Article

Perceptions of Danger: The China threat theory

Taylor & Francis
Journal of Contemporary China
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Abstract

The People's Republic of China witnessed unprecedented growth at the end of the twentieth century and the manner in which it will choose to use its consequent power in the twenty-first century has become a hotly debated topic in foreign policy circles. Some have chosen to interpret China's emergence as an economic and aspiring military superpower as a threat to the national interests of the United States and Asian-Pacific security. This threat has been categorized as ideological, economic, and strategic. This essay explores the China threat theory through an in-depth analysis of the arguments of 'anti-China hands' as outlined in a variety of right wing publications.

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... 5 Two coding processes were undertaken; the first one examined how many of these occurrences indicated China as a threat divided by the total number of China referenced in the text, thus calculating the percentage ratio. Subsequently, these threat references were examined using a deductive approach by using the pre-designed codebook based on sources of threat as categorised by Broomfield's [13] and Walt's [113] primary "sources" of threat: capability, identity and intentions with the addition of geography. Thus, each sentence that was referring to China as a threat was coded according to the four sources of threat as identified in this study's codebook, and the number of occurrences in each category was measured. ...
... This code refers to "increased relative capabilities" that allow "a rising great power to exert more control" (p. 274) Broomfield [13] and ultimately, change the distribution of power in the system. Accordingly, mentions of China that refer to its material capacity were coded as emanating from capabilities such as military build-ups, PLA's modernisation, defence expenditures, weapons arsenals, economy, and technological advancements. ...
... In the former, the US recognised that China has the "economic power to coerce countries" (p.23), and China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit (p.3). 13 This greater focus on identity, as expressed in the document, there are "profound differences with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government, those differences are between governments and systems" (p.25), also indicates a greater emphasis on the importance of democratic values in US foreign policy, in which the United States plays an active global role in promoting human rights and defending democracy, explicitly highlighting the two countries' ideological differences. 14 Besides, as Biden has emphasized, US-China relations also need to be seen as a "battle between the utility of democracies in the twenty-first century and autocracies." ...
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China's expanding role in global affairs, along with its economic, military, and technological capabilities, have increased concerns about it being a potential threat to U.S. hegemony. Consequently, since 2017, threat perceptions have heightened, with China increasingly viewed as a strategic competitor and rival. While the"China threat theory"is widely analyzed, it is often approached from a U.S.-centric perspective, neglecting the viewpoints of other key actors. This study aims to address that gap by examining also the threat perceptions of four US allies—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—under the Five Eyes intelligence partnership. By analyzing their national security documents from 2008 to 2024, the study seeks to identify the presence, frequency, and sources of perceived threats. The findings indicate that although China as a threat is a multifaceted concern in issues such as identity, intentions, and geography, these countries primarily perceive China’s capabilities as the main source of threat. Finally, all states have elevated their threat perceptions of China, justifying decisions to counter its power in the Indo-Pacific as the main theatre of competition and to reinforce multilateral and bilateral alliances against Beijing.
... Na medida em que a China se desenvolveu e de certa forma desafiou a hegemonia estadunidense a partir do seu robusto crescimento econômico, as narrativas sobre esse "agente externo" foram adquirindo nuances mais extremas. A teoria da ameaça chinesa (Broomfield, 2003), bastante acionada durante o século XXI, traduz os "perigos" que a ascensão da China apresenta para o mundo tal qual conhecemos, conforme exploraremos na seção a seguir. Assim, ela passa a ser vista, necessariamente, como um agente disruptor do sistema internacional que nos conduzirá a uma forma de vida indesejável. ...
... Said (2007) reside no fato de que, no caso da China, esse orientalismo não é sustentado a partir da procura das distinções entre ocidentais e orientais, mas sim na ideia de que esse "oriental" está se tornando cada vez mais próximo de um "ocidental", principalmente dentro de uma perspectiva socioeconômica. O movimento rumo à mesmice -que Dessa vez, não se trata de representá-la necessariamente como um inimigo, mas, sim, em percebê-la como um inimigo em potencial (Broomfield, 2003). Essa construção da China como um "outro", um inimigo potencial, reflete a relação de interdependência cultivada por diversos governos dos EUA, ao mesmo tempo em que funciona para justi- Na perspectiva europeia da época, a superioridade necessária poderia ser alcançada a partir do momento em que os chineses/orientais adotassem a cultura ocidental. ...
... A teoria da ameaça chinesa assumiu diversas formas e pode ser categorizada como uma reflexão ideológica, econômica e militar, cujo pressuposto que sustenta essas noções é de que a China utilizará o seu crescente poder para desestabilizar a segurança regional (Broomfield, 2003). Nisso, a vertente anti-China aponta "[...] o nacionalismo crescente e propaganda anti-América como evidência da ameaça ideológica que a última nação comunista poderosa remanescente apresenta ao resto do mundo" 6 (Broomfield, 2003, p. 266, tradução nossa). ...
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A pujança econômica da China é um dado incontestável. A despeito de seu crescimento, o imaginário sobre o país permanece vinculado a uma perspectiva ocidental que parece não se atualizar. Dito isso, questionamos como a China é representada no audiovisual ocidental, e a hipótese é de que a nação é apresentada de maneira orientalista pelas lentes ocidentais e pouco interessada em sua realidade sociocultural. Procuramos, portanto, entrelaçar alguns casos notáveis da representação sobre a China no audiovisual ocidental com as dinâmicas geopolíticas de sua época.
... Goodman (2017) briefly defines 'China threat' as "the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese" (p.2). For researchers, 'China threat' is a theory (Arif, 2021;Aukia, 2017;Broomfield, 2003;Chansoria, 2011;Christensen, 2006;Ding & Huang, 2011;Hsu, 2009;Jain, 2019;Kim, 2016;Kristensen, 2014;Lai, 2021;Larson, 2015;Larson, & Shevchenko, 2010;Lee, 2016Lee, , 2010Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Liu, 2020;Lu, 2011;Okuda, 2016;Oren, 2019;Saalman, 2011aSaalman, , 2011bSun, 2015;Turner, 2013;Wang, 2010;Wang & Shoemaker, 2011;Wei-cheng, 2015;Yang & Liu, 2012;Yeremia, 2020;Zhang, 2015 October), a perception (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Chengqiu, 2020;Ding & Huang, 2011;Fitriani, 2018;Gao, 2021;Ikegami, 2009;Jung & Jeong, 2016;Larson, 2015;Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Machida, 2010;Mirilovic & Kim, 2016;Okuda, 2016;Peng, 2009;Saalman, 2011;Sun, 2015;Wang, 2021;Wei-cheng, 2015;Zaffran & Erwes, 2015), an argument (Chu, 1994;Foot, 2009;Liao, 2012;Machida, 2010;Tsai & Liu, 2019;Yang & Liu, 2012;Zhu & Lu, 2013), a discourse (Gao, 2021;Goh, 2005;Gries, 2006;Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010;Johnson, 2018;Kim, 2021;Pintado Lobato, 2015), a thesis (Kim, 2016;Ling, 2013;Machida, 2010;Pintado Lobato, 2015;Zhai, 2019), an issue (Broomfield, 2003;Oren, 2019;Yeoh, 2019), a theme (Lee, 2010;Song, 2015), a hypothesis (Kim, 2016, 2021), a notion (Jerden, 2014; Liao, 2012), a charge (Liao, 2019;Shih, 2005), a narrative (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Oren, 2019) a debate (Yeoh, 2019;Zhang, 2001), an image (Szilágyi, 2015;Xiang, 2013), a coverage (Aukia, 2017;Yang & Liu, 2012) a topic (Song, 2015), a school of thought (Broomfield, 2003), a public discourse (Goodman, 2017 (Brittingham, 2007) a mentality (Goh, 2005), and an atmosphere (Tsai & Liu, 2019). ...
