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'They Stole Our Land': Debating the Expropriation of White Farms in Zimbabwe
Abstract
In Zimbabwe today, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF colleagues are busy expropriating white-owned farms, and claiming the moral high ground while they do so. Indeed, many observers, inside Zimbabwe and elsewhere, take it for granted that, whatever Mugabe's excesses, there is justice in his cause. But is there? This paper examines three moral arguments that Mugabe and his supporters advance to justify their land policies: that the peasants need the land, that the war of liberation was fought for the land, and that Zimbabweans are only taking back land that was originally stolen from them. The last of these arguments, which rests on an implicit entitlement theory of justice, is the strongest, and this essay therefore scrutinises it closely. It argues, however, that despite their emotive appeal, all three arguments are flawed beyond repair. Debunking them should help pave the way for a more sensible and more viable approach to the land question in Zimbabwe.
... Most philosophers in this school of thought base their postulations on the Lockean proviso, recently invoked by Robert Nozick (1974). Shaw (2003) and Scalet and Schmidtz (2010) are also in this school of thought. They maintain that property entitlement is to be respected (as per the colonial arrangement), since that is the only form of traceable historical entitlement transactions. ...
... In the first group, which I think is a form of forward-looking perspective, there is a concern about increasing economic activities through growing economies (GDP or any other such economic concepts). There is also a sense in which the argument says that land redistribution should not upset the contributions that have come or are coming from established colonial (skewed) land activities (Shaw 2003). In Shaw's (2003) perspective, the focus should be on redistributing lands that are underutilised, or reducing the sizes of farms owned so that others, as in those who do not own any, may also have access to land. ...
... There is also a sense in which the argument says that land redistribution should not upset the contributions that have come or are coming from established colonial (skewed) land activities (Shaw 2003). In Shaw's (2003) perspective, the focus should be on redistributing lands that are underutilised, or reducing the sizes of farms owned so that others, as in those who do not own any, may also have access to land. Essentially, the argument somewhat supports maintaining the status quo (through respecting "colonial" ownership rights), though with some alterations. ...
This article focuses on land allocation through invoking African values. It seeks to provide a contrast to other rectifications of skewed colonial land distributions from African values, and it also offers an alternative to the land distributive justice that has tended to be premised on Western entitlement or rights-oriented thought. The article proposes conceptualising land distribution specifically based on indigenous African ethics of Unhu/ubuntu, a quintessential southern African ethic of being humane and living communally. The humaneness and communitarian life are centred on values such as relationality, cooperation, common good and equal distribution of communal goods. Through articulating each value, and indicating its usefulness in land distribution, the article hopes to provide an African account of distributive justice in respect of land redistribution.
... According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2010), Africa has lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of agricultural productivity, with many traditional export crops (tobacco, wheat, palm oil) losing their international competitiveness over the previous 30 years. This is supported by Shaw (2003) who used the example of Zimbabwe and stated that its labour intensive commercial farms were not efficient by North American standards. Further, low agricultural productivity has been exacerbated by climate change, lack of capital, low capacity, weak infrastructure and poor governance (IFC, 2010). ...
... Some studies have emphasised the political controversy that surrounded land reform over the last decade. This is again supported by Shaw (2003) who argues that land reform in Zimbabwe has been 'cynically motivated' with the wholesale expropriation of white farms. Rather than continue with the controversial debate, this research project will focus on the events that have led to the current agrarian landscape in Zimbabwe. ...
... Zimbabwe's total land area is 39 million hectares, with approximately 33 million hectares allocated to agriculture and the balance to national parks and urban settlement (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004). Shaw, (2003) notes that white farmers, who constituted less than 1% of the population in 1980, owned 47% of the most productive agricultural land (15.5 million hectares). Since then, the country has had two phases of land reform and resettlement. ...
Agriculture in developing countries is characterised by low productivity and underutilisation of arable land. Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa have a long history of excluding black farmers in the commercial farming sector. Prior to independence, colonial policies favoured the white minority over the black majority, thereby creating large numbers of peasant farmers. Literature argues that contract farming can play a vital role in raising the agricultural productivity of peasant farmers. In contract farming, an agribusiness firm lends inputs such as fertilizer, seeds and pesticides to a farmer in return for the crop grown. This paper examines the Tian Ze Tobacco Company (TZTC) contract farming scheme in Zimbabwe as a “vehicle” to promote a new breed of emerging black commercial farmers in Southern Africa. The results of this study confirm that contract farming has a potential to boost productivity in Zimbabwe’s farming sector and empower the emerging black farmers.
DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n20p237
... There are two dominant schools of thought on land occupation. One school of thought argues that war veterans instigated land occupation as part of ZANU-PF's official campaign strategy for the 2000 elections in response to the dwindling support for the party, as demonstrated by the results of the February 2000 referendum (Alexander, 2006;Cousins, 2003;Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003;Shaw, 2003;Zimbabwe Liberators Platform, 2004). An opposing perspective views the land occupations in 2000 as part of a longer-term and identifiable land reform movement in postindependent Zimbabwe (Andrew & Sadomba, 2006;Moyo, 2002;Moyo & Yeros, 2005). ...
... Sithole et al. (2003: 11) summarize the process as follows: "While the early 'spontaneous' invasions by peasants were hailed as the unfolding of a genuinely people-centred story on land reform, the later invasions by war veterans were a politically motivated story crafted by the state." Critics (Alexander, 2006;Cousins, 2003;Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003;Shaw, 2003;Zimbabwe Liberators Platform, 2004) of the land occupation movement argue that the state instigated the violence and chaos that characterized the 2000 occupations. The FTLRP was marked by violence, coercion, and opportunism. ...
... For instance, investors are anxious to understand how this process will unfold and the real motivation for the policy. Shaw (2003) states that in developing countries, particularly in Africa, Zimbabwe has been the most widely cited case of failed land reform programmes. In the 2000s, President Robert Mugabe was vocal on the slow rates at which ordinary black Zimbabweans were not benefiting from the vast availability of land in the country (Shaw, 2003). ...
... Shaw (2003) states that in developing countries, particularly in Africa, Zimbabwe has been the most widely cited case of failed land reform programmes. In the 2000s, President Robert Mugabe was vocal on the slow rates at which ordinary black Zimbabweans were not benefiting from the vast availability of land in the country (Shaw, 2003). He also decried the dominance of land by white farmers. ...
