one but three decision processes, reflective, incidental, and spontaneous activation, which differ in the extent to which actors had deliberated on whether to seek help and on whom to approach before activating the tie. We find that while the process was reflective (consistent with existing theory) when skill or trustworthiness played a role, it was significantly less so (consistent with the alternative) when accessibility did. Findings suggest that actors decide whom in their network to mobilize through at least three systematically different processes, two of which are consistent less with either active “mobilization” or explicit “help seeking” than with responsiveness to opportunity and context.
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Analytical sociology shares an historical lineage with the sociological rational-choice tradition. However, there are fundamental differences as well. The chapter articulates these differences so that the relation between analytical sociology and rational-choice sociology becomes clearer. It begins by examining what people mean when they talk about rational-choice theory (RCT), especially in the context of sociology. Then, the basic ideas of analytical sociology are presented. The chapter concludes with some more general reflections about the nature of analytical sociology and the future of rational-choice sociology, and an itemized summary of the most crucial differences between analytical sociology and rational-choice theory. There are good reasons to reconsider meta-theory that motivates sociological RCT (SRCT), and this is precisely what analytical sociology attempts to do.
Article
We study a rational decision maker who obeys social norms. In our setup norms prescribe choices in some decision problems. The decision maker obeys norms in situations to which they apply and otherwise maximizes her preference relation. We characterize the class of choice functions that can be explained by this decision procedure, relate this procedure to other decision procedures in the literature, and engage in welfare considerations.
Article
Opp's major objection to the Model of Frame Selection (MFS) pertains to the central thesis of the main article. He maintains that opposed to its portrayal there, the MFS can indeed be reconstructed as a variant of an (expanded) Rational Choice Theory (RCT) which thus needs not be altered but provides general micro foundations for the social sciences. Our reply shows (once again) that this is not the case: However much expanded, RCT does not recognize the central mechanism of pattern recognition and the definition of the situation through the activation of mental models. RCT therefore offers no solution to a central concern of the MFS: the explanation of the potential unconditionality of norms and other attitudes and the accompanying suppression of all (rational) incentives - in lieu of the sole focus on utility differences that is always retained in RCT. The other conceptual and methodological objections by Opp are shown to be either unfounded or else general problems not specific to the MFS.
Article
Zusammenfassung Bei der Frage nach den Determinanten der Zustimmung zu sozialstaatlichen Maßnahmen seitens der Bevölkerung wird in der Literatur entweder auf die Werterwartungstheorie oder auf die Bedeutung ergebnisunabhängiger Wertorientierungen und Einstellungen zurückgegriffen. In dieser Arbeit werden beide Ansätze am Beispiel inter- generationaler Transferleistungen für Familien mit Kindern (Erhöhung des Kindergeldes) diskutiert und mithilfe der Entscheidungsheuristik des Modells der Frame Selektion berücksichtigt. Nach Auswertung von Befragungsdaten zur Salienz von familiären Einstellungen und instrumentellen Anreizen kann geschlussfolgert werden, dass beide Ansätze jeweils für unterschiedliche Teile der Bevölkerung eine Erklärung liefern können. Eine vollständige Erklärung variierender Zustimmung mithilfe eines einzigen Erklärungsansatzes kann indes als nicht ausreichend angesehen werden. Die fallspezifische Auswertung von Interaktionseffekten zwischen der generellen Einstellung zur Familie sowie der individuellen Abwägung von Kosten und Nutzen liefert neue Einsichten in die Entscheidungsprozesse. Insbesondere können Unterschiede in den Erwartungen an den Sozialstaat zwischen Befragten aus Ost- und Westdeutschland herausgearbeitet werden.
Article
Standard economic theory cannot explain why so few Haredi (ultra-orthodox) men attain college degrees in Israel, despite the significant economic returns to such degrees. In addition to economic variables, this article introduces a combination of social and behavioral characteristics, such as religious identity, into the individual choice process. This, in turn, enables us to evaluate a possible trade-off between economic benefits associated with a college degree and the corresponding loss of religious identity in the decision of young ultra-orthodox Israeli men to attain a college degree. In the language of standard economics, we simply ask: What is the economic price Haredi men are willing to pay for their religious beliefs? Utilizing case-control sampling and analysis techniques, we collected retrospective data on Haredi men who study in academic higher education institutes (N = 410) and matched them to Haredi men who do not attend college (N = 310). Our logit econometric model indicates that Haredi men, even those with extreme orthodox beliefs, respond to economic incentives. However, our model indicates that the size of the incentives required to entice academic studies increases with the intensity of religious beliefs.
