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How Can it Happen that Horrendous State Crimes are Perpetrated?: An Overview of Criminological Theories

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Abstract

This article offers a criminological explanation of crimes perpetrated by state officials or those involving states, more specifically such crimes as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. After exploring the criminological implications of the Milgram experiments on obedience towards authority, the author presents the theory of ‘neutralization techniques’ and applies it at the state level. Finally, by way of illustration, the notorious speech made in 1943 by Himmler on the extermination of Jews is analysed.
1
How Can It Happen that Horrendous State Crimes are Perpetrated? An
Overview of Criminological Theories
Frank Neubacher*
Abstract
This article offers a criminological explanation of crimes perpetrated by state officials or
involving states, more specifically such crimes as genocide, war crimes or crimes against
humanity. After exploring the criminological implications of the Milgram experiments on
obedience towards authority, the author presents the theory of ‘neutralization techniques’ and
applies it at the state level. Finally, by way of illustration, the notorious speech made in 1943
by Himmler on the extermination of Jews is analysed.
1. Introduction: Explaining the Incomprehensible
Most serious crimes committed by the state, such as genocide or systematic torture, leave
observers with a sense of shock and bewilderment. As a first reaction, the origins of heinous
crimes are sought in the pathological personality of the perpetrator or in the exceptional evil
of a political system. At times claims are even made that crimes like the holocaust are
inherently unclassifiable, as they portray a unique, incomparable and incomprehensible
incident.
1
Hans Magnus Enzensberger argued that those who term Hitler a common criminal
render him apparently harmless, mistransforming his crimes into something comprehensible.
2
This perspective has merit, in particular if the dimensions of the crimes committed during the
holocaust are considered. The genocide of the European Jews cannot simply be understood as
a horrible accident of German or European history. Since it was planned and carried out in the
centre of a modern, rational and enlightened society proud of its culture it should be rather
seen as a product and problem of this civilization and culture.
3
And yet, in asking how we can
explain state crime, we should not overlook lessons from the disciplines of social psychology
and sociology regarding behaviour in decision-making situations. Not least, because these
disciplines may offer explanations based on the behaviour of normal people rather than
monsters, demons or devils.
* Privat Dozent, Ph. D, Institute of Criminology, University of Cologne (currently at University of Dresden).
[Frank.Neubacher@uni-koeln.de]
1
On this issue see D. Diner (ed.), Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987); M. Freeman, ‘The Theory And Prevention of Genocide’, 6 Holocaust and Genocide
Studies (1991), 185-199, 186; M. Dabag, ‘Genozidforschung. Leitfragen, Kontroversen, Überlieferung’, 1
Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung (1999), 6-35, 29.
2
H.M. Enzensberger, Politik und Verbrechen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1964), 36.
3
Z. Bauman, Dialektik der Ordnung, Die Moderne und der Holocaust (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt,
1992), 98-131; M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987), 112, 221.
2
It is well known that most Nazis were very ordinary: many of them were loving
husbands and caring family-members, educated, generally law-abiding people and yet they
were also capable of horrendous criminal acts. In the course of the Jerusalem trial against
Adolf Eichmann, head of department for Jews at the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), a
psychiatrist found Eichmann ‘in any case more normal than I am after having examined
him’.
4
And philosopher Hannah Arendt pointed out that the commission of even so grievous
crimes did not require human monsters. To her Eichmann personified the ‘banality of evil’ a
term which has come to be understood as a synonym for the thoughtlessness with which an
individual in bureaucratic structures can participate in such criminality, unable or unwilling to
confront the logical consequences of their own actions.
5
Confronted with the consequences of their deeds, even the perpetrators have difficulty
in understanding those deeds and recognizing themselves therein. The excuses offered by
Nazi criminals for example, that they were compelled to obey orders have provided
nothing more than a legal defence strategy, albeit in vain. What then are the factors enabling
people to display such cruel behaviour that they can hardly admit it to themselves, committing
deeds which they themselves perceive as an attack on their self-image and pride, and which
are consequently banished from memory or retrospectively falsified?
These questions are considered here from a criminological standpoint.
