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Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews
... They gather around themselves people of the same nationality, impose the habit of praising one another (while making others erroneously believe that they are indispensable), and force their protégés through to high posts. (In Kostyrchenko 1995, 237) Similar themes are apparent following emancipation in Europe, where there was a decline in legislation restricting the economic activities of Jews, but there was also a phenomenal increase in Jewish wealth, political influence, and representation in the professions and other positions of high social status (Lindemann 1991;Krausnick 1968;Massing 1949;Pulzer 1964). A common theme of the anti-Semitic writings of the 19th and early 20th century concerned Jewish economic domination of gentiles as well as the ancient charge of misanthropy. ...
... 55 From the late 19th century until the Russian Revolution, the Jewish desire to improve the poor treatment of Russian Jews conflicted with the national inter- ests of several countries, particularly France, which was eager to develop an anti-German alliance in the wake of its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Aware of these deep suspicions, the Jewish community made public efforts to display affection for Czar Alexander III, despite his persecution of the Jews, but the suspicions of the anti-Semites remained (Johnson 1988, 384;Lindemann 1991). This issue also resulted in a successful attempt by American Jews to have their government abrogate the Russian-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, despite being told by the Secretary of State and the president that such action would "harm vital American trade interests" (Goldstein 1990, 135ff; see also Sachar 1992, 229ff). ...
... Similarly, Lindemann (1991) emphasizes that the public perception of Jews as ruthless and immoral was not entirely without foundation. Jewish capitalists were prominent beneficiaries and promoters of the Boer War. ...
... attitudes. The underlying argument within the modernization thesis is that the losers (either social groups or nations) in the modernization process tend to harbor the strongest anti-Semitic beliefs (Lindemann, 1991(Lindemann, , 1997Fein, 1987;Almog, 1990;Strauss, 1993). 3 Arendt (1975) provides an interesting variant to the modernization thesis. ...
... There is a rather rich literature on the four strains of anti-Semitism in Europe. For religious anti-Semitism, see Hertzberg (1968), Ruether (1987), Quinley and Glock (1987), Lindemann (1991), Mosse (1970), Efron (1994), Weiss (1996), Pulzer (1992), Weinberg (1986), Katz (1980), Pauley (1992), and Wistrich (1991); for racial anti-Semitism, see Efron (1994), Katz (1980), Pauley (1992), Wistrich (1991), andPoliakov (1971); for economic anti-Semitism, see Weiss (1996), Pauley (1992), Katz (1980), Birnbaum (1992), Ruppin (1934), and Arendt (1975); and for political anti-Semitism, see Wilson (1982) and Lindemann (1997). 6. ...
It is commonly accepted that the years 1899–1939 represent a highpoint in anti-Semitism in western societies. What factors account for the wave of extraordinary anti-Semitism after 1899? Was the rise of anti-Semitism between 1899 and the Holocaust uneven? Did anti-Semitism vary in content and intensity across societies? Did Germans embrace anti-Semitism differently from French, Italian, Romanian, and British citizens? Data drawn from the annual volumes of the American Jewish Year Book are used to examine these questions systematically. Pooled time-series analyses suggest that variation in anti-Semitism over time and across countries was largely a function of economic conditions and Jewish immigration, and to a limited extent of the rise of leftist parties.
... (1) Given that World War I did occur and that the Czar's government was drastically weakened, it seems reasonable that there would have been major changes in Russia. However, without Jewish involvement, the changes in Russia would have resulted in a constitutional monarchy, a representative republic, or even a nationalist military junta that enjoyed broad popular support among the Great Russian majority instead of a dictatorship dominated by ethnic outsiders, especially Jews and "jewified non-Jews," to use Lindemann's (1997) term. It would not have been an explicitly Marxist revolution, and therefore it would not have had a blueprint for a society that sanctioned war against its own people and their traditional culture. ...
This preface reviews criticisms of The Culture of Critique and expands on several issues important for understanding Jewish cultural influence, including Jews and the left and Jewish media influence. It also discusses the decline of ethnic consciousness among Euro-Americans and develops a theoretical perspective on Western individualism versus Jewish collectivism.
... Its origin was researched on cultural, religious, economic or political levels (Andreski, 1963;Aust, 2018;Brustein, 2003). The time-frame of the work was limited to the period of growth of anti-Semitic sentiment, especially among Western European societies, which took place in the late-19th and early-20th century (Almog, 1990;Brustein & King, 2004;Lindemann, 1997 ...
