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Structure After 50 Years: The Anatomy of a Charter
Abstract
In the half century since its publication, The Structure of Social Action has emerged as one of the classics of the sociological tradition. At the present time, however, there is scarcely any agreement about the status of the book's argument among all those who still appeal to the volume. After 50 years, the vast scholarship generated by Structure is in disarray, with separate literatures existing for different aspects of the book and controversies present in all these literatures. This paper examines each major aspect of Structure: its (1) sociohistorical context, (2) writing style, (3) methodological argument, (4) account of the history of social theory, (5) analysis of action, (6) view of the social world, (7) perspective on the actor, (8) treatment of the problem of order, and (9) approach to voluntarism. The paper argues that, when Structure is embedded in the sociointellectual context where it was produced, and is interpreted as a "charter" intended to defend the science of sociology against forces ...
... To znamenalo určiť problematické stránky ekonomickej teórie a nájsť v tomto priestore miesto pre sociologicky relevantné teoretické vysvetlenia. (Camic 1989, Velthuis 1999. ...
... Týmto spôsobom vlastne Parsons prepojil teóriu ekonomickej racionality, ktorá charakterizovala úlohu ekonómie, s inštitucionálnym a hodnotovým kontextom konania, ktorý je predmetom sociológie. (Camic 1989) Zároveň sa mu podarilo inštitúcie charakterizovať ako neekonomický faktor, ktorý nie je ovplyvnený ekonomickým systémom, ale hodnotovými postojmi aktérov v spoločnosti. ...
... To znamenalo identifikovanie problematických stránok ekonomickej teórie a nájdenie v tomto priestore miesto pre sociologicky relevantné teoretické vysvetlenie. (Camic 1989, Velthuis 1999) Christoph Deutschmann vysvetľuje, že napriek výraznej kritike ekonomického utilitarizmu hlavným cieľom Parsonsovej teórie nebola samotná kritika, ale pokus o určité zjednotenie, respektíve hľadanie spojenia medzi sociológiou a ekonomickou teóriou. Tento Parsonsov základný postoj sa utváral v priebehu americkej obdoby súboja o metódu, ktorý sa odohrával medzi predstaviteľmi inštitucionálnej ekonómie a predstaviteľmi neoklasickej teórie. ...
... Týmto spôsobom vlastne Parsons prepojil teóriu ekonomickej racionality, ktorá charakterizovala úlohu ekonómie, s inštitucionálnym a hodnotovým kontextom konania, ktorý je predmetom sociológie. (Camic 1989) Zároveň sa mu podarilo inštitúcie charakterizovať ako neekonomický faktor, ktorý nie je ovplyvnený ekonomickým systémom, ale hodnotovými postojmi aktérov v spoločnosti. Špecifické postavenie inštitúcií vo vzťahu k ekonomickému konaniu dokumentuje nasledujúci citát z Parsonsovej práce, v ktorej sa venoval problému motivácie k ekonomickej aktivite: " Vlastný záujem nie je možné považovať za jediný a rozhodujúci činiteľ ovplyvňujúci ľudské správanie, a to ani v ekonomickej sfére. ...
... First, there is the genesis or pre-history of the canon and here Connell offers us a plausible narrative of sociology in crisis. Parsons (1937) swept away the cobwebs of the past to establish foundations in the writings of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, claiming that they independently converged on a "voluntaristic" theory of action that was forged in opposition to behaviorism and utilitarianism (Camic, 1989). This theory of action would, in due course, aspire to make the other social sciences a special case of sociology. ...
... Primero, está la génesis o prehistoria del canon y aquí Connell nos ofrece una narrativa plausible de la sociología en crisis. Parsons (1937) barrió las telarañas del pasado para establecer fundamentos en los escritos de Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim y Weber, afirmando que convergieron de manera independiente en una teoría de la acción "voluntarista" que se forjó en oposición al conductismo y utilitarismo (Camic, 1989). Esta teoría de la acción aspiraría, a su debido tiempo, a hacer de las otras ciencias sociales un caso especial de sociología. ...
Uno de los debates más polémicos que atraviesa a la sociología es qué hacer con el canon de Marx, Weber y Durkheim: ¿abandonarlo, comenzar con uno nuevo o reconstruir el existente? En este artículo examino las afirmaciones de Connell, la principal defensora de la idea de abandonar el canon. Ella afirma que este es una imposición arbitraria que no tiene relación con la historia real de la sociología y que sería mejor que examináramos cómo el canon llegó a serlo. Ella no considera el valor intrínseco del canon y, en cambio, propone la idea de la teoría del Sur. No está claro qué es lo que caracteriza a una teoría tal ni qué es lo que reúne al conjunto de teóricos que se proponen como parte de ella. Como alternativa propongo reconstruir el canon con la vida y obra de W.E.B. Du Bois, quien fue impulsado precisamente por los temas que preocupan a Connell. El canon es relacional, de modo que Du Bois no se agrega simplemente, sino que se pone en conversación con Marx, Weber y Durkheim, lo que lleva a una relectura de cada uno de estos teóricos.
... Sociological reviewers were actually ambivalent (Owens 2010: 167): they commended Structure's theoretical reflections, and complimented its introduction of European thinkers, but they did not embrace its proposed "voluntaristic theory of action. " Structure also presented a sort of mission-statement or "charter" (Camic 1989) for sociology as the science that focuses on the integration of all types of human groups by means of institutionalized values. Parsons always thought of sociology within a larger matrix of the social sciences, somewhat in the manner of Andrew Abbott's (2001) more recent analysis of disciplines as "fractals. ...