... Goodman (2017) briefly defines 'China threat' as "the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese" (p.2). For researchers, 'China threat' is a theory (Arif, 2021;Aukia, 2017;Broomfield, 2003;Chansoria, 2011;Christensen, 2006;Ding & Huang, 2011;Hsu, 2009;Jain, 2019;Kim, 2016;Kristensen, 2014;Lai, 2021;Larson, 2015;Larson, & Shevchenko, 2010;Lee, 2016Lee, , 2010Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Liu, 2020;Lu, 2011;Okuda, 2016;Oren, 2019;Saalman, 2011aSaalman, , 2011bSun, 2015;Turner, 2013;Wang, 2010;Wang & Shoemaker, 2011;Wei-cheng, 2015;Yang & Liu, 2012;Yeremia, 2020;Zhang, 2015 October), a perception (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Chengqiu, 2020;Ding & Huang, 2011;Fitriani, 2018;Gao, 2021;Ikegami, 2009;Jung & Jeong, 2016;Larson, 2015;Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Machida, 2010;Mirilovic & Kim, 2016;Okuda, 2016;Peng, 2009;Saalman, 2011;Sun, 2015;Wang, 2021;Wei-cheng, 2015;Zaffran & Erwes, 2015), an argument (Chu, 1994;Foot, 2009;Liao, 2012;Machida, 2010;Tsai & Liu, 2019;Yang & Liu, 2012;Zhu & Lu, 2013), a discourse (Gao, 2021;Goh, 2005;Gries, 2006;Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010;Johnson, 2018;Kim, 2021;Pintado Lobato, 2015), a thesis (Kim, 2016;Ling, 2013;Machida, 2010;Pintado Lobato, 2015;Zhai, 2019), an issue (Broomfield, 2003;Oren, 2019;Yeoh, 2019), a theme (Lee, 2010;Song, 2015), a hypothesis (Kim, 2016, 2021), a notion (Jerden, 2014; Liao, 2012), a charge (Liao, 2019;Shih, 2005), a narrative (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Oren, 2019) a debate (Yeoh, 2019;Zhang, 2001), an image (Szilágyi, 2015;Xiang, 2013), a coverage (Aukia, 2017;Yang & Liu, 2012) a topic (Song, 2015), a school of thought (Broomfield, 2003), a public discourse (Goodman, 2017 (Brittingham, 2007) a mentality (Goh, 2005), and an atmosphere (Tsai & Liu, 2019). ...
... Goodman (2017) briefly defines 'China threat' as "the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese" (p.2). For researchers, 'China threat' is a theory (Arif, 2021;Aukia, 2017;Broomfield, 2003;Chansoria, 2011;Christensen, 2006;Ding & Huang, 2011;Hsu, 2009;Jain, 2019;Kim, 2016;Kristensen, 2014;Lai, 2021;Larson, 2015;Larson, & Shevchenko, 2010;Lee, 2016Lee, , 2010Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Liu, 2020;Lu, 2011;Okuda, 2016;Oren, 2019;Saalman, 2011aSaalman, , 2011bSun, 2015;Turner, 2013;Wang, 2010;Wang & Shoemaker, 2011;Wei-cheng, 2015;Yang & Liu, 2012;Yeremia, 2020;Zhang, 2015 October), a perception (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Chengqiu, 2020;Ding & Huang, 2011;Fitriani, 2018;Gao, 2021;Ikegami, 2009;Jung & Jeong, 2016;Larson, 2015;Liao, 2012;Liff & Ikenberry, 2014;Machida, 2010;Mirilovic & Kim, 2016;Okuda, 2016;Peng, 2009;Saalman, 2011;Sun, 2015;Wang, 2021;Wei-cheng, 2015;Zaffran & Erwes, 2015), an argument (Chu, 1994;Foot, 2009;Liao, 2012;Machida, 2010;Tsai & Liu, 2019;Yang & Liu, 2012;Zhu & Lu, 2013), a discourse (Gao, 2021;Goh, 2005;Gries, 2006;Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010;Johnson, 2018;Kim, 2021;Pintado Lobato, 2015), a thesis (Kim, 2016;Ling, 2013;Machida, 2010;Pintado Lobato, 2015;Zhai, 2019), an issue (Broomfield, 2003;Oren, 2019;Yeoh, 2019), a theme (Lee, 2010;Song, 2015), a hypothesis (Kim, 2016, 2021), a notion (Jerden, 2014; Liao, 2012), a charge (Liao, 2019;Shih, 2005), a narrative (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020;Oren, 2019) a debate (Yeoh, 2019;Zhang, 2001), an image (Szilágyi, 2015;Xiang, 2013), a coverage (Aukia, 2017;Yang & Liu, 2012) a topic (Song, 2015), a school of thought (Broomfield, 2003), a public discourse (Goodman, 2017 (Brittingham, 2007) a mentality (Goh, 2005), and an atmosphere (Tsai & Liu, 2019). ...
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This study aims to critically analyze the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey during his tenure while concentrating on the challenges and shortcomings of democracy. It will focus on various dimensions, including political restrictions, limitations on freedom of expression, one-party rule, electoral systems, socio-cultural factors as well as economic policies so as to offer a detailed examination of the complex dynamics which shaped the democratic landscape of the mentioned era. Studying the mentioned dimensions is expected to uncover the factors which led to the inadequacy of democracy during the İnönü era and eventually to evaluate their implications for Turkey's democratic development, which on the one hand encompasses the succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People's Party's (CHP) dominant role and on the other hand emphasizes the consolidation of power and the challenges to political representation. Particularly, the analysis of electoral practices can provide insights into the limitations of democratic processes, such as restrictive laws, voter intimidation, and limited political pluralism. Moreover, the study will examine the impact of these challenges on democratic decision-making which would include but not limited to the centralization of power, the marginalization of opposition voices, and the implications for citizen participation. The study will also try to evaluate the restrictions on freedom of speech and the media landscape, discussing the limitations imposed on critical voices, media control, and its consequences on public discourse and democratic participation. In addition to these, the study is expected to assess the socio-cultural dynamics which would focus on İnönü's modernization policies and their impact on social transformation. The study will explore the tensions between traditional values and cultural constraints, too. This will be carried out by highlighting the challenges faced by less represented groups and the inclusiveness of the political system. The economic policies of the İnönü era, including the economic vision and development strategies will be scrutinized, with particular attention given to the socio-economic disparities and their effects on democratic participation as well as political power dynamics. Furthermore, the study will attempt to examine the international relations and foreign policy approach of İsmet İnönü. This examination will be through the consideration of the implications for democracy and Turkey's international standing. The influence of external factors on democracy in Turkey during the mentioned timeline will also be assessed. Finally, the study will be concluded with the evaluation of the legacy of the İnönü’s era, weighing the democratic gains and losses while drawing lessons for Turkey's democratic development and considering the implications for the post-İnönü era. This comprehensive analysis is expected to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the İsmet İnönü era's impact on democracy in Turkey which could highlight the complexities and challenges faced during his tenure. The critical examination of the various dimensions, the study will provide valuable insights for scholars, policymakers as well as for any expert who is interested in Turkey's democratic history and in the ongoing democratic journey.
... 4 In separate studies, Kent Ono and Joy Jang Jiao (2008) and Susan Brownell (2012) provided a comprehensive sociological analysis of how human rights and related phenomena were (mis)used against China in the context of the 2008 Summer Olympics. 5 For instance, relaxation of relations with China during the seventies (Goh 2005;Komine 2016) and certain issues connected to China's internal assumptions about its foreign policy behaviour, few of them devote the stream of analysis to the study of the perception of others (Solomon 1981;Chen and Chen 1992;Broomfield 2003;Ono and Jiao 2008), and this study falls into such a category. The analysis proceeds as follows: the results of the analysis will be presented after the theoretical premises and methodological apparatus that will be used as a research model in this study. ...
... Rather, if the QUAD was considered a project to legitimise an attempt to "defeat the communist menace" (The White House 2017) in the eyes of the public and political leaders of Western countries, then the AUKUS is nothing more than the pure legitimization of such efforts and the result of a posttruth period. The academic community (Chen and Chen 1992;Broomfield 2003;Clark 2011;Drezner 2019) generally agrees that, in modern circumstances, great powers' (and superpowers') foreign policy cannot be conducted on rational grounds but rather on deceptions, creating false threats, securitizing issues that do not deserve it, and permanently creating a "security theatre" atmosphere in (south) Eastern Asia, labelling it as "the US' Indo-Pacific policy". 21 This attempt to restrict China in the manner of the Cold War will almost certainly fail, as the ways in which the international system functions have substantially altered since the Cold War. ...
... All four cases show that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China's security and defence policies are deeply anchored in what the US hawks are supposed to monitor, which is why attempts to create a coherent "theory of perception of China" (Broomfield 2003) are not entirely futile. Based on the neuralgic areas, it is feasible to infer the existence of numerous possibilities that will be reflected in US foreign policy. ...
Article
This article presents the findings of a study that examined the Pentagon’s perception of China’ssecurity and military affairs. Its goals are to explain the major trends and projections of how the United States views China’s security policy as part of the launch of its new Grand Strategy, as well as the patterns of US foreign policy response. The main unit of analysis is the report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”, which has been issued annually since 2001 by the Pentagon. In total, twenty-one reports submitted until 2021 are involved in the sample. The analytical process is split into several levels, aiming to get insights and highlight elements of Chinese growth as a major security threat to US global hegemony. The author uses the congruency comparison method to see whether the Pentagon’s perception of China’s security policy has evolved over time. The reports’ features were then qualitatively studied through a series of global security crises, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US military retreat from Afghanistan, military alignment in the Indo-Pacific, and regional security dynamics in the Arctic. The findings reveal that the Pentagon’s perspective on how China formulates its security policy agenda has shifted from a strategic to a more specific military dimension, along with China’s domestic potential concerns with Taiwan.