The purpose of the below considerations is an attempt to determine whether the actions of the authorities of the Lviv’s Polytechnic were in line with those of other milieus during the period of increasing anti-Semitic sentiment in Europe in the early-20th century. It became the area of research due to the specific character of the city of Lviv, famous for its multiculturalism, multiethnicity and the mutual tolerance of its inhabitants.
... In modern times this tendency is to be found in ideologies such as "socialism (both Marxist and anarchist), Zionism, and various forms of the psychiatric worldview (Freudian psychoanalysis and related schools)." 20 Remarkably, Lindemann makes these arguments with no indication that Cuddihy's work has informed him, suggesting a fortuitous simultaneous discovery on the order of the simultaneous but independent invention of calculus by Newton and Leibniz in the late 1600s. ...
... " And Voltaire's anti-Semitism was only a theatrical exaggeration of a negative stance that was widespread in the age (see Poliakov 1975). It has been pointed out that in the debates of the revolutionary National Assembly over French Jewry, all speakers agreed that they were a " social problem, " and the disagreement was merely over whether the solution lay in lenient assimilation, or severe separation (Lindemann 1997, 46). The classical economists, however, did not share this hostile position. ...
History of Political Economy 35.4 (2003) 759-777
This symposium is concerned with prejudice and economics. This essay turns from prejudice in those concerned with advancing economics, to prejudice in those concerned with diminishing economics. It turns to the prejudice of those implacably hostile to economics: "anti-economists."
Anti-economics is almost as old as economics itself (see Coleman 2002). Its historical investigator need not venture far into the pre-1930 literature of anti-economics before encountering conspicuous anti-Semitic effusions in some of its leading lights (e.g., Leroux, Dühring, Toussenel, Cobbett). These effusions have a frequency, length, and intensity that make them distinctive, even by the standards of the nineteenth century. One may say that, before about 1930, anti-economics and anti-Semitism existed in striking conjunction. But how much significance did this conjunction have? Did it signify at all? This article argues that it did—and that the conjunction was not accidental. As we will show, anti-economics and modern anti-Semitism shared some leading ideological contentions. Although these contentions themselves address directly neither Jewry nor economics, they almost amount to a sine qua non of most modern forms of anti-economics and anti-Semitism, in that if one was to deny these contentions then one simultaneously empties the force of most popular forms of anti-economics, along with many strands of anti-Semitism.
This essay begins by identifying the leading assumptions of anti-economics that we will maintain are a sine qua non of much anti-Semitism. We then demonstrate that many leading articulators of anti-economics also maintained a congruent anti-Semitism. The paper then exposes a virtual fusion of anti-economics and anti-Semitism. It concludes with a contrast of the tolerance of Jewry by the classical economists with the intolerance of their contemporary lumières.
The defining feature of anti-economics is its belief that economics is a bane. To the anti-economist, economics is harmful; it is "pernicious" (Moffat 1878, 5). It would be best, therefore, if it were done away with. It would be best if its teachings were discredited, its honors (such as the Nobel Prize) abolished, its representatives barred from public institutions, its institutional identity effaced, its centers of propagation encumbered or eliminated.
The thickly and widely scattered justifications of anti-economics are not reducible to a single case. Anti-economics is instead composed of a suite of distinct cases, each with its own worldview, critique, historical genesis, and habitat (Coleman 2002). The most important of these are Right anti-economics, Left anti-economics, nationalist anti-economics, irrationalist anti-economics, altruistic anti-economics, ideal anti-economics, and material anti-economics.
We will briefly summarize each.
Emerging in the late eighteenth century, Right anti-economics sees the market as destroying a desirable social order, identifies economists as the market's advocates, and consequently judges them to accommodate, wittingly or unwittingly, the destruction of this desirable social order. To Right anti-economics, economists are the apostles of disorder, the ideologists of anarchy, "the wretched procurers of sedition" (Toussenel 1847).
One distinguished example of a Right anti-economist was L.-G.-A. de Bonald (1754–1840), an advocate of absolute monarchy and ecclesiastical authority (Bonald [1810] 1864a, [1810] 1864b). Better-known examples include John Ruskin, Thomas Carlyle, and William Cobbett.
