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Conclusion: Emerging Issues in the Study of Church-State Relations
Zsolt Enyedi
INTRODUCTION
The contributors to this volume have analysed recent developments in church and
state relations in various European countries. They investigated particular dimensions
of these relations, and pointed at new research directions in the field. On the basis of
the analyses they present, one may identify eight major tasks lying ahead for political
scientists who study the interpenetration of religion and politics in the European
context. These tasks involve 1. the study of the dynamics of contemporary church-
state relations, 2. the extension of existing theoretical frameworks to take account of
east European developments, 3. the re-assessment of the significance of
denominational differences for the links between churches and state, 4. the scrutiny of
the links between national identities and discrimination among churches, 5. the
analysis of the impact of European integration, and of the development of global
governance, 6. the conceptual clarification and operationalisation of the different
dimensions of church and state relations, 7. systematic mapping of the strategic
options of the churches in twenty-first century Europe, and, finally, 8. establishing the
nature of the links between church-state regimes and the national political structures.
Some of these topics are age-old, but new developments or obsolete conceptual tools
necessitate their revisiting, while others stem from recent political processes.
THE DYNAMICS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
Church and state relationships are, as is the case with other national institutional
structures, the products both of historical traditions and of conscious, rationally
planned, and democratically legitimised statecraft. But, there are probably few areas
where modern norms are as much in contradiction with inherited structures. The
contradictions between the two principles do not necessarily lead to open political
conflict, but the reform of old institutions and practices is today a topic of political
2
discussion in virtually all European states. The re-configuration of church-state
relations typically happens through cautious and often tacit re-interpretation of the
existing rules, but revolutionary changes do also occur, particularly in states
undergoing political transformation.
1
There are some commonalities in the national
and regional trends, but there is no common European model yet, although state
support for church institutions, respect for the self-determination of religious
communities and the extension of privileges to a growing circle of religious
organisations seems to be the norm in most countries.
2
Secularisation, understood
here as institutional differentiation and the dismantling of religious monopolies, is the
leading trend, but it is far from being linear and monotonous.
There are converging tendencies not only across Europe but between Europe
and the United States as well. Partly as a result of the policies pursued by the Bush
administration, European-style state support for churches has attracted considerable
interest. The irony is that while in the USA churches and politicians have begun to
embrace the idea of closer co-operation between church and state, in Europe, the
principle of separation finds growing support among religious sectors.
The European changes often have a common starting point, and this is the
formal or informal establishment of one particular church. But, even where the recent
changes in church and state relations can be perceived as a move away from this
starting point the direction of the changes differ from country to country. While
Ireland is ready to make concessions towards pluralism, but is less ready to embrace
the spirit of classical liberalism, Greece is inclined to accept the predicaments of
individual liberalism, but is reluctant to provide room for genuine pluralism
3
.
As the individual contributions to this volume have shown, churches are still
in very different positions in the European liberal democracies. In Greece the
Orthodox church is in the position of a quasi public authority vis-à-vis the other
churches when it comes to decisions, for example about the construction of religious
buildings
4
. As opposed to that, in the Czech Republic the majority church has had to
struggle to have its voice heard in political discussions about the status and role of
religion in the new post-communist society.
5
To sum up, in spite of the common
pressure towards less discrimination and more religious freedom, different starting
points and different directions characterise the church-state relations in Europe.
3
Approaches that emphasise path-dependency may be particularly useful in explaining
the variance.
6
EASTERN EUROPE
The fall of the Berlin Wall signalled a new era in the study of church-state relations.
Not only did a new region become accessible to researchers, but also new processes
and configurations emerged as a result of the post-communist transition. These
processes and configurations refocused attention on questions of freedom of religion
and religious equality. After regimes that oppressed and even, on occasion, attempted
to suppress religion tout court, the new power holders throughout the region often
came under pressure to establish a hierarchy of denominations based on historical
traditions and on the ‘appropriateness’ of the present behaviour of the respective
churches.
In terms of denominational composition, depth of religiosity and church-state
relations, eastern Europe confronts us with a bewildering complexity. Countries
dominated by Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, or Protestant churches on the one hand,
and confessionally mixed nations are found in the region.
