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Manipulating Membership: Supply-Side Influences on Group Size
Abstract
This article examines those public interest groups that have grown through heavy advertising expenditure and sophisticated marketing techniques, most particularly direct mail solicitations. It suggests that an Olson-style rational choice understanding of this 'mail order' membership must be supplemented by a recognition of the importance of group activity in manipulating the factors considered by individuals in joining decisions. Thus it moves the focus from the demand-side to the supply-side. Active marketing by groups can exploit sympathy for causes and encourage the predisposed potential member to join. Individuals do consider the range of benefits offered (though the list of factors is broader than Olson indicates) in their membership choices, but the group deliberately shapes the way in which these are regarded.
... Their members share opinions rather than objective characteristics. As argued by Grant Jordan and William Maloney (1998), these groups have no simple way of identifying potential members. Therefore, broad strategies of communication such as mass direct mail and press strategies are particularly important ways for them to attract members (Binderkrantz 2008;Gais and Walker 1991: 105;Jordan and Maloney 1998: 390). ...
... A British study largely confirms the American results. Grant Jordan and William Maloney (1998) demonstrate how large-scale organisations such as Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth exhibit little participation 660 A. S. Binderkrantz on the part of members. In fact, members are more akin to customers than to members in any sense implying democratic participation and Jordan and Maloney (1997) coined the term 'protest business' to describe the character of these organisations. ...
The article tests the argument that group–membership relations vary between public interest groups and other types of groups. While public interest groups draw their members from diffuse constituencies supporting the causes of the groups, sectional groups exhibit a closer correspondence between the interests advanced and the members recruited. According to the literature, differences can therefore be expected both in the patterns of membership recruitment and in the degree of membership influence in groups. The analysis draws on a survey of all national interest groups in Denmark. It demonstrates that public interest groups differ from other groups in their patterns of membership recruitment. However, it finds no tendency for public interest groups to be either less or more democratic than the average group.
... Similar competition for members occurs among interest groups. Organisational leaders are incentivised to prevent exit and invest in means to improve the long-term engagement of members, such as through membership magazines, outreach, and opinion research, often combined with continuous membership recruitment campaigns (Jordan & Maloney, 1998). This exit mechanism works at the level of organisational communities of "like-organisations.'' ...
Why do some interest group systems provide group members with more elaborate voice opportunities than other systems? We argue that evaluating membership voice is important for understanding the representative potential of interest group systems. An adequate understanding of “voice” forms the basis of “context”-embedded assessments of benchmarks such as interest group bias, interest group representational distortion, and interest group-driven policy overload. We examine two competing hypotheses on the differences in internal voice in Eastern and Western Europe. Primarily, case-specific arguments lead us to expect a weaker internal voice in post-communist Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. Conversely, some theoretical approaches, such as population ecological organisational theory, lead us to expect a relatively weak membership voice in the organisationally saturated Western European systems. We assess these two hypotheses on the basis of an international survey of interest group leaders and observe, in line with the population ecological hypothesis, that members of Western European interest groups, compared to those in post-communist countries, are perceived as having less influential voices in internal decisions on policy positions. We conclude, neither optimistically nor pessimistically, that there is a meaningful representative potential of interest group systems supporting democratic societies, also, or even especially, in the post-communist countries studied.
... This might entice a potential member to either leave one group and join another, or pay membership dues to both groups. Potential members will not have to work very hard -groups actively market themselves and present many (easy) joining opportunities (Jordan and Maloney, 1996Maloney, , 1998. ...
Why do some associations provide members with an effective voice whereas others appear to have internal democracy in name only? We theoretically combine population ecology with Hirschman’s strategic response model. This leads us to hypothesize that in dense, competitive organizational environments, the effective alternatives available make it likely that dissatisfied members respond with exit rather than voice. However, in low-dense, monopoly-like situations dissatisfied members demand and receive effective voice options. We further hypothesize that the particular sets of incentives of firms and individuals as members moderates this effect. We assess our argument on the basis of the Comparative Interest Group elite survey among interest group leaders in five European countries and at the EU level. We control for the level of professionalization and use country dummies to identify country-level differences. We find strong empirical support for our theoretical argument. The contribution of this article is to theoretically connect macro-level population-level factors to micro-level intra-organizational processes and specifies the nature of the organizational link between interests in society and those represented in the interest group system.