... A China foi inserida no rol estadunidense de ameaças à Segurança Internacional Segurança Internacional e ao ordenamento econômico mundial desde o final dos anos 1980 (Broomfield, 2003;Pan, 2004), intensificando-se nas duas primeiras décadas do século XXI (Yuan, Fu, 2020). Ao mesmo tempo, a retomada do crescimento e o aparecimento de iniciativas multilaterais voltadas ao desenvolvimento nos países da periferia global tem sido recebidas como ameaças ao ordenamento econômico internacional (Lazell, Petrikova, 2019). ...
... A fluidez própria da Teoria da Securitização proporciona maior facilidade na migração entre objetos de estudo no momento em que a ameaça soviética desaparecia. O escopo dos estudos de SI passa para novas ameaças no limiar da década de 1980, com novos atores ocupando o lugar de ameaças estabelecidas, a despeito de suas comparavelmente limitadas capacidades bélicas (Broomfield, 2003;Pan, 2004). Cria-se também uma versão alternativa à compreensão estadocêntrica de ameaça, com atores não-estatais figurando como objetos da securitização . ...
... Por outro, os arranjos geopolíticos mantidos ao longo dos anos finais da Guerra Fria puderam ser alterados, afinal a ameaça sistêmica aos EUA e ao capitalismo em escala global havia sido eliminada. De acordo com Broomfield (2003) (Pan, 2004). ...
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Não são recentes as interpretações da China como uma ameaça aos valores e aos interesses dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA). A percepção da China como ameaça também diz respeito ao crescimento econômico alcançado pelo país asiático. Este processo de securitização é, portanto, transposto para o plano do desenvolvimento econômico. Em decorrência disto, interromper iniciativas transnacionais chinesas de estímulo ao desenvolvimento tornou-se objetivo do Estado Norte-americano. Através de estudo de caso, este artigo aborda o processo de securitização da agenda do desenvolvimento promovida pelo Banco Asiático de Investimentos em Infraestrutura (AIIB) enquanto nova fase da securitização do desenvolvimento da China. Em seu primeiro segmento, recobram-se as bases da teoria da securitização. Após, é exposta a securitização da China, inserindo-a no contexto dos processos de securitização do desenvolvimento e da periferia do capitalismo. O artigo encerra abordando o estudo de caso da agenda do desenvolvimento proposta pelo AIIB. Palavras-chave: China; Securitização do Desenvolvimento; AIIB. ABSTRACTInterpretations of China as a threat to the values and interests of the United States of America (USA) are not new. The perception of China as a threat also concerns the economic growth reached by the Asian country. This process of securitization is, therefore, transposed to the economic development sphere. As a consequence, interrupting Chinese transnational initiatives for development stimulus became an objective for the American State. Using a case study, this paper discusses the process of securitization of the development agenda promoted by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a new phase of the securitization of China’s development. To so, in its first segment, the theoretical bases for the securitization theory are recovered. Next, the securitization of China is exposed, inserting it in the context of two distinct processes of securitization: the securitization of development; and the securitization of the periphery of capitalism. The last section ends by taking on a case study of the securitization agenda of development proposed by the AIIB.Keywords: China; Securitization of Development; AIIB. Recebido em: 05 ago. 2021 | Aceito em: 18 mai. 2022.
... O segundo ponto a ser contemplado reflete a percepção de que o crescimento da China é uma ameaça ao mundo tal qual conhecemos, pautado por uma (des)ordem global alicerçada nos interesses hegemônicos de um grupo seleto de países aliado aos Estados Unidos (EUA). Tal visão, reforçada por discursos de que a China não poderia ascender pacificamente (Mearsheimer, 2014), não é necessariamente nova e pode ser encontrada no que a literatura acadêmica convencionou chamar de teoria da Ameaça Chinesa (Broomfield, 2003). Se a China é vista como uma ameaça, dessa forma, pode ser contida. ...
... As razões não são incompreensíveis: os Estados Unidos estão vivenciando desafios à manutenção da sua hegemonia. Diante de um cenário de ascensão de outros países Nordestreng, 2021;Albuquerque;Lycarião, 2018) (Takeuchi, 2008;Chen, 2012) e a Ameaça Chinesa (Broomfield, 2003). ...
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O artigo traz uma reflexão a respeito da hegemonia estadunidense em diálogo com a ascensão chinesa no século XXI. Utilizamos o caso do filme chinês Terra à Deriva (2019), que oferece uma visão alternativa de mundo, alinhada aos valores e interesseschineses, para explorar a interseção entre geopolítica e ficção. Buscamos compreender como a China vem afirmando a sua identidade e investindo na construção de um imaginário a respeito de sua influência global. Atentamos, portanto, aovalor das narrativas ficcionais para se discutir dinâmicas geopolíticas mais abrangentes.
... The notion of "China threat" during the cold war focuses more on operations such as China promoting communism in US allies' societies (Gertz, 2000) and military actions over Taiwan (Yan, 1998). "China threat" was brought up again since China's economic power rise during the 1990s, when the socialist camp collapsed, and China chose to integrate into the world trade system (Broomfield, 2003;Roy, 1996). Here, we define the "China threat" as the argument that China's rising national capabilities gained through economic reform poses a potential threat to the United States since the 1990s. ...
... In this study, we compared and synthesized previous works and proposed a renewed exemplary agenda list of "China threat" in economic, ideological, and military domains (Broomfield, 2003;Gertz, 2000;Yang and Liu, 2012;Yee and Storey, 2013). Especially, we filtered out actions that China no longer conducts to fit our analysis into the period from 1999 to 2019. ...
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This study analyzed “China threat” coverage in US media and examined how such coverage affected public perception of China from 1999 to 2019. We retrieved 15 national polls on perceptions of “China threat” together with 30,795 China-related news articles published before each poll. Media discourse related to “China threat” was coded into ideological, military, and economic second-level agendas using computational methods. We first tracked how “China threat” waxed and waned in media discourse over this period. Second, we examined whether the salience of “China threat” in the media has agenda-setting effects on public opinion. We found the economic threat agenda is correlated with the American public perception of China's threat at a marginally significant level and is significantly correlated with the Democrats’ threat perception.
... One possible explanation is that the Chinese state's stringent censorship may have shaped the Chinese training corpus, which in turn skewed the Chinese GPT's "political attitude" toward China and made it significantly less critical of China's sociopolitical problems. Meanwhile, this may also speak to the impact of the longstanding "China threat" rhetoric in American and Western political discourse, including particularly strong Sinophobia during the early COVID-19 pandemic [23][24][25][26] . This could make the English GPT model highly negative in regard to China-related issues. ...
... In the U.S.-China context, it is reasonable to suspect that the rampant state censorship and propaganda in China 18,32 , the longstanding "China threat" rhetoric in American and Western political discourse 23,24,26 , and the more recent American and Chinese government-sponsored disinformation campaigns targeting at each other 35,36 jointly contributed to the content and sentiment inconsistency in bilingual GPT answers. While it falls out of the scope of the current study, more scholarly effort is warranted to investigate how and to what extent each of these factors impact LLM performance. ...
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The growing popularity of ChatGPT and other large language models (LLMs) has led to many studies investigating their susceptibility to mistakes and biases. However, most studies have focused on models trained exclusively on English texts. This is one of the first studies that investigates cross-language political biases and inconsistencies in LLMs, specifically GPT models. Using two languages, English and simplified Chinese, we asked GPT the same questions about political issues in the United States (U.S.) and China. We found that the bilingual models’ political knowledge and attitude were significantly more inconsistent regarding political issues in China than those in the U.S. The Chinese model was the least negative toward China’s problems, whereas the English model was the most critical of China. This disparity cannot be explained by GPT model robustness. Instead, it suggests that political factors such as censorship and geopolitical tensions may have influenced LLM performance. Moreover, both the Chinese and English models tended to be less critical of the issues of their “own country,” represented by the language used, than of the issues of “the other country.” This suggests that multilingual GPT models could develop an “in-group bias” based on their training language. We discuss the implications of our findings for information transmission in an increasingly divided world.
... A ansiedade em torno da China com que o discurso de Luskin se apresenta não é um caso isolado e muito menos uma novidade. Noções como a do "perigo amarelo" (CHEN, 2012) circulam desde o século XIX e a supracitada teoria da "ameaça chinesa" emergiu na década de 1990 para descrever os "perigos" que a ascensão da China representa ao modo de vida ocidental (BROOMFIELD, 2003). Nas palavras do próprio Secretário de Estado dos Estados Unidos, Mike Pompeo, "é o Partido Comunista Chinês que passou a ambicionar a destruição das ideias ocidentais, da democracia ocidental e dos valores ocidentais. ...
