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Understanding 'ethnocratic' regimes: The politics of seizing contested territories


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The paper proposes a preliminary political-geographical theory of ‘ethnocratic’ regimes. It identifies such regimes as a distinct type, neither democratic, nor authoritarian. The paper defines and illustrates the evolution and characteristics of ethnocratic states, and examines their impact on ethnic relations and political stability. While these regimes represent themselves as democratic, their main project promotes the ethnicization of contested territory and power apparatus. Their logic, structure, features and trajectories are articulated and generalized, especially as regards key dimensions such as: democracy, minorities, ‘ethno-classes’, ethno-nationalism and religion.Three examples of ethnocratic regimes—in Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia—are briefly described, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the paper constructs a tentative model, identifying six ‘regime bases’ as constituting a hegemonic regime core, including: immigration and citizenship, land and settlement, the role of the armed forces, the legal system, the flow of capital and public culture. These ‘bases’ largely determine the character of ‘regime features’, such as party politics, elections, gender relations and the media. But the hegemonic status of these bases is frequently challenged by groups marginalized by the expansion and control of the dominant ethnos. These groups attempt to exploit the ‘cracks’ emanating from the state’s self-representation as democratic. The ceaseless ethnocratic-democratic tension typically results in chronic instability and prolonged ethnic conflict.
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Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes:
the politics of seizing contested territories
Oren Yiftachel
, As’ad Ghanem
Department of Geography, Ben-Gurion University, 84105 Beer-Sheva, Israel
Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
The paper proposes a preliminary political-geographical theory of ‘ethnocratic’ regimes. It
identifies such regimes as a distinct type, neither democratic, nor authoritarian. The paper
defines and illustrates the evolution and characteristics of ethnocratic states, and examines
their impact on ethnic relations and political stability. While these regimes represent them-
selves as democratic, their main project promotes the ethnicization of contested territory
and power apparatus. Their logic, structure, features and trajectories are articulated and gen-
eralized, especially as regards key dimensions such as: democracy, minorities, ‘ethno-classes’,
ethno-nationalism and religion.
Three examples of ethnocratic regimes—in Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia—are briefly
described, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the paper constructs a tentative model,
identifying six ‘regime bases’ as constituting a hegemonic regime core, including: immi-
gration and citizenship, land and settlement, the role of the armed forces, the legal system,
the flow of capital and public culture. These ‘bases’ largely determine the character of
regime features’, such as party politics, elections, gender relations and the media. But the
hegemonic status of these bases is frequently challenged by groups marginalized by the
expansion and control of the dominant ethnos. These groups attempt to exploit the ‘cracks’
emanating from the state’s self-representation as democratic. The ceaseless ethnocratic-
democratic tension typically results in chronic instability and prolonged ethnic conflict.
#2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Democracy; Ethnicity; Regime; Sri Lanka; Estonia; Israel; Palestine
Corresponding author. Tel.: +9728-6472011; fax: +9728-6472821.
E-mail address: (O. Yiftachel).
0962-6298/$ - see front matter #2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The rapid transformation in the world political order during the last decade and
half has generated active debate on regime types in general, and democratization in
particular (see: Bermeo, 1997; Diamond, 2002; Harris, 2001; Huntington, 1997;
Linz & Stephan, 1996; Keating & McGarry, 2001). Yet, the academic discourse has
been unduly constrained by a binary democracy–non-democracy framework of
analysis. The emphasis by most western scholars on a formal–procedural definition
of democracy, on free markets and on various forms of constitutionalism, caused
many to overlook the persistence of an ethno-national ‘engine’ of political change.
This has obscured the on-going existence, and recent proliferation; of a regime type
we term here—‘ethnocracy’.
In this paper, we aim to address the deficiency by focusing on this type of
regime. We will define and illustrate a model of what we term ‘open ethnocratic’
regimes, and examine its impact on ethnic relations and political stability. Our
theoretical argument centers on the mechanisms of the regime, which explain both
the persistent patterns of ethnic dominance and its chronic instability. A related
theoretical contribution is the existence of ethnocratic regimes as a distinct identifi-
able type, which promotes a central (political-geographical) project of ethnicizing
contested territories and power structures.
We contend that the logic, structure, features and trajectories of open ethno-
cratic regime can be articulated and generalized, and that the model we proposed
below can frame a new understanding of politics and geography in many states
embroiled in protracted ethnic conflicts. Such understanding forms a necessary step
in managing the typically volatile inter-group relations of ethnocratic societies. In
this vein, the paper attempts to make a theoretical, conceptual and practical contri-
bution to the understanding of deeply divided societies, and to illustrate the
dynamics of ethnocratic regimes, by briefly comparing the relevant cases of Sri
Lanka, Israel and Estonia.
Scholarly settings
Our discussion focuses on regimes, which we define as frameworks determining
the distribution of power, values and resources. A regime reflects the identity,
goals, and practical priorities of a political community. The state is the main
vehicle for the regime, providing institutions, mechanisms, laws and legitimized
forms of violence to implement the projects articulated by the regime.
Ethnocratic regimes may emerge in a variety of forms, including cases of ethnic
dictatorships or regimes implementing violent strategies of ethnic cleansing, as
occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo by means of control and exclusion as
The term ‘ethnocracy’ has appeared in previous literature (see Linz & Stephan, 1996; Little, 1994);
However, as far as we are aware, it was generally used as a derogatory term, with very little discussion,
or development into a theoretical model or concept, as formulated here.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676648
happened in Sudan, pre-2003 Iraq or pre-1994 South Africa (Mann, 2000). In this
paper, however, we are interested in ethnocratic regimes, which represent them-
selves as democratic, and uphold several formal democratic mechanisms, although
they still facilitate a disproportional and undemocratic expansion of the dominant
ethno-nation. They can thus be described as ‘open ethnocracies’. Examples of such
regimes at present include states such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Estonia, Latvia,
Serbia, and Israel, as well as past cases such as 19th Century Australia or Canada
until the 1960s.
Our analysis of ethnocratic regimes ‘converses’ with a range of scholarly debates
and a number of disciplinary fields. We present below a combined political geogra-
phy and political science perspective, which seeks to contribute to debates on key
concepts such as nationalism (for key texts, see Brubaker, 1996; Hechter, 2000);
ethnicity (see Connor, 1994; Conversi, 2002), political regimes (Collier & Levitski,
1997; Linz & Stephan, 1996); political stability (Lustick, 1993; McGarry &
O’Leary, 1993, 1995), multi-cultural citizenship and the postcolonial condition
(Benhabib, 2002; Kymlicka, 2001). The knowledge accumulated in these fields
forms an important basis for our new formulations.
Ethnocracies: key components
We define ethnocracy as a regime facilitating the expansion, ethnicization and
control of contested territory and state by a dominant ethnic nation. ‘Open ethnoc-
racies’, on which we focus here, exercises selective openness: they possess a range
of partial democratic features, most notably political competition, free media and
significant civil rights; although these fail to be universal or comprehensive, and are
typically applied to the extent they do not interfere with the ethnicization project.
Given this selective and partial openness, open ethnocratic regimes cannot be
classified as democratic (as elaborated below). Neither they can be classified as
authoritarian, given their extent of political freedoms and openings, which far
exceeds the typical range characterizing such regimes (see Linz & Stephan, 1996).
The most striking differences between open ethnocracies and autocracies are:
(a) the real possibility of government change in most ethnocratic regimes, as
opposed to long-term dominance of one ruler or party typifying autocracies; (b)
the strong emphasis on ethnic loyalties as a foundation of politics, not found in
most autocracies.
The combination of democratic and ethnocratic features makes open ethnoc-
racies a particularly interesting, and not uncommon, case during the current age of
‘superficial democratization’ (Zakaria, 1997). Instability is typically generated by
marginalized and oppressed minorities, who often use the partial openings granted
by the state to resist, mobilize and challenge the regime. But at the same time,
regime legitimacy is augmented by the introduction of democratic features, which
possess an appeasing effect on restive minorities. The ethnocratic–democratic ten-
sions in open ethnocracies thereby creates a high level of regime dynamism and
649O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
instability, found neither in more oppressive ‘closed’ ethnocracies, such as pre-2003
Iraq or Sudan; or in liberal democracies, such as Denmark or Sweden.
As elaborated elsewhere (see Yiftachel, 1999) ethnocratic states emerge from the
time–space fusion of three main historical-political forces: (a) settler-colonialism,
which may be external (into another state or continent) or internal (within a state)
(Lustick, 1993; McGarry, 1998); (b) ethno-nationalism, which draws on the inter-
national legitimacy to national self-determination to buttress the political and terri-
torial expansionist goals of the dominant ethno-nation (Connor, 1994; Mann,
1999); and (c) a conspicuous ‘ethnic logic’ of capital, which tends to stratify ethnic
groups through uneven processes of capital mobility, immigration and economic
globalization (Sassen, 1998; Soysal, 1994). These settings mean that ethnocratic
regime reflect, and at the same time reproduce, patterns of ethnic stratification and
discrimination. The parallel workings of these structural forces have shaped several
key regime characteristics—all enhancing the process of ethnicizing contested terri-
tory. These are
.Ethnicity, and not citizenship, forms the main basis for resource and power
allocation; only partial rights and capabilities are extended to minorities; there is
a constant ethnocratic-civil tension.
.The dominant ethnic nation appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the
political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to
expand and deepen its control over state and territory.
.Political boundaries are vague, often privileging co-ethnic of the dominant group
in the Diaspora, over minority citizens; there is no clearly identified ‘demos’.
.Politics are ethnicized, as the ethnic logic of power distribution polarizes the
body politic and party system.
.Rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socioeconomic stratification are main-
tained, despite countervailing legal and market forces.
A central point is that in ethnocratic regimes, the notion of the ‘demos’ is
crucially ruptured. That is, the community of equal resident-citizens (the demos)
does not feature high in the country’s policies, agenda, imagination, symbols or
resource distribution, and is therefore not nurtured or facilitated. But the ‘demos’
forms the necessary basis for the establishment of democracy (‘demos-cracy’), and
as a foundation for the most stable and legitimate form of governance known
to human society. Needless to say, the concept of the demos is open to many
interpretations, as evidenced by the variety of federal, multi-cultural or unitary
state structures. Yet, the structural diminution of the demos by ethnocratic regimes
The characteristics are worded as assertions which may be subject to further theoretical and
empirical validation.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676650
highlights their qualitative difference from the norms and practices of democratic
Notably, the ethnocratic model presented here is dynamic, depicting and inter-
preting processes, rather than fixed reality, most notably ethnic expansion, and the
challenges and resistance it faces. One of our main arguments is the inherent insta-
bility of open ethnocratic regimes, born out of the dynamism of societies embroiled
in ethnic territorial conflicts. Let us now explore further the structure of ethno-
cratic regimes by elaborating on additional key dimensions, regarding territory,
religion and class.