7
Some of the most, and
some of the least, religious countries of the continent are located here within close
proximity of each other. Even the communist past differs across the region, varying
from a relatively high tolerance of church autonomy to exceptionally violent anti-
religious and anti-church policies.
he patterns of political-ideological alliance differ too. While in the Catholic
and mixed-confession countries there is generally a polarisation between Christian
centre-right and anti-clerical left, in the Czech Republic the right is also dominated by
secular, even anti-clerical forces. While nationalism, anti-communism, and
clericalism often form a single package, in the Orthodox countries anti-communism is
still not a self-evident part of this ideological pattern and the political space has not
broken down into clerical and anti-clerical camps.
The churches in the region are both perpetrators and victims of the
discriminatory state policies. After surviving the worst possible discrimination under
communism, they emerged as potentially influential political players, with
considerable moral capital. Endowed with this initial advantage, but burdened with
4
the consequences of long decades of suppression, the churches have had to make
difficult choices. They had to commit themselves to particular institutional models,
and to define their position vis-à-vis political actors, especially the political parties.
The memory of the repressive anti-religious policies of the previous regime, the
search for a new national identity, the need for the establishment of a new church-
state model, and the ongoing crisis of political legitimacy often turned religion into a
politically divisive factor.
Eastern Europe is a particularly promising area for the research of normative
political approaches towards religious equality. While in long standing democracies
the inherited institutional relations between churches and the state are often accepted
by the political actors without much critical reflection, in post-communist countries
any particular aspect of regulation must be argued for.
8
There is little space for inertia,
even the maintenance of the status quo requires explicit justification. In the course of
the political transition the logic of communist dictatorship was replaced with the
principles of democratic universalism and national sovereignty. But the national
historical traditions are often at odds with the liberal egalitarian-universalistic
principles. The constraining factors, the pre-communist traditions, the interests of the
actors involved, and the expectations of the international environment might point in
different directions. The result is most often untidy compromise. But, in the course of
establishing a balance between these principles a large number of practical and
philosophical issues must be addressed, providing the observer with rich material for
understanding the potential relationships between religion and politics.
DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES
The inclusion of eastern Europe into traditional typologies helps in clarifying the
impact of confessional background as well. The impression that is gained from studies
on European Union countries is that Catholic and Orthodox domination is not
compatible with pluralism
9
. But in eastern Europe the coexistence of majority
Catholic and Orthodox churches with other significant denominations can be analysed
in countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, or the Ukraine.
Confessional background is still one of the most powerful predictors of church
and state relations. But denominational background must be studied à la Rokkan, in
5
conjunction with historical alliances specific to the respective countries.
10
The
different attitude of the Catholic church in Poland and the Czech Republic and the
fundamentally different relations between church and state in these countries are not
understandable without taking into account the position of the church in the time of
nation-formation.
In multiconfessional countries the conflict potential of religious politics is
higher, but it is also more likely that institutionalised practices of tolerance develop.
Mono-confessional background, on the other hand, may lead to particularly severe
clashes between clerical and anti-clerical forces (Catholicism) or to the development
of inner pluralism within the ruling church (Lutheranism, Orthodoxy).
11
Comparing
countries of different confessional backgrounds has the methodological benefit of
reminding us that the power of churches cannot be measured with a single yardstick
across denominations. Catholic churches, having a well defined social teaching, pay
close attention to public policy formation, especially on moral issues, while Orthodox
churches focus on community related issues, and tend to be less concerned with
questions of individual morality.
But differences between individual countries even within the Orthodox world
are obvious. While the Orthodox churches have generally been politically passive,
functioning in symbiosis with sympathetic governments, this has not always been the
case. Sometimes, as in Greece, the maintenance of close links with the state requires
political mobilisation, and anti-governmental campaigns. The Romanian Orthodox
clergy also has a political agenda. For example, it has pressured the government for an
elevated status in the constitution, the reservation of seats for the clergy in the upper
chamber, and the maintenance of legal discrimination against homosexuals. Many of
its demands are rejected by the government, and the church has even been ordered to
return property to the Greek Catholics, a denomination whose legitimate existence is
questioned by the Orthodox clergy.
12
Church-state relations are politicised, the stakes
are high. But, in accordance with the Orthodox pattern, no open conflict has
developed between the church and the state or the church and the various political
parties, and no anti-clerical party has been formed.
6
NATIONAL IDENTITY
National identity, particularly on the peripheries of Europe, is often built around
religious values and is linked to church-state regimes as well. Churches provide
rituals, unity, and identity for community builders even in the modern world.
Denominations differ in their readiness to combine with nationalism, but historical
dynamics are as important as denominational differences. Churches with an
international spirit can, over time, become national and the reverse is also true.
