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The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe
Abstract
Between 2003 and 2006, members of the so-called Hofstad group planned various terrorist attacks inside the Netherlands, including the assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Amateurish in its modus operandi and composed mostly of second-generation Muslim immigrants, Hofstad perfectly exemplifies the new terrorist networks that are growing in most European countries. Its perception of Europe as a battlefield of jihad, no less critical than Iraq or Afghanistan, signifies the break from the networks that operated in the continent in the 1990s. Its amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks make Hofstad the quintessential example of the homegrown terrorism that is worrying European intelligence agencies.
... Rekrutering lijkt geen belangrijke rol te spelen in de losse, horizontale netwerken die ontstaan onder moslimjongeren in het Westen, ook niet in jihadistische netwerken (Vidino 2007 ...
... Het meest bekende jihadistisch netwerk in Nederland is natuurlijk de Hofstadgroep. Deze groep leek organisatorisch niet op een terroristische groep.Het was een netwerk zonder hiërarchische structuur, zonder duidelijke centrale aansturing, met los-vaste leden, die min of meer spontaan in subgroepjes of alleen in actie kwamen(AIVD 2006a, Vidino 2007. Het blijkt moeilijk om binnen het netwerk de verschillende rollen te onderscheiden, behalve die van meelopers en volgelingen rondom de groep van activisten. ...
... Hence, companionship is developed and individuals become sounding boards for their collective grievances (Bazex & Mensat, 2016;Schuurman & Horgan, 2016). It is also within these networks, that youth can be exposed to adult role models and recruiters who can be admired and respected by their younger counterparts (Vidino, 2007). Other theories include trajectory models which understand radicalisation as progressing through different stages or pathways. ...
Studies on youth radicalisation are few, even though it has been identified as an increasing problem. This paper aims to contribute insights on youth radicalisation by examining data from 33 cases of Australians, aged 19 and below, who have been identified as radicalising to violent extremism. It draws on a subset of data from the Profiles of Individual Radicalisation in Australia (PIRA) dataset. This is an open-source dataset that replicates variables from the Profiles of Individual Radicalisation in the United States (PIRUS) dataset. The PIRA dataset is outlined and we undertake a descriptive and exploratory analysis of selective key variables identified in the terrorism and criminology literature. Analysis shows that radicalisation amongst our sample of youth is associated with poor educational achievement, mental health problems, active engagement with online social media, exposure to other radicalised networks and associates, personal grievances and triggering events. The data both confirm and diverge from the existing literature. The paper, in particular, considers the role of social bond attachments and networks in the youth radicalisation problem. Limitations in the study design and sample size are acknowledged and implications for the prevention of youth radicalisation are considered.
... As perhaps the most high-profile Dutch terrorism case of the 21st century, the Hofstadgroup had already been the focus of work done on Dutch journalists and academics before I began my PhD research (De Koning & Meijer, 2011;Groen & Kranenberg, 2010). Moreover, as one of several early examples of homegrown jihadism in Europe, the Hofstadgroup had also attracted considerable attention from the international scholarly community (Silber, 2012;Vidino, 2007). An immediate challenge, therefore, was designing my PhD ...
... Those in leadership roles do indeed indoctrinate junior members, but small group dynamics play an equally important role as members facilitate and reinforee the indoctrination o f each other, thus contributing to emergent violence. Jordan et al. (2008) and Vidino (2007) similarly find that the perpetrators o f major terrorist attacks, as with the Madrid bombings and the Hofstad Group, may not be formally affiliated with global jihadist movements. In sum, proscribed groups tend not to behave like formal bureaucracies, making the flexibility o f network approaches to terrorist detection all the more critical. ...
... [62] During the first two years of its existence, the group's most militant participants were focused on traveling to jihadist groups in Chechnya and Afghanistan as foreign fighters. Unlike the more recent generation of jihadist The Hofstadgroup had too many idiosyncratic qualities to truly embody the moniker of a 'quintessential' [64] example of homegrown jihadism it was once given. [ The group's loose organizational structure and its participants' capacity for terrorist violence despite their lack of (significant) paramilitary training or experience, make it a representative example of a subset of homegrown jihadism that has included numerous groups with similar attributes. ...
A central issue with many interpretations of radicalization remains their tendency to overemphasize the role of extremist beliefs in motivating involvement in terrorism. A er elaborating on this critique, the authors propose that ‘fanaticism’, a concept developed by Taylor in the early 1990s, o ers a way of overcoming this de ciency in radicalization-based approaches through its conditional understanding of when radical beliefs can lead to violent behavior. Primary-sources driven empirical analysis supports both the critique of radicalization and the discussion of fanaticism’s bene ts. Results are relevant to both academics and counterterrorism practitioners working to understand the role of extremist beliefs in motivating involvement in terrorist violence.
... Instead, Mohammad Sidique Khan exerted influence over his three young collaborators in perpetrating suicide bombings that killed 52 civilians and injured over 700 more. Vidino (2007) describes another group within the movement and suggests that the Hofstad group's amorphous structure and lack of ties to international Islamist groups will influence recruitment practices and target selection in future attacks in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. ...
We present a novel explanation for the group polarization effect whereby discussion induces shifts toward the extreme. In our theory, rhetorically-induced asymmetry preferentially facilitates majority formation among extreme group members thereby skewing consensus outcomes further in the extreme direction. Additionally, heuristic issue substitution can shift the effective reference point for discussion from the policy reference, yielding differential polarization by policy side. Two mathematical models implementing the theory are introduced: a simple rhetorically-proximate majority model and the accept-shift-constrict model of opinion dynamics on networks which allows for the emergence of enduring majority positions. These models produce shifts toward the extreme without the typical modeling assumption of greater resistance to persuasion among extremists. Our online group discussion experiment manipulated policy side, disagreement level, and network structure. The results, which challenge existing polarization theories, are in qualitative and quantitative accord with our theory and models.