Ethnocracies are driven, first and foremost, by a concerted collective project of
exerting ethno-national control over a territory perceived as the nation’s (exclus-
ive) homeland. The regime is thus propelled by a sense of collective entitlement
among the majority group to control ‘its’ state, and ‘its’ homeland, as part and
parcel of what is conceived as a ‘natural’ right for self-determination. But given the
perennial existence of multi-ethnic and multi-national territories, the imposition of
ethnic control over a mixed territory (and at times beyond) is likely to cause bitter
and protracted conflicts generated by rival claims for the same territory made by
other groups, typically those controlling the areas in different historical periods (see
Hakli, 2001; Murphy, 2002; Yiftachel; 2002).
While geographers and political scientists have compiled many studies of ethnic
politics and geographies (see Boal, 1987; Eyles, 1990; Peach, 1996), there has been
a relative paucity of studies linking questions of power, identity and ethnic conflict
to the dynamics of spatial expansion. Yet, the last years have seen several impor-
tant beginnings, with recent geographical studies beginning the task of systemati-
cally describing, theorizing and offering critical evaluation of ethnocratic spatial
Penrose (2000a,b), for example, shows how the very structure of modern nation-
states (termed ‘nationalist democracies’) spawns societal projects, which ghettoize
and marginalize minority groups, and at the same time attempts to forcefully
assimilate them into the mainstream. Penrose theoretically and empirically exposes
the embedded contradiction between the claims of such states to be democracies,
and their systematic oppression of part of their citizenry
...systemic inequalities arise when the application of democratic principles is
constrained by the more fundamental need to demonstrate that the state repre-
sents a single, coterminous nation. Accordingly... efforts to improve democ-
racies must begin with the assumption that the spaces and places in which this
ideology operates are not neutral. Instead, I suggest that [under the nationalist
order—OY] the context in which democratic principles are applied, and their
interpretation challenged, both produces and reflects ongoing, structural
unequal, power relations. (Penrose, 2000a,b: p. 35).
651O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
Likewise, geographers Paasi (1999, 2000), Herb and Kaplan (1999) and Murphy
(2002) provide detailed accounts on the historical evolution of the close nexus
between identity and territory as a fundamental basis for the existing dominant
political order. This nexus provides the normative ‘ideal’, and the political basis for
mobilization, which stand behind the making of the global nation-state order. Not-
withstanding recent processes of globalization and localization, which erode their
power, national states remain the main repository of political, violent and econ-
omic power, especially as regards minorities.
Paasi (2000) elaborates on the principles and methods of state building, which
invariably include a quiet, hegemonic, process of ‘spatial socialization’, whereby
cultural norms, official cartography, military activity and education infuse the
taken-for-granted link of people to their exclusive ethno-national homeland. Sibley
(1996) and Sack (1993) address the phenomenon of territoriality, with Sibley add-
ing a critical psychological-spatial dimension by introducing the concept of ‘pure
space’, as a social desire apparent on all scales. This often contradicts with the dic-
tates of global capitalism, creating a spatial politics of difference, manifested per-
versely and often brutally, in the planning and making of the built environment:
The built environment assumes symbolic importance, reinforcing a desire for
order and conformity... space is implicated in the construction of otherness and
deviancy. ‘Pure space’ exposes difference and facilitates the policing of
boundaries... This xenophobia is based... on a purified national identity; (it)
sits uneasily with the flows and cultural fusions, which are generated by global
capitalism. But the contradiction between a racist nationalism and the impera-
tives of capitalist economies is denied... The myth of cultural homogeneity
is needed to sustain the nation-state... It is convenient to have an alien other
hovering on the margins (Sibley, 1996: pp. 106–108).
Based on these theoretical foundations, we can proceed to observe the process of
ethnicizing contested territory as involving several key steps: (a) structural segre-
gation, without which the expansion of the majority group would not be possible;
(b) the construction of minorities as a ‘threat’ or ‘enemies’ to the project of ‘purify-
ing’ ethnic spatial control, embedded in the model of the national state, from
which ethnocratic regimes receive their ultimate internal, and at times inter-
national, legitimacy; (c) the formulation of public policies and practices, in the field
of land, development and planning, which enhance ethnocratic spatial control; (d)
the structural, and hence enduring, discrimination of minorities in the fields of land
control, planning rights, development and access to decision-making powers.
The manipulation of ethnic political geographies is hence one of the most central
pillars of all ethnocratic regimes; that is, the ethnicization of political space. The
legal, political, cultural and demographic ‘bases’ of the regime, as elaborated
below, all facilitate this collective goal. But the geographical process in which
ethnocratic regimes are enmeshed, also expose their long-term weakness: as shown
by the recent work of social and political scientists such as Brubaker (1996),
Gurr (2000), Mann (2000), McGarry (1998) and Hechter (2000), the process of
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676652
state-led ethnic territorial expansion may and marginalize minorities to such an
extent, that their resistance often generates serious threats to the regime, most com-
monly on a regional or transnational scale. The remaking of ethnic geography is
also closely related to another key component of most ethnocratic regime—the
reigning of religion to advance the ethnic project.
While the main mobilizers of politics in ethnocratic states is definitely ethno-
nationalism, in most cases, the ‘national’ question is intimately involved with an
institutionalized and politicized religion, because the religion held by the dominant
majority is often an ‘ethnic religion’. This creates reciprocal relations, where religi-
on is influenced by contemporary ethnic and national struggles, while the nature of
the ethno-national struggle is, in turn, shaped by religious motives. The expansive
type of ethno-nationalism typical to ethnocracies is thus able to develop resilient
forms of internal legitimations, based on the mutual reinforcement of nationalism
and religion.
Examples of the intimate connection between religion and ethno-national segre-
gation are rife in ethnocratic states, and are evident in the cases of Sri Lanka (with
a major Buddhist–Hindu division), Israel/Palestine (Jewish–Muslim), Serbia (East-
ern Orthodox–Catholic), Northern Ireland (Protestant–Catholic), Estonia
(Lutheran–Russian Orthodox) and Malaysia (Muslim–Confutes). Yet, our analysis
of the ethnocratic model still points to the general subordination of religion vis-a-
vis ethno-nationalism. This is the reason our terminology and explanation stress
the ethnic and national ‘engines’ of mobilization, through which religion assumes
its contemporary political and cultural potency.
Significantly, religious narratives, norms and practices enhance in most ethno-
cratic societies the project of ethnic spatial expansion. This is mainly due to the
sanctification of space, common in areas of ethnic and religious conflict. This pro-
cess sees religious texts and norms reinterpreted so as to make the exclusive claim
to territory a matter of divine truth. This gives rise to a range of religio-spatial
practices on all major scales. On the urban level, as well illustrated by Shilhav
(1991), and Kong (2001) religious discourses constantly inform the making of
‘sacred urban spaces’. These may include neighborhoods and quarters where
enough religious people congregate, so as to elevated their religious customs to the
level of public norm. This relates to customs such as dress, eating, gender mixing,
content of signs and billboards, the aesthetic, vocal and physical prominence of
places of worship.
On regional and national scales too, religious practices, such as the demarcation
and celebration of sacred sites, the association of certain areas with religious mira-
cles or major mythical events, movements or wars, are coupled with ethnic claims
for that region or state as a homeland. These tend to effectively fuel the struggle
for exclusive territorial control. As shown by Stump (2000) and Akenson (1992),
religious narratives and goals in conflict situations are inherently spatial, with con-
stant mobilization to widen influence and control.
653O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
Winichakul (1994) and Smith (2002a,b) elaborate further on the impact of religi-
on on the national scale, by noting that the ‘layered’ and ‘selective’ historical inter-
pretations of many modern nations is commonly based on popular religious myths,
which emphasize ‘our’ control over the land. Such selective collective memories are
then extrapolated into present day political territorial claims. Hence, the present
(often tacit) coalescence of religious leaders and discourses with the national frame-
work creates a process of sanctification of the entire state territory, which becomes
a complete and holy ‘geobody’, embodying, symbolizing and mobilizing the nation.
Hence, despite the putatively secular foundation of nationalism (Anderson,
1991), the histories, identities and boundaries of the dominant groups in ethno-
cratic societies are never very far from their religious affiliation. The religious logic
is instrumental for most ethnocratic regimes by generating an essentializing dis-
course of rigid political and social boundaries. The existence of such boundaries is
commonly justified in public opinion, in politics and the media as stemming from
divine or ancient roots, and is thus portrayed as ascriptive and insurmountable
(Smith, 1995).
The reinforcement of boundaries by nationalism and religion thus assists the
dominant and expanding ethnic nation to segregate and marginalize peripheral
minorities. Moreover, since ethno-nationalism is enmeshed in the definition of the
state, and since it often has clear religious undertones, the entry of marginalized
minorities to a ‘common good’ defined by the state is extremely difficult. The
regime can also use religion to create formal and informal differentiation between
citizens, where ‘objective’ or ‘god-given’ religious criteria function as a basis
for discriminatory policies; in the allocation of resources, power and prestige
(Akenson, 1992).
But—significantly—the close association between ethnocratic regimes and
religious institutions is never totally congruent, because at a structural level, religi-
on and nationalism advance competing hegemonic projects. The first is structurally
bound to the state, and regards its development and power as a goal in itself. The
latter (religious institutions), however, promotes a competing regime of truth and
power, which holds a global or international ‘redemptive’ vision, often ‘in waiting’
for the right historical circumstances. For religious movements, particularly of the
fundamentalist kind, control of state territory is never an end-state goal, but rather
a stepping stone towards a grander vision of broader salvation and control, which
may make the nation-state redundant (see Lustick, 2002; Stump, 2000).
