ArticlePDF Available

A neoliberal sports event? FIFA from the Estadio Nacional to the fan mile


Abstract and Figures

With more than 200 member associations the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is one of the largest nonprofit organizations in the world. Founded in 1904 as an Old Boys Network, from the 1980s onwards, it turned football into a global business and the FIFA World Cup into its main product, thus generating billions of euros from sponsors, the sports and media industry, from host nations and host cities. Every four years and for a time period of four weeks, FIFA invades cities, beforehand setting rules and regulations the applicants for holding the event have to obey to—including but not limited to infrastructure demands, advertisement regulations, safety and security rules. Taking the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany as an example, the purpose of the paper is twofold: it firstly asks, using Jessop’s approach about promoting and adjusting global neoliberalism through strategies of neostatism, neocorporatism and neocommunitarianism (200244. Jessop , B. 2002. ‘Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: a state‐theoretical perspective’. Antipode, 34(3): 452–472. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®]View all references), whether and if so to what extent FIFA can be described as a neocommunitarian but neoliberalizing global institution shaping and being shaped by ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, Antipode 34(3), pp. 349–379, 20026. Brenner , N. and Theodore , N. 2002. ‘Cities and the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”’. Antipode, 34(3): 349–379. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®]View all references). In the second section, the World Cup is taken as an empirical example for how and in which forms neoliberalization FIFA‐style shapes and is shaped by the urban form, that is, the commercialization and commodification of (public) space and its hierarchization. In the same line, the ‘safety, order and security’ complex (SOS) and its strategies and tactics demanded by FIFA are analyzed in terms of humanware, software and hardware. The paper concludes by showing that the nonprofit FIFA has been able to determine not only the glocal football market, but as well the urban form, the respective security networks, and the tax‐free absorption of profits from state and private actors before, during and after World Cups.
Content may be subject to copyright.
This article was downloaded by:
19 July 2010
Access details:
Access Details: Free Access
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
A neoliberal sports event? FIFA from the
Estadio Nacional
to the fan mile
Volker Eick
Online publication date: 11 June 2010
To cite this Article Eick, Volker(2010) 'A neoliberal sports event? FIFA from the
Estadio Nacional
to the fan mile', City, 14:
3, 278 — 297
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2010.482275
Full terms and conditions of use:
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
CITY, VOL. 14, NO. 3, JUNE 2010
ISSN 1360-4813 print/ISSN 1470-3629 online/10/030278-20 © 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2010.482275
A neoliberal sports event?
FIFA from the Estadio Nacional to the
fan mile
Volker Eick
Taylor and Francis
With more than 200 member associations the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) is one of the largest nonprofit organizations in the world. Founded in
1904 as an Old Boys Network, from the 1980s onwards, it turned football into a global
business and the FIFA World Cup into its main product, thus generating billions of euros
from sponsors, the sports and media industry, from host nations and host cities. Every four
years and for a time period of four weeks, FIFA invades cities, beforehand setting rules and
regulations the applicants for holding the event have to obey to—including but not limited
to infrastructure demands, advertisement regulations, safety and security rules. Taking the
2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany as an example, the purpose of the paper is twofold: it
firstly asks, using Jessop’s approach about promoting and adjusting global neoliberalism
through strategies of neostatism, neocorporatism and neocommunitarianism (2002),
whether and if so to what extent FIFA can be described as a neocommunitarian but neolib-
eralizing global institution shaping and being shaped by ‘actually existing neoliberalism’
(Brenner and Theodore, Antipode 34(3), pp. 349–379, 2002). In the second section, the
World Cup is taken as an empirical example for how and in which forms neoliberalization
FIFA-style shapes and is shaped by the urban form, that is, the commercialization and
commodification of (public) space and its hierarchization. In the same line, the ‘safety,
order and security’ complex (SOS) and its strategies and tactics demanded by FIFA are
analyzed in terms of humanware, software and hardware. The paper concludes by showing
that the nonprofit FIFA has been able to determine not only the glocal football market, but
as well the urban form, the respective security networks, and the tax-free absorption of
profits from state and private actors before, during and after World Cups.
Key words: FIFA, football (soccer), neoliberalism, neoliberalization, commercialization,
securitization, surveillance
he 1973 CIA-backed coup in Chile
against the democratically elected
government of Salvador Allende—
the ‘little September 11th’ as David Harvey
(2005, p. 7) calls it—for the first time offered
an opportunity for its proponents to exper-
iment with authoritarian market reforms,
the reduction of the role of law, the sell-off
of public goods, the promotion of free
competition, or in short: to experiment
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
with neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore,
2002; Leitner et al., 2007). If it is true that
this little 9/11 gave birth to what ideologi-
cal think tanks in the UK, the USA and
beyond (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009) have
been aiming at for years in favor of a
market-driven political economy and state
restructuring, the same holds true for
the Fédération International de Football
Association (FIFA). Not only that FIFA’s
then-General Secretary let himself be
persuaded by the Pinochet regime that the
abuse of Santiago’s Estadio Nacional as a
torture prison was no barrier to consider it
as the proper location for the then-World
Cup knock-out match (Hachleitner, 2005,
p. 267), but it was also the time when
FIFA’s new President, João Havelange, a
Brazilian business magnate, came into
power and turned FIFA into a global busi-
ness company by attracting multinational
brands such as Coca-Cola and Adidas to
lucrative sponsorships and the sale of TV
rights, thus transforming the World Cup
into big business in terms of global audi-
ences, profits and spectacular security
(FIFA, 2003; Homburg, 2008; Boyle and
Haggerty, 2009).
Taking the 2006 FIFA World Cup in
Germany (hereinafter referred to as the
World Cup) as an example, the purpose of
this paper is twofold. It firstly argues for an
understanding of FIFA as a neocommunitar-
ian but neoliberalizing organization aiming
at profit maximization by its main product,
the World Cup. In order to better under-
stand the relationship between neoliberalism
and neoliberalization with regard to football
(soccer) as a for-profit business and FIFA as
a nonprofit organization (hereinafter referred
to as nonprofit), this first section will briefly
develop this theoretical argument using Bob
Jessop’s approach (2002) about promoting
and adjusting global neoliberalism through
strategies of neostatism, neocorporatism and
In the second section, the World Cup will
be taken as an empirical example for how and
in which forms neoliberalization FIFA-style
shapes and is shaped by the urban form, that
is, the commercialization and commodifica-
tion of (public) space and its hierarchization.
In the same line, the ‘safety, order and secu-
rity’ complex (SOS) and its deployed strate-
gies and tactics demanded by FIFA are
analyzed in terms of humanware (i.e. people),
software and hardware (i.e. technology). In
addition, this section argues that, at least
since the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Korea
and Japan, a new governance model emerged
with regard to the coordination, cooperation,
cooptation and competition between all
stakeholders involved.
The final section draws some conclusions
on the capability and effectiveness of the
World Cup for sustaining neoliberalism by
neoliberalizing space, security and new forms
of governance. In the last 35 years, FIFA as a
nonprofit has been able to determine not
only the glocal football market with the
World Cup, but in the same line the urban
form, the respective security networks, and
the tax-free absorption of profits from state
and private actors before, during and after
World Cups.
Neoliberalism, neoliberalization and
FIFA’s main product: the World Cup
As an ideology neoliberalism can be defined
as a set of political discourses that reconfig-
ure liberal conceptions of freedom, the indi-
vidual, the market and the noninterventionist
state, or as ‘an ideological rejection of egali-
tarian liberalism in general and the Keynesian
welfare state in particular, combined with a
selective return to the ideas of classical liber-
alism’ (Hackworth, 2007, p. 9). Yet neoliber-
alism is also a practice, differing from that
ideology, and can be understood as neoliber-
alization or ‘actually existing neoliberalism’
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In other
words, neoliberalism can be described as the
ideology and neoliberalization as the respec-
tive historically evolving process.
Put bluntly, neoliberalism promotes
market-led economic and social restructuring.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
281 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
In the public sector this involves privatization,
liberalization and the imposition of commer-
cial criteria in the residual public sector as well
as in the nonprofit sector. Neoliberalism also
supports free trade and capital mobility in a
global economy that involves as dominant
trends financial deregulation, flexibilized
and a respective enabling state policy to
promote neoliberalism.
Referring to ‘actually existing neoliberal-
ism’, neoliberalization is more of a highly
contingent process than a final product. This
process can be described as a dialectical one,
in the sense that it is constituted by the
conflicting tendencies towards destruction
of structures already in existence and
construction of new ones. Neoliberal destruc-
tion implies the removal of the so-called
Keynesian amenities such as public housing
or public space, of policies such as redistrib-
uted welfare and food stamps in the case of the
USA, and of institutions such as the labor
unions in the UK. In addition, this process
subverts established Keynesian agreements;
among them, to name just one, the Fordist
labor arrangements enabling continuous
negotiations between the unions and the
companies that the state would oversee. On
the other hand, neoliberalization implies the
establishment of new institutions and prac-
tices or the cooptation of the existing ones
with the ultimate goal of reproducing neolib-
eralism in the future. That might lead to
government–business consortia, to legislative
amendments, for example, initiating workfare
policies, or to different types of public–
private partnerships.
Peck and Tickell (2002) have depicted this
evolution in a more linear way, arguing that
neoliberalization consists of three phases: a
proto-phase, a roll-back phase and finally, a
roll-out phase. Whereas proto-neoliberalism
refers to the theoretical stage of initiating
neoliberalization (starting with the Mont
Pelerin Society in the late 1940s), the two
subsequent phases encompass the develop-
ment of neoliberalism as praxis. During the
roll-back phase, focused narrowly on market
logics, Keynesian policies and formations are
dissolved. The second phase of the neoliber-
alization process is the roll-out phase that
involves proactive neoliberal practices and
ideas, constructing new policies and institu-
tions such as workfare programs, public–
private partnerships or community-based
urban governance.
The general aim is to establish a more stable
sociopolitical and socioeconomic infrastruc-
ture for neoliberal strategies of accumulation,
thus aiming at a sustainable neoliberalism.
Roll-back and roll-out neoliberalization do
not unfold in a linear way but tend to shift
arrangements and institutions back and forth,
absorb parts of the Keynesian–Fordist
compromise while also rolling back already
rolled out ‘solutions’.