... In Nederland is de Hofstadgroep regelmatig als een dergelijk netwerk gekarakteriseerd (bijv. Schuurman e.a., 2014;Vidino, 2007), en ook de gehele jihadistische beweging in Nederland wordt wel als zodanig omschreven. De AIVD (2014) beschrijft deze bijvoorbeeld als een zwerm van gelijkgezinden zonder expliciet hiërarchische aansturing. ...
... Instead, Mohammad Sidique Khan exerted influence over his three young collaborators in perpetrating suicide bombings that killed 52 civilians and injured over 700 more. Vidino (2007) describes another group within the movement and suggests that the Hofstad group's amorphous structure and lack of ties to international Islamist groups will influence recruitment practices and target selection in future attacks in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. ...
Research using social network analysis to study terrorism and insurgency has increased dramatically following the 9/11 attacks against the United States. This research emphasizes the importance of relational analysis and provides a variety of concepts, theories, and analytical tools to better understand questions related to militant group behavior and outcomes of terrorism and insurgent violence. This paper defines key network concepts, identifies important network metrics, and reviews theoretical and empirical research on network analysis and militant groups. We find that the main focus of existing research is on organizational analysis and its implications for militant group operational processes and performance. Few studies investigate how differences in network structure lead to divergent outcomes with respect to political processes such as militant group infighting, their strategic use of violence, or how politically salient variables affect the evolution of militant cooperative networks. Consequently, we propose a research agenda aimed at using network analysis to investigate the political interactions of militant groups within a single conflict and provide illustrations on how to pursue this agenda. We believe that such research will be of particular value in advancing the understanding of fragmented civil wars and insurgencies consisting of multiple, independent militant groups.
... Those in leadership roles do indeed indoctrinate junior members, but small group dynamics play an equally important role as members facilitate and reinforee the indoctrination o f each other, thus contributing to emergent violence. Jordan et al. (2008) and Vidino (2007) similarly find that the perpetrators o f major terrorist attacks, as with the Madrid bombings and the Hofstad Group, may not be formally affiliated with global jihadist movements. In sum, proscribed groups tend not to behave like formal bureaucracies, making the flexibility o f network approaches to terrorist detection all the more critical. ...
... According to some researchers, there seems to be a relationship between increasing anti-Islam sentiments in Western Europe and the emergence of (violent) radicalization in young European Muslims (Abbas, 2012;Moghaddam, 2005;Stroink, 2007). The Netherlands experienced a "homegrown" terrorist attack (e.g. the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh) and the formation of a "homegrown" terrorist network (the Hofstadgroup, see Vidino, 2007) by young second generation Dutch Muslims in 2004 and. In addition, more recently the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice announced a considerable increase in Dutch Muslim youth traveling to Syria to fight for the cause of their Muslim brothers against the regime of Assad, alongside with Belgian, British, French and Swedish Muslim youth (NCTV, 2013). ...
... Unfortunately, the prevalence of these ideologies may have contributed to the home grown terrorism in the western countries. Examples of these influences are the bombings in Madrid and London; the murder of Van Gogh in the Netherlands; the many attempted attacks against EU countries since 2001; the many thwarted attempts in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands; the 9/11 airplane crashes in New York; the 2009 killing of 13; and wounding of 32 USA army servicemen in Texas (Ibrahim, 2012;Lorenzo, 2007;Silke, 2008;Silber & Bhatt, 2007;Wicker, 2007). Examples of the prevalence of the extreme ideologies among first or second generation Middle-Eastern emigrants are drawn from several sources. ...
The goal of this research was to investigate whether new immigrants from the extended Middle-Eastern countries differ from each other on issues related to extreme Middle-Eastern religious beliefs based on their religious identification. The Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ARTS; Loza, 2007a), a scale designed to assess extreme religious beliefs originating from the Middle-East, was administered to a sample of 91 participants who had recently immigrated to Canada from Pakistan. The sample was comprised of Muslims (the majority of the participants) and a small number of Christians from the same background. Due to the small number of the Christian participants, Christian responses from previous studies were included in the present comparisons. Results indicated significant differences between the religious groups and were consistent with previously obtained results. Current results also support the use of ATRS as a reliable and valid measure to help with risk assessment for beliefs supporting violence.
... En ten vierde onderscheiden we idealisten en politieke activisten, voor wie maatschappelijke ongenoegens de belangrijkste motivatie vormen voor hun betrokkenheid bij de internationale jihadistische beweging. (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006), van 'inside, homegrown, self-financed, self-trained terrorists' (Sageman, 2008) of van netwerken met een 'amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks' (Vidino, 2007 ...
... Their sense of alienation from mainstream culture and/or from the out-groups that pose a threat to the community helps them to overcome the mental thresholds that would otherwise prevent them from engaging in violence, and instead leads them to act on their sense of moral obligation by taking revenge and inflicting harm on those they regard as enemies of the community (Post, 1990). Their absolute commitment to the community and their willingness to resort to violence are reinforced by the intensive interaction that takes place in primary social groups within the community (Post, 1990; Sageman, 2004; Vidino, 2007). 2 The socialization that takes place within the group fosters mutual commitment among the members while intensifying their alienation from the norms and values of the majority culture and enhancing the majoit ultues depaaed iage (Sageman, 2004Sageman, , 2008). ...
