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Europe's ‘Division’ over the war in Iraq
Abstract
The profound political crisis within the EU and across Europe before and after the US-led war in Iraq is due primarily to the policies of governments and not diverging views among European publics. Among the majority of EU and European citizens the sense of belonging to Europe is well developed. For this reason the division of Europe over Iraq, aggravated as it was by the resounding French and Dutch ‘No’ votes with regard to the EU Constitution, has not resulted in any irrevocable setback or the division of the continent into two rival camps. The degree to which the EU has truly accelerated the growth of a truly European ‘identity’ among its members' peoples, however, remains unclear.
... As the EU viewed Iran, Syria and Libya as part of its strategy of restructuring the region in line with the needs of its MNCs, it occasionally contested US geopolitical measures against them. The Franco-German axis against the US invasion of Iraq was the epitome of this transatlantic rift (Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2006;Hanieh, 2013: 39-42). ...
The existing accounts of the Iranian nuclear programme and the JCPOA suffer from ontological exteriority, in conjunction with the problematic conception of the state and unpersuasive assessments of future outcomes. Grounded on the philosophy of internal relations, which challenges the artificial detachment between political economy and military-security concerns, this article contends that grasping the Iranian nuclear programme and the JCPOA requires unpacking their internal links with neoliberal global capitalism. The article thus presents a three-part argument. First, it asserts that the Iranian nuclear programme and economic sanctions should be viewed as part of the great powers’ efforts, particularly those of the United States and the European Union, to shape neoliberalism in the Middle East and North Africa. Second, it delves into the post-2008 global economy’s imperial rivalry and cooperation, suggesting that the nuclear deal was a result of the US pivot to the East, China’s Belt and Road Initiative in West Asia, and the need for multinational companies to find new avenues for capital accumulation following the financial crisis. Finally, it connects the JCPOA to Iranian neoliberalisation, which gives rise to two competing capital fractions (the internationally oriented capital fraction and the military–bonyad complex) to emphasise the crucial role played by the former in reaching the nuclear deal.
... As known, the Iraq issue has been hotly contested across the region, while the elites chose a similar, supportive course (e.g. Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2006). Additionally, later, while some Central and East European leaders expressed a deeply securitized outlook, lamenting Obama's withdrawal from Europe and the "reset" policy in the face of Russian aggressiveness (Adamkus et al. 2009), others continued to develop very pragmatic, low-key cooperation. ...
This book employs various theories of contemporary security studies to explore some of the most important and most common security issues in Central Europe at this time. Individual chapters of the book adhere mainly to European branches of critical and constructivist security studies, through which they look at some of the salient topics of Central European security politics.The distinction between internal and external security issues is employed throughout the book for analytical purposes.
Produktu kvalitātes un to atšķirību izaicinājumi Eiropas Savienībā
(ES) nav jauna problēma, divējādas kvalitātes preces Eiropā ir bijušas
sastopamas vairāk nekā 30 gadus. Produktu divējāda kvalitāte paredz
praksi, ka produktu zīmoli ir vienādi, taču to sastāvs vai īpašības atšķiras (European Parliament, 2019a). No vienas puses, saskaņā ar Eiropas Savienības tiesību aktiem preces pārdošanu iepakojumā, kas
ir identisks citās dalībvalstīs tirgotai precei, kaut gan tās sastāvs un
īpašības ievērojami atšķiras, var uzskatīt par negodīgu un nelikumīgu
patērētāju maldināšanu, ja vien tam nav likumīga un objektīva iemesla (European Parliament, 2012, 19). No otras puses, starp uzņēmējiem
pastāv prakse, ko dēvē par “Domā globāli, rīkojies lokāli” (Think Global, Act Local) principu (IMS Marketing, 2021). Šis princips paredz un
mudina uzņēmumus ievērot konsekventu stratēģiju – pārdodot starptautiskā mērogā, nepieciešams vienlaikus pielāgot taktisko pieeju
vietējam tirgum, uz kuru tie orientējas. Tas nozīmē, ka daudzi starptautiski pārtikas uzņēmumi pēc nepieciešamības pielāgo tos vietējai
kultūrai un vēlmēm, jo kultūru atšķirības un vietējo patērētāju vēlmes
ietekmē ēdiena gatavošanas receptes, pārtikas pārstrādi, to garšas un
faktūras (Metin & Kitzin, 2015, 112).
