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Journal of Sport
& Social Issues
Volume XX Number X
Month XXXX XX-XX
© XXXX Sage Publications
10.1177/0193723507307813
http://jss.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
The Media Sports Cultural
Complex
Local-Global Disjuncture in New
Zealand/Aotearoa
Jay Scherer
University of Alberta, Edmonton
Mark Falcous
Steven J. Jackson
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
This article explores the powerful interdependence of interest groups operating within
the media sports cultural complex in relation to the national sport of rugby union
in New Zealand/Aotearoa. Specifically, we scrutinize the corporate “partnerships”
between the New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU), Adidas, and News Corporation in
relation to specific issues and debates surrounding the globalization of New Zealand’s
iconic rugby team, the All Blacks. The article draws on extensive interviews with the
NZRU’s marketing and sponsorship manager and Adidas New Zealand’s marketing
manager. These interviews provide rare insights into how the strategies of these orga-
nizations, and their interrelated (but not interchangeable) commercial objectives, set
limits and exert powerful pressures on aspects of the production and consumption of
the national sporting mythology in New Zealand.
Keywords: globalization; rugby; New Zealand
The biggest winner in rugby’s recent broadcasting deals is News Ltd. . . . News con-
trols pay TV businesses in key rugby markets....If the governing bodies do not co-
operate, it will create its own competition.
—David Rutherford, Sunday Star-Times, 2005, p. B9
Putting the rugby on SKY is a sore point for me. Rugby’s our national game and we
have to pay to watch the big games live. I sit here and ask myself what I went to war
for—democracy and freedom of speech. Well, that’s gone. Now if you want some-
thing, it isn’t your right. You have to pay for it.
—Former All Black captain Fred Allen, cited in Romanos, 2002, p. 15
Authors’ Note: Please direct all correspondence to Jay Scherer at jay.scherer@ualberta.ca.
T
he juxtaposition of the two quotes above ably demonstrates the uneven interdepen-
dence of the national sport of rugby union in New Zealand/Aotearoa and media
conglomerate News Corporation. On one hand, columnist and former New Zealand
Rugby Union (NZRU)
1
CEO David Rutherford bluntly concedes the power of media
leviathan News Corporation over rugby’s national governing body. In turn, former All
Black captain and coach Fred Allen castigates the effects of media-sport convergence
that have inexorably transformed the relationship between New Zealanders and their
iconic national team, the All Blacks. Specifically, he laments the shift from free public
access to test matches via the state-owned broadcaster TVNZ to the subscription-based,
Murdoch-owned SKY channel monopoly. Notwithstanding an air of nostalgic romanti-
cism in Allen’s critique, such observations bring into focus two key interrelated issues.
First, both commentators illuminate a range of power relations surrounding the devel-
opment, control, and ownership of the national sport of rugby union that have set
powerful limits and pressures on aspects of the production and consumption of culture
in New Zealand/Aotearoa. Second, they subsequently identify issues pertaining to cul-
tural citizenship (Rowe, 2004) in the context of the integration of the national sporting
mythology into a global promotional culture (Wernick, 1991).
The presence of these issues and debates in New Zealand/Aotearoa, a small
nation of 4 million people in the South Pacific, is intimately related to globalization
processes and the contextually specific power relations operating within the media
sports cultural complex (Rowe, 1999). This complex is seemingly constituted by
three main interests that appear to receive mutual benefit from their elective affinity
2
(Gruneau, 1989): sporting organizations, media conglomerates, and transnational
corporations (Maguire, 1999). Not surprisingly, scholars within the sociology of
sport community have extensively examined the contested interplay between these
interest groups in relation to a range of local/national contexts (Andrews, 2004;
Bairner, 2001; Falcous, 2005; Harvey & Law, 2005; Horne, 2006; Leifer,1995;
Maguire, 1999; McKay, Lawrence, Miller & Rowe, 1993; Miller, Lawrence, McKay
& Rowe, 2001; Phillips & Hutchins, 2003; Phillips & Nauright, 1999; Rowe, 2003;
Silk & Andrews, 2001; Silk, Andrews & Cole, 2005). A focus on the global-local
nexus (Morley & Robins, 1995), an increasingly deregulated new media order dom-
inated by a small number of global conglomerates, the construction of communities
of consumption that transcend national boundaries, and instances of local resistance
to the commodification of local and national sporting mythologies lie at the heart of
much of these analyses. However, although the entwinement of sport governing bod-
ies, media conglomerates, and other corporations has been widely documented, there
remains a paucity of contextualized case studies that explore the uneven, contested,
and dynamic interdependencies between such power brokers. As such, there is a
danger in simply viewing the media sports cultural complex as one of seamless
economic synergy and untrammeled affinity between interest groups. However,
processes of commodification and media-sport convergence occur against a back-
drop of locally specific conditions, histories, traditions, sporting codes, and power
relations; and consequently, their effects can never be automatically guaranteed.
2 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
With these issues in mind, this article has three interrelated aims. First, we document
the embryonic relationship between rugby’s national governing body, the NZRU, media
conglomerate News Corporation, and transnational corporate partners, specifically prin-
cipal sponsor Adidas. Our specific focus here is on contextualizing Adidas’s sponsor-
ship of the national team and critiquing the public relations discourse of partnership that
constitutes the articulation of the Adidas and All Blacks brands. Second, we examine
the cultural tensions surrounding the branding of the All Blacks and the antagonistic
protection strategies employed by the NZRU that have fueled local criticism of the
rugby union for its unrepentant commodification of a national institution and cultural
symbol. Finally, we explore the complexities and uneven power relations between the
NZRU, Adidas, and News Corporation: the interest groups that exemplify the media
sports cultural complex within New Zealand.
We draw on extensive semistructured interviews conducted with key personnel
within two of the organizations implicated in the broader media sports cultural com-
plex: the NZRU and Adidas New Zealand. The personnel we spoke to include the
NZRU’s marketing and sponsorship manager, Fraser Holland, and Adidas New
Zealand’s marketing manager, Craig Waugh.
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In dialoguing with these cultural inter-
mediaries, we were able to gain rare insights into the strategies of these organiza-
tions with respect to their interrelated (but not interchangeable) commercial
objectives. Indeed, although there has been a growing focus on engaging cultural
intermediaries within cultural studies (du Gay & Pyrke, 2002; Negus, 2002; Nixon
& du Gay, 2002), this practice is often neglected by academics researching the com-
modification and mediation of sport (Bernstein, 2003).
4
By engaging the industry,
we were able to query a number of economic and cultural issues, tensions, and
power relations with specific individuals in positions of power in each organization.
Before engaging these issues in greater detail, we provide a brief contextualization
of the processes and interest groups that have exerted powerful pressures on the
national sport of rugby union, thereby accelerating the integration of the All Blacks
into a global consumer culture.