6
Usually
criminology deals with deviant behaviour. In this regard, however, state crime is special. The
perpetrators of state crime are often not considered criminal by those in their own society,
since their behaviour conforms with the expectations of others in that society. To call their
behaviour deviant only makes sense with reference to some standard at a superior level (e.g.
international law, universal norms).
7
At the domestic level, a major part of the explanation has
to deal with conformity or, as in Stanley Milgram’s experiments, with obedience. Despite the
focus on individual behaviour, it would be wrong to assume the explanation is limited to the
micro-level. The state is clearly implicated in the production of such behaviour through
defining political aims, defining political in- and out-groups, disseminating propaganda and
justifications for violence against the out-group, and signalling that it expects these aims,
4
Cf. H. Welzer, Täter, Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2005), 9.
5
H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on The Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963); H.
Brunkhorst, Hannah Arendt (München: Beck, 1999), 53. Also A. Alvarez, ‘Adjusting to Genocide, The
Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust’, 21 Social Science History (1997), 139-178, 154-157 rejects the
‘Myth of Monsters’.
6
See F. Neubacher, Kriminologische Grundlagen einer internationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit Politische Ideen-
und Dogmengeschichte, kriminalwissenschaftliche Legitimation, strafrechtliche Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2005), 215-239.
7
See I. Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, 13 European Journal of
International Law (2002), 561-595, 575.
3
rules, views, and orders to be followed. After all, there are numerous links between the
individual and the political level. These links are the central concern of this article. After
exploring the implications of the Milgram experiments, the theory of ‘neutralization
techniques’ is presented. Originally developed in the context of individual crimes, it is here
applied to the state level, offering an explanation of state crimes, wherein ordinary people
commit extraordinary crimes. The theory is illustrated through analysis of the notorious secret
speech by Heinrich Himmler advocating the extermination of Jews.
2. The Milgram Experiments and Beyond
The Milgram experiments also known informally as the ‘Eichmann experiment’ were
carried out at the University of Yale at the beginning of the 1960s. Stanley Milgram’s
research work provided essential findings relating to the phenomenon of obedience and its
destructive potential.
8
Its relevance is widely recognized in genocide studies.
9
Milgram
believed the essence of obedience to be a person coming to the point where he sees himself
as a tool which carries out the will of others and is thus no longer responsible for his own
actions.
10
This reversal of self-image should be seen as the central issue in the complex
problem of obedience. Once a person has completed this crucial transformation all the
essential traits of obedience appear. Adjustments within the thought process, willingness to
participate in cruel deeds and the categories of self-justification built up by an obedient
subject are generally similar. External circumstances do not make any difference whether
the subject is obeying in a psychological laboratory or the control station of a launch pad for
inter-continental missiles.
11
8
S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: HarperCollins, 1974).
9
Z. Bauman, supra note 3, 166-183; H. Welzer, supra note 4, 108-113.
10
S. Milgram, Das Milgram-Experiment, Zur Gehorsamsbereitschaft gegenüber Autorität (Reinbek bei
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982), 11.
11
Milgram, supra note 10. Milgram’s experimental design which gave cause to his alarming observation
presented itself as follows: Male volunteers received the order to subject other people to a number of painfully
electrical shocks under the pretext that the experiment was to analyse the effect of punishment on memory and
learning. Each test person held the position of a ‘teacher’ whose only task was to punish a ‘pupil’ with supposed
electrical shocks each time a mistake was made during a learning test with pair association. However, the pupil
was actually a member of the research team who was simply play-acting, and there were no real shocks given.
The test person was instructed to increase the voltage to the next highest level for each mistake made by the
‘pupil’. The shock generator was clearly marked with thirty current levels which appeared to be evidently
connected to the ‘electrical chair’ of the ‘pupil’. The voltage ranged from ‘15 volts: slight shock’, over ‘195
volts, very strong shock’ and ‘375 volts: Danger: severe shock’ up to ‘450 volts’. However, labelling from ‘435
volts’ onwards consisted of ‘XXX’. The experiment began after the teacher/test person had himself been
subjected to a real trial shock of 45 volts and after the ‘pupil’ had been tied down. Protest of the victim was
coordinated to the supposed electrical shocks and audible via a door being slightly ajar. At 75 volts the ‘pupil’
began to moan and grumble; at 150 volts he demanded to be released from the experiment; at 180 volts he yelled
that he could not stand the pain any longer, at 300 volts he screamed with pain, insisted on his release and
announced that he would refuse to answer any more questions. If the teacher/test person hesitated thereafter or
protested against administering electrical shocks, the head of the experiment dressed in a grey coat would reply
4
Psychologists concluded from Milgram’s experiments that relatively ordinary people
can be made to perform cruel acts on others.