Increasing calls to amend Section 25 of the South African Constitution which promotes that land may be expropriated without compensation has drawn global attention. The driving factor behind the increasing rhetoric of land expropriation without compensation is the assumption that the majority of black South Africans are living below the poverty line, mainly because they do not have access to land. This chapter seeks to understand if the expropriation of land without compensation will lead to poverty alleviation within the black community or rather it will have an adverse effect by worsening of poverty and economic conditions of black South Africans. The findings of the study reveal that although implementing the strategy may give the poor access to land, in the long run‚ it will have a detrimental effect on economic growth‚ addtionally‚ commercial farmers are heavily indebted to commercial banks, owing them billions‚ hence expropriating land with compensation will significantly effect the balance sheet of commercial banks and the economy at large. The failure of Venezuela and Zimbabwe to alleviate poverty through land expropriation raises questions regarding the success rate for such a policy and its suitability to South Africa‚ especially considering the country’s current economic direction.
... On the one hand land reform and resettlement have been viewed as a tool for redressing landlessness among the blacks and a tool for restoring their political rights. Before independence in 1980, ownership of agricultural land was skewed in favour of whites, even though they were the minority (Shaw, 2003). During colonial times landlessness was prevalent among the blacks despite the fact that access to land was their main means of survival, since the livelihoods of the majority of them was based on agriculture. ...
... During colonial times landlessness was prevalent among the blacks despite the fact that access to land was their main means of survival, since the livelihoods of the majority of them was based on agriculture. On the other hand, the transformation of white owned commercial farms into resettlement areas has been viewed as detrimental to the livelihoods of not only the dispossessed commercial farmers but also to the farm workers who were previously employed on the farms (Shaw, 2003). However, such an argument could easily be dismissed as a pretext for justifying the racially based skewed distribution of land. ...
This study investigates the importance of social-ecological systems in the conservation of forest and
woodland resources in a planned resettlement area in Zimbabwe. The study uses methodological integration,
comprising a questionnaire survey and participatory rural appraisal that were conducted on five randomly
selected farms to explore the way resettled communities interact with tree resources and the cultural
and traditional practices that they employ to conserve the resources. The study concludes that forest and
woodland resource conservation is a function of complex and dynamically linked processes that are not
only embedded in biophysical space but also connected to socio-economic and political realms depicting the
livelihoods, social needs and culture of members of the resettled communities. This knowledge is important
for designing conservation strategies in future resettlement areas.
... They have further argued that unsettling land issues in Africa will impact on investors. In Zimbabwe some argue that Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union -Patriotic Front colleagues should not claim moral high ground (Clark 2019, August 23;Shaw 2003). The point here is whether the same arguments against returning land back to Africans would apply to Ukrainians who are demanding back their eastern territories that were seize by Russia. ...
... In an effort to change that situation, former President Mugabe implemented EWC. The massive, forced, eviction of white famers led to an economic crisis, unemployment and food insecurity (Hughed, 2010;Shaw, 2003). However, in Zimbabwe, expropriated farms were handed to political allies and family, instead of the general population (Rutherford, 2016, as cited in Mubecua & Mlambo, 2020). ...
South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid has left the country in conflict over land. Especially politicians are accused of exploiting the land issue and stigmatising white landowners. Beside farmers being at risk of becoming a victim of a farm attack, landowners also fear that their land will be expropriated without compensation due to new legislation. The occurrence of farm attacks against white farmers and the hate speech by politicians directed at the white population have given rise to the ‘white genocide’ narrative. Besides the ‘white genocide’ narrative, narratives on farm attacks, especially in the context of the land issue, are lacking in criminological research. This qualitative research aimed at filling the gap through describing and exploring the narratives of social interest groups on farm attacks and its link to expropriation without compensation.
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted and the Twitter API was used to gather tweets, which resulted in a large dataset. A narrative analysis was employed and insight was obtained in the formation, spread and possible consequences of narratives on the land issue and farm attacks. Although the social interest groups shared the same goal, the narratives were heterogenous. The research indicated that especially the behaviour of radical politicians surrounding the land issue influenced the forming of narratives on farm attacks. In addition, the perceived threats resulting from that behaviour form a risk in maintaining and fuelling the ethnic tensions in South Africa. However, friction was not only found between different ethnicities, but also between the social interest groups with different narratives. Hence, in order to maintain peace in South Africa and improve the situation for South African landowners, farmers and farm dwellers, social interest groups must come together and actively include organisations and people from other ethnicities to shift the situation from conflict to cooperation.
... After gaining independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government repealed and replaced all discriminatory laws (UNDP, 2002;Shaw, 2003;Pilossof, 2012). During the first decade of independence, compulsory land acquisition in Zimbabwe was guided by the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. ...
Property valuation for compensation of expropriated properties in Zimbabwe has been characterised by inconsistencies for decades. Previous studies have noted that displaced people are dissatisfied with the compensation paid by the expropriating authority. Even though many academic works were done on expropriation and compensation in Zimbabwe, issues surrounding consistency in property valuation practices and fairness of compensation paid remain unresearched. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to close this gap. Data for this study were collected through primary sources (questionnaire surveys to members of the compensation committee, private property valuers, designated property valuers and former commercial farmers) and secondary sources (literature surveys including a review of statutes, official reports, books, journals, and newsletters). Findings reveal that there is inconsistency in property valuation for expropriation, no clear legal definition of what constitutes fair compensation, and that views on the fairness of the compensation paid for expropriated properties in Zimbabwe are divergent. The study suggests that there is a need to review existing expropriation and compensation laws in Zimbabwe to create consistency in practice, thereby improving the fairness in the amount of compensation paid to the displaced person(s).
... It won Mugabe support and political actors in other countries, like South Africa, seeking land reform have cited the Zimbabwean case as a success. However, it has also been criticised as a gross violation of human rights by Mugabe and his regime (Human Rights Watch, 2002;Shaw, 2003). ...
The name Robert Gabriel Mugabe conjures a multiplicity of often highly divergent thoughts, emotions and sentiments. With conflicting reflections of Mugabe in both his personal capacity and as head of the Republic of Zimbabwe, being lauded as an inimitable African nationalist, orator, liberator, reformist, decolonialist, Pan Africanist among other praises on the one hand and vilified as a despot, murderer, election thief, gross human rights violator among other colourful indictments on the other, Mugabe remains in death as he was in life, an enigma. Robert Gabriel Mugabe (21 February 1924 – 6 September 2019) ruled over Zimbabwe for nearly four decades in the capacities of both Prime Minister (1980 – 1987) and President (1987 – 2017) and was removed from power by his lieutenant and deposed former Vice President, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa with the backing of the military through what has been considered a ‘soft coup’. Hailing from diverse multidisciplinary expertise and/or active participation in politics, international relations, policy studies, history, social sciences, media studies and/or language studies, the book is a collection of scholarly contributions that are reflective of issues surrounding and about the life of the late former Zimbabwean President, Robert Gabriel Mugabe as it relates to this philosophy, life, politics, legacy and other relevant issues to understanding the ‘enigma’ that is Mugabe.
