Article

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

More than thirty years after the fall of Saigon, historians still argue about the lessons of the Vietnam War. Most fall into two schools of thought: those who believe that the United States failed to apply enough pressure – military and political – to the Communist government in Hanoi, and those who argue that the Americans failed to use an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. Both arguments have merit, but both ignore the Communist strategy, and the result is a skewed picture of what sort of enemy the United States actually faced in Vietnam. The reality is that the United States rarely held the initiative in Vietnam. Hanoi began a conventional troop build up in South Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s, and by the time of the US ground force intervention in 1965 the allies already faced a large and potent conventional Communist army in the South. Simply employing a ‘classic’ counterinsurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning. Despite this fact, the US military has tended to embrace flawed historical analysis to explain our failure, often concluding that there was a ‘strategic choice’ in Vietnam – a right way to fight and a wrong way. Most blame General William C. Westmoreland as choosing the wrong way and argue that if he had eschewed a big unit ‘search and destroy’ strategy, the war might have turned out differently. However, this article argues that this is untrue. Westmoreland could not have done much differently than he actually did given the realities on the ground. The flawed interpretations of the Vietnam War are not only bad history, but they also lead military and political policymakers to bad decisions in current counterinsurgency strategy. As the US military finds itself embroiled in unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs clear lessons from America's longest counterinsurgency campaign – the Vietnam War.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

... To show this, we construct a principal-agent model with imperfect measurement of success and assumptions particular to the military context. 1 The principal is unable to observe (ex ante or ex post) actual operational e¤ectiveness. Instead the principal must use an imperfect performance measure (or metric) to assess information about the current con ‡ict. ...
... The …rst type has incentives that are aligned with the principal and consequently its behavior does not respond to the metric. The second type of agent has misaligned 1 There is a signi…cant literature on principal-agent relations with imperfect performance measure. Gibbons (1998) provides an excellent overview of some of this literature. ...
... Whether this strategy was apprpriate or not is still the subject of debate. For a recent critique of this strategic approach, seeAndrade (2008). For a brief overview of the vast historiography of the Vietnam War, seeHess (1994). ...
Article
We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. We illustrate the model’s insights in the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War.
... Westmoreland certainly was a flawed man, but his biographer's refusal to confront countervailing arguments suggests an underlying agenda aimed at condemning one general in order to lionize another. 27 By painting William Westmoreland as duplicitous, conniving, and self-promotional at all costs, Sorley can strengthen his own past work arguing that Creighton Abrams had fought a better war. In the process, however, this partisan work languishes in overly reductive analysis. ...
Article
A review of Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley.
... W warunkach, kiedy Amerykanie nie mieli strategicznej inicjatywy jedynym wyjściem byłoby wysłanie kolejnych setek tysięcy żołnierzy i trwająca lata pacyfikacja terenów Wietnamu Południowego. Nie było więc dobrego wyjścia w tamtejszych warunkach a rewolucyjna sztuka wojenna okazała się zwyczajnie lepsza (Andrade 2008). ...
Article
Full-text available
Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie sukcesu wietnamskich komunistów w wojnach z siłami francuskimi, a następnie amerykańskimi w kategoriach strategicznych. Teza postawio-na w artykule zakłada, że wietnamscy rewolucjoniści lepiej niż ich przeciwnicy rozumieli anna-ły strategii wojskowej i politycznej, ponieważ wietnamscy dowódcy za pośrednictwem tradycji marksistowskiej przyswoili zasady prowadzenia wojen wyłożone przez pruskiego generała Car-la von Clausewitza. Tymczasem w tradycji amerykańskiej aż do zakończenia konfliktu w Wiet-namie myśl Clausewitza, na czele z tezą o wzajemnych powiązaniach wojny i polityki odgry-wała niewielką rolę w edukacji twórców amerykańskiej strategii, co prowadziło do tego, że nie potrafili zrozumieć oni przyczyn swojej porażki. Dlatego lepsze przygotowanie strategiczne, w połączeniu z zapleczem materialnym i sytuacją geopolityczną zadecydowały o tym, że zwy-cięstwa wietnamskich komunistów nie były przypadkiem. Słowa kluczowe: Wojna w Wietnamie, Carl von Clausewitz, marksizm, strategia, wojna i poli-tyka. Summary: The purpose of the article was to explain the success of the Vietnamese communists in the wars against the French and then the American forces in strategic terms. The thesis put forward in the article assumes that the Vietnamese revolutionaries understood their military and political strategy better than their opponents because the Vietnamese commanders through the Marxist tradition had assimilated the principles of waging war laid by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. Meanwhile, in the American tradition until the end of the conflict in Vietnam, Clausewitz's thought, in the lead with the thesis on the interrelationships of war and politics, played a small role in the education of the creators of American strategy, which led to the failure to understand the reasons for their failure. Therefore, better strategic preparation, combined with the material background and the geopolitical situation, determined that the victories of Vietnamese communists were no accident.