The political construction of markets and
the institutionalization of competitive logics
and privatized management by state and
non-state actors has been accompanied by a
simultaneous shift from the nation-state as
the central actor: upwards, to the global scale
and its institutions (IMF, G8, FIFA, etc.) and
downwards, to the local scale (devolution). It
is for this reason that Swyngedouw (1997)
introduced the term ‘glocalization’. The
regulatory power previously held or exer-
cised by the nation-state vanishes while the
global and the local scale and their respective
institutions and stakeholders grow in impor-
tance. Therefore, cities began to play a much
more decisive role which, in turn, results in
the emergence of multiple neoliberalisms due
to intensified inter-urban competition.
In times of ‘glocalized’ neoliberalization,
the most important goal of today’s urban
policy is to mobilize city space as an arena of
market-oriented economic growth. Roll-out
neoliberalism has established some flanking
mechanisms and modes of crisis displacement
such as local economic development policies
and community-based programs to elevate
social exclusion. It has introduced new forms
of coordination and inter-organizational
networking among previously distinct spheres
of local state intervention, so that ultimately,
social, political and even ecological criteria
have become intertwined and at the same time
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
redefined in an attempt to promote economic
competitiveness. Social infrastructures, polit-
ical culture and ecological foundations of the
city are being transformed into an economic
asset. Already with the deregulation and
the dismantling of the welfare state in the
1980s, distributive policies were increasingly
replaced by measures of reinforcing urban
competitiveness; as a consequence socio-
spatial polarization intensified whereas wealth
and economic opportunities became more
unevenly distributed.
During the roll-out phase of neoliberaliza-
tion in the 1990s, new discourses on reforms
(dealing with, among others, welfare depen-
dency, community regeneration, social capi-
tal) and new institutions and modes of
delivery such as integrated area development,
civic engagement, public–private partner-
ships, urban regeneration and social workfare
emerged. Large numbers of non-state actors
are involved today in all those fields of
activity in different forms of urban gover-
nance. These new discourses and partnering
programs reinforce but also exploit commu-
nities and other social networks and in this
sense create and maintain the competitive
and revitalized urban growth machine.
‘With so-called mega-events, cities began to
engage in subsidizing zero-sum
competition.… Packaging and sale of urban
place images have become as important as
the measures to keep the downtowns and
event spaces clean and free of “undesirables”
and “dangerous elements” (such as youth,
homeless, beggars, prostitutes and other
potential “disrupters”).’ (Mayer, 2007,
pp. 91, 94)
If, as stated by Jessop (2002), neoliberaliza-
tion goes with liberalization, that is, the
promotion of free competition; with deregu-
lation, that is, the reduction of the role of the
law and the state; with privatization, that is,
the sell off of the public sector; with market
proxies in the residual public sector; with
internationalization, that is, the free inward
and outward flow of capital and goods (and
pre-selected people); and with lower direct
taxes, that is, the increase of consumer
choice—and if all this has a direct impact on
urban space, how does this relate to FIFA?
Firstly, how is FIFA as an organization shap-
ing and being shaped by ‘actually existing
neoliberalism’? What has been and is the role
of FIFA’s main product, the World Cup? To
what extent is FIFA a neocommunitarian but
neoliberalizing organization?
In order to answer these questions, I relate
FIFA and the World Cup to six aspects of
economic regulation. In order to facilitate a
comparative analysis of ‘actually existing
neoliberalization’, Jessop contrasted ‘neolib-
eralism with three other ideal-typical strate-
gies’ that might promote or adjust to global
neoliberalism (2002, p. 460). These additional
‘ideal types’, ‘theoretical constructs’ or
‘configurations’ he calls neostatism, neocor-
poratism and neocommunitarianism which
‘are constructed around six interdependent,
partly overlapping aspects of economic regu-
lation’ (ibid.) that comprise the dominant
form of competition; the form and extent of
external regulation of private economic
actors; the size of the public sector; the form
and extent of state-owned production of
goods and services; the articulation between
national economies and the state’s role in
managing international economic relations;
and the tax regime. Jessop explains, these
‘configurations are never found in pure form,
but their construction might be still useful
for heuristic, descriptive, and explanatory
purposes’ (ibid.).
As for FIFA (a nonprofit), the World Cup
(its main for-profit product), and football
(the profit-generating industry) more gener-
ally, the promotion of free competition is
more than obvious. FIFA as the head of the
‘football family’ from the very beginning
(1904) heralded free competition. But from
the 1970s onwards, the new president of
FIFA, João Havelange, ‘was ready to
consider football not only as a competition,
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
283 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
but also to try to find new ways and means to
enhance worldwide technical development
and to prepare new generations for these
changes’ (FIFA, 2003, p. 6). Such changes
include a market-based football industry,
turning its business from a multi-million
market in the 1980s to a multi-billion one by
the turn of the 21st century. Football players
have been developed by FIFA from amateurs
to entrepreneurial athletes, carriers of manu-
facturers’ trademarks and the modern form
of gladiators; the respective bounty even
being listed on the web.
Having started as a
kind of Old Boys Network, FIFA turned
into a modern profit-oriented and de facto
profit-making nonprofit corporation—from
a loose network of a few national football
associations to a global player with a salaried
full-time, hierarchical and functionally speci-
fied management including a systematic
accounting system.
In addition, it should be noted that FIFA
transformed itself not only from a loose
network into a two-fisted global player but,
over the decades, turned more and more hier-
archically organized and, in turn, less demo-
cratic, if not even autocratic. This process,
however, was not only a product of inner-
organizational decision-making by FIFA’s
Presidents and General Secretariats but a
response to the demands of media and
market partners who insisted on reliable
administrators of their respective contracts
with FIFA; this is especially of high impor-
tance as contracts generally are closed, up to
six years in advance of the respective event
(Homburg, 2008, p. 63). It is this ambigu-
ity—a nonprofit shaping and being shaped
by profitable markets, state and non-state
actors—which sheds light on a neocommuni-
tarian kind of capitalism under which, in the
empirical case at stake, FIFA sets the rules.
According to Salamon (1995), there are
two conflicting paradigms with respect to the
relationships between nonprofits and the
state (and the market): the ‘paradigm of
conflict’ where the independence of nonprof-
its has been effectively eroded and turned
them into an arm of the state apparatus. In
more detail, an ‘audit culture’, the corporati-
zation of nonprofit activities, and the profes-
sionalization of nonprofit staff (and thus,
alienation from their ‘clients’) have been
mentioned as examples for conflicting inter-
ests. On the other hand, there is the ‘para-
digm of partnership’ which sees nonprofits as
operating in a niche created by the failure of
the market and the state, thus profiteering
from a division of labor—in particular, both
paradigms are applied to fields such as social
services, health care, unemployment, work-
fare and education (Eick et al., 2004).
In the case of FIFA, however, neither the
failure of the market to provide services,
because they do not generate the profits that
could attract businesses, nor the failure of
the government to provide services in ways
that are responsive to the needs, desires,
aspirations and preferences of particular—in
our case the global football—communities
are at stake.
On the contrary, FIFA has
been able to conquer a civil society activity
turning it into a profitable business while at
the same time being shaped by the neoliberal
market logic and the respective state restruc-
turing under way. In the case of the World
Cup FIFA even holds an exploitation
monopoly—thus, minimizing free competi-
tion down to zero.
Events such as World Cups are symbolically
loaded, highly nationalized events (Giulian-
otti and Robertson, 2007). From this point of
view, the free movement of players between
different national clubs and even nation-
states’ teams undermines their role as compet-
ing nation-state representatives. The vantage
point of football clubs is slightly different, as
the free movement of footballers without
compensation for services such as training,
education and healthcare are perceived as
failed investments. Nevertheless, the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) legislation guaranties for
the free movement of workers within the EU,
including football players. UEFA and FIFA
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
as representatives of their respective member
associations argued against the EU law claim-
ing their members are not companies. Their
attempts finally failed in 1995 with the so-
called Bosman adjudication. From a regula-
tory point of view, the EU deregulated the
football market whereas FIFA aimed and
aims for re-regulation.
While FIFA defines its own rules and
therefore reduces the role of the state, at the
same time it aims at regulating free competi-
tion in making use of the law (by contesting
current public legislations) and in establish-
ing its own ‘private’ laws. One could even
claim that regulation is the business of
FIFA’s management as the following exam-
ples show.
Generally, FIFA claims to bring regula-
tions to the fore in order to defend their
respective member associations against the
outcomes of the Bosman case (Schumann,
2005, pp. 157–160). The Bosman adjudication
applies to EU football professionals, plus
assimilated ones, who at the end of their
contract wish to move from one country to
another. Since the ruling came into operation
(1995), it is prohibited for footballers’ former
clubs to demand transfer fees from the play-
ers’ new clubs—a regulation effectively
undermined by European football clubs.
addition, the number of foreign players
within clubs no longer can be limited to a
maximum number within the EU. FIFA
contests such legislations.
An interesting illustration for such an
attempt of re-regulation is the current debate
about the so-called 6 + 5 regulation contested
by the European Court of Justice. FIFA
president, Sepp Blatter, wants to restrict the
number of foreign players in teams with a
minimum of six home-grown players and
a maximum of five foreigners by 2012/13 (6
+ 5).
But the EU Commission believes a
quota on foreign footballers would be
incompatible with the EU’s legislation which
allows workers to move freely between
member countries. Without going into
details here, it is noteworthy that a globally
organized nonprofit is challenging the law,
here in particular a basic right. In another
decision in 2008, FIFA even has introduced
rules to make it harder for players to switch
their nationality. Before the vote, uncapped
players could switch allegiances after living
in a country for two years; FIFA has opted
to extend the timeframe to five years.
As for deregulation, FIFA rather repre-
sents a re-regulating body in order to preserve
football matches as symbolically loaded
national events—international contests are
the main source of FIFA’s income—and to
retain control over its membership basis.
Privatization in the case of FIFA is obviously
not the sell off of the public sector but the
successful commodification of practices of
civil society. The percentage of gained profits
from all contracts with partnering organiza-
tions such as media companies rose from 19
to 25%, including 1% that, in 1990, was
earmarked as a ‘contribution to a special
fund, the use of which is to be decided by
the FIFA Executive Committee’ (cited in
Homburg, 2008, p. 59). In 1998, financial
transparency in regard to the distribution of
generated profits among the ‘FIFA family’
has been abolished: ‘It is disturbing that after
1998 neither the Cup’s Regulations nor the
Federation’s Statutes keep track of the distri-
bution of the Cup’s proceeds and FIFA’s
relative share’ (ibid., p. 61).
