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Secularization, R.I.P
Abstract
From the beginning, social scientists have celebrated the secularization thesis despite the fact that it never was consistent with empirical reality. More than 150 years ago Toajuen'lle pointed out that "the facts by no means accord with [the secularization] theory," and this lack of accord has grown far worse since then. Indeed, the only shred of credibility for the notion that secularization has been taking place has depended on contrasts between now and a bygone Age of Faith. In this essay 1 assemble the work of many recent historians who are unanimous that the Age of Faith is pure nostalgia -that lack of religious participation was, if anything, even more widespread in medieval times than now. Next, 1 demonstrate that there have been no recent religious changes in Christendom that are consistent with the secularization thesis -not even among scientists. I also expand assessment of the secularization doctrine to non-Christian societies showing that not even the highly magical "folk religions" in Asia have shown the slightest declines in response to quite rapid modernization. Final words are offered as secularization is laid to rest.
... While the secularization process intensified in the past decades (Inglehart, 2020), the decline in the importance of religion in both the public and private spheres can be traced to the 19th century in some countries (Brown, 2019;Stark, 1999). As a matter of fact, secularization was a vital topic already for Max Weber-one of the early sociologists-who observed that through economic development, the world becomes more rationalized and 'disenchanted' (Weber, 1946, p. 139). ...
... The proponents of secularization were also quick to predict a near demise of religions, at least in the West. However, the end of the 20 th century witnessed an increase in religious affiliation, for example, in the post-Soviet countries (Northmore-Ball & Evans, 2016;Schnabel & Bock, 2017;Stark, 1999;Stolz et al., 2023), and it was clear that the predictions of the secularization theory would not be supported (Stark, 1999). Despite the failed predictions of the early proponents of the secularization theory (as admitted by Berger himself, 1999) and the subsequent departure from the secularization theory by many researchers (Stark, 1999), the theory enjoyed a strong come-back, especially in the light of the recent increase in secularization observed globally (Inglehart, 2020). ...
... The proponents of secularization were also quick to predict a near demise of religions, at least in the West. However, the end of the 20 th century witnessed an increase in religious affiliation, for example, in the post-Soviet countries (Northmore-Ball & Evans, 2016;Schnabel & Bock, 2017;Stark, 1999;Stolz et al., 2023), and it was clear that the predictions of the secularization theory would not be supported (Stark, 1999). Despite the failed predictions of the early proponents of the secularization theory (as admitted by Berger himself, 1999) and the subsequent departure from the secularization theory by many researchers (Stark, 1999), the theory enjoyed a strong come-back, especially in the light of the recent increase in secularization observed globally (Inglehart, 2020). ...
The study tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing existential insecurity. While the former explanation argues that people are unwilling to join religious groups because of increasing mechanistic understanding of the world that clashes with religious views (and is rather irreversible), the latter argues that it is the decreasing insecurity that causes secularization and that this trend can be reversed with increasing insecurity. In the present study, 811 secular participants from the USA and Poland played a modified version of the Nash demand game, which simulates dilemmas indexing cooperative insecurity. Participants were randomly assigned to either a secure or insecure environment, manipulated by the parameters of the Nash demand game, and we assessed whether they would be willing to join costly normative groups that regulate cooperation in the game. Crucially, participants were randomly assigned either to a secular condition (choosing between a secular normative group and a group with no norms)—our manipulation check—or a religious condition (choosing between a normative group with religious framing and a group without norms)—main test between the two theories. The results showed that participants in the secular condition were more likely to choose the normative group in the insecure compared to the secure environment, but this difference was inconclusive in the religious condition. However, when re-assigning participants from insecure to secure environments and vice versa, we found strong support for the existential insecurity theory. We discuss potential explanations for the discrepancy between stated and actual behavior as well as potential motivations for joining religious normative groups. This submission has been positively recommended by PCI RR (links to Stage 1 and Stage 2 recommendations).
... Secularization theory is one of the few sociological theories that managed to achieve a paradigmatic status in social sciences (Casanova, 1994). Despite the extensive discussion surrounding the concept of secularization (Bruce, 2002;Casanova, 2006;Clark, 2012;Franzmann, 2016;Stark, 1999;Stolz, 2020;Swatos & Christiano, 1999), very little attention was ever dedicated to exploring the broader implications of secularization for the secularity itself (see C. G. Brown, 2001;D. Martin, 2005;Remmel, 2017). ...
... For each country, the resulting corpus includes one more radical source that self-identify with atheism and one more moderate source that self-identify with humanism. The decision to focus on the US and the UK was instead motivated by the role that the two countries -often at the center of the dispute about the American and/or European exceptionalism (Bruce & Glendinning, 2010;Davie, 2002;Schnabel & Bock, 2017;Stark, 1999;Voas & Chaves, 2016;Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012) -played in the ongoing secularization debate. Building upon Atko Remmel's (2017) observations on the "secularization of language" in Estonia, I suggested that relevance of religion, relevance of non-religious identities, and spread of the negative sentiment toward religion in the public discourses of militant non-religious organizations should all decline in tandem with the weakening of their religious others. ...
Despite the growth of Non-Religion Studies in recent years, historical changes within secularity remain underexplored and there is a shortage of extensive longitudinal studies dealing with the phenomenon. This shortcoming arguably stems, on one side, from the lack of sufficient granularity in the commonly used longitudinal survey data and, on the other, from a chronic indifference of secularization theory toward the changes occurring within secularity itself. It was argued that secularization is a process of broader (non-)religious change, and that secularization theory can and should be extended to the analysis of non-religion. This thesis employs a series of computational methods, ranging from Topic Modeling to Sentiment Analysis and Dynamic Word Embedding, to explore a large collection of magazines published by two American and two British non-religious organizations between 1881 and 2019. The analysis reveals that the historical fluctuations in the relevance attributed to religion by militant non-religious organizations closely follows fluctuations in the public visibility of religion. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical expectations, the relevance of these topics is consistently higher among groups with a more radical orientation (i.e., among atheists rather than humanists) and in contexts characterized by a lower degree of secularization (i.e., in the US rather than the UK). On the contrary, the demand for positive non-religious identities remained prevalently stable over time showing signs of a descending trend only throughout the latest decades. Sentiment Analysis, in combination with linear regression, confirmed that the proportion of negative sentiment in religion-related topics is positively associated with the perceived relevance of religion. Finally, Dynamic Word Embedding revealed two prevalent shifts. On one side, the critique of religion progressively moved away from an ideological confrontation of religious others and towards a more moderate focus on pragmatic concerns. Second, the conceptualizations of atheism and humanism increasingly converged, emphasizing a positive non-religious identity, political activism, and the organizational aspects of the secular movement.
... In dominant social science literature, secularization has often been framed through three distinct paradigms: the decline of religious belief, the privatization of religion, and the differentiation of secular spheres such as law, politics, and economics (Casanova 2007;Bruce 2002;Asad 2003;Stark 1999;Pollack 2015). However, these models assume a linear trajectory of religious decline rather than recognizing secularization itself as a historically contingent mode of political organization (Hurd 2008;Mahmood 2005Mahmood , 2006. ...
The contemporary restructuring of religion and secularism demands a departure from conventional post-secular analyses that remain confined within the epistemic and institutional frameworks of the nation-state. This paper develops the concept of post-secular cosmopolitanization to theorize the dissolution of the secular–religious binary as a regulatory mechanism of power, revealing how religion and secularism are co-constituted through global entanglements that transcend national boundaries. Unlike dominant conceptions of post-secularism, which assumes the continued dominance of secular and national institutions despite religious resurgence, post-secular cosmopolitanization captures the ways in which transnational religious movements, digital religious networks, and global governance structures are reshaping religious authority, secular regulation, and political sovereignty. It is shown that this transformation leads to three major consequences: (1) the erosion of the nation-state’s regulatory monopoly over religious life as alternative religious and transnational actors emerge as influential governance entities; (2) the deterritorialization and fragmentation of religious authority, undermining traditional clerical and institutional hierarchies; and (3) the blurring of religious and secular domains, where global economic, legal, and political structures increasingly integrate religious actors, norms, and ethical frameworks. These developments signal a paradigmatic shift beyond the secularization thesis and dominant conceptions of post-secularism, necessitating a reconsideration of how power, governance, and religious authority function in a world no longer structured by the nation-state’s exclusive claim to sovereignty. By analyzing these entanglements, this paper provides a theoretical framework to understand the reconfiguration of global secular and religious orders, challenging entrenched assumptions about the trajectory of modernity.