... A teoria da Ameaça Chinesa assumiu diversas formas e pode ser categorizada como uma reflexão ideológica, econômica e militar. O pressuposto que sustenta essas noções é de que a China utilizará o seu crescente poder para desestabilizar a segurança regional (BROOMFIELD, 2003). Nisso, a vertente anti-China aponta que "o nacionalismo crescente e propaganda anti-América como evidência da ameaça ideológica que a última nação comunista poderosa remanescente apresenta ao resto do mundo" (BROOMFIELD, 2003, p. 266, tradução nossa A separação do eu e do "outro" (SAID, 1978) vigente desde os primórdios do Perigo Amarelo nos ajuda a compreender os retratos que são feitos da China dentro e fora da academia estadunidense, que buscam retratá-la ora como um inimigo e ora como um No entanto, na perspectiva ocidental, esse sentido tem sido suprimido através do termo "propaganda", que embute em seu significado um conteúdo que tem segundas intenções (XU, 2014). ...
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Nas últimas décadas, a China despontou internacionalmente com o seu crescimento econômico e desenvolvimento social, de certa forma desafiando a hegemonia dos Estados Unidos e a unipolaridade global. No entanto, apesar de sua crescente expressividade, a pesquisa acadêmica na área da Comunicação no Brasil não parece estar atenta aos seus movimentos ao desconsiderar a investigação de seus modelos. Não se trata de um evento ocasional. Os países do chamado “Sul global” permanecem sendo influenciados pelo “Norte”. Nesse sentido, o problema que motiva a presente pesquisa diz respeito a mediação ocidental presente no diálogo entre os países do “sul global”. Para explorarmos essa questão, recorremos ao conceito de imperialismo como um fio condutor para direcionar a nossa análise. Levamos em consideração algumas de suas formas que ainda vigoram no Brasil do início do século XXI: o imperialismo cultural / midiático; intelectual / acadêmico e de plataformas. Esse percurso nos direciona diretamente para o nosso objeto de investigação: a representação da China a partir do catálogo disponível na Netflix Brasil. Nele, observamos que lógicas orientalistas são constantemente reproduzidas e reforçadas através do seu sistema de algoritmos que costumam ser entendidos a partir de categorias-chave como neutralidade e eficiência. No entanto, percebemos que esses algoritmos refletem as mesmas problemáticas que temos enquanto sociedade ao emular um olhar ocidentalizado sobre o restante do mundo. Apontamos que as principais características desse orientalismo algorítmico são a homogeneização da “Ásia”, o apego excessivo a um “passado imperial” e o pouco cuidado da plataforma em segmentar os gêneros chineses. Essa discussão destaca a relevância de se atentar para as formas “menos visíveis” da dominação ocidental e também se propõe a abrir uma agenda de pesquisa que contribua com a proposta de desocidentalização do campo da comunicação.
... Taking a social-psychological approach, we define out-group threats as either perceived symbolic group threats ("a group's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview") or realistic group threats ("a group's power, resources, and general welfare") (Stephan et al. 2016: 257-258). Specifically, in the context of Sino-US rivalry, perceived threats between both countries have been widely explored by scholars in terms of international relations, regional studies, and public opinion (Broomfield 2003;Chen 2001). Thus, this paper considers ideological and cultural threats as symbolic, and economic and military threats as realistic. ...
... Perceived Out-group Threats. Drawing from prior research in social psychology and international relations (Broomfield 2003;Stephan and Stephan 2013), we developed eight items to measure perceived out-group threats (mean = 2.31, SD = 0.68, α = 0.90). The participants were asked to rate ideological, cultural, economic, and military threats using eight components: (a) military security in the Pacific circle; (b) sovereign security in the Chinese national realm; (c) security in the field of economy and international trade; (d) autonomy of science and technology development; (e) Chinese traditional culture; (f) socialist core values; (g) the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; and (h) national unity in China. ...
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The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed a torrent of conspiracy theories across different social media platforms. Parallel to this conspiracy wave was a heightened sense of nationalism, which manifested through both in-group solidarity and perceived out-group threats. In this study, we examine how individuals’ use of government social media to gather political information correlated with nation-related conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. Data were collected from 745 subjects in China and analyzed through path analyses, which allowed us to examine the direct association with political information consumption from government social media and the indirect association with nationalism on conspiracy beliefs. The results indicated that the use of government social media to gather political information was associated with greater beliefs in nation-variant COVID-19 conspiracies, both directly and through different mediations of nationalism. Our findings highlight the importance of examining government social media use and how nationalism can have differentiated mediation effects on beliefs in conspiracy theories.
... A heavy emphasis on economic benefits of a Chinese innovative firm is more likely to trigger concerns in conservative-leaning states about successful Chinese rivals than in liberal-leaning states. Populistic and nationalistic sentiment may increase [80], and the investment can thus be portrayed as a potential threat along with opportunities [69,70]. For example, it is found that Chinese firms operating in conservative-leaning states tend to maintain a low profile on economic benefits to the community including jobs and energy supplies to avoid unwanted concerns over U.S. national security [81]. ...
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Outward foreign direct investments from innovative Chinese firms pose challenges to American stakeholders regarding how to balance economic gains and nationalistic sentiment. Relying on the stakeholder management framework, we analyze the dual nature of American economic stakeholders’ sentiments towards innovative Chinese firms. Both positive and negative sentiments increase as Chinese companies’ innovative capability improves. While stakeholders in conservative-leaning states may temper their positive sentiment, their negative sentiment is mainly directed at Chinese state-owned companies. Our findings help to gain particular insight into the complex nature of stakeholder sentiment, a key element shaping multinational companies’ operating environment.
... The economic rise and increasing international influence of China under the leadership of a Communist government have caused some unease, suspicion and concern among Western countries. To increase the world's understanding of China as a benign and peaceful country and to address the Western concerns over the 'China Threat' (Broomfield 2003) posed by China's rise, the country has aimed to 'Tell China's Stories Well' to the world as its new global public relations strategy. The phrase 'Tell China's Stories Well' was first used by Chinese President Xi Jinping around 2012 and 2013 to encourage the Chinese population to use their own communication channels to promote Chinese discourses and to improve the Chinese image around the world (Huang and Wang 2019). ...
Article
Foreign language education may serve many goals, but national storytelling would not be an obvious one. Due to the position of English as an international language, it has become an increasingly important tool for intercultural communication and international public relations for countries whose official language is not English. In this study, we will look into the case of China, where English has been seen as the most important medium of China’s national storytelling. Chinese youths are encouraged to learn English well and to equip themselves with the competence to tell China’s stories well in English. As a key theoretical underpinning in this study, national stories are taken as national identities to live by. To better understand this relationship, we have invited 100 undergraduate English Majors in a provincial Chinese university to each tell a China story in English. By subjecting the 100 China stories told by 100 Chinese youths in English to a rigorous thematic analysis, we hope to determine in this study what Chinese national identity is constructed through this national storytelling exercise. More importantly, by examining the Chinese case of English as a medium of national storytelling, this study aims to shed light on the specific purpose of English as a global medium for communicating a country’s national narratives and national discourses.
... In recent years, China has developed rapidly and made remarkable achievements. The growth of China's national strength and the expansion of its economy are all seen as threats to the national interests of the US and the security of the Asia-Pacific region (Broomfield, 2003). Moreover, China's rise in the international community is in direct conflict with the world order dominated by the US. ...
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The opening ceremony of Beijing Winter Olympic Games in 2022 has been extensively covered in international news reports. Although these news reports seem impartial and objective, they carry underlying ideologies that can influence public opinions and judgments. This paper examined the discursive representation of China in American news reports on the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics using Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis model as the theoretical basis. News stories from American media were collected and analysed in terms of headline, collocation, and quotation pattern. The research found that American news reports present mixed and multifaceted views toward the host country. They showed appreciation for the host country’s success in delivering a spectacular opening ceremony, but they tended to frame China negatively, portraying it as an intimidating power and a geopolitical threat. This study can improve our understanding of the discursive practice of news reports and enhance critical awareness in interpreting news texts.
... The economic rise and increasing international influence of China under the leadership of a Communist government have caused some unease, suspicion and concern among Western liberal democratic countries. China is perceived by some countries in the West as a danger and a threat to the existing world order led by the USA (Broomfield, 2003). It is believed by the Chinese government that the world's adverse impression of China is a result of a lack of knowledge about the country and a lack of experience in the country, and thus the best way to increase the world's understanding China as a Destination for international stuDents: a "Pull anD rePel" faCtors analysis in the Post-CoViD-19 era of China is to attract more international students to study in Chinese universities (Liu & Lin, 2016). ...
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International student mobility is a complex phenomenon influenced by numerous factors. This study examines the prospect of China as a destination country for international students in the post-COVID-19 era. With qualitative data from 30 frontline international educators (support staff in international student recruitment and services) from 30 Chineseuniversities, this study has determined a set of “pull” factors that serve to attract international students to study in China and a set of “repel” factors that discourage students from going. On the basis of both the “pull” and “repel” factors identified, the participants anticipate important challenges for China’s international enrollment in the short term, but stay optimistic about the long-term prospect. The “pull and repel” factors analysis is found to be a useful approach to examining the attractiveness of a host country to international students in a focused manner.