Hence, religions such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and Eastern Orthodox Chris-
tianity—found in most ethnocratic societies—also commonly hold uneasy relations
with their state governments. As shown below, in cases such as Sri Lanka and
Israel, the bands holding together the Statist and religious projects has been under
increasing strain, with religious forces, buoyed by the past support of the ethnic
state, now threaten to undermine their territorial, social and political stability.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676654
The power of religion and ethnic struggle tend to overshadow class politics in
ethnocratic societies, although socioeconomic considerations are still central in the
shaping of political struggle over resources. Typically, such considerations are
expressed indirectly by the politics of religion and ethnicity, with a general associ-
ation between poverty, religion and nationalism. But as noted above, ‘the ethnic
logic of capital’ operates constantly in ethnocratic societies, and puts in train
mechanisms, which generally result in persisting ethnic stratification. These
mechanisms include the ‘cultural division of labor’ (Hechter, 2000), the flow of
international and domestic capital, which tends to favor the more educated groups,
the uneven pattern of urban and industrial development, the typically skewed dis-
tribution of governmental assistance and incentives, and the tendency of capital to
avoid risks. All these combine to create a socioeconomic map, which tends to sep-
arate ethnic groups, thereby fueling inter-ethnic tensions.
Consequently, we observe that politics in ethnocratic states operates on two
main and distinguishable levels: ethno-nations and ethno-classes (for a fuller dis-
cussion, see Yiftachel, 1998). This begins with an ethnic logic of politics, which is
generated by the national struggle, where ‘our’ ethnic nation is routinely elevated,
while rival groups are demoted (Connor, 1994). This logic is often diffused into
both majority and minority communities, bestowing legitimacy for the use of hier-
archical ethnicity as a political and distributive category, and causing various
forms of ethno-class divisions. Hence, ethnocratic regimes do not only promote the
dominance of a specific ethnicity, but also the general dominance of ethnicity as a
political and socioeconomic category.
The two levels of ethnicity operate with different social effects. Typically, the
ethno-national discourse attempts to unite the various groups in the nation (as
defined by the dominant group, barring ‘external’ of ‘foreign’ minorities); while the
ethno-class logic tends to fragment groups within the nations according to their
socioeconomic status and/or regional locations (see Hechter, 2000). Needless to
say, there is never a clear-cut division between ethno-national and ethno-class stra-
tifications, but the analytical distinction helps us trace the central role of ethnicity
in both national and economic lines of demarcation, and account for its various
manifestations in the ‘thick’ political struggles prevalent in ethnocratic societies.
Consequently, the contours of political mobilization and organization within
each ethnic nation often combines ethnic, religious and class affiliation. The pat-
terns of ethno-class stratification typical to ethnocracies has been explained and
elaborated elsewhere (see Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995). Its importance for the
present discussion is the inherent tension it exposes between the parallel projects of
nation- and state building, and the attention it draws to the material aspects of eth-
nic struggle, frequently overlooked in recent scholarship on politics memory and
The tension between the use of ethnic and civil categories is highly evident during
the process of nation-building, which usually entails an active exclusion of groups
who are constructed as ‘external’ by the prevailing discourse of the dominant
655O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
nation, a status reified by a combination of legal measures, public policies and cul-
tural norms. The excluded are usually indigenous peoples or peripheral minorities,
but also collectivities marked as ‘enemies’ or ‘foreigners’. Yet, at the same time,
these groups are incorporated (often coercively) into the project of state building.
The crises emanating from the process of ‘incorporation without legitimation’
(Mann, 1999; Soysal, 2000) is at the heart of the chronic instability experienced by
ethnocratic regimes, to be discussed further below.
The making of ethnocratic regimes: three illustrations
The following section will briefly illustrate the process of ethnicization in three
representative states—Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel. The common political-
geographical elements emerging from these three examples will then assist to create
a more robust and refined model of the ethnocratic regimes, to which the following
sections are devoted.
As in all comparative analyses, there are obvious differences between the three
states, in history, economy, culture and geography. However, the main common-
ality, which makes these cases comparable, is the institutionalization of an ethno-
cratic project ‘within’ a self-declared democratic setting. Hence, several important
democratic characteristics, such as separation of powers and elections, exist along-
side a state project of deepening ethnic control. This combination sets ‘open’ eth-
nocratic states, including the three following cases, apart from most other nation-
This point requires some elaboration. It is often claimed that most nation-states
advance a project of ethnic domination (see Brubaker, 1996), thereby diminishing
the distinctiveness of the ethnocratic type (see Smooha, 2002a,b). However, we
claim that there exists a qualitative difference between what Brubaker terms ‘natio-
nalizing states’, and between ethnocratic regimes. This difference lies in the deliber-
ate undermining of the political demos. As elaborated below, ethnocratic regimes
work ceaselessly to prevent the making of an inclusive demos—a community of
equal citizens within a definable territory. Instead—they use a rhetoric of the
nation-state, but do not allow minorities any feasible path of inclusion. Indeed, the
ethnocratic project is often constructed specifically against these minorities. There
is no attempt to assimilate ‘external’ communities of citizens, quite the contrary—
their identity is well demarcated and structurally marginalized.
Put differently, contrary to most nation-states, ethnocratic regimes actually work
against the project of universal citizenship. The universal project is of course
incomplete in most nation-state, and often involves oppressive policies and prac-
tices, such as forced assimilation, discrimination or state-led economic stratifi-
cation, the state framework, de-jure, still leaves members of minority communities
an option of integration.
Ethnocracies, on the other hand, annul this inclusionary option. The state is con-
structed so as to prevent the integration of minorities, typically through the rejection
of citizenship, limiting personal laws, restriction on immigration and land rights or
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676656
denial of accessibility to decision-making powers. This is a significant structural dif-
ference, which sets ethnocratic regimes apart from most ‘normal’ nation-states.
Hence, one may point to the zone on a continuum between actively exclusionary
and inclusionary regimes, as the ‘tipping zone’ between democracy with an ethnic
bias, to ethnocracy. It is analytically difficult to sharply define this zone which may
concurrently contain contradictory movements towards democracy and ethnocracy,
as evident by the Israeli case below. However, when the political demos has been
fundamentally undermined by the state’s ethnocratic laws, policies and institutions,
the regime can be said to have crossed the ethnocratic threshold, as evident in Sri
Lanka. Estonia, on the other hand, appears to be moving across the tipping zone in
the other direction, from ethnocracy to democracy. The three brief cases outlined in
the following pages were selected to demonstrate the above processes.
The three cases were also chosen because of the different potential trajectories of
the ethnocratic project they display—from deterioration into an open ethnic war,
to the possibility of peaceful democratization. In Sri Lanka, deepening oppression
and intensifying minority resistance have led to a virtual collapse of state into a
protracted civil war. In Estonia, the opposite process of non-violent democratiza-
tion and gradual inclusion of the Russian minority has been gathering pace; while
Israel is caught between the conflicting logics of ethnicization and democratization.
Its relative openness and high standard of living, as well as the weakness of the
Palestinian-Arab minority, have so far halted the eruption of open ethnic conflict,
but it is positioned at a historical juncture of delicate fragility.
The different trajectories of political development are highlighted by the political
and cultural freedom index data, compiled by the Freedom House project
( Estonia scores low on political and cultural freedoms
during the early 1990s (3 on both assessment, on a scale of 1–7, with 1 being most
free). But it significantly improves in the last few years, scoring 1 and 2, respect-
ively in 2003. On the other hand, Sri Lanka scored relatively well during the 1970s
with 2 on political freedom and 3 on cultural. The situation deteriorates during the
1990s, when Sri Lanka scores a very low pair of 4 and 5, only to improve slightly
during 2003, scores of 2 and 3. Israel remains relatively stable since the 1970s, scor-
ing around 2 on each count for the entire three decades. These three cases then
illustrate a wide spectrum of development possibilities apparent under ethnocratic
Finally, it should be emphasized that we see the development of ethnic relations
and regime structure as dialectical. That is, state actions and majority politics in
ethnocratic states are informed and fueled by minority activity and mobilization.
While the dialectics are commonly asymmetrical (with the state having far more
power than marginalized minorities), the evolution of these regime cannot be
understood without acknowledging the role of minority mobilization, especially as
regards the use of violence and terror, and the articulation of dissenting, often
threatening, collective narratives.
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Sri Lanka: from biethnic democracy to Sinhalese ethnocracy
The island state of Sri Lanka (previously Ceylon) is composed of two main
ethno-national groups. Sinhalese, who are mainly Buddhist, make up 75% of
the state’s 19 million inhabitants. Tamils, who are mainly Hindu, make up 18%.
Sri Lanka gained its independence from Britain in 1948, after an anti-colonial
struggle dominated by the Sinhalese groups, but shared by Tamils, as well as other
small ethnic groups on the island. However, in the decade following independence,
the state gradually turned towards a Sinhalization strategy. This orientation inten-
sified due to Tamil resistance and an ensuing process of ethnic polarization.
Sri Lanka was formed as a democratic state, with formal institutions and
governing procedures following, initially, the Westminster model (Little, 1994). But
in later years, the Sri Lankan state was gradually appropriated by the Sinhalese
community, mainly due to its demographic advantage and strong sense of ethno-
nationalism (de Silva, 1996; Uyangoda, 1994). The Sinhalese used their dominance
in the legislative, judiciary and executive arms of government to advance an
explicit Sinhalization process. As declared in 1983 by the Sri Lankan development
minister (Nissan, 1996: p. 176):
Sri Lanka is inherently and rightfully a Sinhalese state... this must be accepted
as a fact and not a matter of opinion to be debated. By attempting to challenge
this premise, Tamils have brought the wrath of the Sinhalese on their own
heads; they have themselves to blame.
This approach found expression in several key policies and programs, beginning
in the 1950s with the adoption of religious Buddhist state symbols, which denote,
in the Sri Lankan context, a purely Sinhalese affiliation. Another major step was
taken in 1956 when Sinhalese was declared the only official state language. The
state’s official culture was also developed around a series of Buddhist ‘‘invented’’
histories, symbols and values, glorifying the link between Buddha and the Sinha-
lese ‘guardians’ of ‘his’ island (Little, 1994), and glorifying the images of the Sin-
hala nation as the indigenous ‘sons of the earth’, and hence the only rightful
owners and controllers of the state (Uyangoda, 1994).