... We are now decades into the study of religious decline, and overwhelmingly, existing data indicate that church attendance, church affiliation and the selfreported importance of religion are all in decline across Europe and North America (Bruce 2011;McCaffree, 2017a;Zuckerman et al. 2016;Kasselstrand et al., 2023). While some scholars in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Chaves 1989;Stark 1999) maintained that rates of religious commitment were staying stable in some countries like the United States, better specified models are now showing that even in these countries, religiosity is declining inter-generationally (see Voas and Chaves, 2016). ...
... The secularization theory was taken up again in the second half of the twentieth century by scholars who argued that the social significance of religion was on the decline in modern societies (Wilson 1966) and that religion had moved from the public to the private sphere and become more autonomous through a process of "structural differentiation" (Parsons 1966). However, the continued resilience of religion has led to widespread criticism of the secularization theory (Stark 1999), with one of the founding proponents of the theory writing that "the assumption that we live in a secularised world is false" and 61 Secular-Sacred Hybridity of Ren ' ai Review of Religion and Chinese Society 11 (2024) 58-94 claiming that the "whole body of literature by historians and social scientists, loosely labelled secularization theory, is essentially mistaken" (Berger 1996). Central to the secularization debate, and the argument of this article, is the category of religion, which is founded on a distinction between the sacred and the secular. ...
This article explores the growth of religious philanthropy in contemporary China over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. By describing the strategies of one of China’s most important Buddhist-inspired charities at macro, meso, and micro scales, I argue that the Ren’ai Charity Foundation’s success is due to its strategic blurring of the boundaries between the sacred and the secular. This strategy is manifest in its negotiations with the secular state, internal organizational structures, and ethical discourse. Sacred-secular hybridity, the central concept advanced in this article, is an important feature of China’s religious revival, and an important example of innovative strategies employed by non-government organizations in the policy gray areas of contemporary China. The sacred-secular hybridity of Ren’ai not only reveals the latest developments within Chinese religious philanthropy, but also serves as a theoretical framework to better understand the contested category of religion in contemporary China.
... Max Weber, in particular, through his concept of the "disenchantment of the world" and the emphasis on rationalization, illustrated the inevitable progression towards a cosmos devoid of mysticism and religious faith (Draaisma and Wilson 2021). Sigmund Freud, in his penetrating analysis, characterized religion as the "greatest of all neurotic illusions" (Shiner 1967), thus exposing the fragility of human belief (Stark 1999). This period saw the dissolution of the Church-State apparatus at the beginning of the last century. ...
The endorsement from Christian circles in facilitating the rise of radical right-wing populism in Brazil and the United States, as well as the support and alliance of the Polish Catholic Church with the Law and Justice (PiS) government, are widely acknowledged. Embedded within the intricate fabric of multifaceted factors contributing to the surge of right-wing populism, the Culture War assumes a pivotal yet often underestimated role. Manifesting as a profound confrontation, the Culture War signifies an existential clash between contrasting perspectives concerning socio-cultural values grounded in religious scripture. The research employs a qualitative methodology and a singular case study focused on Portugal, owing to the nation’s enduring relationship with Catholicism. Portugal emerges as indisputably one of the most religious countries in the Western world, akin to Poland. The research question aims to understand the support or relationship from the Portuguese Catholic Church (PCC) and Christian (social) movements to the populist right-wing Chega (lit. ‘Enough!’), slightly departing from their traditional center-right support for PSD and CDS in the Culture War. The results show that the support extended to Chega by the PCC and the Portuguese Episcopal Conference is non-existent in a formal manner. Despite this fact and the lack of formal backing for Chega, some Christian social movements have shown their approval or support for Chega, as the party has some roots in the movement sector, but not as strongly as the Front Nationale. Further research is suggested in order to attain deeper conclusions from both the Portuguese Catholic Church and Christian social movements using other methods for a deeper understanding, such as semi-structured interviews and participant observation of events.
... First, that secularization was linked with modernization, as its necessary consequence; second, that secularization resulted in a visible decline in individual piety; third, that science was one of the principal reasons for the decline of religion; fourth, that secularization was irreversible; fifth, that secularization could be applied globally, despite most discussions being focused on Christendom. 91 However, Stark argued based on historical and contemporary evidence that these beliefs are problematic and should be dismissed. Stark concluded: "Therefore, once and for all, let us declare an end to social scientific faith in the theory of secularization, recognizing that it was the product of wishful thinking."92 ...
... In the view of Basuki and Hidayati (2019), moral and religious principles such as being obedient to God Almighty and having fear of Him should be instilled in children from an early age. In the words of Stark (1999), the secularization "doctrine" belongs in "the graveyard of failed theories." It is possible to prioritize religious principles over those materialistic notions. ...
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the moral interactions between power
distance and servant leadership by conducting a critical analysis of Bangladeshi educational
institutions. The educational administration framework in Bangladesh is the subject of our
study, with particular reference to the policies of schools, colleges, and universities. The results
are measured using five Likert scale questionnaires, and they are then input into SME using
STATA software. As a result, there is currently a hierarchical, top-down administration that
continuously puts educational management and administration before moral principles. The
moral principles that uphold the connection between the theory of power distance and the
servant leader as the foundational theoretical framework for moral principles. This study
opens up a new perspective on the idea that moral values are fundamental to the way society
is structured because they affect how individuals interact, how institutions function, and how
communities thrive. Their impact is far-reaching, touching on everything from domestic
relationships to global events.
... However, towards the end of that past century, various studies showed that secularization had become more of an unquestioned dogma than a verified theory. Some key figures in this debate are Berger (2000Berger ( , 2006, Ferrarotti (1993), Martin (1991), and Stark (1999). * All textual citations and titles of works of this article come from bibliographic references in Spanish and were translated and thoroughly verified into English by the translation committee of the Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales [Editor's note]. ...
This article aims to demonstrate that the dimension of the sacred is constitutive of politics. First, abandoning any substantive view of the sacred that confines it to the exclusive jurisdiction of religions is necessary, reaching a broad and non-essentialist conception based on developments from Durkheim to Bataille. In this way, the sacred can be considered the center and common foundation of all society, present both in its glorious manifestations and its excremental ones, which will be referred to as pure and impure heterogeneous elements, respectively. Furthermore, contrary to those who speak of the “sacralization of politics” —a formula that implies an external relationship between politics and sacredness and a rejection of their contamination— this article proposes to understand politics as the practice of sacralization —of people and processes, of events, objects, and places— which aims to construct objectivity, that is, to stabilize the principal meanings within a social set. ______________ Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que la dimensión de lo sagrado es constitutiva de la política. En primer lugar, es preciso abandonar toda mirada sustantiva de lo sagrado que lo sitúe como jurisdicción exclusiva de las religiones, para así llegar a una concepción amplia y no esencialista a partir de los desarrollos desde Durkheim hasta Bataille. De este modo, lo sagrado puede pensarse simultáneamente como centro y fondo común de toda sociedad, presente tanto en sus manifestaciones gloriosas como en aquellas excrementales, que serán nombradas como heterogéneas puras e impuras respectivamente. A continuación, en contra de quienes hablan de la “sacralización de la política”, fórmula que supone una relación de exterioridad entre política y sacralidad y un rechazo de su contaminación, en este artículo se propone entender por política la práctica de sacralización —de personas y de procesos, de acontecimientos, objetos y lugares— que apunta a construir una objetividad, es decir, a estabilizar de los principales sentidos al interior de un conjunto social.