... In contrast to transmission belt practice, many studies have shown a trend among groups towards professionalization characterized by elite-level (staff and leadership) dominated decision-making and less membership participation and involvement (Albareda 2020;Jordan and Maloney 1998;Halpin 2006Halpin , 2010Klüver and Saurugger 2013;Maloney 2015). As noted by van Deth and Maloney (2012, p. 2): 'From the beginnings of the 1980s we see a gradual organizational change. ...
Interest groups are perceived as vehicles that can enhance the legitimacy of public institutions at the national and supranational level. However, the potential of these organizations to enhance democratic representation is often questioned and has rarely been systematically analysed. In this article, we examine the under-researched area of interest group accountability, a key component for groups to realize their democratic potential. To do this, we take an organization-centric and top-down perspective and develop a tailored analytical framework including three key dimensions—information, discussion and consequences. Drawing on data from a large-scale survey of interest groups active at the EU level, we find considerable variation in the extent to which groups demonstrate practices related to these three accountability dimensions. Furthermore, while receiving funding from EU institutions does not have any significant effect on interest group accountability, we find that organizations representing businesses interests more frequently develop accountability practices related to the dimensions of discussion and consequences, whereas citizen groups are more focused on the information dimension.
... This is in line with Marien et al.'s (2010, p. 193) finding that men are more likely to participate in more conventional means of political participation, such as voting and running in elections and that women are more involved in non-conventional methods of political participation, including engaging in demonstrations, consumer boycotts, petitions, and donations, and plausibly interest group memberships. Furthermore, the marketing practices of major cause groups may effectively create differences in the likelihood of mobilization of men and women, with women more likely to be targeted through direct mailing campaigns and direct recruitment activities (Jordan and Maloney 1998). On the other hand, the socioeconomic status (or low education) may have different political implications for men and women. ...
Surveys reveal that there are great differences among citizens in their membership of political associations. Such differences plausibly lead to a better representation of interests of privileged citizens compared to other citizens. We examine the demographic groups (in terms of education, gender and immigration background) that tend to be members of interest groups. We also investigate the relation between the membership profile of associations and the propensity of interest groups to be routinely approached by policymakers. The results of our elite survey of Dutch interest associations indicate that relatively well-educated citizens and men are better represented in interest groups. Patterns of underrepresentation are not further exacerbated by the outreach of policy-makers, except that interest associations with a relatively large female membership are less likely to be consulted.
... Perhaps more importantly in our analysis of overconfidence, though, related to tactics for generating members' and donors' support, public interest groups often frame themselves as outsiders in conflict with powerful opponents who associate and work closely with those in government 51 . To the extent that public interest groups are disproportionately membership-based organizations, this is also broadly consistent with Jordan and Maloney 52 and their focus on the importance of 'supply side' activities tapping and creating interest group-compatible dispositions. Lobbyists working for these public interest groups may internalize an 'underdog' identity, which would bias their perception of their own efficacy against too much success. ...
Overconfidence helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent regardless of objective ability, so this bias may be especially prevalent among status-oriented members of elite communities. Based on this premise, we explore whether lobbyists in the USA misperceive their success. Using models that (1) control for legislative outcome when predicting self-assessed policy success and (2) compare self-assessed policy success on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate achievements. Lobbyists with higher incomes, who reside in Washington, DC, USA, have congressional experience and who engage in a broader range of activities are more likely to overrate their success. Public interest group lobbyists tend to underestimate success. We conclude that political elites are subject to the same biases as others when evaluating their performance, and these biases may be largely status-driven. Recent accounts of overconfidence suggest it helps individuals reach higher status in groups by making them seem more competent. Lyons et al. show that lobbyists with higher social status (for example, higher income) are more likely to overrate their own success.