Referring to Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’, research on the democratic peace is based on the assumption that citizens’ preferences are fully and directly transferred into actual security policy by democratic leaders. However, democratic responsiveness in foreign politics is a more complex issue. Parliaments are usually key institutions with regard to ensuring responsiveness of democratic leaders both by authorizing political decisions and by monitoring executive policy-making and implementation. However, in several democracies military security policy-making is understood as part of an ‘executive prerogative’. This article examines the role of parliaments in providing for democratic responsiveness of security policy-making. We test the hypothesis that, depending on the extent of their ‘war powers’, parliaments do effectively limit the scope of executive security policy if and when public opinion strongly opposes military action. The decision-making of 25 European democracies on military participation in the 2003 Iraq War serves as a test. Testing the hypothesis we find that countries with strong parliamentary war powers tended to be significantly less involved in the military intervention against Iraq. However, several puzzles of a theory of ‘parliamentary peace’ remain to be addressed by future research.
With its focus on the external dimension of the rapidly evolving European Union immigration policies, this article seeks to contribute to the debates on the EU’s impact on states and international relations in two ways. Firstly, it seeks to move beyond the inward-looking focus of contemporary studies on the EU’s effects on the member states, and proposes a framework for analyzing its external effects on non-EU member states. Secondly, and in contrast to traditional accounts of the EU’s strengthening international role, which focus on external trade policy or foreign and security policy, it highlights a hitherto overlooked aspect of the EU’s foreign relations related to immigration control. Drawing on the recent literature on Europeanization and policy transfer, it is shown that the external effects of European policies take place along a continuum that runs from fully voluntary to more constrained forms of adaptation, and include a variety of modes such as unilateral emulation, adaptation by externality, and policy transfer through conditionality. The scope and shape of policy transfer is conditioned by existing institutional links between the EU and the third countries concerned, the latter’s domestic situation at hand, and the costs of nonadaptation associated with an EU policy.
Reflections on the future of American foreign policy following the September 11 terrorist attacks are best understood as part of a debate that has been on-going since the end of the Cold War. At the heart of this debate are questions of power and national purpose, themes that have long been at the heart of analyses of American foreign policy and are not unique to the post Cold War era. In this symposium I argue that as important as questions of power and purpose are, they constitute only two of the three essential pillars on which any analysis of American foreign policy must build. Questions about the third pillar, responsibility, have been relatively unexplored. Studies of power provide insight into the ability of the United States to act on the international stage. Studies of purpose, or national interest, provide insight into the range of goals that can be pursued or should be pursued in conducting foreign policy. Studies of responsibility direct our attention to questions of obligation, accountability, and definition of community. Only by examining all three pillars can one obtain a full picture of American foreign policy and reach judgements about its content.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism remains alive and well across an increasingly integrated Europe. While most nationalisms are not violent, the desire for greater national voice by both states and groups continues to exist in both the East and the West. As the European Union deepens and widens, states and groups are choosing among four nationalist strategies: traditional, substate, transsovereign, and protectionist. The interplay among these nationalisms is a core part of Europe's dynamic present and future.
This article seeks to develop a concept of ‘security governance’ in the context of post-Cold War Europe. The validity of a governance approach lies in its ability to locate some of the distinctive ways in which European security has been coordinated, managed and regulated. Based on an examination of the way governance is utilised in other political fields of political analysis, the article identifies the concept of security governance as involving the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes. Three issues are examined to demonstrate the utility of the concept of security governance for understanding security in post-Cold War Europe: the transformation of NATO, the Europeanisation of security accomplished through EU-led initiatives and, finally, the resultant dynamic relationship between forms of exclusion and inclusion in governance.
In the wake of French and Dutch voters'‘no’ to the European Union's draft constitutional treaty, European leaders have so far failed to rise to the occasion. Rather than struggle to define a reasonable way forward at the June 2005 summit in Brussels, European governments fiddled over relatively trivial budget issues while the EU burned. Ironically, the draft EU constitution has died — or at least has fallen into a deep coma – in France, where the European project was initiated more than half a century ago. The endeavour is now stalled. A battle of visions has started amidst widespread confusion about what to do with the constitutional treaty. The time has come to clarify the institutional nature, as well as the ultimate goal, of the European Union.