... In other cases, the process has been entirely criticised in favour of new interpretative paradigms that are still competing-such as the post-secular society, multiple modernities and secularities, desecularisation, secular transition, or competition. Davie (1990), Iannaccone (1991), Finke and Stark (1992), Casanova (1994), Berger (1999), Hervieu-Léger (1999), Stark (1999), Eisenstadt (2000), Habermas (2006), Grim and Finke (2006), Semán (2007), Mallimaci (2008), Voas (2008), Molendijk et al. (2010), Rosati and Stoeckl (2012), Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), and many others have all contributed to this boundless field of study. While a great deal of ongoing quantitative and qualitative research is producing new empirical evidence on the various dimensions of religiosity and secularity, and a new focus has arisen on intergenerational religious transmission as a factor in the growth or decline of religiosity among populations, recently Stolz (2020) has been busy reordering a good deal of this immense body of scientific literature, and Voas (2020) has continued the debate 4 . ...
The normative framework is one of the constitutive edges of state regulation of religion. It contributes to the configuration of different forms of relations between state and religions. This can be observed in at least three areas. First, in the way the state defines religion. Second, in the way it recognises and legislates its relationship with different religions. Finally, in the rules it establishes for confessional institutions and actors at different levels of social life (education, health, prisons, etc.). In this article, we propose to comparatively analyse the national legal systems that regulate religion in Italy and Argentina, with special emphasis on the equal or differentiated treatment of different religions. The policies of recognition and integration of religious minorities find in the normative framework an empowering or limiting factor, depending on the national context. Although both countries share a dominant Catholic matrix, their historical developments and legal formats present contrasts that project different scenarios of religious governance, which we will try to elucidate.
... Even in the centuries of the reign of the so-called christianitas or Christian civilisation, the actual living by faith concerned minorities. (Ven 2001, 188-91;Stark 1999). On the structural and cultural dimensions of secularisation and the response of churches to it, see: Ven 2001Ven , 1996 Egalitarian universalism and tendencies towards the (often extreme) emancipation of the individual are, as Jürgen Habermas argued, a legacy (consequence) of the Jewish ethics of justice and the Christian principle of love. ...
The subject of this article is the crisis of Western culture (Christianity) in terms of its sources and consequences. The author attempts to present the diagnosis of European culture by John Paul II and Benedict XVI. They associate its crisis with the internal weakness of Christianity (the Catholic religion) and the influence of philosophical trends and ideologies with the purpose of creating a “new culture” on the ruins of the old one. Postmodern thought, which not only breaks with the rationalism of the Enlightenment but questions (in the name of individual freedom) the truth and the ability to get to know it, plays a special role in this respect. The anti-Christian narrative adopted by intellectual elites in the West, which in some manifestations becomes an ideology of secularism, is thus a consequence of philosophical assumptions. The author suggests that the popularisation of a model of life according to the principle “as if God did not exist,” i.e. the acceleration of de-Christianisation processes (e.g. in Poland) is significantly related to the development of the so-called new media, especially in the form of virtual reality.
... Six-in-ten Bosnian Muslims say that divorce is morally acceptable while almost one-fifth (19%) see it as morally wrong. 72 More than 90% of Bosnian Muslims favour a women's right to choose whether to wear a veil in public and for a wife to have the right to divorce her husband. More than three-quarters of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (79%) hold the view that both, sons and daughters should have equal inheritance rights. ...
... To tackle the contemporary religious landscape-more specifically the question of religious change-the scientific community of the sociologists of religion has produced competing theories that can be divided into three ideal-typical meta-narratives (Popp-Baier 2010, p. 34), which have framed the recent debate in this field: (a) a narrative about decline, which is articulated by variations of the classical secularisation theory maintaining that modernisation has led and still leads religion to decline in magnitude and importance; (b) a narrative about transformation, which is often linked to concepts such as "invisible religion", "implicit religion", "believing without belonging", "vicarious religion", and, in recent years, more prominently with "spirituality", maintaining a metamorphosis of the social form of religion in the context of the more general cultural and societal changes relating to individualisation and subjectivisation (Heelas and Woodhead 2005;Houtman and Aupers 2007;Steensland et al. 2022); (c) a narrative about resurgence, which is most eloquently articulated by the rational choice or religious economies approach linking religious vitality to religious pluralism and a market of competing religious organizations. This perspective stresses the supply side of religion, implying that a basic religious demand is an anthropological constant and that people act as religious consumers, shopping for religious commodities, weighing costs and benefits (Iannaccone 1991;Stark 1999). Equally effective, Day (2020, p. 38) describes those narratives in terms of the "Three Rs": 1. Retreat; 2. Reinvention; 3. Resurgence. ...
In this article I present the main findings of an empirical study about contemporary spirituality in Italy begun in 2017 by reasoning about the analysis of twelve case studies which are particularly eloquent concerning the different spiritual worlds emerging in Catholic Italy. I argue that three main narratives—the spirituality of nature, wellbeing, and mystery—are useful to synthesize the heterogeneousness of groups, communities, festivals, and organizations engaged in the Italian “holistic milieu”. In order to address this reflection, firstly I will trace the international sociological debate that has accompanied the concept of contemporary spirituality and the relationship between spirituality and religion, a couple which I have named “frenemies”. Then, I will extend the analysis to the concept of the secular, examining the intertwining of the spiritual, religious, and secular spheres. After illustrating the landscape of contemporary spirituality in Catholic Italy more broadly, I shall focus on the case studies taken as examples of the spirituality of nature, the spirituality of health and wellbeing, and the spirituality of mystery. In the Discussion and Conclusion, I shall raise some fundamental questions that the study of contemporary spirituality poses for the sociology of religion with reference to secularisation, one of its most classic and yet contested paradigms. I shall claim that future research paths could further contribute to strengthening the idea, raised in this article, that secularisation can also be understood not only as an antithetical force to religion but as the process in Western history that has led to the emergence of a secular social space in dialogue with the religious sphere.
Religious Centrality has been widely studied in Europe and North America and is generally associated with better psychological and social outcomes. Religious centrality is often assessed as a measure of intrinsic religiosity (IR)—religion as one’s guiding approach to life – and has been widely validated in societies around the world. However, most studies of religious centrality/IR are cross-sectional and use samples from ‘Western’ societies or samples from single non-European societies. Moreover, most samples are not nationally representative. Systematic comparisons are difficult because the samples, measures, and procedures vary between studies. This article examines religious centrality across 22 nationally representative samples from religiously diverse countries from the 1st wave of the Global Flourishing Study (GFS) using a single-item IR measure and identical demographic measures and methods in each country. The study will serve as the foundation for longitudinal studies designed to assess the causal impact of religious centrality on human flourishing. In the current study, we find societies range widely, with religious centrality lowest in Europe and East Asia, moderate in the Americas and Israel, and highest in Africa and the rest of Asia. We discuss the complexities of assessing religious centrality across religious traditions, how the demographic factors associated with religious centrality vary between countries, and provide implications for secularization theory as well as theories of human flourishing.
This article studies organizational isomorphism as a force of religious change and highlights the importance of competition in inciting the isomorphic behaviors of religious organizations. Empirically, it tackles the puzzle of why, facing competitive pressure, Chinese Buddhist organizations actively copied organizational traits of their rivals during the Republican China era (1912–1949) and in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek (1949–1975), but not in post-Mao mainland China since 1978. Theoretically, it aims to amend the institutional isomorphism theory of DiMaggio and Powell by suggesting that competition remains a significant force in organizational change in the modern age. The analysis suggests that for incumbent religious organizations to launch competitive isomorphic moves, they must meet at least two prerequisites: first, they must acutely perceive competitive pressure; second, without the resources or means to neutralize the challenge, they must learn from their rivals’ strengths to (re)gain dominance. This article also stresses the vital and pervasive role of the state, in terms of its nature and patterned behaviors, in conditioning incumbent organizations’ perceptions of and responses to their rivals.