12
No deficits in their character are required, since
they are simply fulfilling their duty, void of any personal animosity. The experiments
suggested that the percentage of volunteers obeying a person in a position of authority could
only be decreased by weakening the authority of that person. As if they existed in some kind
of force field, the head of the experiment lost power over the volunteers to the same extent
that the ‘victim/pupil’ or two colluding, disobedient accomplices gained influence. In the
‘immediacy of the victim’ condition, in which the volunteer was asked to force back the
pupil’s hand on the metal shock plate at the 150 volts level, the percentage of obedient
volunteers was considerably reduced to 30 %. This was apparently because it is more difficult
to harm a person that is concrete, visible, and able to observe our actions. In the ‘disobedient
group’ condition, in which two colluding accomplices who were, like the victim, members of
the research team and were acting as co-teachers, refused to continue at different shock levels,
obedience could be reduced as low as 10 %. In this case the volunteer was left alone with sole
responsibility for carrying out the instructions, and typically did not want to appear callous in
front of others. Moreover, both colluding accomplices had just demonstrated that
disobedience was possible and how to do it. Thus, they served as a model from which the
volunteer could learn how to get out of the situation.
13
Yet, Milgram concluded that the
overall results raise the possibility that human nature cannot be counted on to insulate people
from brutality and inhumane treatment. A substantial proportion of people do what they are
told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long
as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority.
Herbert Kelman built on Milgram’s work by reflecting on the loss of moral restraint.
He agreed with Milgram that ‘authorization’ enhances the willingness of people to participate
‘You have no choice but to continue!’ In the absence of a reaction by the ‘pupil’, the head of the experiment
insisted on punishment nevertheless.
The results showed that 62.5% of the test persons were obedient, i.e. two thirds carried out the orders of
the head of the experiment right up to the maximum shock of 450 volts. A further 22.5% risked considerable
physical injury despite protests of the ‘victim’, whilst only 15% refused to carry out orders after the ‘victim’
demanded breaking off the experiment for the first time. These results being virtually identical for men and
women alike, caused a considerable shock in the scientific world and in the public. It was unequivocal that the
phenomenon of obedience was due to authority. Upon changing the experiment so that the shock level was left to
the test person’s discretion, the majority used only minimum voltage on the ‘pupils’ which was even below the
level where first moans were uttered. Therefore, aggressive impulses of individuals as a cause for the behaviour
in the experiment could be ruled out.
12
T. Blass (ed.), Obedience to Authority, Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm (Mahwah,
N.J./London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000); A.G. Miller, The Obedience Experiments, A Case Study of Controversy
in Social Science (New York: Praeger, 1986); P.B. Smith and M.H. Bond, Social Psychology across Cultures,
Analysis and Perspectives (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 20.
13
Cf. F. Neubacher and M. Walter (eds), Sozialpsychologische Experimente in der Kriminologie: Milgram,
Zimbardo und Rosenhan (Münster: LIT, 2002), 49-52.
5
in massacres. According to Kelman, the situation becomes so defined that common moral
principles are suspended. The perpetrators see themselves in a ‘no choice situation’ either
because they feel their duty lies in obedience or because they feel involved in a ‘transcendent
mission’.
14
In addition, Kelman identified two more significant processes: routinization and
dehumanization.
The process of ‘routinization’ minimises the opportunities to question moral
responsibility for repetitive actions. If others are also involved, nobody seems to be fully
responsible; participants even mutually reinforce each other. Furthermore, moral reflection is
limited by drill and numbing: the individual is gradually focused on the technical aspects of
the routine job, e.g. how to arrange mass killings and make them more effective and less
stressful for the executors.
15
The greater the frequency of repetition of an action, the more the
given definition of the situation becomes ingrained, including the techniques of justification.
That is the reason why defiance becomes increasingly difficult after having made the first step
(‘passing the gate region’)
16
. Breaking off would be seen as admitting having repeatedly made
the wrong decision. Psychologically, it is easier to continue and defend the given definition of
the situation against reservations and doubts.