Article
Zusammenfassung Handlungsentscheidungen kçnnen mit inneren Konflikten verbunden sein, die aufgrund der Interaktion verschiedener Grundorientierungen einer Person (z. B. Normen vs. Ressourcen) bestehen. Zielsetzungen des Aufsatzes sind die Rekonstruktion und Analyse solcher Konflikte im Rahmen eines formalen Modells und die Illustration seiner Anwendungen. Diese Modellierung erfolgt auf der Grundlage der (nichtkooperativen) Spieltheorie, die als Teilgebiet der Rational-Choice-Theorie (RCT) explizit mit Konfliktsituationen befasst ist. Der vorliegende Aufsatz steht damit im Gegensatz zu einer insbesondere im deutschsprachigen Raum zu beobachtenden Tendenz, handlungstheoretische Arbeiten in Abgrenzung zur RCT zu verfassen und dabei deren Unzulänglichkeit zu behaupten. Das hier vorgelegte formale Modell zeigt hingegen, dass die RCT flexibel genug ist, um vermeintliche Abweichungen vom traditionellen Kalkül theoretisch zu erfassen. Verdeutlicht wird dies durch modelltheoretische Diskussionen einiger Beispiele (z. B. Low-Cost-Hypothese, Crowding-Out-These, Wahlteilnahme), deren vermeintliche Unvereinbarkeit mit der RCT oft betont wird. Im Rahmen von Modellerweiterungen werden zudem empirisch prüfbare Hypothesen zu Verhaltenseffekten theoretisch begründet.
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One of the controversial issues of rational choice theory is whether individual actors maximize their utility. Answering this question first requires to make clear what is meant by “utility maximization” (UM). There are different definitions in the literature. In this essay, “utility” refers to anything that realizes or thwarts individual goals. “Maximization” means that actors do what they think is best for them in the given situation, i.e. what realizes their goals in the subjectively best way. It is argued that this definition is theoretically fruitful as a concept in a wide version of rational choice theory that seems superior to other versions. After a brief outline of this theory several possible problems of the UM hypothesis are discussed. (1) It is shown that the UM hypothesis is falsifiable. (2) It is illustrated with examples that existing social psychological theories, the work of classical social scientists and theories of the middle range implicitly assume UM. (3) It is argued that a “reason-based” approach is not a convincing alternative to UM. (4) Several possible falsifications of the UM hypothesis are rejected. The conclusion of this essay is that the UM hypothesis is widely applied implicitly and confirmed in empirical research. It is further argued that there is so far no clearly superior alternative decision algorithm.
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Zusammenfassung Ungelöste Probleme in der Theorie des Handelns pflanzen sich auf der Ebene der Handlungskoordination fort. Wenn Handlungstheorien mit verkürzten Modellen von Menschen arbeiten, fallen auch Antworten auf Fragen nach der Möglichkeit der sozialen Ordnung, der Herrschaft, der Kooperation auf dem Markt verkürzt aus. Individueller Erfolg und soziale Anerkennung über Normhandlungen sind zwei weit voneinander entfernte Grundsteine, auf welchen bislang separate sozialtheoretische Gebäude hochgezogen wurden. Demgegenüber wird an dieser Stelle ein Konzept des Spiels eingeführt, das die beiden Momente verbindet. Spiele sind erfolgsorientierte und normerfüllende Interaktionen, in welchen Menschen sich wechselseitig bewerten. Normen sind Voraussetzungen sozialen Leistungs- und Qualitätsvergleichs. Menschen halten sich an Normen, um ihre Wertigkeiten gegenüber anderen Menschen zu ermitteln. Das Theorem des Spiels bietet Lösungen für das Problem der Handlungskoordination in der Hierarchie und auf dem Markt.
Article
This research asks whether and how institutional trust—trust in the reliability, effectiveness, and legitimacy of public institutions—promotes the provision of public goods. To understand the underlying mechanisms, we apply three choice models to the example of recycling behavior: a standard rational choice model, the low-cost hypothesis, and a dual-process theory. The models carry competing hypotheses about the interplay of trust and incentives in recycling behavior. Using survey data collected in four countries (Sweden, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom), we find a positive and significant interaction effect of institutional trust and recycling costs on self-reported recycling behavior. No such interaction was found using generalized social trust as a second measure of trust. Our results support a dual-process perspective and indicate that high levels of institutional trust can suppress the inhibiting effect of individual costs on cooperation in a collective action dilemma.