Immigrant religious communities in the United States are undergoing profound transformations. Three processes of change occurring in new immigrant religions are described and analyzed: (I) adopting the congregational form in organizational structure and ritual, (2) returning to theological foundations, and (3) reaching beyond traditional ethnic and religious boundaries to include other peoples. These changes support the “ new paradigm” in the sociology of religion that refutes secularization theories: Internal and external religious pluralism, instead of leading to the decline of religion, encourages institutional and theological transformations that energize and revitalize religions. Moreover, these changes are not merely attributable to Americanization. Rather, these changes have transnational implications for global religious systems—implications that are facilitated by the material and organizational resources that new U.S. immigrants possess.
This study, which looks at the relationship between religion and the digital world, a term used to describe today's rapidly developing communication and information technologies, offers a glimpse of the future from the present of digital religion. The rituals and practices in which digitalized religion differs from traditional religion are significant in terms of mindsets and habits in the daily lives of individuals. However, the fact that individuals change their religious identity and affiliation for periods that can be considered frequent and even choose to leave religion makes them religious nomads. Religious nomadism expresses the reflection of the individual's identity construction on digital platforms. Studies show that similar cases will become more frequent in the coming years. With the concern that this and similar situations will become more frequent in the future and against possible similar phenomena, individuals, groups, or organizations should participate in digital platforms and produce content. The study examines this shortcoming through various examples.
In the wake of the ‘New Atheism’ movement, Greek atheists began to gain visibility in the 2010s through various media channels, social media platforms, legal activism, and the establishment of the Atheist Union of Greece. This article presents findings from qualitative research conducted through semi-structured interviews and participant observation, exploring atheism within Greek society. A key focus of this research was to examine the religious or religious-like beliefs and practices adopted by Greek atheists as they reconstruct their identity. Drawing on concepts such as lived atheism, secular paradox, and religion-relatedness, the article delves into the beliefs and practices of self-identified Greek atheists. The goal is to map and analyze these specific beliefs and practices within the context of the Greek Orthodox religious and cultural environment, aiming to understand and elucidate their formation and evolution.
The cultural landscape of the Western hemisphere has historically been shaped by Christianity, which has strongly influenced societal values and identity. However, the foundations of this tradition now face significant challenges amid the forces of progress, modernity, and enlightenment. Scholars have long anticipated the rise of secularization, predicting profound shifts in human consciousness. Using Smith’s “Wisdom from Babylon: Leadership for the Church in a Secular Age” as a framework, this article explores these changes. The ongoing discussion of secularization sheds light on the growing phenomenon of Christian secularization in Western society, especially as postmodern thought triggers a quiet cultural revolution that questions traditional Christian values. The article presents two main arguments. Many Christian communities have not withdrawn into privatized faith. Instead, they have actively resisted secular ideologies in the public sphere, often aligning with radical right-wing movements. Dataset methods vary between the World Values Survey (WVS), document material and online material (written, áudio and vídeo). Secondly, some Christian groups increasingly interpret recent events—especially regarding sexual and gender rights policies—not merely as cultural shifts but as eschatological signs, drawing parallels with biblical Babylon. These views are supported by WVS data and can reflect deeper theological responses to contemporary societal changes.
The phenomenon of secularisation has long been a subject of considerable interest among sociologists of religion. This process is intricately linked with modernization, which represents a fundamental dynamic driving societal change and reshaping various social institutions. According to some sociologists, religion, once a central institution, has begun to lose its influence and prominence as societies modernize. Numerous scholars, particularly sociologists have articulated this observation. Western sociologists have approached the study of secularisation through different paradigms, including “the old secularisation paradigm,” “the new secularisation paradigm,” and “the alternative (eclectic) secularisation paradigm,” the latter of which often focuses on non-Western contexts. For instance, Bryan Ronald Wilson (1926-2004), a prominent representative of the classical paradigm, has authored several influential works on new religious movements, such as Sects and Society: Magic and the Millennium (1973) and The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism (1990). From a different perspective, Rodney Stark (1934-2022), a key figure in the new paradigm, has contributed extensively to the discourse on religion and secularisation through publications such as The Triumph of Faith (2015), A Theory of Religion (1987), The Future of Religion (1985), and various articles including “Secularization, R.I.P.” (1987) and “Must All Religions Be Supernatural?” (2015). Our study aims to examine, evaluate, and compare the perspectives of Bryan Wilson and Rodney Stark on secularisation using qualitative analysis and literature review methodologies. For the sake of comparison, we will focus on Stark's and Wilson's views on secularization and religion. In addition, the study aims to illuminate the evolution of secularization paradigms over time and show that although secularization is associated with modernity, it is perceived differently within the new paradigm. Furthermore, focusing on the perspectives of these two sociologists, we will analyze what role new religious movements and pluralistic understandings play in this context. On the other hand, Wilson argues that subjective religiosity remains high in Europe, suggesting that secularisation has significantly impacted traditional religious groups and contributed to the formation of new cults. Specifically, we will examine Wilson’s assertion that, in modern society, churches have become a“post office,” visited only as needed, and that the rise of new religious movements reflects the diminished importance of religion in society. For Wilson, these movements are considered a secularized form of religion. According to Stark, secularisation has notably impacted traditional, low-intensity religious groups, it has not precluded the emergence of fervent cults and sects. Stark argues that although the influence of traditional religious institutions has diminished due to secularization, religious practices persist. We will explore Stark's views on religion and secularisation, including the evidence for secularisation and the proliferation of new religious movements in the modern world. In the final analysis, this paper claims that despite the decline in the influence of traditional religious institutions due to secularisation, religious practices have persisted in different forms or structures.
Számos területen és korosztályban – különösen a városi fiatalok esetében utalnak erre kutatások – a vallásosság klasszikus szerepe, amely tehát a közért, közösségért vállalt felelősséget, s az ezzel járó, aktív, konkrét segítő munkában is megnyilvánuló szociális érzékenységet jelenti, világszerte elhalványult. Az értelemkereső hit, az egyénnek individuális fontosságot, biztonságot ígérő, sok elemből összegyúrt „maga módján vallásosság” ezzel szemben jelentős. Tanulmányunkban egy kis léptékű kérdőíves kutatást is bevetve annak igyekszünk utánajárni, hogy e világszerte tapasztalt változások milyen mértékben és formában vannak jelen a magyar fiatalok körében, s hogy, amint tanulmányunk címe is mutatja, hogyan értelmezhetjük a magyar fiatalok vallási érdeklődését a 2022. évi népszámlálás eredményeit megismerve.
This study uses narrative theory to examine how a subject’s (men and women) reflection upon welfare on life in this world and life after death, without any proselytization, converts from Catholicism, which was a religion of his birth, to Islamism which is a religion of his choice. While the narrative principle, in of itself, does not generate theories, it does bring meaning to some consumers’ life. Using it to analyze a subject’s story does not only generate insight, but it demonstrates how logic and facts can be given a new metaphor for personal relevance.
Few studies have explored religious professionals’ interactions with scientific authority in work settings. Fewer still examine professionals outside Western contexts. We analyze the science‐religion interface as it exists in Shaolin Temple—an ancient Chan Buddhist temple with a worldwide reputation for Shaolin Kungfu. Drawing on a near‐exhaustive survey within Shaolin monastery and 23 interviews with Shaolin monks, we discern and differentiate two modes of nonconflict operating in monks’ psychic lives. One group understands Buddhism and science as comprising independent realms—nonconflictual by virtue of their noninteractivity. Another views science and religion as being interpenetrative and nonconflictual in the sense of being mutually constitutive. These differing orientations, which reflect established categories of “transcendentalist” versus “immanentist” religion, further correlate with different facets of religiosity: Monks with high religious knowledge tend to view Buddhism and science as independent, while monks with high levels of piety tend to see them as collaborative or mutually constitutive.
