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Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 59
Police Foot Pursuits and Officer Safety
Robert J. Kaminski, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology
and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina
Police must frequently pursue suspects who flee to avoid apprehension and
punishment. Although a substantial body of research exists regarding suspect
flight and pursuits with motor vehicles (e.g., Alpert, 1997; Hill, 2002), a search of
the criminal justice literature failed to uncover a single dedicated study of police
foot pursuits. Although the hazards of foot pursuits are not nearly as great as the
hazards associated with high-speed motor vehicle pursuits, the “costs and benefits”
of foot pursuits are unknown, and we have little or no empirical information about
their nature, frequency, or outcomes (Bohrer et al., 2000). To begin to fill this gap
in knowledge, this article presents findings from a study of foot pursuits in the
Richland County, South Carolina, Sheriff’s Department. Although the original study
solicited a broad range of information from deputies regarding their experiences
with foot pursuits, the findings reported in this article are limited to issues of officer
safety.
1
Specifically, findings are presented on the frequency of foot pursuits, the use
of force by and against deputies during foot pursuits, the frequency and severity
of foot-pursuit-related injuries (both intentional and accidental), medical treatment
and work time lost associated with injuries, and other information.
Prior Research
Several studies have examined the relationship between various police activities and
officer risk of being assaulted and injured (Ellis, Choi, & Blaus, 1993; Hirschel, Dean,
& Lumb, 1994; Kaminski & Sorensen, 1995; Uchida, Brooks, & Koper, 1987); however,
none examined the risks of assault or injury associated with foot pursuits. Research
by Kaminski, DiGiovanni, and Downs (2004) found that the odds of police use of force
increased dramatically during arrests that involved pursuits. Although the majority of
pursuits in their study presumably occurred on foot, they did not differentiate between
foot and motor vehicle pursuits. Studies by Brandl (1996) and Brandl and Stroshine
(2003) analyzed incidents in which officers were injured accidentally or intentionally
and the activities in which officers were engaged at the time of injury. They found
that between 12% and 14% of the injury incidents involved officers chasing suspects
on foot and that the vast majority of injures were accidental, but a detailed analysis of
foot pursuits was not provided. As this brief review shows, very little is known about
the nature of the hazards officers face when engaging in foot pursuits.
Data and Methods
The study site for the research was the Richland County, South Carolina, Sheriff’s
Department (RCSD). The RCSD is a full-service agency that employed approximately
475 sworn personnel at the time of the study. The RCSD serves a resident population
of about 200,000 that is 50% white, 46% African American, and about 3% Hispanic.
The racial composition of the agency was 66% white, 31% African American, and
about 3% Hispanic. About 81% of the sworn deputies were male.
The study employed a web-based survey to obtain information retrospectively about
foot pursuits from deputies ranked lieutenant and below (though four captains
60 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
also completed it). The results showed that the survey was accessed 252 times by
deputies from mid-August through October 31. Accessing the survey does not mean
the survey was completed. In 33 cases, few or no questions were answered, probably
because of technical issues or other factors (e.g., a respondent accessed the survey
but decided not to participate or to complete the survey at a later time). Another six
surveys were partially completed, and all or most questions were answered in 213
surveys. Since there were about 370 deputies with the rank of lieutenant or below
at the time of data collection, the study attained about a 60% response rate (59.2%),
which is considered good by social science standards (Babbie, 2005).
The average age of the respondents was 38 years (range = 23 to 63); their average
length of service was 8 years (range = less than a year to 34 years); and 82% were
male. Nearly half of the respondents (49%) held the rank of deputy; about a quarter
(26%) were corporals; 29 (14%) were sergeants; 18 were lieutenants (9%); and 4
were captains.
The questionnaire solicited information for three “time frames.” In the first section
of the questionnaire, deputies were asked about their experiences with foot pursuits
since they began working for the RCSD (through June 31, 2006) and includes estimates
of the total number of foot pursuits, whether deputies were ever injured, etc. These
are variously referred to as career-based, “lifetime,” or “ever” estimates. The second
section solicited information on deputies’ experiences with foot pursuits during the
first six months of 2006. Because recall was less of a concern for this time frame than
for the career-based estimates, this section asked for additional details regarding foot
pursuits. In the third section, the questionnaire asked deputies to provide information
about their most recent foot pursuit that occurred during the first six months of 2006.