... While an inductive argument may not offer a proof as in a deductive argument, the strength of the argument lies in the extent of the probability claimed by the premises and the relationship between the premises and the conclusion. Philosophical contributions to land reform in Zimbabwe have looked at debating expropriation of white farms (Shaw 2003a); application of Nozick's principles of justice to land reform in Zimbabwe (Shaw 2003b); land justice within the context of Sen's capability approach (Daka 2006); reconciliation and the land question in Zimbabwe ; land contestations within an economic crisis ; and distributive justice and capability approaches to land reform in Zimbabwe . While these scholars use logical tools to assess arguments, this is done within a broad philosophical area such as social and political philosophy or economic philosophy. ...
Appealing largely to southern African values associated with ubuntu such as communion and reconciliation, elsewhere I have argued that they require compensating those who have been wronged in ways that are likely to improve their lives. In the context of land reform in southern Africa, I have further contended that this approach probably entails not transferring unjustly acquired land en masse and immediately to dispossessed populations since doing so would foreseeably lead to (amongst other things) capital flight and food shortages, which would be bad for them and the broader society. In two recent works, Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe has argued against my claim that land reform should be enacted in a way expected to benefit victims of colonialism while not greatly burdening innocent third parties, instead supporting the return of land to its rightful owners regardless of whether the manner in which it were done would produce good outcomes. In this chapter, I expound Oyowe’s argumentation and respond to it in defence of my initial position, appealing to examples from southern Africa to illustrate.
... While an inductive argument may not offer a proof as in a deductive argument, the strength of the argument lies in the extent of the probability claimed by the premises and the relationship between the premises and the conclusion. Philosophical contributions to land reform in Zimbabwe have looked at debating expropriation of white farms (Shaw 2003a); application of Nozick's principles of justice to land reform in Zimbabwe (Shaw 2003b); land justice within the context of Sen's capability approach (Daka 2006); reconciliation and the land question in Zimbabwe ; land contestations within an economic crisis ; and distributive justice and capability approaches to land reform in Zimbabwe . While these scholars use logical tools to assess arguments, this is done within a broad philosophical area such as social and political philosophy or economic philosophy. ...
The chapter introduces land reform as a complex set of problems around redistribution, restitution and tenure, which call for the integration of different systems of rights recognition, administration and governance which were segregated under colonialism and apartheid, to the neglect of the security of social tenures recognised in the majority of African communities. Expropriation of white-owned land without compensation, the main policy issue in the land reform debate in South Africa, is overloaded with expectations and claims, driving land reform policy and programmes which reproduce colonial norms of ownership that do not recognise the land rights of most citizens. I explain how a disjuncture between titled tenure and (informal, off-register) social tenures in South Africa perpetuates colonial segregation and apartheid, such that land reform is reproducing poverty, insecurity and dispossession. I then draw on African norms of land rights recognition, first, to point out theoretical and ideological deficiencies with Michael Barry’s influential metaphors for analysing land tenure systems (of a constellation of interests on a land tenure continuum)—and, second, to offer in their place a theory of land rights recognition, which can better accommodate a continuum of land tenure rights and enable steady, incremental land reform, in ideology, law and practice.
... ZANU-PF's policy of expropriating white farms as an almost wholly cynical exercise, sacrificing the good of the nation for short-term political expediency. The reasons for this belief are easily observable: the prospect of receiving land plays well with the peasantry; expropriation of white farms puts fresh booty into a patronage system starved of resources; and the mechanism of expropriation and resettlement breaks a rival source of authority in the countryside (namely, the white farmers) and strengthens the government's paramilitary control of the rural areas (Shaw, 2003). Therefore, the process to expropriate Land had detrimental outcomes, including disinvestment in the country and decline in markets which impacted on the socio-economic well-being of the country (Thomas, 2003: 703). ...
Implementation of land expropriation without compensation and the possibilities of how it might unlock greater economic growth or damage it further in South Africa. An Illustration based on using international experience, “Zimbabwe and Namibia”.
... Mugabe and ZANU (PF) were able to resurrect the 'nationalist project' and to create a new and narrow nationalist historiography labelled 'patriotic history' which I have highlighted in the introductory section (see Ranger 2004). According to Shaw (2003), the ruling party made sure that the populace was exposed (through the state media) to their argument that the white settlers had stolen the land from the indigenous Africans and the land invasions were justifiable and part of an overdue crusade to regain lost ancestral land. This was in a process spearheaded by the ruling and revolutionary ZANU (PF) government as it concluded the unfinished business of the liberation struggle. ...
The paper explores the reconfiguration of rural relations and social structures after the fast track land reform programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe focusing on the youth. It shows that in rural Zimbabwe after the FTLRP, there can now be found young persons who are increasingly demanding a greater share of social and economic benefits which they feel entitled to by virtue of their citizenship. Focusing on three farms and two communal areas, this paper shows that one of the outcomes of the FTLRP has been the reconfiguration of the socioeconomic structure and this has had an unprecedented impact which is only becoming visible now that the FTLRP has been concluded. It argues that the rural landscape which now characterises the farming areas is a result of authoritarian populism which was deployed to push forward the FTLRP process. This process created rural authority structures which have continued to have a stranglehold over the rural areas and they are now causing disaffection with the younger generation. With this background in mind, the paper looks at the realities of the youth, their aspirations, their attitudes towards the local authorities as well as their relations with the local communities. It also explores the strategies which they have developed and use to ensure that they derive maximum benefits from their citizenship, there is a reduction in inequalities, there is participation, there is equitable redistribution of resources and there is social cohesion which in sum characterises the new politics of the countryside in rural Zimbabwe.