Rugby in New Zealand: From National Interest
to Private Profit Margins
Processes of media-sport convergence surrounding the national sport of rugby
union have occurred against the backdrop of uneven and contested political-
economic and sociohistorical conjunctures relating to New Zealand/Aotearoa’s
development as a postimperial, industrial, and consumer society. For example, the
first NZRU-sanctioned tour of Great Britain in 1905 was regarded by politicians as
an extension of New Zealand foreign policy and critical to establishing the nation’s
identity. The tour was extensively covered by local and British newspapers. This sub-
sequently anchored the position of rugby union as the dominant sporting code and
consolidated a number of traditions associated with the national team (Hope, 2002;
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 3
Fougere, 1989; Phillips, 1987).
5
Rugby’s centrality in the national imagination was
further enhanced with the introduction of live radio broadcasts of test matches in
1930. These matches rapidly emerged as national media events where “the national
imagination would be transported live to Twickenham, Cardiff, Murrayfield, Paris,
or Ellis Park in South Africa. These epic, ritualized media events became remem-
bered episodes of national history” (Hope, 2002, p. 242). The introduction of free-
to-air television coverage of All Blacks test matches on state broadcaster TVNZ in
1972 once again transformed the production and consumption of the cultural sport-
ing experience while further entrenching the All Blacks as a national institution.
Paradoxically, rugby emerged as a dramatized visual public spectacle while the All
Blacks became a sought-after commodity for corporations, including Ford and Lion
Breweries, seeking brand exposure in the national economy.
The emergence of rugby as a nationally televised spectacle, however, coincided
with the sport’s most contested period of existence. Specifically, the eruption of
national protests over the 1981 Springbok Tour is regarded as the nadir of New
Zealand’s sporting contacts with apartheid South Africa (Hope, 2002; Richards,
1999; Thompson, 1988). These disruptive and violent protests temporarily unsettled
rugby’s hegemonic position within the national culture, and threatened the commer-
cial viability of the game and the mystique of the All Blacks. However, following a
legal injunction that stopped a proposed 1985 All Black tour to South Africa, admin-
istrators, journalists, and corporate sponsors attempted to reposition rugby as the
nation’s dominant sporting pastime (Perry, 1994). Here the prospect of hosting the
first global rugby media event, the inaugural Rugby World Cup in 1987, provided a
monumental opportunity for these interest groups to hegemonically mend the fis-
sures of a divided nation. Moreover, the global tournament also provided corporate
sponsors with a lucrative occasion to align their brands with the All Blacks to appeal
to a range of demographic groups (Perry, 1994).
Following the All Blacks victory at that event, rugby enjoyed a relatively pros-
perous period. The significance of the three-way relationship between the NZRU,
advertisers, and media coverage in promulgating the cultural presence of the rugby
union at this time is encapsulated by Hope (2002):
NZRU revenue came from provincial levies, TVNZ payments for telecast rights, cor-
porate sponsorships and All Black equipment contracts (jerseys, books, socks, balls).
Meanwhile TVNZ sold test match audiences to advertisers and featured clips of each
game on prime-time news and weekly sports shows to maximize ratings. Rugby jour-
nalists of all kinds reflected on and reinforced the significance of each upcoming inter-
national match. (p. 245)
This period of relative stability was, however, radically unsettled by shifting global
media economies, which reached a crescendo during the mid-1990s (Fitzsimmons,
1996). Specifically, rival global media conglomerates sought to secure lucrative rugby
4 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
broadcasting properties, while national governing bodies worked to secure their hege-
mony within the reconfigured media-rugby nexus (see Hutchins, 1998; Jackson, Batty,
& Scherer, 2001; Jackson, Grainger, & Batty, 2004). Within the shifting marketplace,
administrators from South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia cooperated to reformu-
late the Southern Hemisphere rugby unions under a new composite body SANZAR
(South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia rugby), which was aligned with the
Murdoch-owned News Corporation. The News Corporation-SANZAR axis helped
these national bodies ward off the threat of a Kerry Packer-backed “rebel” World Rugby
Corporation, which was seeking to wrest key players and control of the elite interna-
tional game from them (see Fitzsimmons, 1996). One outcome of this was the rapid
acceptance of professionalism by the world rugby union governing body, the Interna-
tional Rugby Board, in August 1995. In that year, SANZAR signed a 10-year, US$555
million contract with Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.
In accordance with these wider shifts, the New Zealand game was revamped
structurally from one centered around provincial and national rivalries and nation-
ally focused commercial activity to one premised on consolidated geographical mar-
kets, which were awarded regional franchises alongside a national team aligned with
transnational sponsors. Locally, a number of key figures embraced these market-
centered philosophies in significant ways. For example, the biography of John Hart,
former coach of the All Blacks, perfectly revealed how these corporate ideologies
can be promoted by those within the game itself. “The game,” Hart reasoned, “must
be led by people who understand business, particularly marketing, and can match the
professionalism of the commercial community” (Thomas, 1993, p. 262). Hart’s anal-
ogy is clear: “Just as a businessman must focus on his major clients, so a sports body
must constantly focus on its sponsors and be committed to servicing their needs”
(Thomas, 1993, p. 262). In a telling portent, he advocates for a commercial model to
be applied to rugby at every turn: He writes of the need for centralized control of
commercial gain to avoid “conflict,” clarity of expectations on players’ commercial
responsibilities, and the need to appeal to the demands and desires of sponsors for
market expansion of their products (Thomas, 1993). Driven by the marketing imper-
atives and neoliberal philosophies of these businessmen, the commodification of the
game and players who have emerged as junior brand managers have become insep-
arable from the broader national interests of “the game” (Hope, 2002). Such an
approach, however, was not uncontested.
6
Indeed, although coverage of rugby matches had historically been provided by
free-to-air broadcaster TVNZ, the agreement gave News Corporation exclusive
rights to an annual Tri-Nations series and a provincial “super rugby” competition.
Although it was initially implied by NRZU administrators that the deal with News
Corporation would not affect free-to-air coverage, the commercial reality of sub-
scription television meant that access to live coverage of the All Blacks was
restricted to those who could afford it. Here it is also important to note that “sub-
scription to SKY was not only limited by financial constraints, there were also a few
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 5
geographic regions of the country that could not get reception, effectively excluding
them from watching live coverage of the national game” (Jackson et al., 2001,
p. 189). The loss of free-to-air coverage infuriated many pundits, fans and politi-
cians, and triggered pleas for legislation that protected live coverage of All Blacks
test matches in the name of national interest. Despite calls by Opposition Labour MP
Steve Maharey to protect games of national significance and efforts by New Zealand
First Deputy Leader Tau Henare to introduce “The Live Broadcast of All Black Test
Matches Act,” no political action was taken (Hope, 2002).
The All Blacks Brand and the Adidas “Partnership”
In relation to these contextual processes of media-sport convergence, we now dis-
cuss the intensified commodification of the All Blacks and the NZRU’s pursuit of
global revenue streams. In what follows we present a narrative, drawing on interview
data, that focuses on the emergence of an NZRU-Adidas axis in 1999 (see Jackson
et al., 2001). This relationship signified a powerful interdependence in the reformu-
lation of New Zealand rugby both locally and on a global stage.