The most detail was requested regarding these incidents.
For the purposes of this research, a foot pursuit was defined as any time a law
enforcement officer ran after a suspect who was trying to evade police, regardless
of whether the pursuit lasted a few seconds or a few minutes. This included
deputies running after suspects who fled on foot, on a bicycle, skateboard, scooter,
motorcycle, and so forth. It also included any foot pursuit that occurred following
a motor vehicle pursuit, such as when a suspect jumped out of a car, ran, and was
then chased on foot by a deputy.
Findings
A premise of the research was that engaging in a foot pursuit elevates officer risk
of injury (accidental and/or intentional) and that it is therefore important to obtain
estimates of how often deputies pursue suspects on foot. These estimates are presented
first. Prior research has shown that arrests requiring the application of physical force
by police significantly increases officer risk of injury (Kaminski et al., 2004), and many
studies have shown that a substantial number of officers are injured when assaulted
(Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Brandl, 1996; Brandl & Stroshine, 2003; Durose, Schmitt, &
Langan, 2005; Ellis et al., 1993; Hirschel et al., 1994; Kaminski et al., 2004; Kaminski
& Sorensen, 1995; Smith & Petrocelli, 2002; Uchida et al., 1987; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2006). Thus, there was an interest in this study to determine the frequency
with which deputies used force and were assaulted during foot pursuits. The above
studies have also shown that most on-the-job injuries in policing are relatively minor,
but because previous research has not examined foot pursuit-related injuries in detail,
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 61
we also present data regarding the severity of injuries sustained during foot pursuits,
including workdays lost and days worked in a reduced capacity.
Frequency of Foot Pursuits
Deputies first were asked whether they began working for the RCSD before
January 1, 2006, with 218 (96%) of 228 respondents indicating they had and 10
indicating that they began their employment on January 1 or thereafter. Of those
hired before the first of the year, 191 (88%) reported engaging in one or more foot
pursuits during their careers, and 27 (12%) indicated they had not.
2
As of June 31, 2006, 214 of the responding deputies estimated engaging in 5,783
foot pursuits while working for the RCSD, for an average of 27 pursuits per deputy.
Table 1 shows that about a quarter of the deputies engaged in 0-3 foot pursuits,
another 26% engaged in 4-10 pursuits, 23% engaged in 11-26 pursuits, and 26%
engaged in 27-408 foot pursuits.
Table 1. Number of Foot Pursuits While Employed by the RCSD
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
1 0-3 53 24.8 24.8
2 4-10 56 26.2 50.9
3 11-26 50 23.4 74.3
4 27-408 55 25.7 100.0
Subtotal 214 100.0
Missing 38
Total 252
The number of pursuits engaged in varied substantially by unit assigned at the
time of the study. As displayed in Table 2, deputies assigned to patrol accounted
for the majority of foot pursuits (1,924 or 34% of the total). Twelve responding
deputies from the Narcotics Unit, however, reported the highest average number
of pursuits per deputy (mean = 88). Note, though, that if the one narcotics deputy
reporting the extreme value of 408 foot pursuits is removed, the average for the
Narcotics Unit deputies drops to 59. The Drug Suppression Team reported an
average of 72 pursuits, while the averages for members of the Major Crimes Unit
(mean = 28) and Patrol (mean = 26) are lower and close to the overall mean of 27.
The number of pursuits engaged in by deputies varies by length of employment.
We calculated the average number of pursuits engaged in per year employed by
dividing the number of pursuits by the number of years employed with the RCSD.
This produced estimates ranging from a low of .11 pursuits per year (one deputy
reported one pursuit in 9 years) to a high of 75 pursuits per year (one deputy
reported 149 pursuits over 2 years).
3
On average, deputies reported engaging in
just over four pursuits per year (4.48), while the median number was two pursuits
per year (1.8).