Рассматриваются длительные, сложные и порой конфликтные профессиональные и личные отношения между Питиримом А. Сорокиным и Талкоттом Парсонсом. Они выступают как представители последовательных поколений в социальной науке. Два самых выдающихся и влиятельных американских социолога двадцатого века в течение тридцати лет одновременно работали в Гарвардском университете, где боролись за лидерство как на организационном уровне, так и в области социологии в целом. Статья сочетает повествование и концептуальный анализ, излагая ряд событий, которые ранее не были полностью описаны, и рассматривая их в широких рамках с точки зрения нескольких этапов. Особое внимание уделяется Гарварду как контексту, включая его организационную культуру и преобладающее понимание науки, а также ключевым лицам, которые принимали решения, и влиятельным фигурам, которые поддерживали карьеру Сорокина и Парсонса или препятствовали ей. Анализ имеет значение для понимания процессов стратификации во времени в социологии и других науках, особенно на организационном уровне.
... 4 Социологические исследования № 10, 2020 ситуации [Kuklick, 1992: 88-89]. Также обосновывалась значительная роль взглядов К. Коф фки [Koffka, 1935: 306-422] в исходной концептуализации Т. Парсонсом перехода от уровня биологического организма к уровню укоренённого в культуре «агента» действия в терминах подсистемы «Эго/Личности» [Camic, 1989]. ...
... For an outline of everything wrong with Parsons's Structure, seeCamic (1989): Parsons's neglect of social psychology (Mead, Dewey, even Freud), politics (Tocqueville, Michels), relational thought (Simmel, that aspect of Marx), and the ahistorical nature of his understanding of human habitus, not mention 'the problem of social order', all mistakes which have tended to be reproduced in subsequent social theory, including in organization studies. ...
This chapter outlines the main elements of Elias's broader sociological approach, organised around the top-level concepts of 'process' and 'figuration', followed by two of the more important elaborations of his theoretical approach, The Court Society and On the Process of Civilization. I then sketch the main elements of the ways in which his ideas have been taken up by organisation scholars to date, concentrating on a selection of studies drawing on Elias, and conclude with some reflections on the future directions that process-figurational theory might take in organization studies. The core line of argument is that Elias provides a range of powerful theoretical resources to transcend many of the problems usually addressed through the work of Foucault, actor-network theory, postmodernist and post-structuralist theory, especially the supposed agency/structure problem, constituting an alternative and effective analysis of organizational life that is anchored in the relational and processual strands of classical sociological theory.
... It goes without saying that this convergence, if it can be demonstrated, is a very strong argument for the view that correct observation and interpretation of the facts constitute at least one major element in the explanation of why this particular theoretical system has developed at all (Parsons [1937] 1968, p. 12). Camic (1989) has unveiled the substantial amount of academic politics that motivated the argument of Parsons's book. According to Camic, Structure has more than anything else to be read as a charter intended to defend the science of sociology against other disciplines and their leading theoretical approaches. ...
This article investigates the status assigned to Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as a case study on the development of the concept of theory in twentieth century sociology. I trace this development in the interplay between scholars in the United States and Germany and distinguish three waves of meaning given to the text. The transitions between these phases were brought about by an initial process of mystification of the text in the 1930s and a dynamic of de- and re-mystification beginning in the 1980s. Following this process of (re)interpretation over time, I show that at the beginning of the century the work was perceived as an empirical inquiry, while at the end of the century it was treated as pure theory. Based on the example of the peculiarities of the Weberian expert communities in the United States and Germany, I analyze how the invention of a concept of theory as independent from empirical evidence helped to stabilize the value of scholarly expertise on Weber in the face of otherwise declining resonance of the text. The analysis of this paradigmatic case adds to our understanding of the development, uses, and meaning of theory in contemporary sociology.
... Philosophy aside, for there may be other, more effective arguments against Connell's point, the thrust of Connell's reasoning concerns not whether canonization took place, but an appeal to think more about how and why it happened -surely related rather than antagonistic to Heilbron's (1990) argument for the emergence of sociology as a "science of society"within the context of significance provided by the French "intellectual regime" between 1750 and 1850. We are not being asked to be amazed at how selectively few sociologists get canonized, but to be aware of the context of the process of canonization, and to think about some possible explanations, a concern very closely related to that of Levine's (1989) and Camic's (1989) work on the history of sociological theory. Collins ends his commentary with an appeal to "broaden out" from the analysis of American sociology to "the formation of canons in other disciplines and in other parts of the world" (p. ...
... 25 Issues of worth and justification raise important questions for the new economic sociology. Recall that the maturation of sociology was struck in an institutionalized bargain with economics separating their disciplinary objects of study (Camic 1989): You, the economists, study value; we sociologists will study values. Acknowledging your jurisdiction in the analysis of the economy, we study the social relations in which economies are embedded. ...
... 25 Issues of worth and justification raise important questions for the new economic sociology. Recall that the maturation of sociology was struck in an institutionalized bargain with economics separating their disciplinary objects of study (Camic 1989): You, the economists, study value; we sociologists will study values. Acknowledging your jurisdiction in the analysis of the economy, we study the social relations in which economies are embedded. ...
... 25 Issues of worth and justification raise important questions for the new economic sociology. Recall that the maturation of sociology was struck in an institutionalized bargain with economics separating their disciplinary objects of study (Camic 1989): You, the economists, study value; we sociologists will study values. Acknowledging your jurisdiction in the analysis of the economy, we study the social relations in which economies are embedded. ...
... 25 Issues of worth and justification raise important questions for the new economic sociology. Recall that the maturation of sociology was struck in an institutionalized bargain with economics separating their disciplinary objects of study (Camic 1989): You, the economists, study value; we sociologists will study values. Acknowledging your jurisdiction in the analysis of the economy, we study the social relations in which economies are embedded. ...
The article adds to the debate on theorizing—understood as the process of theory building—the proposal to consider convergence as a method of comparison. The starting point is the so-called “convergence thesis” with which Talcott Parsons developed and justified his “Voluntaristic Theory of Action”. The systematic nature of convergence as a comparative method becomes clear by tracing why Parsons had decided not to integrate the analyses of Georg Simmel. As a result, one can distinguish between intersection convergences, unification convergences and complementary convergences and make this systematics fruitful for theory building.
Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism is an obligatory structural element of works on the history and theory of sociology. On the one hand, such works postulate and explain his contribution to the development of the macro-sociological theorizing within the “paradigm of social facts” founded by Émile Durkheim (concepts of social fact, social institution, mechanical and organic social solidarity, objective scientific method, etc.). On the other hand, any reconstructions of Parsons’ theory invariably contain critical arguments, the essence and scope of which vary from brief mentions of its excessive abstractness (teleology) and even utopianism to extensive quotes from numerous works by representatives of those research areas (as a rule, conflict theories) that are largely based on the disagreement with specific postulates or the general logic of Parsons’ reasoning about the structure of social system and the essence of social action. This format for presenting Parsons’ legacy has become generally accepted; therefore, the revival of interest in Parsons’ ideas, primarily in his concept of societal community in a rather practical-empirical way, in the works of Giuseppe Sciortino (with co-authors) in the last two decades has been somewhat unexpected. Albeit admitting the objective impossibility of mentioning all corresponding thematic lines, arguments and references in one article together with the high probability of subjective biases in their reconstruction and interpretation, the author makes an attempt to present Sciortino’s general argumentation: his rejection of the excessively simplified historical-critical perception of Parsons’ legacy, his attempts to systematize Parsons’ theoretical constructs that require only some clarification to be applied in the study of contemporary social realities, and his identification of those areas of the theoretical-empirical sociological analysis in which Parsons’ model of societal community has obvious heuristic (and even humanistic) potential, despite its generally recognized limitations.
One of the most contentious debates coursing through sociology is what to do with the canon of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim: abandon the canon, start afresh with a new canon, or reconstruct the existing canon? In this paper I examine the claims of Connell, the foremost advocate of abandoning the cannon. She claims the canon is an arbitrary imposition that bears no relation to the actual history of sociology and we would be better off examining how the canon came to be. She does not consider the intrinsic value of the canon and instead advances the idea of Southern theory. It is not clear what is Southern about Southern theory nor what holds together the array of theorists she proposes. As an alternative I propose reconstructing the canon with the life and work of W.E.B. Du Bois who was propelled by precisely the issues that concern Connell. The canon is relational so that Du Bois is not simply added but brought into conversation with Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, leading to a rereading of each theorist. The canon has always been subject to revision when it atrophies, when it moves out of sync with questions raised by the world and by sociology. I agree with others that contemporary questions push Du Bois to the forefront—however, not at the expense of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim but in dialogue with them. I outline a possible direction of such dialogues from which all would benefit. Just as the inclusion of Marx had dramatic consequences for the recalibration of Weber and Durkheim, so the same will happen with the inclusion of Du Bois with regard to Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, and, at the same time, stiffening and advancing a Du Boisian sociology. Incorporating Du Bois into the existing canon may appear to be a reformist move but if attention is paid to the whole gamut of Du Bois’s oeuvre, then the consequences could be revolutionary, even to the point of sidelining one or more of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim.
Nelle scienze sociali si fa spesso riferimento alla “svolta culturale”; ma il modo solitamente sbrigativo con cui si allude al percorso storico che ha portato all’attuale enfasi sulla cultura merita di essere ribaltato secondo una prospettiva capace di riconsegnare il senso e le ricadute di una trasformazione che ha rimesso i fenomeni culturali al centro della conoscenza. Questo libro nasce proprio dall’esigenza di ricostruire storicamente il cambiamento di approccio e di pensiero che ha attraversato i diversi campi delle scienze sociali, determinando un distanziamento dalle epistemologie positiviste a favore dell’interpretazione dei significati dell’agire umano. La svolta culturale non costituisce un paradigma proposto in maniera unitaria, consapevole e programmatica da parte di un gruppo coeso di autori, ma coagula un insieme di tendenze nuove, asistematiche e indipendenti che convergono, in momenti e modi diversi, verso un generale ri-orientamento delle scienze sociali e una maggiore e più estesa considerazione della cultura, dei fenomeni culturali e del loro carattere simbolico. Eventi e fenomeni extra-accademici hanno accompagnato e stimolato questa radicale trasformazione: il movimento per i diritti civili, il femminismo, le contestazioni giovanili e più in generale tutte le rivendicazioni di fine secolo hanno favorito l’emergere della cultura come aspetto fondamentale dell’esistenza soggettiva e collettiva.
Das Thema «Krieg» ist ebenso aktuell wie beständig. Aktuell, weil auch heute weltweit der Krieg in allen Formen Menschen und Gesellschaften bedroht. Beständig, weil sich die Geschichte auch als eine endlose Abfolge von Kriegen lesen lässt. Aber trotz Aktualität und Beständigkeit hat sich die Soziologie insbesondere in der Schweiz noch vergleichsweise wenig mit diesem Thema auseinandergesetzt. Ausgehend von theoretischen Ordnungsbestimmungen des Krieges, mit Fall- und Länderstudien und der Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Krieg und Vergemeinschaftung, leistet dieser Band einen Beitrag zur Schliessung dieser Lücke. Das Buch geht zurück auf den 2007 in Basel abgehaltenen Kongress der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, an dem sich Soziologinnen und Soziologen sowie Sachverständige aus verwandten Disziplinen mit dem Phänomen des Krieges beschäftigt haben. Die Beiträge in diesem Buch stammen von Bernard Degen, Jürgen Endress, Josef Estermann, Johan Galtung, Kurt Imhof, Katharina Inhetveen, Michael Kutzner, Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz, Michael Nollert, Anja Sieber, Katharina Thurnheer und Jens Warburg.
Zusammenfassung
Im folgenden wird die um das Problem sozialer Ordnung kreisende Hobbes-Interpretation Parsons’ vorgestellt und kritisiert. Hobbes ist keineswegs der Utilitarist und Atheist, den Parsons in ihm sehen will, sondern nimmt in nuce die Lösung des Problems vorweg, die Parsons als die seine reklamiert.