Following the 1995 10-year, US$555 million contract between News Corporation
and SANZAR, the NZRU began searching for a major multinational sporting com-
pany to sponsor the national team and globally promote the All Blacks brand
(Knight, 1997). Saatchi & Saatchi CEO Kevin Roberts, then CEO of Lion Nathan
and an independent member of the NZRU board, stressed the need for a transna-
tional corporate sponsor of the national rugby team at this juncture:
International rugby has the potential to become the next major global team sport, but it
needs strong financial backing from commercial partners....Rugby needs to harness this
power and the All Blacks, in particular, must ensure that they do not miss the boat. ...We
have the first leg of the stool in place through the lucrative News Corp. television deal. The
next leg is to partner with a global company which has resources and the experience to
drive the All Blacks brand and rugby ahead of other sports. (cited in Knight, 1997, p. 23)
These comments explicitly capture the NZRU’s mandate to expand its commer-
cial operations to worldwide levels and point to the pivotal role of media and
transnational corporate alliances in facilitating the globalization of the All Blacks,
thereby adding equity to the NZRU’s core asset, the All Blacks brand. Indeed, this
represents an important shift from earlier national brand advertising for companies,
including Ford and Steinlager, that sought to capture a national audience on free-to-
air broadcaster TVNZ through a commercial association with the All Blacks and
national heritage.
7
The NZRU awarded the sponsorship to Adidas on October 1997, ahead of global
rival Nike, which initially appeared to be the front-runner to sponsor the All Blacks
6 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
and rugby in New Zealand (Heeringa, 1997). Adidas had emerged with a lucrative
offer that appealed to the rugby union in its apparent commitment to “grass roots
rugby” (Ogilvie & Palmer, 1997, p. 32). Although exact figures were not disclosed,
the 5-year agreement was estimated at NZ $100 million with a renewal option
(Schumacher, 1998). Advertising executive Kevin Roberts was instrumental in nego-
tiating the multimillion-dollar contract on behalf of the NZRU, and his friendship
with Adidas CEO Robert Louis-Dreyfus, a noted rugby fan, helped secure the valu-
able sponsorship deal (Heeringa, 1997).
8
Interestingly, Louis-Dreyfus was the chief
executive and a board member of Saatchi & Saatchi until 1995, highlighting the cor-
porate connections of the businessmen who operate behind the scenes at the elite
levels of professional rugby and beyond. The mobility of such power brokers who
pass seamlessly between sectors (sporting, corporate, and media) also reveals the
increasing similarity and indeed affinity of the interest groups associated with the
media sports cultural complex. In 1998 Adidas awarded the local and global adver-
tising contracts for its sponsorship of the All Blacks to Saatchi & Saatchi Wellington.
The agreement with Adidas changed the sport sponsorship and marketing land-
scapes of New Zealand, and secured a considerable amount of revenue for the NZRU
(Jackson et al., 2001). To put the sponsorship deal into perspective, the previous year
the NZRU received a total of NZ$12 million in apparel and other sponsorships
(Heeringa, 1998). Hence, the union’s sponsorship revenues increased by 60% with
the Adidas contract alone. The deal with Adidas also ended the NZRU’s association
with Canterbury International Ltd. (a New Zealand-based subsidiary of LWR
Industries, 65% owned by Brierley Investments), which had held the apparel con-
tract with the rugby union for 75 years: a reminder that long-term local partnerships
count for naught in the global economy. Although Canterbury had right of first
refusal, it declined to counter the costly bids from Nike and Adidas, citing the New
Zealand government’s “fundamentally flawed” tariff policy on clothes and the com-
pany’s inability to compete with the “Chinese wage rates” that benefit other multi-
national sporting companies (LWR reviews, 1997, p. 35)
.
From the outset, the apparently symbiotic nature of the NZRU-Adidas relationship
was explicitly framed by both parties as a “partnership” as opposed to a sponsorship or
some form of brand/sporting property ownership. For example, according to Kevin
Roberts, the NZRU signed with Adidas because of the “total partnership concept in its
proposal, because they know sport backwards, they’re committed to developing the
game at every level from the grass roots.” (Ogilvie & Palmer, 1997, p. 32). Meanwhile,
when asked about the initial deal with the NZRU, Adidas New Zealand Marketing
Manager Craig Waugh utilized a similar discourse in our interview:
I don’t refer to it as a sponsorship but as a partnership; pretty much everything that the
rugby union does, we know what they are up to and they know what we are up to...
that’s how a partnership should be. (personal communication, February 7, 2003)
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 7
Hence, it is clear that the collective affinity of a corporate alliance was in the
interest of both groups—indeed, in the NZRU’s case such an alignment with Adidas
and its substantial injection of capital was a necessity to offset the lure of local rugby
players to more lucrative destinations in the highly competitive global sports labor
market. Furthermore, the use of the term “partnership” by the NZRU and Adidas
reveals the mutual benefits to be gained from the brand alignment that the relation-
ship offers. The rhetoric that accompanies much of this “corporate speak,” of course,
remains to be evaluated. The veracity of claims, for example, of commitment to
“developing the game at every level” in meaningful ways require due scrutiny.
Likewise, the notion of partnership suggests a mutual reliance where power and
commercial leverage is equal. However, as is revealed in the following section, this
is not always the case. Moreover, we also wish to note that the discourse of partner-
ship needs to be understood first and foremost as the local application of Adidas’s
broader global corporate branding strategy, which has been implemented to distin-
guish the Adidas brand from that of main rival, Nike. In fact, Adidas endeavors to
promote a corporate “philosophy of partnership, not ownership with athletes and
sporting institutions” that will “develop and build the Adidas brand personality”
(Adidas 1999-2000 All Blacks Sponsorship, 2000). This discourse is evident in
Adidas’s global promotional rhetoric beyond New Zealand. For example, it was
recently announced that Adidas has signed an 11-year deal with the National
Basketball Association and the Women’s National Basketball Association to be the
official uniform and apparel provider for both leagues. According to Erich
Stamminger, president and CEO of Adidas, “this partnership [italics added] deepens
our relationship with a sports league that continues to soar in global popularity. We
are building a foundation on which we can grow the sport of basketball globally”
(Adidas signs, 2006).
The partnership between the NZRU and Adidas was prosperous to the extent that
in December 2002 both parties agreed to a 9-year renewal contract estimated to be
worth close to NZ$200 million. In a revealing interview worth quoting at length,
NZRU Marketing and Sponsorship Manager Fraser Holland explained the ongoing
importance of the rugby union’s partnership with Adidas in these terms:
Adidas and ourselves is a unique partnership....Adidas is a global brand....They
have looked at what the New Zealand All Blacks and New Zealand rugby have to offer
from a global perspective and have compared that against some of the other amazing
athletes and teams that they sponsor around the world and obviously we come up to the
mark....Adidas offers us so much on two fronts really: first and foremost in perfor-
mance and innovation and ensuring that our athletes are getting the leading-edge tech-
nology...and then, secondly, from a marketing and commercial perspective they are
obviously offering us a large sum of money, which gives us a level of sustainability
within the professional environment that gives us security from a financial perspective.