It was the English and Welsh football asso-
ciations who invented professional or for-
profit football in 1885 (Hachleitner, 2004);
FIFA transformed football into a global
commodity in the 20th century. This
commodification of football is well known—
from stadia worldwide named after multina-
tional companies,
sports clubs merchandized
on stock exchanges (such as Manchester
United, Borussia Dortmund, Sporting
Lissabon, etc.),
the creation of new leagues in
order to extend profit options (such as the 3rd
League in Germany, introduced in 2008), to
new attempts in marketing and design of
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
285 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
stadia in order to attract a financially more
solvent audience (van Winkel, 2000;
Hagemann, 2007). As for FIFA’s intention to
bring the Cup’s commercial exploitation to
perfection, the Regulations for the 2006
World Cup (FIFA, 2006c, p. 47) state:
‘Marketing rights mean all rights of
exploitation (in whatever form) of all types of
advertising, including electronic and virtual
promotion, marketing, merchandising
(including but not limited to publications,
musical compositions, coins, stamps, DVDs,
videos, commercial hospitality, apparel and
electronic games of any nature), licensing,
franchising, sponsorship, hospitality,
publications, and any other rights and/or
associated commercial opportunities relating
to or in connection with the 2006 FIFA
World Cup™, including advertising,
franchising, displaying, sampling and selling
rights of any nature at the event stadiums and
other official sites. The marketing rights also
include the exclusive right to use and sub-
license the use of the marks.’
During the 2006 World Cup, 64 matches were
held in 12 cities
from nine German states,
with around 3.5 million stadium tickets sold.
Based on these ticket sales around 2 million
foreign visitors came to Germany from
abroad. Around 18 million people, 9 million
in Berlin alone, attended the official fan festi-
vals on the more than 2000 so-called fan
miles, where matches were shown on large
screens (Bundesregierung, 2006, pp. 38, 43).
Market proxies
The creation of the fan miles can be either
understood as a privatization of public space
or as the introduction of market proxies into
public space. The respective public space of
the fan miles was temporarily leased to
FIFA’s television partner Infront Sports.
Principally, the fan miles had to be registered
and licensed and depending ‘on the classifica-
tions of the event as commercial or non-
commercial, public viewing licenses were
liable to pay costs’ (Klauser, 2008, p. 179).
From FIFA’s point of view, giving
supporters without stadia tickets the oppor-
tunity to watch the matches was clearly not
the main purpose of the fan miles. The
pivotal issue was about marketing and adver-
tisement rights. The (transient) take-over of
public space during the 2006 World Cup by
FIFA came in an attempt to assure that the
exclusive rights for ground-advertisement
space are safeguarded for FIFA sponsors.
Already in 2002, FIFA extended its exclusive
rights to sell advertisement space to the
precincts of the stadia and tended its sover-
eignty to the so-called Controlled Access
Sites as well. In 2006, the exclusive rights for
ground-advertisement were to include the
so-called ‘event-stadia and other official sites’
(FIFA, 2006c, p. 47). It is under such condi-
tions that a business-oriented international
nonprofit takes over the control rights of
public space from the respective local
governments during the event. These areas in
many ways turned parts of the ‘coalition of
the willing’ (to host the event) into one
particular sub-group, the ‘coalition of the
billing’. To be clear, this coalition solely
consists of FIFA and its member organiza-
tions. As Klauser (2008) has shown, FIFA
forces all applicants for hosting the World
Cup (nation-states as well as respective host
cities) to accept all branding conditions,
commercialization interests and security
demands laid down in the so-called FIFA
Regulations (FIFA, 2006b) even before the
applicants would know whether they will be
allowed to host the World Cup.
The concept of market proxies can also be
applied more generally to FIFA as an institu-
tion, since a nonprofit per definition is
neither a state nor a commercial entity and, in
addition, nonprofits are not allowed to
generate profits for private purposes but
solely to reinvest the monies for the purpose
of their mission as stated in their statutes. In
the case of FIFA, the following applies:
‘The objectives of FIFA are: (a) to improve
the game of football constantly and promote
it globally in the light of its unifying,
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
educational, cultural and humanitarian
values, particularly through youth and
development programs; (b) to organize its
own international competitions; (c) to draw
up regulations and provisions and ensure
their enforcement; (d) to control every type
of Association Football by taking
appropriate steps to prevent infringements of
the Statutes, regulations or decisions of FIFA
or of the Laws of the Game; (e) to prevent all
methods or practices which might jeopardize
the integrity of matches or competitions or
give rise to abuse of Association Football.’
(FIFA, 2007, p. 5)
As such, FIFA imposes conditions for the
World Cup that are in tune with commercial
criteria while at the same time remaining an
entity officially not making any profits. With
regard to market proxies—we might even
define FIFA as the personate embodiment of
a market proxy.
In the social science literature on nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) the term
BINGO (business-oriented nongovernmen-
tal organization) has been coined in order to
more accurately differentiate the plethora of
NGOs active globally. Based on attempts
made so far to better understand the market
orientation of nonprofits, though, it, accord-
ing to Brady and Johnson (1999), appears that
market orientation has been used inappropri-
ately in the nonprofit context. They conclude
that an appropriate reconceptualization is
needed in order to form the basis of further
research. In the same line, Martens (2002, p.
282) argues for NGOs that most sociological
approaches circumscribe NGOs by applying
a ‘method of disqualification’ and tend to
emphasize what is excluded from the NGO
sector rather than elaborating ‘positive’ char-
acteristics (for further discussions see below).
According to Eisenberg (2002), sport is the
only part of mass culture which—unlike
fashion, music or showbiz—has a global
institutional system at its disposal. The
respective organizations on the regional (like
UEFA in Europe) and global scale (where
FIFA sets the rules) can be seen as supra-
national organizations and, due to their
direct link to the local sports clubs, as an
expression of Swyngedouw’s term ‘glocaliza-
tion’ (cf. Giulianotti and Robertson, 2007).
This is especially evident with respect to
FIFA’s attempts over the last 35 years to
extend the worldwide audience to, for exam-
ple, Asia and to improve the specification of
its property rights as an owner and orga-
nizer of the World Cup. The ‘wedding’ of
football, television and commercialization
came into being with the 1954 World Cup in
Switzerland when for the first time ‘a virtual
audience by means of simultaneous radio-
and television broadcasts of the most impor-
tant matches’ emerged (Homburg, 2008,
p. 41).
The 2006 World Cup was broad-
casted to 214 countries around the world,
with more than 73,000 hours of program-
ming and an estimated viewing audience of
over 26 billion (Monks and Husch, 2009,
p. 391)—FIFA numbers on spectators are
contested, however.
Obviously, the World
Cups are a clear example for attracting atten-
tion to per se local events on an increasingly
global scale since the 1980s and as such, for
the globalization of sports, or football in
While FIFA was founded in 1904 with
seven European members only, today it has
208 member organizations around the globe
and thus more members than the United
Nations Organization (Eisenberg, 2006,
p. 56). While FIFA initially ‘was “designed”
to be an international sports organisation and
was supposed to administer rules and regulate
competitive matches’ (ibid., p. 59), since the
late 1970s it turned into a capitalist business
on a global scale. Profits for FIFA grew from
about 20,000 in 1930 to 1.1 billion in 2006
(ibid., p. 42). In addition, sports clubs not
only transformed into transnational compa-
nies, but with foreign fans, fan clubs world-
wide and the recruitment of migrant players,
football organizers created a global (business)
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
287 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
Lower direct taxes
The most obvious point in terms of the struc-
tural characteristics given by Jessop (2002) on
neoliberalism is the status of FIFA as ‘an
international nongovernmental, nonprofit
organisation in the form of an association
according to Swiss law’ (FIFA, 2009, p. 63)
which exempts the organization at all from
The nonprofit FIFA is allowed to reinvest
its revenues: according to Salz et al. (2006, pp.
64–65), in 2006 the profits included but are
not limited to 40 million from each of the
15 so-called exclusive sponsors, 13 million
each from the six so-called national sponsors,
and 230 million from the German TV
stations ARD and ZDF for the viewing rights
of the FIFA matches. Given that most of the
monies (75% according to Homburg, 2008)
are directly redistributed to the member asso-
ciations (Eisenberg, 2006, pp. 60–61) this
revenue relocation can also be described as a
kind of a carers’ allowance—and, therefore as
an exemplification of neocommunitarianism.
Neoliberalization and its others
As mentioned above, Jessop (2002) contrasted
neoliberalism with three other ideal-typical
strategies that might promote or adjust to
global neoliberalism. These theoretical
configurations he calls neostatism, neocorpo-
ratism and neocommunitarianism. Claiming
that neoliberalism is a contingent and contra-
dictory process I would prefer to speak about
neostatelization, neocorporatization and
neocommunitarization, respectively. In order
to better understand FIFA’s role in the
management of football with respect to the
above-mentioned configurations it is useful to
briefly return to juridical and sociological
attempts to define nonprofits.
A comprehensive definition of nonprofits,
until today, does not exist but includes
relevant ideal-typical characteristics: accord-
ing to such accounts, nonprofits are formal
(professionalized) independent societal
organizations whose primary aim is to
promote common goals at the national or the
international scale (Martens, 2002; Trudeau
and Veronis, 2009; Eick, 2010a).
Nonprofits originate from the private
sphere, and their members are either individ-
uals or local, regional, national branches of
an association (in our case the national foot-
ball associations) that usually do not include
members from governments or governmen-
tal institutions. Nonprofits work for the
promotion of a public good (in our case
football or ‘social cohesion’), from which
their members profiteer and/or the public
gains. Nonprofits can be called professional-
ized, because they may have paid staff with
trained skills, but they are not profit-
oriented. Nonprofits are deemed to be inde-
pendent, if they are primarily sponsored by
membership fees and private donations.
They may receive financial funding from
official institutions as already discussed in
the section about conflict and partnership
‘paradigms’. Nonprofits are formal organi-
zations as they are to have a minimal organi-
zational structure (this includes to have
headquarters and permanent staff); a precon-
dition is also a constitution which goes with
a recognized legal status (Eick et al., 2004).