... W warunkach, kiedy Amerykanie nie mieli strategicznej inicjatywy jedynym wyjściem byłoby wysłanie kolejnych setek tysięcy żołnierzy i trwająca lata pacyfikacja terenów Wietnamu Południowe-go. Nie było więc dobrego wyjścia w tamtejszych warunkach a rewolucyjna sztuka wojenna okazała się zwyczajnie lepsza (Andrade 2008). ...
Article
Full-text available
The Author examines the role and mandate of the UN Security Council with reference to the climate change. The latter became to be regarded as a threat to peace and international security. This notion has evolved and now it encompasses not only armed conflicts or human rights violations but also climate change or HIV/AIDS or Ebola virus. The author analyses UN Security Council resolutions that refer to climate change as a threat to international peace and security. Autorka analizuje role i mandat Rady Bezpieczeństwa w odniesieniu do zmian klimatu. Zmiany te zaczęto postrzegać jako zagrożenie dla pokoju i bezpieczeństwa na świecie. Ten ostatni termin ewoluował i obecnie obejmuje nie tylko konflikty zbrojne lub naruszenia praw człowieka, ale także zmiany klimatu lub epidemię HIV/AIDS lub wirusa Eboli. W artykule analizie poddano przede wszystkim rezolucje Rady Bezpieczeństwa dotyczące zmian klimatu jako zagrożenia dla pokoju i bezpieczeństwa na świecie.
... Such phenomena should not surprise, as it has been a cardinal assumption within insurgent theory for centuries that initial guerrilla and terroristic action will graduate eventually to more regular forms of violence; further, that these will unfold both tangibly and intangibly, on the ground and in the mind. To return to Vietnam, this diversity of violent attack is what made the American dilemma so formidable: The United States faced a shadowy insurgent network but also the main forces of the Viet Cong and the NVA (Andrade, 2008). And yet, despite significant scholarship on the conflict, this complexity is often missed in favor of the two-dimensional and preconceived archetype of an "insurgency" limited to low-intensity and small-scale violence. ...
Article
Full-text available
The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.
Article
Say not the struggle naught availeth,The labour and the wounds are vain,The enemy faints not, nor faileth,And as things have been, things remain. Arthur Hugh CloughThis introductory article introduces some of the articles in this issue and examines the debate surrounding the idea of the “COINdinistas” in the US. It traces the roots of their approach to counter-insurgency and distinguishes “small c” counterinsurgency based on small groups of military advisers in “peripheral” conflicts from “big C” counter-insurgency which became allied to modernisation theory and nation building. The article also looks at developments in COIN thinking after the drawdown of US and other ISAF forces from Afghanistan, especially the work of David Kilcullen focussed on the emergence of future mega “feral” cities on coast lines vulnerable to terrorist and insurgent attacks.
Article
Events in Iraq during the period 2006-8 marked a profound shift both in how the US Army understood its role in the Vietnam War and how it approached counterinsurgency warfare. The shock of failure in Iraq had dislocated several of the US Army's core assumptions about how war should be fought and what the lessons it had learned from Vietnam meant. Now, the Army's challenge was to make sense of Vietnam again in light of the lessons of Iraq and to re-evaluate the place of counterinsurgency in its doctrine and, more broadly, its culture. Part of this re-evaluation and reimagining took place at the Army's Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where the new doctrine to deal with the unexpected challenges the Army now faced in Iraq was put together. This paper will explore how understandings of the Vietnam War intersected with the Iraq experience in terms of counter-insurgency doctrine. Doctrine writers and strategists revisited the Vietnam War to draw different, more pertinent lessons from that conflict. The manner in which they did this illustrates the way in which institutional memory can change to suit contemporary needs.
