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The ‘security paradoxes’ of the Black
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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
a
a
International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Athens, Greece
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region, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9:3, 225-241
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2009, 225–241
ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online
© 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14683850902934143
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The ‘security paradoxes’ of the Black Sea region
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou*
International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Athens, Greece
Taylor and FrancisFBSS_A_393586.sgm10.1080/14683850902934143Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies1468-3857 (print)/1743-9639 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis93000000September 2009DimitriosTriantaphylloud.triantaphyllou@icbss.org
The international order has entered a new era that is characterized by dramatic
changes, in terms of both structure and process. Within this evolving non-polar
world, the emergence of the Black Sea as a region and as a geopolitical hub is
undeniable; yet the issues at hand are many, complex and challenging. A number
of key paradoxes that have shaped the profile of the region to date, and will
continue to define its future, are ever more clearly making their presence felt. This
article attempts to illustrate and bring to the surface these paradoxes, namely the
interplay between economic growth/subregionalism versus ethnonationalism/
security dilemmas and the ‘neighbourhood perception paradox’. The purpose is to
help assess the current state of play and address the key questions for the future of
the region.
Keywords: Black Sea region; security paradoxes; regionalism; perceptions;
neighbourhood policies; ethnonationalism; energy security
The Black Sea region in the emerging new world order
The international order has entered a new era that is characterized by dramatic
changes in terms of both structure and process, resulting in the emergence of a precar-
ious new world balance. To date, the highlight of this new era has undoubtedly been
the election of a new administration in the United States, under the leadership of
Barack Obama. Since the inauguration of the newly-elected president on 20 January
2009, one can already observe the dismantling of a number of Bush-era policies, lead-
ing to rising expectations across the globe. At the same time, however, an ongoing,
ever-growing international financial and economic crisis with projected negative
growth in 2009 for the industrial world and predictions for a very limited recovery in
2010 makes the picture somewhat bleaker by adding new challenges to the agenda.
1
If one also takes into account the persistent security dilemmas deriving from the after-
math of the killing fields of Gaza (and South Ossetia), the situation in Afghanistan,
and the 2008 terrorist attacks in India combined with the tense relations with Pakistan
and the ‘Iranian enigma’, to name but a few, it becomes obvious that the international
(security) agenda – in particular Barack Obama’s – is filled to the brim and bound to
overflow.
In parallel with these political and security shifts, another ongoing process is the
transformation of international organizations that are struggling to discover their
role on the world stage, as the current set-up (whether institutional or policy) does
not reflect the variable balance of power and the new realities of the world today.
*Email: d.triantaphyllou@icbss.org
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226 D. Triantaphyllou
At the same time, some states are trying to adjust their political and economic
agendas in order to deal with the financial crisis while others are simultaneously
facing long-standing structural socioeconomic and political problems and (security)
dilemmas.
Overall, the international order seems to be in flux, dominated by a number of
actors that have at their disposal a number of instruments of influence. More precisely,
according to Richard Haass, today’s international relations reflect non-polarity – ‘a
world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of
actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power’ (Haass 2008, 44).
This redefinition of the international order implies that great power rivalry is alive
and kicking, compounded by globalization, which ‘has increased the values, velocity,
and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything’, thereby leading to an
increase in the number of threats and vulnerabilities of countries such as the United
States and conceivably giving rise to a condition of ‘non polar-disorder’ (Haass 2008,
44–8). For the European Union, the new global puzzle is just as challenging, as the
future of the international system, the future of global governance and the future of
democracy will define the nature and ability of the Union to pull its weight on the old
continent, as well as within its immediate neighbourhood and across the globe, in the
years to come.
2
Finally, the emerging theoretical and pragmatic debate about the
nature of international relations in non-Western societies such as Russia, China, India
and the Muslim world (among others) reflects the need for a more universal under-
standing of concepts such as ‘governance’, ‘democracy’ and ‘hegemony’ in order to
better grasp the nature of the evolving international order.
3
Within this emerging non-polar world, the Black Sea region
4
– a region encom-
passing the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and some of the European
Union’s member states (and therefore the Union)
5
– undoubtedly constitutes a high-
priority region; not least due to the presence of Russia, as well many of the aforemen-
tioned issues and the paradoxes stemming from the region itself. Especially after 2001,
where unipolarity has steadily been giving way to an emerging new world order with
power being diffused, the emergence of the Black Sea as a region and as a geopolitical
hub is undeniable. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the issues at hand are many,
they are complex, and they are challenging. A number of key paradoxes that have
shaped the profile of the region so far and will – to a certain degree – continue to define
its future, are ever more clearly making their presence felt. By and large, security para-
doxes have been ‘hard-wired’ into the ‘Black Sea system’, and fundamental features
of paradigmatic realist/neorealist and reflectivist/constructivist approaches, both
related to security competition, have not only been relevant in the case of the Black
Sea region but have also been analytically predominant.