Christiane Eisenberg (2006, p. 61) charac-
terizes FIFA as an international nongovern-
mental organization (INGO). According
to her, INGOs ‘operate independently of
governments and pursue cultural, humanitar-
ian and developmental aims; second, they
contribute to implementing universal stan-
dard values, principles and activities with the
help of an official elite’. According to Pablo
Eisenberg (2000, pp. 327–328), it needs to be
clarified why, among other questions, ceme-
teries, trade associations and sports associa-
tions are included in the nonprofit sector:
‘Although a few umbrella organisations and
some academics have done some thinking
about these concerns, there has been no orga-
nized attempt to tackle the problems as a
whole.’ The analysis of the (global) politico-
economic activities of nonprofits is systemat-
ically underdeveloped. Nevertheless and put
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
bluntly, since the 1980s it emerged what
Manzenreiter (2007, p. 1) characterizes as a
‘sports industrial complex’ under conditions
of globalization. Since the 1930s, football has
been organized by more or less the same
stakeholders—the membership basis of FIFA
comprised of national football associations
was basically complete by then—who sepa-
rately or together fight for intensified market
penetration and extended market coverage.
Due to the new technologies and satellite-
based media, the production, consumption
and distribution of football became less
space-bound and, together with the amalgam-
ation of fashion, leisure and entertainment
industries further fuelled the commodifica-
tion of the game. International sports regula-
tors such as FIFA together with the sports
industry and the media constitute a triumvi-
rate and its ‘effects are clearly experienced in
consumption styles, but they have also left
their marks on processes of production,
marketing and distribution as well as global
governance in sports’ (Manzenreiter, 2007,
p. 3).
In addition, FIFA aims at limiting free
competition in setting rules within its organi-
zation (but promotes neoliberal marketing in
the outside world). But these regulations are
contested by the EU which aims to deregu-
late the rules EU footballers have to obey
according to FIFA. FIFA claims to stand for
fair trade, not for free trade, and accordingly
tries to shape the deregulating attempts of the
EU. It is for this reason that FIFA not only
wants to keep its uncontested match monop-
oly but the respective regulations as well.
At the same time, FIFA is a clear expres-
sion of the enhancement of the role that third
sector organizations are to play. In marketing
football publicly including its political role,
FIFA emphasizes football’s social use-value
and constantly highlights the capacity of
football to boost ‘social cohesion’ as stated in
the FIFA objectives: ‘to improve the game of
football constantly and promote it globally
in the light of its unifying, educational,
cultural and humanitarian values’ (FIFA,
2007, p. 5). Even though it is true that
surpluses are not distributed according to the
size of the initial investment capital and the
beneficiaries are mainly the member associa-
tions, nevertheless 25% of all FIFA’s profits
are reserved for FIFA’s general office
(Homburg, 2008, p. 59). FIFA’s principles of
profit distribution might be ‘unorthodox’
(Eisenberg, 2006, p. 60) but FIFA definitely
is a capitalist business enterprise.
It is from this point of view that I argue for
an understanding of nonprofits such as FIFA
as ‘neocommunitarian realists’ (Eick, 2010a)
in the sense that it takes advantage of the
Swiss legislation in a quiet prosaic manner—
by limiting free competition within its
member associations; by empowering itself
in order to enhance the role of nonprofits; by
emphasizing the (nationalized) ‘social cohe-
sion’ of football; by thinking globally but
acting locally in the very sense; and, while
being exempted from tax-paying, by redi-
recting most of its profits to its member asso-
ciations. It is striking to what extent FIFA
has an outward impact and influence on state
and non-state stakeholders before, during
and after the World Cups. In the following,
the securitization and commercialization of
the urban space—underpinned by nation-
branding throughout the games—will be
analyzed. Securitization and commercializing
include if not require the coordination, coop-
eration, cooptation and probably even
competition between all stakeholders on all
scales—global, national, local—involved.
The FIFA World Cup: securitizing and
commercializing urban space
The FIFA World Cup in Germany in 2006 has
seen the largest display of domestic security
strength since 1945: during the four weeks of
the World Cup in June and July, more than
220,000 police officers from the 16 Länder, an
additional 30,000 from the Federal Police, an
unknown number of secret service officers,
7000 military guards and more than 20,000
rent-a-cops, in the football stadia called
‘supervisors’, were in operation (Eick et al.,
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
289 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
2007, p. 14). In addition, more than 20,000
security screened citizens took part in security
and safety measures as either ‘stewards’ or
‘volunteers’. A vivid exchange of German
police officers with colleagues from neighbor-
ing nation-states emerged (more than 500
foreign police officers were in operation;
Bach, 2008, p. 151), cutting across national
borders and, thereby, neglecting any constitu-
tional restraints in the respective countries.
Tournament venues and their vicinity as
well as public viewing locations in downtown
areas were converted into high-security zones
with access limited to registered persons and
pacified crowds only; in addition, measures
were taken to allow business only for those
multinationals which sponsored the event.
About 150,000 persons, applying for jobs
during the tournament, got security-screened
by secret service officers and the respective
computer systems in order to get an accredi-
tation (Eick et al., 2007): all in all, even selling
sausages became a security issue. Finally,
FIFA has its own internal policing entity, the
Task Force ‘For the good of game’
in 2007 was transformed into a new body—
the ‘Strategic Committee’—in order to ‘to
resolve problems within the family, rather
than let rulings be made by a judge who
comes from outside the world of football’.
All these resources deployed can be called
‘humanware’ (Shimada, 1986).
The overall effort was supported and
mediated by sophisticated surveillance, infor-
mation, identification and communication
technologies—the security ‘hardware’ and
‘software’ of the World Cup—such as 200
data banks with more than 18 million data
files (Averesch, 2009, p. 6); RFID ticketing
systems; CCTV systems to monitor stadia,
their surroundings, the hotels hosting the
teams and the public viewing zones; Auto-
matic Vehicle Location systems (AVL);
Sniper Locating Systems (SLS);
and robots
to detect potential bombs and explosives.
In addition, NATO provided airspace
surveillance with two Airborne Warning and
Control System planes (AWACS) to control
air space over the host cities. In US military
terms, a C
ISR system (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance) had been
As stated, neoliberalization promotes a shift
away from the Fordist–Keynesian kind of
government to forms of governance more
focused on managing and organizing
devolved centers and resources, negotiating
‘both policy and implementation with part-
ners in public, private, and voluntary sectors’
(Stoker, 2000, p. 98). The role of the (nation)
state has, according to the often-cited analogy
of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), shifted from
‘rowing’ toward ‘steering’. As part of the
discussed developments, security functions
previously regarded as the domain of the state
have been privatized and outsourced.
From a somewhat different point of view,
this more market-oriented and individual-
ized view of security includes that consumers
are to a specific degree responsible for their
own security, both in terms of their behavior
and in terms of making provisions for their
own protection (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997;
Ericson, 2007). In times of risk and precau-
tionary logic new crime prevention measures
come to the fore with a socio-spatial rather
than individual orientation, introducing
the participation of what is deemed to be
civil society (such as Neighborhood Watch
schemes or football volunteers), and new
forms of cooperation in ‘police–private part-
nerships’ (Stober, 2000), where private secu-
rity companies are integrated into policing.
Finally, techno-prevention and -repression in
the form of CCTV, drones (unmanned aerial
vehicles), RFID, GIS/GPS are part of FIFA’s
The rules and regulations deployed by
FIFA for behavior standards in football
stadia, for example, resonate with the redefi-
nition of deviant behavior, the return of
order as an issue for crime fighting, and the
creation and redefinition of (new) crimes and
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
disorderly behavior by (local) administra-
tions. The zero-tolerance politics deployed
worldwide (Smith, 1996), the Anti-Social
Behavior Orders in the UK (Flint, 2006), the
area bans for undesirables in Germany
(Belina, 2007), the policing of the urban poor,
the homeless and migrant youths by rent-a-
cops (Eick, 2006) and nonprofits (Eick, 2008)
might serve as empirical evidence.
Banning by the police
Even though the 2006 FIFA World Cup was
heralded as a total success both from the
government and the media in terms of orga-
nizational capacities of the host cities,
nation-branding and image production
(Bundesregierung, 2006), questions of civil
rights have been raised by human rights
groups and fan clubs alike (Eick et al., 2007).
From the 1990s onwards, bans on alleged
‘hooligans’ began to spread all over Europe,
creating what has been called ‘legal vague-
ness’ for football fans (Tsoukala, 2009, p. 105)
and backed by a 2006 European Council
decision that a ‘risk supporter’ can be
regarded as a person ‘posing a possible risk to
public order’, or the possible risk ‘of anti-
social behavior’ (cited in Tsoukala, 2009,
p. 109). The highly contested German data
bank Gewalttäter Sport (violent offenders,
sports related), introduced in 2000, was
declared unlawful by the Higher Administra-
tive Court in December 2008, but is still in
operation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009, p. 2).
It was used during the 2006 World Cup to
ban people from stadia and public viewing
zones; data have been transferred to police
forces internationally (Tsoukala, 2009, pp.
111–116). The number of persons whose data
is stored in the German data bank grew from
about 6500 in 2004 to 9400 in 2006 to 10,711
in 2009 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009, p. 3).
Banning by rent-a-cops and volunteers
As ‘private logics circulate through public
institutional domains’ (Sassen, 2006, p. 195),
rent-a-cops and volunteers have been inte-
grated into the ‘policing family’; between 900
and 2300 rent-a-cops (supervisors and stew-
ards; see Figure 1), and an additional 300
volunteers have been deployed per game in
the security zone. The total number of about
18,000 rent-a-cops—coordinated in a consor-
tium that, in effect, regulated competition
between the companies in a neocorporatist
way—came from 12 different companies
(Buhl, 2006).
Whereas it was possible to collect informa-
tion from the police about their banning
practices, nothing is known about their for-
profit and nonprofit counterparts. Watching
the match between Mexico and Argentina in
Leipzig, though, Görke and Maroldt (2006,
p. 3) observed guys with yellow waistcoats
and labels that read ‘supervisor’. One of them
‘just has given order to about ten of his
“stewards” to take a Mexican fan out’,
‘he was standing while watching the match.
Minutes later, during the next attack of the
Mexican team, another fan jumps up, sways
his scarf and laughs. So, they come, the
regulators in orange waistcoats who are
called “stewards” here. He does not
understand what’s going on. His neighbors
also don’t. He is pulled out. The others
look intimidated. It is now that the
“supervisor” locates the jersey-swaying
Mexico fan a couple of seats further ahead.