62 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
Table 2. Number of Foot Pursuits by Unit
Unit # Reporting # of Pursuits Min - Max Average Median
Narcotics 12 1,059 2 – 408 88 41
Drug Suppression 5 358 10 – 149 72 50
Major Crimes 28 635 0 – 120 23 13
Patrol 74 1,924 0 – 275 26 10
Notes: Statistics for other units are not presented here due to small numbers of respondents from those
units. The number of pursuits reported by two members of the Drug Suppression Team are likely
undercounts due to an inadvertent “cap” of 99 placed on the field in the survey that asked how many
pursuits were engaged in prior to 2006. This error was detected early and fixed to allow deputies to
report any value. This cap also impacted a deputy form the Warrants Section, one from the Major Crimes
Unit, and one from an “other” nonspecified unit (each of these deputies also reported 99 pursuits). Thus,
the actual number of total estimated pursuits is probably slightly higher than that reported here.
To obtain recent estimates of the incidence of foot pursuits, deputies were asked
how many suspects they chased on foot during the first 6 months of 2006. Of 224
respondents, 79 (35%) reported engaging in 425 foot pursuits during this period for
an average of 1.9 pursuits per deputy (median = 0). Interestingly, the 79 deputies who
engaged in one or more foot pursuits during this time estimated that there were a
total of 456 foot pursuits they could have engaged in but chose not to for safety or other
reasons. Thus, in total, the 79 deputies were presented with about 880 opportunities
for foot pursuits and actually pursued suspects on foot in about half (48%).
Table 3 displays the frequency distribution of the number of pursuits deputies
engaged in during the 6-month period. As can be seen, most of the 224 respondents
(65%) reported engaging in zero pursuits, and just over one-fifth (21%) reported
in engaging in one to three pursuits. Those engaging in many pursuits over the
6-month period tended to be assigned to specialized units. For example, the two
deputies who each reported 50 pursuits were assigned to the Narcotics and Drug
Suppression units, while two other members of the Drug Suppression Team
reported 25 and 20 pursuits. Although members of these units tend to engage in
substantially more foot pursuits than members of other units, one patrol deputy
reported pursuing 25 suspects on foot during the 6-month period.
Use of Force
Information on use of force by and against deputies was solicited for pursuits
occurring during the first half of 2006 and for deputies’ most recent pursuit during that
time frame. For the period January 1 to June 31, 2006, deputies were asked whether or
not one or more of the suspects they chased on foot attacked them without a weapon
(physical force only). Sixty-eight of the 79 deputies (86%) indicated that no suspect
attacked them, while 11 deputies (14%) indicated that they were attacked without
a weapon during one or more pursuits. Specifically, six deputies reported being
attacked during one foot pursuit, two reported being attacked during two pursuits,
one reported being attacked during three, one reported being attacked during five,
and one reported being attacked during 15 foot pursuits. In all, 11 deputies indicated
they were attacked physically by suspects during 33 foot pursuits. Since deputies
estimated they engaged in 425 pursuits during this time frame, assaults on deputies
occurred during 8% of the pursuits. In other words, attacks on deputies occurred
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 63
in 8 of every 100 foot pursuits, or 1 in 13. Attacks with weapons were rarer, with 74
of 79 deputies (94%) indicating no such attacks during the 6-month period. Four
deputies indicated they were attacked with a weapon during one pursuit, and one
deputy reported being attacked with a weapon during two pursuits.
Table 3. Number of Foot Pursuits January 1 – June 31, 2006
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
0 145 64.7 64.7
1 26 11.6 76.3
2 13 5.8 82.1
3 9 4.0 86.2
4 5 2.2 88.4
5 9 4.0 92.4
6 1 .4 92.9
7 2 .9 93.8
8 2 .9 94.6
10 6 2.7 97.3
15 1 .4 97.8
20 1 .4 98.2
25 2 .9 99.1
50 2 .9 100.0
Subtotal 224 100.0
Missing 28
Total 252
Because police are authorized to use force to subdue actively resistive suspects, it is not
surprising that the rate of force used by deputies was substantially higher than that
used by suspects. Regarding force used by deputies, 50 (63%) indicated that they used
only physical force (no weapon) to apprehend fleeing suspects during 242 pursuits.