Regarding the structure of the paper, it is organized as follows. After this brief
introduction on the position of the Black Sea region on the world stage, the theoretical/
methodological background of the analysis follows. Overall, by using a blend of mate-
rialist and ideational elements from the prevailing theoretical approaches, this section
has the objective to clarify, utilize and apply concepts and notions such as ‘region’,
‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’ to the case of the Black Sea region in order to
illustrate and bring to the surface the main paradoxes of the region, namely the inter-
play between economic growth/subregionalism versus ethnonationalism/security
dilemmas and the ‘neighbourhood perception paradox’. The third section deals with
the current state of play – the situation on the ground – and the main focus is on the
key issues at stake, namely the policies of the key actors and how these have produced
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 227
security paradoxes/dilemmas. The fourth part, which constitutes the core of the paper,
deals with the paradoxes of the region as formulated by the policies of the regional
and extraregional actors as well, while the last section tries to briefly assess the future
prospects of the region.
Conceptualizing the Black Sea region: a material and ideational approach
Overall, the problem of defining a region – and not only the Black Sea region in
particular – is extremely complex. The term ‘region’ has no standard definition; one
can find in the literature a plethora of definitions for this particular term as it has many
different, if not opposing, connotations and interpretations both in scholarly and popu-
lar parlance, indicating that the notions of regionalism and regionalization (analysed
below) mean different things to different people (Hettne 2005, 544, 562; Russett 1968,
317–52; Nye 1968, vii; Neumann 1994, 53–74; Bailes 1999, 161–3). Therefore, in
order to overcome the particular problems of the Black Sea region, this study uses a
priori the working definition of the European Commission mentioned above, empha-
sizing basically the concepts of ‘regionalism’
6
and ‘regionalization’
7
and deliberately
avoiding any reference to other related terms such as ‘regional integration’, ‘region-
ness’, ‘regionhood’, ‘region-building’, etc.
8
This study uses all the analytical tools/
criteria taken from different theoretical perspectives and thus, while applying the
concept of ‘balance of power’ that is closely related to neorealism, it also focuses on
how power politics are socially constructed under anarchy, and how identities and
interests are transformed (Wendt 1992).
The first conceptual problem that emerges in the case of the Black Sea region is
related to its definition. Indeed, the ‘regionality’ of this geographic sector remains
rather vague. Are common history, geographic proximity and some common concerns
and challenges enough to cause regionalism and thus define the Black Sea as a region,
or is it something more than that? A prompt reply would be that the Black Sea is not
yet consolidated as a distinct self-aware entity. At the same time, however, the geopo-
litical understanding of the Black Sea region by the various actors takes its existence
and geographical coherence for granted (Aydin 2004, 5). One could argue that this
correlation of geography and politics, so clearly evident in the Black Sea, requires a
geopolitical approach. Borrowing from the thinking of traditional geopolitics, the
Black Sea could be certainly described as a ‘natural geopolitical centre’ or a new
‘geopolitical pivot’ (Pavliuk and Klympush-Tsintsadze 2004, 9; Goncharenko 2005,
23–32). Furthermore, as Felix Ciut
[abreve] suggests, the Black Sea region (project), situated
at the crossing-point of the key concepts of ‘region’ and ‘security’, is defined basically
by ‘its emphasis on security threats as a key regional coagulant and its understanding
of the region as an organizing category rather than an ontological one’ (Ciut 2008,
129).
Alexander Goncharenko’s approach is testament to the geopolitical upgrade of the
Black Sea region. More specifically, Goncharenko (2005, 23) argues:
From a classical geopolitical point of view, the wider Black Sea region is one of the
cornerstones of Euro-Asian stability and security. It is part of an extremely important and
sensitive area – with huge natural resources and major strategic transport and energy
corridors – on the frontier between the Heartland and the Rimlands. Control over this
region determines control of Euro-Asia both today and in the future. For this reason the
Black Sea area… has been a centre of gravity for the geopolitical, political-military,
financial-economic and other interests of the main global and regional powers.
a˘
a˘
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228 D. Triantaphyllou
Notwithstanding this geopolitical/materialistic approach, King goes even further and
points out that the Black Sea should not be approached only as the result of geopolit-
ical calculations, but as a product of history, in the sense that in the past there has been
a web of ‘connections’ that may exist once again. In this regard, he is cautious enough
to add that regions are not about commonalities of language, culture, religion or other
common and unifying traits. On the contrary, the formation of a region, he argues, is
basically about ‘connections’ implying profound and durable linkages among people
and communities that seem to mark off one space from another (King 2004, 6–7).
Therefore, in this study the Black Sea region is both a project and a product of
discourse. Last but not least, in this intellectual endeavour of the definition of the
Black Sea as a region, many approach it as a Regional Security Complex (RSC)
including both material and ideational elements that are shaped by both structure
(material and ideational) and process.
9
In short, although this overproduction of crite-
ria creates some methodological barriers, at the same time it allows for flexibility and
the freedom to approach this region and its security state of play from different angles
and to bring to the surface its diverse paradoxes.
Regarding its geography (which, as elaborated later, does constitute one of the key
paradoxes of the region), the Black Sea region is a distinct geographical area rich in
natural resources, strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia and
the Middle East. Situated at the epicentre of the grand strategic challenge of stability
projection into a wider European space, it constitutes a front line in dealing with the
new frontiers of the West having acquired a key role in the US-led ‘global war on
terror’ (Asmus and Jackson 2004, 20). Indeed, at least in terms of geography, the
Black Sea region rapidly became a bridge of paramount importance between the Euro-
Atlantic community and the strategic zone of the Middle-East – Caspian Sea – Central
Asia.
