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Robert Kennedy and His Times
... Schlesinger acted as a special advisor the President, organized the Hickory Hill seminars, and wrote foundational 'Camelot school' histories of John and Robert Kennedy (Schlesinger, 2002(Schlesinger, , 2018(Schlesinger, /1978. ...
... The first seminar was held on November 27, 1961. Schlesinger claimed that the group managed to hold around one meeting per month, except during the summer months (Schlesinger, 2018(Schlesinger, /1978. The format was 'lecture meetings, accompanied by drinks and dinner' (Thomas, 2000: 188). ...
... Other documents similarly display the seminars' light-hearted side, such as Robert Kennedy nudging Schlesinger to keep the seminars ticking over: 'I hope you are working on a schedule for our seminars starting mid-September. You said you would and if you don't I'll tell J. Edgar Hoover.' (Schlesinger, 2018(Schlesinger, /1978. Schlesinger also jokingly described the sessions as 'The Robert F. Kennedy School of Advanced Studies' and its head as 'Dean Kennedy'. ...
The concept of ‘place’ can play a powerful role in understanding how leadership is socially constructed. This article explores the geographic, symbolic and mythic uses of place in the cultivation of a distinct leadership style around the Presidency of John F. Kennedy. It focuses on the history of a social and learning event that today might be called a leadership development programme: the ‘Hickory Hill Seminars’ of 1961-4, named after and mostly held at the specific location of Robert F. Kennedy’s home. These seminars–only lightly touched on in Kennedy-era history and leadership literatures–were semi-formal occasions organized by the historian Arthur Schlesinger that brought eminent public intellectuals of the day to present their work to the assembled group of insiders. The seminars functioned as a network in action, both cultivating and projecting certain cultural formations of leadership. Bounded by the geographic places inhabited by Washington elites, the seminars formed part of the broader construction of the symbolic place of the ‘New Frontier’ and the mythic place of ‘Camelot’. The Hickory Hill seminars were one part of a broad metaphysical canvas upon which a distinct presidential leadership style and ‘legacy’ was created. Building on critical and social constructivist perspectives, we argue that geographic, symbolic and mythic notions of place can be central to the social construction of particular leadership styles and legacies, but that these creations can be deceptive, and remain always vulnerable to critique, co-optation and distortion by opponents and rivals.
... Today, in the World, there is very little paper on the spare parts despite of the inventory management of being very essential for any business that deals with spare items. This means that it is necessary to access a time management system properly to reduce the cost, because any delay should be reduced whether caused by transport, sales movement, or regulation to avoid an increase in cost [2]. With the continuous development of experience in the 21st century, the industrial management system has become more complex in all respects. ...
... After completing the calculation of all variables mentioned above, all factors that have Z score more than (1.96) have been rejected which perfectly highlights the importance of the system development. Factors which have a rank from (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14) have not been taken into consideration which causes the need for developing an inventory management system [14][15][16]. ...
Inventory control of spare parts is very important to many organizations. Excess inventory and overstocks lead to high holding costs. On the other side stock outs can have a great impact on production or service. The problem of this paper is the shortcomings of the current systems of inventory management and the lack of proper regulation of spare parts using most common manual methods to manage them in inventory. This paper was conducted at Laptop sale company known as UPS company and electrical appliances supply Company in Amman, Jordan as a case study.
Consequently, the results of this survey revealed that the factors influencing inventory management of laptop spare parts are setup cost, holding cost, carrying cost, selling prices of laptop spare parts and reorder point besides transport cost incurred during the maintenance or delivery duration. In this paper, the EOQ cost management model and XYZ analysis were implemented using a software system that helps to make the inventory management automatically prepared and organized. Using the EOQ model with XYZ analysis and following the procedures of entering the data into the system consequently lead to a process of getting the necessary reports inconsistent shape. Using the software system such as the one used in this paper helps to facilitate access to the history of any items that could be managed by such a system.
... Foreign policy: If it is demoralizing to look inward at our domestic idiocy, it is equally disconcerting to note that our foreign policy for forty-ive years after WWII was stuck like a broken record in a rut [51] of rhodophobic [52] negativity. Over and over again, we were anti-Communist, anti-Communist, anti-Communist. ...