Totalistic ideologies are breeding grounds for radicalization. Communities that adhere to such ideologies tend to rally when they feel threatened by powerful outsiders. Under such circumstances, community leaders become central. If they frame the situation as an existential threat to the community itself or to its most sacred values, they will accelerate the radicalization process and subsequently increase the prospects of violent actions by group members. The shift to violence takes place in the framework of close-knit social networks within the broader radicalized community. These networks consist of individuals who usually live in the same area and engage in continuous interaction among themselves. Such interactions bolster their communal commitment and develop a collective mindset that facilitates the slide of some of the individuals into violence. Those who eventually descend into terrorism usually exhibit strong identification with the community's values and extreme alienation towards the outside world. They also enjoy high levels of biographical availability. These hypotheses are tested using the case study of Jewish terrorism in Israel between 1948 and 2006.
... These cases also illustrate the risks from domestic, often described as home-grown terrorists (Durham, 1996;Mulinari and Neergaard, 2012;Olson, 1999). The shocks caused by such extreme events have been seen to generate shifts in the views held by policy-makers regarding potential risks of this nature (Field, 2009;Savitch, 2003;Vidino, 2007), even in the most consensus-seeking societies (Reader, 2001). The challenge for public management is how to change that dominant paradigm before a terrorist attack so that effective defences can be put in place to prevent it. ...
This article considers the challenges for hospitals
in the United Kingdom that arise from
the threats of mass-casualty terrorism.
Whilst much has been written about the
role of health care as a rescuer in terrorist
attacks and other mass-casualty crises, little
has been written about health care as a
victim within a mass-emergency setting.
Yet, health care is a key component of any
nation’s contingency planning and an erosion
of its capabilities would have a significant
impact on the generation of a wider
crisis following a mass-casualty event. This
article seeks to highlight the nature of the
challenges facing elements of UK health care,
with a focus on hospitals both as essential
contingency responders under the United
Kingdom’s civil contingencies legislation
and as potential victims of terrorism. It
seeks to explore the potential gaps that
exist between the task demands facing hospitals
and the vulnerabilities that exist within
them
... The image of jihadi terrorism sketched by public authorities, researchers, and journalists in the Netherlands in the past few years was strongly coloured by the attack of 2 November 2004 on writer, director, and television producer Theo van Gogh. Unlike the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, this attack was said to involve 'home-grown fighters' ( Buijs et al., 2006); 'inside, home-grown, self-financed, self-trained terrorists' (Sageman, 2008); or networks with an 'amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks' (Vidino, 2007). Various scientists have used this Dutch case to emphasise that jihadi terrorism evolved in the period between 2001 and 2005 from relatively strictly organised and centrally directed terrorist cells that ori- ginated in Muslim countries and moved to the West, to small groups of young people who were raised in the West and who are fighting their own holy war. ...
The book describes the way in which jihadi terrorism manifested itself in the Netherlands at the outset of the 21st century, and focuses specifically on a few jihadi collaborations that were active on Dutch territory in the period between 2001 and 2005.
What kind of groups were they? How were these groups formed? How were they organized? Which people were active in these groups? What was their aim? Which activities did they carry out? How did they operate? Researchers in the area of terrorism and counterterrorism have been engaged in these questions for years, but empirical research into this phenomenon is scarce. On the basis of information from closed criminal investigations, this report describes how these jihadi cooperations operated. It consequently provides a unique view of the world of jihadism, and makes a valuable contribution to the development of our empirical knowledge in this area
... En ten vierde onderscheiden we idealisten en politieke activisten, voor wie maatschappelijke ongenoegens de belangrijkste motivatie vormen voor hun betrokkenheid bij de internationale jihadistische beweging. (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006), van 'inside, homegrown, self-financed, self-trained terrorists' (Sageman, 2008) of van netwerken met een 'amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks' (Vidino, 2007 ...
... The murder of Van Gogh and the siege in The Hague had a tremendous impact on Dutch society. There have been numerous serious attempts to explain the murder of Van Gogh and the radicalization and emergence of the Hofstad network (Aarts & Hirzallah, 2005;AIVD, 2005AIVD, , 2006Benschop, 2005;Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006;Buruma, 2006;Eyerman, 2008;Nesser, 2005;Peters, 2005;Slootman & Tillie, 2006;Vidino, 2007). 2 None of these studies regards the Hofstad network as part of a larger movement, apart from those which over-emphasize its link with Al-Qaeda (Vermaat, 2005), nor do they adequately place the rise of the group against a larger background of rising "assimilationist" anti-Islamic populism in Holland 3 and the simultaneous rise of an Islamic revitalization movement, the Salafi movement (Meijer, 2005). ...
In this chapter we analyze the shift from a politicized identity to a radicalized identity of (members of) the Hofstad network. Our findings are based on an analysis of texts written by the Hofstad network by Meijer who acted as an expert witness at one of the trials involving the network. We also include my observations and transcripts of chats and online debates that I gathered when I followed the activities of the Hofstad network on the Internet between 2002 and 2005 and conducted interviews with three informants within the network. After introducing the Hofstad network, we provide an analysis of the “assimilationist” discourse and the rise of the Salafi movement as a background for the politicization and radicalization of the members of the Hofstad network. This process is analyzed from a social movement perspective, following Gamson (1992), by focusing on their perception of injustice, the agency of the people, and their identity.
... In any case, the Netherlands for them no longer was the envisaged theater for violent actions. Many Moluccans decided to contribute in other ways to the relieving of the plight of their people: they became active in development initiatives or in the care and treatment of drug addicts: Respondent 2 42 : It became diluted. [But how?] ...