... The 'China threat theory' is one of them. This 'theory' means that China's rise would pose a danger to the existing international order, spanning from ideological to security threats (Broomfield, 2003). China is conscious of it. ...
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The rise of China has become a catchword to define China’s current position in the international system. China’s increasing power comes with responsibility. Continuing Hu Jintao’s peaceful development, Xi Jinping is committed to realising China’s responsibility as a great power. Concurrently, Xi sets out a neighbourhood diplomacy that underlines the importance of bringing development and prosperity to neighbouring states. This paper aims to investigate the way China realise the twin goals of peaceful development. The South China Sea (SCS) disputes involving China and four neighbouring Southeast Asian states serves as a case study. It is found that China's assertiveness, manifested in continued escalations and dragged-on negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC), does not bode well for China’s peaceful development. In other words, China is hardly a responsible great power or a good neighbour in its handling of the SCS issue.
... This study delves into the specific perceptions of China held by university students in Indonesia's capital, with a focus on their views concerning the South China Sea dispute and the BRI. The prevailing discourse on the 'China threat' typically frames it within economic, security, and political dimensions (Al-Rodhan 2007;Broomfield 2003;Goodman 2017a;Yang and Liu 2012). Our literature review critically examines these facets of the perceived threat and their relevance to the educated urban youth of Jakarta. ...
Article
Discussions on the ‘China threat theory’ in Southeast Asia have been reignited by China’s assertive manoeuvres in the South China Sea and its expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While substantial research has investigated the views of political elites and policymakers, the perceptions of educated urban youth, particularly regarding China’s geopolitical and economic strategies, remain underexplored. This study centers on Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s most populous nation, to gauge the sentiments of urban youth towards China’s rising influence. Through a survey of 403 university students in Jakarta and its vicinity, we reveal an intensifying negative stance among these young, educated Indonesians corresponding with China’s increased assertiveness and economic pursuits under the BRI. This article underscores the nuanced perspectives of Indonesia’s future leaders, offering a targeted analysis of the attitudes of educated youth in an urban setting towards evolving Sino-Indonesian relations.
... As China's economy expanded quickly in the early 1990s the possibility of a China threat was already a passionately debated subject in the US (Roy, 1996). The China threat issue can be categorized as ideological, economic, and military (Broomfield, 2003). Yang and Liu (2016) further detailed the contents of these three thematic dimensions into sixteen subcategories. ...
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The China Threat has risen significantly since 2020. This study examines the roles of China’s territory-related issues, including Senkaku Islands, Xinjiang’s Uyghurs, the South China Sea, a threat of war across the Taiwan Strait, China-India border conflicts, and Hong Kong national security law, in contributing to the China Threat. Based on weekly Google Trends search results from May 2020 to July 2022, this study created a series of time series variables to measure these narratives. In particular, this study finds that, except for the South China Sea, all other issues are connected to the China Threat by the English-speaking public. Also, the Uyghur issue has attracted the most lasting attention. These conclusions are supported by survey results and fundamental analysis. This study contributes to knowledge of the China Threat and to academia as well by presenting a (still) new quantitative method for international relations.
... Likewise, the perception of China as a potential threat to the US had already been circulating in political circles, mainly-but not exclusivelywithin the Republican ranks (Nymalm 2020, 190-192). 5 The article introduces how this description of China, mostly recognised with the term 'China Threat' (Broomfield 2003), might be influenced by stereotypical representations of social reality rooted in US mainstream academic thinking and shared at the government level, above all, at a time when an emotional leader, such as Trump, came to the presidency. Therefore, it also shifts attention to the implications of what we as scholars accept as sound interpretations of international politics and whose adequacy we tend not to question. ...
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When Donald Trump was elected, the idea of the ‘China Threat’ gained popularity. Nonetheless, this was not a novelty. From the early nineties, when the country consolidated its economic growth, concern had begun to spread that China would convert its economic resources into a military force to turn against the US. This article explores whether the concept of the China Threat may have been influenced by stereotypical representations rooted in US academic thinking and shared at the government level. The analysis proceeds by adopting a three-stage approach. First, it draws a theoretical framework that intertwines a constructivist perspective from IR theory with social psychology, referring to Social Representations Theory and theories of stereotypes. Second, while focusing on the expressions ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ and ‘New Cold War’, it describes how the China Threat has been elaborated in the US scholarly agenda. Finally, it discusses how the China Threat has found an outlet especially in the Trump administration’s narrative.
... Since the 1990s, this so-called 'China Threat Theory' has warned of the political, economic, human rights, environmental and other risks linked to the expansion of a rising China, governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 7 The negative portrayal of Chinese telecommunication companies is one of many examples of such broader efforts to present Chinese actors as a security threat. 8 ...
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Amidst the transition to the fifth generation of mobile telecommunications (5G), the US has launched a diplomatic campaign to prevent other states from acquiring such technologies from Chinese providers. In reply, China has launched a similar campaign to rebut being perceived as a security threat. However, the outcomes of such influencing campaigns in other states have been varied. This article argues that mediated public diplomacy and securitisation theory offer complementary ways to research the competition between the US and China in terms of influencing the policies of foreign states. Empirically, it examines the cases of Brazil and Chile, where the US campaign against Chinese 5G suppliers was successful in setting the agenda. However, neither the increased economic interdependence of Brazil and Chile with China nor their close political cultural congruency with the US, though, are enough to explain the different outcomes of the US campaign against Chinese 5G providers in each country. Indeed, Chile rejected the US securitisation move, while in Brazil it was successful, but partial in that it only refers to government 5G, not commercial 5G. The article argues that the degree of consensus among national political elites and other non-state actors to endorse or reject the US narrative explains such differences.
... On the other hand, the opposite view focuses on the threat that China poses to the world. This so-called China threat theory has deep roots in the US (Broomfield, 2003;Pan, 2015;Roy, 1996;Vuori, 2018) and posits that the rise of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, is a grave national security threat to the US and the rest of the world. This narrative, reproduced since the 90s by various politicians, think tanks, pundits and some academics, became a centrepiece of former President Trump's foreign policy. ...
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This article studies how Argentine national media outlets reported on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) between 2013 and February 2022 (this covers the period from the launch of the BRI to Argentina’s official accession to the initiative). Based on a framing analysis of 272 articles, this study argues that national media outlets tend to reproduce two frames about the BRI: they either present it as an opportunity or as a threat. The balance between them matters when attempting to understand how media organisations shape citizens’ perceptions of China and the BRI. In the case of Argentina, even though its political and economic relations with China have become closer, reports on the BRI were quite polarised. Indeed, national media outlets’ portrayal of the BRI as an opportunity has been slightly more prevalent than negative portrayal (41% vs. 35%). However, national media firms covered the BRI in different ways. Some organisations conveyed largely positive frames, some chiefly presented negative ones, and others were more balanced. The specific editorial lines of the newspapers and their affinities to national political alliances explain these different patterns. Furthermore, although articles citing Western sources were indeed more negative about the BRI, many of the op-eds and reports criticising the BRI were produced by Argentine journalists and other local actors. Thus, Chinese academics exaggerate Western media sources’ influence on Argentina’s national media critical coverage of China while overlooking reasonable concerns about the impacts of Chinese projects.
... On the other hand, the opposite view focuses on the threat that China poses to the world. This so-called China threat theory has deep roots in the US (Broomfield, 2003;Pan, 2015;Roy, 1996;Vuori, 2018) and posits that the rise of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, is a grave national security threat to the US and the rest of the world. This narrative, reproduced since the 90s by various politicians, think tanks, pundits and some academics, became a centrepiece of former President Trump's foreign policy. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article studies how Argentine national media outlets reported on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) between 2013 and February 2022 (this covers the period from the launch of the BRI to Argentina's official accession to the initiative). Based on a framing analysis of 272 articles, this study argues that national media outlets tend to reproduce two frames about the BRI: they either present it as an opportunity or as a threat. The balance between them matters when attempting to understand how media organisations shape citizens' perceptions of China and the BRI. In the case of Argentina, even though its political and economic relations with China have become closer, reports on the BRI were quite polarised. Indeed, national media outlets' portrayal of the BRI as an opportunity has been slightly more prevalent than negative portrayal (41% vs. 35%). However, national media firms covered the BRI in different ways. Some organisations conveyed largely positive frames, some chiefly presented negative ones, and others were more balanced. The specific editorial lines of the newspapers and their affinities to national political alliances explain these different patterns. Furthermore, although articles citing Western sources were indeed more negative about the BRI, many of the op-eds and reports criticising the BRI were produced by Argentine journalists and other local actors. Thus, Chinese academics exaggerate Western media sources' influence on Argentina's national media critical coverage of China while overlooking reasonable concerns about the impacts of Chinese projects.