Through ‘dehumanization’ the perpetrator excludes the victim from the community
which is mutually bound by its morals, or as Helen Fein puts it, from ‘the universe of
obligation’.
17
The victim is deprived of the protection generally granted to any human being,
in that he or she is assigned degrading and subhuman characteristics. In effect, the people so
characterized are removed from the in-group and relegated to the out-group. ‘Perceived as
inferior, members of the out-group are easily stereotyped, scapegoated, and stigmatized, and
the hostility toward them strengthens in-group solidarity’.
18
3. Techniques of Neutralization
Taken together, these theories offer explanatory components ranging from Milgram’s
‘obedience to authority’ to Kelman’s ‘process of dehumanization’ and his ‘transcendent
mission‘. Interestingly, there is a criminological theory that encompasses all these
14
H.C. Kelman, ‘Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and
Victimizers’, 29 Journal of Social Issues (1973), 25-61, at 38, 44. See also H.C. Kelman and V.L. Hamilton,
Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989); L. E. Day and M. Vandiver, ‘Criminology and genocide studies: Notes on what might
have been and what still could be’, 34 Crime, Law & Social Change (2000), 43-59, 45.
15
H. Welzer, supra note 4, 86, 129.
16
H.C. Kelman, supra note 14, 46.
17
H. Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage, 1993).
18
A. Alvarez, supra note 5, 146.
6
components: ‘denying the responsibility’, ‘denying the victim’, and ‘appeal to higher
loyalties’.
In their 1957 paper, Sykes and Matza presented a theory of delinquency based on the
assumptions of learning theory that, first of all, provides an explanation of how ordinary
citizens drift into criminality without rejecting the dominant social order.
19
According to
them, the delinquent generally accepts the legitimacy of this order including its basic norms
(he is law-abiding). That is why he appears so ordinary and, in fact, is ordinary. However, he
has learnt to neutralize these norms in specific situational contexts. The perpetrator claims an
exceptional situation in which breaking the norm is justifiable without questioning the validity
of the norm as such. Neutralization thus makes it possible for the violation to appear
acceptable, if not legitimate. Moreover, the perpetrator protects his image and himself from
self-blame and feelings of shame and guilt. In the words of Sykes and Matza, ‘he has his cake
and eats it too.’
Sykes and Matza divide neutralization into five different techniques:
1. The Denial of Responsibility (‘I did not mean it’):
To minimize responsibility for the deed, it is transferred to external circumstances, e.g.
an unlucky chain of events, legal incapacity or other circumstances (it was not my fault, I had
no choice, I acted on superior orders).
2. The Denial of Injury (‘I didn’t really hurt anybody’):
Similarly, the wrongfulness of a deed can be denied by presenting theft as ‘borrowing’
or brutal bodily harm as a ‘fair duel’ with equal chances for the opponents.
3. The Denial of the Victim (‘They had it coming to them’):
The status of victim can be denied in offences against property by referring to
compensation at a later date, e.g. via insurance. For sexual offences the victim’s consent can
be claimed. Shedding a different light on the deed, the victim can also be presented as
aggressor so that the delinquency appears to be an act of self-defence or a consequence of
provocation. In extreme cases the perpetrator denies that there is a victim by denying that the
victim is truly a ‘person’. The rule ‘thou shalt not kill’ does not apply as the victim is reduced
to ‘enemy’, ‘communist’, ‘terrorist’, ‘scum’, ‘filth’, ‘bacillus’, removing any human traits
(dehumanization).
7
4. The Condemnation of the Condemners (‘Everybody is picking on me’):
Furthermore, the delinquent can try to turn the tables by reasoning that the accusation
against him is one-sided, hypocritical or a transparent political move. In this way the accusers
will be deprived of the moral right to accuse. For example the police being involved in the
arrest are called ‘brutal and corrupt henchmen’, the prosecutor is termed ‘self-righteous’, and
the judges are described as the ‘tool of an unlawful system’.
5. The Appeal to Higher Loyalties (‘I didn’t do it for myself’):
Finally, the delinquent seizes the opportunity to call upon a higher authority or rather
upon higher values. The deed is then justified by stating that it was essential ‘for the rescue of
one’s own people’ or ‘in the name of God’ or ‘a higher justice’. This last type of
neutralization is characterized by presenting himself as an unselfish person driven by ethical
motives.
