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The Effects of Happiness and Sadness on Moral Reasoning
Abstract
Three experiments were designed to investigate effects of mood on college students' capacities of moral reasoning. Following a mood induction, the standard or a modified version of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) was administered to measure moral reasoning. The results of Experiment 1, using the standard short form of the DIT, showed elated subjects performed more poorly and took longer than subjects in neutral and sad mood conditions. The results of Experiment 2, using the self-orientated DIT, showed that mildly depressed subjects performed better than did subjects in neutral and happy mood conditions. The results of the third experiment, presenting more socially disturbing moral dilemmas, showed no effect for either happy or sad mood conditions. Reviewing recent literature of studies on mood and cognition, this study extended the theories and predictions of those studies to the moral context for the purpose of exploring our moral reasoning capacities in real life and enriching our current understanding from moral educational situations.
... The role of emotion in shaping individuals' moral judgments has been widely researched (Schnall et al. 2008;Horberg, Oveis, and Keltner 2011). For example, previous studies have found that emotions such as empathy, happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust affect individuals' moral judgments (Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen 1978;Sarlo et al. 2014;Zarinpoush, Cooper, and Moylan 2000;Pettigrove and Tanaka 2014;Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2013). Notably, previous studies on humorous advertising suggest that humour can also elicit negative emotions such as disgust, which can be counterproductive to advertising effectiveness (Larsen and McGraw 2014;Buijzen and Valkenburg 2004;McGraw and Warren 2010). ...
Despite the potential of humour in increasing positive marketing outcomes, some consumers may negatively evaluate humour in advertising. This is because even though consumers perceive a humorous advertisement as funny, such content can also elicit negative emotions. Extending the literature in this area, the present research explores how consumers with high (vs. low) levels of moral identity react more negatively to a humorous advertisement. Further, this effect is driven by the emotion of disgust elicited by the humorous content. These predictions are tested across three studies. As such, the findings of this research offer theoretical and practical implications by highlighting the potentially negative role of moral identity in consumer evaluations of humorous advertisements.
... Many studies have shown that in addition to individual self-awareness, social context factors are also important sources of variation that affect individual moral judgment and evaluation (Pizarro 2010;Sinnott-Armstrong 2006;Wynn 1990;Zarinpoush et al. 2000). Relevant scholars put forward the concept of "mediazation", emphasizing the shaping role of media as a social context factor in social culture (Hjarvard 2013). ...
Although the relationship between traditional media usage and moral evaluation has been studied in China, it is not clear what role religion plays in this relationship. The 2013 Chinese General Social Survey was used to examine the moderation role of religious identity and religious practice in this correlation. The STATA 15.1 and PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 2) was employed. This research confirms that religion has a moderating role in the correlation between traditional media usage and moral evaluation. Specifically, religious identity, no matter whether it is polytheistic or monotheistic, will strengthen the correlation between traditional media usage and moral evaluation. However, religious practice will weaken the correlation between traditional media usage and moral evaluation, except the religious practice of monotheism in China. Furthermore, our findings prove that religion is an important situational factor in the correlation between traditional media usage and moral evaluation. We should take religious identity and religious practice as independent factors to conduct a richer study in the future. Most importantly, our findings further confirm that the rationalization of society does not necessarily lead to the secularization of religion.
... The upshot is that the influence of new experience on model updating (revising expectations) will be stronger when feeling negative emotion. This is consistent with a body of work showing that people in a sad mood process information more carefully and attend more to detail (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990;Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994;Gasper & Clore, 2002;Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000;Zarinpoush, Cooper, & Moylan, 2000), whereas people in a happy mood tend to rely more on heuristics and prior expectations (e.g., filling in details from stereotypes, schemas, scripts; Bless et al., 1996;Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994;Park & Banaji, 2000), and that these phenomena may relate to differences in uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). ...
The application of computational neuroscience models to mental disorders has given rise to the emerging field of computational psychiatry. To date, however, there has been limited application of this approach to understanding the change process in psychotherapy. In this chapter, we review leading approaches in computational neuroscience: predictive coding, active inference, and reinforcement learning. We then provide examples of how these complimentary approaches can be used to model a range of clinical phenomena and associated clinical interventions, including those associated with emotional awareness, specific phobia, maladaptive self-related beliefs, maladaptive repetitive behavior patterns, and the role of re-experiencing negative affect in the therapeutic process. We illustrate how this perspective can provide additional insights into the nature of the types of memories (cast as parameters in computational models) that maintain psychopathology, how they may be instantiated in the brain, and how new experiences in psychotherapy can alter/update these memories in a quantitatively model-able manner. We conclude that the computational perspective represents a unique level of description that compliments that of the integrated memory model in a synergistic and informative manner.