Whereas Right anti-economics assumes the market destroys social order (and is therefore bad), Left anti-economics supposes it maintains the social order and is therefore (also) bad. The Left interpretation of the relation of the market to the social order readily suggests a verdict on economics. To the Left, economics, through its advocacy of the market, is merely buttressing the social order. Economists are the "apostles of the rich."
Karl Marx provides the classic template for this thesis, which has been restated by many persons since, including J. A. Hobson (1858–1940).
Right economics and Left economics find common ground in the hypothesis that financiers and capitalists are the effective, but parvenu, rulers of society. In this hypothesis capitalists are simultaneously usurper and potentate. Alphonse Toussenel (1803–1885), who ambiguously straddled Left and Right, championed this thesis.
Nationalist...
... Öyle ki, Robert Wistrich, antisemitizm üzerine yazdığı kitabının başlığını "Antisemitism:The Longest Hatred" (Antisemitizm: En Uzun Nefret) diye seçmiştir (Wistrich, 1991). Antisemitizm tarihsel süreç içinde çeşitlenmiştir (Lindemann, 1997). Farklı araştırmacılar, birbirlerinden farklı olarak antisemitizm sınıflandırması yapmışlardır. ...
1. sınıfa 60-84 aylık başlayan öğrencilerin LGS puanlarının kıyaslanması.
... 91 The Enlightenment opened up possibilities for religious tolerance, for the legalization of Jewish civil rights, and for urbanized Jews to enter university. 92 But these new opportunities for emancipation were conditional on the improvement of Jews who had to give up their superstitious ancient traditionalism and ghetto mentality. 93 Most importantly, they also had to start working "productively" instead of earning their money from being "superfluous" middlemen. ...
The goal of this article is to examine the various forms of Orientalism generated
by the East-West distinction in European thought, and the complexity of corresponding perceptions of Judaism and Jews that emerged as a consequence. What
have been the major shifts in European self-perception and in European perceptions of Jews and Judaism if one traces Europe’s orientation in terms of East
and West? My starting point is not in Jewish history, but in Europe’s worldview
and self-perception. The East-West parameter both predates and postdates the
historical stages of Orientalism. The article offers two typologies of Orientalism:
a historical typology that distinguishes between religious, philosophical, imperialist, and artistic forms of Orientalism; and, an intercultural communication typology of the Oriental Other based on two scales ranging from foreign to
familiar and from threatening to interesting. Both typologies demonstrate that
Orientalism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a single form.
Moreover, when applied to current definitions and expressions of antisemitism
the second typology shows how these definitions and expressions vary considerably
depending on different forms of interaction between the Self and the Other.
Neither Orientalism nor antisemitism are monolithic.
... (1) Given that World War I did occur and that the Czar's government was drastically weakened, it seems reasonable that there would have been major changes in Russia. However, without Jewish involvement, the changes in Russia would have resulted in a constitutional monarchy, a representative republic, or even a nationalist military junta that enjoyed broad popular support among the Great Russian majority instead of a dictatorship dominated by ethnic outsiders, especially Jews and "jewified non-Jews," to use Lindemann's (1997) term. It would not have been an explicitly Marxist revolution, and therefore it would not have had a blueprint for a society that sanctioned war against its own people and their traditional culture. ...
This is the preface to the First Paperback Edition of my book, The Culture of Critique. It updates some topics of the original book (decline of ethnic consciousness among Europeans, Jews and the left) and adds new material related to the concerns of The Culture of Critique (Jews and the media, the culture of the Holocaust).
... The study's findings empirically support the propositions by scholars that growing solidarity among immigrant individuals may result in the backlash of stronger xenophobic attitudes by the host community (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004). These findings may also expand prior scholarly discussions regarding the individual and collective perceptions of a group's characteristics on prejudice toward the group, such as with anti-Semitism directed at Jewish people (Lindemann, 2000). Thus, while immigrants may seek to create closer bonds among themselves to challenge the negative images and discriminatory practices of the host culture, the nativeborn community may perceive them as a greater threat and react in a xenophobic manner. ...
To apply a Mokken Scale Procedure in developing a hierarchical cross-national scale to measure xenophobia, a pool of 30 xenophobia-related items was collected from several sources and modified using established unidimensional criteria. The survey was administered to 608 undergraduate students in the USA, 193 undergraduate students in The Netherlands, and 303 undergraduate students in Norway. 14 items measuring perceived threat or fear and meeting the criteria of the Stereotype Content Model were selected for further analysis. A separate item analysis and, subsequently, Mokken Scale Procedure yielded a cumulative scale with the same five items for each of the three samples. The items and the total scale met criteria for homogeneity in all samples with H > .40.