This article deals with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical movements. The question posed is: “Which story can the government tell to encourage the decline of radical groups and the disengagement of their members?” The article makes use of the survey of factors promoting decline and disengagement drawn up by Demant, Slootman, Buijs († †Deceased. View all notes) and Tillie in 2008, as well as the factor “official policy strategies” based on concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterrorism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The article will therefore not address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception of these official measures by the radicals. It will illustrate this with two case studies: the deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s and of jihadist radicals after 2001, both in the Netherlands.
... The murder of Van Gogh and the siege in The Hague had a tremendous impact on Dutch society. There have been numerous serious attempts to explain the murder of Van Gogh and the radicalization and emergence of the Hofstad network (Aarts & Hirzallah, 2005;AIVD, 2005AIVD, , 2006Benschop, 2005;Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006;Buruma, 2006;Eyerman, 2008;Nesser, 2005;Peters, 2005;Slootman & Tillie, 2006;Vidino, 2007). 2 None of these studies regards the Hofstad network as part of a larger movement, apart from those which over-emphasize its link with Al-Qaeda (Vermaat, 2005), nor do they adequately place the rise of the group against a larger background of rising "assimilationist" anti-Islamic populism in Holland 3 and the simultaneous rise of an Islamic revitalization movement, the Salafi movement (Meijer, 2005). ...
IntroductionIntroducing the Hofstad NetworkThe Dutch Islam DebateThe Rise of the Salafi MovementPoliticization and Radicalization of the Hofstad NetworkInjustice: The War against IslamFighting for God: AgencyThe Lions of Tawheed: IdentityConclusion
References
... These trends have been noted by scholars (Kirby 2007; Vidino 2007; Kohlmann 2008; Krueger 2008) as well as security agencies and police organizations ((Silber 2005 London Bombings in Great Britain which killed 56 people (including the bombers), and injured more than 700 (House of Commons 2006) Islamist terrorism may be transforming (or expanding) into a model of terrorism longused by right-wing and environmental terrorist groups, known as leaderless resistance (see Kaplan 1997). The most infamous act of right-wing terrorism, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, was an attack carried out by just two people; but they were propelled by a large movement that created, distributed, and legitimated a very specific ideology, through pamphlets, and other literature (and more recently through the Internet). ...
Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a steady increase in the incidence of self-starter terrorist plots in both Western Europe and the United States. Past studies of self-starter terrorism focused on how persons come to acquire radical beliefs but take the additional step for granted - the transformation of isolated radical individuals into cells or networks that produce violent collective action. To better understand this search and assembly aspect of radicalization we constructed an agent-based computational model of radicalization and then validated its predictions with empirical data. Our work yielded three distinct contributions: 1) we operationalized radicalization with precise network measures and distinguished between four types of radicalization scenarios; 2) we characterized the factors that contribute to radicalization as well as deradicalization; 3) we extended radicalization theory by identifying specific network mechanisms such as occlusion, encapsulation, and magnet-rewiring by which radicals self-organize. Our findings may allow us to distinguish the conditions that lead to small transient cells from conditions that lead to large long-lasting terrorist organizations.
This article presents the findings of an explanatory study into the perceptions of Dutch Muslims in The Hague concerning pre-emptive counter-extremism and de-radicalisation policies. Based on 15 in-depth interviews with established Muslim community figures and a theoretical survey of 102 respondents from 8 mosques, it was found that pre-emptive interventions were perceived unfavourably due to their inherent misconceptualization of the Muslim lived experience. Respondents perceived wide-ranging negative labelling, viewing policies as not just ineffectual but also detrimental in a climate of persistent Islamophobia. In reality, these Dutch Muslims were faced with tackling the challenges of radicalisation based on their existing levels of social and cultural capital. Securitisation forces some Dutch Muslims into further retreat at a time of existing issues of social exclusion and political polarisation. This research highlights the need for greater sensitivity to Muslim community norms and values in developing policy in this area.
The endeavour to explain and predict international affairs is getting harder since it is ever more widely accepted that heterogeneous and fluid actors are making international politics. Positivists of various types have dominated the discussion on knowledge creation in the discipline of International Relations (IR), but the increasing acceptance of the dynamic character of international politics has led to the support and use of constructivist, post-Western or feminist approaches. There has also been an uptick in methodological discussions on these critical, non-positivist approaches. This article contributes to these debates by offering the first steps towards a cognitive frames–based methodology for IR. With a pragmatist ontology as its foundation, the approach re-sets the focus of analysis to the rationality of the international actors. The article, offers an initial description, by relying on illustrative examples, of the creation, the reach, durability and the organisational structure of cognitive frames in the global arena.
As the Islamic State’s hold on territory was gradually diminished in Iraq and Syria, countries around the world expressed concern that the group’s large contingent of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) would return to their home countries to continue their campaign of violence. However, as time has passed and relatively few attacks have taken place, some wonder if the threat has passed. This article argues that an FTF returning directly to their country to commit an act of violence is only one way that such a threat may manifest itself, but that there are other ways that may ultimately take longer to appear. This article utilises the network of individuals responsible for carrying out the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as a case study to demonstrate the various pathways and timeframes through which FTFs may pose a future threat. This approach reveals that, although the concern of FTFs directly returning to participate in attacks is valid, the varied and long-term ways in which FTFs may ultimately pose a threat are of equal if not greater concern.