A further aspect of the Sinhalization strategy was evident in Sri Lanka’s
citizenship policies. Over a million long-term Tamil residents who migrated to the
island during the period of British rule, mainly as plantation workers, have been
denied citizenship as part of the Sinhalization approach, by being officially classi-
fied as ‘Indian Tamils’. This forced large sections of this community to leave the
island and settle in India during the 1950s and 1960s. Many from this group who
remained on the island have remained to date. The Sinhalese majority has thus
managed to contain the size of the Tamil community, and reinforce geographical
and political intra-Tamil cleavage between ‘Indian’ and ‘Sri Lankan’ Tamils. Geo-
graphically, Indian Tamils mainly reside in the central heights, while Sri Lankan
Tamils inhabit the island’s northern and eastern regions. Politically,
the disenfranchised Indian Tamils became totally dependent on the Sinhalese
regime for basic rights and services, and hence remained politically immobilized.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676658
Consequently, Indian Tamils have rarely participated or assisted in the militant
resistance staged by Sri Lankan Tamils against the Sinhalizing state.
The island’s ethnic geography has also been the main cause of another notable
ethnocratic policy—the Sinhalization of contested space. The British rulers had
already encouraged the Tamils to immigrate into Sinhalese areas, breaking a cen-
turies-long tradition of (mainly voluntary) spatial separation. Likewise, the
Sri Lankan government encouraged Sinhalese to settle in the island’s central and
eastern regions, which previously were dominated and claimed by Tamils as part of
their ‘own’ regions.
This has been most evident in the large-scale Mahaweli irrigation and settlement
project carried out predominantly during the 1970s and 1980s (Roded, 1999). The
project opened up large tracts of agricultural land in the island’s central and north-
eastern regions, which were offered mostly to landless or impoverished farmers. By
1993, 1.1 million people (the vast majority Sinhalese) were resettled in these
regions, creating a new Sinhalese regional lower-class collectivity and exacerbating
the conflict with the Tamils, who considered the region as part of their historical
‘Elam’ homeland (Peiris, 1996).
Subsequently, the regions in question became a destination for large-scale (and
mainly unauthorized) Tamil counter-settlement. As the two populations increas-
ingly intermingled in competitive settings (largely as a result of settlement initia-
tives like the Mahaweli project), antagonism and discrimination against the
minority deepened, intensifying the breakdown of social and political order since
the early 1980s.
The civil (ethnic) war, which has dominated the Sri Lankan state since the early
1980s, has brought to the fore the military as a major agent in the Sinhalization of
contested space, and the reinforcement of Sinhalese dominance in Sri Lankan poli-
tics. The army gradually extended state (that is, Sinhalese) control north and east-
wards, confining the resisting Tamil groups to the Jaffna Peninsula, at the state’s
northeastern end. It has also caused a major internal refugee problem, with some
550,000 residents losing their homes during the fighting, 78% of them Tamils (de
Silva, 1996). During the same time, a series of emergency and ‘security’ legislation
reduced the protection of Tamil citizens against arbitrary state oppression
(Uyangoda, 1994). A parallel constitutional move increased the powers of a popu-
larly elected president at the expense of the previously powerful legislature. Finally,
in 1978, several Tamil parliamentarians were disqualified on the basis of ‘acting
against the Sinhalese state’, reducing the already limited Tamil political power
(Little, 1994).
The accumulating alienation of Tamils from the Sri Lankan state drove many of
them to boycott the political process altogether. From 1978 until 2001, the
majority of Tamils boycotted the Sri Lankan elections and only rarely participated
in other state affairs. The state, on its part, did little to induce the Tamils back into
the political arena until 1987, when further constitutional reforms attempted to
ease ethnic tensions by decentralizing state authority and granting autonomy to
regional authorities. However, the Tamils did not accept the plan that was pre-
pared without their participation, claiming that: (a) it compromised their drive for
659O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
self-determination, and (b) it legitimized the ‘unlawful’ Sinhalese domination of the
eastern regions (Nissan, 1996). Further, the state maintained ultimate control by
classifying ‘national projects’ that could bypass the proposed decentralized forms
of decision-making (Gunasekara, 1996).
The Sinhalization strategy generated widespread Tamil resistance. The Tamils
initially struggled for territorial-political autonomy within the Sri Lankan state,
but following the state’s ethnocratic policies, began a campaign to reinstate their
vision of Tamil Elam—an independent Tamil state. Tamil disengagement from the
state further polarized the two groups, culminating in increasing inter-communal
mistrust, Tamil withdrawal from state politics and eventually the breakout of a
civil war. The fighting, which had been fluctuating since 1982, reached a peak of
widespread inter-ethnic violence during the mid-1990s, and exacted a toll of 70–
80,000 casualties, most of them civilians.
Only in 2002 was a ceasefire declared, when the Tamil leadership agreed to
return to negotiations after the Sinhalese promised serious constitutional amend-
ments and made a more genuine attempt to include the Tamils in devising a new,
highly devolved state structure. However, during late 2003 and early 2004, follow-
ing serious negotiations between the government and the LTTE for substantial
Tamil autonomy, Sri Lanka was thrown into a deep political crisis. The ensuing
elections of April 2004 returned to power the United People’s Freedom Alliance,
traditionally opposed to a federated Sri Lankan state. At the same time, a major
split occurred in the LTTE. These developments appear to usher another period of
political instability and ethnic conflict.
The case of Sri Lanka illustrates well the emergence of ethnocracy and
the inherent tensions between formal democratic procedures and a parallel state
project of ethnicizing contested spaces and political institutions. It also demon-
strates the inability of an ethnocracy to be sustained for the long term, and its need
to structurally reform in order to survive as a state.
Estonia: from communism to (democratizing?) ethnocracy
The independent Estonian state re-emerged during the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the 1989–1992 period. It is situated on the Baltic Coast, and has a popu-
lation of 1.5 million, of whom 65% are ethnic Estonians, 14% Russians with cit-
izenship and 25% non-citizen residents (mainly Russian speaking) (EHDR, 2000).
The new polity was formed as a result of an anti-Soviet (and by implication anti-
Russian) struggle, which followed five decades of often-brutal Soviet rule. It has
since adopted an explicit program of Estonization (de-Russification), designed to
reinstate the ethnic and national situation existing during a previous period of
independence 1918–1939). During that period, ethnic Estonians dominated the
state—politically, demographically, economically and culturally. The Soviet Union
subsequently promoted a process of Russification and encouraged Russian immi-
gration to Estonia, thereby threatening Estonian demographic and cultural domi-
nance in their homeland.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676660
Since official independence was declared in 1992, state building has assumed eth-
nocratic characteristics. For example, in 1992, the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu)
decided not to grant citizenship to ‘non-ethnic’ Estonians. It classified them as
‘aliens’, thus excluding them from the 1992 referendum on a new constitution.
Estonian state policies in the 1989–2000 period clearly aimed to ensure the polit-
ical, territorial and cultural dominance of ethnic Estonians by focusing on
citizenship, culture, language and land.
In 1992, Estonia adopted the new Constitution, according to which the bearers
of the supreme power are ‘the people’ (that is, the citizens; art. 1). The consti-
tutional preamble contains a clause obliging the state to ensure the preservation
of the (ethnic) Estonian nation and culture. Courts have actively referred to this
preamble in a variety of rulings on citizenship and property matters.
Hence, the new Constitution includes special clauses concerning the priority of
ethnic Estonians, Estonian culture and language (Ruutsoo, 1998: p. 176). Every
Estonian is entitled to preserve his/her national identity, but no special minority
rights are recognized by the Constitution. Some state symbols are of purely ethnic
character (e.g. flag, anthem, stamps and official letterheads). The state holidays
include Protestant sacred days, not Russian Orthodox. There is no State Church in
Estonia, but the majority of ethnic Estonians are (Protestant) Lutheran, and Esto-
nian nationalism is widely associated with a Lutheran way of life, as an antithesis
to the Orthodox Russian influence. During the Communist years, the population
became largely secular, but since the return of Estonian nationalism as a legitimate
ideology, the church has increased markedly its public profile (
The issue or citizenship (and by association culture and language) has been most
central to the Estonization project. The Citizenship Law of 1992 (amended 1995)
granted citizenship to all pre-1940 citizens and their descendants and prohibited
dual citizenship. Because in 1940, the state was 92% ethnic Estonians, this law
actually granted superior citizenship rights to ethnic Estonians (in and outside the
state) over the state’s own Russian residents.
The law sets a difficult path for acquisition of citizenship by non-Estonians,
including long-term state residents who previously had full (Soviet) citizenship
rights and are now considered ‘aliens’. Such ‘aliens’ are required to reside in Esto-
nia for at least five years, pass demanding language tests, prove command of the
Estonian constitution, have a steady income, establish permanent residency and
pledge allegiance to the state and its (ethnic) character (The Aliens Law, 1989;
2000; Human Rights Watch, 2000).
The ethnicization strategy is also evident in Estonia’s language policies, which
have reinforced the imposed dominance of the Estonian language in most spheres
of life, including education, street signs and government services. This dominance
was deepened by a new language law, introduced in 1989 (and amended in 1995,
1999 and 2000), which demoted Russian to the status of a ‘foreign’ language,
similar to dozens of other languages used by immigrants and minorities. The
requirements of the new law severely restricts the public usage of any language
except Estonian. For example, ‘foreign’ languages are prohibited in all street and
commercial signs, and all TV broadcasts must have Estonian subtitles. Estonian is
661O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
the compulsory language in the parliament and local councils, for state employees
and for government dealings in both public and private sectors. The only exception
is minority language usage in territories where they form a majority, but this is
implemented in a very restrictive manner.
In 1993, the Riigikogu enacted a new law for Cultural Autonomy of National
Minorities (Estonian Government, RT 1993, 71,1000). But the law defined a min-
ority as consisting of citizens only. Thus, the state did not recognize special rights
of the vast majority of the non-Estonian population. Previously, the Soviet Law on
National Rights allowed minorities full enjoyment of certain rights obtainable
through special autonomous organs and under the supervision of the State.
Ethnicization has also been prominent on the political level. After 1992, right-
wing nationalist parties have dominated the Riigikogu. A process of ethnic political
polarization has seen electoral competition revolving around the intensity of the
Estonization (and de-Russification) process. Changes of government during the
1990s did not result in any significant change in Estonia’s policies toward its Russian
minority. Russians have suffered persistent political under-representation: in the
1992 Parliament, there were no ethnic Russians, while in 1995 and in 1999, their
numbers rose to only six members (out of 100). In the Riigikogu, Russians have
always belonged to the opposition and have had no significant influence on the
decision-making process.