In terms of its own history, the region has been prone to various types of conflicts
(internal and external) whereby new realities and old tensions have coexisted (Nuriyev
2002, 1–2). Divided by conflicts, blockades and trade restrictions and characterized by
complex causal relationships and correlations, one of the results so far has been the
absence of any ‘strong’ institutional set-up. Overall, the region has long been poor in
institutional and political dialogue. The insecurity dynamics, including the protracted
conflicts and the various separatist movements; the security of vital oil and natural gas
pipelines; the difficult process of the democratization of weak states; flourishing orga-
nized crime; ecological risks; and massive economic underdevelopment, have all been
sustained by a lack of trust (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006, 7–8). As a result, the region, at
least for the time being, seems not to be influenced by the spirit of regional cooperation
that has been in place since at least June 1992, as expressed by the establishment of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). In fact, due to the differences among
them, the attention of the states of the region has been directed more outside the region
rather than on the region itself or on interaction with their neighbours while, when the
focus of the regional heavyweights such as Russia and Turkey has been toward the
region, their objective has been traditionally how this region could potentially become
part of their respective spheres of influence (Lynch 2003, 9–10).
The state of play: challenges and concerns
Before proceeding to an elaboration of the paradoxes, an assessment of where the
region stands today is necessary. The most interesting and urgent challenge has to do
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 229
with both regional and extraregional actors. Will the engagement of Russia by the
Obama administration on a variety of longstanding global imperatives elevate Russia
to greater than regional power status, to which the Kremlin’s current leadership
aspires? Will this engagement strengthen Russia’s hold on its ‘near abroad’ in the
Black Sea region? Will it create the conditions for stability and prosperity? As a
consequence, what will be the implications of this power shift on the Black Sea region
as a whole?
10
How will another regional power like Turkey, with aspirations for an
ever greater regional and global role (participation in the G-20, role model as moder-
ate Islamic country, Alliance for Civilizations co-chair, regional leader, etc.), react to
greater Russian influence?
11
Also, what will be the future of the countries that have
chosen the path of the Euro-Atlantic integration?
Within this context, some of the key concerns and challenges of the Black Sea
region are outlined below.
Energy and energy security
The energy feud between Russia and Ukraine in December 2008/January 2009 is a
clear indicator of the importance of energy security for the region and its customers,
especially the European Union. Oil and natural gas – together with their exploration,
production and transport – are commodities that flow across borders, however tenuous
these may be (Sherr 2009). Overall, energy has become a major national and regional
security concern, and in the case of the Black Sea region – the principal transport route
of energy resources from the Caspian Sea and Russia to the West – it is also a testing-
ground for the pattern of relationships among the producer (e.g. Russia, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan), the transit (e.g. Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine), and the consumer
countries. Ultimately, the energy security issue is a proving-ground for EU–Russia
energy cooperation in particular, and for EU–Russia relations in general (Roberts
2008, 54–6; Triantaphyllou 2007, 289–302).
Dealing with Russia
The 2008/2009 winter energy gridlock between Russia and Ukraine has also led to a
more balanced, less ideological and subjective analysis regarding Russia and its role.
In other words, the muck-raking – whether periodic, systematic or inherent – regard-
ing Russia and its current regime has given way to more realist analyses, especially in
Western media outlets and among researchers, of the foreign policy and role of the
countries in the region. Concepts such as the inevitability of a ‘soft war’ with Russia
(Jackson 2006, 3–14) have gradually been replaced by concerns about the ability of
Ukraine (and Georgia) to be reliable partners. Nevertheless, the vestiges of ideological
or bloc divisions (whether these come from Moscow or Western capitals) continue to
pose a challenge.
The redefinition of US–Russia relations as previously mentioned could and
would seriously define whether cooperation in the region will be enhanced, or the
existing divisions emphasized. The problem has been the lack of hard and unbiased
analysis on Russia. As a result, ‘Western thinking on Russia has too often substi-
tuted analogy for analysis’ (King 2008b, 11). According to Stephen Sestanovich, a
more realist approach is necessary in order to recalibrate US–Russia relations in
particular and rethink national priorities (2008, 12–28). The impact on the uneasy
status quo between Turkey and Russia is also another important dimension. Turkey
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230 D. Triantaphyllou
recently felt the limits of overreach when it received a firm rebuke from some EU
states when it attempted to link its support for the Nabucco pipeline to its EU
accession talks.
12
Weak states – bad governance
The shaken credibility in Ukraine and Georgia (or, to be more precise, in their current
leaderships) to bring about the requisite transformation inspired by the Orange and
Rose revolutions, respectively, has placed their eventual Euro-Atlantic integration on
the back burner. The question remains whether this also implies the end of European
integration for Ukraine in particular, or a renewed effort to integrate – based not on
the undelivered promises of reform, but on clear conditionality, where a condition is
cooperation with all its neighbours (read: Russia). A clearer assessment of integration
driven by interests and measurable benchmarks, including effective and responsible
use of power by the governments of the region, are gaining greater weight today (Ladi
2008).