The theory of Sykes and Matza is empirically supported by particular reference to acts
of violence.
20
It is interesting to note that the inter-connection to other disciplines has hardly
been noticed up to now. Albert Bandura’s psychological learning theory also deals with
neutralization which prevents self-condemnation for aggressive behaviour. In contrast to
Sykes and Matza, Bandura recognizes eight different variations, although the differences
between the two theories appear extremely minor over all. Bandura differentiates between (1)
minimization by advantageous comparison; (2) citing higher principles; (3) shifting
responsibility; (4) blurring responsibility; (5) dehumanizing the victims; (6) attributing guilt
to the victims; (7) gradual de-sensitization; as well as (8) playing down and selective
forgetting of behavioural consequences.
21
Another approach worth mentioning is Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive
dissonance.
22
His central statement is that cognitive dissonance arises when attitudes and
behaviour patterns do not harmonize. Cognitive dissonance is always felt as something
unpleasant, thus motivating the individual to its minimization. In order to regain balance
within the cognitive system, i.e. to reduce dissonance, it is necessary to change individual
cognitive elements. The most common way of reducing cognitive dissonance is by ‘spreading
19
G.M. Sykes and D. Matza, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’, 22 American
Sociological Review (1957), 664-670.
20
R. Agnew, ‘The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence’, 32 Criminology (1994), 555-573; see also G.A.
Antonopoulos and J.A. Winterdyk, ‘Techniques of Neutralizing the Trafficking of Women’, 13 European
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2005), 136-147, 138; S. Maruna and H. Copes, ‘What
Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?’, 32 Crime & Justice (2005), 221-320.
21
A. Bandura, Aggression, Eine sozial-lerntheoretische Analyse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1979), 235-246.
22
L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).
8
apart alternatives’. After having chosen one of two alternatives, the desirability of the chosen
one is increased and that of the non-chosen one is reduced. This process is often helped along
by selecting information, i.e. dissonant information is avoided or suppressed. The fewer
opportunities exist to change the decision, the more pronounced these effects are. Festinger
himself did not apply his theory to delinquent behaviour. Nevertheless, his findings are
applicable as the delinquent has feelings of dissonance because of the violation of the norm.
In short, Festinger explains why a perpetrator neutralizes (motive) while Sykes and Matza,
and Bandura, respectively, show how this goal is achieved (techniques).
4. Neutralization by the State: Labelling the Adversary a Political Enemy
History has shown that crimes committed or ordered by the state are particularly appalling.
The scope for reinterpretation and neutralization grows within the political context.
23
The
extraordinary dimensions of genocide and state crime necessitate extremely intense
neutralization in order for the crimes to become feasible. People or groups of people are
declared to be political enemies that have to be ‘combated’, ‘killed’ or ‘annihilated’.
Dehumanization is one of the most resolute forms of neutralization. Linguistically, this is
enforced by euphemisms which disguise the fact that homicide or genocide is the final goal.
Thus, terms such as ‘special treatment’, ‘evacuation of Jews’, or ‘ethnic cleansing’ are used as
synonyms for mass killings. Powerful ‘interpretation by the elite’ legitimizes politically
motivated violence by connecting it to the political order, its establishment and assertions.
24
Carl Schmitt, for whom the essence of politics lay in the distinction between friend and foe,
including the declaration as an internal enemy
25
, represents a fatal school of thought that
became totally dominant during the period of National Socialism, through the dehumanization
of political enemies. Deprived of all rights and of the status of human being, the ‘enemy’ was
killed like an insect.
26
States violating human rights use the same neutralization techniques as individuals.
State neutralization, however, is spread via the state’s propaganda machine, thus having a far
greater impact than individual neutralization. Collective awareness of right and wrong is
synchronized, while neutralization techniques are offered to individuals to be taken into their
repertoire of justification. In fact, this is a universal problem; techniques of neutralization and
23
See H. Jäger, Makrokriminalität, Zur Kriminologie kollektiver Gewalt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989).
24
See H. Münkler and M. Llanque, ‘Die Rolle der Eliten bei der Legitimation von Gewalt’, in W. Heitmeyer and
J. Hagan (eds), Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002),
1215-1232, 1230.