Ethnic Estonian dominance is also expressed in denial of state recognition of the
local Orthodox Church under its pre-war name (Estonian Apostolic Orthodox
Church; see Theile, 1999). That means the deprivation of the church pre-war pro-
perty in the process of property restitution, as noted below. In 1993, the Govern-
ment registered the EAOC an ‘exile’ entity whose legitimacy is highly disputable.
As expected, and as planned by Estonian policymakers, the laws created consider-
able difficulties for non-ethnic Estonians to acquire citizenship, and have caused sub-
stantial emigration, mainly into Russia, with some 133,000 Russians leaving Estonia
during the 1990s (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2000). By 1999, only about 38% of
this group received Estonian citizenship, while 19% have retained foreign (mainly
Russian) citizenship, and 43% have remained stateless. Non-citizens are excluded
from many political and economic arenas in Estonian life, and are prohibited from
voting or being elected at a national level. The Russians have voting rights for local
elections, but cannot stand for mayorship (EHDR, 1999;Hallik, 1998).
The discrepancy between citizenry and the residential composition of Estonian is
highlighted by the following figures: in 1999, ethnic Estonians constituted 81% of
the citizenry, but only 65% of the population. Likewise, Russians were 28% of the
residents, but only 14% of the citizenry. However, due to pressure from the
European Union, into which Estonia seeks to integrate, and from international
human rights organizations, Estonia introduced in the beginning of the 2000s sev-
eral measures which open a path of naturalization for the Russians, evolving
mainly around language acquisition, military service or contribution to the Esto-
nian public (Berg, 2002; Pettai & Hallik, 2002).
The Estonian government also attempted to reinforce ethnic land control, by res-
urrecting the traditional ‘indigenous’ Estonian system of family farms to replace
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676662
the Kolchoz and Sobchov Soviet system of collective cultivation. This was aided by
the Law for Land Reform (1992), the Law of Agrarian Reform (1994) and a com-
plex system of financial incentives designed to assist the restitution and privatiza-
tion of land, while at the same time restrict the benefits of this process chiefly to
ethnic Estonians (Anderson, 1999).
In sum, like Sri Lanka, but within different historical and geographical settings,
Estonia demonstrates the deep logic of ethnicization behind ethnocratic structure
and policies. Estonia adopted a structure of an ‘open’ formal democracy, but at
another level has set into motion an ethnic transformation of the state from a Rus-
sified communist republic into an ethnic Estonian state. The new state structurally
discriminates against most of its long-term Russian residents, and actively facil-
itates the Estonization of institutions, politics, culture and territory. However,
unlike Sri Lanka, the ethnicization process has not been violent, and appears to be
waning, mainly due to the influence of the European Union and the globalization
of ethnic politics (Berg, 2002). Hence, Estonia appears to be an ethnocracy under-
going a gradual process of democratization.
Israel: an ethnocratic settler-state
Following half a century of Jewish colonization of (mainly Arab) Palestine,
tacitly supported by the British rulers, Israel gained its independence in 1948. This
followed a failed UN partition attempt, rejected by the Arabs, and a Palestinian–
Jewish war, in which some 700,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out of their
homeland. Israel seized control over 78% of Mandatory Palestine, about 40% lar-
ger than the territory allocated to it by the UN plan. This area—known as ‘Israel
Proper’ (the sovereign state within its pre-1967 borders)—is the focus of our analy-
sis here, not including the occupied Palestinian territories. We do acknowledge, of
course, that the occupation and on-going Jewish settlement in Palestinian terri-
tories have had an immense impact on ethnic relations, but for comparative and
methodological reasons, ‘Israel Proper’—where Israeli sovereignty is inter-
nationally recognized—is a more appropriate scale of analysis. This, without
diminishing the significance of the increasingly oppressive regime imposed by Israel
in the Palestinian occupied territories for nearly four decades, and the waves of
mutual violence it generated.
In 1949, only 160,000 Palestinian-Arabs remained in Israel, and received state
citizenship. In the next five decades, Israel absorbed some 2.7 million Jewish refu-
gees and immigrants, and prevented the return of the Palestinian refugees, who
remained chiefly in surrounding Middle-Eastern states. In the year 2002, Palesti-
nian-Arabs have become 18% of Israel’s population of 6.3 million.
Both ethno-national groups claim to have historical rights over the country. The
Palestinian-Arabs claim continuous residence as indigenous people, and a natural
right for self-determination in a national homeland. The Jewish-Zionist justifi-
cation rests on the existence of ancient Israelite kingdoms on the land before
the Jews were forcefully exiled, and on sacred Jewish texts, which promise the land
to the Israelite ‘chosen people’. The Zionist movement claims that Jews maintained
663O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
in their diasporas a continuous bond with the ‘promised land’, and that following
the eruption of genocidal European anti-Semitism, the Land of Israel (Palestine)
became the rightful and natural site in which to build a safe, independent, Jewish
state (Kimmerling, 2001).
On a formal level, Israel formed a democratic regime in 1948, but in parallel
initiated a concerted project of Judaizing the land and the polity. Israel’s Declar-
ation of Independence, for example, stresses the Jewish connection to an ancient
homeland, and its expression as political control over this contested land:
In the Land of Yisrael the Jewish people was created. Here its spiritual, religious
and political identity was shaped... the people kept faith with it throughout
their dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return... According
to our natural and historical right... we are hereby declaring the establishment
of a Jewish state in this Land of Israel...
The Judaization project, which turned Israel into a ‘frontier state’ (Shafir &
Peled, 2002) was significantly aided by Jewish diaspora, which not only funded
many Israeli projects, but also circumvented the state apparatus by forming and
maintaining Jewish organizations, which operate in Israel officially as ethnic arms
of the states. These organizations—notably the Jewish National Fund and/or the
Jewish Agency—enabled the implementation of ethnocratic ‘Jews only’
policies in the allocation of key resources, powers and land, thereby structurally
undermining the notion of equal citizenship (Rouhana, 1997; Kretzmer, 2002).
Until 1966, Israel’s Arabs citizens were placed under military rule. In the follow-
ing decades, and against the on-going conflict with their Palestinian brethren,
Israel’s enacted a series of laws, which enshrine the legal, institutional and political
dominance of Jewish goals and interests. Despite small advances in the last decade,
discrimination against Israel’s Arab citizens has remained rampant, leading a
recent comprehensive study as to label the minority as ‘citizens without citizenship’
(MADA, 2003).
Judaization took many substantive forms, including the mass expropriation of
Arab land in Israel (Kedar, 1998), the building of over 700 Jewish settlements,
often on the sites of the hundreds of Arab villages destroyed after the 1948 war (see
Falah, 1996, 2003), the Hebraization of the landscape and erasure of its Palestinian
Arab past (Benvenisti, 2001), and the establishment of a highly centralized econ-
omy and political systems in which the Arab minority was marginalized and weak-
ened. Expansion of Jewish control continued after the 1967 war, with the conquest
and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, but also in Israel’s own outlying
regions, mainly the northern Galilee and southern Negev, where hundreds of thou-
sands of Jews were settled in close proximity to Arab towns and villages. This was
facilitated by the Israeli land and planning systems which have worked consistently
for the transfer of spatial control from Arab to Jewish hands, and have legitimized,
planned and funded large-scale projects of Jewish settlement (see Benvenisti, 2001;
Yiftachel & Kedar, 2000; Yacobi and Yiftachel, 2003).
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676664
Notably, then, despite the formal appearance of the Israeli regime as democratic,
the state has advanced an ethnocratic strategy in key bases of the regime. For
example, immigration policies, governed by the Jewish Law of Return, allow any Jew
and his/her immediate family to enter Israel and receive citizenship. At the same
time, the immigration and naturalization of non-Jews, those born on the land or
married to an Arab Israeli has been made extremely difficult (Kretzmer, 1990).
Other building blocks of Israel’s Judaization strategy are manifest in the state’s
development policies, which have consistently privileged Jewish capital and local-
ities over their Arab counterparts. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), too, is in
essence a Jewish army, and military service is a prerequisite for substantial benefits
in employment, education, land allocation, and access to the state’s centers of
power. Jewish-Israeli Hebrew culture is the dominant force in shaping Israel’s pub-
lic spaces. While Arabic is an official state language, it is virtually impossible to
deal with the Israeli bureaucracy, legal system, arms of government or national
media in Arabic (Ghanem, 1998; Rouhana, 1997).
The state culture also reflects a deep connection with the Jewish religion: Jewish
holidays and the Sabbath are Israel’s main rest days, no public transport or free
commerce is available on these holidays, and all public (and most private) food
outlets observe Jewish dietary laws. Personal matters are run according to religious
laws, giving the Arab citizen a measure of religious autonomy. Arabic is also an
official language, used in the separate Arab education stream. But despite these
measures, Jews control decision-making in most educational and religious arenas,
meaning that communal autonomy is severely restricted. The above measures are
hence often interpreted as preserving institutional communal segregation between
Jews and Arabs (Shafir & Peled, 2002).
In addition, while Israel lacks a formal constitution, the state’s legal system has
reinforced its Jewish character, with legislation privileging Jewish interests and goals.
According to a recent study, 18 laws explicitly discriminate against Israel’s Palesti-
nian-Arab citizens, rupturing the notion of the ‘demos’ as a political community of
equals. This despite concerted legal activity, especially through appeals to the Israeli
High Court, which have managed to outlaw or contain several legal obstacles to
Arab civil equality (Adala, 1998, 2003). It is worth noting that even the 1992 new
and putatively liberal basic Laws—hailed as signaling a ‘civil revolution’ (Barak,
1998)—still ambiguously declare the state’s character as Jewish and democratic.
Israeli-Jewish culture fostered an exclusive Jewish bond to the land, and for
many years denied, delegitimized and ignored the existence of Palestinian national-
ism, and hence the minority’s collective territorial or political rights. Following the
1993 Oslo agreement and the mutual recognition of Jewish and Palestinian
‘national rights’, the rhetoric has somewhat changed, although Jewish settlement
and expansion of land control has continued in parallel to contraction in several
heavily populated Palestinian areas.