... Traditionally, smallholder farmers are characterized with little or no investment in agricultural production due to limited access to agricultural input and output markets, insecurity in land tenure systems, opportunities in off-farm employment and imperfection in local agricultural and credit markets. As a result, some market analysts and researchers have argued that the efficiency of agricultural production in Zimbabwe has deteriorated after the FTLRP, which essentially replaced efficiently-run commercial farms with smallholder farms lacking the ability to optimally utilize the available resources (Cliffe et al. 2013;Davies 2005; CONTACT Xiaoli L. Etienne xiaoli.etienne@mail.wvu.edu 1 Shaw (2003) reports that 45 percent of agricultural land in Zimbabwe was occupied by less than 1 percent of the population in 1980. 2 Currently, Zimbabwe's land ownership falls into four categories: communal, old resettlement, A1, and small-scale commercial and A2. USDA (2018) reports that in 2018, A1 and A2 farmers produced about 26% and 31% of the country's maize, respectively. ...
The controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe that redistributes commercially-owned farmland to smallholder households has caused concerns about the efficiency of agricultural production in the country. In this paper, we estimate the efficiency of resource use among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe when producing maize, the staple crop in the country. Using both a semiparametric model and a fully parametric stochastic frontier model, we find significant production shortfalls for smallholder maize production. While labor, capital, and land all significantly affect the total output, the estimated mean efficiency score for farms with less than 10 hectares of land (A1) appears to be under 0.75, and for the entire sample (A1 and A2) it ranges between 0.595 and 0.772. There clearly exists a great potential for maize farmers to improve the technical efficiency and increase the total output. Gender and age of the household head, access to extension services, and activities of other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. We also find that all farms operate under increasing returns to scale and that the technical efficiency score tends to increase with the level of output.
... Significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and FTLRP that emerged in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 and that led to the formation of A1 and A2 farms. One school of thought argues that land reform was instigated by war veterans as part of ZANU-PF's official campaign strategy for the 2000 elections and as a response to the dwindling support for the party as shown by the results of the February 2000 referendum on the state-sponsored constitution (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003;Shaw 2003). An opposing perspective views the land occupations in 2000 as part of a longer-term and clearly identifiable land occupation movement in post-independent Zimbabwe (Moyo 2001(Moyo , 2002Moyo and Yeros 2005;Sadomba 2008). ...
This article interrogates studies focusing on gender and Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe, highlighting the emerging patterns and missing linkages. We utilize theories of intersectionality and agency to argue for more robust empirical research on the varied experiences of women. An analysis of intersectionality of experiences and agency is necessary to understand how women were differentially positioned and, how this is ultimately linked to how they got access to and ownership of land. The article posits that whilst gender is important, there is need for further analysis of who got what, how and where under FTLRP. To that end, the article asks: How is gender construed in relation to women’s access to FTLRP (what is included and excluded)? Whilst women appear losers as portrayed in many studies, was it only gender that determined access? What about age, nationality, class, political affiliation and traditional roots among other aspects? How did the 18% quoted in several studies get land? What about married women in this debate? Where women just victims in the FTLRP? We argue that ultimately other factors like patronage may as well explain exclusion (and inclusion) of women but this is better understood within intersectionality theoretical premises. At the same time, we also posit that women were not merely victims but used versatile tactics and strategies to get land hence invoking the notion of agency.
... Upon attaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a flourishing dualistic agricultural sector skewed in favour of the white settlers. The white settlers owned large-scale commercial farms, consisted of less than 1% of the population yet occupied 50% of all agricultural land, of which 75% of the land was located in fertile agricultural productive areas (SHAW, 2003). In contrast, indigenous Africans occupied the small-scale communal agricultural sector with communal ownership vested in the state with chiefs bestowed the rights to reallocate the land to individuals. ...
In an attempt to address a racially skewed land distribution and alleviate rural poverty, Zimbabwe has, since its independence, pursued redistributive land reform programmes. The latest phase of these programmes is the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) launched in 2000 to accelerate compulsory acquisition and resettlement of land. This paper uses data on FTLRP beneficiaries and a control group of unsuccessful communal applicants to examine the programme's impact on the technical efficiency of its beneficiaries. To account for possible systematic selection into FTLRP, we employ a probit selection equation and estimate a corrected CobbDouglas stochastic frontier function model. The resultant inefficiency model estimates reveal that FTLRP beneficiaries are more technically efficient than communal farmers. Further, there exist a nonlinear relationship between farm size and technical efficiency. Fencing parcels and livestock holdings is found to improve technical efficiency suggesting that alleviating resource constraints would enhance technical efficiency of smallholder agriculture.
... the white Rhodesians 1 seized control of the majority of fertile land within the country and forced blacks to use the poorer, arid and unproductive ground. The white, largescale commercial farmers (less than 1% of the population) occupied 45% of all agricultural land, of which 75% was found in the most agriculturally productive areas (Shaw, 2003). After minority rule ended in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a thriving agro-based economy. ...
In a predominantly agricultural country like Zimbabwe, the problem of land reform has naturally been one of the most important subjects of political campaigning and economic turmoil. Zimbabwe's land distribution was racially highly skewed towards whites before land reform and the status quo was not politically, socially or economically sustainable. This has been the state of affairs since the British reform of 1890. It is this inequitable distribution of land that prompted the black people to take up arms and fight for independence. At independence, the government of Zimbabwe decided to embark on the land reform programme. It is therefore of paramount importance not to overlook the events of the then Rhodesia at colonization through to the independent Zimbabwe at the Fast Track Land Reform stage. This article therefore provides the untold story of Zimbabwean agrarian change from colonial times to the present. It clearly explains how land rights of both the whites and the black Zimbabweans were damaged by the government of Rhodesia and later by the government of Zimbabwe.
... In January 2000, Mugabe unilaterally inserted a land clause, making it the British government's obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement (Bowyer-Bell & Stoneman, 2000). Opinion polls before the referendum indicated majority support for the state's right to expropriate land for redistribution to the disadvantaged but only about 15 per cent favoured expropriation without compensation (Shaw, 2003). 13 White farmers opposed the land clause and, like most other voters, the increased presidential powers in the proposed constitution. ...
This paper aims at some general understanding of the phenomenon of politicians using land rights as a patronage resource in attempts to mobilise electoral support. Using Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire as case studies, it argues that the increasing visibility of land as a patronage resource in African multiparty elections may be at least partly explained by the convergence of three specific constraints and incentives confronting politicians. First, weak legal restraints on rulers’ ability to allocate land rights create opportunities for politicians to use land as a patronage resource. Second, competitive multiparty elections mean that politicians must work to mobilise constituency support in order to win. Third, the dwindling fiscal capacity of the state can heighten the attractiveness of land as a patronage resource. Land can be offered as a patronage resource even when state coffers run low.