... Such persons become reference point and celebrated when discussing that particular subject within and outside the community. As a role model, he or she serves as standard of excellence and is worthy of emulation (Schlesinger, 1978;Carter, 1982;Dappa-Biriye, 1995). For Engels (1978), the role model is to ensure that the "useless memories and futile strife by oppressors that spur violent conflicts were dead and buried. ...
African scholars and experts have developed several methods and strategies of conflict management and peace-building, they have not been widely popularized as role models. Thus, researchers and practitioners have to fall back on theoretical frameworks and methodologies propounded in Europe and Asia in building peace in Africa. This has created problem of intellectual poverty for the continent. This paper, therefore, aims at promoting four Africans, who have distinguished themselves in peace-building to serve as role models. The characters are Anwar Sadat, Nelson Mandela, Harold Dappa-Biriye, and Yakubu Gowon. The paper adopts post-behavioural theoretical framework and applied purposive sampling technique, and finds that the efficacy of the methods of the characters have built confidential relationship among the people and parties. In the process, they have narrowed-down the gulf between theory and practice in peace-building in Africa. It concludes that the methodologies and strategies they applied become standard in peace-building for the benefit of humanity. The paper then recommends making the characters role models in peace-building and security studies as is done in other disciplines.
... Meanwhile, federal response to the conditions in Mississippi had been restrained and slow. Even though key federal actorsfor example, John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall and other legal officers in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Departmentdid convey stronger aspirations to end racial discrimination in the south than previous administrations, these aspirations were tempered by a countervailing pair of concerns: (i) that the severity of white resistance to black political participation, especially in Mississippi, would require massive federal intervention and (ii) that such intervention would pre-empt the due course of local political processes, particularly the process in which local officials become both responsive and accountable to their own constituency, including those with whom they clashed or disagreed (Marshall 1964;Schlesinger 1978;Belknap 1984). ...
The distinctness of each person’s life and experience is an important consideration in dominant accounts of how democratic institutions should distribute basic rights and liberties. Drawing on recent social movements, philosophers like Iris Marion Young, Miranda Fricker, and Axel Honneth have nonetheless drawn attention to the distinctive claims and challenges that plurality and difference entrain in democratic societies by analysing how the dominant discourses on rights and justice tend to elide, obscure, or reify the lived experiences of individuals belonging to disadvantaged and oppressed groups. In this essay, I offer an independent justification for why we should take such lived experiences seriously. I show how the lived experiences of disadvantaged and oppressed individuals can be a resource for deep and meaningful social change. I propose a distinctive kind of social change in which the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves drive the process of transformation whereby they change the oppressive frames of difference relating to their race, class, sex, or ability. I call this kind ‘organic social change’. I also show that organic social change is distinctively important in that the disadvantaged and oppressed get to enact an empowering mode of cooperation that harnesses their singularities when they are the ones driving the process of their own and one another’s transformations.
... Furthermore Grattan (2002) saw parallels between the process of military and business strategy formulation like it occurred in the Cuban missile crisis. Quite an important scientific distinction was made by Schlesinger (1978) in regards to the characteristics of political leaders which were categorized in two groups called «hawks» and «doves». Janis (1972) put focus on interactions between personalities belonging to the ExComm by analyzing how «groupthink» affected collective decision-making. ...
How could negotiation analysis be conducive to explain the conciliatory solution of the Cuban missile crisis between Soviet Union and United States? «A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory» is stipulated to be the explanation frame.
Sic semper tyrannis. Charlotte Corday ersticht Jean Paul Marat. Die tödlichen Attentate auf Präsidenten der USA. Das Politische Attentat in der Kunst (Band 4) Der vierte Band befasst sich mit berühmten Attentaten der Neuzeit. Die Tötung des französischen Revolutionärs Jean Paul Marat durch Charlotte Corday hat eine bis ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein dauernde Verarbeitung in der Kunst ausgelöst. Je nach vorherrschender politischer Stimmung und persönlicher Präferenz wird Marat als Opfer oder Corday als Heldin stilisiert, nur um kurz danach erneut neu bewertet zu werden. Die tödlichen Attentate auf bislang vier amerikanische Präsidenten beleuchten den Umgang der Neuzeit mit diesen einschneidenden Ereignissen. Sie schufen neue Bilder, welche in die Kunst der Gesellschaft eingegangen sind: So die berühmte Phrase Sic semper tyrannis, die erst beim Mord an Lincoln ausgerufen wurde, und das Entstehen einer ganzen Verschwörungstheorie-Industrie nach dem Attentat auf Präsident John F. Kennedy. Dies, weil die offiziellen Erklärungen krass unglaubwürdig erscheinen. Trigger-Warnung: Das Buch enthält forensische Photographien, welche Leser/innen verstören können
ISBN: 978-3818784614
The chapter delves into the multifaceted nature of leadership and its intrinsic connection to power. Various definitions and conceptualisations of leadership are critically examined, with attention to how it is often conflated with other forms of social influence and authority. The relational aspect of leadership is emphasised, focusing on the leader’s status, personal qualities and the type of influence exerted. A comparison is drawn between different leadership theories, including transformational and transactional leadership, while introducing the concept of power as it relates to influence, authority and political leadership. The chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the development of leadership studies, tracing its roots back to classical social science theories and exploring the interdisciplinary nature of leadership research. This foundation aids in understanding the complex interplay between leadership, power and democracy, particularly within the context of contemporary social change.