Der Sozialtheorie Talcott Parsons’ eilt der Ruf voraus, ahistorisch zu sein, eine Präferenz für Statik, Bestände und Konsens, für Strukturen und deren Erhaltung zu haben und gerade darin den sozialwissenschaftlichen Funktionalismus zu begründen. Eine solche Auffassung kann zudem damit argumentieren, daß Parsons selbst eine befriedigende Erklärung sozialen Wandels und historischer Prozesse im Theorierahmen des Strukturfunktionalismus für nicht möglich gehalten hat.1
Ich habe im Titel des Aufsatzes die Th eorie des Handelns bewußt in Anführungszeichen gesetzt. Der Grund ist, daß zwar – wenn auch nur bedingt – Konsens darüber besteht, was die Soziologie ist, aber innerhalb der Soziologie es keine Einigkeit darüber gibt, was die „Th eorie des Handelns“ oder „Handlungstheorie“ ist und welcher Stellenwert ihr in der Soziologie zukommt. Ich möchte einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung dieser Frage leisten, indem ich drei Ebenen der Problematisierung unterscheide, für die die Beschäft igung mit Handlungen und Handeln zentral ist. (Ich werde diese Begriff e synonym verwenden).
Das in den dreiBiger Jahren von Talcott Parsons begonnene Projekt einer urmfassenden Sozialtheorie ist unabgeschlossen geblieben. Das hat vor allem zwei Gründe: Zum einen hat Parsons selbst dieses Projekt immer wieder reformuliert und dabei seine Ausgangsbasis, die klassische soziologische Theorie, aus immer neuen Perspektiven gedeutet. Bis zuletzt ist Parsons damit beschaftigt, dieses Projekt durch wesentliche Anderungen und Verbesserungen voranzubringen.1 Einen krönenden Abschluss, eine Abrundung hat sein Werk in diesem kontinuierlichen Umarbeitungsprozeß freilich nicht gefunden, viele Theorieteile sind zudem nur in groben Zügen oder ansatzweise entfaltet. Diese Offenheit des Parsons’schen Theorieprojekts besteht dann zum anderen gerade in der Anschließbarkeit weiterer Theorieprojekte, in der Weiterführung (und Richtungskorrektur) der von ihm begonnenen Theoriearbeit. Dabei ist es unausweichlich geworden, sich die Prämissen und die Programmatik von Parsons’ Theorie zu vergegenwärtigen, um einen überzeugenden Zugang zur Entwicklung seines Werks zu finden und dessen paradigmatische Bedeutung für die Sozialtheorie auszuweisen.
Rainer Greshoff (1998) beklagt mit Bezug auf mehrere gleichgesinnte Autoren das unabgeklärte Nebeneinander, ja sogar den Wirrwarr und die Anarchie von Theorien in den Sozialwissenschaften. Der Theorienvergleich soll hier Abhilfe schaffen. Eine theorievergleichende Strategie hat Talcott Parsons in The Structure of Social Action entwickelt. In einer Verbindung aus theoriegeschichtlicher Rekonstruktion und theoriesystematischem Begriffsrahmen entwickelt er seine Konvergenzthese: die wichtigsten soziologischen Theorien und Traditionen sind auf einem höheren theoretischen Niveau synthetisierbar. Diese These ist bezweifelt worden (vgl. Schwinn 1993) sowohl was die selektive Auswahl der von Parsons behandelten Theorien betrifft (Camic 1989: 59f.) als auch seine bisweilen eigenwillige Lektüre der vier soziologischen Klassiker selbst (Cohen/Hazelrigg/Pope 1975; Pope/ Cohen/ Hazelrigg 1975). In modifizierter Form mit z.T. anderen Klassikern und einer anderen Theoriesystematik und dadurch mit anderen Ergebnissen als Parsons hat Jürgen Habermas diese Konvergenzanstrengungen in der Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns fortgesetzt. Einen anderen Weg, allerdings mit gleichem Ziel, schlug Niklas Luhmann ein: die theoriegeschichtliche Rekonstruktion des eigenen Fachs wird als irrelevant gestrichen und durch Anschluß an fachfremde Theorieentwicklungen eine dissziplinübergreifende „Supertheorie„ für die Sozialwissenschaften zu entwickeln versucht. Diese Konvergenz- und Integrationsbestrebungen haben sich als nicht sonderlich erfolgreich erwiesen. Parsons‘ Theorieanspruch hat als Gegenreaktion eine ganze Flut von andersartigen Theorieentwürfen stimuliert, insbesondere mehrere Spielarten der Mikrosoziologie wie Ethnomethodologie und symbolischer Interaktionismus, aber auch konflikttheoretische Gegenentwürfe. Bis in Anthony Giddens‘ Arbeiten hinein ist diese Absetzbewegung von Parsons feststellbar. Gleiches läßt sich für Luhmann sagen: in dem Maße wie er fachuniversale Theorieansprüche erhebt, floriert zugleich das Geschäft von handlungstheoretischen und systemkritischen Ansätzen. Der historische Rückblick auf das eigene Fach erweist die Divergenzthese als plausibler gegenüber der Konvergenzthese.
This book offers a comprehensive overview of the major theoretical perspectives in contemporary sociology, covering schools of thought or intellectual movements within the discipline, as well as the work of individual scholars. The author provides not only a rigorous exposition of each theory, but also an examination of the scholarly reception of the approach in question, considering both critical responses and defences in order to reach a balanced evaluation. Chapters cover the following theorists and perspectives: • Alexander • Bourdieu • Ethnomethodology • Exchange Theory • Foucault • Giddens • Goffman • Habermas • Luhmann • Merton • Network and Social Capital Theory • Parsons • Rational Choice Theory • Schutz and Phenomenalism • Structuralism • Symbolic Interactionism An accessible and informative treatment of the central approaches in sociology over the course of the last century, this volume marks a significant contribution to sociological theory and constitutes an essential addition to library collections in the areas of the history of sociology and contemporary social theory.