He slightly bends his head aside, talks into
the microphone that is fixed on his
shoulder.… Minutes later, this fan is taken
out by the “stewards” as well. They are
not alone. There are young guys in t-shirts
whose label reads “volunteer.” This one in
block 51 plays a police officer commanding
the “stewards” against the fans. “That
one!” he shouts and his eyes glimpse as
excited as the eyes of those youngsters,
being fascinated by the riots on May 1 in
The 12,000 volunteers were divided in sub-
groups for information services outside the
stadia and for guiding, safety and security
services within the security rings around
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
291 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
the stadia (entrance regulation, grandstand
control, etc.). In addition, FIFA developed
guidelines for the cooperation between the
rent-a-cops and the volunteers that read, ‘the
security and order staff is authorized to
direct the volunteers and depending on the
situation is allowed to integrate them into
the security and order tasks’ (Bach, 2008,
pp. 152–154).
In general, the security tasks between the
state police and commercial and volunteering
security forces were spatially divided. The
private security officers were deployed on
private space (stadia) and temporarily priva-
tized space (fan miles) in order to provide
information, to control entrances, to do
bodily checks, to coordinate parking lots and
to control tickets (Schmidt, 2007). The
monopoly of the legitimate use of force, at
least officially, remained in the hands of state
police who primarily controlled public space
and, depending on the host city, the public
viewing areas as well.
Securing the fan miles
In Hamburg, for example, the police
controlled the public viewing area at
Heiligengeistfeld, in Berlin it was a private
security company that controlled the fan mile
Straße des 17. Juni with only a few police
officers within the public viewing area; but the
police was on constant standby with addi-
tional squads in the surrounding of the public
viewing area (Falkner, 2006, p. 12). In addi-
tion, the Berlin police held sway with their
demands for higher security measures at the
Berlin fan mile: it was surrounded with a
fence, 5.3 kilometers long and 2.20 meters
high—the additional monies being paid by the
Berlin government (ibid.). The 14 entrances
and exits were controlled by 5–10 rent-a-cops
each, who did bodily checks; the whole area
was monitored with CCTV cameras.
With regard to the governance of local
security what emerged in and around the fan
miles was a security mix between state and
Figure 1 Private security officers doing bodily checks and controlling football fans at a fan mile during the 2006
FIFA World Cup. © Die Kriminalpolizei, December 2006.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
private policing bodies both financed with
public monies during a commercial event.
With regard to the spatial reorganization of
urban space, fan miles concentrated fans in
selected areas in the city, and in doing so clas-
sified, separated, symbolically marked, mate-
rially arranged and in essence controlled
public space (Klauser, 2008, p. 178).
As shown above, local governments under
the conditions of global neoliberalization
have taken to, among others, place-market-
ing, public–private partnerships and new
forms of local boosterism. With so-called
mega-events, cities thus opened a window of
opportunity for global players such as FIFA.
Consumer attractions such as sports stadia,
shopping malls and entertainment ‘in the
form of urban spectacles on a temporary or
permanent basis have all become much more
prominent facets of strategies for urban
regeneration’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 9).
Mega-events such as the Olympics or
World Exhibitions are high-profile, symboli-
cally and emotionally laden meetings and key
moments of urban entrepreneurialism. At the
very same time, they are part of an intense
global inter-urban competition. They have
direct impacts on and are marketed in line
with neoliberal urbanism, the commercializa-
tion of urban space, the neoliberalization of
security and the respective new crime policies.
Packaging and sale of urban place images
have become as important as the measures to
keep the downtowns and event spaces
clean—and the safety, order and security
complex (SOS) under control. Commercial-
ization of public space extended far beyond
the urban environ as, for example, most of
the FIFA teams stayed in hotels with training
grounds in rural areas. As FIFA (2006a, p. 2)
‘The official training grounds used by the 32
teams must be handed over to the OC
[Olympic Committee] free of advertising
materials, as the grounds are a component of
the official organisation. Specifically, fixed
perimeter advertising must be covered or
removed by the operator of the facility.’
In the following, I will focus on the commer-
cialization of the fan miles and the security
rings around stadia.
Commercializing the fan miles
As shown above, FIFA forces all applicants
for hosting the World Cup (the nation-state
as well as respective host cities) to accept all
branding conditions and commercialization
interests laid down in the so-called FIFA
Regulations (FIFA, 2006b). World Cup
applicants have to accept these rules and
regulations in advance. FIFA itself extended
its right to control urban space even further
from 2002 onwards, thus seeping even
deeper into the neoliberalizing cities. In
other words, a nonprofit organization,
FIFA, opens up the space for the profit
purposes of itself and of some of the largest
multinational companies in sports and media
Even though it is true that most of the fan
mile organizers did not ask for an entrance
fee—only Cologne, Munich and six addi-
tional non-host cities relied on admission
fees (Klauser, 2008, p. 179)—and the
consumption of beverages was not a precon-
dition to watch the matches, the claim of the
German criminologist Thomas Feltes that the
‘the World Cup has been democratized by
public viewing’ (2006, p. 9) is at least confus-
ing if not irritating. What emerges during the
World Cups on a four-year basis in the
respective host cities is in fact the spatialized
suspension of democracy.
Commercializing the stadia and their
security rings
According to Klauser (2008, p. 181), the
whole outer security rings around stadia
had to be handed to FIFA as ‘neutralized
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
293 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
space’ with all advertisements to be removed.
As FIFA states with regard to accessibility
for individuals and advertisements of non-
‘The OC, FIFA and the stadiums/cities have
simply created “controlled areas”—on an
individually agreed basis—in the direct
vicinity of the stadiums. In these areas no
alternative events should take place on match
days and the day before a match to ensure the
seamless organisation of FIFA World Cup
fixtures.’ (FIFA, 2006a, p. 1)
Rules and regulations for the commercializa-
tion around the stadia did not only apply to
the official sponsors but, in turn, against their
competitors. As Klauser (2008, pp. 181–182)
notes, even local car garages had to remove
advertisements, restaurants had to hide their
outside beer signs (to protect the sponsor
Budweiser). In Munich and Hamburg the
respective ads of the insurance corporation
Allianz and of the online marketing company
AOL Germany had to be removed from the
stadia as the corporations were not FIFA
sponsors (Wilson, 2006) (Figure 2).
Figure 1 The newly built, fully CCTV and RFID equipped Allianz Arena in Munich advertised by its management at the Kloten Airport in Zurich during the UEFA Championship 2008. © Author.
From a particular point of view, we cannot
only speak about the ‘wedding’ of football,
television and commercialization (Homburg,
2008, p. 41) but about the wedding of securi-
tization and commercialization as well.
Affected by FIFA’s regulations are by no
means only sponsors and non-sponsors, the
urban and non-urban citizenry but all
administrations from the global to the local
scale. The influx of FIFA on regulating the
urban space as a market and commodity
already raises concern about the democratic
conditions of the commonweal before and
during these four weeks of a mega-event. It
also raises concerns about the longer-lasting
impact of FIFA’s activities. It is to this topic
the paper, by concluding, now turns.
Given the well-known trend of the Festival-
ization of urban politics (Häußermann and
Siebel, 1993) and given the intensified
marketing of the ‘city as an entrepreneur’
(Duckworth et al., 1987), it is the temporal–
spatial intensity of the marketing and
commodification processes before, during
and after the four weeks of the World Cup
that makes a difference. In marketing its main
product, FIFA makes use of its World Cup
monopoly. In essence, it does so by regulat-
ing the competition between the big players
in the sports and media industry in order to
allow for greater revenues to be—in part—
redistributed to its member associations.
In addition, mega-events fuel the growing
acceptance of and conviction that rent-a-cops
and policing volunteers are needed; the same
seems to be true for FIFA. Anyway, the grow-
ing influence (not necessarily the acceptance)
of all three stakeholders—FIFA, rent-a-cops,
nonprofits—is the continuation of a trend to
be witnessed latest since the early 1990s in
Germany as all stakeholders enjoy growing
decision-making powers: FIFA, in parallel
with the neoliberal crusade of the global and
urban elites (Smith, 1996)—of which the orga-
nization is in fact part and parcel—turned
from an Old Boys Network into a big business
company, even dictating nation-states and
cities their rules and regulations. Private secu-
rity companies are able to extend their fields
of operation due to ongoing outsourcing
Figure 2 The newly built, fully CCTV and RFID
equipped Allianz Arena in Munich advertised by its
management at the Kloten Airport in Zurich during the
UEFA Championship 2008. © Author.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
processes and the commodification of public
space (Eick, 2006). Finally, nonprofits gain
greater influence from the merging of policy
fields such as social welfare, labor-market
(re)integration and local SOS provision
(Eick, 2008, 2010a); during the World Cup
nonprofits intensified workfare measures
against long-term unemployed and deployed
them as additional security staff (Feltes, 2006,
pp. 10–11).
Nevertheless, all stakeholders remain
under what might be called a neostatist
regime. I have argued for an understanding
of FIFA as a neocommunitarian realist:
being backed by the Swiss nonprofit legisla-
tion, it aims at limiting free competition
within its realm and is willing to contest
public law. FIFA constantly tries to extend
and enhance its influence within its commu-
nity and even beyond. It emphasizes its
political role, making use of the (national-
ized) ‘social cohesion’ function football is
said to play. By thinking globally and acting
locally in the very sense, FIFA became an
important stakeholder (and shareholder)
within sports and style, marketing and
media, politics and propaganda, even
nation-building and -branding on the urban
ground—tax-exempted billions of euros
What remained in operation even after the
event was over, were new laws that extended
executive power and sophisticated surveil-
lance technologies (‘counter-laws’ in terms of
Ericson, 2007). As such, the World Cup has
had a catalyst function for the implementa-
tion of security technologies (for a detailed
analysis of the CCTV and RFID surveillance
before, during and after the World Cup, cf.
Eick, 2010b; Eick and Töpfer, 2010). The
FIFA World Cup also allowed for an excep-
tional experience in comprehensive training
for (inter)national security including mili-
tary, private security companies, nonprofits
and volunteers. In summarizing, I am high-
lighting four points.
First, FIFA is a nonprofit organization that
shapes and is shaped by neoliberalization. Its
main business is the marketing of a per se
civil society activity, playing football, and
transformed it into a profitable commodity.
In managing and marketing glocal football
events it shapes the social meaning of the
game as it is shaped by, in particular, the
World Cup. Given its nonprofit status, FIFA
deploys a particular kind of neoliberaliza-
tion—a highly regulated and constantly
readjusted process with elements of neocom-
munitarian thought and practice.