Thus, deputies used physical force in 57 of every 100 foot pursuits (57%), or about 1 in
2 [(242/425)*100]. Fifty-six deputies (71%) reported threatening the use of a weapon
during 227 foot pursuits (53 of every 100 or about 1 in 2), and 27 deputies (34%) said
they actually used a weapon during 59 pursuits (14 of every 100 or about 1 in 7).
When asked about their most recent pursuit that occurred during the period of
January to June of 2006, 27 of 75 deputies (36%) reported that a suspect had resisted
or threatened them (excluding the suspect’s initial flight as a form of resistance). As
shown in Table 4, when asked what the highest level of physical resistance presented
was, deputies indicated that suspects most often pulled away or tried to escape a
second time (12 suspects or 44%). Another eight suspects (30%) resisted aggressively
by striking deputies with their hands, fists, or feet or by biting them. Another four
(15%) stiffened up or refused to move, and one suspect pushed, pulled, or slapped the
deputies’ hands away. In two pursuits, deputies reported that suspects used a weapon
(a firearm) against them or a partner.
Note that the percentage of deputies reporting being attacked without a weapon
during the 6-month period (14%) is substantially lower than the 36% indicating
suspects threatened or resisted during their most recent foot pursuit. If in Table 4
we only count the nine pursuits during which suspects assaulted deputies (pushed/
64 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
pulled/slapped hands away or punched/kicked/hit/bit), however, we obtain a
value similar to that reported for the 6-month period [(9 / 75) * 100 = 12%].
Table 4. Highest Level of Force Used by Suspects During Most Recent Pursuit
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
1 Refused to move, stiffened up
4 14.8 14.8
2 Pulled away, ran away again
12 44.4 59.3
3 Pushed, pulled, slapped hands
away
1 3.7 63.0
4 Punched, kicked, hit, bit
8 29.6 92.6
6 Used weapon
2 7.4 100.0
Subtotal 27 100.0
8 Not applicable
193
Missing 32
Subtotal 225
Total 252
Thirty-five of the 75 deputies (47%) indicated that they used some type of force to
apprehend fleeing suspects (excluding verbal commands). This estimate is lower
than the 63% reported earlier regarding deputies use of physical force during the
full 6-month period. This may be due to a variety of factors, including differences in
recall regarding all pursuits during the 6-month period versus (presumably better)
recall regarding the most recent pursuit and/or a chance factor, meaning that simply
by chance many of the most recent pursuits did not involve force.
Table 5 displays the highest level of force used by deputies to apprehend and
subdue fleeing suspects during their most recent pursuit. One deputy reported
discharging a firearm; two released a K-9; eight (23%) discharged a Taser (dart
mode); one used pepper spray (OC); and two used strikes with hands, fists, or feet.
Most deputies, however, used some type of soft hands-on tactic, such as holding,
pushing, joint locks, PPCT, or take downs (60%).
Table 5. Highest Level of Force Used by Deputies During Most Recent Pursuit
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
1 Firm grip, holding, handcuffing
7 2.8 20.0
2 Push, shove, trip
7 2.8 40.0
3 Joint locks, PPCT, take down,
wrestling, etc.
7 2.8 60.0
4 OC
1 0.4 62.9
5 Strikes with hands, fist, feet
2 0.8 68.6
8 Taser – dart
8 3.2 91.4
10 Dog – release
2 0.8 97.1
12 Firearm discharge
1 0.4 100.0
Subtotal 35 13.9
88 Not applicable
185 73.4
Missing 32 12.7
Subtotal 217 86.1
Total 252 100.0
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 65
Because foot pursuits involve suspects actively running away from deputies, there was
an interest in determining whether or not deputies used some type of force against
suspects while suspects were actively running away and whether or not the tactic was
successful in stopping the suspect. Fifteen of the 35 deputies who used force (43%)
indicated that they used some type of force against suspects while the suspects were
actively running, with the vast majority reporting the tactic was successful (93%).
Deputies also were asked whether or not a suspect tried to take their firearm away
during the pursuit, with three deputies indicating this was the case. Fortunately,
deputies reported that none of the suspects were successful. Although the survey
didn’t ask whether suspects attempted to take other weapons from deputies, it is
important to consider attempts by suspects to take deputies’ Tasers or OC canisters
in future research, as these can be used to incapacitate officers, potentially making
it easy to acquire a deputy’s firearm.