In seeking explanations for the origins of modern antisemitism, historians have often dwelt extensively on the developments in anti-Jewish discourse in nineteenth-century Imperial Germany and the Hapsburg Empire. The role played by the Tsarist Empire – darkest, backward Russia – has frequently been overlooked or underplayed. Until the past decade or so, antisemitism in the dying days of Tsarism was often characterised as little different from its medieval predecessor. Recent interpretations have shed new light on changes in antisemitism in Russia in the late nineteenth century. Much like the apparently unchangeable Tsarist state, a multitude of internal and external influences gradually altered the nature of Russian antisemitic discourse, which – in the years after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution – would have profound consequences for the rest of Europe.
Over Easter 1903, a large-scale anti-Jewish riot in Kišinev, capital of the Russian governorate of Bessarabia, left dozens of Jews dead and hundreds injured, thus leading to a massive wave of emigration. A product of social discontent and anti-Semitic agitation, the riots of Kišinev became notoriously famous as the onset of a wave of pogroms of hitherto unprecedented brutality, which only subsided after the end of the Russian Revolution of 1905/06. This article analyzes the incidents by emphasizing cultural transfers between Kišinyov and Lithuania, using the histoire croisée approach in order to provide for the different ethnic, social and political backgrounds and motivations of the actors. It also compares the disturbances in the rural north of Lithuania and in the Bessarabian industrial city of Kišinev in order to contextualize anti-Jewish violence in Lithuania on the larger scale of the Russian pogroms. When Lithuanian Jews were sometimes threatened to be killed "as in Kišinyov" and at other times to be treated "as in Linkuva", the significance of analyzing cultural transfer while keeping the regional context in mind becomes apparent. fără precedent până în acel moment, care s-a diminuat abia după încheierea Revoluţiei Ruse din 1905-1906. Articolul de faţă abordează incidentele prin studierea transferurilor culturale dintre Chişinău şi Lituania, utilizând metodele histoire croisée în scopul de a oferi explicaţii pentru diferenţele ce apar în ceea ce priveşte mediile etnice, sociale şi politice şi motivaţiile actorilor. Acesta compară, de asemenea, tulburările din partea rurală de nord a Lituaniei şi din oraşul industrial basarabean Chişinău, în scopul de a contextualiza violenţa anti-evreiască din Lituania la scara mai largă a pogromurilor ruseşti.
Jewish women have struggled to develop identities that allow them to meet the needs of their various communities and remain true to themselves. Ernestine Rose has been described as having disavowed her Jewish heritage; yet, she is included as “the Jewish woman's rights advocate.”; This analysis focuses on an 1863–1864 debate with editor Horace Seaver about anti‐Semitism and the Jews published in the Boston Investigator. This single encounter is rhetorically significant, because it illustrates the subtle, non‐institutional character of anti‐Semitism among mid‐nineteenth century liberal intellectuals. It also illustrates that Rose's Jewish identity was neither elusive nor conflicted, but a basis for her advocacy of human rights which has historic as well as contemporary relevance for the understanding identity development.
The relationship between anti‐Semitism and anti‐black racism in Europe has been largely neglected by scholars. The article examines one facet of this problematic by exploring the ways in which after c.1860 the rise of modern anti‐Semitism was accompanied by stereotypes that racialized the Jews through associating them with the most ‘primitive’ racial modality, the black African. Against a background of deepening political anti‐Semitism, colonial racism, Social Darwinism and eugenics, the Jews were perceived as a danger both through their impurity and biological mixing with blacks (hybridity being a source of degeneration), as well as through their ability to retain their own racial purity while manipulating black ‘interbreeding’ with Europeans, an infernal conspiracy to weaken the white race and to achieve racial dominance.
An internet-related survey distributed to Norwegian students explored predictors of fear-related xenophobia toward immigrants. Specifically, this study examined a new social construct called "entitativity" (i.e., the extent to which out-group members are perceived as bonded together in a cohesive or organized unit), as well as frequency of informal social contact and valence of a recent encounter in relation to certain xenophobic attitudes. Correlational and multiple regression analyses indicated that perceived out-group entitativity was a moderate predictor of fear-related xenophobia. Voluntary informal contact was a weak predictor of fear-related xenophobia, whereas negative evaluation of an encounter in the recent past was a strong predictor. Further analysis indicated that the effect of entitativity on xenophobia was strongest when informal social contact was low. Moreover, analysis indicated that the effect of valenced contact was partly mediated through perception of entitativity.