This chapter is about Jewish hostile representations of prominent exponents of the Berlin Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), especially the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, and the educational reformer Hartwig Wessely. There were intervening circumstances, independent of Mendelssohn’s and Wessely’s own behaviour, that elicited in response very unfavourable attitudes to these two cultural figures, for the very reason that they had become iconic. For example, Joseph Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn’s nominally still Jewish son (his siblings had converted), misrepresented his father’s motifs and unwittingly confirmed some of the most damning claims later made against him in Eastern Europe. This chapter begins with an introduction to Moses Mendelssohn, and to attitudes to his memory. The second section deals with the Berlin Haskalah movement, and other branches of the Jewish Enlightenment. The third section is concerned with Naphtali Hertz (Hartwig) Wessely and his controversial proposal of reform in Jewish education, as part of Josephinism in the Holy Roman Empire. The fourth section is about the peculiar Isaac Satanow (Satanov, Satenow, Satenof), who joined the Berlin Enlightenment but was also interested in mysticism. The fifth section turns to a social phenomenon: the wave of baptisms among Berlin Jews between 1770 and 1830. In the sixth section, the evolution of David Friedländer is considered: from Moses Mendelssohn’s closest disciple, to extreme Enlightener advocating an end of Jewish education, an end to Jewish knowledge, and “dry” yet not wet baptism. The seventh section considers the hostile reception of Moses Mendelssohn especially in Eastern Europe, and what was held against Moses Mendelssohn by rabbinic opponents of the Haskalah. The eighth section turns to a factor that reinforced such a negative reception, namely, to how Joseph Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn’s non-practising yet unconverted son misrepresented his father’s motifs (so they would befit Joseph’s own ideals), and unwittingly confirmed some of the most damning claims later made against him in Eastern Europe.
This study asserts that the secularization theory has the potential to offer insights into the processes of social change experienced by faith groups outside the modern West. The study focuses on the transformation undergone by Alevi groups in Turkey, who are now experiencing a more modern way of life compared to their past. In this qualitative study, data collection was conducted through semistructured interviews during field studies in the cities of Çorum (Turk Alevis) and Tunceli/Dersim (Zaza/Kurd Alevis). Based on the interview findings, the study concludes that the new Alevi generation leads a more modern and at the same time more secular daily life compared to their parents. Therefore, the main assertion of this research is that the classical secularization theory has the potential to provide valuable insights not only for modern societies where Christianity is dominant but also for understanding the transformations occurring within Alevi communities in Turkey.
Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2018/2019 and 2020/2021, the author investigates the contemporary religious structure in Montenegro, using the variables included in the survey: religious identification, self-assessment of religiosity, attendance at religious services, and prayer. The comparison involves all three confessions in Montenegro: Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and believers of the Islamic religious community. The main goal of the research is to determine whether there has been a shift in religiosity and whether there is an emphasized distance in the religiosity of the three confessions in this country. Moreover, the goal is to get an insight into the current situation regarding religiosity in Montenegro. The working hypothesis is that there is a current stabilization of the religious structure in Montenegro and a discrepancy between religious and confessional declarations and religious practices. Hereupon, we analyse the dimensions of religiosity with regard to basic socio-demographic characteristics and political orientations. The results have shown that there is no significant discrepancy in sex structure. The connection between dimensions of religiosity and "right-wing" political orientation is also registered.
Hızlı toplumsal değişmeler dünya görüşlerini, değer yargılarını dönüşüme uğratmaktadır. Din anlayışları da bu sürece tabidir. Saha araştırmaları Batılı son nesilde öncekilere oranla dinsiz, ateist ve spirütüelci eğilimlerin arttığına dair bulgular içermektedir. Türkiye’de yapılan araştırmalarda ise gençlerin büyük çoğunluğunun kendilerini inançlı, dindar, Müslüman, dini ve Allah’ın varlığını önemseyen kimseler olarak tanımladıkları görülmektedir. Ancak güncel bazı araştırmalar düşük oranlarda da olsa Türkiye’deki gençlerin kendilerini deist, agnostik, ateist ya da inançsız olarak tanımlayabildiklerini göstermektedir. Güncel araştırmalarda genç dindarlığı bağlamında dinden uzaklaşma, yeni spiritüel arayışlar, dinî kimliğin dönüşümü, dinin düşüşü, şüphe gibi temaların ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Bu temalar ebeveynlerde kaygıya sebep olmaktadır. Nitekim dijital bir evrene doğan 21. yüzyıl kuşağının önceki kuşaklardan farklılaşmayacağı düşünülemez. Bu çalışmada klasik sekülerleşme paradigmasının din-toplum ilişkisini açıklamakta yetersiz olduğu tezinden yola çıkılarak genç yetişkinlerin din ve dindarlık anlayışları konu edinilmiştir. Din anlayışı araştırması, dindarlık araştırmasından farklı olarak bireylerin algı ve anlayışlarına odaklanır. Türkiye’de gençlik ve din konusunda 2000’den sonra yapılan araştırmalar sayıca görece azdır ve bunların büyük çoğunluğu din psikolojisi alanında, nicel yöntemlerle yapılmıştır. Kategorinin genişliği ve nicel yöntemin sınırlılıkları konunun etraflıca değerlendirilmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu sebeple çalışmada belli bir yaş aralığında bulunan genç yetişkinlere odaklanılarak nitel yöntemle onların din ve dindarlık anlayışları incelenmiştir. Anlayıcı-yorumlayıcı paradigma ile genç yetişkinlerin din ve dindarlık anlayışlarının betimlenmesi ve beliren farklılaşmaların tespiti bu çalışmanın temel amacıdır. Keşfedici bir saha araştırması olan bu araştırmada amaçlı örnekleme yapılmıştır. Farklı sosyokültürel özelliklere sahip 19- 28 yaş aralığında; üniversite öğrencisi, çalışan, kadın, erkek kategorilerinden 18 gençle yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirilmiştir. Elde edilen bulgular genç yetişkinlerin anlayışlarındaki benzerlik ve farklılıklara odaklanılarak anlayıcı paradigma bağlamında yorumlanmıştır. Bulgular Tanrı ve din tasavvuru, dindarlık ve dindarlığa bakış, modernist/seküler eğilimler, din-ahlak ilişkisi, din-akıl/bilim ilişkisi, din ve toplumsal sorunlar, din-siyaset/devlet ilişkisi başlıkları altında sunulmuştur. Genç yetişkinlerin çoğu geleneksel taklidi bir inanç söylemine sahiptir. Bazıları içinde yaşadıkları sosyo kültürel şartların etkisiyle din ve Tanrı hakkında derinlikli düşünsel ve/veya duygusal tecrübe yaşamamış görünmektedir. Kendi tasavvurunu inşa etme ve/veya öğrenilmiş olanı içselleştirme eğilimi gösteren gençler de yok değildir. Genç yetişkinlerin tasavvurlarında din güven veren, kimlik kaynağı, kültürel bir unsur, toplumsal bütünleştirici, anlam kaynağı ve sığınak nitelikleriyle ön plana çıkmaktadır. Gençlerin bazıları inanç kimliklerine rağmen dinin temel inanç esaslarından bazıları konusunda şüphe içinde ya da bunlarla yüzleşmemiş görünmektedirler. Genç yetişkinler dinî emir ve yasaklara tam olarak riayet et(e)mediklerini belirtseler de dindarlık konusunda normatif bir tasavvur taşımaktadırlar. Onların çoğuna göre “popüler sekülarist kültür” çeşitli zorluklar üretse de “dindarlık” mümkündür. Onlara göre dinin esaslarına riayet doğrultusunda bir dindarlık ancak iman, okuma, tefekkür, araştırma, terbiye, güven ve özeleştiri kavramları çerçevesinde gerçekleşebilir. Bununla birlikte “hazcı serbestlik” eğilimlerle dindar olmayı imkânsız olarak gören gençler de bulunmaktadır. Genç yetişkinler kurumsal sekülerleşme süreçleri doğrultusunda yer yer değişime uyum sağlama eğilimi göstermektedirler. Gençlik ve din ilişkisi sorunlarının çözümünde başta aile olmak üzere, kurumsal dinî yapılara, eğitimcilere, gençlik politikaları dâhil toplumun geleceğine ilişkin politika geliştirenlere önemli görevler düşmektedir.