Like in Sri Lanka, oppression has met with increasing minority resistance. This
has been expressed by continuing waves of large-scale protest against state policies,
which reached a notable height in October 2000, when 12 Arab citizens were killed
by state forces during mass demonstrations in support of the Palestinian al-Aqsa
665O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
Intifada. Political polarization has also deepened between the two ethnic groups,
with increasing votes going to non-Zionist Arab parties, reaching 70% in 1999, and
an all time high of 81% in the 2003 elections. In the special Prime Ministerial elec-
tions of 2001, and following the killing of 12 Arab demonstrators, 82% of
Arab citizens boycotted the vote, signaling again the intensifying process of polar-
As we can see, although Israel managed to project a democratic image, mainly
because of a competitive electoral system and relatively independent judiciary and
media, in effect it became a state dedicated to the expansion and control of one
ethnic group, at the expense of a homeland minority community, and with signifi-
cant undermining of basic democratic principles (see Ghanem, et al., 1998).
date, the Judaization strategy had remained a main foundation of the Israeli ethno-
cratic regime.
Ethnocracy and regime components
The foregoing accounts of Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia highlighted the chan-
ging ethnic relations in states undergoing a planned process of ‘ethnicization’. The
three illustrative cases facilitate the next step of our exploration: a discussion of the
relationships between ethnocracy and key regime components—namely, democ-
racy, minority status and political stability.
Ethnocracy and democracy
The ‘open’ ethnocratic regimes studied here combine partial elements of both
authoritarian and democratic systems. But regardless of the formal political
system, they enhance a rule by, and for, a specific ethnos. As such, they cannot be
classified as democracies in a substantive sense, as they structurally privilege one
group of citizens over all others, and strive to maintain that privilege.
Ethnocracies are, therefore, neither democratic, nor authoritarian (or ‘Herren-
volk’) systems of government. The lack of democracy, as noted above, rests on the
rupture of the concept of the ‘demos’, on their unequal citizenship, and on their laws
and policies that enable the seizure of the state by one ethno-national group. They
are not authoritarian, as they extend significant (though partial) political rights to
ethnic minorities.
While most Arabs (62%) returned to vote in the 2003 elections, the Arab turnout was the lowest
among all ethnic groups in the country and the second lowest in history after 2001.
It should be noted, however, that Israel’s electoral system has not been universal since the 1970s,
given the voting rights granted to Jewish settlers (who reside outside the state’s sovereign area), and the
denial of such rights from all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The settlers have determined the
outcome of several key elections and are over-represented in Israel’s government apparatus. This clearly
breaks the concept of universal suffrage, which calls for an overlap of territory, citizenship and voting
power, and has further marginalized the Arab citizens politically. In addition, Israel’s electoral laws pro-
hibit any party opposed to Zionism from contesting the elections, placing another serious breach of the
concept of universal and free elections.
The following two sections are summarized from Yiftachel (2000).
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676666
Importantly, we do not treat the term ‘democracy’ uncritically, recognizing that
it is a contested concept, widely abused, particularly in multi-ethnic states (see
Mann, 1999). This is not the place to delve deeply into democratic theory. Suffice is
to note that several key principles have emerged as foundations for achieving the
main tenets of democracy—equality and liberty. These principles include equal cit-
izenship, protection of individuals and minorities against the tyranny of states,
majorities or churches, and a range of civil, political and economic rights (Held,
1990). A stable constitution, periodic and universal elections and free media gener-
ally ensure the attainment of these rights (Dahl, 1995). In multi-ethnic or multi-
national polities, as illustrated by the seminal works of Lijphart (1977), Kymlicka
(1995) and Rawls (1999), a certain parity, recognition and proportionality between
the ethnic collectivities is a pre-requisite for democratic legitimacy and stability.
While no state ever implements these principles fully, ethnocratic regimes are con-
spicuous in breaching the spirit, purpose and major tenets of the democracy ideal.
Generally, ethnocratic regimes emphasize the procedural aspects of their self-
defined democracy, but attempt to draw attention away from substantive matters,
such as privileges for the dominant group in the allocation of resources, political
representation, territorial control or preference by the law. The emphasis on pro-
cedural aspects also diverts attention from the substantive limitations placed on
minority rights and capabilities, and from the lack of equal treatment by state poli-
cies, laws and institutions.
To further fathom the workings of ‘open’ ethnocracies, and drawing on Grams-
cian-informed analysis, we differentiate analytically between regime features and
structure. As noted in Fig. 1, ethnocracies demonstrate ‘visible’ democratic fea-
tures, such as periodic elections, free media and autonomous judiciary that pro-
tects, and (some) human rights legislation. But these tend to work on a ‘surface
level’, while the deeper structure of such regimes it undermines key democratic
principles, such as civil and legal equality within agreed state boundaries, protec-
tion of minorities, maintenance of equality and a measure of proportionality
between the state’s main ethnic groups.
The analytical differentiation between ‘features’ and ‘structure’ highlights the
selective and often hollow use of the term ‘democracy’ by the dominant ethnic
group. The democratic discourse, partial as it is, often has the effect of legitimizing
the regime, especially in the eyes of the majority, as evident so vividly in Sri Lanka,
Israel and Estonia.
A hallmark of the ethnocratic hegemony is the common waging of political
struggles around the ‘shallower’ state features, while relatively few battles are
fought over the ‘deeper’ ethnic (and class) hegemony, which is painted as ‘natural’
The distinction between ‘features’ and ‘structure’ is, needless to say, never overt or stable, with a
constant flow of reciprocal influences. However, during the intense process of state building, the ethno-
cratic logic of the regime structure generally dictates the terms of much of what transpires in the more
visible arenas of political features.
667O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
and universal. As powerfully argued by Antonio Gramsci (1971); as synthesized by
Sasoon (1987: p. 232), a ‘moment’ of hegemony is marked by:
...the unquestioned dominance of a certain way of life... when a single concept
of reality informs society’s tastes, morality, customs, religious and political
principles...’(Sasoon, 1987: p. 232).
Drawing on the cases of Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia discussed above, we have
identified several structural ‘bases’, which constitute the foundation of ethnocratic
regimes. These are key components of the dominant hegemony, which are gener-
ally protected by the boundaries of public discourse and political discussion. Let us
emphasize again that we see the structural bases of the regime as dynamic, evolving
over time in an effort to maintain their ‘natural’ and popularly accepted status. But
as part of the conflict-riddled ethnocratic regime, they are never sustainable in the
long term. The main regime bases thus include:
Fig. 1. Ethnocratic regime: structure and features a conceptual framework.
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676668
.Demography: rights of entry and membership into the political community define
the all important boundaries of political (and by implication social) power. In
ethnocracies immigration and citizenship are chiefly determined by affiliation
with the dominant ethnic-nation.
.Land and settlement: territorial control is central for ethno-national politics. As
such, the ownership, use and development of land, as well as planning and settle-
ment policies are shaped by the state’s project of extending ethno-national con-
trol over its (multi-ethnic) territory.
.Armed forces: violent force is critical in assisting the state to maintain (oppress-
ive) ethno-national control over contested regions and resisting groups. To that
end, the armed forces (the military, the police), which bear the name of the
entire state, are predominantly affiliated with the leading ethnic nation.
.Capital flow: while the flow of capital and development is deeply influenced by
an ‘ethnic logic’, privileging the dominant ethno-classes; notably, these market
mechanisms are often represented as ‘free’ or ‘neutral’ and hence beyond chal-
.The Constitutional System: legalism often depoliticizes and legitimizes patterns of
ethnic control. Such controls are often premised on redundant, absurd, non-exi-
stent or only partially functional constitutional settings. This is often presented
as ‘the law of the land’, and subsequently placed outside the realm of legiti-
mately contested issues.
.Public culture: the ethnocratic public culture is formulated around a set of sym-
bols, representations, traditions and practices, which tend to reinforce the narra-
tives of the dominant ethno-national group; while silencing, degrading or
ridiculing contesting cultures or perspectives.
Genuine open debates on these ‘taken-for-granted’ issues are generally absent
from the public discourse, especially among the dominant majority. When these
issues are questioned by resisting groups (say, in the parliament, or through the
media) they are usually silenced, ridiculed or represented as ‘state enemies’. But the
dominance of regime ‘truths’ is of course never absolute, and may be exposed and
resisted by political entrepreneurs exploiting the tensions between the declared
‘democracy’ and its substantive discriminatory manifestation. In such settings,
destabilizing cracks are likely to appear in the ethnocratic structure.
Ethnocracy and minorities
Central to the ethnocratic regime is its ability to maintain the dominance of the
leading ethno-national group while marginalizing and/or excluding indigenous or
national minorities. But not all minorities are treated equally, with some incorpor-
ated as ‘internal’ while others are constructed as ‘external’. A critical difference
exists between those considered part of the ‘historical’ of even ‘genetic’ nation, and
others whose presence is portrayed as mere historical coincidence, or as a ‘danger’
to the security and integrity of the dominant ethnos. These discourses strip
669O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
‘external’ minorities from means of inclusion into the meaningful sites of ‘the
nation’ (Penrose, 2000a,b).
Ethnocracies are generally driven by a sense of collective entitlement among the
majority group to control ‘its’ homeland—that is, the state—as part and parcel of
what is conceived as a universal right for self-determination. Thus, belonging to
the dominant ethno-nation (and to its leading ethno-classes) is the key to mobility
among peripheral groups. This is the strategy adopted by most immigrant mino-
rities, who thereby distance themselves from indigenous or other ‘external’ mino-
rities. As such, ethnocratic societies continuously maintain an ‘ethnic project’,
which similarly to the ‘racial project’ identified by Omi and Winant (1994),
attempts to build an informal public image of ‘separate and unequal’.
The leading ethno-classes (also often termed ‘the ‘charter’ or ‘titular’ groups) can
thus play a dual game, vis-a-vis peripheral minorities. On the one hand, they
articulate a discourse of belonging, which incorporates immigrant and peripheral
groups not associated with any ‘external’ or ‘rival’ nation. These groups are ‘invi-
ted’ to assimilate into the moral community of the dominant ethno-nation. But on
the other hand, the dominant groups use this very discourse of inclusion and
belonging to conceal the uneven effects of its strategies, which often marginalize the
immigrants economically, culturally and geographically. It would be a mistake,
however, to treat this as a conspiracy; it is rather an expression of broad social
interest, generally unarticulated, privileging social circles that are closest to the
ethno-national core. This ‘natural’ process tends to broadly reproduce—though
never replicate—patterns of social stratification.