... After just a few hours of sending out a new campaign via email, they can see what proportion of their list is interested. Although pre-Internet era NGOs may seek members' feedback and guidance on campaigns (e.g. in the 1990s Amnesty used direct mail to canvass members), they are not able to effectively listen to and aggregate members-interests without digital analytics (Jordan and Maloney 1998). ...
Digital advocacy organizations are permanent institutions which can rapidly mobilize people online and offline. Scholars are beginning to examine these organizations’ distinctive mode of advocacy within national contexts. However, we know relatively little about how these organizations select their campaigns, and when they successfully mobilize the public on international issues. This is important as most advocacy targets national decision-makers, rather than international institutions. This article asks: how do digital advocacy organizations select the issues they campaign on? It examines refugee campaigns across seven organizations in seven different countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA) between late 2015 and 2017. It draws on extensive primary research, including a dozen interviews with digital activists, journalists, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It finds that digital advocacy organizations choose campaigns based on issuesalience, whereas traditional NGOs are driven by issue-expertise. Professional staff select campaigns in NGOs, whereas in digital advocacy organizations campaign decision-making is member-driven. Overall, this paper calls for International Relations (IR) and interest group scholars to examine campaign selection and decision-making in all advocacy organizations.
... They seek to recruit people who care about the cause. Their members share opinions but have no simple way of identifying potential members (Jordan and Maloney 1998). Therefore, broad strategies of communication such as mass direct mail and press strategies are particularly important ways for them to attract members (Dunleavy 1988). ...
Social media can pose challenges to campaign group strategy, especially for existing campaign groups who incorporate social media into their campaigns. This article uses social network analysis to explore how social media is used by the anti‐airport expansion group, HACAN Clearskies (HACAN Clearskies is an acronym for the Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise). Social media data were obtained using NodeXL and Twitonomy. As a result of questions raised in these findings, interviews with the social media coordinator of HACAN Clearskies were conducted. The results show the utilization of social media as an information dissemination platform and how a social media reluctant membership base prevents them from organizing mass protest through social media. The implications of these results are also discussed in relation to future social media practice.
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... The main reason for this gap in the literature is that scholarly work has usually emphasized just one of the constituting elements of the transmission belt. Studies focus either on membership involvement (Binderkrantz 2009;Jordan and Maloney 1998;Kohler-Koch 2010;Moe 1991), or on the organizational capacities developed to be more professionalized (Klüver 2012;Klüver and Saurugger 2013;Maloney 2015;Skocpol 2003), but not on how CSOs can and do manage the combination of these two aspects. Furthermore, most studies use indirect variables and proxies to assess CSO membership involvement and organizational capacity-the most frequent ones being resources, organizational type (citizen vs. business groups), scope of action (specialist vs. generalist organizations), and organizational scale (individual organizations, national associations, or supranational associations)-thereby obscuring key organizational processes that facilitate the connection between society and policymakers. ...
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are considered important intermediaries between citizens and policymakers. They are assumed to function as transmission belts that filter societal preferences and channel them to policymakers. Although the ability of CSOs to connect civil society with policymakers has been put into question, it has rarely been theoretically specified and empirically tested. This paper develops a conceptualization of CSOs that examines their capacity to function as transmission belts. It does so by distinguishing two organizational dimensions related to member involvement and organizational capacity. The paper draws on a large survey of CSOs active at the EU to empirically assess these organizational dimensions and relate them to basic CSOs’ characteristics. The findings indicate that one out of three organizations approximates the ideal-type transmission belt. The findings contribute to a better understanding and assessment of CSO’s potential contribution to policy-making in representative democracies.
... In some cases the groups assigned one of its members to manage their social media site which then permits members of the community to communicate and comment on issues affecting their shoreline. Jordan and Maloney (1998) and Bosso (2003); argued that communication exchange (interaction and information sharing) often determines the effectiveness of environmental groups. In terms of communicating with the public, almost three-quarters of the groups produce some form of publication such as newsletters, leaflets or flyers. ...