8 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
And, then from a marketing perspective, they are . . . showcasing the All Blacks brand
to the world, and the way they do it is outstanding. They are most definitely building
equity in our brand and reaching markets we haven’t reached before. (personal com-
munication, February 26, 2003)
Holland’s comments are enlightening on numerous levels.
9
First, he identifies
that the All Blacks brand exists as a global commodity sign that “comes up to the
mark” in terms of an industry marketing standard seemingly set by the visibility of
other world-class sporting brands and celebrities. Second, he reinforces the signifi-
cance of Adidas’s partnership with the NZRU, which is likewise seeking to extend
its “market presence” to worldwide levels. Specifically, Adidas’s global presence is
heralded for the ability to “showcase the All Blacks brand to the world.”
Similarly, consider the following frank admission by Adidas New Zealand’s mar-
keting manager, who explicitly noted the commercial value of the All Blacks as a
global commodity sign for Adidas’s promotional endeavors:
Our contract was due to expire in June 2004, which is the middle of next year, and what
we were wanting to do was to look to secure the NZRU for a good period of time so
we could build a really strong relationship with them. What you’ll find is a lot of sport-
ing companies such as ours that have a sports marketing arm are tending to go for
longer-term contracts. The contract that was just signed with the All Blacks and the
rugby union is actually the longest, well up until last week was the longest-term con-
tract that Adidas has globally. So, the attraction for us, first and foremost is brand
recognition, getting our brand out there in a sport that is growing globally....Now
regardless of whether they are winning recently, they are the best in terms of most well-
known around the world, and also if you look at percentages, they are the best per-
forming team, so those are the main reasons for the contract and the benefits we will
see. (personal communication, February 7, 2003)
The commercial logic that underscores the partnership was also explicitly noted
in Adidas’s sponsorship documents:
The All Blacks certainly transcend the game of rugby itself—with people in countries
where rugby isn’t even played having heard of the All Blacks. Partnered with a giant sports
marketing company in Adidas, the All Blacks have the potential to one day become a true
global sporting icon in the same league as the likes of Manchester United, Brazil Soccer,
Chicago Bulls. . . .” (Adidas, 1999-2000 All Blacks Sponsorship, 2000)
Despite the discourse of partnership and public rhetoric that constitutes Adidas’s
sponsorship, the All Blacks first and foremost represent another commodity-
sign/sporting property and circuit of promotion (Whitson, 1998) in Adidas’s broader
portfolio of cultural sporting symbols in their competition for sign visibility and
brand visibility against their rivals, including Nike.
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 9
Cultural Tensions, Brand Equity, and Sponsor Exclusivity
The NZRU’s sizable sponsorship contract with Adidas has increased pressures
with respect to brand protection, sponsor exclusivity, and profit maximization: issues
that often run at odds with local understandings of the All Blacks as a national insti-
tution and cultural symbol. For example, although the rugby union’s sponsorship and
marketing manager conceded that the All Blacks brand was unique with respect to
the cultural significance of rugby and New Zealand identity, he also acknowledged
the broader set of pressures associated with regulating the brand as any other trade-
marked commodity:
We need to be realistic; the New Zealand Rugby Union has an 80 million dollar plus
turnover, and we operated within a professional sports environment. ...You know,it is
not like any other corporate brand, but a lot of the things we do, we need to act in that
way: We need to be sure we are gaining equity and not eroding equity within the brand,
whether that is through protection or through increased global presence. (personal com-
munication, February 26, 2003)
In a later interview, Holland expanded on the significance of the All Blacks brand as
the rugby union’s “core asset” (personal communication, March 15, 2005) in relation to
the key power brokers in the media sports cultural complex operating in New Zealand:
Globalization is paramount for rugby per se, and therefore as a component of that, it is
paramount that the All Blacks remain at the top of the global rugby tree. Why is this?
Well, because New Zealand is a market of a little more than 4 million people at the bot-
tom of the earth, many miles and many hours in terms of a time difference from the rest
of the globe, and for us to survive in the global marketplace we need to have our team
and our brand being seen globally more often. The demand for our product must be
beyond New Zealand shores. So, when it comes down to our commercial partners, then
first and foremost in the broadcasting sense we have a very strong relationship with our
SANZAR partners, Australia and South Africa, and we take our combined product to
the global market jointly, i.e., television rights. Secondly, when it comes to the NZRU
we look to find a balance with our sponsors between our New Zealand market and our
aspiration to grow globally and consequently we will look for organizations that have
a global reach. (Fraser Holland, personal communication, March 15, 2005)
We wish to suggest that such commentary is also emblematic of an ongoing transfor-
mation of the relationship between sports and fans, who are being increasingly addressed
by the businessmen who run sports as “free-floating consumers” (Ammirante, 2006,
p. 246). These delocalization processes speak very clearly to the importance of market-
ing discourse “in which consumers in far away places are invited to identify with ‘world
class’ teams and players, and to take pride in their consumption of ‘world class’ sports
products” (Ammirante, 2006, p. 246).
10 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
The commercial value placed on commodifying the All Blacks by the NZRU and
its global sponsors, however, begs the following question: What exactly is the All
Blacks brand, and does it differ from a national symbol of substantial cultural sig-
nificance? In response to these questions Holland remarked,
Well, when I’m posed the question “are the All Blacks a brand?” I talk about it from
two directions. To the rugby fan that we were just speaking about, the All Blacks are
their team, the team that is named for that series or that upcoming event. The All Blacks
brand is a combination of all the teams that have gone before and that are current,
and/or the stories, legacies, and results that those teams have been a part of. I like to
use the term “product” more than I like to use the term “brand” primarily because a fan
can relate more to their team in that way. It’s slightly less “marketing speak.” (personal
communication, March 15, 2005)
This is an interesting public relations admission from the NZRU that speaks
directly to a disjuncture between the commercial imperatives of News Corporation,
Adidas and the NZRU, and the perception of passionate local fans who regard the
All Blacks as neither a brand nor a product, but a public good. Moreover, we can also
see the reincorporation of this consumption information (namely public criticism
surrounding the commodification of the All Blacks) into production processes (see
du Gay, Hall, Janes, Mackay, & Negus, 1997; Hall, 1980; Johnson, 1986/1987), and
the subsequent rearticulation of commodification processes into a supposedly more
palatable public discourse. In other words, such a conscious maneuver represents a
distinct effort to differentiate the current All Blacks team that is revered by the public
from the All Blacks brand/product, which represents the cumulative commodified
heritage, tradition, and mythology of the national team.