The EU factor
The European Union’s role in the region to date leaves much to be desired. EU lead-
ership is needed, but the question is whether it is feasible. The EU is involved in the
region on a number of fronts: it launched the Black Sea Synergy in 2007 and the East-
ern Partnership in 2008. Both are ambitious, though somewhat contradictory – and
complementary – policies calling for more engagement in the Union’s Eastern neigh-
bourhood (Tsantoulis 2009; European Commission 2007, 2008). Furthermore, since
October 2008 the Union has deployed a monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM)
under the European Security and Defence Policy while it was also actively involved
in mediating the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute. Also, in December 2008 the EU adopted
a report beefing up its European Security Strategy by giving prominence to issues
such as energy security, the various protracted conflicts, human security and greater
engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood (Council of the European Union 2003;
European Commission 2008). On the other hand, the lack of progress on the ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty, which would enhance the Union’s foreign policy prospects
and the continued inability to achieve consensus regarding the status of Kosovo (and
hence its implication for the separatist regions of the Caucasus and their recognition)
have placed serious constraints upon the Union’s ability to pull its weight in the
region. For example, the inability to arrive on a modus vivendi with Russia on
the development of their common neighbourhood continues to be a thorn in the side
of the EU.
Future worries
Finally, a number of issues that are currently less obvious priorities will eventually
make their way up to the surface and will need to be handled by all stakeholders
concerned. One such worry, which is also a key challenge, has to do with the future
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet once the lease on Sevastopol expires in 2017. Reports
of the construction of a naval base in Abkhazia actually suggest that the issue needs
to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Beyond the tricky issue of the Fleet’s future
deployment, the economic impact of the withdrawal of the fleet on Sevastopol itself
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 231
is a concern in itself. Ideas include one propounded by the city’s mayor, that Sevasto-
pol become a Free Economic Area merit consideration. Another possible flashpoint
has to do with Crimea’s future.
13
Imaginative solutions that assure its future within
Ukraine need further study.
In light of these concerns, what should be done? Conceivably, the countries of the
region have to constructively work together, either bilaterally or regionally, within
the framework of existing cooperative arrangements (such as BSEC, among others).
This continued cooperation – which within the BSEC, for example, has survived the
August 2008 Georgian–Russian war – acts as a confidence-building measure or mech-
anism for all its stakeholders. In this context, the European Union, in its capacity as
an observer to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), needs to assert itself and
stress that regional cooperation is part and parcel of successful engagement and devel-
oping closer ties with its ENP East partners. A lesson from both Georgia’s and
Ukraine’s recent troubles with Russia is that attention needs to be paid to their neigh-
bour(s) while they seek to integrate with the West. In other words, further integration
into Euro-Atlantic structures need not imply the severing of relations with powerful
neighbours that have no such aspirations. Regional cooperation needs to be perceived
as helping states eventually move away from zero-sum thinking and actions.
14
Facing the paradoxes
In terms of paradoxes, the Black Sea region is home to many vestigial attitudes and
ideological divides, and thus great power (neorealist) politics remain, in part due to
the presence of a number of relatively weak states that seek or need protectors,
anchors or hegemons in either regional or extraregional powers, which in their own
right aim to enhance their role in relation to each other. As such, the region can be
perceived to be replete with paradoxes such as:
● On the one hand, the Black Sea region ‘has become a new strategic frontier for
Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security, frozen and
festering conflicts, trade links, migration and other key policy areas’ (Hamilton
and Mangott 2008; Brzezinski 1997). On the other hand, others suggest that in
spite of the many dividing lines, the ‘incentives for regional cooperation are
clear’ (King 2008a). There is thus an ongoing battle between obstacles and
incentives to regional cooperation.
● The economic equation shows one of the fastest-growing regions in the world,
with improving key socioeconomic indicators region-wide, but with wide-
ranging disparities among and within the various states of the region.
● Notwithstanding the economic disparities between the states of the region, the
increased prosperity of some – due in particular to gas and oil revenues – brings
about increased arms sales in the hope of unblocking the deadlock over some of
the protracted conflicts such as Nagorno–Karabakh. According to Steven Main,
‘the traditional link between increasing economic prosperity and decreasing
military threat does not seem to work here: it must be one of the few regions in
the world where increasing wealth may, in fact, bring about resumption in
hostilities’ (Main 2006, 2).
● The tendency for certain issues to both divide and unite: one such issue is energy
and energy security, which has the potential to act as a factor enhancing regional
security and cooperation, given that both oil and natural gas are commodities
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232 D. Triantaphyllou
and natural resources that are vital for the modern globalized economy. Never-
theless, the correlation between energy, pipeline wars, the restrictions imposed
by the Montreux Convention regarding the tonnage of military ships allowed
access to the Black Sea, and a perceived Russian–Turkey condominium (bige-
mony) regarding influence in the Black Sea, all contribute to deepening fault
lines in the region, as energy security seems vulnerable to great power compe-
tition (Kogan 2008; Thumann 2006; Mangott and Westphal 2008; Roberts 2008,
54–6; Triantaphyllou 2007, 289–302).
● The same applies to the role and interest of the European Union, whose power
of attraction leads many of the region’s stakeholders with membership to prefer
privileged bilateral ties with the Union and downgrade the regional cooperation
approach. In fact, the current debate regarding the confusion between the Black
Sea synergy and the Eastern Partnership policies is a case in point (Tsantoulis
2009).