This article explores whether and how the norm of solidarity has been demonstrated in the enlargement policy of the European Union (EU) towards the ten former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe aspiring for EU membership. According to constructivist approaches, which dominate the literature on eastern enlargement, the EU's decision to enlarge was norm-driven and is therefore better understood within a constructivist rather than a rationalist framework. However, this article argues that, while the norm of solidarity has provided some of the initial impetus for the start of the EU's eastern enlargement process, it has had a more limited impact on defining the EU's enlargement policy as regards concrete policy issues. This article aims to contribute to the current debate between rationalist and constructivist theories in European integration by arguing that there is a difference in the degree of influence of normative factors on EU policies when considering long-term as opposed to short-term interests. It demonstrates there are limits to the role of norms in the EU's eastern enlargement policy when the focus of analysis shifts from the EU's decision to enlarge to the level of substantive policy issues, where EU actors' short-term interests prevail.Journal of International Relations and Development (2004) 7, 323. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800006
In this paper, Euro-skepticism in post-socialist EU accession countries is conceptualized as a program, which is directed against both idea and practice of European integration. It is argued that Euro-skepticism is not an isolated phenomenon but has to be interpreted as an issue in party competition that is rooted in socio-cultural and socio-economic conflict. Two-party families are disposed to rely on the EU issue in their efforts to attract voters: nationalist and communist parties. Euro-skepticism, which is treated both on the attitude and parliamentary level, has different scopes in the accession area. Whereas in the Czech Republic and in Poland Euro-skepticist forces have a considerable weight both in the populations and in the parliaments, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia are countries with low levels of Euro-skepticism in both dimensions.Comparative European Politics (2004) 2, 2950. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110024
The early history of the United States makes clear that political unions take shape in incremental fashion and not without setbacks. In these terms, Europe's ongoing integration is proceeding apace and of considerable geopolitical consequence. Europe's mounting geopolitical weight, although contributing to the turmoil that has beset Atlantic relations, need not come at the expense of its link to the United States. On the contrary, the emergence of a more unified and muscular Europe has the potential to salvage a transatlantic alliance that is currently strained to the breaking point.
This paper analyzes recent accession negotiations to evaluate pressures for Europeanization upon countries seeking to join the European Union (EU). Despite the European Commission's policy of evaluating applications for membership on a country-by-country basis, the paper finds that accession negotiations followed an unexpectedly uniform process, whereby a similar sequence of policy areas were opened for evaluation and closed across diverse countries that had, in some cases, initiated their applications at different times. Using data from the EU's regular reports on progress towards accession, the paper compares and analyzes patterns of negotiations with the European Commission, contrasting the sequence of openings and closings of chapters of the acquis communautaire, the duration of negotiations for each chapter, and patterns of transition periods. Second, the paper finds that applicant countries have made substantial and similar adaptations of policies and institutions to comply with the EU's requirement that they adopt the acquis. The paper compares adaptations for the chapter on regional policy to highlight an arena in which the demands for institutional and policy adaptation are high and conditionality is especially powerful due to prospective EU funds associated with this chapter. The paper raises questions about whether changes in new member states can be considered to be deep or long-lasting and considers the future prospects for Europeanization.Comparative European Politics (2004) 2, 328. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110023
The paper seeks to analyse whether citizens' utilitarian expectations towards the European level can explain variations in European identity. Based on Lipset (1960) it is argued that a political system that is expected to be efficient can gain identity. Identity is believed to encompass different dimensions of which efficiency is one. As such it is possible to use utilitarian reasoning to observe affective (identity) variations. As utilitarian expectations we use citizens' policy preferences. We observe whether they favour a national handling of the policy or whether they prefer the EU to be the main policy actor. The results of factor and multinominal logit analyses confirm the existence of a utilitarian identity at the European level indicating that the development of a European identity is closely connected to the EU's ability to deliver policy outputs according to citizens' expectations.Comparative European Politics (2005) 3, 5075. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110048
American secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld's characterisation in early 2003 of an 'Old Europe' and a 'New Europe', provides particular challenges when applied to the exploration of European security. The 'New Europe' is a very elusive concept. As far as the Iraq war is concerned, the 'New European' states have less in common than the US secretary of defence might have thought. This is indicated by an exploration of specific factors that have affected the attitudes of supposed 'New European' states towards the Iraq war in general, and towards their own security in particular. Slovenia is particularly interesting in this regard, as a country that found it especially hard to address the 'New-Old' Europe dilemma. A theoretical framework for the analysis of this aspect of contemporary European diplomacy can be constructed on the basis of the two main positivist (rational) theories of International Relations: realism and liberalism, although neither offers any conclusive explanation of the post-cold war division in Europe as constructed by Rumsfeld.