Furthermore, the NZRU has also endeavored to rearticulate the All Blacks brand
in relation to a broad range of national values to appeal to traditional fans of the All
Blacks.
10
According to Holland,
In simple words, the core values are about performance, on and off the field, the her-
itage surrounding the All Blacks, and there are a number of different heritage compo-
nents that the All Blacks are a part of. The All Blacks brand is about authenticity, about
being real, and that is particularly important to the fans, it’s about humility and respect.
(personal communication, March 15, 2005)
Despite the emergence of such seemingly palatable commonsense national values
that attempt to blur the lines between national identity and private interests, what is
clearly at stake in these creative processes is the commodification of culture and her-
itage for the sake of private profit. Indeed, what is really for sale with the All Blacks
brand, and undoubtedly what appeals to the corporate sponsors of the All Blacks, is
the affective heritage, past traditions, former players, and cultural identity that
encompass the myths and memories of a national sporting mythology (Bell, 2003).
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 11
Thus, despite the NZRU’s discourse of “being real” and “authentic,” the commodi-
fication of the All Blacks and the team’s heritage ends up being produced and mar-
keted as a commercial image, simulacrum, or pastiche (Harvey, 1989). It is precisely
these sorts of irreconcilable fissures between globalization (as evidenced by the
commercial/marketing rhetoric and ambitions of the NZRU and Adidas) and the sta-
tus of the All Blacks as a national institution of priceless value that produce sizable
disjunctures and public resentment.
It is somewhat unsurprising, then, that a range of fans and pundits have criticized
NZRU administrators and marketeers as being overly focused on branding the All
Blacks and the nation’s identity and cultural heritage (Laidlaw, 1999; Romanos,
2002; Scherer & Jackson, 2007). When asked to respond to such criticism, NZRU
Marketing and Sponsorship Manager Fraser Holland forcefully disagreed with the
assertion that the All Blacks were overly branded and commercialized:
I dispute that .... There are ten sponsors around the All Blacks...the core of those
sponsors have been All Black sponsors for eight or nine years, you know long-term
sponsorships....If you move to someone like the ARU [Australian Rugby Union]
where you know they’ve got a large Vodafone logo emblazoned across their jersey and
the team are called the Vodafone Wallabies, you know that is not us. . . . So, to put it in
that context of overt commercialization I think is unfair and unjust. In New Zealand we
pride ourselves on our jersey being clean and black. (Fraser Holland, personal com-
munication, February 26, 2003)
Holland’s understanding of what might be deemed overly brazen commercialism
is noteworthy. His interpretation centers on a degree of sanctity and exclusivity of
commercial associations with the All Blacks brand, which he contrasts with other
global sport brands that he regards as less “pure.” This form of protectionism is, of
course, integral to maximizing the exclusivity of corporate associations with the All
Blacks. Hence, the NZRU’s response to criticism of overt commercialism is to
appeal to the exclusivity and heavily protected nature of commercial properties,
rather than commercial maximization per se. That is, it is a carefully crafted, framed,
protected, and indeed naturalized form of commonsense commercialism—not an
absence of it. It is germane to note that such protectionism is of particular impor-
tance for sustaining relations of power and privilege for principal sponsor Adidas.
For example, consider the comments from Craig Waugh, who also explained the cur-
rency of a black jersey in relation to Adidas’s global brand image and the company’s
broader corporate sign war with Nike:
With Nike it’s all ritzy and we are a little bit more below the line and subtle, and that’s
why you will never see a huge Adidas logo on the jersey, whereas if it was Nike spon-
soring the All Blacks, they would have a huge swoosh on their jersey (personal com-
munication, February 6, 2003).
12 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
Yet there are more persuasive critiques of Adidas’s commodification of the All
Blacks. For example, when Adidas released a new team strip in 1999 for the incep-
tion of its sponsorship, a conscious decision was made to refrain from adding
Adidas’s trademarked three stripes on the jersey out of respect for the tradition of the
team. Instead, Adidas produced a new black jersey with a silver fern on the left
breast and the Adidas logo on the right; the key difference was in the elimination of
the traditional white collar characteristic of the All Blacks jersey over the past 75
years. However, Adidas also reinvented an older tradition by replacing the white col-
lar with a black “Chinese-style” collar reminiscent of the 1905 jerseys worn by the
All Black “Originals.” In addition to the overt branding and the “Adidasification”
(Jackson et al., 2001) of the All Blacks, which included articulating the Adidas brand
with the cultural identity and heritage of the nation as well as the controversial and
contested commodification of indigenous Ma
–
ori culture within Adidas advertising
(Jackson & Scherer, 2007; Jackson & Hokowhitu, 2002; Jackson et al., 2004;
Scherer & Jackson, in press), there was no need to overtly brand the jersey.
11
In relation to the increased commercial value of the All Blacks brand, issues sur-
rounding intellectual property rights, trademarks, and copyrights have emerged as
paramount for the NZRU (Jackson, 2001). A recent example illustrates the extent to
which the NZRU attempts to articulate its economic agenda over the nonsanctioned
use of the All Blacks brand and by extension, the governing body’s self-appointment
as the “guardian” of a national cultural symbol. The NZRU has taken out advertise-
ments in the Air New Zealand in-flight magazine in an attempt to communicate with
global travelers and visitors to New Zealand about buying nonsanctioned All Blacks
products. One advertisement features a young male rugby player standing on a rugby
pitch in front of a goal post looking off into the distance and proudly wearing an offi-
cial Adidas/All Blacks jersey. The advertisement’s text encourages readers to
Protect the legend for the future by making sure you choose All Blacks products that carry
the Officially Licensed Product mark or Adidas logo. This way you can be sure your sup-
port is being placed where it counts—with your team. (Nothing but, p. 86, 2004)
Despite draping such a commercial message in a cloak of nationalistic rhetoric,
what is clearly at stake is intimately related to a global logic of accumulation:
namely, the value of the All Blacks brand, the exclusivity of the NZRU’s partnership
with Adidas, and by extension, Adidas’s private profit margins.
12
More recently, the NZRU has attempted to protect the All Blacks brand and the
union’s intellectual property rights by endeavoring to trademark another national
symbol, the silver fern, for exclusive use in All Blacks merchandise.
13
The NZRU’s
legal maneuvering has, however, drawn the ire of citizens, sporting bodies, and other
organizations who regard the silver fern as a national symbol. For example, the New
Zealand Chefs Association, an organization completely unrelated to sport, publicly
accused the NZRU of bullying the association into altering its logo and threatening
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 13
court action (Chalmers, 2004). Not surprisingly, other local clothing manufacturers
vigorously opposed the NZRU’s monopolistic trademark application and heavy-
handed tactics. Consider the following quote from the managing director of Crawford
Souvenirs, who explained that the trademark application “forced us to act to defend
a national symbol on a black jersey for future generations, and not be ring-fenced for
the commercial benefit of one organization” (Dye, 2005). Such commentary is an
important reminder that although national symbols are significantly shaped by capi-
talism, they are also riddled with a range of contradictions and tensions associated
with commodity production in particular contexts. For example, in our interview,
Fraser Holland aggressively defended the rugby union’s trademark application:
We are in a professional environment and need to protect our brand, and we give rights
to people who pay a sponsorship fee and they have rights that need to be protected ....