15
● The notion of neighbourhood and how it is perceived by key stakeholders is a
major conundrum. Does it enhance further cooperation, or further division and
competition?
● While regional cooperation is sought by the region’s stakeholders, its
institutionalization has proved to be a difficult endeavour.
● Finally, the most challenging paradox has to do with the coexistence of both
globalization and entrenched nationalism in the wider Black Sea region.
However, although one can discern a number of key paradoxes in the region, the two
– and interrelated – key contradictions, namely the ‘regionalism paradox’ and the
‘neighbourhood paradox’, both driven by the overarching ‘perception paradox’, are
assessed in detail below. Both these paradoxes contain many elements of the chal-
lenges outlined above. Interestingly, all these concerns could augur instability as well
as the potential for constructive, long-standing cooperation and stability.
Failing regionalism (cooperation versus power politics)
In the case of the Black Sea Region, and in particular for the former Soviet bloc coun-
tries, regionalism was considered to become the route for overcoming the economic
and security vacuum in the region. With the end of the Cold War, this kind of ‘new
regionalism’
16
has quite simply been recognized by the countries of the region as a way
of overcoming marginalization and strengthening links with the advanced industrial-
ized states. Indeed, it was an attractive proposition, since regional economic agreement
increased the ability of developing countries to attract Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI). Also, regional initiatives offered the possibility of adopting a step-by-step
approach to liberalization, which would cushion some of the adjustment loss. For
developing countries, like most of the Black Sea states, participation in subregional
and regional cooperation schemes alongside more developed and experienced states
was considered to be a step towards integration into the broader global system and
adjustment to the competitive milieu of globalisation (Tsardanidis 2005, 362, 368).
The result of this process has been quite impressive. Since the late 1990s, the
region has witnessed a fairly rapid economic recovery growth. Countries like
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, which experienced the most severe tran-
sition ‘blues’, demonstrated the fastest growth rates. Actually, since 2000, GDP has
more than doubled in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and expanded more than 50% in
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 233
Georgia and Ukraine. In the other countries of the region, cumulative economic
growth has been in the range of 30 – 40%, while in Russia it barely reached its pre-
transition GDP level, despite the significant growth (Astrov and Havlik 2008, 126).
According to the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), in 2007 the
Black Sea region grew at nearly twice the rate of the world economy, at a rate of
6.1.%, lagging only behind the regions of East Asia and Pacific (10%) and South Asia
(8.4%), which have benefited respectively from China’s and India’s ‘continued excep-
tional outturns’ (BSTDB 2008, 13).
17
Also, there has been a sense in which regionalism has become fashionable, even
desirable. Leaders, both from the newly emerging states of Eastern Europe and from
the former Soviet Union, soon realized that a commitment to regionalism is likely to
receive the approval of the international community in various policy fields, even includ-
ing cooperation on security issues, and was therefore a policy worth pursuing. While
in the early 1990s Black Sea regional cooperation was fashionable, as it allowed newly
independent states to make their first appearance in international fora, over time it came
to be accepted as a means to deal with real economic development and transition issues
(Manoli 2007, 8). In fact, trade among Black Sea countries increased 352% between
1999 and 2006, from US$ 36.2 billion to US$ 163.5 billion (from 5.4% to 7.8% as a
share of GDP) (BSTDB 2008, 18). However, at the same time one could also discern
hidden objectives behind Black Sea regionalism. Namely, the whole idea to form
regional organizations and promote regional initiatives had the following purposes:
● to be a form of reaction/response of weaker states towards great powers
(‘alliance formation’), e.g. GUAM (against Russia);
● to contain and possibly entangle the regional hegemon(s);
● to use regional integration as an instrument to become attached to the hegemon,
i.e. to seek regional accommodation with the regional hegemon in the hope of
receiving special rewards (labelled ‘bandwagoning’ by neorealists); and
● to be a resource for the hegemon (e.g. Russia, Turkey) itself ‘to pursue its inter-
ests, to share burdens, to solve common problems and to generate international
support and legitimacy for its policies’ (Hurrell 1992, 50–2).
In this regard, it is truly paradoxical that although there has been significant economic
growth (and although regionalism could act as a catalyst of further prosperity and stabil-
ity, following the example of European integration and the more similar case of the
Baltic Sea), the countries of the region decided to follow the path of zero-sum thinking.
Moreover, one can also discern another paradox concerning the established regional
organizations. Inclusive organizations – like the BSEC, which was designed to promote
a consensual economic agenda – did not deliver, due to conflicting interests. At the
same time, organizations bearing some resemblance to ‘alliance formation’, like
GUAM, also failed to produce positive results, as their agenda – to entangle the regional
hegemon – did not provide the incentives to promote cooperation among them.