Students of management are nearly unanimous (as are managers themselves) in believing that the contemporary business corporation is in a period of dizzying change. This book represents the first time that leading experts in sociology, law, economics, and management studies have been assembled in one volume to explain the varying ways in which contemporary businesses are transforming themselves to respond to globalization, new technologies, workforce transformation, and legal change. Together their essays, whose focal point is an emerging network form of organization, bring order to the chaotic tumble of diagnoses, labels, and descriptions used to make sense of this changing world. Following an introduction by the editor, the first three chapters--by Walter Powell, David Stark, and Eleanor Westney--report systematically on change in corporate structure, strategy, and governance in the United States and Western Europe, East Asia, and the former socialist world. They separate fact from fiction and established trend from extravagant extrapolation. This is followed by commentary on them: Reinier Kraakman affirms the durability of the corporate form; David Bryce and Jitendra Singh assess organizational change from an evolutionary perspective; Robert Gibbons considers the logic of relational contracting in firms; and Charles Tilly probes the deeper historical context in which firms operate. The result is a revealing portrait of the challenges that managers face at the dawn of the twenty-first century and of how the diverse responses to those challenges are changing the nature of business enterprise throughout the world.
Social theory is the theoretical core of the social sciences, clearly distinguishable from political theory and cultural analysis. This 2009 book offers a unique overview of the development of social theory from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the present day. Spanning the literature in English, French and German, it provides an excellent background to the most important social theorists and theories in contemporary sociological thought, with crisp summaries of the main books, arguments and controversies. It also deals with newly emerging schools from rational choice to symbolic interactionism, with new ambitious approaches (Habermas, Luhmann, Giddens, Bourdieu), structuralism and antistructuralism, critical revisions of modernization theory, feminism and neopragmatism. Written by two of the world's leading sociologists and based on their extensive academic teaching, this unrivalled work is ideal both for students in the social sciences and humanities and for anyone interested in contemporary theoretical debates.
The theories of Parsons and Althusser are compared in terms of the questions they asked, the answers they gave, and the methodological strategies they used to link the two in order to raise questions about the theoretical solutions sociologists have developed to confront methodological individualism and avoid psychological reductionism. In the theories of Parsons and Althusser action is linked to structure by a systems framework in which no theoretically relevant social action occurs outside the system. Both adapted natural science models to explanations of social phenomena by using analogies of the unconscious and of language. Because these theoretical conceptualizations do not enable one to specify the limits of structural effect, it is argued that they are "sociologically reductionist." Alternative conceptualizations are suggested which conceive of social structure as setting limits but not preselecting behavior and as enabling theoretically meaningful choice out of multiple and conflicting pressures on social action. It is then argued that this choice must be incorporated in our theories of the social in order for us to explain social change. Finally, questions are raised about several underlying assumptions which may lead sociologists to sociologically reductionist theories.
The main thesis of this paper is that Parsons' claim that the works of Durkheim and Weber substantively converged on a voluntaristic theory of action is inaccurate and that his alleged demonstration of such convergence is grounded in serious distortions of the Durkheimian and Weberian positions. We first examine basic differences between Durkheim and Weber and then consider Parsons' claim in the light of those differences.
One of the most influential interpretations of Max Weber's sociology has been that provided by Talcott Parsons, especially in The Structure of Social Action. We contend that the Parsonian interpretation is erroneous both in many of its particulars and in the general cast that it gives to Weber's theoretical product. The crux of Parsons' misrepresentation is his overweening emphasis on the category of the normative. A confusion of "factual regularities" with "normative validity"--despite Weber's numerous warnings against such--led Parsons to an exaggeration of the importance Weber assigned to normative orientations of social action, legitimacy and collectivity integration, and, correspondingly, to a severe understatement of the importance of nonnormative aspects of social action and structures of dominance. In consequence, Parsons expanded what was but a part of Weber's sociology and made it very nearly the whole.
A theory of a phenomenon is an explanation of it, showing how it follows as a conclusion from general propositions in a deductive system. With all its empirical achievements, the functional school never produced a theory that was also an explanation, since from its general propositions about the conditions of social equilibrium no definite conclusions could be drawn. When a serious effort is made, even by functionalists, to construct an explanatory theory, its general propositions turn out to be psychological--propositions about the behavior of men, not the equilibrium of societies.
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Various critiques of American sociology, most recently that of Alvin Gouldner, argue that the domain assumptions of the field stemming from the functionalist approach of Talcott Parsons have imposed an essentially conservative system maintenance set of concerns on the field. Gouldner suggests that Parsons's approach reflects a lifelong opposition to socialism. In fact, Parsons's personal history belies these contentions. Further, a variety of survey studies, including a major unpublished one by Gouldner, indicate that sociologists as a group have been the most left-disposed field in academe, an occupation which is to the left of other strata. Within sociology, the "achievers," those at the most prestigeous schools, who have published most, and have the most research funds, are to the left of others in the field. This pattern reflects a general characteristics of intellectual life in which the most successful people hold more unorthodox socially critical views, behavior which may stem from a link between c...
Contemporary discussions of Parsons's thought have faltered because they are insufficiently generalized. Only after his theoretical and epistemological logic has been explored, for example, can his more specific, ideological purpose be correctly understood. Parsons's theoretical ambition has been to resolve long-standing antinomies in social thought. His theory, to the degree it succeeds, formulates two central points: the social basis of individual autonomy and the multidimensional basis of social order. These positions present the heart of Parsons's formal theory. In his analysis of historical development as differentiation--cultural, structural, and psychological--Parsons combines this formal logic with an ideological commitment to the expansion of individual freedom and conscious control. Incorporating elements of liberal, idealist, and materialist arguments, he outlines a theory of substantive voluntarism that is, potentially, neither conservative nor static. Considered as a whole, Parsons's theory contains serious contradictory strains. Nevertheless, his analysis of formal and substantive freedom represents a major contribution to social thought.