With some recent exceptions, demands for global reparations have largely been ignored by former colonial countries. While the past two decades has seen renewed interest in colonial reparations in normative political theory and philosophy, this work has focused on determining responsibility for redress. By contrast, relatively little has been said on the further question of how redress might be sought in face of persistent colonial amnesia and apologia. This paper defends expropriation—unilateral public takeovers of ownership and/or control of foreign assets—as a justified response to overdue colonial reparations. In making this case, the paper (1) moves our focus beyond questions of responsibility for reparative justice to consider what victims of past injustice (and/or their descendants) are justified in doing to obtain their due and (2) explores distinctive issues that arise for political resistance at the global level.
This book examines how the on-paper hydropower boom impacts the safe and fair access to water and energy in emerging economies.
The global hydropower boom is largely made up of small hydropower plants located in emerging economies, but a lack of funding, over-ambitious planning, and corruption has halted the production of these projects. Describing this state as the ‘on-paper’ hydropower boom, this book shifts attention to the hydrosocial problems arising from hydropower projects that remain on paper. It examines how these proposed but unbuilt projects can lead to disruptions in the control and governance of water resources and increase the international dependence of emerging countries due to deep problems in their sustainable development planning, and how all this can affect both ecosystems and the communities that depend on them. In doing so, it critically examines the dominant discourses on energy security and sustainable development, emphasises the extent to which the effects of global imperialism are at play, and examines the effects of international power relations in the hydrosocial context and their implications for perpetuating international relations of dependency. Further, this book provides a unique perspective on the global hydropower boom by highlighting that although the global hydropower boom largely remains on paper, it can still have a significant impact on human-water systems. Contributing to the debate on hydrosocial relationships, each chapter offers an insightful examination of the social, cultural, and political interacts humans have with water, and uses these insights to provide a nuanced understanding of the challenges and issues associated with on paper plans.
This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of water politics, water governance, political ecology, corruption and environmental economics, as well as sustainable development policymakers.
For fifty years, the Brazilian Amazon has experienced extensive deforestation, stripping away one of the world’s largest rainforests and accelerating global warming.
Is wealth inequality unjust? Is it automatically an injustice for some groups to have more wealth than others? This chapter answers these questions by identifying the causes of economic inequality and the extent to which historical injustice explains wealth distribution. One argument often advanced in support of reparations is that former imperialist states ought to pay compensation for injustices associated with slavery and colonialism. This chapter evaluates the case for atoning for historical crimes through social welfare measures. The chapter draws upon Lockean principles of natural law to identify the normative standard by which we should evaluate the coherence of these proposals.
Demands for the return of stolen property or payment of reparations rely on concepts associated with the rule of law such as compensation for breach of binding agreements, unjust enrichment or restitution. In that sense social justice activists claim to demand no more than what rightfully belongs to them. This chapter examines the extent to which these claims are consistent with the normative foundations of the rule of law. What is meant by the rule of law in the context of redressing historical injustice? The chapter answers that question by drawing upon principles of natural law and natural rights. We argue that law which violates principles self-ownership and individual liberty cannot rightly be deemed to be compatible with the rule of law.
The book concludes by considering some of the policy implications of prioritising self-ownership and property rights in the context of redressing historical injustice. The chapter focuses on the financial implications of state interventions designed to promote economic equality and the extent to which such interventions call into question the legitimacy of the state. We argue that the protection of private property and individual rights imposes normative limits on state power, and that any state which violates foundational principles of natural law calls into question its legitimacy and moral authority. By raising funds through taxation and allocating welfare payments on racial lines through ideas like financial equity, the question arises whether the state is a defender or a threat to private property.
Zimbabwe’s new administration indicated its willingness to end the compensation dispute, which lasted for two decades with former commercial farmers (FCFs), by signing the global compensation agreement (GCA). In the agreement, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) offered to pay the sum of 3.5 billion, United States Dollars (USD) to the FCFs for their expropriated farmlands. A study carried out by the Valuation Consortium (Valcon) before the GCA signing revealed that most of the FCFs accepted the compensation offered by the expropriating authority. Thus far, no study has been done to assess the level of satisfaction of the affected FCFs, with the GCA provisions. Therefore, this study evaluated the views of FCFs and members of the Compensation Committee (MsCC) on this subject. Data were collected through a questionnaire survey which was mailed directly to the Chairperson of the FCFs, who sent it to other members to respond to issues raised. The study found mixed views by the FCFs on their levels of satisfaction with the GCA. Thus, the study concluded that compensation offered was not entirely satisfactory because it did not include accruals for delayed payment, professional fees, and a detailed breakdown of the compensable heads of claim.
Different African states have dealt with the land reform issue differently. The same applies to ideas on addressing skewed land reform that have also been proffered by scholars. These perceptions emanate from the different African political, social and economic environments; in fact the different circumstances assisted in the shaping of the different theoretical and practical responses to the land challenges. For note is the fact that land distribution in almost all African states—with the exception of Ethiopia, Eretria (which was part of Ethiopia then) and Liberia—followed the Western distributive pattern. The Western distributive system was established at the colonisation of Africa by Western countries. The Western distributive pattern was skewed in favour of the colonialists (colonial countries, race and individuals). This has not only been unfair and/or unjust on the part of the local inhabitants, but marked the end of the locals’ land distributive systems in favour of the colonialists’ own. In that sense the colonial distributive system was not only foreign but was imposed on the locals. The imposition and disregarding of the locals’ land tenure systems constitute the unfairness and injustice that the colonial distributive arrangement brought.
Whereas most debates within the area of land redistribution focus on entitlements, utilitarian values of land redistribution and expanding individual liberties and rights for the formerly disadvantaged communities, my focus in this work is on the kind of life that individuals ought to live (individuals’ well-being or justice) within redistributing land, irrespective of status. I note that while expanding liberties and rights benefits the formerly disadvantaged communities, it is important to focus on the individual’s well-being, which includes the ability to convert those liberties, rights and resources to the individual’s advantage. I suggest and evaluate functionings (beings and doings) that necessarily enhance individuals to realise lives they have reason to value within land redistribution. In this endeavour, this work will be guided by the concept of justice in the Capability Approach (hereafter acronym C.A. is used), which promotes individual well-being.