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Changes in U.K. government coastal and flooding policies in the last twenty five years, have resulted in a reappraisal of all coastal defence schemes with a focus on a strategic analysis to ensure that the all schemes provided the greatest net benefit. This strategy and the emphasis on adaptive management, particularly in the second wave of shoreline management plans (SMPs), provoked a reaction from local communities who felt their voice was largely being ignored as they became aware of SMP policies that increased their perceived risks but did not offer appropriate compensation. The formation of Coastal Action Groups (CAGs), has been a key community response and enabled diverse communities to feel that they can collectively participate in the ongoing planning process. Using a combination of questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews, this paper analyses the nature and effectiveness of CAGs. Although initially formed as opposition groups, the shared ideology of CAG members has resulted in the character of these groups evolving to units that embrace a broader range of social justice issues. It is argued that well led, well-supported, well-resourced and tactically astute CAGs have tended to be the most effective pressure groups. In reality however, CAGs have had relatively limited effects in changing the decisions of local SMPs, but have had great impacts in challenging the concept of meaningful public engagement in the coastal planning process, ultimately leading to more participatory approaches. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X18304445
... Although most attention has focused on political or policy impacts of movements, this scholarship provides an important foundation for our analysis (Andrews 1997;Ganz 2000;McCammon et al. 2001;Soule and King 2006). 2 In this body of research, the shift toward a multi-dimensional framework has been driven by insights that movement impact varies depending on the institutional arena (e.g., courts versus legislatures) and stages in the policy process (e.g., agenda-setting versus policy enactment) (Amenta, Caren and Olasky 2005a;Andrews 2001;Burstein, Einwohner and 2 For recent efforts to examine movement consequences in the context of organization scholarship see (Haveman, Rao and Paruchuri 2007;Schneiberg and Soule 2005;Vogus and Davis 2005). A small number of studies examine differential levels of participation across movement organizations or interest groups (e.g., McCarthy and Wolfson 1996), but most focus on individuals, thus privileging -demand‖ side factors with little attention to the organizational factors that may contribute to differential participation across organizations (Jordan andMaloney 1998). Hollander 1995;Soule and King 2006). ...
Why are some civic associations more effective than others? The authors introduce a multidimensional framework for analyzing the effectiveness of civic associations in terms of public recognition, member engagement, and leader development. Using original surveys of local Sierra Club organizations and leaders, the authors assess prevailing explanations in organization and movement studies alongside a model highlighting leadership and internal organizational practices. Although available resources and favorable contexts matter, the core findings show that associations with more committed activists, that build organizational capacity, that carry out strong programmatic activity, and whose leaders work independently, generate greater effectiveness across outcomes.
... Although most attention has focused on political or policy impacts of movements, this scholarship provides an important foundation for our analysis (Andrews 1997;Ganz 2000;McCammon et al. 2001;Soule and King 2006). 2 In this body of 2 For recent efforts to examine movement consequences in the context of organization scholarship, see Schneiberg and Soule (2005), Vogus and Davis (2005), and Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri (2007). A small number of studies examine differential levels of participation across movement organizations or interest groups (e.g., McCarthy and Wolfson 1996), but most focus on individuals, thus privileging "demand"-side factors with little attention to the organizational factors that may contribute to differential participation across organizations ( Jordan and Maloney 1998). research, the shift toward a multidimensional framework has been driven by insights that movement impact varies depending on the institutional arena (e.g., courts vs. legislatures) and stages in the policy process (e.g., agenda setting vs. policy enactment) (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995;Andrews 2001;Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005a;Soule and King 2006). ...
... Based on the available literature on associational membership the following list of individual-level controls is included in the analyses: Education, gender, age, income, satisfaction with own financial situation, self-efficacy (positive beliefs about own ability to affect surroundings), immigrant versus native resident, value orientation (materialism vs. post-materialism), political orientation, life satisfaction, religious orientation and religious affiliation (primarily protestants vs. other denominations) (refer to Appendix 2 for wording and sources) (cf. the literature cited in Section 2 and Curtis et al., 1992;2001;Jordan and Maloney, 2001;Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001;Dalton and Rohrschneider, 2002;Hooghe, 2003a;Letki, 2004;Dalton, 2005;Gillham, 2008;Sønderskov, 2008a). Not all variables have been found to affect all types of associational membership and some of the variables are specifically related to active membership. ...