This study analyzes the unconventional strategies employed by President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, with a particular focus on the influential role of his brother. The first aim is to explore how familial bonds were leveraged in high-stakes governance, addressing the gap in scholarly attention regarding the pivotal involvement of President Kennedy's brother in the decision-making process. Despite extensive literature on the crisis, only a handful have written about it, and little has been said about this aspect. The second aim is to elucidate the unorthodox methods used by President Kennedy, especially his delegation of significant responsibilities to his younger brother and confidant (Scott and Hughes, 2015:208), who held no formal defense or diplomatic position. Through a comprehensive analysis of primary sources and seminal works from the Cold War era, the study highlights how Robert F. Kennedy facilitated dynamic discussions within the Executive Committee (ExComm) and conducted confidential negotiations with Soviet officials. The findings reveal that President Kennedy's reliance on his brother and the ExComm, rather than traditional cabinet structures, marked a significant departure from conventional governance practices. During the crisis, the USA and the USSR engaged in a strategic chess game, employing unconventional methods, including back-door diplomacy, to avert catastrophe. This study highlights these dramatic events and underscores the innovative and familial approach to crisis management that defined this pivotal historical period.
This contribution examines recent developments in the activism of a Russian religious minority community in the United States. After fleeing persecution in Russia to Manchuria, Turkey, and Brazil, since the 1960s 10,000 Old Believers have settled in the Williamette Valley, Oregon. The contribution describes how and why this paradigmatically ‘closed’ religious group, which has eschewed active political engagement for centuries, made a sudden and effective entry into Oregon politics in 2019–20. Initial political mobilisation was provoked by Oregon State Legislature’s attempt to pass a law to eliminate exemptions on religious or philosophical grounds for children’s vaccinations. Following the theorising of Rawls, I argue that the Old Believers formed with other Americans opposed to mandatory vaccinations an ‘overlapping consensus’ of political liberalism. Their exclusive reliance on political arguments grounded in the secular American tradition of liberal rights and freedoms conflicts with the influential thesis of ‘public religion’, articulated prominently by Casanova and Habermas, who highlight the spiritual and theological character of interventions by religious groups into modern politics. Notwithstanding the secular tenor of their political intervention, I argue that it constitutes a form of ‘religious activism’ motivated by the pursuit of values at the heart of their centuries-old religious project.
UNRAVELING THE ASSESSMENT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
This book offers a comprehensive critique of how the assessment industry and standardized testing adversely impact students, teachers, and society. The authors present the case that the interconnected developments of the testing industry and the Assessment Industrial Complex (AIC) have effectively anchored American schooling to testing. Using an antiracist lens, the authors deconstruct the AIC, exposing the neoliberal agenda of education reformers and how
proponents utilize the rhetoric of testing, and the data extracted from them, to normalize the reliance on AIC systems. This critique further exposes education reformers’ ideological agenda, their hypocrisy, and how they grossly profit from the AIC at the expense of society’s
marginalized and most vulnerable students. The CoVid-19 pandemic, society’s racial unrest, and anti-testing movements have aligned to underscore the need to examine systemic oppression and the impact it has on society through our education system. This text exposes
how standardized testing perpetuates these injustices and provides the opportunity to disrupt the systems they rely upon and bolster the societal resistance that is needed.
Executive Order 13491: Re-Leashing the C.I.A.