Scholars theorize the effect of modernization on religious and familial institutions in a parallel way. Some argue that both are irreversibly in decline—as secularization and deinstitutionalization, respectively—while others argue that they have either merely changed or are in fact growing stronger. However, correctly interpreting institutional change depends not only on how one evaluates the empirical starts and endpoints but also on how one defines the domains under change themselves. In this paper, I examine these debates, detail the structural similarities in their arguments, and outline a new analytical approach informed by recent work in institutional logics to better answer the definitional questions. Theorizing both institutions together and their parallel trajectories in modernity reveals unique insights about the scholarly discourse on modernization and is especially important given the unique influence of religion and family on one another as (seemingly) privatized spheres of social life.
Over the past decade, theories of erosion of the religion and its disappearance from the public sphere has come under increasing criticism. Indeed, secularization theory is currently experiencing the most profound challenge in its long history. Critics point to multiple indicators of religious health and vitality, ranging from the rising popularity of the church in the United States to the emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe, the exponential power of fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the Islamic world and a major evangelical revival in Latin America.1 There is no doubt that the traditional secularization theories need to be revised and updated. Religion has clearly not disappeared from the world, and it does not seem likely. Debate over secularization shaped through two main perspectives, the first is demand side theories which represent the traditional theories include theory of rational Weltanschauung "The loss of faith" and the theory of evolutionary functionalism "The loss of purpose", the second perspective is supply side theories which represent the alternative theories include the theory of religious markets "The loss of competition" and the theory of secularization based on Existential Security.2 Traditional theories focus "bottom up" on the masses suggest that modernization and industrialization of the societies result in eroding of the religion regardless of the behavior of religious leaders or organizations, the rational theory "loss of faith" based on the assumption that era of Enlightenment granted a rational view of the world depend on science and empirical standards that made the central ideas of the church unbelievable. Accordingly, loss of faith led to
The transformation of religious area by arising of new modes of expressing religiosity is almost worldwide phenomena. The idea of making up personal bricolage of beliefs, choosing what fits and what does not is very popular mode of religiosity or spirituality today. To hear that one could choose religious identity without religious belief is not surprising in Lithuania today. Sociologically, it could be explained referring to the identity constructing theories. This article presents the research that was performed by the Department of Sociology at Vytautas Magnus University (in 2003-2004). The aim of the research was to explore the process of construction of religious identity via applying Hervieu-Leger idea of four dimensions of religious identification. The data of focused interviews confirms that religious identity could be constructed via one or few dimensions of religious identification excluding other dimensions. However, reference exclusively to one or few dimensions shifts traditional ( or confessional) ways of expressing religiousness and still for somebody rises the question about her/his religiousness in general.
Introduction
The concepts of religion and belief have witnessed a metamorphic process in the modern and post-modern periods. According to those who defend the idea that religion has lost its visibility and effectiveness in the public sphere, this process is explained as moving away from religion, secularization, indifference to religion,
and rejection of religion. We chose to use the concept of different styles of belief to express the phenomenon in question. In the article, postgraduate (master's, doctoral) studies examining young people's levels of different styles of belief were analyzed. The primary purpose of the research is to investigate, compare, and
photograph studies that scientifically evaluate individuals without religious affiliation from a meta-analytical perspective.
Methods
In line with its purpose, the content analysis technique, one of the qualitative research designs, was used in the study. The research includes the theses in the YÖK National Thesis Center and ISAM Theses Catalog between 2000 and 2023 (March). The data of the study was collected in two screening phases. In the first stage, "atheism, deism, agnosticism, nihilism, apatheism" were scanned. In the second stage, "disbelief, religious doubts and questionings, conception of God, belief in God" were scanned. As a result of this screening, 23 theses were found regarding the different belief styles of young people. The theses reached are on atheism, deism, and agnosticism. No studies on nihilism and apatheism were found.
Findings and Discussion
Of the theses discussed within the scope of the article, five are at the doctoral level, and 18 are at the master's level. It was observed that 14 of them adopted a qualitative research design, and 9 adopted a quantitative research method. Six new scales were developed in quantitative studies, and three adaptations were used. All but one of the relevant theses were completed after 2010. 18 of 23 studies were completed in 2018 and later. In light of the statistical information regarding the theses in the data pool (a. most of them are at the master's level, b. the scales do not have the opportunity to be tested in different samples, c. almost all of them have been completed in the last five years), it can be seen that the academic interest in different styles of belief is relatively fresh and the data is not yet at a saturation level. It was concluded that it was not reached. When the findings of quantitative studies on atheism were compared, it was observed that different results were obtained depending on the question item used in the research. Accordingly, young people make a distinction between the creative being and God. However, when the studies, in general, are taken into consideration, it is thought that young people's level of belief in atheism is not high, that they can develop negative opinions about God even if they do not result in atheism, and that this is due to the idea of God rather than the concept of God. In addition, when qualitative studies are examined, inferences such as "atheists see religion as an obstacle to thought and science, some of them experience conceptual confusion and define themselves as atheists, intellectual arguments predominate in the transition to atheism, and the lack of an exemplary personality in this process is an important factor." can be done.
What stands out in deism studies is that young people's level of agreement with propositions supporting the deist worldview is high, even if they do not define themselves as deists. The inconsistency between being a deist and advocating a deist worldview is based on qualitative study findings as "the prioritization of science, the bad profile of some religious people, the idea that religion cannot regulate daily life, and the search for freedom during adolescence, etc." linked to factors. As a result, it was thought that young people developed a different attitude towards faith due to their positivist perspective, and it was understood that this situation resulted in high levels of agreement with deist propositions, even if they were not deists.
Some cultural evolutionary models predict that under stressful reductions of well-being, individuals will be more attracted and fastidiously adhere to traditional systems of norms that promote solidarity and cooperation. As religious systems can bolster human relationships with a variety of mechanisms, the material insecurity hypothesis of religion posits that individual religiosity will increase under conditions of material insecurity. The bulk of the literature up to this point has been correlational and cross-national. Here, across 14 field sites, we examine the causal role that educational attainment and food insecurity play in religiosity. We find that years of formal education and food insecurity do not consistently contribute to individual religiosity cross-culturally. We conclude with a discussion of some theoretical and methodological implications. As a general workflow for cross-cultural causal research in the quantitative social sciences, the present work is a modest but necessary first step in reliably estimating causation in the material insecurity hypothesis of religiosity.
Within the intricate structure of global political landscapes, the nation of Turkey emerges as a captivating subject of study, particularly when examining its progressive secularism and the complex interplay of socio-political dynamics. This study aims to examine the fundamental structural factors that surround the implementation of Turkey's present political secularism, while also employing Habermas' proposed notion of a post-secular society as an approach to address and resolve these intricacies. This study utilizes a qualitative research methodology by doing literature studies and relying on secondary data for data collection. The findings of this study suggest that Habermas's notion of a post-secular society has the potential to develop a sociopolitical structure that is more democratic and inclusive in the setting of Turkey where it is being investigated.
The article focuses on the conflicting relationship between religious institutions in the community of Goiabal, located in the city of Campos dos Goytacazes, State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. By that, religious rifts stand out from the “narratives of religious differentiation” produced by the leaders of Pentecostal communities in the territory. Therefore, the main sources of the work are the semi-structured interviews with religious leaders in which religious disputes, tensions, and petrified divisions in the community are revealed. Based on the category of “narratives of religious differentiation,” one recognizes an edge of the disputes of “religious tendencies” (Lowy)—two evangelical churches—in front of the “terreiro,” present in Goiabal; they shape a religious division in the community space in the Parque California area.
There is currently no secularity scale with strong psychometric properties that would allow for the examination of the secularization process experienced by Muslims. Thus, the purpose of this article is to develop a psychometrically sound and quick-to-apply scale that can be used to measure the degree of secularity among Muslims. For exploratory factor analysis (EFA), an inventory with 65 items was applied to 1,573 university students, and it yielded a two-factor structure with an internal reliability of 0.975 for Daily Life factor and 0.952 for Faith and Prayer factor. After EFA, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed with 4,391 individuals, and a structure that can be deemed very solid was found. The measurement invariance was also examined, and it was discovered that the scale can be used for various populations. In addition, the scale has convergent validity, a high test-retest result, and discriminant validity. The 25-item Secularity Scale has a new theoretical approach – which is not only based on faith and prayer but also daily life activities – and sound psychometric properties. Examining how secularity manifests itself in Muslim societies might be useful in describing, predicting, and explaining how individuals act in a variety of contexts. The scale might also help to avoid the use of approach utilized in Christian-centred secularity debates in the case of Muslim-majority societies.