Within the social capital literature it is often assumed that membership of voluntary associations causes generalized social trust and not the other way around. This study challenges this assumption by investigating if generalized social trust causes membership in a novel design that yields valid results despite possible feed-back effects from membership to trust. Using individual-level data from several countries, the article shows that trust does increase membership. Treating associational
membership as exogenous to trust produces biased results, it is therefore concluded. Moreover, the study provides rare individual-level evidence for a connection between generalized social trust and collective action in that generalized social trust in particular increases membership of associations producing public goods.
Digital advocacy organizations are permanent institutions which can rapidly mobilize people online and offline. Scholars are beginning to examine these organizations’ distinctive mode of advocacy within national contexts. However, we know relatively little about how these organizations select their campaigns, and when they successfully mobilize the public on international issues. This is important as most advocacy targets national decision-makers, rather than international institutions. This chapter asks: how do digital advocacy organizations select the issues they campaign on? It examines refugee campaigns across seven organizations in seven different countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA) between late 2015 and 2017. It draws on extensive primary research, including a dozen interviews with digital activists, journalists, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It finds that digital advocacy organizations choose campaigns based on issue salience, whereas traditional NGOs are driven by issue-expertise. Professional staff select campaigns in NGOs, whereas in digital advocacy organizations campaign decision-making is member-driven. Overall, this chapter calls for International Relations and interest group scholars to examine campaign selection and decision-making in all advocacy organizations.
Studies conducted between the 1950s and 1970s found that the principles embodied in the First Amendment constituted a “clear norm” endorsed by large majorities of community leaders and virtually all legal practitioners and scholars. This consensus has since weakened under the strain of arguments that racist slurs, epithets, and other forms of expression that demean social identities are an intolerable affront to egalitarian values. Guided by the theory that norms are transmitted through social learning, we show that these developments have spurred a dramatic realignment in public tolerance of offensive expression about race, gender, and religious groups. Tolerance of such speech has declined overall, and its traditional relationships with ideology, education, and age have diminished or reversed. Speech subject to changing norms of tolerance ranges from polemic to scientific inquiry, the fringes to the mainstream of political discourse, and left to right, raising profound questions about the scope of permissible debate in contemporary American politics.
We explore student attitudes toward freedom of speech on campus using a think-aloud method, in which students are exposed to source material on a subject and “think aloud” as they work through the controversies. We gain an in-depth picture of how students understand and make judgments about who should and should not be allowed to speak on campus. Utilizing the think-aloud method to examine various cases of invited speakers on campus, we learn that students have difficult times differentiating legal and political reasons for preventing certain campus speakers. We also find that students tend to be more restrictive than a civil libertarian might like, albeit in (usually) internally consistent and sympathetic ways. We conclude by suggesting interventions that could help students better understand the way First Amendment rights are typically adjudicated and balanced against other lofty goals.
We often think that individuals should live their lives in ways they are convinced are most appropriate to their self-understanding and beliefs. However, we equally think that this idea of living according to one’s convictions and self-understanding does not mean endorsement of forms of speech that injure the person and dignity of others. So far, the debate on hate speech has revolved around the justification of its protection and prohibition. In this article, we examine the idea of hate speech through the lens of authentic personhood, the foundation upon which most arguments for and against speech restriction are based. The aim is to demonstrate that the state restricting speech may be as justified as the one protecting it, seeing that in reality, hate speech both violates and vindicates authentic personhood. Given the nature and structure of “autonomy” and “speech,” a balancing approach to free expression and equality is preferable to outright protection or prohibition of hate speech.