The literature indicates that violent conflicts tend to spread across bordering countries via rebel/terrorist networks and refugees. However, this effect has not been tested for “overseas neighbours” that share the same basin. Focusing on the Mediterranean Basin, this study investigates the impact of civil and interstate conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on terrorist attacks in Southern European countries. The findings indicate that MENA conflicts increase violence in Southern Europe, whereas this effect does not exist in other European countries. This study contributes to the literature by establishing a theoretical and empirical link for overseas contagion effect.
Islamic fundamentalist movements such as Salafism are of great concern to Western societies like the Netherlands, yet much remains unknown about these phenomena. Striving for Allah aims to fill in the blanks by presenting primary data from in-depth qualitative research in the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Britain. Firstly, this study distinguishes orthodox, radical and extremist groups within Islamic fundamentalism regarding attitudes, motives, reasons, and behaviour. Secondly, it presents an innovative theoretical framework that helps to understand the attraction of these different fundamentalist currents to individuals from Muslim families and to converts, an important group that is often overlooked.The author finds that Dutch Muslim fundamentalists are not as ‘other’ as is commonly assumed. Instead, her research demonstrates that Islamic fundamentalism among these Muslims is to a large extent a Western, and hence a truly glocal phenomenon.
Target group
criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, politicologists, researchers and practitioners in the field of terrorism and radicalisation
Author's information
Fiore Geelhoed is Assistant Professor of Criminology at VU University Amsterdam. After having obtained a law degree from the University of Groningen and a criminological master at the University of Barcelona, she conducted this PhD study on fundamentalist Muslims at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her dissertation ‘Purification and resistance: Glocal meanings of Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands’ was awarded a shared second place for the Willem Nagelprijs 2014, a three-annual prize for the best doctoral dissertation in Criminology in the Netherlands and Flanders.
"Radicalization is a complex area of study and few researchers get it right from stem to stern. Fiore Geelhoed is a welcomed exception. Her analysis is theoretically nuanced, empirically rigorous, and exceptionally humane" - Mark S. Hamm, Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University, and author of 'The Spectacular Few. Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat'.
"Finally, a book that cuts through the deceiving polemics about Muslim fundamentalism through fieldwork and actually talking to orthodox, radical and extremist Muslims. Its sober analysis and tone will raise the discourse about this issue in Western societies." - Marc Sageman, author of 'Understanding Terror Networks' and 'Leaderless Jihad'.
Lone wolf organizations are entirely autonomous, quite small in size, and usually very limited in capabilities. This category was originally popularized under the term “leaderless resistance” by selfdescribed Ambassador-at-Large for the Aryan Nations Louis Beam.1 Beam had recognized that highly hierarchical organizations were easily penetrated and rolled by counterterrorism forces, so those who sought to oppose the state and its repression would have to find another mode for conducting operations. He thus describes groups he labels as “phantom cell networks” and “autonomous leadership units” (ALUs), in which
… individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction, as would those who belong to a typical pyramid organization. Organs of information distribution such as newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc., which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events, allowing for a planned response that will take many variations. No one need issue an order to anyone.2
This study examines a factor that has thus far received little attention in research on attitudes toward violent in-group defense, namely, the role of perceived parental ethnic socialization. We hypothesized that perceived parental ethnic socialization (i.e., cultural socialization, egalitarianism, bias/mistrust) affects attitudes toward violence in defense of the in-group by others as well as willingness to use such violence oneself via its influence on collective identity factors (in-group connectedness, collective deprivation, religious superiority, connectedness with mainstream society). We analyzed a sample of children of Turkish Muslim migrants in the Netherlands. The data came from a survey conducted among pupils at 7 secondary schools (age 14-18, N = 133). Results show that perceived parental ethnic socialization has an indirect effect on attitudes toward and willingness to use a violent in-group defense that runs via the collective identity factors. Perceived parental socialization that emphasizes equality is related to less willingness to use violent in-group defense. Perceived parental messages of mistrust of the other and preparation for bias were associated with a more positive attitude toward violent in-group defense by others and toward willingness to use such violence. Perceived cultural socialization correlates positively with attitude toward violent in-group defense by others and willingness to use violent in-group defense. The total size of the indirect effects of perceived parental ethnic socialization was modest. We did not find a direct effect of perceived parental socialization. (PsycINFO Database Record
Militant Salafism is one of the most significant movements in politics today. Unfortunately its significance has not been matched by understanding. To begin to address this knowledge deficit this book argues that, rather than the largely unhelpful pursuit of individual ʹroot causesʹ offered in much of the literature, we would be better served by looking at the factors that have enabled and facilitated a particular political imagery. That political imagery is one that allows individuals to conceive of themselves as integral members of a global battle waged between the forces of Islam and the West, something that lies at the heart of militant Salafism. Frazer Egerton shows how the ubiquity of modern media and the prevalence of movement have allowed for a transformation of existing beliefs into an ideology supportive of militant Salafism against the West amongst Western Muslims.
