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The Practice of Attention: Simone Weil’s Performance of Impersonality
... Several studies have focused on the undeniable importance that the concept of 'attention' plays in Simone Weil's thought (Pirruccello 1995;Cameron 2003;Dall'Igna 2022). There is no such thing as 'mechanical attention'. ...
The article offers an analysis of Simone Weil's philosophy of mathematics. Weil's reflection starts from a critique of Bourbaki's programme, led by her brother André: the "mechanical attention" Bourbaki considered an advantage of their treatment of mathematics was for her responsible for the incomprehensibility of modern algebra, and even a cause of alienation and social oppression. On the contrary, she developed her pivotal concept of 'atten-tion' with the aim of approaching mathematical problems in order to make "progress in another more mysterious dimension". In the Pythagorean 'crisis of incommensurables', Weil saw the possibility of defining the relationships between things in terms that are not exclusively numerical. This implies drawing an analogy between mathematical relationships and God's relationship with mankind (logos), the basis of a 'supernatural' reformu-lation of the entire scientific understanding of the world. The consequence is a critique of machinism and the possibility to contrast algorithmic reason with a "supernatural reason".
This paper suggests that cultivating an aesthetics of attention in education can be a valuable affective tool for combatting the kind of numbness often associated with the resilience of racism. The notion of attention broadens the frame of analysis of racial violence by taking into consideration the affective and aesthetic dimensions of attention. The paper brings together Taylor Rogers’ recent theorization of ‘affective numbness’ and Simone Weil’s theory of attention to argue that the cultivation of an aesthetics of attention to others’ personhood has a potentially pivotal role in education to restore hearing of non-dominantly-situated persons’ cry of injustice. The article suggests pedagogical ways of engaging teachers and students affectively to resist their numbness in the classroom. The analysis argues that ‘paying attention’ to racial violence can contribute to creating ‘reparative futures’ in education, but care is needed to avoid re-traumatizing students of color and other traumatized students.
This paper argues that the influential French thinker, Simone Weil, has something distinctive and important to offer educational and ethical inquiry. Weil’s ethical theory is considered against the backdrop of her life and work, and in relation to her broader ontological, epistemological and political position. Pivotal concepts in Weil’s philosophy – gravity, decreation and grace – are discussed, and the educational implications of her ideas are explored. The significance of Weil’s thought for educationists lies in the unique emphasis she places on the development of attention, a notion elaborated here via the key themes of truth, beauty and love.
In the later, ethically oriented writings of the philosopher Simone Weil, she develops her concept of attention. This involves using the body to train the mind and thus the soul, into an open, receptive state. This state is the first condition for any ethical action to take place. This article explores how Weil’s account of attention can provide a new perspective in philosophical and theological engagement with psychology, first in terms of moral psychology and virtue ethics, and second in statements on the malleability or plasticity of human nature. As Weil sees that human nature’s stress on activity tends to lead to suffering rather than ethical action, she proposes not ethical action per se, but an ethical attitude of attention instead. Habit-formation and character development can thus be approached differently as cultivating a state of openness rather than of particular virtues. This article will therefore explore the relationship of theology and psychology in terms of human nature as irremediably situated but also psychologically receptive for restoration.
Beginning with Simone Weil’s writing on the subject of attention, this article reflects on the place of attention in contemporary human rights practice—specifically in relation to the challenges posed by the multiple patterns of migration that have so defined our era. Through the lens of Jenny Erpenbeck’s remarkable novel, Go, Went, Gone, the article explores what attentiveness may mean today with regard to research and advocacy concerning migration issues. The article also asks how we secure and maintain the interest of the general public in the so-called global migration ‘crisis’ at a historical moment characterized by mass distraction?
For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.
In this very moment, our attention is being captured, tracked and traded as a commodity in the commercial market. As a global community, we are facing one of the most serious cultural crises of our time yet we are too distracted to be aware of it and for that simple reason we are ill-prepared to deal with its consequences. This is the challenging landscape of the Attention Economy where managers are expected to make responsible, ethical decisions every day and where organisations are fighting a battle to maintain focus on what matters. This reality is the backdrop of this study and the environment in which I explore what a deliberate practice of attention means for the development of self and others in the workplace.
I present a case for why a conscious engagement with attention is essential for management learning and how the development of a deliberate practice plays an important role for human self-transformation and connection to purpose. It starts with a review of historic and contemporary academic literature on different aspects of attention and proceeds to present the findings of an eighteen-month longitudinal study comprising the stories of ten managers as they explore their emerging practice of attention in the context of everyday life. A five-year record of autoethnographic accounts weaves through the research and reveals that not only is a regular, rigorous self-examination a necessary condition for maintaining a deliberate practice of attention – the deliberate practice of attention is a necessary condition for being on a path to self-knowledge. In exploring the epistemic significance of attention, this study reconstructs the bridge between attention and ethics – a connection that, in light of our current situation, is far too rarely made explicit.