25
C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).
26
G. Agamben, Homo sacer, Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002), 124.
9
dehumanization can be observed in diverse societies.
27
The genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda
are no exceptions.
28
Neutralization by the state can equally be classified as belonging to one of the five
techniques described by Sykes and Matza. Manners of speech and patterns of argumentation
can deny unlawfulness as such (‘the reports are false, made up, exaggerated’, ‘we were at
war’, ‘times were like that’ etc.); they can accuse the victim (‘the others are the aggressors,
we were just defending ourselves’, ‘they have only got themselves to blame’); play down the
state or society’s own responsibility (‘we had our orders’, ‘otherwise others would have done
it’, ‘we had a blackout’, ‘we couldn’t know’, ‘we were just small cogs’, ‘we were in danger
ourselves’); attack those who call a spade a spade (‘elsewhere the situation is even worse’,
‘for transparent reasons we are being scapegoated’); or appeal to higher loyalties (‘it
concerned our national security, our honour, a good cause, a higher form of justice’ etc., ‘the
end justified the means’).
29
The use of particular language or of official jargon is not
necessarily based on a conscious decision of the individual. Analyses of decision-making
processes in politics have shown the degree to which even political protagonists are subjected
to the dynamics of social conformity. They consequently develop euphemisms to avoid any
kind of direct reference to human suffering.
30
It is not far-fetched to include Sykes’ and Matza’s theory as a supporting pillar for a
criminological theory of state crime.
31
Below, the application of the theory to the political
level is tested through an analysis of Himmler’s secret speech advocating the extermination of
the Jews.
5. Heinrich Himmler speaking of the Extermination of Jews (4 October 1943)
Himmler’s speech in Posen (Poznan) on 4 October 1943 before the highest ranks of SS-
Gruppenführer is both an eloquent and infamous example of state neutralization.
32
Infamous
27
See P. Roberts and N. McMillan, ‘For Criminology in International Criminal Justice’, 1 Journal of
International Criminal Justice (2003), 315-338, at 327; F. Neubacher, supra note 6, 252; C. Möller,
Völkerstrafrecht und Internationaler Strafgerichtshof (Münster: LIT, 2003), 273.
28
H. Fein, ‘Genozid als Staatsverbrechen, Beispiele aus Rwanda und Bosnien’, 1 Zeitschrift für
Genozidforschung (1999), 36-45, at 42.
29
See also S. Cohen, ‘Human Rights and Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial’, 26 Australian & New
Zealand Journal of Criminology (1993), 97-115, at 107; E.M. Opton, ‘It Never Happened and Besides They
Deserved It’, in N. Sanford and C. Comstock (eds), Sanctions for Evil, Sources of Social Destructiveness
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 49-70, at 57.
30
I.L. Janis, ‘Groupthink Among Policy Makers’, in Sanford and Comstock, supra note 29, 71-89.
31
See F. Neubacher, supra note 6, 251-254; C. Reese, Großverbrechen und kriminologische Konzepte, Versuch
einer theoretischen Integration (Münster: LIT, 2004), 141-146.
32
‘I shall speak to you here with all frankness of a very serious subject. Among ourselves, it ought to be spoken
of quite openly, although we shall never speak of it in public. Just as little as we hesitated to do our duty as
ordered on 30 June 1934, and put comrades who had failed against the wall and shoot them, just as little did we
10
because Himmler termed the atrocity of the ‘extermination of the Jewish people’ a ‘glorious
chapter of our history, never having been written and never to be written’, and described the
participating officers as ‘decent’. Infamous also for the way in which he seemed to anticipate
the thoughts, anxieties and maybe even objections of his audience. Words of understanding
are followed up by demands for even greater resolution and an appeal to an alleged historical
necessity.
Himmler’s words are an example for the horrifying re-evaluation and reinterpretation
of state crimes: according to his perspective, the perpetrators of the holocaust are not
criminals but decent men. Having set aside matters of personal interest, they have coped with
a difficult task expected to be carried out by them, and thus deserve glory. The suffering of
the victims is completely transformed into the suffering of the perpetrators. This shows that
the National Socialist propaganda took great care not to give the impression of an amoral rule;
on the contrary, old morals were transformed into new ones with different content.