Empirical literature on the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has presented the economic argument as one of the key justifications of the post-2000 land reform. This argument has been advanced in economics, gender studies, religion, political science, political philosophy and related disciplines. There has been hardly any sustained scholarly work on the logical evaluation of the fast track land reform economic argument in Zimbabwe. In this chapter, I examine the logical cogency of the fast track land reform economic argument in Zimbabwe and demonstrate that the argument is largely fallacious. The fallacious nature of the argument rests on three problems. First, the assumptions of the argument that include (1) the view that land deprivation is the cause of poverty and (2) the claims that the land is the economy and the economy is the land are both mistaken and grossly problematic. Secondly, the premises used to buttress the argument such as the fast track land reform creates employment, generates foreign currency, promotes industrialisation and economic growth are false. Thirdly, the conclusion arrived at to justify fast track land reform, namely, land reform is good for the overall economic well-being does not follow with probability from the given premises. Given these logical problems, I argue that the fast track land reform economic argument in Zimbabwe is more emotive than reasonable.
In the early 1980s, former President Mugabe was a celebrated nationalist hero at home and abroad. Towards the end of the 1990s, in some sections, Mugabe’s popularity plummeted in the wake of occupations by war veterans of white-owned farms. In the face of strident criticisms, the Mugabe administration used, among other tactics, state-controlled stations like Radio Zimbabwe for rebutting the disparagements and accentuating their own ideological positions. Informed by framing theory, this article uses qualitative content analysis to examine how God was presented as the ultimate frame of reference to support the beleaguered leader and his political party on Radio Zimbabwe between March and April 2011. Radio Zimbabwe vindicated Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s support of the land occupations by framing the occupations as just appropriations of a God-given inheritance to black Zimbabweans. Mugabe’s presidency was presented on the station as unassailable by constituting him as God’s messenger to Zimbabweans. Considering the survival struggles associated with the political and economic crisis post 2000, Radio Zimbabwe listeners were encouraged to turn to God in a manner that served to give them hope and to deflate attention from a government that was failing to provide basic services for them.
Nkrumah remained optimistic about the ability of Africans to realise a progressive form of agency that could challenge, and overcome, relations of neo-colonialism. This chapter examines recent debates about sovereignty and Africa. It reiterates Nkrumah’s––and Fanon’s––concerns about the diminution of genuine empirical sovereignty in Africa even after juridical/legal sovereignty had been achieved. It then considers opportunities for progressive agency with regards to civil society and trade unions, the democratic developmental state in Africa, and pan-Africanism (with focus on the current African Union). The chapter highlights Nkrumah’s analysis that only pan-African solutions to neo-colonialism would offer a long-term antidote to donor and corporate subversion of empirical sovereignty in Africa.
March 12, 1968, marked the collapse of almost two centuries of Franco-Mauritian hegemony. That day the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius gained its independence from the UK, which was the continuation of a process toward a multiethnic democracy that had begun in the preceding decades. This was of disadvantageous to the white colonial elite, the Franco-Mauritians, as the overlap between their elite position and ethnic background was associated with colonial domination. Franco-Mauritians had strongly opposed independence as they feared that their position might be compromised, especially since they only numbered about 1 percent of the population vis-à-vis much larger sections of Hindus (52 percent), Creoles (28 percent), Muslims (16 percent), and Sino-Mauritians (3 percent). Remarkably, however, more than 40 years later, the Franco-Mauritians, who currently number about 10,000 out of a population of 1.3 million, can still be considered an elite—albeit that they no longer constitute a hegemon. In comparison, white elites in other postcolonial states, such as a number of Caribbean islands, also retained postcolonial positions of power. The relative success of securing their elite position is, in my opinion, not sufficiently explained by existing theories on (elite) power.
This chapter analyses the tension between a justiciable right to property and a state-led agrarian land reform program in a postcolonial context by examining Zimbabwean Constitutional law. It starts by presenting the conceptual framework that underlines the nexus between land reform, the right to property and justiciability. This is followed by a discussion of the various land reform policies adopted by the government of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2013, focusing on the relevant constitutional and legislative arrangements. The chapter then analyses these constitutional and legislative frameworks and outlines their implications for human rights justiciability. It concludes that a national constitution and human rights norms may not realistically address the issue of land reform in a postcolonial situation such as Zimbabwe. Rather, the solution lies in a combination of constitutionalism, human rights norms and international diplomacy.
Yaël Ronen analyses the international legal ramifications of illegal territorial regimes, namely the illegal annexation of territory or illegal declarations of independence, by reference to the stage of transition from an illegal territorial regime to a lawful one. Six case studies (Namibia, Zimbabwe, the Baltic States, the South African Bantustans, East Timor and northern Cyprus) are used to explore the tension between the invalidity of the illegal regime's acts and their effectiveness, with respect to the international relations of such territories, their domestic legal systems, the status of settlers and land transfers. Relying heavily on primary and previously unconsidered sources, she focuses on the international legal constraints on the post-transition regime's policy, particularly in the context of international human rights law.
Many studies have addressed the justice of public land acquisition, but few studies have addressed the question of what landowners perceive as just. Individual perceptions drive an important part of the social and scientific debates on legitimate and just land acquisition. This article addresses this gap by studying landowners’ and land purchasers’ perceptions of just land acquisition. We did this by uncovering the prevailing discourse on just land acquisition and studying the values that shaped people’s perceptions of just land acquisition. The results showed that perceptions of justice are based on the values of lawfulness, decentness and equality. These values were translated into different norms that resulted in expectations pertaining to just land acquisition. Insight into the different perceptions and the prevailing discourse of just land acquisition and their underlying values increases the understanding of land acquisition processes and land policy strategies. First, it becomes apparent that land acquisition has an essential element of injustice that cannot be avoided by a good process or a just compensation fee. Second, insight in different discourses provides valuable input for debates on just land acquisition. Third, such insight shows that money is not always a sufficient means of indemnification. The combination of sufficient financial compensation, the opportunity of a new location, attractive selling conditions and accurate and open process are all important requisites to ensure that public land acquisition is perceived by the majority of landowners as just.
White Africans are particularly associated with the troubles South Africa and Zimbabwe have faced throughout their histories. The story of the Franco-Mauritians, the white elite of Mauritius, and how they have fared during more than forty years since the Indian Ocean island gained independence, is much less known. However, their case is relevant as a distinctive example when attempting to understand white Africans in postcolonial settings. Unlike whites elsewhere on the continent, Franco-Mauritians did not apply brute force in order to defend their position in the face of independence. Yet the society that emerged from the struggle over independence is one shaped by dominant beliefs about ethnicity. As this article shows, despite a number of inverse effects Franco-Mauritians have benefited from this unexpected twist, and part of the explanation for their ability to maintain their elite position lies therefore in the complex reality of ethnic diversity in postcolonial Mauritius.