You have opportunistic people that are looking to ride on the crest of the All Blacks brand,
and they have no right to it. That’s quite different than the protection of silver ferns and I
say silver ferns in a generic sense. You know, right now New Zealand is in the world mar-
ket and the silver fern is representative of New Zealand, and we have no intention of stop-
ping other New Zealand organizations or teams in utilizing the silver fern. What we want
to do is protect our unique, stylized fern and any association or passing off of the All
Blacks brand. And, the Canterbury Invincibles example that you referred to is the best
example. There is no doubt that that jersey and that mark was passing off on the All
Blacks [said very sternly]. It was less about the number of jerseys that were projected to
be sold in the marketplace...but it’s a precedent that needed to be addressed. (personal
communication, February 26, 2003)
Again, it is critical to reiterate what appears to be a disjuncture between the global
imperatives of the NZRU, which admittedly operates in relation to global market
imperatives, and other nationally based businesses, which are also attempting to cap-
italize on national symbols and heritage. When asked whether Adidas had prompted
the NZRU to initiate brand protection strategies and create a unique and stylized sil-
ver fern, thereby preserving Adidas’s exclusive association with the All Blacks,
Craig Waugh responded with the following statement:
That is really funny, mate. I had people ringing me up saying “you guys changed the
All Blacks logo” [laughter] and I just had to laugh it off because I’d get idiots ringing
me up saying “next thing you know they are going to be the Adidas All Blacks.” We
were never involved in the decision-making process, and we don’t want to be. That’s
just like if the All Blacks and the rugby union came and said we want you to change
your Adidas logo; it just wouldn’t happen, it would be “piss-off.” (personal communi-
cation, February 7, 2003)
The NZRU has, however, recently lost its contentious trademark application. While
arguing that the bid was a constant area of misunderstanding, NZRU chief executive
Steve Tew explained that the rugby union was disappointed with the ruling:
14 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
Frankly we find some of the trading offers done around our intellectual property to be
rude and against common sense. We’ll continue to watch very closely and ensure the
rights we already have in place are not infringed. And if they are, we will act. (Dye 2005)
Of course, the meanings and struggles associated with defining national common
sense have always been a contested terrain, particularly as such struggles relate to
capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the prevalence of such issues, in addition to the
decision to remove free-to-air live All Black matches, has raised important issues
regarding who owns the national team and who can profit from New Zealand’s iden-
tity and heritage: questions that are indicative of the close relationship that has
always existed between culture and power.
Power Relations in the Media Sports Cultural Complex
Although conceptualizations of the media sports cultural complex are useful in
capturing the economic interdependences of commercial sport, they need to be con-
textualized to illuminate the relations of power and privilege that operate within the
nexus. Specifically, although there is an affinity between national governing bodies
who increasingly seek access to the global promotional networks of transnational
corporations, which in turn seek to capitalize on discourses of corporate nationalism,
the “partnership” is constituted by disproportionate and fluctuating power relations.
With respect to the NZRU, Adidas, and News Corporation, the nexus is clearly sym-
biotic and mutually beneficial in significant ways, but it is not equal in terms of the
dynamic interplay of power and capital.
For example, whereas Adidas’s sponsorship of the All Blacks was characterized by
both interest groups as a partnership, it is all too clear that discrepant power relations exist
between the NZRU and the transnational sporting corporation. Capturing this point,
Adidas Marketing Manager Craig Waugh bluntly identified the importance of Adidas’s
sponsorship and the broader SANZAR deal with News Corporation for the NZRU:
You probably have seen the day we were all in Wellington signing the contract and Jock
Hobbes, when being interviewed, his comment was “anyone who thinks there is no
room for corporates and sponsorship in rugby is completely wrong” because without
being arrogant, if there wasn’t us, if there wasn’t News Corp., then there would not be
the New Zealand rugby team. (personal communication, February 7, 2003)
Although Waugh’s assertion that the All Blacks would cease to exist in the
absence of Adidas and News Corporation is a dubious claim, he clearly articulates
the relative dependence of the national governing body on corporations that operate
and market globally with diversified revenue streams. Although the All Blacks rep-
resent a valuable partnership (one of many) and contribute value to Adidas’s brand
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 15
image and broader global sporting portfolio, the multinational sporting company
does not depend purely on its relationship with the NZRU for financial stability. That
is, although both brands are symbiotically aligned, Adidas clearly has additional
leverage in its relations with the NZRU.
These differential power relations appear in various power plays between the enti-
ties that, at specific moments, maneuver for capital and opportunity in the media
sports cultural complex. For example, in 2005 SANZAR renegotiated its global tele-
vision agreement with News Corporation. Beyond holding first right of refusal on
the contract and a virtual monopoly on global sports coverage, News Corporation
was in a powerful position relative to the national sporting unions and their individ-
ual sponsors, which depend on the global visibility provided by television. As the
NZRU’s Fraser Holland explained, “Broadcasting revenues underpin the organiza-
tion’s total revenue, and then with regards to marketing it is the key channel that our
fans can purchase our product. It is the channel that delivers our product into the
fans’ homes” (personal communication, March 15, 2005). Interestingly, the NZRU’s
extension of its sponsorship deal with Adidas in 2002 provided bargaining power for
the rugby union, and by extension SANZAR, because it added equity to the All
Blacks brand, thus making it more desirable for News Corporation. For example,
consider the following comments from Craig Waugh:
It gives the rugby union a little more ability to go in and play a bit more hardball. If
they had not signed our deal, they would go into those negotiations with no security on
their top two streams of income, and that puts you in an extremely vulnerable position
when you are going into any form of negotiation. Whereas if they went in without us,
then, God it would be a brave man to play real hardball in those negotiations. (personal
communication, February 7, 2003)
Here it is also important to note that although the NZRU would obviously suffer
financially from a devalued television contract with News Corporation, Adidas
would also face a considerable loss. As Waugh noted in the lead-up to the contract
renegotiations,
SANZAR is going to start negotiating with old Rupert [Murdoch] in the next 12 months
and that is going to be an extremely important time because although Adidas gives the
NZRU a huge amount of money and a lot of support in other ways, the Rupert Murdoch
deal is extremely important in terms of dollars. Now, one of the risks that we have is if
the negotiations with Rupert [Murdoch] are not going to be that flash and that is going
to put the likes of the NZRU in a position where they are going to have to go out and
find a lot more sponsorship, which in turn detracts from being the principal sponsor.
