My aim in this essay is to show how far it is possible to defend the quality of ‘humanness’ against the scientific world view, under stringent (and, I would say, appropriate) conditions.1 The conditions are: first, not to resort to anything in the nature of vitalism or teleology — by modern standards, a not particularly stringent condition; second, which is, I think, quite stringent, not to
... [Show full abstract] resort to anything in the nature of holism or organicism, nor appeal to hypothetical schemes of thought or laws of nature of a non-empirical kind, like dialectics. In effect, I propose to defend this quality, which we may think of for purposes of this discussion as tied in with such felt, relatively noncognitive entities as ‘the spark of life’ or free will, sense of self or sense of one’s uniqueness, without challenging the scientific reducibility of life to the laws of physics, and without postulating any laws of physics not in the textbooks today. The defense I speak of is not new. It was first put forth some fifty years ago by Alfred North Whitehead, in the early chapters of his book Science and the Modern World (Whitehead [1925]). I shall take up only Whitehead’s very simple proposals of his early chapters, without the speculative material further on. I shall argue, first, that this stark message of Whitehead’s deserves new attention because it is all that one can reasonably expect; and second, by means of various observations including a proposition that I call a ‘quasi-theorem’, which is a continuation of Whitehead’s thought, that it is really enough, if properly and not very complicatedly developed, and therefore deserves the further attention of philosophers.