13
Nationalism also deserves attention because it is intrinsically related to discrimination
among churches. New religious movements are often regarded as ‘anti-national’,
especially when they have a global centre outside of the state.
The links between the nation and religion are often recognised, but the
implications of these links for church-state relations must be more fully taken into
account. These links mean that the logic of nationalism and national identity
formation may have a direct impact on church-state relations and even on
ecclesiastical structures. For example, ethnic, civic, diaspora, or imperial nationalisms
may all require a different church structure as well. The tensions between
Constantinople and Athens show that competing understandings of national interests
may leave their mark on the power structures within the churches and shape the
expectation towards the role of the state in regulating churches.
14
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Domestic factors are less and less able to account for the dynamics of church and state
relations. International NGO’s, various European bodies, and the American
government are all major players in shaping national patterns, particularly on issues
related to discrimination among churches. In the last decade a large number of
legislative drafts were prepared in countries like Georgia, Russia, Estonia, and
Romania, aimed at restricting the rights of religious minorities. Yet these drafts were
all, in the end, withdrawn, modified, or vetoed by the president, largely as a result of
international pressure.
The process of globalisation, understood as the growth in economic, legal,
cultural, and political interdependence, affects church-state relations in various ways.
7
Accelerated immigration reduces religious homogeneity all over Europe, polarises
opinions on the relationship between politics and religion, and leads to the appearance
of religious organisations which do not easily fit into existing frameworks.
15
In Europe, the further integration and expansion of the European Union deserves most
attention. The norms prevailing in the European Union have an especially great
impact on those eastern European countries that are asking for accession.
The practice of certain states like France and Belgium shows, at the same
time, that blacklisting marginal denominations is not at all incompatible with EU-
membership. The activity of new religious movements is clearly a matter of concern
for the European bodies. In 1996, the European Parliament warned member states to
be cautious with granting legal status and tax exemption to these new organisations.
The Assembly of the Council of Europe also discussed the issue of sects in 1999. The
terminological uncertainties and the lack of a neutral language in these debates are
telling. One rapporteur emphasised that ‘… present opinion tries to avoid all kind of
ideological considerations and any argument or presupposition of a religious,
theological or spiritual nature’. At the same time he claimed that ‘false teachers,
dangerous sects and narrow-minded “religious” groups have always tried to pervert
the natural sense of people for spiritual values’, and warned that there is a new wave
of such movements in Europe.
16
The Assembly discouraged nation states adopting
anti-sect legislation, warned against any discrimination of religious minorities, and
committed itself to state-neutrality. It also recommended the establishment of a
European observatory institution to monitor ‘groups of a religious, esoteric or spiritual
nature’
17
.
The European Union’s legal system is constantly challenged by the sharp
differences between the member states’ regulations on church and state matters, and it
usually supports the status quo. As its decisions show, the European Court of Human
Rights tolerates establishment, differential treatment of mainstream and peripheral
churches, and the denial of ‘church’ status to certain religious groups. It has also
found the banning of Refah, the islamist Turkish party, acceptable, in spite of the fact
that the party, which used to be the largest in the Turkish parliament, played by the
rules of democratic competition. Even when state authorities are found to violate the
rights of religious groups, the Court, as with its American counterpart, prefers to treat
them not as freedom of religion, but as, for example, freedom of speech issues.
8
OPERATIONALISATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
Concepts like neutrality, establishment, or erastianism are more at home in historical
studies, legal theory, or political philosophy than in empirically oriented comparative
politics. The various existing typologies provide us with many insights, but it is a
further question whether these analytical concepts are empirically justified. In order to
test the validity and reliability of these constructs, we need to break them down into
components, and to see whether the various elements subsumed under a specific label
hang together as well empirically. A preliminary analysis has distinguished seven
major components of church-state relations: privileges attached to state recognition,
threshold of state recognition, financial subsidies, discrimination, the general attitude
of the state towards religion, church autonomy, and church influence over education.
18
Only after decomposing large concepts in this or in other alternative ways, and only
after identifying the empirical indicators may one hope to find answers to questions
like: Is the type and degree of privilege given to churches (tax exemptions, subsidies,
access to public facilities) predictable from the size of the threshold that is required to
pass in order to achieve church or recognised-denomination status? Is the amount of
financial support given to churches systematically related to the degree of the
autonomy of churches? Is there a linear correlation between degree of separation and
the state’s pro-religious orientation? Is there a positive relationship between the state
support provided to religious welfare agencies and educational institutions? Is
government support of religion associated with higher levels of control over
churches?