Article
Scholars have long argued about why the United States pursued a conventional military strategy during the Vietnam War rather than one based on counterinsurgency principles. A recent article in this journal by Jonathan Caverley presents a bold challenge to the historiography of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the standard historical focus on the organizational culture and strategic perspective of Gen. William Westmoreland and the U.S. Army, Caverley argues that the roots of the United States' strategy in Vietnam can be traced to the direct influence of civilian leaders and the strong constraint of public opinion. Caverley's main arguments are a welcome challenge to the established wisdom, but they are not supported by the historical evidence. Civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration did not instruct the military on how to fight the ground war within the borders of South Vietnam. Westmoreland did not want to change U.S. military strategy to focus on pacification at the expense of search and destroy tactics and the main force war. Both U.S. civilian and military officials were convinced that counterinsurgency was a South Vietnamese responsibility that U.S. ground forces should not assume. Public opinion was a weak, rather than a strong, constraint on the specific decisions of the Johnson administration during the pivotal years of the Vietnam War. Democracies may not be able to win certain counterinsurgency conflicts, but the primary source of this failure is not a civilian aversion to casualties.
Article
This paper examines the insurgency in Nepal (1996–2008) from a military theoretical point of view. It looks at the insurgency from André Beaufre's exterior/interior framework, which is modified to match postmodern conflicts. Simultaneously the importance of the political is underlined. The author critically examines the relevance of the Maoist label the movement and insurgency have received. He claims that the insurgency became a hybrid consisting of Chinese, Latin American, and Leninist thoughts wrapped in pragmatic/revisionists and nationalist ideas. The author also suggests that the ability of insurgents – or counter-insurgents – to combine the effects of the exterior and interior is more likely to constitute the key centre of gravity of a conflict than any single political, economic, or military factor.
Article
Since the publication in 2002 of John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, organizational learning has been widely presumed an important ingredient for success in counterinsurgency. But sampling the literature from before and after this time shows remarkably little analytical treatment of the issue of learning and even confusion over what it may mean. This article considers the theories, hypotheses, research strategies, threats to validity, methods of measurement, treatments of time, and general lack of statistical analysis in the work to date and recommends a course for future research.
Article
What can explain the decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars? Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for these trends. Some focus on the structure and doctrine of counterinsurgent forces, while others emphasize the lethality and motivation of insurgent adversaries. I challenge these explanations. Declines in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars are not driven by fundamental shifts in the character of these conflicts, but in the political context in which they take place. Nineteenth-century colonial incumbents enjoyed a variety of political advantages-including strong political will, a permissive international environment, access to local collaborators, and flexibility to pick their battles-which granted them the time and resources necessary to meet insurgent challenges. In contrast, twentieth-century colonial incumbents struggled in the face of apathetic publics, hostile superpowers, vanishing collaborators, and constrained options. The decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency warfare, therefore, stems not from problems in force structure or strategy, but in political shifts in the profitability and legitimacy of colonial forms of governance.
Article
The U.S. Army has directed that its entire force must be capable of conducting what it terms Full Spectrum Operations, which is being able to conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and/or civil support operations, simultaneously in the 21st Century. Historical study and oral history interviews of the experiences of the British and American Armies in the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom illustrate that the general purpose forces of these organizations can conduct successful counterinsurgency operations. This same study also highlights that while these forces are adaptable at the tactical and operational level, their ability to adjust to changing conditions in the contemporary operating environment is due primarily to personal study and initiative. In order to develop true full spectrum capabilities, the United States Army must develop an institutional educational program that provides leaders with solid foundations in conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. The doctrinal basis for this system should include input from the recent and current operational theaters as well as in depth historical study in order to both keep it relevant to current events and to provide the breadth and depth that will ensure leaders do not "cherry pick" tactics, techniques or procedures. Educating leaders in all aspects of Full Spectrum Operations will allow them to tailor properly the training of their units for the missions they will face in the contemporary operating environment.