The history of Zionism illustrates a dynamic within the Jewish community in which the most radical elements end up pulling the entire community in their direction. Zionism began among the most ethnocentric Eastern European Jews and had explicitly racialist and nationalist overtones. However, Zionism was viewed as dangerous among the wider Jewish community, especially the partially assimilated Jews in Western countries, because it opened Jews up to charges of disloyalty and because the Zionists' open racialism and ethnocentric nationalism conflicted with the assimilationist strategy then dominant among Western Jews. Zionist activists eventually succeeded in making Zionism a mainstream Jewish movement, due in large part to the sheer force of numbers of the Eastern European vanguard. Over time, the more militant, expansionist Zionists (the Jabotinskyists, the Likud Party, fundamentalists, and West Bank settlers) have won the day and have continued to push for territorial expansion within Israel. This has led to conflicts with Palestinians and a widespread belief among Jews that Israel itself is threatened. The result has been a heightened group consciousness among Jews and ultimately support for Zionist extremism among the entire organized American Jewish community.
persistent theme among critics of Jews—particularly those on the pre-World War II right—has been that the Bolshevik revolution was a Jewish revolution and that the Soviet Union was dominated by Jews. This theme appears in a wide range of writings, from Henry Ford's International Jew, to published statements by a long list of British, French, and American political figures in the 1920s (Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and David Lloyd George), and, in its most extreme form, by Adolf Hitler, who wrote: Now begins the last great revolution. By wresting political power for himself, the Jew casts off the few remaining shreds of disguise he still wears. The democratic plebeian Jew turns into the blood Jew and the tyrant of peoples. In a few years he will try to exterminate the national pillars of intelligence and, by robbing the peoples of their natural spiritual leadership, will make them ripe for the slavish lot of a permanent subjugation. The most terrible example of this is Russia.1 This long tradition stands in sharp contradiction to the official view, promulgated by Jewish organizations and almost all contemporary historians, that Jews played no special role in Bolshevism and indeed were specifically victimized by it. Yuri Slezkine's book provides a much needed resolution to these opposing perspectives. It is an intellectual tour de force, alternately muddled and brilliant, courageous and apologetic.
Part I: Auschwitz and the Time of HistoryMy family dates time from the moment my father and uncle re-united in Melbourne. The last time they saw each other was in Auschwitz. It got into The Sun. People talked about it on trams. Conductors, drivers, passengers, ticket inspectors. All the trams were talking. All over Melbourne. Moreland Road. Sydney Road. St. Kilda Road. Everyone knew about us. I wave to surprised strangers at tram stops till my mother tells me to stop. My family burst out of a clamshell like Botticelli's Venus in one of the art books Leon kept in a suitcase under his bed. (Rosa Safransky, 'History in the Kitchen', p. 146)
Depictions of Jews in the Edwardian fiction of Saki (Hector Hugh Munro, 1870–1916) have been overlooked or condemned out-of-hand. Yet what is usually stark anti-semitism in Saki's fiction turns, in ‘The Unrest-Cure’, on its purveyor and audience, satirising anti-Jewish feelings in Munro's bourgeois world. Saki exposes a dark lining in the golden idyll of Edwardian rural England while subverting the Jewish cabal stereotype. But as Munro and Saki blur into a strident, jingoistic voice with the approach of war, there is a return to the unironic, overt anti-semitism of earlier stories, culminating in the reactionary, anti-cosmopolitan attacks of When William Came (1913).
This monograph on incitement to violence, terror and genocide is intended for policymakers, genocide scholars, and experts in conflict resolution ethics, human rights, social psychology, and anthropology. The core section of the document presents and discusses epidemiologic models of incitement and hate language as hazardous exposures (analogous to microbial or toxic exposures), increasing the risk of genocidal violence. The decision to look at epidemiologic models for grappling with the phenomenon of incitement requires some explanation. Unfortunately neither the understanding of the dynamics of incitement nor the adoption of politics which seek its elimination have advanced very far in recent years. As a result, international diplomacy has not made the problem of incitement a priority. While the question of incitement to genocide appears in international treaties, like the Genocide Convention, the legal community has only addressed this issue sporadically. And yet, a careful examination of the role of incitement in the outbreak and spread of violence is incontrovertible. The failure of other disciplines to deal effectively with incitement suggests that other methodologies be tried out that
might have a better chance at dealing with this problem by providing more powerful tools that policymakers can employ.
