Article

The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror

International Studies Quarterly (Impact Factor: 1.26). 06/1989; 33(2). DOI: 10.2307/2600536

ABSTRACT

A central theoretical question in the literature on state-sanctioned terror is whether, and under what conditions, repressive violence deters or stimulates a shift in popular support away from the regime and toward the opposition. By combining a rational choice model of the nonelite response to escalating levels of death squad violence with a structural analysis of the global and domestic conditions under which the escalation of state-sanctioned terror can be expected, we demonstrate theoretically that carefully targeted repressive violence may in fact reduce the level of active popular support for the opposition, at least temporarily. However, as the level of repressive violence escalates and its application becomes more indiscriminate, it may in fact produce increases in active support for the opposition because nonelites can no longer assure themselves of immunity from repression by simply remaining politically inert. Thus, they turn to the rebels in search of protection from indiscriminate violence by the state. Why, then, would a regime, itself composed of supposedly rational individuals, pursue a policy of escalating repression if such measures are ultimately counterproductive? We argue that the conditions of structural dependence characterizing these regimes leave them without the institutional machinery, economic resources, or political will to address opposition challenges through more accommodative programs of reform. Thus, escalating repression is perpetrated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives. The utility of this approach is illustrated with a case study of reform, repression, and revolution in El Salvador.

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Available from: Dale A. Krane
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    • "A second set of benefits concerns security in the face of state violence (Mason and Krane 1989; Stoll 1993; Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). When state repression targets individuals who are not active participants in an insurgency, many individuals fearing that their lives are in danger may join the insurgents. "
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    • "State-oriented empirical strategies implicitly assume that governments and not leaders make the decision to form linkages with pro-government militias and consequently omit leader-specific predictors from any empirical analysis. There is a danger to such an approach as even the type of pro-government militias most associated with blame evasion, so-called 'death squads' or nongovernmental community battalions that carry out extra-judicial operations against suspected rebels (Mason and Krane, 1989), could aid in ensuring a leader's political survival if overthrown, as was the case with Nicaragua's Contras. In fact, qualitative case evidence presented further in the article reveals that leaders often personally create linkages to pro-government militias, either by creating new groups or by forming accountability chains with existing armed actors. "
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    ABSTRACT: It is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations.
    Full-text · Article · Feb 2016 · International Interactions
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    • "The group's leader could report to or be a member of the state, the group might receive weapons or training from the government, or carry out joint operations with the police or military. Informal militias include what others have labeled death squads, paramilitaries, proxy militias, or surrogates if they are on the government side (e.g., Alvarez 2006, Campbell & Brenner 2002, Huggins 1991a:4, Mason & Krane 1989, Mazzei 2009, Schneckener 2006). They are similar to " Second Generation civil militias " (Francis 2005:2), although not restricted to weak or failed states. "
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    DESCRIPTION: The Monopoly of Violence and the Puzzling Survival of Pro-Government Militias. Submitted to Annual Review of Political Science
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