Article
This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population-centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme, whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy (enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions on the ground. ―Centric‖ means to focus efforts only in one direction or the other. The ―centric‖ banners must be dropped and the U.S. should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The U.S. is fighting a counterinsurgency that necessitates both the destruction of the enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with counterinsurgencies now and in the future.
Article
Full-text available
As Karl von Clausewitz noted, war is a continuation of political activity by other means and counterinsurgency provides one of the best examples of how this is true. The contest for support of a population is a contest not about the people but for their allegiance. U.S. political campaign theory developed over many decades of local, regional and national elections is about influencing the population to support one side or another. Political campaign strategy can provide a valuable and appropriate mindset for all COIN forces in addition to numerous useful practices to benefit the informational campaign within counterinsurgency because it also targets the population‟s allegiance in the same manner. This paper will present a framework based on political campaigns theory for both the Joint Task Force Commander down to the lowest tactical members of the COIN forces to take the offensive in the message war within counterinsurgency. It will also present a few of the many common political campaign practices such as benchmark polls, focus groups, development of messages and political campaign targeting and demonstrate how they can serve the counterinsurgency effort. Finally the paper makes recommendations in its conclusion on how the counterinsurgency forces could implement this model throughout the force.
Article
This article explores how current professional military scholarship on insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) uses history to frame its arguments. It then attempts to reframe the current historical problematic surrounding insurgency. First, the article shows that the historical narrative of professional military scholarship on insurgency and its theoretical grounding are highly flawed. They are both parochial and profoundly ahistorical. Second, the paper constructs an alternative narrative of insurgency beginning from the ideas of the German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), returning insurgency to history. This alternative narrative emphasizes the critical role played by the fall of European public law (jus publicum Europaeum). As a consequence of this and other historically contingent events, war in Europe lost its relative autonomy from society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In turn, insurgency became an increasingly prominent and normatively accepted form of warfare by the mid-twentieth century.
Article
Full-text available
The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency – the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns have been bloody, violent, and protracted. Yet as this review highlights, beyond these central points, criticism of counterinsurgency is too often off the mark in its approach and totalizing in its pretentions. There is much to criticize and an urgent need to learn from past campaigns, yet bold claims and broad generalizations can mislead rather than enlighten. The analysis is particularly unhelpful when the definition of the central issue at hand – counterinsurgency – is being unwittingly or deliberately distorted. In the end, these two books form a poor basis for the debate that must now take place, because they are too ideological in tone, too undisciplined in approach, and therefore too unqualified in what they finally say.
Article
Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.
Article
Within the framework of classical theory, the joint US Army-Marine field manual Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) described an ambitious set of skills required for success against guerrillas. But if counterinsurgency, as FM 3-24 describes it, is ‘the graduate level of warfare’, then these two military services have been for years systematically failing to train their talent in the appropriate fields. In today's small wars, NCOs serve as modern-day Mounties, and consequently require at least a modest undergraduate education in armed good governance.
Article
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to 're-learn' counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance'all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Article
The belief that U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam did not know how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign underpins belief that reforms are necessary for counterinsurgency success. However, contemporaneous U.S. documents show that military officers in the advisory period, 1954–1965, believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. If advisors urged their partners to liberalize and democratize, yet the state remained autocratic, repressive, and corrupt, what explains the South Vietnamese failure to reform? I identify the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns.
Book
In 2002, Governor General Michael Jeffrey stated that ‘we Australians had everything under control in Phuoc Tuy Province’. This referred not only to military control, but to the policy of ‘pacification’ employed by the Republic of Vietnam and external ‘Free World’ allies such as the US and Australia. In the hopes of stemming the tide of Communism, pacification aimed to win the allegiance of the populace through political, economic and social reform. In this new work, Thomas Richardson explores the 1st Australian Task Force’s (1ATF) implementation of this policy in Phuoc Tuy between 1966 and 1972. Using material from US and Australian archives, as well as newly translated Vietnamese histories, Destroy and Build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966-1972 challenges the accepted historiography of the Western forces’ fight against insurgency in Vietnam.
Book
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to ôre-learnö counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned any.