Cyrus Jabbari; Andrew Malek
Abstract
While Russia, a few European countries and Asian nations have entered into joint venture with African nations by providing them foreign funding, China has been one of the predominant players. Mali is one of those countries that have been benefitted from this foreign investment. The major areas of Chinese funding include the textiles sector, construction among others. The noteworthy constructions in Mali that are the outcome of Chinese investment include the stadium for hosting 2002 Africa Cup, the bridge across Niger River, the expressway at the capital of Mali and as well as a conference center in the prime location of this African city. There are mixed reactions among the indigenous Malian population regarding this Chinese investment in Malian economy. Although some understand that the local textile and furniture industry will be at jeopardy due to the inflow of cheaper and imported clothes and furniture, the increment in employment opportunity growth of GDP and overall increment in economic emancipation of economy cannot be underestimated.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jirfp.v4n1a3
Organized crime is a subject of enormous fascination in popular culture and has been a major criminal justice concern for more than a century. Books and films about this phenomenon are abundant. The names of infamous gangsters with their colorful aliases and street names are as well known to the public as they are to law enforcement authorities. Although organized crime takes many different forms and exists in many different cultures and societies, it has certain basic features widely shared across the globe. While the real Mafia is being systematically dismantled and disrupted by federal law enforcement, American popular culture has breathed life into its fading image. The enduring popularity of the mob is best illustrated by the number of organized crime films, from The Musketeers of Pig Alley to The Departed, American Gangster, and the legendary Godfather trilogy. Actors like James Cagney, Edward G. Robinson, Humphrey Bogart and others reflected the costs of the nation’s grim realities: the lack of work, the crime waves, violence, and the unsettling political unrest that blanketed the country. The films of the movie stars were gritty and tough but also exuded a roguish charm. They were hard-hitting, realistic social dramas that were readily understood by most movie-goers.
This is a biographical essay about Stanley Levison, who is the subject of Ben Kamin’s Dangerous Friendship: Stanley Levison, Martin Luther King Jr., and the Kennedy Brothers (2014). Levison was a communist and friend of Martin Luther King. The review focuses on the limitations and strengths of the book, of Levison and of the Civil Rights Movement. At a time when the Communist Party was facing difficult challenges, Levison was not totally a failure in helping to uphold the aspirations of the underprivileged.
Although no society is ethnically homogeneous, in some the tensions associated with ethnic divisions are more prominent than in others. In such contexts a key factor concerns the organization of schools and the implications of this for ethnic relations. Broadly stated practice might be seen as lying on a continuum, with one end characterized by a plurality of schools and the other end by plural schools. A plurality of schools implies that different communities can organize their own schools and that the separate school systems reflects the plurality of the wider society. The notion of plural schools implies that each school seeks to embody the diversity that exists within society and that, preferably, a single system of common schools exists.
He was a fresh face in the U.S. Senate for only ten months when the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached him. The year was 1963 and for Senator George Stanley McGovern, like millions of others, his life would change. This soft-spoken, thoughtful, and strong intellect from the prairies of South Dakota had only the year before been appointed to the position of director of the Food for Peace by President Kennedy after his first run and subsequent defeat of an open Senate seat in South Dakota. McGovern would run again in 1962, this time defeating Republican Joe Bottum.
We conduct a survey experiment to examine the effects of international compromise, war, and foreign government rhetoric on presidential approval. We find that, in certain conflicts, popular approval tracks fairness heuristics—leaders seeking to maximize voter approval prefer equitable divisions of disputed goods and are risk acceptant for divisions below this threshold. Moreover, aggressive rhetoric by a foreign leader increases domestic leaders’ expected approval from war, decreases the value of compromise, and provides them with powerful incentives to fight harder. Thus, leaders motivated by popular approval have preferences that are inconsistent with the non-satiated, risk-averse preferences defined over shares of an objective good—that is, with those that much of the rationalist literature on conflict assumes. Fairness heuristics and the rhetorical framing of disputes during the conflict process may be at least as important as material factors in understanding why some disputes result in war.