"Mitch Silber reveals how a police officer analyzes a terrorist threat. The empirical and pragmatic approach in the Al Qaeda Factor provides a guide to how detectives on the street prioritize their resources in order the protect the city. A must read for anyone interested in terrorism."-Marc Sageman, author of Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad "The Al Qaeda Factor is a lucid and deeply researched account of the group's plots in the West and the degree to which they were directed or inspired by the core of Al Qaeda. Silber brings real analytical rigor to a field that needs his cogent voice."-Peter Bergen, author of The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al Qaeda The horrific and devastating events of September 11, 2001 changed the world's perception of Al Qaeda. What had been considered a small band of revolutionary terrorists capable only of attacking Western targets in the Middle East and Africa suddenly demonstrated an ability to strike globally with enormous impact. Subsequent plots perpetuated the impression of Al Qaeda as a highly organized and rigidly controlled organization with recruiters, operatives, and sleeper cells in the West who could be activated on command. We now know, however, that the role of Al Qaeda in global jihadist plots has varied significantly over time. New York Police Department terrorism expert Mitchell D. Silber argues that to comprehend the threat posed by the transnational jihad movement, we must have a greater and more nuanced understanding of the dynamics behind Al Qaeda plots. In The Al Qaeda Factor he examines sixteen Al Qaeda-associated plots and attacks, from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to today. For each case, he probes primary sources and applies a series of questions to determine the precise involvement of Al Qaeda. What connects radicalized groups in the West to the core Al Qaeda organization in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Does one of the plotters have to attend an Al Qaeda training camp or meet with an Al Qaeda trainer, or can they simply be inspired by Al Qaeda ideology? Further analysis examines the specifics of Al Qaeda's role in the inspiration, formation, membership, and organization of terrorist groups. Silber also identifies potential points of vulnerability, which may raise the odds of thwarting future terrorist attacks in the West. The Al Qaeda Factor demonstrates that the role of Al Qaeda is very limited even in plots with direct involvement. Silber finds that in the majority of cases, individuals went to Al Qaeda seeking aid or training, but even then there was limited direct command and control of the terrorists' activities-a sobering conclusion that demonstrates that even the destruction of Al Qaeda's core would not stop Al Qaeda plots. Mitchell D. Silber is Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York Police Department. © 2012 by University of Pennsylvania Press. All rights reserved.
The article seeks to outline the evolution of European jihadism from its origins in the late 1980s to its most current developments. It argues that today the movement is highly diverse and increasingly managing to establish ties with groups operating outside of Europe. But it is also relatively contained, its appeal limited to small clusters operating at the fringes of - and increasingly in contraposition with-European Muslim communities.
The article asks why the area stretching from Senegal over Nigeria to the Horn of Africa/East Africa is so important to European security. The area is clearly not the “near abroad” like the Middle East/North Africa or the former communist countries to the east. The article launches three arguments aimed at explaining the European Union's crisis management policy towards the region and in particular its strong focus on failed states and terrorism. First, there is a perception among EU decision-makers that Europe's security is threatened by a “Somaliasation” of African states. The second argument states that EU decision-makers are so strongly influenced by French and US security priorities that fighting terrorism becomes a remarkably high priority of the Union's Africa policy. Third, EU decision-makers share a common notion that immigrant communities in Europe might be inspired by the radicalisation taking place among Muslims in some African countries. Thereby, the Muslim immigrant communities may contribute to breeding “home-grown” terrorists. The article concludes that the perception of a threat stemming from “Somaliasation” in Africa, the impact of French and US security priorities and the fear of “home-grown terrorists” explain the comprehensive crisis management initiatives launched by Brussels in recent years.
Full Report can be found at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fhome-affairs%2Fdoc_centre%2Fterrorism%2Fdocs%2Fec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf&ei=GPNYVODiA7SKsQTNjIKgAQ&usg=AFQjCNFH6saskqPBY_LkqXLTRj8uNz1EEA&bvm=bv.78677474,d.cWc
This Research Note provides a chronological overview of the most important events that occurred during the 2002-2005 existence of the Dutch Hofstadgroup. This group is frequently cited as a leading example of the 'homegrown' jihadist threat that arose in Europe from 2004 onwards. Despite this status in the literature, a detailed and above all primary sources-based account of the main developments of this group has so far been missing. With this contribution, the authors hope to provide fellow researchers with a useful resource for their own work on the Hofstadgroup and homegrown jihadism more broadly.
Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroup's status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002-2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Gogh's death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to warrant the “jihadist network” label often ascribed to the Hofstadgroup. Arguably the most archetypical aspect of the Hofstadgroup case is its ability to illustrate the deleterious effects of the ongoing scarcity of primary sources-based research on terrorism.
This article studies the structure of Jihadist terrorism in the West from the perspective of the existence or absence of links between grassroots militants and organizations such as Al Qaeda Central and its regional affiliates. It undertakes a comprehensive case study of Jihadist militancy in a European country (Spain) over a period of almost two decades, from 1995 until December 2013. The study analyzes the results of 64 antiterrorist operations carried out during this time.
In this article, the violent threat emerging from “menacing loners” and autonomous cells in The Netherlands is being historicized and contextualized by providing quantitative and qualitative insight into this threat and illuminating some of the most dramatic incidents. Although beyond the core purpose of this mainly empirical article, some tentative remarks will be presented as possible explanation for both continuity and change. We argue that the shift from political violence originating from groups and networks to political violence perpetrated by individuals, and the shift from ideologically motivated violence to performative violence, are both shifts within a continuum, not radical breaks with the past. It is a difference in degree. Further, we argue that these gradual shifts in types of violence can only be understood as dependent on parallel manifestations of counter-policies, technological developments, and broader trends within society, rather than as attributable to indigenous terrorist developments as such. We postulate a shift from ideologically motivated to performative violence, resulting to a large extent from the possibilities offered by the Internet and social media, and from a broader cultural trend defined as the emergence of the “casting society.”
This article analyses European initiatives to counter radicalisation and recru‐itment as a practice of governing that works preemptively through civil society and semi‐public spaces. Since the London and Madrid bombings, the EU agenda in this domain is substantial and ambitious. At the same time, proposals are embraced by member states to various degrees and materialise in local settings and concrete programmes in different ways. We propose to regard radicalisation as an assemblage of governing that is mobilised through particular threat representations, knowledge practices, training programmes and strategies for intervention. This lens allows for the simultaneous recognition of national differentiations, the power and reach of “Europe”, and the tensions, fluid relations and alignments that are forged in counter‐radicalisation conceptualisation and practice. In so doing, the motivation behind our research is to make strange the idea of radicalisation itself, which has been fully embraced and mobilised as a problem of governance across Europe.