A theoretically driven empirical investigation could also reveal whether there
is a trade-off between the formal and informal privileging of churches, as the example
of Ireland suggests, where formal establishment was unnecessary because of the
tremendous informal power of the church. As Kissane shows, in such cases even state
neutrality can become a technique for maintaining the social power of the church. The
utility of representing dimensions of church and state relations in the form of ordinal
scales is demonstrated by Minkenberg’s chapter, which shows that church-state
regimes are useful as independent variables not only for explaining religious vitality
19
,
but for explaining public policy outputs as well.
9
Church-state regimes are independent variables also in the sense that they shape the
self-image of the actors, and thereby determine their behaviour
20
. The way churches
perceive their role is important since churches constitute complex organisational
phenomena, which may appear in many guises. As stated elsewhere:
‘Even within the restricted field of modern Europe, religious bodies
(institutions, organisations, groups) have a protean capacity to present
themselves vis-à-vis the state in a number of distinct guises, for
example:
As providers of ‘Truth’ (cp. other worldviews and ideologies)
As more or less hierarchically organised bureaucracies
As voluntary associations (cp. stamp collectors or ramblers)
As interest or pressure groups (cp. labour unions)
As public corporations/public utilities (cp. post office or water
works)
As institutions or sets of institutions (cp. university)
As states within the state (cp. the military ).’
21
The multi-faceted nature of churches raises particularly interesting questions
concerning the opposition between private and public. The insistence of churches on
retaining or acquiring autonomy, or developing a political agenda, may be particularly
contentious when they function as ‘para-public’ institutions.
A conceptual mapping of church-state relations must be sensitive to the
paradoxical nature of these relations, meaning that while they involve two main types
of actors, they affect three types of interests: the interests of states, churches, and of
non-believers. The third group has often no institutional manifestation, although, in
some countries and in some periods, liberal parties, humanist organisations and
various anti-clerical movements fulfil such a role. The complexity of the situation is
further increased by the fact that clericalism and religiosity are different social
phenomena, and therefore religious but not clerical and clerical but not religious
groups may equally exist.
10
Most typologies of church state relations from as early as Weber’s discussion
of hierocracy and caesaropapism, concentrate on the question of which two
institutional actors, church or state, has the upper hand. As the chapters of this volume
have shown, the answer to this question is, in many cases, far from obvious. It is
often difficult to detect which actor is using the other one
22
. States that were seen at
some point as confessional, have in retrospect become regarded as party states.
23
.
Finally, a conceptual rethinking of church-state relations would need to
reassess the validity of market analogies. Regulation, for example, is often regarded
as the opposite of competition
24
. But fair competition presupposes a certain level of
regulation, therefore the impact of state- determined thresholds on competition needs
to be studied empirically
CHURCH STRATEGIES
Today churches are rarely dominant actors in their relationship with the state, but they
are not passive subjects of state regulation either. Their political strategies in the
context of the twenty-first century need to be systematically analysed.
Neutrality is a central concept in the analysis of church strategies. While states
are expected to be religiously neutral, churches are expected to be politically
impartial. Although it is rare for religious officials to be constrained in their political
activity by law, direct partisan agitation is often seen as incompatible with democratic
functioning. At the same time, protests on behalf of marginal groups such as
immigrants, or opposition to extremist forces, for example, that of the French clergy’s
actions against Le Pen, are usually judged differently. Transitions from dictatorship to
democracy also provide a context in which democrats expect churches to take a stand.
And indeed, the southern and eastern European political transitions have many
examples of clergymen playing an instrumental role in the process of democratisation.
Churches are part of civil society, and can promote civil virtues even when bound by
a hierarchical organisation.
25
But even churches which accept the basic principles of liberal democracy, like
the Spanish Catholic church, may demand constitutional recognition of their primacy
in certain cases, and even churches which acquiesce to the reality of church-state
separation, like the Polish Catholic church, may fight against its explicit inclusion in
11
the Constitution.
26
The widespread demand of the churches for the recognition of their
own particular role or of religious values, contrasts sharply with the laicist demand for
maintaining a ‘naked public sphere’.
Anderson finds that
‘… the relationship of the churches to democratisation is shaped by
their particular historical relationship with the political order, their
perception (or mis-perception) of their political capital, and, in the
Catholic case, of the broader attitude to political order, political
influence and minority rights of the international institution at the point
of transition.’