Do leaders learn more about military force from firsthand experience with the armed forces or their nation’s last war? Despite a resurgence of interest in the effects of leaders and their beliefs on international conflict and war, we still know little about which mechanisms cause what beliefs. I theorize that although personal experiences in the military may provide less normatively probative lessons for a leader contemplating the initiation of a conflict than his nation’s last war, personal military experiences will have a greater effect on beliefs because they are more directly experienced, vivid and cognitively accessible. I argue that this availability bias should make leaders who have experience in the military but not combat operations develop beliefs that make them more likely to authorize the use of force than leaders with combat experience. I test this hypothesis on Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy’s beliefs about the use of force in Vietnam with archival evidence and secondary studies. These cases control for the nation’s last war because both experienced the second World War but allow variation in military experiences because Kennedy but not Johnson experienced combat. The results suggest that further attention to leaders’ personal military experiences will yield better predictions about their beliefs and foreign policies.
In the fall of 2009, a short clip of James Baldwin debating William F. Buckley, Jr. in England went viral on YouTube. There, nestled in what seems to be a crowd of one thousand students, a small man with large piercing eyes read a sermon that momentarily rippled through the cacophony of the Twitter-verse, Facebook, and a million other millennial distractions.
Historians have demonstrated a strong tendency to conclude that the John F. Kennedy administration's investment in covert operations and counterinsurgency was based on a distorted view of reality and that its special operations proved largely ineffective in countering the communist national liberation struggle in the developing world, yet historians have also tended to acknowledge that, despite its problems, Camelot confronted international communism while avoiding full-scale military intervention and nuclear conflict.
The close partnership between John and Robert Kennedy is among the most consequential of any political relationship of siblings in American history. In the memoirs of Kennedy administration officials and family friends, and in the works of scholars and journalists, a key aspect of John F. Kennedy's presidency was the teamwork with his younger brother. Early sympathetic works set the tone for celebratory efforts that would follow. In the 1980s and 1990s, new works emerged – some of them best sellers – that challenged the triumphalist narratives, offering a revisionist perspective that was considerably more critical. This examination of the Kennedy brothers' family background, political partnership, and crisis-management style, as well as the more influential books about their lives, offers an understanding of their working relationship and historical legacy that neither fortifies myths nor disconnects them from the historical context of 1960s America.
The chapter traces President Kennedy's recruitment of, and relationship with, a variety of academic figures who served in his administration. It notes the slipperiness of the term “action intellectual,” but acknowledges that the term does capture something integral to the “Kennedy style.” The chapter indicates the considerable variety of action intellectuals who served Kennedy in a number of capacities. Key figures ranged from Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to various Keynesian economists. In respect to foreign policy, three main groups are identified: leading intellectuals and academics who worked in prominent positions for JFK; a group of “defense intellectuals” associated with RAND, the research and development think tank situated in California; and a cohort of modernization theorists, committed to particular programs of aid and development in the Third World. The chapter notes the degree to which many of these intellectuals have come to be portrayed as arrogant and even irresponsible. The chapter seeks to put this judgment into historical context, always emphasizing the considerable range of personality and academic firepower upon which Kennedy drew in shaping new ideas for his presidency.
Historians have argued over John F. Kennedy's policies in Vietnam since virtually the moment that Kennedy was assassinated. Speculation over whether he would have gone to war has been particularly intense. The existence of such differing views is unsurprising, perhaps even inevitable, given that Kennedy left several inconclusive, ambiguous clues about his intentions. Moreover, we do know what happened after Kennedy's assassination: Without the war that followed under President Lyndon B. Johnson, and especially without the disastrous course the war took, the historical stakes would not have been so high and the question about what Kennedy would have done in Vietnam would be largely moot. In the end, most historians argue that John F. Kennedy was neither hero nor villain, but human, and that his Vietnam policies were neither farsighted nor myopic but rather pragmatic responses to circumstance.
Setting the Tone with Personnel ChangesThe Alliance for Progress and the Commitment to DevelopmentIntervention and Coup SupportCounterinsurgencySecret Financing of Elections: Chile and the Dominican RepublicModeration: Mexico and CubaThe Waning of the Monroe DoctrineConclusion
ReferencesFurther Reading
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Einfluss des Nationalen Sicherheitsberaters McGeorge Bundy auf die amerikanische Aussenpolitik zwischen 1961 und 1963.