The debates on hate speech regulation have divided scholars and practitioners. While the liberals largely argue that hate speech ban is anti-democratic and counter-productive for preservation of fundamental human rights, the humanists posit that hate speech is harmful and its regulation is relevant in order to avert the collateral damage/ harm it inflicts on human dignity and equality of human beings. Despite the significant efforts in Africa to regulate hate speech, its debates focus on United States and Western Europe. Thus, the account of hate speech regulation in African context is largely understudied. This study therefore examines the impact state regulation of hate speech on sustainable democracy in Africa. Using the qualitative dominant mixed methods approach and data generated from Nigeria and Kenya, the paper argues that state regulation of hate speech presents an opportunity for fostering order, advancing national cohesion, reducing hate speech and promoting inclusive governance for all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion and economic status. The paper concludes that implementing hate speech legislation alongside other non-legal, dialogue-based, egalitarian , voluntary approaches are relevant for diminishing hate speech and the harms it engender as well as promoting sustainable democracy in Africa and beyond. ARTICLE HISTORY
Cambridge Core - American Studies - Immigration and the American Ethos - by Morris Levy
Political activity is conventionally considered a constitutive feature of interest groups, underpinning an impressive literature on the strategies groups employ to exercise political influence. Whether and how intensely voluntary membership groups engage in political activities to start with, however, are rarely examined. We present a new incentive-theoretical perspective on group political activity, considering both member demands and leadership constraints. We argue that investments in political activities (one way of generating collective incentives) as a means to prevent member exit are more or less important depending on a group’s composition. Simultaneously, the extent to which leaders are incentivized to cater to members’ demands, when trying to balance these against conflicting demands, depends on communication channels between leaders and members and the importance of membership fees. Applying Bayesian ordered logit models to data from two group surveys supports our perspective and stresses the importance of considering how intraorganizational dynamics steer groups’ external activities.
It is hard to imagine any advanced western democracy functioning without the involvement of interest groups. One of the most fundamental concerns of political scientists regarding this long-standing practice is the imbalance in the number and type of interest groups involved in public decision making. Business associations tend to vastly outnumber any other type of interest groups, in particular those representing public interests. This ‘mobilization bias’ has been a remarkably persistent phenomenon across time, government venues and entire political systems (Lowery et al. 2005; Messer et al. 2010; Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1970[1960]). And in our contemporary multi-level governance systems these long-existing mobilization biases seem only to be reinforced (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Hanegraaff et al. 2011; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013). Indeed, recent studies mostly demonstrate that business groups are more often present at key political institutions at national and supranational governance levels and employ a broader set of lobby tactics than citizen groups do (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Dur and Matteo 2013; Eising 2007; Hanegraaff et al. 2011; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013). By now this skewed distribution has almost become a truism and variables representing the distinction between businesses and citizen groups in statistical analyses are often considered control variables rather than main effects.
Interest groups form an important part of the development of political and social systems. This book goes beyond current literature in examining the survival and ‘careers’ of such groups beyond their formation.
Do clergy approve of official lobbying by their denominations? Using a data set of nearly 2,300 Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) and Episcopal Church clergy surveyed in 1998, we investigate how clergy evaluate the work of their official denominational Washington lobbying offices. In particular, we assess the effects of four factors-political ideology, social theology, political engagement, and internal denominational politics-on clergy's evaluations of these Washington offices. We find that clergy evaluations of their Washington office are driven by (1) their own politics, (2) whether they feel it is appropriate for their denomination to pursue political ends, and (3) their support for the general direction of the denomination-not directly connected to the lobby.
For a long time, the study of interest groups has not been the most frequented area of research in Italian political science. During the last decades, scholars working in policy studies have revived the topic by analysing the role of interest groups in the policy process; yet they only have provided sectional analyses of the phenomenon. In this paper, we want to present a more comprehensive picture of that role, by comparing interest groups in seven Italian policy sectors in the last twenty years. The empirical analysis reveals some interesting trends: above all, the Italian Interest Groups System (IGS) has become more fragmented than it was in previous decades and parties' gate-keeping functions have weakened with respect to the so-called First Republic.