... The fact that a decision can be made without explicit volition suggests that it is possible (without always being the case) to produce a moral judgment completely intuitively. Consistent with this, emotion and affective state are often described as a significant and intuitive part of moral reasoning and have been shown to consistently influence moral decision-making [19][20][21]. Activation of the sympathetic nervous system is an implicit aspect of the affective experience that is associated with moral reasoning. This has been documented using skin conductance [22][23][24] and the findings indicate that production of a moral decision is generally associated with higher sympathetic activation when compared to an immoral decision. ...
As the first step of social information processing, visual encoding underlies the interpretation of social cues. Faces, in particular, convey a large amount of affective information, which can be subsequently used in the planning and production of adaptive social behaviors. Sociomoral reasoning is a specific social skill that is associated with engagement in appropriate social behaviors when faced with dilemmas. Previous studies using eye tracking suggest that visual encoding may play an important role in decision-making when individuals are faced with extreme moral dilemmas, but it is not known if this is generalizable to everyday situations. The main objective of this study was to assess the contribution of visual encoding to everyday sociomoral reasoning using eye tracking and ecological visual dilemmas. Participants completed the SocioMoral Reasoning Aptitude Level (SoMoral) task while their eye movements and pupil dilation were recorded. While visual encoding was not a predictor of sociomoral decision-making, sociomoral maturity was predicted by fixation count. Thus, in an ecological context, visual encoding of social cues appears to be associated with sociomoral maturity: the production of a justification is associated with volitional encoding strategies. Implications with regards to the dual-process theory of sociomoral reasoning and social information processing are discussed.
... Transparency International o Transparencia Internacional, es una organización mundial que lleva varias décadas midiendo la percepción de la corrupción en casi todos los países del mundo. asociado a otras variables como el estado de ánimo (Zarinpoush, Cooper, & Moylan, 2000), el ambiente de trabajo (Saat, Porter & Woodbine, 2012), el resultado del comportamiento moral (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005), la recordación de textos narrados y escritos (Narváez & Gleason, 2007), las actitudes religiosas (García, 2008) y el afecto (Barger & Derryberry, 2013), entre otras. ...
2018). Validación de un instrumento para medir el desarrollo moral en el contexto de situaciones relacionadas con la corrupción. Psicogente 21(40), 291-305. https://doi. Resumen Objetivo: Este artículo presenta la validación de una adaptación del Defining Issues Test, versión corta (DIT-SF) para medir el desarrollo moral en torno a la corrupción. Método: La muestra fue de 232 estudiantes universitarios de varias profesiones y niveles con edades comprendidas entre los 15 y 33 años de ambos géneros. El instrumento validado (DIT-C) tiene 3 subescalas donde cada una corresponde con un dilema y unos ítems asociados de la cual se obtiene una puntuación. Resultados: 1. Existen correlaciones significativas entre las 3 subescalas del DIT-C. 2. Todas las subescalas explican un porcentaje de la varianza y, 3. La validación externa con otro instrumento de desarrollo moral presentó correlaciones estadísticamente significativas. El alfa de Cronbach fue de 0.809. Conclusiones: el DIT-C es un instrumento para medir la expectativa individual propia de la corrupción que cumple con varias de las condiciones mínimas de confiabilidad y validez para medir el desarrollo moral en torno a la corrupción. Palabras clave: desarrollo moral, corrupción, cuestionario de problemas sociomorales, evaluación, psicometría. Abstract Objective: This paper presents the validation of an adaptation of the Defining Issues Test, short version (DIT-SF), to measure the moral development around corruption. Method: The sample was 232 university students of various professions and levels between the ages of 15 and 33 of both genders. The validated instrument (DIT-C) has 3 subscales where each one corresponds with a dilemma and associated items from which a score is obtained. Results: The results indicate that: 1-There are significant correlations between the 3 subscales of the DIT-C, 2-All subscales explain a percentage of the variance and, 3-External validation with another instrument of moral development presented statistically significant correlations. Cronbach's alpha was 0.809. Conclusions: The DIT-C is an instrument to measure the individual expectation of corruption that meets several of the minimum conditions of reliability and validity to measure the moral development around corruption.