How are the basic categories of Parsons' theory obtained? In pursuit of an answer, this paper traces the decline of voluntarism with the passage of time in the Parsonian action scheme. The voluntarism of the prewar scheme, including its derivative polemic against behaviorism as a variant of "positivism," appears now to have been replaced by programmatic behaviorism. But the postwar texts are persistently equivocal at every point where they can be compared to the voluntarism of the prewar scheme; these points involve the subjective reference and the normative orientation of action. The differences between the pre- and post-war schemes lead to differences in substantive hypotheses, particularly on the nature of norms and normative control. The paper finally considers whether norms and values need to be the kind of independent variables that they are (though for different reasons) in both versions of the action scheme.
A travers l'analyse d'un cas précis - l'usage que P. Bourdieu fait des notions d'habitus, de schème, d'éthos, de réactivation... -, on se propose d'étudier les attaches parfois insoupçonnées qui peuvent relier une théorie sociologique à des traditions philosophiques établies: l'aristotélisme, d'abord, qui retraduit des structures linguistiques dont les effets persistent dans le langage le plus ordinaire et que l'étymologie contribue à mettre au jour; la phénoménologie ensuite, qui fit grand usage des notions d'habitus ou de schème dans le cadre d'une théorie de la perception et du jugement. Cette réactivation sociologique d'habitus philosophiques pose de sérieux problèmes d'interprétation... que la théorie de l'habitus semble précisément pouvoir éclairer. /// Through the analisis of Bourdieu's use of the notions of habitus, scheme, ethos and reactivation, the author studies the sometimes unsuspected ties which can link a sociological theory to well-known philosophical traditions: first, Aristotelism that expresses linguistic structures the effects of which are persistent in ordinary speech and stressed by etymological studies; second, phenomenology, which made use of the notions of habitus and scheme in the context of a theory of perception and judgement. Such a sociological reactivation of philosophical habitus leads to problems of interpretation... which habitus theory seems to be able to enlighten. /// Anhand der Untersuchung eines präzisen Falles - der Gebrauch, den P. Bourdieu von den Begriffen des Habitus, des Schemas, des Ethos und der Reaktivation macht - werden die manchmal ungeahnten Beziehungen untersucht, die eine soziologische Theorie mit bestehenden philosophischen Traditionen verbinden können. Zunächst den Aristotelismus, der die linguistischen Strukturen, deren Auswirkungen in die gewöhnlichste Sprache fortdauern und die mit Hilfe der Etymologie zutage gebracht werden, rückübersetzt. Danach die Phänomenologie, die häufigen Gebrauch von Habitus- und Schemabegriffen im Rahmen einer Theorie der Wahrnehmung und des Urteils macht. Diese soziologische Reaktivation vom philosophischen Habitus wirft ernsthafte Interpretationsprobleme auf,... die gerade die Theorie des Habitus beleuchten könnte. /// Partiendo de un caso concreto - el uso que hace Pierre Bourdieu de los conceptos de habitus, esquema (" schème "), etos, reactivación... - el autor se propone examinar las conexiones a veces insospechadas que pueden enlazar una teoría sociológica con tradiciones filosóficas establecidas: en primer lugar el aristotelismo, que formaliza estructuras linguisticas cuyos efectos persisten en el lenguage común y que la etimologia contribuye a sacar a luz; en segundo lugar, la fenomenología, que hace uso de los conceptos de habitus o de esquema en el marco de una teoría de la percepción y del juicio. Esta reactivación sociológica de habitus filosóficos plantea problemas de interpretación sobre los cuales la teoría del habitus puede precisamente arrojar alguna luz.
The meaning of voluntaristic action has remained in dispute for fifty years, and its implications for empirical research have never been established. The analytical components of voluntaristic action are specified, and its three related meanings discussed. Voluntaristic action is then subdivided into substantive norms and procedural norms, and the latter is worked into a new conceptual framework called societal constitutionalism. This framework rests on a synthesis of concepts from Lon Fuller, Jurgen Habermas and Talcott Parsons. Orienting hypotheses are proposed for empirical research.
Parsons' commentary on Emile Durkheim's work, first set forth in The Structure of Social Action and later developed is undoubtedly the most influential interpretation yet to appear in English. Parsons attempts to document Durkheim's shift from positivism to the voluntaristic theory of action and to idealism. Neither attempt is successful. Parsons' interpretation often seems as much a function of his own perspectives as of Durkheim's. Examination of Durkheim's theory in light of his intentions and assumptions reveals serious errors in Parsons' analysis.
In this paper an attempt is made to evaluate three answers--normative, coercive and exchange--to the Hobbesian question: how can one establish a society in which force and fraud are not routinely used in satisfying wants? Of the three answers, the normative solution is found to be least acceptable because, unlike the two non-normative explanations, it (1) focuses on the problem of maintaining a system in which the participants have already internalized norms prohibiting the use of force and fraud rather than on explaining how the relevant norms emerged; (2) tends to confound the problem of establishing a relatively well ordered system with the problem of increasing the level of integration of systems in which order already prevails; and (3) seriously underestimates (a) the degree of conflict which may be generated by shared values and (b) the role of norms based on self-interest in the creation and maintenance of social systems.
Using a conception of action drawn from the five major pre-World War II volumes of Znaniecki, MacIver, and Parsons, the contributions of Ward, Giddings, Ross, Small, Cooley, Mead, Thomas, Faris, and Park were investigated for antecedents of the action scheme. References to consciousness, subjectivity, the subject-object relationship, ends, means, reflection and choice, rules, and a distinctive subjective investigative technique were found in their works. The bases of an action orientation in American sociology can be discerned in the two decades before and after World War I and in both the traditions of positivistic evolutionism and subjective idealism. Cooley's concept of valuation, Mead's notion of the individual act, and Thomas' definition of the situation probably provide the most significant antecedents.