In contrast, the strategy towards indigenous and/or national (homeland) mino-
rities is generally more openly oppressive. They are represented and treated, at
best, as ‘external’ to the ethno-national project, or, at worst, as a subversive threat.
The examples of Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel show that the tenets of self-determi-
nation are used only selectively, pertaining to ethnicity and not to an inclusive
geographical unit, as required by the basic principles of democratic statehood.
Oppressive policies are often ‘wrapped’ in a discourse of modernity, progress and
democracy, but the political and material reality is unmistakable, entailing
minority dispossession and exclusion.
However, the self-representation of most ethnocracies as democratic creates
structural tensions, because it requires the state to go beyond lip service and
empower external minorities with some (though less than equal) formal political
powers. The tensions between the claims of democracy and the denial of minority
equality create spaces of struggle and ‘‘cracks’’ in the hegemonic order. These often
fuel minority resistance and inter-ethnic conflict typical to ethnocratic states (see
Mann, 1999).
Ethnocracy and political instability
One of our main theoretical arguments relates to the instability of ethnocratic
regimes. We do not have the space to enter here the diverse and rich discussion
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676670
over the definition and measurement of political stability beyond noting that we
accept the main parameters offered by the likes of Lane and Ersson (1991) or
McGarry and O’Leary (1995). They see political instability as strongly related to
regime illegitimacy among minorities, which results in a combination of social dis-
order and breakdown of regime functions. This is often followed by the bypassing
of the regime by disgruntled minorities, by increasing forms of political polariza-
tion, and by intensifying waves of anti-governmental protest and violence.
In this sense, the ethnocratic model builds on, and critiques, the ‘control’ model
of political stability, first offered by Lustick (1979, 1993) and later used by geo-
graphers such as Taylor (1995) and Rumley (1999). Lustick’s argument pointed
usefully to the ability of regimes to maintain stability through a range of control
mechanisms, including the construction of hegemonic discourses and institutions,
and the cooptation and fragmentation of oppositional elements. But our obser-
vation is that in ethnocratic regimes, such controls are only viable for the short
term, leading in the long term to a destabilizing momentum.
The chronic instability of the ‘open’ ethnocratic regimes stems from a combi-
nation of two of their main attributes: (a) the long-term impact of the spatial,
political and economic expansion of the dominant majority, and the associated
control mechanisms exerted over ethnic and national minorities, and (b) the demo-
cratic self-representation of the regime.
The first factor is quite clear: ethnocratic regimes often reflect and exacerbate
ethnic tensions and conflicts, because they structurally privilege one ethnic nation,
both within the state and among its diasporas over the state’s resident minorities.
As clearly shown in the cases of Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel, the dominant group
then uses the state apparatus, and the international legitimacy accorded to state
sovereignty, to expand its power, resources and prestige, often at the expense of
minorities. In this sense, ethnocratic regimes tend to generate constant tensions
between minorities and majorities.
However, minority resistance to control and discrimination is necessary, but not
sufficient, to destabilize the regime. It is the semi-open nature of ethnocratic
regimes, their partial democratization, and the limited rights extended to mino-
rities, which combine to develop, in a complex process, the situation of structural
instability. In the short-term, we have often seen that partial democratization, and
especially the extension of mere procedural measures (such as ‘representation with-
out influence’, commonly allowed for minorities in ethnic regimes) may actually
prolong the control of the dominant group.
At the same time, the self-representation of the state as democratic, despite its
violation of democratic principles on most substantive arenas of state operation,
does enable the development of minority consciousness and political mobilization.
Such mobilization will typically rally around the contradictions and tensions
embedded in the coterminous existence of limited democratic institutions and
procedures, and entrenched patterns of ethnic dominance.
It also draws on the growing importance of human and minority rights in the
international political discourse, and on the growing institutionalization of demo-
cratic norms among the international community. Due to the strengthening links
671O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676
between international politics and economy, these new arenas can, and do, influ-
ence majority–minority relations traditionally perceived as ‘internal’ (Soysal, 2000).
The effectiveness of minority mobilization, however, is generally limited, as it
encounters insurmountable cultural, political, economic and geographical obstacles
to full integration and/or equality within their states. Within such settings, mino-
rities have several options, which include assimilation (unlikely in ethnocracies), the
intensification of their protest to escalating levels of violence, or the establishment
of competing frameworks of governance and resource allocation accompanied by
disengagement from the state.
The last two courses of action tend to reinforce one another and undermine the
political stability of divided states and regions. They have been evident in the cases
of Sri Lanka and Israel Palestine, but not in Estonia as yet. The difference may lie
in the short time period since the establishment of the ethnocratic Estonian state,
and the hope among the Russian minority to improve their situation by political
means (Hallik, 1998). This hope has totally been abandoned by Tamils in Sri
Lanka (de Silva, 1996), and is quickly fading for Palestinian-Arabs in Israel (see
Ghanem, 2000).
The susceptibility of such regimes to the surfacing of open ethnic conflict, and
their chronic instability, are powerful engines of political change. Yet, this change
may take varying, and at times contrasting, directions. We find a number of ethno-
cratic states which have responded to the pressures and contradictions of ethnic
dominance with a series of democratization steps, such as Canada, Belgium, Spain,
Greece, and most recently South Africa and Northern Ireland.
At the same time, other ethnocracies have reacted to the grievances of margin-
alized minorities by tightening the control over minorities and by deepening the
state’s undemocratic ethnic structure. Several other states—such as Israel, Estonia
and Slovakia—have oscillated between the two options, attempting to keep afloat
both their links with the western democratic world, with the democratization this
entails, and concurrently preserve the control of the dominant ethnic group.
The dynamics of ethnocratic regimes should thus be understood as moving along
a continuum, between the poles of democratization and ethnicization. Quite often,
no clear direction prevails for long periods, and the state policy agenda may be dri-
ven by crises rather than design. A thorough discussion of the possible transition
of regimes from ethnocracy to democracy remains outside the scope of this paper,
but clearly, it is one of the most urgent challenges facing such regimes. As already
mentioned, such an analysis is currently being developed by the authors.
A concluding note
The paper presented a framework for understanding ethnocratic regimes. It
showed that in certain geographical and historical circumstances, various forces
combine to create such regimes, and associated processes of ethnicization and
stratification. The paper focused on ‘open’ ethnocracies, where the state represents
itself as democratic, while simultaneously facilitating the seizure of a contested ter-
ritory and power by a dominant ethnic nation. It outlined the characteristics of
O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem / Political Geography 23 (2004) 647–676672
such regimes, showed their distinctiveness from the ‘normal’ nation-state model,
and analyzed their ability to maintain ethnic dominance. The paper also discussed
the relation of ethnocratic regimes with minorities, democracy and political insta-
bility, and explored the tensions and contradictions which generate their decline
and transformation.
Our framework here is both broad and preliminary. It needs to be tested, chal-
lenged and expanded, in order to gain depth, validity and robustness. This under-
taking can advance in various directions, the most obvious are: (a) comparative
research which would test, calibrate and modify the assertions made above; (b) in-
depth case studies, which would study the more detailed and subtle form of ethno-
cratic expansion and hegemony, as well as the forms of resistance and challenge to
the system; (c) theoretical explorations and modifications, especially vis-a-vis new
structural forces influencing the nation-state, such as the increasingly globalizing
world economy, and/or the growing force and influence of the discourse of human
rights and multi-culturalism. Efforts in these directions have begun by the authors,
but much further research is needed to enrich our understanding of ethnocratic
states, and their volatile ethnic relations.
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... In case of Israel, the ruling ethno-religious majority is pursuing a settler strategy of Judaization, to establish geographical, demographic, political and cultural dominance of the Jewish people in the country and the territories occupied by it. Spatially, as Oren Yiftachel (2004; argues, ethnocratic states are characterized by a specific structure, making marginalized groups of indigenous peoples function in "grey spaces" -outside society, on the periphery, out of control of the administration. These groups are often not included in hegemonic communities not because of a shortage of possibilities, but lack of willingness of official institutions, pursuing settler policies. ...
... The long-term effect was the introduction of racial segregation in the Negev, the factual Judaization of most of the desert, and the sedentarization and concentration of Bedouins. This, in turn, also lead to the development of a specific culture of such cities, where the exclusion of disadvantaged communities is deepened by hegemonic, official narratives presenting "grey spaces" as dangerous areas, overwhelmed by crime, plunged into chaos and dirt (Yiftachel 2004;2009). These narratives emphasize the sense of danger and defilement of "normal" residents of recognized parts of the city but never mention that their situation is a direct result of the lack of recognition by the government administration and refusal to guarantee access to infrastructure and services. ...
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This article draws on the postcolonial legal theories and the concept of imaginative geographies, aiming to shed light on the process of producing and realizing Israeli representations of the Negev Desert through the implementation of legal regulations. The focus is on chosen imaginations of the Negev Desert, researched here as a case study of material realisation of imaginative geographies. In the analysis, symbolic narratives, visions of spaces, and new categories, intertwined in legal acts as their foundations, justifications and goals are underlined. The conclusions of presented study show that imaginations and visions can be in fact reproduced in space through legal regulations, and in the analysed case law has three aspects: it is an expression of imagined geographies; it translates those visions into technical terms; and lastly, the implementation of its provisions becomes the main instrument of producing those representations in reality.
... However, if members of the minority are scattered in the occupying country, they will be less organized, as is the case of the Greek minority in Turkey in dealing with the Turkish occupation to the Southern of Cypress, which they consider occupation, but they do not play a significant role (due to their tiny number) against the Turkish presence in the island. (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004). ...
... Majority-minority relations are problematic anywhere, but especially in states defined as 'ethnocracies' -where the state is owned by the ethnic and national majority -rather than 'democracies' (Yiftachel, 2006;Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). There is no complete solution to the dilemmas that arise in these situations, and some scholars argue that there is a substantive contradiction between collective and pluralistic societies, where minorities enjoy collective rights, and the nation state and liberal and democratic principles. ...