Although the psychology of terrorism is far from a neglected subject, there is still much to learn. “Ordinary” criminals remain enigmatic but have proved a far more accessible population for research purposes. This article bridges the gap between the study of crime and contemporary terrorism by examining the parallels between the two. Significant similarities are shown to exist between terrorists and organized as well as low-level criminals, including activities performed and systems of social influence and organization. Processes of social identification are universally important to varying degrees; however, specific differences in identity may represent key distinguishing features between groups. Although further comparisons utilizing more restrictive samples are necessary, attention is drawn to the sometimes underutilized potential that criminological research holds to act as a point of reference for the investigation of terrorism.
Recent scholarship has called for additional research into the role of charismatic authority in terrorist groups and the process of radicalization. However, the sociological concepts of charisma and charismatic authority are being widely misused in terrorism studies. Current radicalization research often indirectly flirts with core concepts of charismatic authority, but fails to properly tap into its analytical utility. This article proposes to begin addressing this gap in knowledge in three ways, with: (1) a synthesis of social scientific research on charismatic authority, (2) a critical analysis of how charismatic authority is being misused and overlooked in the terrorist radicalization literature, and (3) an exploration of challenges and opportunities for future research concerning charismatic authority and terrorist radicalization.
This article considers how information and communications technologies (ICT) can be used by organised crime groups to infringe legal and regulatory controls. Three categories of groups are identified: traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct. The activities of each group are then assessed in relation to five areas of risk: the use of online payment systems, online auctions, online gaming, social networking sites and blogs. It is concluded that the distinction between traditional organised crime groups and the other two groups—cybercriminal groups and ideologically/politically motivated cyber groups—is converging, with financially-motivated attacks becoming more targeted. Legislation will need to adapt to deal with new technological developments and threats that organised criminals seek to exploit.
This article offers a descriptive analysis of jihadi terrorist activity in Western Europe during the years 2001–2010. Following collection and classification, the information has been analyzed using the following variables: target countries, terrorist method used, stays in training camps, links to organizations, and degree of completion of the terrorist incidents.
Theoretical work on networked organization informs a large swathe of the current literature on international organized crime and terrorism in the field of international relations. Clandestine networks are portrayed as large, fluid, mobile, highly adaptable, and resilient. Many analysts have concluded that this makes them difficult for more stable, hierarchical states to combat. The prevailing mood of pessimism about the ability of states to combat illicit networks, however, may be premature. International relations scholars working in the area have often been too quick to draw parallels to the world of the firm, where networked organization has proven well adapted to the fast-moving global marketplace. They have consequently overlooked not only issues of community and trust but also problems of distance, coordination, and security, which may pose serious organizational difficulties for networks in general and for illicit networks in particular. Closer attention to a wider body of historical and contemporary research on dynamics of participation in underground movements, the life cycle of terrorism and insurgency, and vulnerabilities in organized crime reveals that clandestine networks are often not as adaptable or resilient as they are made out to be. An analysis of the al-Qaida network suggests that as al-Qaida adopts a more networked organization, it becomes exposed to a gamut of organizational dilemmas that threatens to reduce its unity, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.
This bibliography presents books, government documents, reports, and journal articles on various aspects of terrorism. The bibliography is divided into the following sections: causes and origins of terrorism, geographical distribution of terrorist groups, terrorist financing, terrorist groups and networks, the psychology of terrorism, prevention of terrorism, remedies for terrorism, terrorist violence, and bibliographies and reference works.
The present paper represents an exploratory, dynamic and qualitative application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) for modelling the development of Islamist terror cells in the West. Two well‐known case studies are systematically re‐examined using this methodology as a supporting framework for interpreting the sequence of group development from a social psychological perspective. By drawing attention to salient features of evolving network structures, insight is gained into group functioning and underlying social–psychological mechanisms of radicalisation. This article represents a starting point for giving greater methodological and theoretical recognition to the dynamic structural properties of Islamist terrorist groups in the West. It is intended to stimulate discussion and ideas for future, more rigorous research.
The conceptualization of terrorist groups as networks is increasingly common to terrorism studies, although methods of analysis vary widely. Contrary to common understandings, the integration of computational and qualitative methods is possible even with limited (small-n) data. The triangulation of different methods can produce insights overlooked by the use of any single method and validate findings across methods. This article demonstrates some of the possibilities for integrating qualitative and quantitative methods for network analysis using Raffaello Pantucci's recent article, “The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children.”
Radicalization is often seen as a first, prerequisite step along the road towards terrorism. Yet to be radical is merely to reject the status quo, and not necessarily in a problematic or violent way. In Part 1—“Radicals”—this article compares the backgrounds, ideologies, behaviours, and attitudes of a sample of “violent radicals” with both radical and “mainstream” non-violent sample groups. By finding both what the violent and non-violent samples share, and also what they do not, the article hopes to achieve a more adept discrimination of violent and non-violent radicalization. In Part 2—“Radicalization”—the article suggests that, in addition to being an intellectual, rational, and religious decision, becoming a terrorist is also an emotional, social, and status-conscious one.