... In both cases, these communities had some tweets expressing racism and discrimination against Chinese, which are obnoxious and reprehensible expressions of Sinophobia on the platform. Overall, these communities exemplify the productive power of what researchers have called the China Threat Theory in the West (Broomfield, 2003;Pan, 2015), which is a discourse that understands everything emanating from China as a menace. ...
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This article examines three aspects of China’s digital diplomacy efforts about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on Twitter between February 9th 2019 to January 3rd 2020. First, it explores the frequency and geographical distribution of tweets about the BRI. Second, it scrutinises the main topics discussed in such tweets. Finally, it describes the actors producing BRI content. Results show that Chinese digital diplomacy has been proactive on Twitter, driven by the posting practices of its main international broadcasting organisations and BRI partners. As such, China’s digital diplomacy is becoming more relational. However, the open nature of Twitter also paves the way to numerous counter narratives disseminated by other users critical of the BRI, namely, Western media, think tanks, academics, and citizens, who undermine the stories that China aims to convey. These criticisms expose the limits of China’s digital diplomacy and of the sensationalist reporting of its alleged direct effects on audiences.
... The rise of an authoritarian leader like Xi in China proves that the USA failed to produce a more open and liberal China through an engagement policy. The bankruptcy of the engagement camp in fostering a democratic China has given rise to the containment camp, which urges the USA to take preemptive actions to contain China, now seen as a revisionist state challenging the interests of the US hegemon (Roy, 1994;Broomfield, 2003;Friedberg, 2005 Despite the debates about China's threat to the USA, Americans' attitudes toward China were polarized. In 2001, Americans generally saw China as a threat to current and future American interests but not a major threat (Tien and Nathan, 2001). ...
Article
This paper examines US public opinion after the drastic changes in US–China relations during the Trump presidency. I argue that the perceived China threat influences Americans' evaluation of the China–Taiwan tension. Based on the US dataset of the 2018 Survey on Global Attitudes and Trends by the Pew Research Center, Americans tend to perceive the China–Taiwan tension as a serious problem for the USA when Americans identify China as a major threat and its military strength as a concern. As US public opinion shapes the US foreign policy on China, the findings shed light on the public support for the ongoing US–China conflict.
... By exploiting the Lancang-Mekong Basin's water resources, these countries often use arguments such as China's "dam threat theory" to weaken China's influence in Southeast Asia and to break down the strong ties between China and the downstream Mekong countries. [16] Secondly, motivated by their own economic development pursuits, external countries often engage in the region under the pretext of environmental protection and water resource security concerns, aligning themselves with the interests of Mekong countries to gain support from local governments and achieve their economic objectives. Thirdly, cooperation between China and downstream Mekong countries is being strengthened. ...
Article
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Since its launch in 2016, the Lancang-Mekong cooperation has been steadily advancing through a range of projects, notably those concerning cooperative governance of water resources. In recent years, foreign actors have cast doubt on China's involvement in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin, fueling the propagation of the "China water threat theory" and exerting influence over water resource management in the region through various channels, including strategic partnership initiatives, organizational mechanisms, and technical communication. Meanwhile, China faces daunting challenges in managing water resources in the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation region, including intense market competition and hedging issues, which hamper its international image. This study analyzes the challenges and obstacles that China may confront in developing water resources cooperation between the Lancang and Mekong Rivers, and proposes recommendations for further advancing China's engagement in water resources management.
... It is important to note that geopolitical aspects related to "China Threat Theory" and projects like BRI cannot be investigated in isolation. In the overall construct, Chinese Defence Policy of 2019 (China, 2019), and military modernization plans "create anxiety on China's perceived outlook (Hanes, 2017, p. 1), striving to "re-order the rules of global governance, detrimental to US interests" (Broomfield, 2003 (Lo, 2015). Yiping Huang highlights that BRI will help China improve its international standing through cooperative engagement and win-win cooperation (Huang, 2016). ...
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This research article focuses on the evolving international order, which is witnessing a steady transition between the United States (US) and China. Historically, the power transition has occurred after conflicts and wars, while in the contemporary era, no direct military conflict has happened between the US and China, yet it is widely debated across the globe. I want to explore the dialectics of the Chinese peaceful development, creating a community of shared destiny and future through BRI and the US perceptions of the Chinese grand strategy of hegemonic ambitions to rewrite the rules of global order. However, it is widely debated that industrial and infrastructure investments through BRI create new forms of asymmetrical interdependencies that tilt in favour of China, which eventually provide an advantage to China, contrary to US ambitions. There are contrasting perspectives being debated in the US and Western media about BRI due to obvious geopolitics artificially created by them, while from the Chinese perspective, it remains a benevolent undertaking for service to humanity. By applying the theoretical lens of Hegemonic Stability Theory and Power Transition Theory, the research finds answers to asymmetrical partnerships that result in win-win cooperation for China and the recipient countries.
... Both superpowers have been eager to offer the countries improved economic relations or security assurances; yet in return, the nations have been pressured to take a side in the great power struggle. Conventional wisdom, primarily based on realist theories, suggests that ASEAN countries have little choice but to either align with the U.S. to balance the "China threat," or join the bandwagon of a rising China and shun the U.S. (Broomfield 2003;Chan 2012;Murphy 2017;Pan 2004;Roy 1996). In recent years, it has further been assumed that the more intense the U.S.-China competition, the narrower the possibility for the countries to remain unaligned (East-West Center 2021;Korolev 2019;Seow 2018). ...
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Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic. Moreover, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China policy, which follow the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is nuanced in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general.
... For the components' portability, individual-to-individual contact and exchange, as well as transit through the permitted region and leave focuses, are effective ways to reduce pressures. To reduce the level of compulsion, a thorough examination and outline are required [21][22][23][24]. This would reduce usage and provide additional enormous lives. ...
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Actual security ensures individuals, information, frameworks, and gear of a country. It additionally gets worldwide boundaries. Political obstruction and infringement of boundary arrangements can make line security issues. Mechanical headways in actual security diminish the weight of line security work force. On the off chance that the boundary of a nation is not all around ensured, then, at that point, it would confront a progression of illicit movement. Boundaries can be emphatically ensured by utilizing actual obstructions, observation, biomeasurements, light, security faculty, caution frameworks, sensors, radars, access control frameworks, distinguishing proof frameworks, and PC design. This paper talks about certain difficulties and their potential arrangements utilizing different actual security components at global boundaries. This paper likewise indicates the possible changes in genuine which nations’ security can consider for their lines the bosses in a common manner.
Article
Do citizens in democracies view foreign policies as more violative of human rights based on the governing regime’s type? We hypothesize that in democratic societies, there is an inherent association of autocracy with human rights violations, leading citizens to believe that policies from authoritarian governments infringe upon human rights more than those from democracies, even when the policies are seemingly identical. We evaluate this autocracy bias by gathering evidence from nine survey experiments across seven democracies. Consistently, we find that citizens of democratic countries are more likely to consider a policy to be a violation of human rights if China adopts it, compared to when a seemingly identical policy is adopted by Spain or Italy. We find that this perception extends to eleven other authoritarian regimes, and a mechanism experiment reveals that regime type is the driving force behind this differential evaluation. This study contributes to the understanding of how citizens in democratic societies perceive respect for human rights in foreign countries.
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This article analyses Vietnam’s proactive and in-depth integration in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ), with a particular focus on the first decades of the 21st century. The paper argues that Vietnam’s more active and largely responsible contributions to ASEAN integration are fundamentally shaped by its perceptions on opportunities and challenges caused by China’s rise. By maintaining ASEAN ’s non-aligned status, reinforcing its strategic autonomy, centrality, and unification, Vietnam seeks to make the Association strong enough to take a unified position towards China’s aggressive behaviour in the disputed waters close to its shores. However, ASEAN ’s internal limitations, China’s great power diplomacy, and geo-strategic constraints, as well as countervailing incentives, lead us to expect there will be further challenges to Vietnam’s efforts.
Article
This article examines the transformative role of connectivity politics amid global upheaval, focusing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) and Western connectivity strategies. It explores how China’s strategic use of connectivity has enabled it to navigate crises and exert global influence, while also analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of both Chinese and Western approaches. The article highlights the importance of multilateral collaboration, environmental sustainability, local empowerment, and adaptive policies for future connectivity initiatives. By synthesizing lessons from both the BRI and Western models, the article proposes a balanced and sustainable framework for global development, offering insights into fostering a more interconnected, equitable, and resilient world.