Therefore, the key question is whether the need for regional cooperation, region-
alization and regionalism, as it emerged in the post-Cold War era, clashes headlong
with the ability of institutionalizing this process. Can organizations such as the BSEC
and GUAM–Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED), and
initiatives such as the Black Sea Forum or the Community of Democratic Choice
(CDC), enhance and contribute to cooperation; or are they in themselves divisive,
given that the content of their respective agendas and the nature of their membership
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234 D. Triantaphyllou
are potentially more problematic than emblematic? In other words, many of the afore-
mentioned initiatives can actually be seen as promoting economic cooperation as a
source of security ‘on the basis of a paradigm of security that is linked to democracy,
respect for human rights and good governance’ (Ciut
[abreve] 2008, 124). The predominant
question is: can they actually do so, or is their inability to be effective symptomatic of
the differing perceptions regarding the nature and content of regional cooperation? Is
the current regionalism viable? A recent study shows that part of the problem stems
from the lack of equal or requisite commitment to regional cooperation by all the
states of the region; a scientific community that ‘is absent from the debate and policy-
making on Black Sea regionalism’; and a lack of strategic thinking on all issues
(Manoli 2007, 158). As a result, national imperatives hinder substantive progress on
regional cooperation.
Furthermore, beyond the interplay of regionalism and nationalism, an interrelated
paradox has to do with the coexistence of globalization alongside the entrenched
nationalism of the countries of the wider Black Sea region (Muller 2008, 13). The
combination of economic, technological, social, cultural and political forces that
account for the reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order to
facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services and labour – globalization – has to share
its space with resurgent nationalism, which according to some analysts is ‘the domi-
nant force in contemporary Turkish and Russian politics and foreign policy’ (Lesser
2007, 33). In this respect, perceptions of one’s neighbours and attempts to democra-
tize and possibly join Western institutions such as the European Union by some of the
countries of the region, under the wary eye of others, imply that the prospects for a
modus vivendi between the various regional and extraregional actors and stakeholders
in the region is an extremely difficult exercise.
Competing ‘neighbourhood policies’
Yet another paradox has to do with the notion of ‘neighbourhood’ and how it has been
perceived by the key stakeholders. The European Union’s neighbourhood policy has
been based on the idea of bringing down dividing lines. As stated explicitly in its
December 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU has the strategic objective to
‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate
neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy
close and cooperative relations’ (European Council 2003). Furthermore, the European
Union has acknowledged the shared common neighbourhood with Russia as a space
where the ‘EU and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common
concerns’ (ibid.). For Russia, on the other hand, the notion of neighbourhood (its ‘CIS
space’) has been based on preserving its ‘historical and spiritual heritage’. According
to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,
Not only Russia has privileged interests, first and foremost, in relations with our closest
neighbors; they also have the same privileged interests in Russia. Failing to understand
it and trying to destroy what rests on our combined objective history and on the interde-
pendence and intertwining of our economies, infrastructures, cultures and humanitarian
spheres of life means to go against history. (Lavrov 2008)
As a consequence, for Russia, the EU’s neighbourhood policy and the Eastern
Partnership (among others) are revisionist policies that strive to remove the
a˘
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 235
post-Soviet space from Russian influence; thus the ‘voluntary or involuntary aim of
such method is to preserve the dividing line in Europe and move it ever closer to the
Russian border’ (ibid.).
For Russia, the wider Black Sea area is an important part of its foreign policy: it
constitutes part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’, as well as being important as an energy tran-
sit region. More specifically, Russia seeks to remain one of the main stakeholders in
the region, ‘given the emergence of new strong regional (Turkey) and external actors
(the US/NATO)’; it wants to counter and curb extremism, separatism and terrorism
in the region; it wants to secure continuous energy, trade, civil and military commu-
nications ‘within and throughout the Black Sea and the [Bosporus] Straits’; and it
seeks to prevent new dividing lines in the region including ‘the expansion of military
coalitions which exclude Russia as a full member’ (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2008, 25–
8). At the same time, Russia is not convinced that the EU’s European Neighbourhood
Policy could successfully contribute to making the shared neighbourhood more stable
(an objective shared by Russia), as it does not effectively bar the road to further future
EU enlargement. The following analysis by Arkady Moshes (2006, 24) could not be
more telling:
Brussels cannot ignore a consolidated push of EU new member states to be more active
on the eastern periphery. As long as it denies membership perspective for its neighbours,
the policy of Wider Europe that it pursues (however palliative it may look) nevertheless
stimulates their search for alternatives to staying within the same geopolitical and geo-
economic space as Russia. Moscow, in this situation, starts viewing the EU not so much
as a partner, but rather as a systematic rival to its foreign policy goals in the Western NIS
and the Caucasus; a revisionist power; and is instinctively inclined to get involved in a
‘zero-sum game’ type of relationship with the EU.
This implies that, while there is conjunction on dealing with fundamental concerns
between the EU and Russia, major differences remain as to how Russia perceives the
interest and approach of the EU in the common neighbourhood. Indeed, it is interest-
ing to examine the different perceptions towards the region. The Black Sea region has
historically been part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’, while from time to time it has also
been perceived by Turkey as a Turkish lake. Today, it is also conceived to be the
West’s new frontier. As a consequence, the ‘new strategic frontier’ paradox, enhanced
by a ‘perception paradox’, places obstacles to, rather than promoting incentives for,
regional cooperation.