This study is, itself, an exercise in attention practice. Through the reflexive engagement with the literature, the lived experience of the participants and the autoethnographic accounts, the reader is invited to experience the phenomenology of being on a path to self-knowledge by attending to attention in a deliberate manner. This research is a contribution to management learning and a call for a new ethics of attention in which managers develop ways of choosing and discerning to what and to whom they attend as they go about their daily lives in the workplace.
Objective: The purpose of the present study is to investigate the effect of motor-perceptual training on attention in children with visual impairment. Method: A single-case study was conducted on 3 children with the mean age of 5.5 ± 2.1 and visual impairment (VI) of 70/20 and 200/20. The participants were selected through convenience sampling and matched in terms of demographic features. Language Development Scale, Guzel motor-perceptual Scale, Stanford Binet Scale and Conners Neuropsychological Questionnaire were
used to collect the data. Multiple baseline design is used. After the baseline situation was set, motor-perceptual training was performed about 8 weeks for the participants. Results: Analysis of data demonstrate that perceptual˚motor training had a significant effect on attention (Percentage of non- overlapping data = 87.5 and overlapping data = 12.5). Conclusion: Therefore, it can be concluded that motor-perceptual training can be an appropriate training method for improving attention in children with visual impairment.
Keywords: Visual impairment, Perceptual–motor training, Attention, Cognitive functions .
The overall question addressed in this article is,‘What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The article focuses on the following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by philosophers themselves; the meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by policy makers; the difference place and time makes to these meanings; how these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy (of education) influencing policy.The question is addressed using philosophical methods and empirical evidence from conversations and conversational interviews with some philosophers of education and other educational researchers.The argument begins with an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the findings from the conversational evidence.The article is drawn together in the penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the concluding section, some further—thorny—questions are raised by the analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice.
I consider if and how far it is possible to live an educational philosophical life, in the fast-changing, globalised world of Higher Education. I begin with Socrates’ account of a philosophical life in the Apology. I examine some tensions within different conceptions of what it is to do philosophy. I then go on to focus more closely on what it might be to live a philosophical, educational life in which educational processes and outcomes are influenced by philosophy, using examples taken from published sources and from conversational interviews with philosophers carried out by myself with Kenneth Wain, Bas Levering and Richard Pring. I then outline the directions of current European policy for Higher Education. Finally I discuss how far current policies and trends leave room for doing philosophy of education, concluding that it is possible, but only for individuals who are very much in sympathy with current policy trends or who are creative in constructing smoke screens.
It is widely believed that Jacques Lacan fails to explain adequately how the subject, allegedly no more than an effect of signifiers in the Symbolic order, can take responsibility for her actions. I argue that the subject can find an appropriate measure for her actions in an awareness of the role her desire plays in her self- and world-constitution. I propose a measure derived from Simone Weil’s ethics of decreation: the subject accepts a “non-personal” symbolic understanding of herself that opens up space in her world of signifiers for all that is unknown, threatening, or demanding about the other’s desire. Lacan’s critics must therefore respond to Weil’s contention that ethics requires almost no “self” at all.
Fairy tales play an essential role in the prose writings of the Italian poet, essayist, and literary translator Cristina Campo (1923–1977). As she writes in her only overtly autobiographical piece, fairy tales are like those magic walnuts that, once cracked, rescue their bearer at the moment of greatest danger. Although critics have commented on Campo's theories of fairy tales, in this essay I provide a more systematic exploration of the meaning of fairy tales in each of Campo's essays collected in Gli imperdonabili. Emphasis is given to Campo's Christian interpretation, the influence of Simone Weil's philosophy, and the recurring themes of suffering, hope, and transformation.
The work of the French thinker Simone Weil has exerted an important influence on scholars in a wide range of fields. To date, however, her writings have attracted comparatively little interest from educationists. This article discusses some of the key concepts in Weil’s philosophy — gravity, grace, decreation, and attention — and assesses their significance for the arts and humanities in higher education.
Simone Weil's work has always been appreciated for its evocative beauty, but not always for its potential contributions to political thought. In this essay, we engage in a reappraisal of her political thought, and of her relevance to contemporary politics, by way of her discussion of the power of words. Weil shares much with contemporary approaches that view the world as a text to be interpreted. But for Weil, the power of interpretation carries with it an illusion, exemplified in Weil's example of Achilles watching over his war-work, in which the world can be seen, measured, and shaped according to one's will. For Weil, the illusion of control that accompanies this perspective is undermined by our encounter with a world of physical causes and sensations that impact us, quite without us being able to control them.