When we came on board, they went from having 20 sponsors to only 8, so the kind of
weight we were able to put behind the NZRU enables them to drop more than half,
which gives you a good idea in terms of how much bloody support we are giving them.
Now if Rupert Murdoch and his News money kind of diminish, they are going to have
to try and recoup that money, which means they’ll have to push their sponsorship back
up, so there’s a risk there. (personal communication, February 7, 2003)
16 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
In other words, a diminished television contract would force the NZRU to find
additional corporate sponsors, thereby devaluing Adidas’s sponsorship and brand
visibility as the principal sponsor of the All Blacks. Hence, both Adidas and the
NZRU had a vested interest in working together to influence the negotiation process
with News Corporation. We can only speculate on the extent to which this influenced
the negotiation process.
In December 2004, SANZAR and News Limited reached a US$323 million, 5-
year broadcast rights agreement that included an expanded Super 14 competition,
and a nine-test Tri Nations tournament. SKY TV, which is majority owned by News
Limited and broadcasts the live matches, sold delayed free-to-air rights for coverage
of selected Rebel Sport Super 14 matches, All Blacks test matches, and coverage of
the provincial Air New Zealand Cup to free-to-air channel Prime New Zealand
(TV3 formerly held the free-to-air rights) in December 2005. A month earlier, in
November 2005, SKY Television announced that it was buying Prime New Zealand;
the deal was approved by the antitrust Commerce Commission in February 2006.
Thus, the live and delayed free-to-air rugby rights are technically under the SKY
broadcasting umbrella, which raises important questions pertaining to competition
issues and the continued waning role of TVNZ in providing free-to-air coverage of
the national game.
14
However, in June 2007 it was announced that the possible return
of live All Black matches to free-to-air television is under consideration in a gov-
ernment review of broadcasting. Progressives leader Jim Anderton welcomed the
review and noted that “the cultural development and heritage of nations shouldn’t be
held to ransom by one company’s shares. If it’s only on SKY, then only people that
can pay for it can see it” (Chang, 2007).
Conclusion
No force has played a more central role in the MediaSport complex than commercial tele-
vision and its institutionalized value system—profit-seeking, sponsorship, expanded mar-
kets, commodification, and competition. (Real, 1998, p. 17)
Michael Real’s comment above speaks to the dominant ideological framework
and institutional power relations that are setting limits and pressures on the produc-
tion and consumption of local and national sporting mythologies in the context of
globalization. For example, in May 2005 it was reported that Nike was reconsider-
ing its 13-year sponsorship deal with English soccer giant Manchester United.
Signed in 2002, and worth up to €303 million, the contract was reported to have
been in jeopardy if the club continued to “under-achieve.” Despite assurances from
other major sponsors, including transnational corporations such as Anheuser-Busch,
the threat was a sobering reminder of the relative power of global marketing corpo-
rations compared to sporting entities. In short, no matter how powerful, globally
prominent, and diversified they might be in their operations, sporting institutions and
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 17
franchises are increasingly financially dependent on the revenue streams of transna-
tional corporations.
15
As with the Nike-Manchester United example noted above, our data concerning
New Zealand rugby affirm that the media sports cultural complex is a formation
characterized by those that seek mutual material benefit. For example, nationally sit-
uated sporting organizations such as the NZRU seek the global networks of distrib-
ution offered by media corporations and the promotional machinations of global
corporations to stimulate revenue and increase brand equity. In turn, global corpora-
tions, including Adidas, seek association with locally relevant and prominent sport-
ing teams as a means of infiltrating local markets while simultaneously achieving
global brand visibility. This affinity, however, is situational, temporary, and dynamic
according to the relative market worth of entities at any moment; in this case, the
NZRU’s reliance on Adidas monies left the rugby union in an apparently more
dependent position. Indeed, despite record profits in recent years,
16
the NZRU
announced a loss of $4.8 million in 2006. That is, although the NZRU continues to
benefit from its partnerships with News Corporation and Adidas, there are no finan-
cial guarantees as the rugby union continues to navigate the turbulent waters of the
global marketplace.
Observations such as those above illuminate some of the power relations that can
only be teased out by exploring the institutional dynamics of key interest groups
within the media sports cultural complex. Critically, those relationships are marked
by points of mutual benefit, but also by imbalanced relations of power as differing
organizations paradoxically pursue their own interests. For example, consider the
following recent developments. First, in 2007 the NZRU undertook a strategy to rest
22 All Blacks for the first half of the Super 14 season to prepare for the 2007 Rugby
World Cup (RWC). In turn, News Corporation threatened financial adjustments to
the television rights package that fuels professional rugby. As News Corporation’s
Corporate Affairs Director Greg Baxter explained, “We’d be wanting to discuss with
the NZRU and, I guess through SANZAR, arrangements for compensation or things
like that. We are not happy with these developments” (Money men, 2006). The
NZRU has suggested that this is a long-term strategy based on player welfare as
opposed to simply keeping high-profile players out of the starting lineup of Super 14
franchises. The key issues here include the notion that the Super 14 is a fully pro-
fessional sport that is an entertainment commodity paid for by News Corporation,
and by extension, rugby fans. In comparison to other global professional sports, this
situation is relatively unique in that the Super 14 is located in three countries with
professional athletes playing in their own countries. More specifically, the NZRU’s
decision may potentially affect its SANZAR allies. For example, the NZRU’s strate-
gic decision to rest its key players could improve their chances to win the 2007 RWC
(although it resulted in two South African teams competing for the 2007 Super 14
title for the first time in the league’s history), but it may have had a negative impact
on both local ticket sales and the finances of the Australian and South African rugby
unions, as well as on television viewer ratings. Second, it was recently announced,
18 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
following discussions between the NZRU and SKY TV, that domestic rugby
matches for the provincial Air New Zealand Cup will now be aired on weekdays.
Specifically, the broadcaster expressed concerns over the current schedule, which
compresses seven games into three days and has resulted in abysmal television rat-
ings, particularly for matches shown on Saturday. However, local rugby unions are
concerned that fans may not be able to get to the grounds on a weekday for 5:30 p.m.
games, thereby affecting gate receipts.
In relation to these issues, an argument can be made that the professional game is
being increasingly pushed out of the reach of most New Zealanders in favor of afflu-
ent and corporate audiences. For example, despite the government subsidizing the
NZRU’s successful bid for 2011 Rugby World Cup, which was promoted under the
rhetoric that New Zealand represents a “Stadium of 4 Million” rugby fans, ticket
prices will be exorbitantly expensive with the cheapest seat at the final of the Rugby
World Cup rumored to be NZ$700 (Ford, 2005). In a similar vein, public concern
over the commodification of the All Blacks and the Ka Mate haka, and more recent
criticism of the restructuring and quality of the expanded Super 14/Tri Nations and
Air New Zealand Cup tournaments, suggest that many fans and pundits are increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the world-class product that is being produced and sold to
them. These issues, of course, epitomize the growing incursions of transnational cap-
ital into the New Zealand economy that are disrupting older certainties and national
traditions and accelerating the dismantlement of the state (Kelsey, 1999).