The thesis of this paper contends that many sociologists who have attempted to apply Kuhn's argument in analyzing the status of sociology have misunderstood, or have refused to accept, the central meaning of his paradigm concept. In this paper we first clarify the notion of paradigm as explicated by Kuhn and by Margaret Masterman, and note that the "exemplar" is the central element in the concept. We then analyze the usage of the concept by sociologists who have attempted to ascertain the paradigmatic status of sociology and we focus in particular on the work of Friedrichs and that of Ritzer. In so doing, we show that they have concentrated almost exclusively on the less important, more general meanings of the paradigm concept and thus lose the major thrust of Kuhn's argument. Possible reasons for this misuse are discussed. Finally, we argue that sociology has relatively few exemplars, lacks a clear-cut puzzle-solving tradition, and tends to operate from discipline-wide perspectives. In this regard, sociology is not a mature science; attempts to treat it as such within Kuhn's framework are misdirected.
Talcott Parsons's methodological views, particularly as formulated in The Structure of Social Action, have recently become the center of scholarly disagreement, with sociologists portraying his approach as positivist and postpositivist, empiricist and antiempiricist, relativist and nonrelativist. Departing from these interpretations, this paper argues that understanding Parson's early method requires an understanding of the sociointellectual context of his early writings and the social position he occupied within that context. Parsons's methodological ideas are analyzed in relation to the neoclassicist-institutionalist controversy in early twentieth-century American economics and the methodological views of leading economists and philosophers of science at Harvard during the same period. The position that Parsons occupied at Harvard, moving from the high-status field of economics to the low-status field of sociology, led him to accept the basic methodological argument of neoclassical economists--and to shape from it an equivalent method for sociology. Such an historical analysis produces a systematic and coherent interpretation of Parsons's early methodological work, resolves the major contradictions in the existing scholarship, and reveals the limitations of the Parsonian method, especially when contrasted to the Weberian approach which it purportedly transcended.
Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action." Two models of cultural influence are developed, for settled and unsettled cultural periods. In settled periods, culture independently influences action, but only by providing resources from which people can construct diverse lines of action. In unsettled cultural periods, explicit ideologies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run. This alternative view of culture offers new opportunities for systematic, differentiated arguments about culture's causal role in shaping action.
By the time of his last major work, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Durkheim's arguments concerning the influence of society on individual action were no longer couched predominantly in a language of externality and constraint. In 1913, defending the "principal ideas" of that work, Durkheim supported his conception of the "duality of human nature" (simultaneously social and individual) by emphasizing the "dynamogenic quality of religion," its ability to inspire human aciton a well as to curb it. These arguments do not represent a straighforward development of Durkheim's earlier work but must be undestood within the borader intellectual context within which he worked. Of particular importance were the growing differences among British social anthropologists, notably William Robertson Smith and James Frazer, concerning the mythic or utilitarian nature of primitive religion. On the evidence of this context, it is argued that one of the most critical shifts in the development of Durkheim's sociology of religion took place only after 1900. The process by which Durkheim developed his arguments in support of the former position may be understood in the light of recent work associated with the "strong programme" in the sociology of science. Major contemporary works used by Durkheim can be viewed as exemplars and the basis for analogies between substantively different areas of work rather than as the product of the application of a generalizable sociological method.
After an extraordinarily promising beginning in 1937 with The Structure of Social Action, Talcott Parsons abandoned his attempt to ground social theory in a theory of purposive action. The functionalism that resulted moved in one direction, while social research has progressively moved in an individual-behavioristic direction, resulting in an ever-widening divergence between research and theory. This paper describes paths in research and in theory development, that will reconstitute relevance of each for the other. The essential elements are two. The first is use of a theory of purposive action as a foundation for social theory; this entails acceptance of a form of methodological individualism and rejection of holism. The second is a focus in social research and theory on the movement from the level of individual actions to macrosocial functioning, that is, the level of system behavior.
Parsonian thought, often labeled conservative, is more accurately characterized as liberal. Despite Parson's well-known critique of early modern liberalism in its utilitarian form, his own thought progressively incorporated the utilitarian image of a modern social order. Early liberal thought sought to establish that social solidarity could rest on free communication and consent. Late Parsonian theory came to criticize attacks on the alleged utilitarian atomism of modern society as destructive of the special forms of solidarity on which modern community is based.
In The Structure of Social Action, Talcott Parsons developed a theory of action which corresponds in structure and method to Kant's critical philosophy. The core of this theory is the assertion that every action is to be understood as a product of the interaction of dynamizing and controlling forces. This basic proposition is elaborated into a theory through the construction of a four-dimensional "action space," which can be further differentiated into subsystems possessing varying degrees of orderedness. The differential effect of dynamizing and ordering forces on any given action is determined by its locationin the action space and by the kind of relation obtaining between the subsystemsof the action space. The relation between these subsystems which enables them simultaneously to expand their areas of effectiveness is interpenetration. The entire development of Talcott Parsons's theory of action is a progressive refinement of the theoretical devices available for the analysis of such processes of interpenetration. This is demonstrated in this essay for all the various stages of Parsons's theoretical development, from the laying down of thetheoretical core in The Structure of Social Action (1937) through The Social System (1951) to Action Theory and the Human Condition (1978).
This essay presents the thesis that a correct understanding of Talcott Parson's writings must begin form the assumption of a fundamental congruence of basic structure and method between the theory of action and Kant's critical philosophy. It is already generally understood that this congruence holds true on the metalevel of epistemological assumptions. It is less understood that the Kantian form of argument penetrates down to the level of the object theory of the general theory of action. The core of action theory is the notion that concrete action is to be explained as a result of the inner laws and the characteristic interrelations of analytically distinct subsystems of action. Thus the Parsonian solution to the central problem of social order is not "utilitarian"; nor, however, is it in any simple sense "normative", as it is often taken to be. Parson's solution lies instead in the notion of the "interpenetration" of distinct subsystems of action. This notion of interpenetration is a derivative of Kantian transcendental philosophy. In this sense, a Kantian "core" structures the theoretical development must be understood as a progressive elaboration and refinement of this central core.