Propaganda did not just give crime the perfect appearance but also the perfect pomp of morals
with duties and sanctions.
33
One conclusion that can be drawn from Himmler’s speech is this:
only if it is perceived as a struggle for purity or as a war of life and death, can mass murder be
presented as heroic,
34
or as a job to be done. Pity, pangs of conscience and symptoms of
ever speak of it, and shall never speak of it. It was a matter of course, of tact, which thank God lives within us
that stopped us from conversing about it, talking about it. It made everybody shudder but at the same time
everyone knew that he would do it again if ordered to do so, and if it was necessary.
I am now talking about the evacuation of Jews, the extermination of the Jewish people. It is one of those
things which is easy to say. “The Jewish people are to be exterminated”, says each party comrade, “this is clear,
it is part of our party programme, elimination of the Jews, extermination, right, we’ll do it”. And then they all
come along, these 80 million upright Germans, and each one of them has his decent Jew. Of course the others are
swine, but this one is a first-class Jew. Of all those who talk like this, not one has watched, not one has ever lived
through it. Most of you know what it means to see a hundred corpses lying together, five hundred, or a thousand.
To have gone through this and yet apart from a few exceptions, examples of human weakness to have
remained decent, this is what has made us hard. This is a glorious chapter in our history that has never been
written and never shall be written. We know how difficult it would be for us if with the air raids, the burdens
and the deprivations of war we still had the Jews, as secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers. We
would now have probably reached the 1916/17 stage if Jews were still in the body of the German people.
The wealth they had we have taken from them. I have issued the strict order which SS-
Obergruppenführer Pohl has carried out that this wealth is naturally to be passed to the Reich in its entirety. We
have taken none of it. Individuals who have failed will be punished according to an order given by me at the
beginning: he who takes even as much as one Reichsmark is condemned to death. A number of SS-men,
although not many, have violated this order, and they will die without mercy. We had the moral right, we had the
duty to our people to kill this people who wanted to kill us. However, we do not have the right to enrich
ourselves by taking but one fur, one watch, one Mark, or one cigarette or anything else. In the end, we do not
want, because we wiped out the bacillus, to become sick and die from the same bacillus. I shall never sit back
and watch even the smallest spot of putrefaction develop or settle on this point. Wherever it grows we shall burn
it out together. Altogether, we can say that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the love of our nation.
And no harm has come to us in our innermost-self, in our soul, in our character’. (Document 1919-PS, from: Der
Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof [Nuremberg: Secretariate
of the IMT, 1947], Vol. XXIX, 145-146.
33
A. Finkielkraut, Verlust der Menschlichkeit, Versuch über das 20. Jahrhundert (2nd edn., Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1999), 85.
34
M. Freeman, supra note 1, 190.
11
awareness of impropriety were labelled afresh within the framework of new ‘morals’. For
example, they were seen as false humanitarianism, left-over from bourgeois morals, or signs
of weakness.
35
Nonetheless, the re-evaluation was not so comprehensive, the sub-conscience
not so paralysed that the need to keep this work of annihilation secret was not felt. The mass
killing of Jews, and the T4 euthanasia programme alike, violated normative standards even in
Nazi Germany.
36
That is why the importance of secrecy was repeatedly emphasized. At the
beginning of his statement Himmler himself makes mention of this. As far as he is concerned,
the ‘sacrifice’ begins here: getting ‘one’s hands dirty’ without hope for public recognition.
Himmler’s speech is peppered with neutralizations. Evidence of this can be found in
(at least) 13 different passages in the text. Injury is being denied or rather minimized three
times, when the ‘evacuation of Jews’ is mentioned, or the ‘wealth’ possessed by Jews from
which ‘we did not take anything’, at least not for the purpose of personal enrichment. Closely
connected to this is the triple denial of the Jews’ status as victims. Injustice is not just absent
where no damage has been done, but also where there is no victim. By presenting the Jews as
‘secret saboteurs, agitators, and trouble-mongers’ or as ‘bacillus’ endangering the ‘body of the
German people’, they are made to lose their status as victims and instead become aggressors.