Book
This book examines how deterrence, coercion and modernization theory has informed U.S. policy, addressing why former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s famous description of the Vietnam War as the “social scientist’s war” is so accurate. By tracing the evolution of ties between social scientists and the government beginning in World War I and continuing through the Second World War and the early Cold War, the narrative highlights the role of institutions like the RAND Corporation, the Social Science Research Council and MIT’s Center for International Studies that facilitate these ties while providing a home for the development of theory. The author compares and contrasts the ideas of Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling, Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye and Walt Rostow, among others, and offers a cautionary tale concerning the difficulties and problems encountered when applying social science theory to national security policy. Janeen M. Klinger is Emeritus Professor in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, USA. She previously taught at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the University of Mary Washington.
Article
Military officers often oppose political interference in the conduct of war. Political leaders respond by citing Clausewitz’s contention that “war is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.” Scholarship in security studies and civil-military relations argues that civilians are right to oppose military autonomy because it serves the parochial interests of the military. However, through the dialectical relationship between the violent essence of war and its political nature, Clausewitz provides an alternative explanation for military demands for autonomy. He shows that military and political leaders are prone to an incomplete understanding of war that can undermine strategy and policy.
Article
This article explores the impact of one of the key non-military events in the U.S. war in Vietnam, at least in the crucial years from 1964 to 1968. During a two-day U.S.–South Vietnamese conference held in Honolulu in early 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk laid out a series of overarching strategic objectives, both military and political, that shaped the allied war effort through the 1968 Tet offensive, and even beyond. The goals outlined at the summit remained the touchstone of U.S. military strategy until they were superseded in 1969 by a policy of “Vietnamization” under the Nixon administration. These political-military objectives, however, suggested a fundamental problem with the U.S. approach to Vietnam, based as it was on a dangerous mixture of naïveté and idealism stemming from faulty assumptions about the efficacy of U.S. power abroad during the Cold War.
Article
Beginning in the Korea War, through Vietnam and continuing with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, US forces have been involved in combat typified by close, sharp actions - often without the doctrinally prescribed firepower to support the maneuver forces. US Operations in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, in particular, dramatically demonstrate how an adept enemy, the Taliban, place themselves in very "close proximity" to friendly forces and civilian population and as a result, they are able to negate the US firepower advantage, thus removing the ability of US forces to use lethal fires from aircraft and artillery for fear of friendly or collateral damage. The lack of developed road networks and low US troop numbers prevented US forces from massing quickly in large numbers and led to a reliance on stand-off based firepower to support the maneuver forces. The indications point to a coordinated effort by enemy forces utilizing past performances of US enemies as a basis for their tactical evolution. Though not new to warfare, these adhesion warfare tactics present a significant problem for US ground forces that must increasingly rely on maneuver to defeat our enemies in the localized, direct action combat involved in counter-insurgency and low-level military action.
Article
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgetown University, 1972. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 348-360). Photocopy.
sub: Assessment of the Situation in South Vietnam
  • Memo
  • The Record
  • Westmoreland
Memo for the Record, Westmoreland, 23 October 1966, sub: Assessment of the Situation in South Vietnam, October 1966, 3, Historians files, CMH.
Letters to the South, introduction, xv. It is worth reiterating that all guerrillas prefer to fight a 'conventional' war, and they will if they can – or if they are allowed to do so
  • Le Duan
Le Duan, Letters to the South, introduction, xv. It is worth reiterating that all guerrillas prefer to fight a 'conventional' war, and they will if they can – or if they are allowed to do so.
Abrams MAC 14143 to subordinate commanders sub: Operational Guidance-Adjusting to Enemy Current Operations
  • Msg
Msg, Abrams MAC 14143 to subordinate commanders, 20 Oct 1968, sub: Operational Guidance-Adjusting to Enemy Current Operations, Abrams Papers, CMH.
Military Region 8: Thirty Years of Resistance War
  • Stanford
Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1969. Military Region 8: Thirty Years of Resistance War (1945 – 1975) [Quan Khu 8: Ba Muoi Nam Khang Chien (1945 –1975)]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1998.
Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds Jaffe, Greg. 'As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam
  • Washington
  • Dc
  • Hunt
  • Richard
Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1981. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Jaffe, Greg. 'As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam'. Wall Street Journal (20 Mar 2006).
The Victory Division Also see Pham Gia Duc, 325th Division, Volume II
  • Long
Long, The Victory Division, 27 – 28. Also see Pham Gia Duc, 325th Division, Volume II, 40.