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Group rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority are commonly considered in Israeli Jewish society as undermining Israel's Jewish character. In light of this hostility to group rights to the Arab minority in Israel, an important question should be answered: How come does Israel de facto recognize several group rights that in fact protect and enhance Palestinian-Arab culture in Israel? I argue that in order to answer this question, a distinction should be drawn between non-territorial group rights and semi-territorial group rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority. When group rights for the Arab minority are exercised in a non-territorial fashion, in a space which is shared by Jews and Palestinian-Arabs, Jews are more likely to resist them. However, when group rights for the Arab minority are limited to a specific semi-territory, such as schools in which the teaching language is Arabic, or Sharia courts that bind only Muslims, they tend to be much less controversial. The best example of non-territorial group rights is comprehensive language rights. That is, language rights that make Arabic visible in public spaces that are common to Jews and Arabs, such as streets, roads, bus stops, municipal symbols, government websites, and trains. As opposed to the common opinion in Israel among Jews, I will stress that not only do non-territorial group rights not risk Israel's Jewish character, but they also enhance Israel's democratic character. Comprehensive language rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority, for example, have never risked the dominant status of Hebrew. They therefore do not pose any risk to Israel's Jewish character. On the positive side, comprehensive language rights for the Arab minority do have the potential to enhance Israel's democratic character by enhancing the current vulnerable civic status of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, mitigating their constant exclusion from the public sphere.
... In its Basic Laws -equivalent to a constitution -Israel is defined as being a Jewish and democratic state, a definition that has led to intense political and academic debate about the apparent contradiction opposing those terms, the very nature of the Israeli regime and the status of its non-Jewish citizens. This particular regime has been defined as a form of "diminished democracy" (Smooha, 2002: 477), an "ethnic democracy" (Peled, 1992;Smooha, , 2002, an "ethno-security regime" , an "ethnic state" (Rouhana, 1997;Rouhana, 1998; or an "ethnocracy" Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004), this last one being intended as a "distinct regime type that facilitates the expansion of a dominant ethnic nation in a multi-ethnic territory" (Kedar, 2003: 402). ...
... Many note that urban polarisation and spatial manifestation relates to the configuration and range of political, economic, and social cleavages in the urban sphere (Allegra, Casaglia, & Rokem, 2012). Given the importance of residential segregation to the political and policy jurisdiction, it is unsurprising that a rich Northern Ireland tradition of ethnographic research has emerged, offering systematic description and critical evaluation of ethnocractic spatial practices and policy agendas (Yiftachel, 2004;Murtagh, 2002;Lloyd, Shuttleworth, & McNair, 2004). To date, much of the research carried out to examine the effects of residential segregation demonstrates that it is attendant with adverse consequences for social and economic well-being (Foster, 2001;Hall, 2010), educational achievement (Persic, 2004;Murtagh, 2011a), safety from violent crime (Boal, 1969;Hall, 2010), and conflict related deaths (Mesev et al., 2009;Cunningham & Gregory, 2014). ...
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The longstanding issue of discrimination and segregation in housing markets has enveloped housing market analysis and particularly the understanding of house price determination. Whilst the relationship of segregation in residential space is diverse and encompasses numerous taxonomies, in Northern Ireland, the high level of market segregation is compounded by the addition of tactile barriers such as Peace walls. The existence of these tactile barriers serves to physically segregate communities and have the capacity to prevent the restoration of normal community interactions and market processes. This paper attempts to quantify and measure the disamenity implications and costs of these hard structures on segregated communities. It achieves this by measuring the pricing effect of peace walls within segregated market areas within the Belfast housing market employing a hedonic pricing approach using data obtained from 3,836 house sales transactions over a one year period in 2014. The findings emerging from the research demonstrate that peace walls have clearly had a more detrimental and adverse effect on the consistency and application of policy and practice. Indeed, the existence of the peace walls appear to have occasioned or facilitated differential practices in housing strategies either ‘side of the wall’. The results show a clear differential distance decay effect limiting market and efficiency opportunities.
The coalescence of Jews from across the world to form a unified Jewish nation-state has been the dream of many Jewish and Zionist leaders. With the gathering of immigrants after the State of Israel was established, the founders strived for a ‘fusion of exiles’ ( mizug hagaluyot ), where individual migrant cultural identities would assimilate to form a new Israeli identity that was predominantly European. Though the idea of a ‘New State’ appealed to Indian Jews, the promises that were made before they migrated from India did not materialise once they arrived in Israel, and they had to undergo several challenges, including discrimination based on colour and ethnicity, thus delaying their assimilation within Israeli society. This paper tries to understand the migration patterns of the Bene Israeli and Cochin Jewish communities and the prejudices enforced by the Israeli government and its agencies on them, which challenged their integration into mainstream Israeli society.
What type of democracy is multi-ethnic India, and how has it maintained territorial unity since Independence? I argue that India is best coded as a ‘crypto-ethnic democracy’, in contrast to traditional ‘consensual’ and ‘consociational’ interpretations, specifically in relation to its peripheral religious/ethnic minority groups. This argument is demonstrated through three interrelated themes: (1) nation/state-building, legitimating ideology and nationality construction; (2) ethnofederalism, regional political parties and ethnic peace accords; and (3) national security legislation, human rights and state-sponsored pogroms. The new conceptual formulation of ‘crypto-ethnic democracy’ integrates ‘control’ with both ‘consensus’ and ‘consociationalism’ within democracy. ‘Crypto-ethnic democracy’ also adds to existing typologies of multi-ethnic democracies, including differentiating the de facto dynamics of ‘control’ from the de jure institutions identified in traditional models of ‘ethnic democracy’. It is argued that the concept of ‘crypto-ethnic democracy’ has significant conceptual and comparative value for scholars.
This article develops the concept of ecological imaginary to analyse collectively held beliefs, conceptions and metaphors around nature, and how they express notions of “good” and “bad” socio-ecological ordering. Through vignettes from Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, a Baltic former Soviet republic, it critically examines the ideological work ecological imaginaries do to delegitimize socialism. Empirically I offer evidence on how local elites use the imaginaries of ecosystems and wastelands to “other” the Soviet-socialist past, and to justify a peculiar mix of neoliberal, pro-nationalistic and technoutopian policies. The article makes two contributions to the underexplored space between political ecology and postsocialist theory. First, the ecological imaginaries framework opens up possibilities for advancing a critical political ecology perspective beyond the realm of ostensibly environmental and environmentalist practices, and across a wider range of phenomena such as ecological nationalism, green gentrification and digital natures. Second, by drawing out the ways in which imaginaries allow elites and other social actors to neutralize socialist options in the present, I contribute to a rethinking of the concept of postsocialism by refocusing it on the ideological work of the notion that socialism belongs to the past.
Following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris in December 1995 to end the war in Bosnia, Sarajevo simultaneously experienced a transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. This double transition was marked by an increasing intervention from the international community, which deployed an administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the implementation of the peace accord. Even though no specific local peacebuilding mission was established in the Bosnian capital, the OHR became particularly involved in policies shaping its urban transformation. This chapter addresses socialist and post-socialist cities to frame analyses conducted on Sarajevo’s urban spatial restructuring. Secondly, the production and reproduction of ethno-territorialities is considered in order to analyse the division of Sarajevo’s urban area and its consequences. Finally, international intervention in post-war contexts is explored through the characterisation of peacebuilding missions and political institutions in ethnically divided societies, which will allow an assessment of the OHR intervention and the struggle between local and international actors during the post-war period.
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This paper examines the relation between ethno-nationalism and neoliberalism in urban space. Contrary to common views in urban studies, it argues that the ‘ethno-nationally divided city’ and the ‘neoliberal city’ are not antithetical, but that neoliberal nationalism is a new modality of urban conflict in a globalised world, which reshapes the relation between the local and the global and draws new urban geopolitics. By investigating practices of nation-branding in a divided city, this paper bridges different theoretical fields to shed light on an aspect of urban conflict that has largely been ignored by the literature on nationalism and urban divisions. It also complements existing research on neoliberal nationalism by emphasising the spatial and material aspects of nation-branding, and by showing how it can be used by competing ethno-national leaders to mobilise their communities and extend their control at the national and urban levels. By highlighting processes common to neoliberal and divided cities, this paper draws on recent calls within urban geopolitics to rethink current theoretical categories and labels attributed to cities. It develops this analysis by examining contemporary neoliberal urban policies in Skopje, Macedonia, which have become a new battlefield where interethnic conflicts unfold.
The election of the People's Alliance government on a 'peace and human rights ticket' in August 1994 was seen as an expression of hope - hope that after 15 yr of violent conflict a settlement would finally be reached between the government and the Tamil militants of the LTTE in the north and east, and that the human rights of all people in Sri Lanka would be protected. The report explains the background to the war, highlighting the sources of conflict between the Sinhalese majority and minority Tamil population, and also features the plight of the other Tamil community - the Up Country Tamils - who remain the most impoverished on the island, and the Muslims - who are increasingly drawn into the war. In the context of the conflict, the author details the minority grievances over development within Sri Lanka - maintaining that far from benefiting the minority communities, minorities have either been ignored, or been adversely affected by certain projects. The report also studies the island's education system, demonstrating how education can foster prejudice.
Having defined and examined ways of measuring segregation, the author reviews the relationship of class and ethnicity,the functions performed by class and ethnic segregation, and concludes by suggesting areas for further research, including the study of networks and interaction, and the holistic examination of segregated communities. -J.Sheail
What kind of relationship must be built between states and their ethnic minorities in order to avoid intergroup conflict? This book examines the situation of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel, analyzing how the Palestinian collective identity has been shaped by social and political forces and how it poses major challenges to israel's policies, structure, and identity. Nadim Rouhana, who grew up as a Palestinian in Israel, draws on surveys, interviews and archival research to examine how the Palestinian identity has evolved in response to israel's three guiding - and conflicting - principles: Israel as a Jewish state, as a democracy, and as a state with deep security needs. He discusses the consequences of Israel's ideology, policy, and practices toward the Arab minority; the effect of major developments in the Arab world, particularly in the Palestinian communities in exile and in the West Bank and Gaza; and the impact of changes within the Palestinian community in Israel such as demography, level of education, socioeconomic structure, and political culture. Arguing that in a multiethnic state, conflict becomes inevitable unless citizenship emerges as a common and equally meaningful identity to the various ethnonational groups, he concludes by exploring the possibilities of negotiating a new and common identity between Israel and its Arab minority.