What some critics might consider to be a 'mission creep' within the ESDP framework, for the majority of Europeans is a logical development of European defence and security capabilities in a time of emerging new security threats as a response to US policies and with the evolution of the EU itself. The Constitution represents a huge step forward by enhancing the EU's capacity to act. It is flexible, dynamic and has potential for development. The Articles on the ESDP or related to CFSP provide a set of instruments and procedures that add some innovative elements to the existing rules and policies. Some of the elements of a new and more robust ESDP are already being implemented, far before any ratification deadline, irrespective of the ratification itself. There are windows of opportunities for Washington to readjust its policies towards the alliance and possibly even improve them, especially in view of the coming ratification of the EU Constitution. But it might also require the EU to walk an extra mile for the sake of international security.
European integration has in general proceeded by virtue of ‘constructive ambiguity’, a combination of open-ended commitments and ambivalent formulations. The current enlargement, which concluded in April and May 2004 with the near-simultaneous entry into NATO and the EU of a group of Central European countries, was quite typical. From now on, however, addressing the issue of the foreseeable borders of the enlarged Union (and NATO too, for that matter) is crucial for shaping a credible, coherent and effective menu for action not only in and around Europe itself, but also – hopefully – in the wider world. The central European newcomers can play a crucial role in this process, especially if they actively contribute to formulating policies that may be broadly acceptable to all EU members.
The Bush administration's foreign policy following the launch of the ‘war on terror’ has so fundamentally altered the traditional foundations for the transatlantic relationship that the latter's continued existence as a ‘security community’ may be at risk. Security communities need nurturing through a continuous process of socialisation from the leading state to other members in order to safeguard the essential ‘glue’ of the community: shared identity, values and trust. Such a process of patient socialisation and explanation of American foreign policies has been part of ‘normal politics’ since the establishment of the post‐war liberal institutional order. The ‘Bush Revolution’, however, constitutes a re‐definition of foreign policy, that may be seen either as a return to or a departure from ‘normal politics’.
The article aims to explore the utility of Europeanisation as a concept to grasp the interactions between national and European levels. The article illustrates how the EU impacts on the national level of policy, polity and the politics of Member States and assesses how the role of nation states within the European political system has changed as a result. First, the existing definitions of Europeanisation are critically assessed, contextualised and delimited. Initially developed for communitised policy areas in the first pillar, Europeanisation is defined as an interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of ‘Europeanising’ and ‘Europeanised’ countries, linking national and European levels. Defining Europeanisation as ‘domestic change’, the article then discusses mechanisms, objects and forms, as well as the criteria and conditions of change. The article subsequently seeks to clarify the validity of the Europeanisation concept in capturing the increasing interwovenness of national and European spheres in intergovernmental policy fields situated in the second pillar of the EU, that is, foreign and security policy. Inherent methodological challenges, mainly due to the deficient delimitation of Europeanisation and the intergovernmental character of this policy field are discussed as well as the particularities of its applicability in this unique policy area.
This paper addresses the relationship between accumulated knowledge and U.S. policy dealing with failed states and terrorism. The central thesis is threefold: (1) that more was known about the possible linkages between failing states and terrorism than appears in pre-9/11 U.S. policies; (2) that since 9/11 some important realignment of knowledge and practice has occurred, but it remains partial and incomplete; and (3) that new knowledge, especially about the policies to sustain and promote legitimate governance, needs to be generated in order to support an effective grand strategy for addressing the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. The paper recommends such a grand strategy and, in addition to the required new knowledge, a significant reorganization of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus. International studies curricula appear well suited for contributing to that new knowledge and the practitioners we require.