The relationship between secret services and the press is an enduring one. Although the CIA did not seek the kind of salient media profile enjoyed by the FBI, it nevertheless maintained an informal press office from its foundation in 1947. Directors of the CIA and their senior staff devoted significant time to the public profile of the Agency. Their efforts to engage with the world of newspapers divided journalists. Some saw it as their patriotic duty to assist the Agency, even reporting for it overseas, while other saw it as their constitutional role to oppose the Agency. This was especially true during the Vietnam War and Watergate. Thereafter, a more nuanced relationship developed in which the press saw themselves as an informal wing of new accountability processes that provided the intelligence community with oversight. This was ambiguous terrain and its complexities are explored here by focusing on the example of the prominent New York Times journalist Tad Szulc, whose complex relationship with the CIA spanned several decades and connected closely with the vexed issue of Kennedy and Cuba. Szulc played a number of roles including outrider, renegade and overseer, but there was confusion about who was servant and who was master.
Do the personal characteristics and foreign policy behavior of world leaders correlate with their birth order? The literature of birth order theory suggests that they should. An exploratory empirical analysis of 46 world leaders as to their personal political characteristics, foreign policy orientations, and foreign policy behavior is performed in order to assess what, if any, effects can be linked to birth order. The results substantiate the hypotheses derived from birth order theory in a few cases, contradict them in others, and point out some new paths of inquiry as well. In brief, differences between the birth orders can be detected in the attainment of national leadership. Though no substantiation is found for hypothesized differences between firstborns and middle-borns, the group of last-born leaders differs significantly from all other groups on measures of personal characteristics. However, no significant differences were found regarding foreign policy orientation and foreign policy behavior.
This paper contributes to the issue of political deception by exploring the role of self-deception in democratic politics. Within politics, deception of the people is actually very often produced by the self-deception of political leaders and officials, which is then supplemented by mechanisms of self-deception of the public itself. That self-deception, rather than simply straightforward deception, is a significant obstacle to truth and transparency in democratic politics is often hinted at by political scientists and historians but never properly pursued. And yet it should be, for which one of them is the case has important normative implications. This paper briefly presents the notion of self-deception and offers some reasons to take its presence in politics seriously. It also counters possible objections to doing so. Different kinds of political self-deception are presented and illustrated through historical examples so as to provide a clear typology and make the case for self-deception in politics stronger.
Jeffrey W. Legro is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.
Andrew Moravcsik is Professor of Government, Harvard University.
We are grateful to Charles Glaser, Joseph Grieco, Gideon Rose, Randall Schweller, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Stephen Walt, William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria for providing repeated, detailed corrections and rebuttals to our analysis of their respective work; to Robert Art, Michael Barnett, James Caporaso, Thomas Christensen, Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, David Dessler, Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, Daniel Epstein, Martha Finnemore, Stefano Guzzini, Gunther Hellmann, Robert Jervis, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, John Mearsheimer, John Owen, Robert Paarlberg, Stephen Rosen, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Nigel Thalakada, Alexander Wendt, and participants at colloquia at Brown University and Harvard University's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies for more general comments; and to Duane Adamson and Aron Fischer for research assistance.
1. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
2. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-1053. This is another way in which our critique differs from that of Vasquez, who has also charged that the realist paradigm is degenerating. Vasquez argues that "there is no falsification before the emergence of better theory," and that alternative paradigms do not exist. We demonstrate that they do. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm," p. 910.
3. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm"; and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
4. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
5. Or a "basic theory," "research program," "school," or "approach." For similar usage, see Stephen Van Evera, cited in Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," in Frankel, Realism, p. xiii; and Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism." We do not mean to imply more with the term "paradigm" than we state.
6. For a fuller account of the desirable criteria, see Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1998). There we also employ these standards to reject paradigmatic definitions of realism based...
One of the most important and controversial contributions to a vibrant body of new security theories since the 1990s has been the idea of securitization. However, rather than providing a consolidated position the discourse on securitization has only just begun to transform the new idea into a more comprehensive security theory. This article argues that such a theory needs to go beyond the current reflections on securitization by the Copenhagen School. Through internal critique and conceptual reconstruction the article generates an alternative framework for future empirical research and identifies two centres of gravity as a first step towards a more consistent understanding of securitization as a comprehensive theory of security.
The purpose of this study is to assess the ways in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy reacted to the civil rights crises in Little Rock in 1957 and at Ole Miss in 1962. A side theme is to assess presidential learning by seeing whet Kennedy learned from the lessons taught by Eisenhower. Each president was reluctant to commit federal troops to enforcing civil rights, was concerned about the problems associated with federalism, and ended up feeling forced to commit troops nonetheless. The message is that despite the presidents' best intentions, troops ultimately had to be committed. Kennedy was unable to avoid the traps that Eisenhower had encountered, and the imposition of the national government on the enforcement of civil rights was firmly established.