Over the past few decades, the legitimacy of membership-based social movement organizations (SMOs) has been called into question (Bosso, 2005; Jordan and Maloney, 1997, 2007; Putnam, 2000). As professionally-run institutions, SMOs have been accused of a preoccupation with maintaining income through membership marketing at the expense of fostering active participation among their members. In a nutshell, SMOs are seen to be self-serving ‘protest businesses’ which contribute little to social movement activism, and civic engagement in general. Our research into student members of a leading SMO takes issue with this assertion. Whilst organizationally SMOs can appear bureaucratic and impersonal in their marketing strategies, it cannot be assumed that this approach is only capable of attracting passive ‘chequebook activists’. Our findings suggest that younger members feel a sense of loyalty and trust towards the SMO as an effective ‘brand leader’ in its field, though this is by no means unrelenting. As reflexive consumers of activism, members have also grown more accustomed to the flexibilities of emerging post-bureaucratic ‘DIY’ activist groups. In sum, SMOs would benefit from a stronger and more consistent ‘feedback loop’ between the organization and its younger and more active members, as this will help provide scope for greater innovation whilst resisting tendencies towards self-serving ‘bureaucratized activism’.
Political parties were at the heart of the traditional narrative of British democracy. But parties as agents of political mobilisation are in decline. By contrast, membership of political pressure groups and social movement organisations has grown considerably. This shift in political activism is considered by some, but by no means all, to offer a radical alternative narrative of democratic participation. This article examines the organisational changes taking place behind this shift; and explores the extent to which more traditional models of political agency can be reformed in ways that supports and sustains the political activism at the core of a healthy democratic society.
The paper examines some of the potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry for the economic or public choice approach to the study of British politics. It considers the types of questions that might be addressed in core executive studies, parliament, local government, political parties and pressure groups examining a selected view of some of the studies that have been published in these areas. It suggests that the economic approach is most fruitful for identifying interesting hypotheses for empirical evaluation.British Politics (2006) 1, 26–43. doi:10.1057/palgrave.bp.4200003
This article contributes to the discussion of one component of the “crisis” in political participation by looking at (non‐) participation in groups. The starting point is that political science has a heavy gauge tool for accounting for such low inactivity – Olson’s (196516.
Olson , M. 1965, 1971. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. View all references) free rider proposition. The article accepts the influence of Olson, but uses survey data to investigate whether non‐participation is a self‐interested strategy, as he suggests, or whether it reflects broader differences in resources and orientations to political action. While it is often assumed that surveys demonstrating that members join for collective ends “disprove” Olson’s thesis, this article accepts his rebuttal that these surveys of joiners tell us little about those who refuse to join. Olson accepted that (trivial) numbers of members would join (in addition to those seeking selective benefits), but argued that the number joining for collective goods would be dwarfed by those failing to participate. These he assumed to be free‐riding. This article revisits the definition, and supplies theoretically illuminating survey material from non‐members as well as members. The data show little support for the free‐riding instinct. While Olson implies that free‐riding is logical for almost all potential members, this article suggests that non‐participation is not simply a “leftover” from those not mobilized, but is itself based on specific factors.
Important articles in this Journal by Nownes in 2004 and Nownes and Lipinksi in 2005 demonstrate that ‘population ecology’ approaches are now central to interest group studies. Partly at least this move to study at population level is a consequence of the numbers of such organizations. Party scholars typically deal with far fewer cases and sui generis discussion is more defensible. Ecology seems to offer a ‘handle’ on the thousands of cases that exist in the interest group field. Nownes and Lipinski stressed the importance of environmental factors in determining group populations, and challenged group scholars to address the dynamics among interest group populations. This article argues that animal-based population ecology may be an imperfect analogy to use in making sense of group circumstances. It considers the way groups respond to opportunities and constraints.
Charities or interest groups need to attract supporters, who offer both financial support and participation, to achieve their overall goal of influencing public affairs. They can use political marketing to help them attract and retain such supporters. Existing literature indicates they use marketing techniques such as direct mail to communicate to potential new supporters, but new research has discovered that the influence of political marketing is much more comprehensive. The most effective groups are now using political marketing to design the package they offer to supporters. They go through a four-stage process. First, they conduct market intelligence to understand what supporters want from the organisation and second, they design their product accordingly. Third, they communicate this to potential supporters and then finally deliver campaign progress and they communicate this to existing supporters. They use marketing concepts: they adopt a market orientation and build an organisation designed to take account of its users' needs and wants. Although such charities are often associated with non-business behaviour, the most successful groups are adopting the concepts and techniques of comprehensive political marketing as the means to increase their influence on government and public affairs. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications
Individuals do not act collectively simply because they recognise common interests; collective interests can be defined as collective goods and collective goods are non-excludable. In ‘large’ groups instrumental individuals have no incentive to act because individual action is imperceptible. But are individuals always this instrumental? If it is a mistake to assume that collective action occurs ‘naturally’ when common interests are recognised, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common interests. Individuals derive satisfaction from expressing identity with common interests but when will individuals choose to ‘nail their colours to the mast’?