Conclusion
The ‘perception paradox’ – the concept of a perception (or misperception) of the
‘Other’ and his/its behaviour – is to a large extent a prevailing condition in the
Black Sea region. Though the countries of the region have invested resources in
enhancing regional cooperation within the framework of a regional organization such
as the BSEC, these same states have been reluctant to ‘empower further the organisa-
tion and its bureaucracy’ (Manoli 2007, 158). The relevant hegemons – Russia, the
European Union, the United States (and Turkey) – have each been concerned with
their proper ‘national’ imperatives. As a consequence, they have been unable to effec-
tively promote a true culture of regional cooperation, and as such the region keeps
teetering between being a potential trouble spot due to the balance of power dynamics
between the hegemons and a model for further institutional regional cooperation.
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236 D. Triantaphyllou
For the United States, the choice – as Zbigniew Brzezinski reminds us – is between
global domination and global leadership. The argument is that the United States is
confronted by a unique paradox: it is both ‘the first and only truly global superpower,
and yet Americans are increasingly preoccupied with threats from a variety of much
weaker hostile sources’ (Brzezinski 2008, x). In fact, even in today’s post-American
world, the issue is not the decline of the United States but rather the ‘rise of the rest’,
and the ability of the United States and the effectiveness of other rising hegemons in
governing globally (Zakaria 2008).
For Russia, the stake is how it perceives itself. According to Dmitri Trenin, the
‘Kremlin’s new approach to foreign policy assumes that as a big country, Russia is
essentially friendless; no great power wants a strong Russia, which would be a formi-
dable competitor, and many want a weak Russia that they could exploit and manipu-
late. Accordingly, Russia has no choice between accepting subservience and
reasserting its status as a great power, thereby claiming its rightful place in the world
alongside the United States and China rather than settling for the company of Brazil
and India’ (2006, 87–8).
For the European Union, the issue is whether the Union, at the relatively tender
age of 27, has the ability to lead and put to use the ‘smart power’ paradigm that Hillary
Clinton, in her Senate confirmation, expounded for her country.
18
The transformative
experience of the European Union is a manifold process that is sorely needed in the
region. At a time when the United States is putting its house in order and seeks to rede-
fine its international relations, the Union is still barely managing to achieve coherence
in its external action as the Lisbon Treaty escapes ratification. As a result, its potential
is thwarted.
The Black Sea region – part EU region, and a large part of its common neighbour-
hood with Russia – seeks guidance, cooperative action and greater engagement by all
stakeholders. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. For example, as was
proposed at a conference on the Black Sea in early 2009, the Russian proposal for a
new Europe-wide security pact could be an opportunity for the EU to introduce and
promote the notion of ‘overriding European interests’ and include the dimensions of
energy and energy security in the discussions on the shape of the new security frame-
work (Chatham House 2009). Simultaneously, the promotion of a set of commonly
defined principles regarding energy and energy security in the BSEC or some other
inclusive regional cooperation framework could also be another targeted action that
engages all states of the region and obliges key energy-producing and transit states to
work with their neighbours.
In other words, the potential for further Black Sea regional cooperation is great.
The various security paradoxes presented and detailed in this paper suggest the need
to make regional cooperation viable. Yet, at the same time, the growing list of these
paradoxes – combined with the fragile balance of power between the European Union,
Russia, and the United States, and the forces of entrenched nationalism in the region
– could eventually lead to making Black Sea regional cooperation a permanent victim
of deep-rooted antagonisms.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Nikolaj Kocev of the University of National and World Economy,
Sofia and Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo and Yannis Tsantoulis of the International
Centre for Black Sea Studies, Athens for their valuable comments on a previous version of the
paper.
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 237
Notes
1. According to Roger Altman, this financial crisis, the worst in over 75 years, not only has
financial and economic implications, but has also created major geopolitical setbacks to vari-
ous countries including the United States, European Union (EU) and Japan (Altman 2009).
Also, according to the International Monetary Fund’s latest assessment of the world econ-
omy, ‘the world growth is forecast to fall to its lowest level since World War II, with financial
markets remaining under stress and the global economy taking a sharp turn for the worse,
sending both global output and trade plummeting’ (International Monetary Fund 2009).
2. The nature of the international system has to do with the changing definition of ‘power’ in
a world where the absence of a hegemonic power is likely to lead to either a multipolar or
a non-polar world. The global governance variable is linked to the impact and effect of
globalization and its ability to transcend state borders and the ability of the states to manage
and ‘govern’ it. See, in particular Gnesotto and Grevi 2006, 198. The future of democracy
is undeniably one where Fareed Zakaria’s (1997) distinction between ‘illiberal’ or ‘liberal’
democracy is a reality.
3. See, in particular, Shani 2008; Callahan 2008; and Tsygankov 2008.
4. This study uses the term ‘Black Sea region’, which, according to the European Commis-
sion, ‘…includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Russia
in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south. Though
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history, proximity and
close ties make them natural regional actors’ (European Commission 2007). However, two
other definitions merit consideration. The first is the term ‘wider Black Sea area’. This is
basically used within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); it
includes the 10 countries mentioned above, plus Serbia and Albania. The other is the term
‘wider Black Sea region’, which is used by the German Marshall Fund and by the Central
Asia–Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. This definition is more political
than geographic, as it is associated with the forging of a Western and Euro-Atlantic strategy
for the region (see Asmus 2006; Cornell et al. 2006).