Although based on relatively few incidents and caution must be used in generalizing
the results, the data suggests that deputies can expect resistance or force to be used
against them in about one of every three foot pursuits, while deputies can be expected
to use force to apprehend suspects fleeing on foot in about one of every two pursuits.
While the level of the force used by and against deputies generally was on the low end
of the use-of-force continuum, nearly 40% of the pursuits involved serious levels of
force used against deputies by fleeing suspects, including strikes with fists or feet and
use of weapons. Similarly, deputies used relatively high levels of force in 40% of the
pursuits, including strikes with fists or feet, the use of Tasers, K-9s, OC, or firearms.
Injuries
Deputies were asked about accidental injuries and injuries intentionally caused
by suspects that occurred in the course of pursuing suspects on foot. Results
regarding intentional injuries sustained since working for the RCSD are presented
first, followed by estimates for the first 6 months of 2006. Information on injuries
sustained during deputies’ most recent pursuits during the 6-month period is then
presented. Results regarding accidental injuries are presented after that.
Intentional Injuries Since Deputies Began Working for the RCSD
Sixty-two of 187 responding deputies (33%) reported being injured intentionally by
suspects during at least one foot pursuit since they began working for the RCSD.
When asked about the most serious treatment ever received for an intentionally
caused injury (see Table 6), two deputies reported receiving injuries serious enough
to require one or more overnight stays in a hospital (3.2%).
One of these deputies reported spending two nights in a hospital, while the other
reported spending one night in a hospital. Another 26 deputies (42%) indicated
they were treated by a physician. Thirteen (21%) received less severe injuries
and were treated at the scene, while 17 (27%) only required self-treatment. Four
deputies (7%) indicated they received minor injuries that didn’t require any
treatment. Overall, nearly half of the deputies (45%) reported receiving injuries
serious enough to require treatment by a physician.
66 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
Table 6. Most Serious Treatment Received for Intentional Injury, Career-
Based Estimates
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
1 No treatment needed 4 6.5 6.5
2 Self-treatment only 17 27.4 33.9
3 Treated at the scene 13 21.0 54.8
4 Treated by medical doctor 26 41.9 96.8
5 1+ overnight stays at hospital 2 3.2 100.0
Subtotal 62 100.0
8 Not applicable 166
Missing 24
Subtotal 190
Total 252
Deputies who reported being injured intentionally during a foot pursuit were then
asked whether any injury caused them to miss a day or more of work and whether
any injury caused them to work in a reduced capacity for a day or more. Fifty-
eight of the 62 injured deputies responded to these questions. Of these, 18 (31%)
indicated that they missed a day or more of work due to an intentionally caused
injury, and 11 (19%) reported that they worked in a reduced capacity.
In Table 7, we see that two intentionally injured deputies reported being out of
work a total of 7 months, with one out for 5 months and two out for one month
each. Two deputies missed 6 weeks of work, with one out for 2 weeks and one out
for 4 weeks. Twelve deputies reported being out of work a total of 21 days. Five
missed one day of work, another five missed 2 days of work, and two others each
reported missing 3 days of work.
Table 7. Intentional Injuries Causing Deputies to Miss Work and/or to Work
in a Reduced Capacity, Career-Based Estimates
Missed Work Worked in Reduced Capacity
Total Time # Deputies Mean Total Time # Deputies Mean
Months 7 2 3.50 10 3 3.33
Weeks 6 2 3.00 7 2 3.50
Days 21 12 1.75 9 3 3.00
Sum (days) 273 16 17.06 358 8 44.75
Notes: Some deputies may have both missed work and worked in a reduced capacity, while others
may have only missed work or only worked in a reduced capacity. When calculating the total number
of days, a 30-day month and 7-day week were assumed.
Three deputies reported they worked in a reduced capacity for a total of 10 months.
One deputy did so for 6 months, one for 3 months, and one for one month. Two
deputies reported working in a reduced capacity for a total of 7 weeks, with one
doing so for 4 weeks and the other for 3 weeks. Three deputies worked in a reduced
capacity for 9 days, with one doing so for 5 days and two for 2 days each. (One
injured deputy didn’t specify how long he or she worked in a reduced capacity.)