27
The contrast between Italy and Spain, the first, a country where even in the 1990s the
church was trying to maintain an organised form of united political Catholicism, and
the second, a country where the clergy has explicitly rejected the formation of a
Christian party
28
, shows that different historical trajectories may undercut the
relevance of denominational specificities.
The analysis of the dilemmas churches face over their choice of political
strategy may show the untenability of the often-invoked presupposition that the
churches stand alone and united against the state. In reality, churches may politically
be deeply divided and they can create alliances with other churches or with other
political actors. The internal cohesion of churches, and their potential for coalition are
important factors behind their eventual success in acquiring privileged status. Internal
division is not always a drawback. As the Greek example shows, political
decentralisation may actually help to maintain the influence of the church.
29
The coalition possibilities available to mainstream and marginal churches may
differ. The established churches, for example, may ally with the secular state against
the marginal churches under the banner of anti-cultism. Alternatively, they may ally
with the new religious movements against secular forces (including the state), in the
form of a religious crusade against atheism, or they may fight both the state and the
peripheral churches, in order to defend orthodoxy.
For the churches it is often a rational strategy to strive for privileged access to
the government, instead of engaging in outright competition
30
. But rent-seeking
behaviour entails particular costs. Churches that acquire such a status, may find out
12
that their position constrains them and it leads to sub-optimal impact over public
policies
31
. In an anti-clerical environment public ambitions may prove to be
detrimental.
Abandoning neutrality towards political actors makes one vulnerable to the
results of party competition. In cases where the victory of the friendly parties is
uncertain, rational churches should opt for a more neutral strategy. A balanced
strategy towards parties may secure privileges better than close association with one
of the political actors.
32
A neutral strategy should be especially attractive when the
potential ally is weak, as in the case of the Czech Republic
33
.
In spite of the high risks involved, churches often engage in political and
partisan struggles. One likely explanation, often overlooked by rational choice
approaches, is that churches have other goals than that of preserving their ‘market
position’ or increasing their ‘market share’. Often these other goals are strictly
political. Clergymen are also political beings, with secular political preferences. The
behaviour of the churches is likely to mirror in one way or another these preferences.
In the democratic era the ability of churches to put pressure on the state
depends to a large extent on how skilled they are in mobilising public opinion. As
shown, even privileged churches such as the Orthodox church in Greece may need to
mobilise the masses and engage in protest action.
34
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE
In modern politics, parties have a direct impact on the status of the churches and on
church-state relations. Party politicians have a major say on the sort of church
strategies that are acceptable, on what counts as a socially beneficial role, and on
whether religious capital is a legitimate resource in every-day politics.
35
The party
system, especially the pattern of competition, shapes the optimal strategies of the
churches. For example, the transformation of the Italian centre-based party system
into a pattern of bipolar competition, radically altered the opportunity structure of the
church
36
.
Such developments in the party sphere along with the growing relevance of
mass media campaigns, and the de-ideologisation of party appeals, may change the
weight of churches as potential allies. It is especially important for the options of the
13
churches whether parties preserve their clerical or anti-clerical appeal. In addition, if
parties have weak identities, their position on church-state issues may prove to be
erratic.
37
The political weight of churches may increase where governments are
struggling with a lack of popular legitimacy.
38
In cartellised party systems churches
may exert less leverage, while in the context of intensive competition churches may
become much sought after partners or, , on the other hand, be ostracised, if they
scare away voters. The configuration of party competition may determine how badly
party leaders need external allies like churches.
The type of democratic regime also shapes the opportunity structure of the
churches. While all the analysed countries may be subsumed under the label of liberal
democracies, they differ in employing a participatory or a delegative principle.
Varying amounts of assistance given to civic society organisations empowers
churches to different degrees.
39
The state’s attitude towards private organisations
(how easily the state delegates public functions to these organisations), the prevailing
pattern of interest-integration and the degree of corporatism all shape the position of
the churches as much as the fate of other institutions, like universities, chambers of
commerce, trade unions, or parties.
Equally, it matters whether a regime is organised in elitist or populist ways.
The wide use of referenda, for example, may compel churches to actively cultivate
their social power, solidifying their position in various social institutions like
associations, hospitals, schools, etc.
40
The analysis of church-state relations must be integrated into the analysis of
democratisation and state building. Government policies on religious and church
matters are good indicators of the state’s attitude towards equality, tolerance,
pluralism, and freedom of religion, all important building blocks of well functioning
democratic regimes. The support given to particular churches, and denied to others,
shapes the resources of the social and political groups related to these churches, and
thereby influences the outcome of future competitive struggles.