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This article addresses situations in which two kinds of goals exist that cannot be realized simultaneously. One is the goal of following a norm such as heeding speed limits; the other goal refers to interests such as saving time. Norms and interests may influence behavior in different ways. In addition to an additive effect, three interaction effects are discussed in the literature. (1) If norms reach a certain threshold, they are followed, regardless of the intensity of interests (norms proposition). (2) If interests reach a certain threshold, they are realized, regardless of the acceptance of norms (interests proposition). (3) Relatively strong norms reduce the effects of interests and vice versa (symmetric-effects proposition). The MODE model (R.H. Fazio and collaborators) and a broad interpretation of rational choice theory are applied to generate propositions which specify under which conditions each effect is to be expected. In an empirical test the norm is a felt obligation to protest, whereas the interest is to avoid being the victim of state repression. The dependent variable is protest behavior. The data confirms the predicted symmetric-effects proposition. No threshold effects were found, which falsifies the norms and interests proposition.
Article
It is argued that the model of frame selection as a specific version of the dual‐process perspective provides a clear theoretical conceptualisation of the mechanisms by which cultural orientations such as values, attitudes, and internalised norms influence social behaviour. In particular, the model of frame selection allows the derivation of two fundamental action‐theoretical principles. According to the principle of catalysation, situationally relevant cultural orientations have a greater impact on social behaviour, if the behaviour comes about in an intuitive rather than a reflective manner. The principle of suppression states that external factors of the objective situation, which lack salience with respect to situationally relevant cultural orientations, have a greater impact on reflective rather than intuitive behaviour. These two principles can be combined with the so‐called logic of mode selection to derive a multitude of empirically testable hypotheses regarding the question of how motivational factors such as thinking dispositions and feeling of rightness as well as cognitive resources such as time for reflection and availability of working memory moderate the influence of cultural orientations on behaviour.
Article
Zusammenfassung Die Erklärung des Geburtenverhaltens und seines Wandels ist seit jeher ein primäres Anliegen sozialdemographischer Forschung. In der Literatur wurden bislang zwei Arten von Einflussgrößen in mikrosoziologischen Erklärungen von Fertilitätsentscheidungen berücksichtigt: Zum einen ökonomische Faktoren, welche die (Schatten-)Preise von Kindern determinieren, zum anderen pronatalistische Normen und Werte, wie sie unter anderem in christlichen Religionen propagiert werden. Weitgehend ungeklärt ist jedoch bislang das Zusammenspiel solcher anreizbezogenen und normativen Fertilitätsdeterminanten. Analysen an einem Paneldatensatz zeigen, dass Religion in der säkularisierten deutschen Gesellschaft zwar vordergründig keine prominente
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The study investigates effects of the implementation of a law authorizing educational leave in Germany on individual participation in adult learning and education (ALE). In 2015, the federal state of Baden-Württemberg introduced the so-called Bildungszeitgesetz, legitimating an exemption for eligible employees of up to 5 days per year with continued payment of salary. Explaining participation in ALE is a central subject of educational research at national and international level. Current theoretical assumptions of rational choice and empirical findings of educational and socio-statistical research suggest that within the general population, individuals’ availability of time affects the decision to participate and therefore lastly determines participation in ALE. However, current academia mainly discusses time as either a prerequisite for learning activities or as an observable outcome of participation and not as an explanatory factor. Furthermore, since recent studies remain on a descriptive level regarding influences of time on participation in ALE, no causal effects of the availability of time on participation are estimated. Hence, our study addresses this research gap by investigating effects of educational policy interventions such as the Bildungszeitgesetz on participation in ALE. Policy interventions are ideally suited to examine the significance of time resources for participation, as the implementation of the Bildungszeitgesetz provides a specific timeframe for employees to participate in ALE outside of their working time. Drawing on data from the German National Educational Panel Study, we employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy with propensity score matching and instrumental variable to identify the direct causal effect of the implementation of the Bildungszeitgesetz on participation in ALE (N = 709). This combination toward causal inference controls for observed and unobserved baseline differences as well as heterogeneous treatment effects. The results reveal a non-significant but heterogeneous treatment effect of the implementation of the Bildungszeitgesetz on individual participation in ALE. Contrary to our theoretical assumptions derived from rational choice approaches, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that the availability of time resources due to the implementation of the Bildungszeitgesetz causes a positive effect on participation in ALE. Furthermore, the results reveal that the implementation causes decreasing participation rates for younger adults, women and significantly for migrants.