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 67
As displayed in the bottom row of Table 7, 16 deputies missed approximately
273 days of work due to intentional injuries sustained during their tenure with
the RCSD, for an average of 17 days lost per deputy. Eight deputies worked in a
reduced capacity for approximately 358 days, for an average of 45 days each.
Intentional Injuries During First 6 Months of 2006
Of the 79 deputies involved in foot pursuits during the 6-month period, eight (10%)
reported being injured in one or more pursuits. Six were not injured seriously, with four
being treated at the scene and two only requiring self treatment or no treatment. Two
deputies received more serious injuries that required treatment by a medical doctor,
but no overnight stay at a hospital. Of those injured, only one reported missing 2 days
of work due to injury, and no deputies reported having to work in a reduced capacity.
If we assume the risk of injury among deputies is constant throughout the year, the
annual risk for pursuit-related intentional injuries among those sampled would be
20 per 100 deputies, which is substantially lower than the “lifetime” risk of 33 per
100 deputies reported above.
If deputies were involved in more than one foot pursuit during the 6-month
time frame, they also were asked to provide information about any intentional
injuries received during their most recent foot pursuit. No deputies reported being
intentionally injured during their most recent foot pursuit.
Accidental Injuries Since Deputies Began Working for RCSD
Of 186 deputies ever engaging in a foot pursuit, 80 (43%) reported being injured
accidentally during at least one pursuit since they began working for the RCSD. As
displayed in Table 8, 34 (43%) of the injured self-treated, 16 (20%) were treated at
the scene, and two didn’t require any treatment. Thirty-five percent of the deputies,
however, were injured more seriously, with 24 (30%) treated by a physician and 4
(5%) requiring one or more overnight stays at a hospital. Three of these deputies
each reported spending 2 days at a hospital or medical facility, and one reported
spending one day.
Of the 80 injured deputies, 76 provided information on how injuries impacted
their work. Nineteen deputies (25%) reported missing a day or more of work due
to their injuries. As displayed in Table 9, 12 deputies missed a total of 22 days, with
one missing 6 days, six each missing 2 days, and four each missing one day. Three
other deputies reported missing a total of 12 weeks of work, with one missing 8
weeks and two each missing 2 weeks. Five deputies reported missing a total of
13 months of work, with one missing 5 months, one missing 3 months, two each
missing 2 months, and one missing one month of work.
Eighteen (24%) of the 76 injured deputies reported having to work in a reduced capacity
as a result of an accidental injury. Five deputies worked in a reduced capacity for a total
of 14 months, with one doing so for 5 months, two each for 3 months, one for 2 months,
and one for one month. Eight deputies worked in a reduced capacity for a total of
19 weeks, with one deputy doing so 4 weeks, two each for 3 weeks, four each for 2
weeks, and one working in a reduced capacity for one week. Five deputies worked in a
68 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
reduced capacity for a total of 22 days, with one deputy working in a reduced capacity
for 11 days, one for 7, one for 2, and two deputies each doing so for one day.
Table 8. Most Serious Treatment Received for Accidental Injury, Career-
Based Estimates
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
1 No treatment needed 2 2.5 2.5
2 Self-treatment only 34 42.5 45.0
3 Treated at the scene 16 20.0 65.0
4 Treated by medical doctor 24 30.0 95.0
5 1+ overnight stays at hospital 4 5.0 100.0
Subtotal 80 100.0
8 Not applicable 147
Missing 25
Subtotal 172
Total 252
Table 9. Accidental Injuries Causing Deputies to Miss Work and/or to Work
in a Reduced Capacity, Career Estimates
Missed Work Worked in Reduced Capacity
Total Time # Deputies Mean Total Time # Deputies Mean
Months 13 5 2.60 14 5 2.80
Weeks 12 3 4.00 19 8 2.38
Days 22 12 1.83 22 5 4.40
Sum (days) 496 20 24.80 575 18 31.94
Notes: Some deputies may have both missed work and worked in a reduced capacity, while others
may have only missed work or only worked in a reduced capacity. When calculating the total number
of days, a 30-day month and 7-day week were assumed.