South Africa’s Suspended Revolution tells the story of South Africa’s democratic transition and the prospects for the country to develop a truly inclusive political system. Beginning with an account of the transition in the leadership of the African National Congress from Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, the book then broadens its lens to examine the relationship of South Africa’s political elite to its citizens. It also examines the evolution of economic and social policies through the democratic transition, as well as the development of a postapartheid business community and a foreign policy designed to re-engage South Africa with the world community. Written by one of South Africa’s leading scholars and political commentators, the book combines historical and contemporary analysis with strategies for an alternative political agenda. Adam Habib connects the lessons of the South African experience with theories of democratic transition, social change, and conflict resolution. Political leaders, scholars, students, and activists will all find material here to deepen their understanding of the challenges and opportunities of contemporary South Africa.
This article examines state imposed centralisation and soil conservation policies as pursued by the Southern Rhodesian Department of Native Agriculture, and argues that these were at variance with the state’s own veterinary policies. It argues that in the 1930s the state failed to deal with the contradictions caused by shifting and competing agendas between the Departments of Native Affairs, Native Development, Entomology and Veterinary Services. This was compounded by the implicit and enduring acceptance by officials that the problems were precipitated almost exclusively by ‘primitive’ African farming practices. This resulted in the state’s resuscitating in the 1940s the ideology of livestock improvement first conceptualised in 1912 and introducing compulsory destocking from 1945. It concludes that these intrusive latter measures had a significant impact on the African rural socio-political and physical land- scape in general and livestock management practices in particular.
Post-colonial African philosophy has emerged as a viable discipline in a number of African countries. In particular, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and to some extent, Malawi and South Africa, have contributed to the fledging discipline. Although it does not receive prominent coverage, Zimbabwe has witnessed a growing expansion in the teaching of philosophy, as well as in published philosophical reflection. This article provides an overview of the developments of philosophy in Zimbabwe, paying particular attention to the post-colonial period. It surveys the context in which philosophical reflection has taken place in Zimbabwe, alongside highlighting the key themes that have preoccupied practitioners in the field. The article explores some problematic aspects of philosophy in Zimbabwe, and interrogates the possibility (or lack thereof) of locating Zimbabwean philosophy within the broader philosophical traditions such as the analytic and continental traditions.
In sub-Saharan Africa, property relationships around land and access to natural resources vary across localities, districts, and farming regions. These differences produce patterned variations in relationships between individuals, communities, and the state. This book captures these patterns in an analysis of structure and variation in rural land tenure regimes. In most farming areas, state authority is deeply embedded in land regimes, drawing farmers, ethnic insiders and outsiders, lineages, villages, and communities into direct and indirect relationships with political authorities at different levels of the state apparatus. The analysis shows how property institutions – institutions that define political authority and hierarchy around land – shape dynamics of great interest to scholars of politics, including the dynamics of land-related competition and conflict, territorial conflict, patron-client relations, electoral cleavage and mobilization, ethnic politics, rural rebellion, and the localization and “nationalization” of political competition.
This article argues that in its liberal form, transitional justice has no future as it cannot encompass structural injustices arising from issues related to postcolonial land conflicts. The bias of liberal transitional justice discourse towards corrective and retributive justice invites criticism that it is a tool for dealing with 'uncivilized' rogue states. In addition, transitional justice's liberal individualism overlooks pluralistic arrangements of property rights which were secured by colonialism. Liberal justice mechanisms also take no account of the fact that postcolonial states did not start from a 'veil of ignorance' and as such cannot presume that liberty has to take primacy over redistribution. Nonetheless, the article also contends that the continuum of transitional justice can be assured if there is a serious engagement with recent postcolonial innovation which is 'mimicry' of the dominant discourse. The article's use of the concept of 'mimicry' is inspired by the term's use in postcolonial and colonial literature to describe the interaction between members of colonized people and their colonizers. In the context of transitional justice, mimicry can be shameful, empowering and subversive as it includes the shameless copying of former colonizers' tactics by the postcolonial ruling elite and the diffusion of 'western' concepts of rule of law, justice and human rights, and also presents opportunities for postcolonial 'agency.' Postcolonial 'agency' occurs where postcolonial societies merge liberalism with postcolonial realities, thereby responding to these societies' actualities without completely disavowing international law.
This article examines competing interpretations of the nature and cause of Zimbabwe’s contemporary crisis. It finds that while neoliberal macroeconomic policies promoted by international financial institutions helped to provide a structural basis for the crisis, arguments attributing blame to Britain and to wider Western sanctions are overblown and inaccurate. Similarly, although Western reactions to Zimbabwe’s land reform have had a racist tinge, these paled in comparison with the explicit racist intent of policies adopted by the Zimbabwean Government. The claim that Zimbabwe is undergoing a process of progressive transformation must be weighed against the nature of state power, the intensification of class divisions, a precipitous economic decline, a problematic development strategy and the extreme abuse of human, civil and political rights.
Purpose
The aim of the article is to elucidate the political factors which motivated Zimbabwe's land reform that was forcibly initiated by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government in 2000.
Design/methodology/approach
The research makes use of primary and secondary sources. The government of Zimbabwe parliamentary debates highlight the grievances raised by the people over land redistribution as early as 1980. The newspapers, internet and published material provide evidence pointing out to the political nature of the land reform.
Findings
It is apparent that the ZANU PF government was reluctant to address the land question despite the fact that many rural people were crowded in the reserves. It was in 2000 that ZANU PF awakened to its waning popularity after the referendum defeat which coincided with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. Land reform was used as a political weapon to thwart the MDC as evidenced by the brutal suppression of MDC activities countrywide.
Social implications
The research proves that the victimisation of MDC members in Zimbabwe has made opposition politics a disastrous game. Starting in 2000, ZANU PF embarked on a mission to thwart opposition activism and the effects were deeply felt. Paramilitary groups such as the Second Chimurenga war veterans, Border Gezi “youths” and ZANU PF supporters took the lead in torturing and killing real and alleged MDC supporters. The MDC retaliated but with very limited success.
Originality/value
The paper provides unique insights into the political motives which encouraged Zimbabwe's land reform programme. The implications for practice provided herein are useful for policy makers in the country.
Sugarcane, once a vital component of the Mauritian economy, now makes up less than 10% of GDP. The land on which it grows (and grew), however, remains essential to the island's politico-economic power balance. Large tracts of land are still owned by Franco-Mauritians, the island's white former colonial elite, thus leading to an ambiguous relationship between landowners and the government in postcolonial Mauritius. This article argues that both resentment and collaboration contribute to the consolidation of the Franco-Mauritian elite position. Pressure from the state may have compelled Franco-Mauritians to redistribute some of their land, but this ‘pay-off’ hardly jeopardised their elite position. Their striking a balance between opposing redistribution and giving in to government demands is key to explaining how landed (white) elites are, in the absence of (state) violence, able to maintain their position long after the end of colonialism.