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Von den Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der weiten Rational Choice Theorie wird sozialen Normen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Analyse sozialer Mechanismen zur Erklärung von kriminellem Handeln zugeschrieben. Es scheint jedoch keine Einigkeit darin zu bestehen, an welcher Stelle in einer prozessorientierten Erklärung die Normen intervenieren und ob sie direkte oder indirekte bzw. moderierte Effekte ausüben. In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass Normen zunächst im Sinne von Dual Process Theorien als eine Art Filter wirken und entscheidend dafür sind, ob Akteure automatisch-spontan nicht-kriminell bzw. kriminell handeln. Nur Akteure, bei welchen dieser Filter nicht wirkt treten in einen Abwägungsprozess von Kosten und Nutzen ein – in diesem deliberativen Modus spielen Normen nun aber auch eine Rolle. Sie wirken als psychische Anreize, die entweder als Kosten oder als Nutzen gesehen werden und deren Effekte mit anderen Merkmalen, wie der Fähigkeit zur Selbstkontrolle oder Verfügbarkeit von Neutralisierungen interagieren. Der Artikel schließt mit einer kurzen Diskussion über die angemessene empirische Überprüfung der Effekte der Normen, insbesondere über statistische Modelle, die simultan die Effekte einer Variable an mehreren Stellen des Mechanismus überprüfen können, wie Double Hurdle Modelle.
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DEUTSCH: Fehr & Gächter (2000, 2002) überprüfen in einem Kollektivgut-Experiment Hypothesen über die Wirkungen von Bestrafungen auf Kooperation. Hartmut Esser (2018, in dieser Zeitschrift) behauptet, dass zentrale Ergebnisse des Experiments der „rational choice“-Theorie (RCT) widersprechen und das Modell der Frame-Selektion (MFS) bestätigen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Esser eine problematische enge Version der RCT heranzieht. Eine „weite“ Version weist die von Esser behandelten Probleme nicht auf und kann die Ergebnisse des Experiments erklären. Weiter wird auf gravierende Probleme des MFS hingewiesen, die die Erklärung der experimentellen Befunde fragwürdig erscheinen lassen. Die Analyse zeigt weiter, dass das MFS eine Ergänzung und nicht eine Alternative zu einer weiten RCT ist und auf keinen Fall die übergreifende „general theory of action“ ist, wie Esser behauptet. ENGLISH: In a public goods experiment Fehr & Gächter (2000, 2002) tested hypotheses about the effects of punishment on cooperation. Hartmut Esser (2018 in this journal) claims that major findings contradict rational choice theory (RCT) and confirm the model of frame selection (MFS). It is argued that Esser criticizes a problematic, narrow version. A wide version, in contrast, is not burdened with the problems of the narrow version and can explain the experimental findings. Furthermore, serious problems of the MFS are discussed which cast doubt on the explanation of the experimental findings by the MFS. It is further shown that the MFS is, in principle, a supplement to RCT and definitely not an overarching “general theory of action” (Esser).
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We investigate whether fair behavior in negotiations depends on the frame given by an actor to a situation. To test this proposition, we study secondary data from bargaining experiments. In the experiments, subjects were asked what they thought the situation was about. We compare this perception with their behavior in the negotiations. The results show that subjects with a prosocial frame were more likely to distribute the resource equally than those with a proself frame. Investigating the factors that lead to the adoption of a prosocial or proself frame, we find that minor situational differences do not influence the choice of a frame, whereas factors which can be traced back to socialization exert considerable influence on the selection of a frame.
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Order and stability are tenuous and fragile. People have to work to create and sustain a semblance of stability and order in their lives and in their organizations and larger communities. Order on the Edge of Chaos compares different ideas about how we coordinate and cooperate. The ideas come from 'micro-sociology', and they offer new answers to the classic question of Thomas Hobbes: 'how is social order possible?' The most common answers in sociology, political science, and economics assume a fundamental tension between individual and group interests. This volume reveals that social orders are problematic even without such tension, because when people interact with each other, they verify their identities, feel and respond to emotions, combine different goal frames, and develop shared responsibility. The ties of people to groups result from many aspects of their social interactions, and these cannot be explained by individual self-interest.
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* We are grateful to Diego Gambetta for encouraging us to pursue this research and for his many suggestions. Samuel P. Oliner, the director of the'Altruistic Personality Project', has shared with us the data he collected on rescuers of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Europe. Without his generous act, this paper would have never been written. We are indebted to Vittorio Bufacchi, Ivan Ermakoff, Cecilia Garcia-Pe?alosa, John Goldthorpe, Anthony Heath, Jouni Kuha, Gerry Mackie, Avner Offer, Luca Ricolfi, Aage S?rensen, Marc Stears, George Smith, and Ilan Talmud for useful comments. We also wish to thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers referees of Rationality and Society for their helpful commentssuggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ECSR Conference on'Rational Choice Theories in Sociological Analysis'(Stockholm, 16-19 October 1997) and at the APSA Meeting (Boston, September 1998). The usual disclaimers apply. The authors are listed in alphabetic order. Address for correspondence: Federico Varese, Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF, UK. Fax: +44-1865-278621.E-mail: Federico. Varese@nuf. ox. ac. uk
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