As shown in the bottom row of Table 9, 20 deputies missed approximately 496 days
of work due to accidental injuries sustained during their careers with the RCSD,
with an average of 25 days lost per deputy. Eighteen deputies worked in a reduced
capacity for 575 days during this time, for an average of 32 days per deputy.
A comparison of Table 9 to Table 7 indicates that although a substantial number of
workdays are lost due to intentional injuries (N = 273), accidental injuries account
for an even greater number of workdays lost (N = 496). If we combine the totals
for each, about 65% of the days lost are due to accidental injuries, or 1.82 workdays
lost due to accidental injuries for each workday lost due to intentional injuries.
A similar pattern is observed for injuries causing deputies to work in a reduced
capacity. Specifically, intentional injures caused deputies to work in a reduced
capacity for 358 days; whereas, accidental injuries caused deputies to work in a
reduced capacity for 575 days, or 62% of the total (or 1.61 workdays lost due to
accidental injuries for each workday lost due to intentional injuries).
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 69
Accidental Injuries During First 6 Months of 2006
Of the 79 deputies involved in foot pursuits during the 6-month period, 11 (14%)
reported being injured accidentally in one or more pursuits. Eight self-treated their
injuries, two were treated at the scene, and one received treatment by a medical
doctor. Only one deputy reported missing a day or more of work due to an
accidental injury during the 6-month period (two days), and no deputies reported
having to work in a reduced capacity during that time.
If we assume the risk of injury among deputies is constant over the year, the annual
risk for pursuit-related accidental injuries among those sampled would be 28 per 100
deputies, which is substantially lower than the “lifetime” risk of 43 per 100 deputies
reported earlier. It is interesting to note, however, that the deputies’ estimates of
injury risk were greater for accidental than for intentional injuries regardless of
whether career estimates or estimates for the first 6 months of 2006 are examined.
If deputies were involved in more than one foot pursuit during the 6-month time frame,
they were asked to provide information about any accidental injuries received during
their most recent foot pursuit. Only one deputy reported being injured accidentally
during the most recent pursuit. The injury was minor and didn’t require treatment.
In summary, the “lifetime” risk of being injured during foot a pursuit appears to be high,
with one-third of the responding deputies reporting having been injured intentionally
at least once and 43% reporting having been injured accidentally at least once.
Furthermore, a substantial proportion of the injuries were nontrivial, with between
40% and 45% of the deputies indicating they required treatment by a medical doctor.
Intentionally injured deputies estimated missing 273 days of work and working in a
reduced capacity for 358 days, while deputies sustaining accidental injuries reported
missing 496 days of work and working in a reduced capacity for 575 days. Although
the development of training or policy for injury reduction should address injuries from
any cause, these results suggest it may be particularly important to examine the causes
and nature of accidental injuries as they appear to present a greater burden in terms
of cost. Extrapolating from the 6-month injury estimates, the annual risk of injury and
associated costs were lower than the lifetime risks but still substantial.
Discussion
Given the lack of empirical information about the nature of police foot pursuits
and associated hazards, this study used a web-based questionnaire to survey
deputies retrospectively about their experiences chasing fleeing suspects on foot.
In terms of officer safety, the results were revealing, indicating that during their
careers deputies will on average engage in many foot pursuits. The results also
showed, however, that deputies in specialized units (e.g., narcotics) can expect to
engage in foot pursuits at a substantially higher rate.
Although assaults on officers during foot pursuits appear to be relatively rare,
occurring in about 8% of the pursuits in this study (career-based estimates), this
rate of assault appears to be substantially higher than the rate of assault on police
generally. For instance, Kaminski et al. (2004) found that officers were assaulted in
only 2% of arrests in one large southeastern municipal police department. Thus,
compared to arrests generally, foot pursuits appear to be a higher risk activity.
70 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3)
The RCSD data also showed that suspects resisted arrest (excluding the initial flight)
or threatened officers at a high rate (36% of pursuits). Recent research found that
the likelihood of officer injury also increases significantly with increases in levels of
suspect resistance (Smith, Kaminski, Rojek, Alpert, & Mathis, in press). Thus, although
assaults present a greater risk to police, resistance on the part of suspects during foot
pursuits should not be discounted as an element affecting officer safety.