5. Within this context, it should be noted that, as Ronald Hatto and Odette Tomescu point out,
‘the definition of the region is not only a matter of geography but also is related to politics,
economics, security and culture’ (1). Indeed, usage of the term ‘Black Sea region’ exceeds
the purposes of terminology and goes beyond the simple political and geographical barriers,
as there are geostrategic, economic and sociopolitical reasons to link the ‘Black Sea region’
area (in the strict geographical sense, consisting only of six littoral states) with the non-
littoral states. In this manner, all the issues at stake are included and the complexities of the
region can be unfolded and amplified (see Tsantoulis 2008, 7–8; Hatto and Tomescu 2008,
1). In a similar vein, it is worth considering Charles King’s historical assessment of the
Black Sea: ‘over the long course of history, the Black Sea has more often been a bridge
then a barrier, linking religious communities, linguistic groups, empires, and later nations
and states into a region as not as any other in Europe or Eurasia’ (King 2004, 12).
6. The notion of ‘regionalism’ is still characterized by extraordinary vagueness. In short,
regionalism refers to a tendency and a political commitment to organize the world in terms
of regions; more narrowly, it refers to a specific regional project; in some definitions, the
actors behind this political commitment are states, and in others, non state-actors. Andrew
Payne and Andrew Gamble define regionalism as ‘a state-led or states-led project designed
to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines’, while
Helge Hveem talks about ‘an identifiable group of actors trying to realize the project’
(Gamble and Payne 1996, 2; Hveem 2003, 83; Hurrell 1992, 39).
7. ‘Regionalization’ refers to the more complex processes of forming regions; whether these
are consciously planned or caused by spontaneous processes is not agreed upon by all
authors. Actually, many support the argument that regions can emerge by either means.
Furthermore, regionalization is based on territorial boundaries (which may or may not
coincide with state borders) encompassing individuals who directly or indirectly interact
with each other, and are governed by an administrative apparatus (see, for example,
Engelen 2004; Hurrell 1992, 39; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999; Katzenstein 2004;
Gamble and Payne 1996; Fishlow and Haggard 1992).
8. Although these terms merit consideration, this study examines only the notions of ‘region-
alism’ and ‘regionalization’ in order to show one of the key paradoxes of the region. Also,
Downloaded by [Kadir Has Universitesi Kutuphanesi] at 23:40 11 October 2011
238 D. Triantaphyllou
it should be noted that both notions are used according to prevailing definitions in the IR
literature.
9. There are many definitions of this analytical term, but perhaps the following two also
present the evolution of this approach. One of the first definitions – and perhaps the most
widely used – is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together suffi-
ciently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from
one another’ (see Buzan 1991, 190). A few years later, Buzan added elements from the
securitization theory and argued that RSC is a set of units whose major processes of secu-
ritization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ (see Buzan et al. 1998, 12).
10. Incidentally, in a recent article by Henry Kissinger on what the new US administration ought
to do in the international arena, Russia is not mentioned even once: see Henry Kissinger,
‘The chance for a new world order’, International Herald Tribune, 12 January 2009.
11. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, a key advisor to the current Turkish prime minister,
‘Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capacity of maneuvering in several
regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate envi-
ronment’ (see Davutoglu 2008, 78).
12. On a visit to Brussels, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, said on 19 January 2009
that ‘if we are faced with a situation where the energy chapter remains blocked, we would
of course rethink our position [on Nabucco]’. Reacting to Erdogan’s remarks, Germany’s
Economy Minister at the time said that ‘Turkey is engaged in “political blackmail”’ (see
‘Turkey plays energy card in stalled EU accession talks,’ http://www.euractiv.com/en/
enlargement/turkey-plays-energy-card-stalled-eu-accession-talks/article-178623, 20 Janu-
ary 2009, and ‘Turkey blackmailing EU over gas pipeline, German Minister says,’ http://
www.dw-world.de/dw/article/o,,3962409,00.html, 20 January 2009).
13. See, in particular, Maigre 2008.
14. Regarding the term ‘regional cooperation’, it normally refers to joint efforts by states to
solve specific problems. Ernst B. Haass defined the concept as follows: ‘regional coopera-
tion is a vague term covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation
designed to meet commonly experienced need’. Andrew Axline asserted that ‘regional
cooperation can only be understood from the perspective of the national interests of the
individual member states, and that the politics of regional negotiations will involve accom-
modating these interests for all partners’ (see Haas 1958, 16; Axline 1994, 217).
15. While the Black Sea Synergy promotes the regional approach, the Eastern Partnership
enhances bilateral ties between the EU and its eastern neighbours.
16. The term ‘new regionalism’ is an advance over different versions of integration theory, as
it emphasizes the social, political and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon, apart from
the purely economic, which has traditionally been the focus of analysis. See Hettne and
Inotai 1994, 1998; Page 2000; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 1999, 7–8; Telò 2001; Fawcett
and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996.
17. It should be noted that for the BSTDB, the Black Sea Region encompasses the 12 member
states of the BSEC.
18. ‘We must use what has been called “smart power”: the full range of tools at our disposal –
diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – picking the right tool, or
combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard
of foreign policy’. Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, nominee for Secretary of
State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.
Notes on contributor
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou is Director General of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies
(ICBSS), Athens and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of the
Aegean.
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