Article
The period comprising the past thirty-two years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has seen a range of approaches taken by the United States in handling its relationship with China. Launched in November 2011, the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy approach entailed new levels of engagement with ‘a peaceful and prosperous China’, but on the most challenging issues this approach also brought increasing confrontation. The West (in this case the United States) has a history of utilising Orientalist-style, ‘us vs them’ dichotomies to manipulate unequal relations of power with the East (known as the ‘Orient’) throughout history (originally with middle-eastern nations). By using tenets from Edward Said’s Orientalism and critical discourse analysis adapted from Normal Fairclough’s 3-dimensional model, this article seeks to establish whether the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States has shifted to frame China through an Orientalist worldview since the Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy in late 2011. The article analyses 52 speeches from the Obama and Trump Administrations, finding evidence of pro-orientalist themes and language being adopted for both. Whilst utilised to a lower degree, these ‘us vs them’ dichotomies do exist under President Obama’s more accommodating and calmer linguistic-style, being intertwined with language designed to project an image of welcoming cooperation (albeit in a condescending, back-handed way). The use of orientalist themes is more prominently provable under President Trump, with almost all major speeches pertaining to China containing high usage of orientalist tropes in a more openly xenophobic, racist fashion.
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Under the Trump presidency, the United States and China were embroiled in an open trade war that threatened the neoliberal world order. This paper attempts to put forward an explanation of the trade war from a world-systems perspective. Using the world-systems theory, systemic cycles accumulation theory, and the new international division of labor thesis, the paper contends that the rise of China and the protectionist stance of the United States were products of the neoliberal world economic and political order. It concludes that the trade war has not ended with the end of the Trump presidency. On the contrary, the trade war is systemic and will continue to be fought regardless of which party or persons who occupy the White House. The willingness of the American leadership to use international institutions as dispute resolution mechanisms and avoid unilateral undertakings would define the nature of the trade war and its possible outcomes.
Chapter
After the incorporation of Latin America and the Caribbean into the Belt and Road Initiative, responses from countries in the region have been diverse. While some have endorsed the initiative, others have either externally engaged with it or maintained a deliberate distance. Why have South American countries formulated different foreign policies towards the BRI? Existing literature regarding political economy, dependency, realism, or regime type falls short of explaining developing countries’ varying responses towards this loose, non-binding international cooperative arrangement. As such, I suggest drawing upon the Liberal International Relations Theory, and explain why the intensity of domestic business preferences and the state structure matter in understanding these different foreign policies. Following an overview of the BRI, I discern three types of foreign policy strategies towards the BRI, namely endorsement, external engagement, and non-engagement. Thereafter, I elucidate the comparative research design of this study. Specifically, I select Chile, Colombia, and Brazil to form a controlled, structured comparative analysis, with Colombia containing a within-case comparison. This study mainly employs qualitative research methodology, including 54 semi-structured interviews with foreign policymakers, business representatives, and experts from the three selected countries. At last, the structure of the book will be presented.
Chapter
Relations between India and China has often been described as having ups and downs. Both countries fought a war in 1962 which has led to mutual suspicion and mutual distrust. China which is the dominant power in the region has sought to establish its influence through its BRI, OBOR and its Maritime Silk Road which seeks to bring infrastructural development in the Indian Ocean Region. India on the other hand has been opposing such efforts by the Chinese in the region where it has often cited that the BRI violates its territorial sovereignty via the BRI and its projects. The CPEC which passes through POK has often been a contentious issue between both countries. However, most importantly border disputes between both countries have been the reason for rivalry between both countries. This chapter analyses border disputes between both countries but suggests that the rivalries between both countries are more complex.
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During the last decade, the surge in Chinese outbound foreign direct investment in Bangladesh has been met with anxiety, often invoking national security concerns. Most scholars explain China’s investment with the connection of economic interests and market expansion. Scholars have not paid enough attention to the geostrategic rationale behind China’s investment statecraft towards Bangladesh. This study centres on the question: What economic and non-economic (geostrategic) factors drive the growing Chinese investment footprint in Bangladesh? Following the qualitative research approach, this study argues that along with economic incentives, non-economic issues such as security and strategic competition with India are the significant determinants of the Chinese increasing investment footprint in Bangladesh, which is beyond the notion of win–win cooperation enhancing China’s regional status and leadership in South Asia. This study promises to contribute to the literature on the Chinese political economy, providing a theoretically nuanced treatment of Chinese investment statecraft concerning neoclassical realism.
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This study investigates, within the framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis, how The New York Times ( NYT) has been metaphorically formulating China as an “other” from 1949 to 2020. Metaphors were identified with reference to Pragglejaz Group’s (2007) Metaphor Identification Procedure. WAR and GAME were detected as dominant concepts, and LIQUID, DISEASE, ANIMAL, MACHINE, and OBSTACLE secondary imagery. It is found that the newspaper’s journalistic values in foreign news reporting and judging criteria toward political leadership have remained radically unchanged. Having been influenced by changes in China-U.S. relations and America’s domestic socio-political ideals, the NYT has been othering China from the civilized world, which tends to be particularly prominent when China’s performance is short of the values and norms preached by the US, and became inconspicuous during China-U.S. alliance. Running counter to its commitment to “truth,” the newspaper employed discursive strategies to balance between America’s moral self-identity and its China policy, and vindicate behaviors identical to those it has been criticizing China for.
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China and India are two states with which Sri Lanka has maintained close relations in the past. These two states have given a lot of support to Sri Lanka in many crisis situations that Sri Lanka has faced in international politics. China is one of the main countries that have helped Sri Lanka from the past until recently. Also, in view of the severe economic crisis in Sri Lanka after Covid-19, India has also given special support to Sri Lanka. Thus, it can be stated that China and India are keen to provide support to Sri Lanka in a very competitive manner. As a result of all these factors, India and China, the two most powerful nations in Asia, are in a furious power struggle over Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. That is, the South Asian region is facing a problem of balance of power. The primary goal of this research is to examine Sri Lanka's role in the rivalry in South Asia between China and India. The research objective is 'what policy Sri Lanka should adhere to when managing its relations with India and China?'. This study's methodology, which is qualitative in nature, depends only on secondary data to gather information. Content analysis was used for data analysis. According to this study, for Sri Lanka, India and China are equally important and China has provided a lot of assistance to Sri Lanka financially. However, in view of the current economic crisis Sri Lanka is facing, China's response to Sri Lanka has become sluggish. Nevertheless, Indian engagement has recently become increasingly crucial for Sri Lanka due to the terrible economic crisis the country is experiencing in the wake of Covid-19. Sri Lanka should, however, maintain a neutral stance in its interactions with the two adversarial nations, India and China.
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When and how do the American political elites react discursively to China as a rising power? Do they depict it as an economic or military risk? What role do discursive references to China play in the US populist discourses? Relying on the thematic and critical discourse analysis of all the American presidential debates, this article explores the way US politicians portray China throughout three eras marked by distinct global power configurations. Several types of discourses have been identified. In contrast to the belligerent rhetoric of the early Cold War, when China was framed as a major military threat, after 2004, presidential candidates started referring to Beijing as an economic rival. By 2008, the emerging bipartisan consensus centered on China as mainly a trade competitor. By contrast, populist narratives in 2016 and 2020 stood out because they included emotional appeals and inflated the risks of the Sino-American rivalry to mobilize voters. In doing so, the populists sought to forge coalitions in favor of protectionist policies among those voters, who were employed in manufacturing sectors facing growing international competition. The anti-China mentions reached a peak during the 2020 debates amidst the pandemic when the populist candidate used biased language, relying on tropes resembling the 19th century racist "yellow peril" rhetoric. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11366-023-09857-z.
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China’s public diplomacy has experienced profound changes since the new leadership came to power. The outdated diplomatic principle of ‘hide our capacities and bide our time’ was gradually replaced by an emerging narrative about ‘China’s ideas’ and ‘China’s wisdom’. China’s economic and social development is reflected in its unique governance model. In theory, good governance is expected to enhance soft power overseas, but China’s growing influence is controversially mediated as sharp power. This study scrutinises if and how Beijing is promoting its political ideas as the key pillar of its soft power portfolio and how Australia mediated China’s intended narrative. A comparative framing analysis of China’s media and in-depth interviews with 18 Australian experts outlines Beijing’s ambitions and the dilemma of China’s soft power. This research sheds new light on the interplay between domestic governance and soft power by examining the congruity between China’s projection and Australia’s interpretation.
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Based on Q-methodology, this study analyzes public perceptions of disruptive technologies and their impact on future social changes. It presents four competing perspectives on the relationship between technology and social change and four types of perceptions of the future of society. Type 1, the gradual optimism perspective, is characterized by human-centeredness, optimism, and gradual changes. Type 2, the disruptive pessimism perspective, predicts that the future of society will be technologically deterministic, pessimistic, chaotic, and disruptive. Type 3, the contingent optimism perspective, anticipates that in addition to technology, other external factors will influence social change. Type 4, the social shaping of technology perspective, contends that recent economic polarization will further intensify with technological developments.