... Transparency International o Transparencia Internacional, es una organización mundial que lleva varias décadas midiendo la percepción de la corrupción en casi todos los países del mundo. asociado a otras variables como el estado de ánimo (Zarinpoush, Cooper, & Moylan, 2000), el ambiente de trabajo (Saat, Porter & Woodbine, 2012), el resultado del comportamiento moral (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005), la recordación de textos narrados y escritos (Narváez & Gleason, 2007), las actitudes religiosas (García, 2008) y el afecto (Barger & Derryberry, 2013), entre otras. ...
Objetivo:
Este artículo presenta la validación de una adaptación del Defining Issues Test, versión corta (DIT-SF) para medir el desarrollo moral en torno a la corrupción.
Método:
La muestra fue de 232 estudiantes universitarios de varias profesiones y niveles con edades comprendidas entre los 15 y 33 años de ambos géneros. El instrumento validado (DIT-C) tiene 3 subescalas donde cada una corresponde con un dilema y unos ítems asociados de la cual se obtiene una puntuación.
Resultados:
1. Existen correlaciones significativas entre las 3 subescalas del DIT-C. 2. Todas las subescalas explican un porcentaje de la varianza y, 3. La validación externa con otro instrumento de desarrollo moral presentó correlaciones estadísticamente significativas. El alfa de Cronbach fue de 0.809.
Conclusiones:
el DIT-C es un instrumento para medir la expectativa individual propia de la corrupción que cumple con varias de las condiciones mínimas de confiabilidad y validez para medir el desarrollo moral en torno a la corrupción.
This paper considers two studies that address negative affective states and moral reasoning while taking the Defining Issues Tests (DIT, DIT2). Both studies confirmed earlier findings that the DIT dilemma, ‘Heinz and the Drug,’ and the DIT2 dilemma, ‘Famine,’ are related to increased anger and sadness and decreased moral reasoning. Similar findings were observed in the context of a video consideration of a real-life dilemma paralleling these two dilemmas (Study 1). Comparable findings pertaining to Famine were also observed among three samples of different moral judgment developmental levels, further implicating the role of dilemma content where the trends observed are concerned (Study 2). Overall, both studies illustrated similar patterns of affective states and moral reasoning across all considered DIT/DIT2 dilemmas thereby offering further evidence of the joint involvement of rational deliberation and affective states in the consideration of DIT/DIT2 dilemmas.
In the post-material era, people are increasingly focusing on the pursuit of happiness. This popular interest
has been met by a growing number of authors and interventionists who promise routes to happiness. In
large part, these avenues to the good life are anchored in the results of scientific studies. Here, we offer the
caution that there may be an optimal level of happiness. While it is true that happiness is widely beneficial,
there is also a growing body of research suggesting that it is not always beneficial for all people. In this
chapter, we define happiness and review the literature suggesting that more nuance discussion is needed.
We focus on three ways that happiness might be sub-optimal, including mood dysregulation (being happy
regardless of circumstance), complacency (curtailing effort), and affect imbalance. We conclude by
discussing three contexts that interventionists and policy makers ought to consider when promoting
happiness. These include attention to happiness in specific life domains, distinguishing between short and
long-term hap
Forty male and female adults responded to two forms of Kohlberg's test‐‐one in the standard third‐person form, and the other imagining themselves as the protagonists in Kohlberg's dilemmas. Females obtained slightly lower moral maturity scores than males across both forms, but there were no sex differences in moral orientation. There were no significant effects for the perspective from which Kohlberg's test was taken, on either moral maturity or moral orientation. Care‐oriented moral judgements were more prevalent in dilemmas involving life vs. law conflicts than in dilemmas involving conscience vs. punishment conflicts. Subjects did not consistently make either care‐ or justice‐oriented moral judgements. There was a significant negative correlation between the frequency of care‐oriented judgements and moral maturity for males, but not for females. Although these results are partially consistent with the possibility that Kohlberg's test and scoring system are biased against females, they do not support the assumption that females make more care‐oriented moral judgements than males on Kohlberg's test, or, indeed, that members of either sex display enough consistency in care‐and justice‐based moral judgements on Kohlberg's test for such judgements to serve as the basis of moral orientations.
