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Becoming John Dewey: Dilemmas of a philosopher and naturalist
provided a robust and thorough conception of scientific explanation within his philosophical writing. I provide an exegesis of Dewey's concept of scientific explanation and argue that this concept is important to contemporary philosophy of science for at least two reasons. First, Dewey's conception of scientific explanation avoids the reification of science as an entity separated from practical experience. Second, Dewey supplants the realist-antirealist debate within the philosophical literature concerning explanation, thus moving us beyond the current stalemate within philosophy of science. 1. In his essay, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," Carl Hempel begins his argument for the deductive-nomological theory of explanation with an example about soap bubbles from John Dewey's book How We Think (Hempel 1965, 335–336; Dewey MW 6, 235–238). 1 Later in the essay, Hempel draws on another example utilized by Dewey: explaining the rising of water by using a pump (Hempel, 364–365; Dewey LW 8, 272). Despite explicitly drawing upon Dewey for at least one of these two examples, Hempel nowhere acknowledges Dewey's own conceptions of science or scientific explanation. In fact, the literature concerned with scientific explanation, which develops into one of the major areas of the philosophy of science in the latter half of the twentieth-century (see Salmon 1989), rarely contains mention of John Dewey's work, although Dewey could be considered one of the most influential American thinkers to his contemporaries who wrote on the subject in the first half of the century. At best, Dewey is mentioned in the literature concerning scientific explanation as the father of early instrumentalism (e.g. in Fine 2001).
Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar
to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands
and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present
day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or
overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish
between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism.
Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking
metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical
pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of
mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the
brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with
cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how
to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science
and the humanities.
KeywordsPragmatism–Neurophilosophy–John Dewey–Dynamic systems–Consciousness–Mind
Indian intellectuals have been concerned about the complex links between religion, caste and gender, especially in the formation of social science ideas and practices. The mental and behavioural sciences, however, have only been at the fringes of this interest. As a case‐study, and as an initial and tentative attempt in this area, this paper foregrounds the caste and gender basis of ‘Indian’ psychoanalysis. Appeals have been systematically made for an ‘Indian’ psychoanalysis through the pre‐independent days in the works of Girindrasekhar Bose and others and, more recently, in the works of Sudhir Kakar. This literature has influenced cultural perspectives in ‘Indian’ psychiatry. This paper argues that the Indian assimilation of psychoanalysis is underlined by patriarchal and Hinduistic interests. In the fairly recent history of its formation, psychoanalysis facilitated the representation of upper caste Hindu ideas like no other theory or practice. These ideas are still widely prevalent within the modern writings on Indian psychoanalysis. I argue that the ideological (patriarchal and Hinduistic) basis of psychoanalysis compromises what is offered (to Hindu women and women of other castes and religions) in intervention contexts as ‘cure’. The paper emphasizes the contested nature of ‘culture’ in India because of the multiple religious interest groups and the complex intergroup negotiations.
Presents the history of geropsychology in the words of many of the pioneers who developed research, scholarship, and educational programs in the subject during its formative phase. The editors urged the writers to describe the development of their careers so that others might gain an understanding of the conditions and the influences that attracted their interest and that provided support or resistance to their ideas and efforts. In addition to the purely intellectual account of their careers, the authors were encouraged to tell details of their lives that characterize their career pathways between pitfalls and good fortune, depressions and wars, antipathies and attractions, and the influential stereotypes and social lab effects. This book also presents material that helps to give insights into how creative and productive lives develop and flower. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Dreams: The content of sleep
- S K Mathur
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An introduction to space perception The new psychology
- James H Reviewed
- Mills
- Glasgow
- Scotland G1 1xq
- References
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Reviewed by JAMES H. MILLS, Department of History, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland G1 1XQ. REFERENCES Carr, H. A. (1935). An introduction to space perception. New York: Longmans, Green. Dewey, J. (1884). The new psychology. Andover Review, 2, 278– 289.
The reciprocity of perceiver and environment The rise of statistical thinking 1820
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