Schoomaker's foreword in Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
  • Gen
Gen. Schoomaker's foreword in Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, ix.
The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support: The Final Years
  • Clarke
  • Jeffrey
Clarke, Jeffrey J. The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965– 1973.
Su Doan 9 [9 th Division] Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1990. Summers, Harry. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam WarHow to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam
  • Lubbock
  • Tx
  • Thayer
  • Thomas
Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004. Su Doan 9 [9 th Division]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1990. Summers, Harry. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982. Thayer, Thomas C. 'How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam, 1965– 72'. Arlington, VA: Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, 1974.
The Ten Thousand Day Journey [Chang Duong Muoi Nghin Ngay]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House Hoang Ngoc, Lung. The General Offensives
  • Hoang
  • Cam
Hoang, Cam (as told to Nhat Tien). The Ten Thousand Day Journey [Chang Duong Muoi Nghin Ngay]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 2001. Hoang Ngoc, Lung. The General Offensives of 1968– 69.
sub: Concept of Military Operations in SVN, Historians files
  • Msg
  • Comusmacv
  • Cincpac
Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 26 Aug 66, sub: Concept of Military Operations in SVN, Historians files, CMH.
White House Years Komer, Robert W
  • Kissinger
  • Henry
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. New York: Little Brown & Co., 1979. Komer, Robert W. 'Commentary'. In Second Indochina Symposium Papers and Commentary held in Arlie, Vir., 7 – 9 Nov 1984, ed. Schlight John. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1986.
sub: Impact of Enemy Offensive on Pacification
  • Maccords
  • Study
MACCORDS Study, 16 Sep 1972, sub: Impact of Enemy Offensive on Pacification, 2.
Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation
  • Washington
  • Dc
Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1988. Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962– 1967.
The Vietnamese National Art of Fighting to Defend the Nation
  • Lt
  • Gen
Lt. Gen. Pham Hong Son, The Vietnamese National Art of Fighting to Defend the Nation, 69.
Combined Action Program: Marines' Alternative to Search and Destroy'. Vietnam Magazine
  • Donovan
  • James
Donovan, James. 'Combined Action Program: Marines' Alternative to Search and Destroy'. Vietnam Magazine (Aug. 2004): 26 – 32.
Back to the Street Without Joy
  • Cassidy
Cassidy, 'Back to the Street Without Joy,' 75, 78.
Toczek, David M. The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It Tran The Long et al., The Victory Division: A Report Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House
  • Robert Thompson
Thompson, Robert. No Exit From Vietnam. New York: David McKay, 1969. Toczek, David M. The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Tran The Long et al., The Victory Division: A Report, Volume 2 [Su Doan Chien Thang: Ky Su, Tap 2]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1980. Tran Tinh, ed. Collected Party Documents, vol. 28, 1967 [Van Kien Dang Toan Tap, Tap 28, 1967]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2003. Tran Van Quang, Doan Khue, and Van Tien Dung. Review of the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation: Victory and Lessons [Tong Ket Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc: Thang Loi va Bai Hoc]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1995. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975.
Pacification, 108; Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam
  • Hunt
Hunt, Pacification, 108; Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 146.
As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam
  • Jaffe
Jaffe, 'As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam.'
Accelerated Pacification Campaign sub: A Statistical Study of APC Results as Reported in the Hamlet Evaluation System
  • Rpt
Rpt, Accelerated Pacification Campaign, 1 Oct 1968– 31 Jan 1969, sub: A Statistical Study of APC Results as Reported in the Hamlet Evaluation System, 31 Mar 1969, CMH.
US Marine Corps Oral History Collection
  • William C Westmoreland
William C. Westmoreland Interview, 4 Apr 1983, 7, 19, US Marine Corps Oral History Collection. Also see Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, footnote 10.
The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support
  • Quoted In Clarke
Quoted in Clarke, The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support, 345.
The Army and Vietnam
  • Krepinevich
  • Andrew
Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
The Conduct of the War
  • Sorley
Sorley, 'The Conduct of the War,' 183– 84.
A Military War of Attribution'. In The Lessons of Vietnam
  • Westmoreland
  • William
Westmoreland, William C. 'A Military War of Attribution'. In The Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and David D. Frizzell. New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1977.