Second, FIFA shapes and is shaped by the
urban form. From 2002 onwards, FIFA set
the rules and regulations for its mega-events
not only within the stadia—from the consis-
tency of the football green, dress codes for
footballers to security measures to be
deployed and to the commercial logos being
allowed to be displayed. Its influence
outreaches the stadia and extends to the fan
miles within the host cities.
Third, the growing influence of FIFA can
be described as a new mode of governance.
The (contractual) relationships between all
stakeholders involved are shaped by FIFA’s
ability to offer its monopolized product. It is
for this reason that the networks created on a
four-year basis are hierarchical, and the subju-
gation under FIFA’s rules and regulations by
the host nation and the respective cities is the
precondition for hosting the games.
Fourth, the modes of governance estab-
lished before, during and after the FIFA
World Cup are at the same time exploited by
the other stakeholders; in particular by the
sponsors, the media and the sports industry.
From a state perspective, the World Cups
function as experimental grounds to develop
effective mechanisms and measures for polic-
ing the urban citizenry. More generally, the
World Cups normalize the perception of
the populace that private—commercial and
nonprofit—stakeholders define and control
markets, security measures and urban space,
plus to a certain and growing extent even the
everyday life of the people. The FIFA direc-
torate can do so with an ingrained self-
aggrandizement, based on its protection by
the Swiss nonprofit legislation, thus truly
embodying neocommunitarian realism.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
295 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
Figure 2 Private security officers doing bodily checks and controlling football fans at a fan mile during the 2006 FIFA World Cup. ©
1 ‘In no time, Havelange transformed an
administration-oriented institution into a dynamic
enterprise brimming with new ideas and the will to
see them through’ (FIFA, 2003, p. 6). Since ‘the mid-
1970s FIFA has pressed ahead with the
commercialization and professionalization of
international football. In this way it has systematically
extended its financial resources as well as its global
radius of action and adopted a new definition of its
duties’ (Eisenberg, 2006, p. 59).
2 ‘Flexibilized labor’ includes but is not limited to
processes of de-unification, temporary work, the
diminishing of the regular work contract (full-time,
additional payments for Sunday and holiday work,
work with no contracts, etc.).
3 For example,
(accessed 11 March 2010).
4 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the state
subsidizes sports activities, co-finances stadia and
even finances FIFA (Eick et al., 2007).
5 This is not to say that transfer fees are history. On
the contrary, the respective football clubs changed
their behavior and now buy and pay for players
before their contracts end. It is for this reason that
competition intensified instead of vanishing.
6 See
media/newsid=783657.html (accessed 11 March
7 FIFA even regulates capitalist competition in the
field of branding: during the 2006 World Cup in
Germany, out of the 12 stadia seven had to be
renamed, because their commodified names
referred to non-sponsors of the World Cup
(Klauser, 2008, p. 181).
8 See
bundesliga/vereine/boerse.html (accessed
11 March 2010).
9 Another kind of commodification and marketing
regulated by FIFA are sports clothes. Whereas until
1982 it was strictly forbidden to carry any form of
advertisement visible on the clothing or equipment
according to FIFA regulations, from the Mexico
World Cup (1986) onwards more and more
commercial logos were introduced, added and/or
altered in size; the World Cup in Germany (2006)
extended the space for advertisement further
(Homburg, 2008, p. 49).
10 The World Cup cities were Berlin, Cologne,
Dortmund, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg,
Hanover, Kaiserslautern, Leipzig, Munich,
Nuremberg and Stuttgart.
11 The 1994 FIFA World Cup was the first to be
broadcasted on radio and television worldwide.
The 2006 FIFA World Cup was the biggest global
media event of all time. In addition—to clarify for
the importance of football in particular—the
viewing figures for the World Cup have far
exceeded those for the Olympics since 1998
(Daalmann, 1999).
12 ‘The myth that the World Cup final attracts a global
television audience of more than a billion people
has been debunked by an Independent
investigation into TV viewing figures that shows that
true audiences are between a quarter and a third
of that size’ (Harris, 2007).
13 See
associations.html (accessed 11 March 2010).
14 ‘Blatter lenkt ein’ (2 June 2006),,1918663
(accessed 11 March 2010).
15 ‘Platini stresses “family values”’ (2 October
bodies/news/newsid=612977.html (accessed
11 March 2010).
16 See
Mun.php (accessed 11 March 2010).
17 See
index.php?fid=4235=3&pdb=1 (accessed
11 March 2010).
18 See
cup-2006/ (accessed 11 March 2010).
Averesch, S. (2009) ‘200 Dateien der Polizei erfassen
Personendetails’, Berliner Zeitung, 15 August, p. 6.
Bach, S. (2008) Die Zusammenarbeit von privaten
Sicherheitsunternehmen, Polizei und
Ordnungsbehörden im Rahmen einer neuen
Sicherheitsarchitektur. Holzkirchen: Felix.
Belina, B. (2007) ‘From disciplining to dislocation: area
bans in recent urban policing in Germany’,
European Urban and Regional Studies 14(4),
pp. 321–336.
Boyle, P. and Haggerty, K. (2009) ‘Spectacular security:
mega-events and the security complex’, International
Political Sociology 3(3), pp. 257–274.
Brady, E. and Johnson, L. (1999) FONGOS, BONGOS
AND PONGOS: The Misapplication of Market
Orientation in Not for Profit Organisations.
Victoria: ms.
Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002) ‘Cities and the
geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”’,
Antipode 34(3), pp. 349–379.
Buhl, M. (2006) ‘Ein Erfolgsmodell für künftige
Kooperationen von Polizei und Privaten’, Polizei
heute 35(6), pp. 202–204.
Bundesregierung, eds (2006) Fußball-WM 2006.
Abschlussbericht der Bundesregierung. Berlin: Die
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
Daalmann, A. (1999) Fußball und Nationalismus. Berlin:
Deutscher Bundestag, eds (2009) Rechtswidrigkeit der
Verbunddatei ‘Gewalttäter Sport‘ (Drucksache 16/
11934). Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.
Duckworth, R., McNulty, R. and Simmons, J. (1987) Die
Stadt als Unternehmen. Stuttgart: bonn aktuell.
Eick, V. (2006) ‘Preventive urban discipline: rent-a-cops
and the neoliberal glocalisation in Germany’, Social
Justice 33(3), pp. 66–84.
Eick, V. (2008) ‘Urbane Wachen und die neuen
Polizeien’, in F. Arndt et al. (eds) Ordnungen im
Wandel, pp. 81–104. Bielefeld: transcript.
Eick, V. (2010a) ‘Policing “below the state” in Germany:
neocommunitarian soberness and punitive
paternalism’, Contemporary Justice Review,
Eick, V. (2010b) ‘Securing their profits: the German FIFA
World Cup as a neoliberal sports event’, in E.
Haggerty and C. Bennett (eds) Security Games, New
York: Routledge, forthcoming.
Eick, V. and Töpfer, E. (2010) ‘Lack of legacy? Shadows
of surveillance after the 2006 FIFA World Cup’,
Urban Studies, forthcoming.
Eick, V., Grell, B., Mayer, M. and Sambale, J. (2004)
Nonprofit-Organisationen und die Transformation
der lokalen Beschäftigungspolitik. Münster:
Westfälisches Dampfboot.
Eick, V., Sambale, J. and Töpfer, E., eds (2007)
Kontrollierte Urbanität. Bielefeld: transcript.
Eisenberg, C. (2002) ‘Die Entdeckung des Sports durch
die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft’, Historical
Social Research 27(2/3), pp. 4–21.
Eisenberg, C. (2006) ‘FIFA 1975–2000: the business of
a football development organisation’, Historical
Social Research 31(1), pp. 55–68.
Eisenberg, P. (2000) ‘The nonprofit sector in a changing
world’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
29(2), pp. 325–330.
Ericson, R. (2007) Crime in an Insecure World.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ericson, R. and Haggerty, K. (1997) Policing the
Risk Society. Toronto: University of Toronto
Falkner, M. (2006) ‘Das Sicherheitskonzept rund um die
WM’, Berliner Morgenpost, 3July, p. 12.
Feltes, T. (2006) Zusammenarbeit zwischen privaten
Sicherheitsdienstleistern und Polizei bei der FIFA
WM 2006. Köln: VdS.
FIFA, eds (2003) Fédération Internationale de Football
Association. Info Plus: For the Good of the Game.
Zurich: FIFA.
FIFA, eds (2006a) Marketing FAQs for the 2006 FIFA
World Cup. Zurich: FIFA.
FIFA, eds (2006b) Reglement FIFA Fußball-
Weltmeisterschaft Deutschland 2006. Zurich: FIFA.
FIFA, eds (2006c) Regulations 2006 FIFA World Cup
Germany. Zurich: FIFA.
FIFA, eds (2007) FIFA Statutes. Regulations Governing
the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of
the Congress. Zurich: FIFA.
FIFA, eds (2009) FIFA Financial Report 2008. Zurich:
Flint, J., ed. (2006) Housing, Urban Governance and
Anti-Social Behaviour. Perspectives, Policy and
Practice. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Giulianotti, R. and Robertson, R. (2007) ‘Recovering the
social: globalisation, football and transnationalism’,
Global Networks 7(2), pp. 166–186.
Görke, A. and Maroldt, L. (2006) ‘Tanzen verboten! Eine
lateinamerikanische Fiesta in Leipzig’, Der
Tagesspiegel, 26 June, p. 3.
Hachleitner, B. (2004) Von echten Profis und falschen
Amateuren. Available at
index.php?art_id=741 (accessed 11 March 2010).
Hachleitner, B. (2005) ‘Das Stadion als Gefängnis’, in M.
Marschik et al. (eds) Stadion. Geschichte,
Architektur, Politik, Ökonomie, pp. 258–281. Wien:
Turia + Kant.
Hackworth, J. (2007) The Neoliberal City. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Hagemann, A. (2007) ‘Filter, Ventile und Schleusen’, in
V. Eick et al. (eds) Kontrollierte Urbanität, pp. 301–
328. Bielefeld: transcript.
Harris, N. (2007) ‘Why FIFA’s claim of one billion TV
viewers was a quarter right’, The Independent,1
March. Available at
438302.html (accessed 11 March 2010).
Harvey, D. (1989) ‘From manageralism to
entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban
governance in late capitalism’, Geografiska Annaler
71B(1), pp. 3–17.