Social constructionist and positivist approaches to the sociology of emotions differ in three respects: (1) social constructionists generally reject the importance of the biological and physiological substrate in the determination of specific emotions, while positivists affirm the opposite view; (2) social constructionists suppose that emotions are largely determined by social norms for emotion, or "feeling rules," while positivists assert that social structure, particularly the outcomes of actors' power and status relations, determines emotions; and (3) social constructionists, following a symbolic interactionist model, propose that actors must define situations before emotions will be experienced-but they do not explain how this is done, or what categories actors use to help them define situations; positivists on the other hand ofter a specific social structural category scheme for defining situations and determining the emotions those definitions produce. These issues are discussed and suggestions for ...
The editor has asked me to comment on Professor Warner's very interesting article. This request has come at a moment of rather stringent time bind so that, in order to meet his deadline, I must restrict myself to a few rather specific issues instead of attempting to survey a broader range. I very much appreciate the seriousness and competence with which Warner attacks the issues in the controversy between myself and the group he calls the "critics" of my work (Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope in their recent series in the American Sociological Review, which is referred to by him so frequently that further references in this comment would be "bibliographical supererogation"). Warner has, in my opinion, elevated the discussion to a much more general level, transcending the earlier issue of which party was "right" in the interpretation of the works of Durkheim and Weber. To a degree which I prefer not to try to explicate in detail here and would qualify carefully if I did, I concur with Warner's position that "both were right." I should like to center this comment on one major issue: Warner's allegation that I have seriously neglected the "cognitive element" and that, as his subtitle suggests, he proposes to contribute to restoring it to its rightful place. Even on this issue, it will not be possible to enter into the many complexities of the problems, but only to sketch an outline of connected considerations. Warner suggests that there is a great deal of common ground between myself and my critics. In one respect, however, I would like to put Warner and the critics together in contrast to my own present self-interpretation. This lies in the extent to which all, in discussing "Parsons's theory," focus their attention on one book, The Structure of Social Action, which was my first book, published 41 years ago and not revised in the meantime. It may well be construed to be "unfair to organized interpreters" for the author of such a work to be alive and "in circulation" so long after its publication. However that may be, my complaint at the present juncture is that both the "critics" and Warner concentrate so heavily on this one work that they tend to neglect almost everything I have published in the intervening period. Hence I propose to present a brief outline of developments, in my
By means of an examination and a revision of Parsons's "action frame work," this paper offers to mediate the debate between Parsons and the critics of his Durkheim-Weber "convergence" thesis and to present a more satisfactory rendering of Durkheim-Weber continuities. First, Parsons's Structure of Social Action is scrutinized. It is shown that Parsons so construes Hobbes that the "problem of order" for social theory is answered by the concept of internalized normative motivation. As a consequence of this focus, Parsons derogates an analytically independent "cognitive" element in action and elegates cognitive matters either to the "scientific" or "normative" orientations. Second, the interrelated series of articles by Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg are shown to rest on framework assumptions similar to Parsons's own, while drawing nearly opposite conclusions, rendering Durkheim a "positivist" and Weber a "utilitarian" in Parsons's sense of these terms. Third, a "redefined theory of action" is proposed which ackn...
The persuasiveness of Parsons's solution to the Hobbesian problem of order rests on the conjunction of two premises, one substantivesociological, the other methodological. (1) Normative consensus may ensure order in a way which can be "generalized." (2) Sociology must be an "analytic" science. Both premises are criticized, the former because it is empirically false, the latter because in its Parsonian conception it would render sociology nonfalsifiable. It is further argued that Parsons, while contiuning to cling to his normative solution to the problem of order, eventually abandoned his early interpretation of the analytic status of sociology, and therewith deprived his solution to the Hobbesian problem of an essential prop. Finally, the whole Parsonian approach to social science is shown to issue from a metaphysical view of social reality as a composite of several spheres, each of them sui generis.
The object of this paper is both critical and constructive. The first section contains a critical account of some leading interpretations of the rise of modern sociology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe, concentrating primarily on Durkheim but refering also to Max Weber. I try to show that these interpretations, still very commonly held, have to be abandoned as myths. Like all myths, however, they contain a rational kernel, and in seeking to show what this might be, I indicate some lines of development which I consider to be important in sociology in the present day. Most characterizations of the current travails of social theory are concerned with issues of epistemology, that is, with problems of the sorts of "truth claims" that can be made in sociology. These matters, undeniably of pressing importance, are related to legacies from 19th-century social thought which we have to disavow. But there is another residue of the 19th century with which we have also to break: this is represented by what I cal the theory of industrial society. An essential task facing contemporary social theory is that of reconciling a revised epistemology of social science with new frameworks for the analysis of the development of advanced societies.
In the origins of sociology, "social control" served as a central concept both for relating sociology to social philosophy and for analyzing total societies. In its classical sense, it referred to the capacity of a social group to regulate itself. The concept supplied a basis for integration of theory and research until the 1930s. While the traditional usage of social control has persisted, the term has been redefined to mean either socialization or social repression. Either the classical meaning must be utilized or a new term must be developed to refer to the capacity of social groups to effect self-regulation if theory and research are to deal with macrosociology under advanced industrialism.
Social structure is conceptualized as the distributions of a population among social positions in a multidimensional space of positions. This quantitative conception of social structure is the basis for a deductive theory of the macrostructure of social associations in society. The likelihood that people engage in intergroup associations under specifiable structural conditions can bededuced from analaytic propositions about structural properties without any assumption about sociopsychological dispositions to establish intergroup associations, indeed, on the assumption that people prefer ingroup relations. Group size governs the probability of intergroup relations, a fact that has paradoxical implications for discrimination by a majority against a minority. Inequality impedes and heterogeneity promotes intergroup relations. The major structural condition that governs intergroup relations is the degree of connection of parameters. Intersecting parameters exert structural constraints to participate in interg...