How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam
  • Thomas C Thayer
Thayer, 'How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam, 1965– 72,' 789.
sub: Concept of Operations – Force Requirements and Deployments
  • Westmoreland Cable
Westmoreland Cable COMUSMACV 20055, 14 June 65, sub: Concept of Operations – Force Requirements and Deployments, South Vietnam, 6, Historians files, CMH.
The Battle of Ap Bac. Small Wars & Insurgencies 21. Victory in Vietnam
  • See Toczek
See Toczek, The Battle of Ap Bac. Small Wars & Insurgencies 21. Victory in Vietnam, 124.
Vietnam at War: The History
  • Davidson
Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1945– 1975, 571.
Combined Action Program
  • For
  • Donovan
For example, see Donovan, 'Combined Action Program.' 52. Birtle, U.S. Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976, 399– 400.
A Military War of Attribution
  • Westmorland
Westmorland, 'A Military War of Attribution,' 65.
The Haldeman Diaries
  • Haldeman
Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 259.
Abrams Papers US Army strength reached a high of 365,600 (total military: 542,400) men in April 1969; two years later it stood at 227
  • Msg
  • Wheeler
  • Jcs
Msg, Wheeler JCS 5988 to Abrams, 16 May 1969, Abrams Papers, CMH. 178 D. Andrade 112. Army Activities Rpt, 8 Nov 1972, 3. US Army strength reached a high of 365,600 (total military: 542,400) men in April 1969; two years later it stood at 227,600 (total military: 301,900).
Combat Operations, Stemming the Tide DC: US Army Center of Military HistoryBack to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars
  • Carland
  • John
  • Cassidy
  • Robert
Carland, John M. Combat Operations, Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1967. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2000. Cassidy, Robert M. 'Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars'. Parameters (Summer 2004): 47 – 62.
Concluding the 30-Years War, Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation
  • Tran Van
Tran Van Tra, History of the Bulwark B-2 Theater, vol 5, Concluding the 30-Years War, Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation, JPRS 82783, 2 Feb 1983, 37.
The Victory Division, 28. See also the memoirs of the 312th Division's commander, Col. Gen. Hoang Cam, The Ten Thousand Day Journey
  • Tran The
  • Long
Tran The Long et al., The Victory Division, 28. See also the memoirs of the 312th Division's commander, Col. Gen. Hoang Cam, The Ten Thousand Day Journey, 73 – 74;
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, ed. Senator Gravel. 4 vols Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1986. Pham Hong, Son. The Vietnamese National Art of Fighting to Defend the Nation
  • Nagl
  • John
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 180 D. Andrade Downloaded by [University of New Mexico] at 12:57 27 November 2014 The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, ed. Senator Gravel. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Pham Gia, Duc. 325th Division, Volume II [Su Doan 325, Tap II]. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1986. Pham Hong, Son. The Vietnamese National Art of Fighting to Defend the Nation, vol. II: A Scientific Study [Nghe Thuat Danh Giac Giu Nuoc cua Dan Toc Viet Nam, Tap II: Cong Trinh Khoa]. Hanoi: Senior Level Military Studies Institute [Hoc Vien Quan Su Cao Cap] of the Ministry of Defense, 1990. Qiang, Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950– 1975.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996. Le Duan. Letters to the South Le Van, Tuong. 'The Keen Strategic Vision and the Modest but Profound Attitude of General America in Vietnam
  • Kutler
  • I Stanley
Kutler, Stanley I., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996. Le Duan. Letters to the South. Hanoi: Su That Publishing House, 1985. Le Van, Tuong. 'The Keen Strategic Vision and the Modest but Profound Attitude of General Nguyen Chi Thanh' [Tam Nhin Chien Luoc Sac Sao, Tac Phong Khiem Ton, Sau Sat cua Dai Tuong Nguyen Chi Thanh ]. In General Nguyen Chi Thanh: An Outstanding Military Political Figure [Dai Tuong Nguyen Chi Thanh: Nha Chinh Tri Quan Su Loi Lac], ed. Ha Huu Khieu. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1997. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. McGarvey, Patrick J., ed. Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964– 1968.
Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes
  • Sorley
  • Lewis
Sorley, Lewis. Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968– 1972.