Our points of departure are the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and the nternational Criminal Court Rome Statute on Incitement to Genocide as crimes against humanity. The ackground sections and appendices review relevant prior knowledge from the fields of ethics,
international law, genocide studies, social epidemiology, social psychology, history, and conflict resolution. The monograph examines relationships between incitement and violence between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East in the light of this knowledge.
We devote a special section to data collected since the year 2009 for the Incitement and Peace Culture Index, a new epidemiologic tool developed by Government of Israel experts in conflict resolution, for tracking incitement.
Issues * The Jewish Question: A World problem-international manifestations of antisemitism.
* Antisemitism in the modern world, within the context of the socioeconomic and political transformations of Europe, following the Enlightenment, and the Industrial and French Revolutions.
* Reasons for the persistence of popular stereotypes of Jews over centuries.
Secularization of religious antisemitism, and its transformation into political antisemitism.
* Modern secular national and racial antisemitism were added to the religious body of traditional religious antisemitism.
CHAPTER OUTLINE AND FOCUS QUESTIONS.
Main Question: Why could the great majority of nations, and leaders either lend support to the Nazi effort or simply choose to do and say nothing? ________________________________________________________________ _______ On the State of Being Jewish and the " Other " in the Modern Era.
Why and how did the Jews come to have an evil image in the secular nation-state?
As socio-historians review the Holocaust, it is the silence of the bystanders that is considered the most prevalent social response, not rescue. But in the last twenty years scholars have increasingly taken inspiration from the ideal of rescue as a critical aspect of the picture of humanity to be entered into the record along with the saga of torture, carnage and wanton destruction representing the 20th century. Witnessing the condemnation of innocents of all ages during the Holocaust, individuals involved in rescue risked their own lives so that those in danger might be saved (see Rubenstein and Roth, 1987:363; Fogelman and Wiener, 1985). Examples of rescue in the Holocaust usually contain some reference to a wider context in community life, less visible, less publicized perhaps than other elements of the heroic tale, and in which social factors appear to have some salience. Acts of rescue during the Holocaust were accomplished within networks of resistance in various nations, as for instance the Kindertransport into Britain in 1938–39, the various efforts of the World Jewish Congress to arrange for the rescue of children, as well as the contribution of the fishermen of Denmark, Holland and Sweden, who kept a flow of refugees streaming out of occupied Europe and into safe haven in Britain throughout much of the Nazi occupation. Rescue is also associated with the effort in Le Chambon sur Lignon in the French Alps. What we see in Holocaust rescue narratives are strong characters active within a wider field of community as the action unfolds.
Hannah Arendt developed her ideas about race and racism in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) in response to the collapse of European society and culture in the interwar years, preceded by the history of European expansion. The late nineteenth century was the period when modern racism first became a crucial factor in European life. All these elements crystallized into racial totalitarianism, particularly in Nazi Germany. In her adopted country, the United States, she entered the debate about school desegregation in the South and also was worried by the explicit return of race to politics furthered by black militancy. Overall, she objected to the creation of public institutions based on exclusionary principles altogether.
Although the persecution of Jews has a history of at least two millennia, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed a high-water mark in hatred against Jews, especially in western Christian societies. By antisemitism we refer to hostility?rooted in the general population and expressed in sentiments, attitudes, or actions?to Jews as a collectivity. The year 1879 constitutes an appropriate embarkation point for a study of antisemitism in that it coincides with the emergence of political parties and a press that embraced a comprehensive antisemitic ideology and is also the year in which Wilhelm Marr coined the term ?antisemitism.?
The aim of this paper is presentation some statistical data on Jews studying at the Lviv Polytechnic until 1939. Also, the question of Jewish women – students of the Lviv Polytechnic, has been examined. The Author have touched upon a completely new research area which is women’s education in the broadly-defined technical field at the turn of the 19th and 20th century.
Anticlerical alliances: Jews and the Church question in Germany and France, 1783--1905
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