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Häußermann, H. and Siebel, W., eds (1993)
Festivalisierung der Stadtpolitik. Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Homburg, H. (2008) ‘Financing world football: a
business history of the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association’, Zeitschrift für
Unternehmensgeschichte 53(1), pp. 33–69.
Jessop, B. (2002) ‘Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban
governance: a state-theoretical perspective’,
Antipode 34(3), pp. 452–472.
Klauser, F. (2008) ‘FIFA land 2006. Alliances between
security politics and business interests for Germany’s
city network’, in Centre of Contemporary Culture of
Barcelona (ed.) Architectures of Fear, pp. 173–187.
Barcelona: CCCB.
Leitner, H., Peck, J. and Sheppard, E., eds (2007)
Contesting Neoliberalism. New York: Guilford.
Manzenreiter, W. (2007) ‘The business of sports and the
manufacturing of global social inequality’, Esporte e
Sociedade 2(6), pp. 1–22.
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
297 CITY VOL. 14, NO. 3
Martens, K. (2002) ‘Mission impossible? Defining
nongovernmental organizations’, Voluntas 13(3),
pp. 271–285.
Mayer, M. (2007) ‘Contesting the neoliberalization of
urban governance’, in H. Leitner, J. Peck and E.
Sheppard (eds) Contesting Neoliberalism. Urban
Frontiers, pp. 90–115. New York: Guilford Press.
Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D., eds (2009) The Road from
Mont Pelerin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Monks, J. and Husch, J. (2009) ‘The impact of seeding,
home continent, and hosting on FIFA World
Cup results’, Journal of Sports Economics 10(4),
pp. 391–408.
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing
Government. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) ‘Neoliberalizing space’,
Antipode 34(3), pp. 380–404.
Salamon, L. (1995) Partners in Public Service:
Government–Nonprofit Relations in the Modern
Welfare State. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Salz, J., Steinkirchner, P. and Klesse, H.-J. (2006)
‘Deutsches Finale’, WirtschaftsWoche 28 (10 July),
pp. 64–67.
Sassen, S. (2006) Territory, Authority, Rights: From
Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Schmidt, P. (2007) ‘Zur Qualifizierung der
Sicherheitsdienstleister bei Großveranstaltungen’, in
R. Stober (ed.) Der Beitrag des
Bewachungsgewerbes zur Sicherheit bei
Großveranstaltungen, pp. 27–32. Köln: Carl
Schumann, F. (2005) Professionalisierungstendenzen im
deutschen Fußball aus sportökonomischer
Perspektive. Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karls-Universität.
Shimada, H. (1986) Industrial Relations and
‘Humanware‘. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, N. (1996) The New Urban Frontier. New York:
Stober, R. (2000) ‘Police-Private-Partnership aus
juristischer Sicht’, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 7,
pp. 261–268.
Stoker, G. (2000) ‘Urban political science and the
challenge of urban governance’, in J. Pierre (ed.)
Debating Governance, pp. 91–109. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Swyngedouw, E. (1997) ‘Neither global nor local:
“glocalisation” and the politics of scale’, in K. Cox
(ed.) Spaces of Globalization, pp. 137–166. New
York: Guilford.
Trudeau, D. and Veronis, L. (2009) ‘Enacting state
restructuring: NGOs as “translation mechanisms”’,
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
27(6), pp. 1117–1134.
Tsoukala, A. (2009) Football Hooliganism in Europe.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
van Winkel, C. (2000) ‘Dance, discipline, density
and death. The crowd in the stadium’, in M.
Provoost (ed.) The Stadium, pp. 12–36.
Rotterdam: NAI.
Wilson, B. (2006) ‘Stadiums renamed for FIFA sponsors’,
BBC Online, 6 June. Available at http://
(accessed 11 March 2010).
Volker Eick is a political scientist at the
Freie Universität Berlin, John F. Kennedy
Institute, Department of Politics, Lansstr. 7–
9, D-14195 Berlin, Germany. Email:
Downloaded At: 20:48 19 July 2010
... INTRODUCING MEGA-EVENTS Within the last 150 years, there has been a global increase of "substantial, prolonged and spectacular celebrations of human achievements in the arts, sport, and science" (Gold & Gold, 2008, p. 302). These celebrations, often referred as mega-events, vary in type, size, impact, and organization and are not only about sport or culture anymore, but also about politics (See Lenskyj, 2000; Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2001;Boykoff, 2016) and the capitalist economy (Lenskyj, 2004;Eick, 2010). Over the past several decades, it has become clear that mega-events are also about the transformation of cities, as city leaders start to view events not only for their sports and culture merits but also as opportunities to achieve their urban agenda goals (See Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2002;Hiller, 2007, p. 317;Koch & Valiyev, 2016). ...
... These restrictions are in line with those that have been implemented at other mega-events including the 2012 London Olympics that purportedly ' festivalized Hyde Park for the event which restricted everyday uses (Osborn, 2016, p. 147). Moreover, the public viewing sites at FIFA football events called ' Fan Fests allow free viewing of the event and do not charge anything from the visitors but it also abandons any other commercial activities in the same space such as trading or fast food restaurants not selling the products of the event sponsors (Eick, 2010). As there is a general trend in the mega-event industry to look out for the wider urban environment as a site for their brand extension (McGillivray, McPherson, & Carnicelli, 2015, p. 2) it seems that FOG has also taken measures to follow this practice and the F1 entertainment area is a perfect example of that. ...
... Overall, the hosting of such events in cities where citizen participation in decision making is absent and the project is implemented directly from the national and local level, the government runs the risk resulting in the partial privatization and increased securitization of free and open public space. Events such as the Summer Olympics in London (Boykoff & Fussey, 2013;Andrew Smith, 2013a), FIFA World Cup (Eick, 2010;Baasch, 2011) or even the European Youth Olympic Festival discussed in the next paper have already provided certain negative examples of "borrowing" public space for the megaevent use. This article has also demonstrated the evolving interrelationship between the massively commercialized mega-event F1, and the host city of Baku through the exceptionality concept. ...
Mega-events are large-scale cultural, political, religious or sporting events of mass media appeal and international significance. They are typically temporary affairs yet have permanent and costly outcomes. They have also become valuable tools for multi-layered processes of urban transformation. Mega-events are frequently presented by governments as an extraordinary opportunity for their host cities and are often realized through the temporary suspension of judicial laws, or through an imposition of the exceptional regulations. Urban projects, with tangible and intangible outcomes (such as new laws and infrastructure) which for decades have experienced problems with implementation, may be realized in this mega-event environment while other urban development projects get delayed, reduced in scope, or abandoned. These processes often undermine democratic decision-making and have an impact beyond the temporary event time frame and site-specific location. Through three case studies located in Glasgow (Scotland), Baku (Azerbaijan), and Tbilisi (Georgia) this dissertation investigates the various ways of deploying, using and justifying the legal practices of exception in relation to mega-events, as well as their impacts on different groups and spaces in host cities. [for a full text send a direct message]
... Some tournaments have seen organisers erect fan parks in large public spaces where supporters can congregate irrespective of allegiances, watch matches on huge screens and engage in other forms of entertainment. These areas have otherwise been labelled as "fan zones", "fan fests", "live sites", "celebration zones" and "public viewing areas" across various SMEs (Eick, 2010). Although some terms are used interchangeably here, the dominant reference employed by stakeholdersand therefore within this articleis to "fan parks". ...
Full-text available
Rationale This article explores the development, use and impact of fan parks in host cities of men’s football mega events, constructed as temporary commercial sites where fans congregate to watch matches on large screens and partake in other forms of entertainment. Approach This study draws on ethnographic, observational, interview and focus group data, exploring perspectives of fans, volunteers, organisers, journalists, police and security personnel, totalling 212 respondents at five FIFA World Cup finals and ten other confederation tournaments. Findings This paper reveals that fans have increasingly engaged with such provision where available, relative to the degree of cultural resonance, accessibility, affordability, security and the suitability of facilities. However, these fan parks remain conspicuously absent in confederation events beyond Europe. Practical implications The research shows that fan parks can help diversify the fan experience, allowing users to interact with supporters from across the world in defined spaces. They also contribute to crowd management, enabling authorities to contain fans, confine their movement, monitor alcohol consumption and control behaviour. Research contribution This longitudinal study examines the emergence and development of fan parks at 15 events in five continents, analysing their impact on the fan experience and the securitisation of crowd management.
... For example, Eick (2010) highlights how the 2006 edition was used as a convenient excuse to install hundreds of CCTV cameras in various German cities, with many host cities retaining these post-event (accompanied by legal changes that provided the police with new powers). Eick (2010) suggests that the event cast 'shadows of surveillance' , which remained after the event. Similar outcomes have been witnessed in other parts of the Global North. ...
An emerging theme within the mega-events literature is the ways they affect the provision, regulation and design of urban public spaces. Parks, streets and squares host competition venues, and are also used for supplementary occasions and facilities associated with hosting mega-events. Using examples from the London 2012 Olympic Games and Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games, this paper examines the long-term significance of mega-events for urban public spaces. The paper contends that these events can be used as ‘Trojan Horses’, allowing new systems to be introduced under the cover of an event. It also emphasizes how temporary mega-events transform public spaces into venues for subsequent commercial events. Finally, the paper acknowledges more positive legacies, showing how mega-events can change how public space is imagined by users and by those responsible for managing it. Both cases highlight how events influence the ways spaces are used, designed and managed.
... Second, from as early as the interwar period (e.g., Large, 2007), international sporting organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and their continental-scale counterparts have developed increasingly comprehensive requirements for hosting governments. In their candidacy files, or "bid books," each potential host city must agree to these stipulations, which also govern their access-controlled event enclaves outside the event venues (e.g., Eick, 2011;Smith, 2016;Steinbrink, 2013). In addition to ensuring the smooth running of the events, one strategic goal of these requirements is to retain the event owners' legally shielded grip on their and their business partners' exclusive commercial rights. ...
With an eye to attracting global media attention, the ordinary cityscape is purposefully transformed into an out-of-the-ordinary eventscape during major sports occasions. Focusing on the production of captive audience positions and event-goers' associated media-conscious performances, this article compares the implementation of event spaces in the totalitarian-propagandist context of the 1936 Berlin Olympics with the commercially branded 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Apart from blatant dissimilarities in ideological-commercial motifs and emotionally charged forms of audiencehood between these urban spectacles, variable media-densified audience positions were carefully built into the design of both events. The key commonalities include the turning of urban public spaces into strictly controlled event enclaves, civic education aimed at image leveraging through ambassadorial conduct, and atmospheric intensification by enthusiastic audience-performers. We conclude that these measures to maximize positive media publicity continue to steer, in increasingly multimedial ways, the production of urban megaevents even in the digitalized present.