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The enormous economic power of the People's Republic of China makes it one of the most important actors in the international system. Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, all fields of international economic law have been impacted by greater Chinese participation. Now, just over one decade later, the question remains as to whether China's unique characteristics make its engagement fundamentally different from that of other players. In this volume, well-known scholars from outside China consider the country's approach to international economic law. In addition to the usual foci of trade and investment, the authors also consider monetary law, finance, competition law, and intellectual property. What emerges is a rare portrait of China's strategy across the full spectrum of international economic activity.
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an unprecedented increase in the level of political blame attributed to China for the health crisis and other associated xenophobic discourses. Although previous research has revealed the effects of perceived outgroup threats on popular support for policies that control outgroups, threats posed by foreign countries have received little empirical attention. This study advances previous research by focusing on the independent effects of the perceived China threat to public support for restrictive immigration control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a sample drawn from the 2020 American National Election Studies, the results showed that the perceived China threat substantially heightened public support for restrictive immigration control. More importantly, demand for restrictive immigration control intensified when individuals had stronger perceptions of threats and conspiracy beliefs about the virus leak from a Chinese lab. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the roles of politically constructed threats and conspiracy beliefs during the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing new mechanisms of popular attitudes toward social control.
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This paper argues that official Chinese statistics contain major exaggerations of real output growth beginning 1998. The standard data contain numerous inconsistencies. Chinese commentaries castigate widespread falsification at lower levels and question the autheticity of figures emanating from the central statistical authorities. The author speculates that cumulative GDP growth during 1997/2001 was no more one-third of official claims, and possibly much smaller.
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Many American policymakers and Sinologists believe that China will inevitably become nonideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and progressively freer in its culture and politics. Beijing, however, sees the United States not as a strategic partner but as the chief obstacle to its regional and global ambitions. Under cover of its current conciliatory mood, China acquires the wherewithal to back its aspirations regarding Taiwan and beyond with real power. America's number one objective in Asia must be to derail China's quest to become a 21st-century hegemon.
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Avery Goldstein is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), and is completing a study entitled Deterrence and Security in a Changing World: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution. I would like to thank Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Thomas J. Christensen, and the anonymous reviewers for International Security who provided helpful comments on various drafts of this article. 1. The new wave of scholarly interest in East Asian security and China emerged in about 1993. Just two years earlier, such matters received relatively short shrift in one of the first serious comprehensive overviews of the post-Cold War world landscape. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53. Capturing the spirit of the recent "China-mania," the February 18, 1996, New York Times Magazine carried as its cover story, "The 21st Century Starts Here: China Booms. The World Holds Its Breath," by Ian Buruma, Seth Faison, and Fareed Zakaria. The editors of International Security, sensitive to market demand, have published an edited volume of selected articles entitled East Asian Security, whose largest section is a collection of major articles under the heading, "The Implications of the Rise of China." Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). 2. See Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers During the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 478-479, 519. 3. For concise accounts of China's reforms, see Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987); Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); and Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994). 4. On the increased importance of China for U.S. foreign policy, see then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's May 1996 speech to a joint meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and Business Week. "'American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship' Address by Warren Christopher," Federal Department and Agency Documents, May 17, 1996, Federal Document Clearing House, from NEXIS Library, Lexis/Nexis, Reed Elsevier (hereafter NEXIS). For samples of the emerging scholarly literature, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168; Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 5. For a brief introduction to the debate and references to some of the key positions, see William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), especially pp. 3-10. 6. On the strategic rationale for China resisting transparency, see Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security," pp. 485-491, 500-503; Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), p. 31, fn. 92. China's Defense White Paper in 1995 was an unrevealing disappointment. The PLA has reportedly begun a more forthcoming draft for release in late 1997. See "White Paper—China: Arms...
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Developing and deploying a credible defense against ballistic missiles for Americans now must become an even higher national priority following revelations in the May 25, 1999, Cox Report that China soon will have the ability to threaten the United States with new nuclear missiles based largely on stolen or purchased U.S. technology. U.S. technology in the areas of missile motors, nuclear warheads, nuclear reentry vehicle design, and perhaps even warhead penetration aids are enabling China in the near future to begin to field at least three new modern intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching cities inside the United States. According to the Cox Report, by as early as 2002 China could begin deployment of its new 5,000-mile-range DF–31 ICBM. From northern areas of China, this missile could reach the states of Washington and Oregon. Around 2005, China could field an 8,000-mile-range variant of this missile, the DF–41, which could hit most of the continental United States. Both ICBMs are expected to be modern, mobile missiles with solid-fuel motors, possibly armed with multiple warheads. China also is expected to deploy a sub-marine-launched ballistic missile similar to the DF–31. As the Cox Report and an earlier report issued by the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-gence make clear, China' s missile program has benefited significantly from U.S. technology. In fact, China' s new nuclear missiles may have not been possible without access to U.S. solid-fuel rocket motor technology, modern small nuclear warhead and nuclear reentry vehicle design, and missile-guid-ance technology.
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A central premise of the Bush foreign-policy team is that China is trying to challenge the status quo. China is seen as a rising power with a grudge against the international system. In short, we are said to be entering the twenty-first century equivalent of the early twentieth century, when a democratic England struggled with a rising, authoritarian Germany. But this analogy - of a 'Wilhelmine China' - is flawed, for it is hardly obvious, in the year 2001, just who is defending the status quo. At the very moment of China's decision to integrate fully into the international system, the United States seems to have started the process of changing the rules. Just as China aspires to become a 'normal state' for the first time in its history, the criterion for 'normal' is changing. As China goes multilateral in its foreign relations, America turns unilateral.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing and Washington shared common strategic purposes. But these shared interests have narrowed in the 1990s. The Sino-American relationship now involves elements of limited cooperation and growing competition. While there is an important convergence of interests with respect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, the two governments increasingly diverge on a long list of strategic issues, including: Taiwan; Japan's regional security role; Iran and Iraq; the expansion of NATO; the strengthening of other US alliances; missile exports; theatre and national missile defences; and the US security role in the Asia-Pacific. This growing 'strategic competition' is likely to characterise Sino-American relations for most of the coming decade, irrespective of the new American administration that comes to office in 2001.
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Holding strategic interests increasingly in common, China and the United States are developing a partnership with different roles. Although Beijing has far to go before it rivals U.S. global influence, Washington needs this partnership to pursue its own diverse and far‐reaching interests.
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If its economic growth continues, the rise of China will be the most important change in the global economic, political and military balance of the next century. This growth will be accompanied by environmental degradation, an activist foreign policy, and even military adventures. Yet the pervasive tendency to blame China, and the current regime in particular, is misplaced. Most of China's actions are perfectly understandable attempts by a rising power to expand its influence abroad. Copyright © 2006-2010 ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
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This paper offers a theory to explain in the Chinese context how interfirm transactions can be effectively carried out in the absence of a sound contract enforcement system. Noting that the development of China's nonstate sector, the primary contributor to its rapid economic growth, has relied heavily on its transactional relationships with the state sector, we develop an agency theory of interfirm transactions based on the following idea: a state enterprise manager, being an agent, may acquire private benefits in exchange for not holding up a nonstate trading partner; and this, in turn, improves the latter's incentive for transaction-specific investments.
A yellow peril? No: excesses of the new anti-China lobby
  • John O Sullivan
John O'Sullivan, 'A yellow peril? No: excesses of the new anti-China lobby', National Review 52(8), (1 May 2000), pp. 28–30.
U.S. policy toward China: judge China by its deeds, not its words', Foreign Policy Research Institute
  • June Teufel
  • Dreyer
June Teufel Dreyer, 'U.S. policy toward China: judge China by its deeds, not its words', Foreign Policy Research Institute, (6 April 2001).
China cashes in', Insight Magazine
  • Michael Waller
Michael Waller, 'China cashes in', Insight Magazine, (24 December 1999).
The Coming Conflict with China, p. 131. 46. Timperlake and Triplett
  • Bernstein
  • Munro
Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, p. 131. 46. Timperlake and Triplett, Red Dragon Rising, pp. 75–77.
China's 22nd province
  • Timmerman
Timmerman, 'China's 22nd province', pp. 38–45.
WTO: life support for Communist China?', Investor's Business Daily
  • Frank J Gaffney
Frank J. Gaffney, 'WTO: life support for Communist China?', Investor's Business Daily, (1 December 1999).
Timperlake and Triplett, Year of the Rat
  • Ibid
Ibid., p. 126. 61. Timperlake and Triplett, Year of the Rat, pp. 164–167.
Red Dragon Rising, p. 98. 71. Timperlake and Triplett, Red Dragon Rising
  • Timperlake
  • Triplett
Timperlake and Triplett, Red Dragon Rising, p. 98. 71. Timperlake and Triplett, Red Dragon Rising, p. 142.
What China knows that we don't', The Weekly Standard
  • Robert Kagan
Robert Kagan, 'What China knows that we don't', The Weekly Standard 2(18), (20 January 1997), pp. 22–27.
The China threat issue
  • Roy