How are we to understand the paradoxical and contradictory view that seems to exist of religious minorities today where they are simultaneously both highlighted as a risk and a resource and thereby both excluded and included from the public realm? In this chapter this question is further explored by looking at previous research in the field. The chapter argues that although the need to manage religious diversity may have intensified in many Western countries, the way governments and other public authorities see religion as a risk and resource may be more deeply embedded in the national context of a country than sometimes noted. Therefore, the historical perceptive is central to consider. Sweden is used as a case to explore these issues further in the book
The interface of religion and education is a new and significant aspect of international geopolitics, evidenced by key political policy documents emerging from both national governments and inter-governmental agencies. On the world stage, from United Nations human rights-oriented resolutions on freedom of religion or belief (Amor 2001; UN 2023a) and on education and religion as related to the rights of both parents and children (UN 2023b), UNESCO declarations on intercultural understanding (Ade-Ajayi et al. 2007), or initiatives such as the UN’s Alliance of Civilizations (AOC 2023), religion in education is seen as an important mechanism for advancing liberal, democratic goals. Across the European mainland, in borders which far exceed that of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has even produced guidelines specifically to address the teaching of religion in compulsory education (OSCE 2007). The geopolitical and the pedagogical emerge, too, in the United States in the American Academy of Religion’s inclusive Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in K–12 Public Schools in the United States (AAR 2010). The Russian Federation has, by contrast, focused less on diversity than the unifying importance of Orthodox Christianity to enshrine Russia’s cultural and religious heritage as part of the nation state’s social and political well-being, with significant impacts on the teaching of religion in Russian schools (Blinkova and Vermeer 2018; Glanzer and Petrenko 2007; Kozyrev and Federov 2007; Zhdanov 2016).
Psychologists’ assumptions about the world influence theory creation, hypothesis testing, and practical applications. In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor describes how the historical process of secularization has shaped the worldviews of those living in the modern West, and how the particularities of that process have influenced our (implicit or explicit) theories of the human condition. Within this worldview, human nature is seen as understandable and describable without transcendent referents, and human flourishing is described in terms of authenticity and personal satisfaction. In this article, I continue the ongoing discussion regarding the ideological underpinnings of the positive psychology movement by connecting them to the process of secularization in the West. I argue that Western secularity influences the vision of flourishing that shapes theory, research, and application within the positive psychology movement. Psychologists and mental health professionals should be aware that our empirical and practical work runs the risk of imposing a vision of human flourishing that is particular to our current historical and geographic milieu, rather than being necessarily true of all of humanity.
This paper addresses why an animistically‐inspired system of ritual practices, structured around hazy notions of “chaos” and “order”, remain viable in Japan for both the common person as well as for elites, based upon both ancient and “invented” rituals. Shinto religious practices would seem a likely candidate for extinction within Japan's hightech consumer society. And yet, it is commonplace that new cars be blessed at a shrine, that new residences, officers, or factories be built after exorcism ceremonies purify and calm the land and its deity, that children are dedicated there, and that governmental functions frequently invite ritualistic encapsulation that shapes and orders the consciousness of those involved, often in nationalistic directions.
Everyone is familiar with the notion of an ‘Age of Faith’. It is the idea that, at some time in the past, everyone believed what religious authority told them to believe. In this paper I propose to test the truth of this idea, in one period, and one region.
I have chosen thirteenth-century Italy. The Middle Ages stand,
par excellence
, as the Age of Faith; and the thirteenth century, late enough not to starve us of evidence, was still early enough to be safely medieval. Italy, too, chooses itself: its documents, and its debates, yield the historian a clearer picture than he would get elsewhere. Whether Italy was typical of latin Christendom is a question that would call, not for another paper, but for another conference. But hints of her position will appear in the course of our enquiry. Some sources singled her out, some did not – giving an assurance, between them, that any difference between Italy and the rest was a difference between shades of grey.
Italy, then, in the thirteenth century, is our field; and we shall be enquiring in it not, now, about kinds of belief, but about
degrees
of it. How far were our predecessors, in the time and place chosen, in the modern sense ‘religious’?
Recent critics of the secularization thesis have questioned the extent to which premodern Britain was religious by creating a caricature of a 'Golden Age of Faith' and then showing that the reality fell short of that image. This rejoinder stresses the need to appreciate the nature of religion pre-Reformation and draws on the work of leading historians to show that, even if we accept the most jaundiced view of religion before and shortly after the Reformation, the previous orthodoxy was more accurate than the recent revisions. In Laslett's phrase, 'the world we have lost' was a religious world.
Data collected in a multistage probability sample of Russian-speaking citizens of the Russian Federation in the spring and summer of 1991 (as part of the International Social Survey Program's study of Religion) indicate a substantial increase in religious belief and affiliation in the Federation. A third of the Russian people who said they once did not believe in God now do believe in God -- 22% of all Russians. There has also been a substantial affiliation with the Orthodox Church of those who were not previously members. The "revivalists" are disproportionately young and (relatively) disproportionately male. They tend to have become believers because of a "religious turning point" experience and to view the purpose of religion as giving a meaning and purpose to life. They propose to raise their children as religious and, like all Russians, to have a great respect for the Orthodox Church.
Stark and Iannaccone have recently proposed a "supply-side" model of religious change and, in applying it to Europe, challenged the previously widely shared view that Britain is now a much less religious society than it was in 1900 or 1800. This reply presents the summaries of the work of a large number of historians of British religion as well as data from recent social surveys and censuses of church attendance to argue that the previous consensus was by and large correct. It challenges Stark and Iannaccone's notion that British lack of enthusiasm for formal religion can be explained by the lack of competing religious organizations.
We propose a theory of religious mobilization that accounts for variations in religious participation on the basis of variations in the degree of regulation of religious economies and consequent variations in their levels of religious competition. To account for the apparent "secularization" of many European nations, we stress supply-side weaknesses -- inefficient religious organizations within highly regulated religious economies -- rather than a lack of individual religious demand. We test the theory with both quantitative and historical data and, based on the results, suggest that the concept of secularization be dropped for lack of cases to which it could apply.
Although the secularization theories put forward in the 1960s and 70s by different sociologists are not compatible at the theoretical level, they nevertheless share a very broad set of assumptions and analytical categories. This paper provides a systematization of this common framework (or paradigm). It is shown, with exact references to the texts of Luckmann, Berger, Wilson, Martin, Fenn, Parsons, and Bellah, that the secularization paradigm is based on a core of three "concepts" (or exemplars): differentiation, rationalization, and worldliness. Around this core are a number of logically subordinated exemplars, most notably autonomization, privatization, generalization, pluralization, and collapse of the world view.
At present, one important issue under discussion is whether Turkey will join the European Community, despite her being a Moslem country. This study shows that religious socialization among university students (N = 1099) is increasing, but not at the expense of democratic values. Although, religious socialization appears to increase, subjects overwhelmingly reject religious discrimination and fundamentalism. The data were collected in 1978 (N = 536) and in 1991 (N = 563), from groups at universities, in Ankara, which included the Faculty of Theological Studies.
The theory of secularization is a product of the social and cultural milieu from which it emerged. The expectation of receding
religious influence fits well the evolutionary model of modernization. Critical reexamination reveals secularization to be
an orienting concept grounded in an ideological preference rather than a systematic theory. This paper examines the historical
context which permitted the idea of secularization to go unchallenged for so long, and then develops four discrete types of
evidence to account for the present challenge to the theory.
The introduction to this paper provides a brief review of the literature on religious belief and practice suggesting that much of this remains to be fully assimilated within the sociology of religion. The paper examines the contention that contemporary British religious practice can be characterized as 'believing without belonging'. Drawing on a survey of rural residents in five areas of England, the paper suggests that a majority of people express high levels of religious belief and a sense of belonging to a particular denomination. Formal religious observance is, however, low. Through a detailed examination of attitudes to the Church of England, a picture emerges of a populace with a well developed sense of the role of the Church and its clergy which is, in the main, affirmative and positive. An important question remains as to why such sentiment is so unevenly transmitted into formal religious observance such as regular attendance at church services.