... A number of previous studies have pointed out the exceptional aspects of special economic zones (Bach, 2011;Farole & Akinci, 2011;Neilson, 2014;Ong, 2006). Likewise, scholars have shown how top-tier international mega-events can be legally and spatially exceptional, such as: the Winter and Summer Olympics (Boykoff, 2013;Delladestsima, 2003;Smith, 2013a); FIFA World Cup (Aaron Richmond & Garmany, 2016;Eick, 2010Eick, , 2011; Commonwealth Games (Follmann, 2015;Gray & Porter, 2015); and Formula 1 (Gezici & Er, 2014;Gogishvili, 2018). The trend toward exceptional event legislation has not been limited to these most recognized first-tier mega-events and can also be found in less prominent second and third-tier events. ...
Full-text available
Since the 1960s, both mega-events and special economic zones have gained global prominence as agents of urban development. Often relying on extra-legal measures for their realization, these two initiatives further create areas of spatial exclusion in cities. This paper examines their coming together in Tbilisi, Georgia, where costs for the city's hosting of the 2015 European Youth Olympic Festival were defrayed by the company Hualing Group in exchange for government approval of a 420-hectare special economic zone. Using a qualitative mixed-methods approach, the research shows that combining mega-events with special economic zones poses significant threats to the democratic processes tied to urban planning at both the local and national level. It further demonstrates how the coinciding of such projects promotes sprawl and privately-enclaved urban development patterns. In relation to urban theory, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature examining exceptionality in cities, and looking at how mega-events serve as legitimizing devices for even wider practices of long-term spatial and legal exception, such as special economic zones. *message me for a pdf of the article
... As cidades e nações anfitriãs das Olimpíadas têm pouca escolha e têm de aceitar todas as condições das marcas, interesses de comercialização e as exigências de segurança, mesmo antes de lhes ter sido atribuído o evento (Eick, 2010). O COI, através dos seus contratos nas cidades anfitriãs e da expansão dos requisitos técnicos (muitos envolvem os direitos dos parceiros corporativos) que os obriga a regular "o espaço urbano como um mercado e mercadoria" (Eick, 2010, p.293) e isso estende-se à exigência do estado local para controlar o tráfego, reduzir as práticas de comércio normais e facilitar os meios de consumo (muitas vezes) das marcas globais e o acesso das mesmas aos seus mercados-alvo. ...
Full-text available
O artigo começa com uma discussão sobre a evolução da passagem da tocha Olímpica, que culminou com os Jogos Olímpicos de Londres em 2012. A isto segue-se uma análise do poder empresarial e político que envolve os Jogos Olímpicos. Aqui, os valores do movimento Olímpico são contrastados com os movimentos dirigidos ao brandscaping das cidades-anfitriãs e das nações obrigadas pelos acordos contratuais estabelecidos, assim que lhes são garantidos os direitos de serem anfitriãs dos Jogos Olímpicos. Empiricamente, o artigo centra-se na parte escocesa da passagem da tocha Olímpica, um "evento" móvel que viajou pelo Reino Unido no verão de 2012. Através das lentes do projeto de investigação-ação #citizenrelay, a passagem da tocha olímpica é aberta ao escrutínio como um veículo para a ativação de marca, garantida e protegida pelo estado local a um custo significativo para as comunidades pelo país. Antes de tirar conclusões, discute-se o papel dos média cidadãos, que permitem comentários lúdicos, irónicos e, às vezes, provocativos sobre a extravagância dos Jogos Olímpicos. O artigo conclui argumentando que a passagem da tocha Olímpica promove a manifestação do espírito dos Jogos Olímpicos (a paz, a harmonia e a amizade), ao mesmo tempo que usa o seu alcance e popularidade para estender os tentáculos do brandscaping para edifícios, paisagens e espaços anteriormente protegidos contra os caprichos da mercantilização. As experiências concebidas institucionalmente são coreografadas para o benefício dos média nacionais e internacionais, deixando os cidadãos como espectadores passivos, que desempenham os papéis pré-concebidos de abanadores de bandeiras e apoiantes roucos de patrocinadores corporativos. No entanto, também sublinhamos a incompletude do nexo média-corporativo e enfatizamos o potencial dos média cidadãos para subverter as representações estabelecidas, permitindo um espaço participativo onde os média podem ser criados e distribuídos amplamente, em vez de consumidos passivamente. A normalização das relações de poder existentes entre os megaeventos desportivos e o comércio poderá ser ameaçada pelo peso de histórias produzidas localmente, digitalmente conectadas e compartilháveis.
... Successful bidding cities are contractually obliged to pass exceptional Olympic Games legislation that overrides existing local or national legislative arrangements (McGillivray and Frew 2015). This legislation includes decrees that affect planning, the use of public space, the protection of Olympic assets and the ability to secure exclusive access for the Olympic multinational corporate family, including the creation of a clean-city so that the host destination can be dressed in the five rings regalia (Eick 2010). Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter serves to protect the commercial interests of the IOC and The Olympic Partners (TOP) by disallowing any counter advertising or publicity within or around sport venues, but also within other areas deemed part of the event (Boykoff 2017). ...
Hosting the Olympic Games demands the efficient and effective sequestration of public space across the city to stage official sports, cultural, and commercial activity. Specifically, this paper examines how fast-tracked urban development processes create exclusive, commercial enclaves to maximise leverageable benefits for external actors. We focus on the case of Rio 2016, drawing on: i) observations across the city and event zones, including Live Site, Last Mile, and transit spaces, ii) interviews with key event, policy and visitor economy stakeholders, iii) documentary analysis of Rio’s plans and promises outlined in official bid documentation, and iv) supplementary sources documenting Olympic planning effects. Our findings illustrate how the legal power of the Host City Contract and highly-circumscribed Olympic regulations create the conditions for managing urban space that enables the circulation of visitor flows to - and the containment of consumption within - newly privatised, temporarily constructed urban zones that favour global interests.
... Within the last 150 years, there has been a global increase of "substantial, prolonged and spectacular celebrations of human achievements"[1]. These celebrations, often referred to as megaevents are large-scale cultural, political, religious or sporting events of mass media appeal and international significance[2], which vary in type, size, impact, and organization and are not only about sport or culture anymore, but also about politics [3,4] the capitalist economy [5,6]. They are typically temporary affairs yet have permanent and costly outcomes. ...
The current developments in Rio de Janeiro in the wake of the 2014 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup and the 2016 Summer OlympicGames accelerated the transition from a hybrid urban order to a new urban order of intensified neoliberalization and commodification. This transition is a complex and contradictory process that entails both rollback and rollout features of neoliberalism, as well as a permanent restructuring of sociospatial relations and political arrangements. By discussing the ongoing policies and politics of urban restructuring, we examine the creative destruction of urban structures, institutional arrangements, and regulations of urban space with the transformation of three sites in Rio de Janeiro—Barra da Tijuca, the port district, and the South Zone. The process of variegated neoliberalization generates new modes of production and reproduction, which threaten the principles of democratic governance and universalization of rights to the city.
Full-text available
Ordnung muss sein! So lässt sich das zentrale Strukturprinzip der Moderne zusammenfassen. Heutige soziale, politische, wirtschaftliche und rechtliche Ordnungen erscheinen dagegen immer weniger eindeutig. Ziel dieses Bandes ist es, den Blick transdisziplinär für alternative Konzeptionen von Wirklichkeit zu öffnen. Dabei wird gefragt: Welche Ordnungen institutionalisieren sich jenseits von Demokratie, Nation und Staat? Inwiefern bestehen Ordnungen nebeneinander fort und überlagern sich in Zeit und Raum? Die Beiträge eröffnen eine Debatte, die moderne Paradigmen hinterfragt und die Eindimensionalität und Statik traditioneller sozialwissenschaftlicher Konzepte herausfordert.
Seit rund zwanzig Jahren sind Städte zu Laboren neoliberaler Kriminalpolitik avanciert. Das gilt insbesondere für die Metropolen Nordamerikas und Westeuropas, in denen neue staatliche Polizeistrategien erprobt, private Sicherheitsdienste beauftragt und elaborierte Kontroll- und Sicherheitstechnologien zum Einsatz gebracht werden. Erstmals fassen hier ausgewiesene Experten theoretische und empirische Ergebnisse zur sicherheitspolitischen Kontrolle des innerstädtischen Raums, von Sportveranstaltungen, neuen sozialen Bewegungen und sogenannten Randgruppen in vergleichender Perspektive zusammen.
Neoliberalism--the doctrine that market exchange is an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action--has become dominant in both thought and practice throughout much of the world since 1970 or so. Writing for a wide audience, David Harvey, author of The New Imperialism and The Condition of Postmodernity, here tells the political-economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it proliferated on the world stage. Through critical engagement with this history, he constructs a framework, not only for analyzing the political and economic dangers that now surround us, but also for assessing the prospects for the more socially just alternatives being advocated by many oppositional movements.
This book is the first comprehensive volume exploring an issue of growing importance to policy makers, academics, housing practitioners and students. It brings together contributions from the most prominent scholars in the field to provide a range of theoretical perspectives, critical analysis and empirical research findings about the role of housing and urban governance in addressing anti-social behaviour. Contributors assess constructions of anti-social behaviour in policy discourse, identify how housing is increasingly central to the governance of anti-social behaviour and critically evaluate a wide range of measures used by housing and other agencies to tackle what is perceived to be a growing social problem. Although the book focuses on the UK, comparative international perspectives are provided from France, Australia and the United States. The book covers definitions of anti-social behaviour and policy responses including key new legislation and the legal role of social landlords in governing anti-social behaviour. There is comprehensive coverage of key measures including eviction, probationary tenancies, Anti-social Behaviour Orders, mediation and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts, and of innovative developments such as gated communities, intensive support services and the use of private security. “Housing, urban governance and anti-social behaviour” will be of interest to academics, policy-makers, practitioners and students in the fields of housing, urban studies, social policy, legal studies and criminology.
Providing the first EU-wide study of the way football hooliganism has been defined by academics, law makers and enforcers, and the media since the 1960s, this book examines the regulation and policing of the phenomenon, which has been influenced by security-related developments within post-bipolar Europe.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.