This article sheds light on the European Union's counter-terrorism policy in the Maghreb taking into account the diverse influences and interests shaping its strategic thinking. To explain the complex web of opportunities and constraints, the article refers to Terry Deibel's framework for the analysis of foreign and security affairs. The author concludes that the Union's counter-terrorism policy in the Maghreb has been shaped more by the desire for regional stability and greater trade relations and energy security than by the goal of promoting democratic values and human rights. Moreover, the promotion of democracy is perceived by EU policy-makers as a destabilising factor that could endanger counter-terrorism efforts.
Three categories of organised groups that exploit advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) to infringe
legal and regulatory controls: (1) traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial
criminal activities; (2) organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and (3) organised groups of ideologically
and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct are described in this article.
The need for law enforcement to have in-depth knowledge of computer forensic principles, guidelines, procedures, tools, and
techniques, as well as anti-forensic tools and techniques will become more pronounced with the increased likelihood of digital
content being a source of disputes or forming part of underlying evidence to support or refute a dispute in judicial proceedings.
There is also a need for new strategies of response and further research on analysing organised criminal activities in cyberspace.
For decades, a new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. America's ability to remain oblivious to these new movements ended on September 11, 2001. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate. Based on intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad, Understanding Terror Networks gives us the first social explanation of the global wave of activity. Sageman traces its roots in Egypt, gestation in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, exile in the Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including detailed accounts of life within the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned attacks on the United States. U.S. government strategies to combat the jihad are based on the traditional reasons an individual was thought to turn to terrorism: poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance. Sageman refutes all these notions, showing that, for the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own. Understanding Terror Networks combines Sageman's scrutiny of sources, personal acquaintance with Islamic fundamentalists, deep appreciation of history, and effective application of network theory, modeling, and forensic psychology. Sageman's unique research allows him to go beyond available academic studies, which are light on facts, and journalistic narratives, which are devoid of theory. The result is a profound contribution to our understanding of the perpetrators of 9/11 that has practical implications for the war on terror. Copyright
Parts of the tape are available, with Spanish subtitles, at (www.elmundo.es/documentos
- Tape
- Suri
Tape of Abu Musab al Suri, 2000. Parts of the tape are available, with Spanish subtitles, at (www.elmundo.es/documentos/2006/02/01/mustafasetmarian/index.html) (accessed August 2006).
Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe
- Emerson Vermaat
Emerson Vermaat, " Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe, " report for the Mackenzie Institute, 26 May 2002.
Zijn Hobby is Knutselen
- Patrick Pouw
Patrick Pouw, " Zijn Hobby is Knutselen, " AD News, 8 November 2005.
Een rechtlijnige fanatiekeling
- Romana Abels
Romana Abels and Kustaw Bessems, " Een rechtlijnige fanatiekeling, " Trouw, 9 July 2005.
Hoe georganiseerd waren Samir A. en zijn vrienden?
- Jaco Alberts
- Steven Derix
Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, " Hoe georganiseerd waren Samir A. en zijn vrienden? " NRC Handelsblad, 9 April 2005. 21. Report by the Dutch Ministry of Justice on the van Gogh assassination, 10 November 2004.
From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist; Muslim Suspect in Dutch Director's Killing was Caught between Cultures
- Glenn Frankel
Glenn Frankel, " From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist; Muslim Suspect in Dutch Director's Killing was Caught between Cultures, " Washington Post, 28 November 2004.
Police Give Details of Attack Planned on Portugal by Dutch-Based Islamist Cell
- Joã Pedro
- Fonseca
Joã Pedro Fonseca, " Police Give Details of Attack Planned on Portugal by Dutch-Based Islamist Cell, " Diario de Notocias, 15 November 2004 (accessed via FBIS).
Supporting documentation in the case against Samir Azzouz, Openbaar Ministerie, The Hague
- Ibid
Ibid. 26. Supporting documentation in the case against Samir Azzouz, Openbaar Ministerie, The Hague, 7 November 2005.
Dutch Struggle to Prevent Terror and Protect Rights
- Elaine Sciolino
Elaine Sciolino, " Dutch Struggle to Prevent Terror and Protect Rights, " New York Times, 25 December 2005.
In the Grip of the Group, " in European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups From Dawa to Jihad
- Frank
- Mark S Gemert
- Fleisher
Frank van Gemert and Mark S. Fleisher, " In the Grip of the Group, " in European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups, eds. Scott H. Decker and Frank M. Weerman (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2005), p. 19. 42. " From Dawa to Jihad, " p. 20.
Dutch Struggle to Prevent Terror and Protect Rights Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
- Samir Azzouz
- Sciolino
Samir Azzouz, quoted in Sciolino, " Dutch Struggle to Prevent Terror and Protect Rights. " 45. " Violent Jihad in the Netherlands, " p. 13.
Interview with a Dutch journalist
- Ibid
Ibid., p. 37. 49. Interview with a Dutch journalist, Amsterdam, July 2005.
Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on
- Intelligence
- Security
Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, presented to the British Parliament by the Prime Minister, May 2006, p. 12. L. Vidino
Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret Service
- Justin Sparks
Justin Sparks, " Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret Service, " Times (London), 14 November 2004.
When Theo van Gogh Was Slaughtered in the Street for His Attacks on Islamic Fundamentalism, It Was Also a Knife to the Heart of the Dutch Liberal Dream. Now, in a Deeply Polarized Society, Can Free Expression Triumph over Fear? " Observer Magazine
- Andrew Anthony
Andrew Anthony, " When Theo van Gogh Was Slaughtered in the Street for His Attacks on Islamic Fundamentalism, It Was Also a Knife to the Heart of the Dutch Liberal Dream. Now, in a Deeply Polarized Society, Can Free Expression Triumph over Fear? " Observer Magazine, 5 December 2004.