The argument recalls the author's initial critique twenty five years ago of one-directional theories of secularization in terms of covert philosophical assumptions, selective epiphenomenalism, conceptual incoherence, and indifference to historical complexity. Even today the evident revival of religion in Eastern Europe is treated as epiphenomenal i.e. really nationalism. The argument goes on to assert that whether in its hard version as the death of religion or in its soft form as marginalization, secularization should be treated as contingent, in particular on the situation in Europe since the Enlightenment. The rest of the article examines North and South America and the Middle East to show how things can be otherwise. It concludes that even in Europe the hostilities of the last two centuries are over.
By examining the effect of modernization on the frequency of fasting, and the prevalence of various reasons for fasting, we attempted to gain insight into the nature of contemporary religious change. Using data from a stratified random sample of Javanese, we found that fasting was not consistently related to all indicators of modernization. However it does seem that the frequency of fasting will increase on Java, at least in the near future. Further, we found modernization to be associated with a decline in fasting as an expression of piety and an increase in fasting for the purpose of self-control. The data were interpreted in light of the history of fasting and the theoretical perspectives of Hocart and Peacock.
According to its critics, the "old" secularization paradigm has been tried, convicted, and executed by recent scholarship in the social sciences of religion, and is being replaced by a "new" (postsecularization) paradigm which highlights the continued vitality of religion in modern societies. This paper argues that claims to have definitively refuted secularization theory are exaggerated. It mounts a defense of a "neosecularization" paradigm which retains the core insights of the old paradigm while incorporating criticisms leveled against the hubris and laziness of some deployments of the concept of "secularization." Following Chaves (1994), this paper argues that the core of neosecularization theory is the proposition that secularization means not the decline of religion but the declining scope of religious authority at the individual, organizational, and societal levels of analysis. Three exemplars of this perspective in the area of religion and politics are highlighted: the work of Hertzke (1988), Demerath and Williams (1992), and Casanova (1994).
In both empirical research and interpretation today there is a total lack of agreement as to what secularization is and how to measure it. The present paper tries to bring the concept of secularization into focus by considering 1) the history of the term, 2) six types of usage today and their application in selected examples of research, 3) a critique of these forms of secularization concept as analytical tools, and 4) a critique of the secular-religious polarity. It is concluded that the term secularization, because of its polemical past, its extremely varied definitions, and its frequent use as a blanket term to cover several disparate processes, should either be abandoned or be explicitly recognized as a comprehensive term covering three complementary but distinct processes, desacralization, differentiation and transposition.
Religion in Iceland provides the focus for a historical-comparative and participant observation study of the supposed "irrelevance" of religion in secular society. The judgment of irrelevance appears to depend largely on a peculiar definitional construct, formed with little immediate connection to the experience of the participants in the system. A situational definition grounded in the participants' understandings of their own actions produces a rather different assessment of the religio-social systems under investigation. When people act in ways they define as religious, religion must be accepted as "real" for social-scientific analysis. On this basis judgments of the irrelevance of Scandinavian religion are premature and one-sided, with predefined "functions" of religion in society skewing both research and theory.
This article examines the main charges against secularization theory and finds them wanting. Contrary to the recent arguments
of various critics, there is a reasonably solid body of secularization theory with valid historical content; secularization
cannot be explained away as either institutionalization or transformation; it is neither a selflimiting process nor reversed
by fundamentalist movements; and while secularization theory may be of limited use in current macrosociological research on
global change, it is as yet far from irrelevant. Until it is more solidly refuted, secularization theory remains a valuable
part of the theoretical arsenal of the sociology of religion.
This paper reports a test of Roof's (1976) model of secularization in a non-Christian, non-Western context. The model predicts
that education, community size, and mobility will be negatively related to localism which will be positively related to established
religiosity. We studied a sample of Indonesian Muslims living on Java. Generally the data do not fit the model. Community
size is negatively related to Islamic religiosity but education is positively related. Localism is a multifaceted variable
complexly related to religiosity. The paper concludes with a discussion of situational factors that might explain the findings.
SmithMark. Religion in Industrial Society: Oldham and Saddleworth, 1740–1865. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: The Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 311. $55.00. ISBN 0-19-820451-5. - Volume 28 Issue 1 - Albion M. Urdank
The claim that modern societies are less religious than their predecessors because modernity undermines the plausibility of religion has been almost an orthodoxy. But increasingly this `secularization thesis' is being challenged on a number of fronts. This collection brings together leading sociologists and historians who share a common interest in advancing our understanding of religious change by clarifying the key elements of the thesis and testing them against appropriate bodies of data. The book begins with an exposition of the thesis by two sociologists and goes on to present and interpret new data on church adherence in the nineteenth century in the USA and Europe, British church membership rates for the last two hundred years and the British 1851 census of church attendance, changes in English Roman Catholicism, and comparisons of American and European religiosity. The collection is completed with a response by Bryan Wilson, for many the chief advocate of the secularization account of religious change. Even where historians and sociologists cannot agree, Religion and Modernization has the great value of clarifying the arguments and pointing the way toward their resolution.
For generations, sociologists have believed that cities are less hospitable to religion than are rural areas and that where many faiths compete for followers, the credibility of each is reduced. In this essay we attempt to explain why these received truths are, in fact, nostalgic myths. We try to demonstrate that religious participation is and ought to be higher in cities and that competition among religious bodies increases levels of religious mobilization. Our analysis is based on the 1906 U.S. Census of Religious Bodies, and the units of analysis are the 150 largest cities--all of those having an estimated population of 25,000 or more.
Although the suggestion eighty years ago that four in ten scientists did
not believe in God or an afterlife was astounding to contemporaries, the
fact that so many scientists believe in God today is equally surprising.
This article does not seek to argue for or against any aspect of the secularisation thesis. It argues that careful attention to the definition of terms, together with a division of existing arguments relating to the thesis into a “Broad Approach”; and a “Narrow Approach”; would greatly assist in the clarification and evaluation of arguments concerning the secularisation thesis. It argues further that it is vital for historical data to be correctly researched, handled and applied. The article concludes that there is a significant amount of confusion caused by the failure to define terms and apply historical data with care. This makes it difficult to make headway with the secularisation debate or to evaluate properly the alternative model of “Desacralisation”; (Stark & Iannaccone, 1994), so that theorists are often talking at cross purposes.
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1995 The development of Taiwanese folk religion was intertwined with social and economic conditions through Taiwan's history. Since the 17th century, the new immigrant society favored the growth of economic crops to exchange the necessary goods from mainland. This started the long process of dynamic interaction between the folk religion and the economic development of Taiwan. As a result, the original roles of the deities, Ma-tsu (a protector of seamen) and T'u-ti-kung (a protector of farmers) had changed and gradually emerged as commercial gods. The official culture did not root deeply in this new society, so the official temples without the local support, were doomed to decline.Under the Japanese rule, the Taiwanese were barred from government positions but active in economic field. Hence, the content of folk religion, articulating their life, became more concerned with material gains. Without the involvement of high-culture elites in shaping the beliefs, moral or abstract values were less emphasized in the religion. Although the religion is an important part of the cultural identity of the Taiwanese, there was no dramatic and violent confrontation between the folk religion and colonial rule. Only a few Taiwanese converted to the religions that the rulers promoted, although the folk religion adopted some new elements from the Japanese religions.Another important aspect of this study is that the study of Taiwanese folk religion can offer an alternative view to the Western general theory of religious study, which assumes that state and religion are independent institutions, and is unworkable for some religions such as Taiwanese folk religion. Data for the temples of this study mainly come from three sources: (1) Ch'ing Gazetteers (written from 1694 to 1898), (2) The Survey of Temples (six volumes) (conducted by the colonial government in 1915-1916), (3) Appendix: Directory of Temples in Taiwan, in Taiwanese Religion and Superstitious Customs (So, Keirai, 1938).