Electoral turnout cannot be easily explained by reference to instrumental rationality. Instead, turnout depends on consumption gains arising from the act of voting. This paper distinguishes between utility derived from fulfilling a civic duty and utility derived from expressing a political preference. Both considerations affect turnout but a test of the determinants of the decision of whether to vote and the decision of how to vote identifies the importance of perceptions of civic duty. Evidence suggests that intrinsic motivation is important. If so, policy to maintain standards in public life should be framed to "crowd in" intrinsic motivation. Copyright 2000 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile ‘profits’ (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is ‘non-profit’ enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process. There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed ‘non-profit’ and a common goal is non-rival.
According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument
goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to
consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment,
at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are
therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort.
Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good
from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs
only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's
perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests.
Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary
one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective
action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior.
Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception
occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share
of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions.
In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective
interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct)
when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which
voluntary collective action is rational.
But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's
theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In
the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence,
it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's
contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member
of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group
behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit
recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets,
or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations.
It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence,
but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended
precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose
members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption
that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's
theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for
actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational
on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one.
The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective
goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory,
it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose
that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly
values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already
seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it
has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its
maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective
interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing
with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public
cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself.
Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to
profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971).
Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But
the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces
people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members
can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that
their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the
actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it.
By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but
by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose
benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather
than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can
extend beyond private interest.
Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest,
brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a
collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can
be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in
the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting
voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically,
probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent
originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate
a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government
authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between
private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading
as the identification of self-interest with selfishness.
There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other
results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely
to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them
tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment
to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite.
Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow
self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments,
however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's
theory. They were graduate students in economics.
The problem of whether the rational, self-interested individual will voluntarily subscribe to a large group providing collective benefits is examined, using the perspectives of Hardin's application of game theory and Olson's application of economic theory. The arguments in each case are held to be unsatisfactory, and the same analysis cannot automatically be applied to all problems involving collective action. The subscription to large groups normally represents a distinct sub-class of problems, the solution to which, contrary to the established wisdom, is that the rational, self-interested individual with a net benefit (together, perhaps, with the irrational one with a net loss) will voluntarily subscribe to a group providing a collective good.
Rational models using a public choice paradigm are increasingly used to explain and predict political participation. While previous research demonstrates the applicability of these models to voting, far less research concerns nonelectoral behavior. The literature that is available indicates that for some behaviors the assumptions of the rational choice models may need to be relaxed. This manuscript examines nonelectoral participation including attending public hearings, joining and participating in public interest groups, and contacting public officials. To allow variations in assumptions and decision rules six rational choice models are estimated. The results support the use of rational choice models but suggest that the model not be limited to those formulations based on viewing individuals as strictly rational egoists.
The exchange theory of interest groups rests initially on a distinction between the entrepreneur or organizer and the customer/member. The argument asserts that group organizers invest in a set of benefits which they offer to potential members at a price--joining the group. Benefits may be material, solidary or expressive. In order for the group to survive a sufficient balance must be maintained in the exchange; members must receive benefits and leaders enough return, conceptualized as "profit," to warrant continued participation. Implications are drawn for such questions as lobbying and intra-group factionalism as well as for the origins, growth and survival of various types of interest groups.
Eleven closely related experiments testing the free rider hypothesis under different conditions, and sampling various subpopulations, are reported. Results question the empirical validity and generality of a strong version of the hypothesis. Some reasons for its failure are discussed.