The year 2020 will go down in history as the year of COVID-19. With the World Health Organization’s declaration of an International Pandemic on 11th March 2020, its social and economic consequences have spread globally as quickly as the virus itself and, in no small measure, the decease has ushered in a new normal which has yet to be fathomed. Concepts such as teleworking for business and the e-campus for education, particularly in the way these are facilitated by the simplicity of platforms such as Zoom, Teams, etc., are probably here to stay – at least to some extent and in some form. The effects of this on business travel, education and e-commerce are likely to be profound (Suau-Sanchez et al., 2020: Conway et al., 2020; Pokhrel & Chhetri, 2021; Mohdhar & Shaalan, 2021).
Of course, with the outbreak of the pandemic, both global production and international trade initially declined. Naturally, this had to do with the lockdown in China and the closure of many of its production facilities in January 2020. The situation in China initiated a supply shock in Europe, North America and other parts of the world. Container shipping lines resorted to blank sailings on the trade routes with China, while companies tried frantically to reassess their supply chain exposure to that country. The Chinese lockdown led to serious disruptions in global supply chains, demonstrating, if any more lessons were needed, the pivotal role of China as the engine of global industrial production. The initial supply shock was followed by a demand shock, i.e., the lockdowns in Europe and North America that followed in March 2020, substantially reduced the demand for Chinese imports. The short-term economic effects of COVID-19 have been most immediately and acutely felt in the contraction of global demand, mainly for merchandize goods, and the curtailing of passenger travel, holidays, and entertainment. It should be noted, however, that the contraction in overall demand experienced over the course of the whole of 2020 has not been as dramatic as many analysts had predicted and, to the benefit of the shipping industry, the same was also true for international trade. The reason was because the contraction of demand experienced in some sectors had been compensated for by an increase in demand in others, such as electronic equipment (e.g., computers and peripherals, video game consoles etc.); mobile phones; exercise equipment; home-improvement and gardening materials and last but by no means least, medical equipment, such as surgical masks, gowns and disinfectants, most of which were manufactured in China.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that during the various lockdowns of the first half of the year (H1 2020), inventories were run down, as evidenced by the substantial restocking that took place in the second half of 2020 (H2 2020). This restocking wave, combined with an increased demand for consumer products, initiated a global supply chain crisis which lasted through 2021 and the first half of 2022. The peak in demand was partly fed by extensive COVID-related financial support packages implemented by governments in North America and Europe, and the further easing of monetary policies. The resulting excess demand pushed the global logistics system to its limits and became one of the root causes of high inflation (BIS, 2022).
The primary objective of this chapter is to identify the effects and implications of a major disruptor (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) on the activities, operations, management structure and performance of the international shipping and ports industries. Hopefully, lessons learned from our analysis could be useful in addressing other disruptors or uncertainties in and around ports and the global maritime landscape by and large. These emerge constantly, both in number and severity, due intensified competition and the need for ‘lean and mean’ operations for firm survival. Examples of such disruptions range from the effects of wind on high-stacked containers in the yard, to a labour strike or the loss of hundreds of millions of euros because of a successful ransomware cyberattack. Our analysis is undertaken by positioning the immediate impact and potential longer-term implications of this significant disruptor (COVID-19) within the wider context of contemporary research in the area of maritime economics. What follows, therefore, is a critical assessment of some of the key issues and themes in maritime economics research, attempting at the same time to propose new avenues of thought for further port research in a post COVID-19 era. We summarize the main developments by identifying trends and exploring research challenges, gaps and points of (re)orientation. Instead of providing answers, therefore, we provide inputs to ongoing discussions by sketching emerging and eminent issues in the hope that this will provide some guidance for further maritime studies in the field.
To this end, the rest of this work is organised as follows: In section 2, the short-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the shipping industry is summarised, with a specific focus on liner (container) shipping. This provides the short-term demand-side context for the immediate and potentially longer-term response of the (container) ports sector, as the supplier of cargohandling services to the shipping industry. Section 3 outlines the confounding effects associated with the more stringent environmental regulations that have been imposed on the shipping industry immediately prior to, and following, the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The immediate short-term effect of the pandemic on (container) ports and the shipping industry’s response to it are outlined in section 4. The focus of the work is to be found in section 5, where the longer-term implications for the governance of ports is discussed, in relation to the industry’s geopolitical and commercial context, potential business models, the standard port governance typologies, the potential emergence of new approaches to port governance and the role played by the various ‘models’ and measures of port performance. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.