The Key West of March 1961 meeting between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy was the first time that the two leaders met. The talks concentrated on a serious dispute that had arisen between Britain and the United States over how to handle the Civil War in Laos. To develop a good working relationship with the new President, Macmillan went against long‐standing Foreign Office policy and against the advice of the Chiefs of Staff in agreeing to conduct joint‐planning with America on possible military intervention in Laos. In so doing, he risked Britain's involvement in a major conflict in Indo‐China and caused considerable unease among his Cabinet colleagues.
The Apalachin meeting of recognized underworld leaders from cities across the USA was held in upstate New York on November
14, 1957. The event, well known to historians and justice system officials, has become a textbook case rarely examined for
its larger context of how American government officials learned to confront the organization and strength of the American
Mafia, later called La Cosa Nostra (LCN). From 1957 to 1967, three presidents, four attorneys general, and hundreds of federal
agents and prosecutors traveled an obstacle-filled path toward investigating, indicting, prosecuting, and convicting Apalachin
attendees and their successors. Steps were taken to challenge the power of the mob during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations,
but they were consistently plagued by false starts, frustrations, and side steps. Each obstacle further instructed policy
makers, however, on the need for an intensive and coordinated effort grounded in common goals and interagency cooperation.
This article considers six key obstacles to the decade-long quest for a concerted federal initiative against organized crime.
It examines how the characteristics and the impact of each obstacle contributed to a meandering and slothful federal response
to the Mafia’s power. Lessons learned about how to effectively attack the mob were finally implemented in May 1966 when President
Johnson institutionalized Executive agency cooperation, making the Attorney General (AG) the focal point in the war on organized
crime. One element in this new initiative was known as the ‘Buffalo Project,’ an experiment commencing officially in January
1967 in Buffalo, New York to concentrate intelligence, investigations, and prosecutive resources working across bureaucratic
lines to pursue guilty pleas or convictions. The Project, a closely supervised operation directed by the Justice Department’s
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (OCRS), was conceptualized as a small team of supervisory federal investigators and
experienced prosecutors who built cases against local Mafia associates and leaders to withstand the scrutiny of the federal
justice system. Assistance was also rendered by state, local, and international organizations. The Project formed a template
for the DoJ Criminal Division’s Strike Force program.
Appointments to senior-level executive positions are at times the subjects of disagreement between the president and Congress. Recent changes in the nature of the executive-legislative relationship in American government are reflected in the manner in which the Senate exercises its power to confirm nominations to executive offices. Presidents since Nixon have found greater proportions of their nominations encountering significant opposition in the Senate. More importantly, questions of public policy—once viewed as inappropriate—have come to dominate confirmation deliberations. As a result, the confirmation process is best viewed as an extension of the policy struggles between the White House and Capitol Hill and one mechanism at the legislature's disposal for exercising control over the executive branch.
Specific clinical problems emerge in middle-aged men, not so much because of aging, but as a result of the path they have chosen to follow and their reaction to life experiences. For instance, the middle-aged executive has probably spent a lifetime working towards success. His daily existence is characterized by aggression, and his drive to conquer may make him prone to heart disease. Mild depression due to anxious self scrutiny also is common in middle age. Depression and fatigue may lead some patients to overindulge in food, alcohol and/or drugs. Others may become addicted to exercise. These patients look on pain as an ominous threat to their finely balanced daily ritual, and therefore may disregard the warning signs of injury or illness. In treating the problems of middle age, physicians should remember that most middle-aged patients have acquired some practical wisdom.
This thesis presents a research paper and videotaped production of Ora E. Anderson, a former journalist from the Appalachian Ohio region, about the beginning of the Wayne National Forest in Appalachian Ohio. Anderson offers a significant and authoritative contribution to local knowledge about landscape change and the dynamic processes involved and provides a compelling argument that the management of natural resources in Appalachian Ohio were largely subsumed under the national economic development policies established to deal with the overriding issue of unemployment. This research demonstrates how oral history can be used as a methodological approach to landscape history. Anderson’s seasoned perspective regarding 20th century environmental alteration together with his own 1930s newspaper reports augmented by documented archival photographs provide the raw material for a vivid portrayal of environmental degradation and economic conditions experienced during the 1930s in Appalachian Ohio.
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