In view of the shortcomings of both "Westphalian" and "Cosmopolitan" approaches to the EU, the paper will
follow a different path and argue that the regulation of cultural pluralism at he European level is characterized
by the contradictions underlying the EU's institutional development. The principle of intergovernmentalism stresses the role of nation-states and tends to reaffirm the weight of national cultures. At the same time, however, European transnationalism offers possibilities for articulating cultural identities below and beyond the nation-state, contributing to some extent to the "denationalization" of political cultures. This is illustrated with examples taken from the area of European language policy. The last section of the paper deals with the potentials of a pluralist interpretation of the subsidiarity principle for inducing "reflexive identity management" in Europe.
War is too important to be left to the generals or to the politicians. In a dynamic world increasing in complexity at a geometric rate, it is no longer prudent to assume that any one professional class alone, no matter their dedication or training, can be the objective repository for all knowledge, analysis, synthesis, and estimative power on how to conduct war. Just as the U.S. Constitution was founded on the concept of separate institutions sharing power, today it is equally critical that multiple sources of information and analysis be assembled and tested prior to decisions that could fundamentally alter world politics. At present the United States is unnecessarily handicapping its national security capabilities by often ignoring highly powerful tools developed by the academic community. Partly this is the result of ignorance of, or distain for, intellectual contributions. Partly it is the result of an academic community failing to communicate to the policy world in satisfactory terms and timeliness. This essay is a very modest attempt to bridge this opportunity gap. Herein we attempt to deal with the long-term global fallout of the war in Iraq-its impact not just on allied relationships today but the world structure in midcentury. After painting on the large canvas and establishing the strategic perspective, we integrate into the analysis a policy-relevant tool that is useful in answering the everyday questions that most vex decision leaders.
The main argument of this article is that the idea of global civil society challenges the concept of international relations. It traces the evolution of the idea of society and argues that civil society has always meant a rule-governed society where rules were based on some form of social contract among citizens. Historically, civil society was always territorially tied and contrasted with international relations between states. What changed in the 1980s and 1990s was the global dimension of civil society—a social contract is being negotiated across borders establishing a set of global rules involving states as well as international institutions. The article ends by asking whether September 11 and the war in Iraq mark a reversion to international relations.
This paper pursues two objectives, one theoretical the other empirical. First, by keeping separate two grand strands in the EU studies literature, one on the design and reform of EU institutions and the other on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, EU scholars are foreclosing the opportunity to address a hitherto unanswered question: When and under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ – as it is perceived by political elites in the member states – carry institutional design implications? Does the ‘democratic deficit’ really matter to political elites, and if this is the case, how does it matter? Will it inform political elites’ preferences and choices for institutional design and change? By conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ as a value of the independent variable, we are guided to ask when and under what conditions it informs decisions for institutional design and reform. This paper will develop a set of propositions linking political elites’ perceptions about a ‘democratic deficit’ and their institutional design preferences. Secondly, to test the plausibility of these propositions, they will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The paper shows that the creation and empowerment of the European Parliament can be accounted for by applying the propositions elaborated in this paper. Hence, a question that has puzzled students of European integration since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – why national governments have successively bestowed the European Parliament (EP) with powers (supervisory, budgetary, and legislative) – can only be answered by exploring the conditions under which the ‘democratic deficit’ – as perceived by political elites – will carry institutional design implications.
This article addresses a crucial issue underlying enlargement and constitutional reform: the ways in which the EU has come to relate to a common European identity. The discussion problematizes the concept of identity in order to distinguish between different types of identities. It proposes that, while a meaningful common European historical identification barely exists, European identities have come to be expressed first and foremost through EU institutions and EU law. The best way for EU institutions, and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, to respond to and promote such identifications are through enhancing distinctive common citizenship rights and strengthening Europe's supranational institutions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.
To Build a Society, you Need a Sense of Belonging
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We have to Reinvent the Idea of Europe
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