In the year 2000 the government of Zimbabwe launched the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) as part of its on-going land reform and resettlement programme. The main premise of the programme is to address the racially skewed land distribution pattern inherited at independence in 1980. While the programme has been accompanied by an overall reduction in agricultural production which has created widespread food insecurity throughout the country, empirical research on the impact of the programme on the agricultural productivity of its beneficiaries has been limited. This paper uses data on beneficiaries of the programme and a control group of communal farmers to (i) investigate the presence of agricultural productivity differences between beneficiaries and communal farmers, and (ii) examine differences in chemical fertiliser use as a possible source of these differences. The results suggest that FTLRP beneficiaries gain a productivity advantage not only from the fact that they use more fertiliser per hectare, but also from attaining a higher rate of return from its use.
As the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe worsened between 2000 and 2003, the state embarked on an intense propaganda campaign. Facing an increasingly popular opposition, the state adopted a two-pronged strategy of marketing its programmes while subjecting the opposition to violence and negative publicity. Using various media, the propagandists sought to portray the ruling party (ZANU-PF) as a sacred movement fulfilling prophetic oracles that the black majority would reclaim the lost land. State functionaries systematically appropriated religious ideas, with concepts from Christianity and African traditional religions being used to buttress political statements. The controversial land reform programme was couched in religious terms and notions like sovereignty attained mythical proportions. This article examines the appropriation of religious themes in political propaganda in Zimbabwe. It analyses the communication environment in the country and how it facilitated the interface between religious and political discourses.
This thesis tries to provide an answer to one significant question. Why in the pre-industrial period were some settlements resilient and stable over the long term while other settlements were vulnerable to crisis? All pre-industrial societies had to face economic, environmental, and agricultural challenges at some point, which could come in the form of famine, war, expropriation, flooding, failed harvests, pestilence, harsh taxation, or the disappearance of valuable resources in the pursuit of commercial gain. How then can we explain why some societies were able to overcome or negate these problems, while other societies proved susceptible to failure, as settlements contracted, stagnated, or even disappeared entirely?
This thesis places the different arrangements of societies at the forefront of the theoretical framework. It is suggested first of all that pre-industrial society can be divided into four basic types, based on an assessment of how egalitarian or polarised (a test of equality), and dynamic or persistent (a test of change) a number of its key configurations were (property, power, commodity markets, modes of exploitation). Particular ‘types of societies’ ended up exploiting resources in different ways. ‘Egalitarian-persistent’ societies exploited their resources using protectionist strategies with one eye on risk avoidance. As a result, they produced resilient settlements over the long-term, particularly in the face of exogenous crises such as harvest failures and pestilences. ‘Polarised-dynamic’ societies exploited their resources using short-termist strategies with interest groups reaping as much as they possibly could from finite resources, at the same time exposing the wider population to risk. As a result, they produced settlements which could rise up quickly through short-term economic gain, but also were susceptible to rapid decline. ‘Egalitarian-dynamic’ societies exploited their resources flexibly by responding to change – taking production in new directions. As a result, they produced adaptable settlements which could grow organically and furthermore got their resilience from the inherent adaptability of society. Finally, ‘polarised-persistent’ societies exploited their resources using repression and restriction. As a result, they produced entirely dependent settlements which could benefit from structures necessary for long-term resilience (laid down through coercion), but at the same time faced inbuilt restrictions on decision-making processes, which could lead to a failure to adapt to new conditions, and exposure to settlement decline.
This thesis has tried to move away in its philosophy from much contemporary thinking which suggests that the world’s problems can be solved through a relentless pursuit of economic growth. There is still a perception that sustainable and stable human habitation over the long term can be achieved through reliance on technological innovations or by throwing large amounts of capital at impoverished regions, in the recent trend towards big business philanthropy. The basic principle behind the framework offered in this research focusing on the pre-industrial world, however, is that the configuration of society was more important for establishing resilient settlement development – a sentiment which I believe may be applicable for modern-day collapses in habitation. A big part of societies’ capacity to withstand environmental and economic crises is connected with equality: not just in the distribution of wealth or land, but an egalitarian distribution of power and involvement in essential decision-making processes, which determine the ways society is able to exploit and care for its resources.
This paper examines elite power and argues that for a better theoretical understanding of elite power we have to take into consideration that elites often do not initiate power struggles but apply their power ‘defensively’. The ability of Franco‐Mauritians, the white elite of the island Mauritius, to maintain power is the focus of this argument. They established a strong position in colonial times through their involvement in the sugar industry but have since faced numerous challenges to their (ethnic) elite position. Using their power defensively has been effective in facing these challenges and contributed to the relative success of continuing their elite position in post‐colonial Mauritius.
We conducted weekly aerial surveys of islands along the central Maine coast from April-June of 1993-1997 and used aerial photographs to determine peak nest count dates for Double-crested Cormorants (Phalacrocorax auritus), Herring Gulls (Larus argentatus) and Great Black-backed Gulls (Larus marinus). These data also were used to determine the potential effect of survey timing on the ability to detect long-term trends in the abundance of these species. The number of cormorant nests in the study area peaked in mid-June, while Great Black-backed and Herring gulls peaked in late May and early June, respectively. Peak nesting dates generally were consistent for each island across years, but varied by up to a month between islands during a given year. A 10-year monitoring program using annual surveys conducted between 23 May and 23 June, or biennial surveys conducted from 2-17 June, would have an 80% probability of detecting annual changes of ±5% for all three species in this region.
Recently the demand for rectification of past injustices has become an increasingly important issue. Each of the last three decades has witnessed democratization processes in the Mediterranean basin, Latin America, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Africa where debates have arisen over rectification of past wrongs which naturally include the unjust expropriation of property. Most recently, moreover, the idea of land restitution to indigenous people, particularly in Australia, Canada and Zimbabwe, has become a prominent, if not always equanimous, part of those countries domestic political agendas. The difficulties associated with satisfying such demands have been discussed with particular regard to the framing of new post-Communist constitutions in eastern and central Europe by, among others, Jon Elster and Claus Offe. Yet, not only in the field of public policy has the issue of rectification become important. Perhaps because of these developments, there has been a resurgence of interest in rectification in political philosophy as is shown by a forthcoming collection of essays on the subject edited by Elster.