Describes experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in Ss by hypnotic suggestion to investigate the influence of emotions on memory and thinking. Results show that (a) Ss exhibited mood-state-dependent memory in recall of word lists, personal experiences recorded in a daily diary, and childhood experiences; (b) Ss recalled a greater percentage of those experiences that were affectively congruent with the mood they were in during recall; (c) emotion powerfully influenced such cognitive processes as free associations, imaginative fantasies, social perceptions, and snap judgments about others' personalities; (d) when the feeling-tone of a narrative agreed with the reader's emotion, the salience and memorability of events in that narrative were increased. An associative network theory is proposed to account for these results. In this theory, an emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categorization. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Several procedures for the experimental induction of mood states have been developed. This paper reviews nearly 250 studies from the last 10 years which concern mood induction procedures. A classification system is introduced. According to the stimuli used to influence subjects, five groups of mood induction procedures (MIPs) are differentiated. The effectiveness of MIPs is analysed and compared. The Film/Story MIP and the Gift MIP proved to be highly effective in inducing elation. For the induction of depression, the Imagination MIP, the Velten MIP, the Film/Story MIP and the Success/Failure MIP can be recommended.
This introduction to the two-part special issue reviews recent evidence that suggests that positive mood may play a beneficial, multifaceted, and flexible role in self-regulatory processes that cannot be explained by most current theories. First, under some conditions positive mood seems to facilitate careful processing of goal-relevant information, even negative information. Second, the relation of positive mood to cognition and behavior seems to be strongly moderated by goal-relevant features of the task context. Three frameworks (mood as input, processing advantages conferred by positive mood, and mood as resource) that may account for these facilitating effects of positive mood on self-regulation are discussed.
One hundred college students were randomly divided into four groups and were administered the standard version (i.e., other-orientation) of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and/or a Modified version (i.e., self-orientation) of the same instrument on two separate occasions. Subjects displayed greater amounts of principled moral reasoning when responding to the standard (other-orientation) rather than the modified (self-orientation) version of the DIT. Also, significant test-retest reliability was obtained for the standard, but not the modified, version of the DIT. The role of affective factors in the evaluation of moral problems involving the self versus hypothetical others was discussed.
Gilligan's concern for a negative bias in assessing moral reasoning based on feminine interpersonal orientations and corresponding positive bias in favor of masculine orientations of justice and equity was explored. Bem's Sex Role Inventory provided a psychological index of orientation rather than only biological sex. College men and women completed Rest's moral dilemmas (DIT) in the usual manner-other condition-or assumed the role of the central character-self condition. The latter procedure augmented affective dimensions assumed to underlie orientation differences. Males in the other condition scored higher on the DIT than those in the self condition; females revealed the opposite pattern. Using the sex role categories, it appeared that androgynous males had higher DIT scores in the self condition than in the other condition, in direct contrast to the overall results for males. For females who were androgynous or masculine in orientation, the self condition resulted in higher DIT scores than the other condition. Generally, the greater affective demands in the self condition produced a higher frequency of Stage 3 use for men and women regardless of sex role orientation. The other condition showed a higher percentage of Stage 4 use among males and females independent of sex role orientation. Sex role orientation and affective arousal were discussed in terms of Gilligan's view of moral judgment development.
This study investigated the extent to which people interpret real-life moral dilemmas in terms of an internal moral orientation, as Gilligan (1982, 1988) has suggested, or in terms of the content of the dilemma, as Wark and Krebs (1996, 1997) have reported. Thirty women and 30 men listed the issues they saw in descriptions of real-life prosocial, antisocial and social pressure types of moral dilemma. Results revealed that Gilligan's model underestimates the influence of dilemma content. Moral dilemmas differed in the extent to which they were viewed in terms of the same issues by different participants. There was relatively little within-person consistency in moral orientation. There were four gender differences. Compared to men, women rated social pressure dilemmas as involving more care-orientated issues, and prosocial dilemmas as more significant. Compared to women, men viewed all dilemmas as involving more justice-based issues, and reported experiencing more antisocial dilemmas.