Finally, the outcome of conflicts relating to church and state matters are under
the influence of more general patterns of conflict-resolution, such as pillarisation,
14
consociationalism or adversarial democracy. Practices developed centuries ago often
provide a model for the accommodation of new churches as well.
41
The simultaneous analysis of churches and governmental structures provides a
useful complement to rational choice theories, identifying those structural constraints
that prevent the elite from acting on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
The studies presented in this volume highlight the importance of the political context
for the understanding of church-state relationships. The lesson is that specifically
political science frameworks are needed for interpreting the dynamics of this field.
The relevance of approaches using juridical, historical, economic, or philosophical
perspectives are in no way denied. But by drawing analogies between churches and
the other subjects of standard political science like parties or corporations, or by
contrasting types of church-state regimes and types of democracy, we may gain
insights that the above mentioned approaches cannot deliver. Both churches and the
state are part of the political institutional setting that surrounds us, and therefore they
should not be studied in isolation. The relationship between churches and states in
Europe is in flux, and only by establishing the links with other sectors of the political
system and by identifying the political interests involved are we likely to be able to
account for the direction of the changes.
1
G. Gustafsson’s contribution on the case of the recent church-state separation in Sweden indicates that
large-scale changes also occur in the otherwise most stable corners of western Europe.
2
G. Robbers, ‘State and Church in the European Union’, idem (ed.) State and Church in the European
Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996), p. 325.
3
Kissane and Mavrogordatos.
4
Mavrogordatos.
5
O’Mahony.
6
Madeley.
7
Madeley, ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in Europe: North
and South, East and West’.
8
Enyedi.
15
9
See D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (Oxford: Blackwell 1978), pp. 18-19.
10
Madeley.
11
Madeley.
12
L. Stan, and L. Turcescu, ‘The Romanian Orthodox Church And Post-Communist Democratization’,
Europe-Asia Studies, 52/8 (2000), pp. 1467-1488 and Gillet, O. Religie si nationalism. (Bucuresti:
Compania 2001)
13
Mavrocordatos.
14
Mavrocordatos.
15
G. Robbers, ‘State and Church in the European Union’, pp.323-333.
16
Council of Europe, 20 April 1999, doc. 8379.
17
Recommendation on “Illegal activities of sects” of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European
Council, 1412/1999, accepted 1999 June 22.
18
Zs. Enyedi, B. Girvin, J. Madeley, M. Minkenberg, The Structure and Dynamics of Church–State
Relations in Europe. Plan of a collaborative research project.
19
L. Iannaccone, ‘The Consequences of Religious Market Structure’, Rationality and Society, 2
(1991), pp. 156-177, L. Iannaccone, ‘Introduction to the Economics of Religion’, Journal of Economic
Literature, 9 (1998), pp. 1465-1496, L. Iannaccone, R. Finke, and R. Stark ‘Deregulating Religion: The
Economics of Church and State’, Economic Inquiry, 4 (1997), pp. 350-364, R. Stark, and L.
Iannaccone ‘A supply-side reinterpretation of the `secularization’ of Europe’, Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion, 3 (1994) pp. 230-252
20
Minkenberg.
21
Enyedi, Girvin, Madeley, Minkenberg, The Structure of Church-State Relations.
22
Enyedi.
23
Donovan.
24
M. Chaves and D.E. Cann, ‘Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure. Explaining
Religion’s Vitality’, in Rationality and Society 4/3 (1992), pp. 272-290.
25
O’Mahony.
26
Anderson.
27
Anderson.
28
Donovan and Anderson.
16
29
Mavrogordatos.
30
Gill, A. ‘Rendering unto Caesar? Religious Competition and Catholic Political Strategy in Latin
America, 1962-79’ American Journal of Political Science, 2/403-425 (1994), p. 406.
31
Minkenberg.
32
A. Kilp, Religion enters politics: the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-
communist countries. MA Thesis. University of Tartu. Faculty of Social Sciences. Department of
Political Science. 2002.
33
O’Mahony.
34
Mavrogordatos.
35
Enyedi.
36
Donovan.
37
O’Mahony.
38
Enyedi.
39
O’Mahony.
40
Kissane.
41
S. Monsma and J. C. Soper, The Challenge of Pluralism. Church and State in Five Democracies
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefied Publishers 1997), p. 62.