Consequently, killing them seems legitimate and even their due. Or, as Himmler put it: ‘We
had the moral right, we had the duty to our people to kill the people who wanted to kill us.’ In
this way Himmler claims the existence of an emergency, a conflict of life and death involving
two people with mutually exclusive desires to live. Although this picture does not at all
correspond to the facts, it does give the appearance of a legitimate fight for survival. The
denial of the Jews’ status as victim is reinforced by the degradation to a ‘bacillus’ hereby
completing the dehumanization process. A further denial of the victim, this time without
reference to the Jews, is the passage on the Röhm-Putsch (30 June 1934). The politically
motivated execution of ‘comrades’ of the SA is passed off as just punishment for ‘failing
themselves’.
Himmler refers to a higher authority or higher values three times. Special emphasis is
given to the ‘necessity’ of annihilating the Jews and the ‘moral right’ to commit this deed.
The historic necessity of the mission is again shown by Himmler’s reference to the years
1916/17. Furthermore, he stresses several times that the Jews were killed for reasons of
honour and unselfishness, namely ‘love to our nation’ and ‘duty towards our nation’.
Unselfish discharge of duties is connected twice to the reference of ‘duty ordered’. One
problem arises here: acting on superior orders can be seen as reducing personal responsibility
35
H. Jäger, Verbrechen unter totalitärer Herrschaft (Olten/Freiburg: Walter, 1967), 275.
12
(denial of responsibility), but the superior order can also be seen as a good reason for
participating in a legitimate military/political campaign (appeal to higher loyalties). This
demonstrates that the techniques of neutralization can be difficult to differentiate.
37
In the end,
even the fourth technique listed by Sykes and Matza (Condemnation of the Condemners) is
represented in this speech. In order to immunize his followers against critique, Himmler
portrays those of the ‘80 million upright Germans’ opposing the deportation of Jews as naïve
hypocrites who endorse the National Socialist party programme but are unwilling to get their
hands dirty. Thus, the speech in which all five techniques are proven culminates in this
incomprehensible statement which is both the invocation of the ‘we feeling’ and the assurance
of a positive self-image: ‘And no harm has come to us in our innermost-self, in our soul, in
our character.’
6. Conclusion
The theory of neutralization techniques proves to be an important theoretical element in
explaining macro-crimes, in particular linking the individual and the political level. It offers
an explanation how heinous crimes are possible as well as how ordinary citizens can get
involved with them without feeling guilty. However, a weakness is the lack of selectivity
between specific neutralization techniques. It can be hard to distinguish between ‘denial of the
injury’ and ‘denial of the victim’, as well as between ‘denial of responsibility’ and ‘appeal to
higher loyalties’ (regarding acting on orders). Some overlapping cannot be ruled out.
Neutralization does not just happen. It might be offered or ordered by the state but
incorporating it into one’s own justification repertoire is the active choice of each individual.
Ordinary citizens, not monsters, drift into crime because they have decided to accept the given
definition of a situation. In this sense neutralization is no excuse in a legal sense instead, it
makes the contribution of the individual visible.
36
A. Alvarez, supra note 5, 143.
37
See further W.W. Minor, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination’,
18 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency (1981), 295-318, at 298.
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... Harrendorf (2014: 233) has argued that it was this notion of banality, normality, conformity associated with perpetrators of "crimes of obedience" that made them invisible and uninteresting to criminology as a discipline devoted to deviant behaviour (for an early exception see Christie 1952). Nevertheless, in the last decades two arguments have been made quite clearly and strongly within criminology: (a) criminology has ignored genocide and international crimes; and (b) criminological theories developed to explain relatively mundane forms of deviance can help explain seemingly incomprehensible acts of mass violence and help the study and understanding of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and state and international crimes more generally (see Alvarez 1997;Day and Vandiver 2000;Yacoubian 2000;Hagan and Greer 2002;Brannigan 1998;Brannigan and Hardwick 2003;Roberts and McMillan 2003;Hagan et al. 2005;Neubacher 2006 As Alvarez (1997) has highlighted, none of the criminological theories has gone as far as neutralisation theory (Sykes and Matza 1957) to make sense of how "ordinary" people can commit "extraordinary evil". At the heart of neutralisation theory is the idea that criminal behaviour becomes possible when individuals are able to rationalise the behaviour in a way that reduces its apparent immorality. ...
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