To conclude, we wish to echo Bernstein’s (2003) calls for broader empirical stud-
ies that critically engage such issues with respective power brokers and representa-
tives who operate within the media sports cultural complex. It is through such
discussions that key issues and contextually specific power relations within the
dynamic media sports cultural complex can be teased out, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, where the logic of globalization can be illuminated and held up for critical
reflection. As Whitson reminds us, “The ultimate outcome of globalization is less
likely to be the hegemony of American sports than the intensive commodification of
any sport that will retain a place in a mediated global culture” (1998, pp. 70-71).
Notes
1. The NZRU is the governing body of rugby union in New Zealand. Having been known as the New
Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) since its inception in 1892, it officially changed its title to the
New Zealand Rugby Union in 2003.
2. Gruneau (1989) draws the concept of “elective affinity” from Max Weber: see Treiber (1985) for a
more recent discussion of this concept.
3. Craig Waugh was interviewed on February 7, 2003, and Fraser Holland was interviewed twice; the
first time on February 26, 2003, and again on March 15, 2005. Both interviews were conducted by the
first author. The second interview has been published verbatim (Scherer, 2006).
4. For example, readers are directed to a special issue of Cultural Studies (2002, volume 16, issue 4)
devoted to further engagement of cultural intermediaries as an occupational group and their increasingly
central role in economic and cultural life.
5. Notably, during the course of the tour, the British press began describing the team as the All Blacks
because of the color of the black jerseys; once embraced by New Zealanders, this discourse effectively
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 19
created the national team (Daley, 2005; Hope, 2002). Moreover, picking up on the “Natives” tour of
Britain (1888-89), the 1905 Originals performed a haka before most games, further establishing a cultural
tradition that has been modified and reinvented over the past hundred years (Daley; 2005; Karetu, 1993).
6. Hart’s last tenure as coach of the All Blacks ended with his resignation after the New Zealanders
capitulated to France in the semifinals of the 1999 World Cup. His resignation followed intense public
criticism of the All Blacks’ disastrous performance in relation to the recent professionalism of rugby, the
commodification of the All Blacks by Adidas and Saatchi & Saatchi, and Hart’s corporatization of the
team (Scherer & Jackson, 2007).
7. Stuart Ewen (1976) has similarly outlined the emergence of advertising in the United States that artic-
ulated consumption with patriotism and in turn socially constructed a homogeneous national character: a
reminder that discourses of “corporate nationalism” (Silk, Andrews & Cole, 2005) are not unique to the con-
temporary era of globalization. Also, see Lee’s (1993) discussion regarding the power of national brand adver-
tising in the United States with respect to its role in disrupting consumer loyalties to local products in the
United States.
8. First, he instigated a cost-saving initiative, including mass firings, and shifted manufacturing from
Europe to developing countries long after Nike and Reebok had relocated to regions of cheap labor and lim-
ited union activity (Evans, 1997). Second, Louis-Dreyfus sought to reimage the Adidas brand (which had
been superseded by Nike and Reebok) and localize it in as many markets as possible around the world.
9. Some of Adidas’s technological innovations have been less than successful. For example, in 2002
Adidas released a yellow rugby ball that was roundly ridiculed by players, including All Black first five-
eighth Andrew Mehrtens, who described the ball as a “pig and a lemon.” In 2003 Adidas was criticized
for producing jerseys that were prone to ripping in rugby matches.
10. During the initial creative processes for Adidas’s local and global advertising campaigns, advertising
agency Saatchi & Saatchi negotiated with the NZRU managers, the All Blacks coaches, and individual All
Blacks to determine a constellation of ten brand values for the All Blacks to be used in creative processes.
These included three core values of “excellence,” “respect,” and “humility” and extended values of “power,”
“masculinity,” “commitment,” “teamwork,” “New Zealand,” “tradition,” and “inspirational” (Motion, Leitch,
& Brodie, p. 1087).
11. It is also important to note that the Adidas sponsorship deal also included outfitting the New
Zealand A side (now the Junior All Blacks), the New Zealand Maori team, the Black Ferns, the New
Zealand Colts, and New Zealand School Sides: The three stripes appear on each of these jerseys, includ-
ing most notably the New Zealand Maori who have a tradition almost as long as the All Blacks (Jackson
et al., 2001).
12. The release of an “Invincibles” rugby jersey by former apparel sponsor Canterbury International
Ltd. in 2001 is another telling example of the intimidating legal processes initiated by Adidas and the
NZRU to enforce the exclusivity of their sponsorship agreement and the sanctity of the All Blacks brand.
More specifically, Canterbury released a commemorative black jersey with a white collar and silver fern
on the breast named after the iconic 1924-25 All Blacks team that was unbeaten in 30 games. In turn,
Adidas responded by threatening local retailers that Adidas-licensed All Black products would be
removed if they sold the Canterbury jersey. Meanwhile, the NZRU took the clothing manufacturer to court
claiming the jersey breached intellectual property rights because it implied a direct connection with
the All Blacks (Jackson, 2001). The issue was eventually settled, with Canterbury agreeing to transfer the
Invincibles trademark to the NZRU and refrain from using All Black imagery in future promotions. The
company also agreed to stop manufacturing the jersey pending the sale of remaining jerseys.
13. The NZRFU registered a trademark on the words “All Blacks” in 1991 and on its own stylized sil-
ver fern in 1991. Ironically, in 1924 the NZRFU declined an offer from the state for exclusive rights to
the silver fern (Romanos, 2002).
14. State-owned TVNZ asked the Commerce Commission to prevent SKY from buying Prime New
Zealand, claiming that SKY would have no incentive to license free-to-air rights for sports programs to
any network other than Prime.
15. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/4591031.stm (accessed January 9,
2005).
20 Journal of Sport & Social Issues
16. In 2003, the NZRU posted a net surplus of NZ$11.1 million on total income of NZ$93.6 million
(Chalmers, 2004). In 2005, the NZRU announced a record net profit of NZ$27.3 million dollars (up from
NZ$20.5 million in 2004) and increased reserves of NZ$81.4 million (up from NZ$57.7 million in 2004).
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Jay Scherer, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Physical Education & Recreation at the
University of Alberta, where he teaches undergraduate courses in sport sociology and a graduate course
in sport and popular culture. His primary research interests include globalization and the commodifica-
tion of sport and popular culture.
Mark Falcous, PhD, is a lecturer in the sociology of sport in the School of Physical Education/Te Kura
Akoranga Whakakori at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. His research explores intersec-
tions of sport, globalization, media, and nationalism.
Steve Jackson is a professor in the School of Physical Education, University of Otago, Dunedin, New
Zealand, where he teaches courses in sociology of sport and sport, media and culture. His research inter-
ests include globalization, media, and national identity.
Scherer et al. / Media Sports Cultural Complex 23