The use of force to apprehend fleeing suspects also was common, with physical
force used by deputies in about 1 of every 2 foot pursuits and a weapon used in
about 1 of every 7 pursuits. Since the very act of running away to avoid capture
represents active resistance on the part of suspects, high rates of use of force by
police to apprehend them is to be expected. That said, this represents a much higher
rate of use of force than is used in making arrests generally (Adams, 1999; Kaminski
et al., 2004), again indicating that foot pursuits represent a substantial risk to police
as use of force also is a strong correlate of officer injury (Kaminski et al., 2004).
Although statistics on suspect resistance and the use of force by and against deputies
may be useful indicators of the potential hazards associated with foot pursuits,
injury rates are more useful measures of risk. Regarding previous research, several
studies examined rates of officer injury using calls for service in the denominator.
These studies found the rate to be low—along the order of 4.6 to 7.9 injuries per
10,000 calls for service (Ellis et al., 1993; Hirschel et al., 1994; Uchida et al., 1987).
The choice of denominator, of course, substantially affects the estimates obtained.
Using arrests in the denominator, Kaminski et al. (2004) found that .89 officers were
injured for every 100 arrests; whereas, studies that used assaults in the denominator
found the rate of injury to be between 24 and 48 per 100 assaults (Hirschel et al.,
1994; Kaminski et al., 2004; Uchida et al., 1987; U.S. Department of Justice, 2006).
Precise estimates of the injury rate using the number of pursuits in the denominator
are not possible using the RCSD data,
4
but if we assume that the deputies who
reported being injured one or more times during the first 6 months of 2006 were
injured only once, the calculated rate of injury is 1.88 per 100 pursuits [(8/425)*100].
While this indicates the risk of injury is not nearly as great as when police are
assaulted, the rate of injury is substantially higher than the rate associated with
arrests generally (Kaminski et al., 2004).
Even given that relatively few officers are injured (or injured seriously) while engaging
in foot pursuits, the “costs” of the injuries that are sustained to agencies appear to
be high. In the RCSD, the data indicates that one-third of the deputies were injured
intentionally at least once, and 43% were injured accidentally at least once during
their tenure. Between 40% and 45% of the deputies indicated their injuries required
treatment by a medical doctor. Furthermore, deputies estimated missing 848 days of
work and working in a reduced capacity for 933 days due to pursuit-related injuries,
with accidental injuries accounting for greater proportions of both.
In conclusion, foot pursuits appear to be more hazardous than arrests generally,
with injuries sustained during foot pursuits accounting for substantial numbers
of workdays lost and employees having to work in a reduced capacity. Although
further research in other law enforcement agencies is needed to corroborate these
findings, the findings reported here suggest that law enforcement administrators
may want to revisit existing foot pursuit training protocols and to consider
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(3) 71
developing written policies to manage foot pursuits, an apparently growing
trend in policing (e.g., Bohrer, Davis, & Garrity, 2000).
5
Substantial percentages
of deputies in this study agreed that training for foot pursuits is important, both
at the academy and on the job (81% and 78%, respectively), and 63% agreed that
departments should have written guidelines regarding foot pursuits.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Sheriff Leon Lott and the deputies in the Richland County
Sheriff’s Department for their participation in this research.
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Endnotes
1
The full report is available from the author upon request.
2
The ten deputies hired after January 1 are excluded from the career-based
calculations. Seven of these deputies reported engaging in no foot pursuits
since January 1; one reported engaging in one foot pursuit; and two reported
engaging in five each.
3
Twenty-two deputies (11%) reported zero pursuits.
4
This is because deputies were asked whether or not they were injured one or more
times during the 6-month period, rather than how many times they were injured in
separate pursuit incidents. It is probably reasonable to assume, however, that most
deputies were injured only once during this time frame. To the extent deputies
were injured more than once, the estimated rate of injury is conservative.
5
The International Association of Chiefs of Police developed a model policy for
foot pursuit in 2003 (see www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/modpolalpha.htm).
Robert J. Kaminski, PhD, is an assistant professor with the Department of
Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. Dr.
Kaminski’s research interests include public perceptions of the police, police
use of force, violence against the police, less-lethal technology, crime mapping
and spatial analysis, and applied quantitative methods.
