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This is the final peer-reviewed manuscript that has been published as
Hammer, N. (2005) International Framework Agreements: Global Industrial
Relations between Rights and Bargaining. Transfer 9(4), 511-530. doi:
10.1177/102425890501100404
International Framework Agreements: global industrial relations
between rights and bargaining
Nikolaus Hammer #*#
Summary
This paper examines the emergence and the main features of International
Framework Agreements (IFAs). IFAs originated in the 1980s and proliferated
after 2000. They aim to secure core labour rights across multinational
corporations’ global supply chains. Global Union Federations, as well as other
global (World Company and Works Councils), regional (European Works
Councils or European Industry Federations) and national trade union
structures, are parties to IFAs. Based on various features of international
trade union activity, such as World Company Councils, codes of conduct, the
trade and labour rights campaign or international social dialogue, IFAs
constitute an important and innovative tool of international industrial relations.
An analysis of the substantive and procedural provisions of IFAs leads to an
analytical distinction between ‘rights’ agreements and ‘bargaining’
agreements. The article assesses the substantive and procedural aspects of
the 38 IFAs concluded before June 2005. Finally, key issues such as the
scope of agreements, trade union capacity, and global supply chains are
discussed in the context of international labour’s campaigning, organising and
negotiation activities.
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3
International Framework Agreements: global industrial relations between
rights and bargaining
The globalisation of the last decades has challenged (Northern) labour’s
traditional practices of internationalism at the national and the international
level. Organised labour was hit by economic liberalisation, deregulation,
privatisation and the emergence of new and vast labour, manufacturing and
consumer markets. It also faced severe challenges to establish forms of social
dialogue and organisation. Although still on the defensive, there are important
developments in international industrial relations, forms of organising and
campaigning that pick up historic fragments of international trade union work
and adapt them innovatively, often in new alliances, to the contemporary
context of a global economy dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs)
(see Miller 2004; Greven 2003; Wills 2002; Herod 2001; Russo 1999 for
analyses of these campaigns).
As part of these developments Global Union Federations (GUFs) started to
conclude what have come to be called International Framework Agreements
(IFAs), that is, agreements on fundamental labour rights with MNCs. Based on
different sectoral determinants, industrial relations structures and forms of
organising, an analytical distinction is drawn between ‘bargaining’ agreements
and ‘rights’ agreements. This distinction relates to the conclusion, the content
as well as the procedure of IFAs.
‘Bargaining’ agreements, for example, tend to come out of the reactivated World
Company Councils of the 1960s and stronger global networks, in particular
within the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) and the International
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM). In
this context, the institutional and strategic support of European Works Councils
(EWCs) deserves particular attention, as EWCs play a role in concluding IFAs
as well as in periodic evaluations and reviews (Müller and Rüb 2002; Rüb
2002). Disputes within the remit of IFAs are dealt with along the hierarchy of
industrial relations structures. Called in after local disputes could not be
resolved, the IMF, for example, succeeded in gaining trade union rights in a
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Turkish supplier of DaimlerChrysler; in another case a Brazilian supplier lost its
contract as a result of non-compliance with the terms of the IFA (see IMF 2003;
Anner et al. 2004).
A very different picture can be observed in sectors where trade union strength is
uneven and/or where employer strategies traditionally have been more hostile.
In this context IFAs are often the result of campaigns at local and global level,
aiming to secure organising rights in the first place. The agreement between
French hotel and services chain Accor and the International Union of
Foodworkers (IUF), for example, was used by the IUF to campaign and
organise across the group’s global operations (Wills 2002). Another case of this
use of IFAs (as well as the difficulties in transnational organising) is the
agreement between Chiquita, the IUF and COLSIBA, the Latin-American
Coordination of Banana Workers’ Unions (Riisgaard 2005).
IFAs can thus result from the activities of different trade union structures and
may go part of the way towards establishing regular bargaining relations. They
can equally constitute the starting point for putting labour on the map by
according it organising rights in the first place. This paper focuses on the
emergence of IFAs and, via an overview of their substantive and procedural
content, elaborates the distinction between ‘bargaining’ agreements and ‘rights’
agreements. The paper concludes by discussing a range of important strategic
and innovative issues IFAs raise for trade unions.
An emerging international industrial relations governance
In parallel to major shifts occurring in the world economy, trade unions have
developed their political and strategic repertoire. As early as the 1920s (Fimmen
1924), but in a more concerted form since the 1960s (Levinson 1972), trade
unionists reflected on the nature of the multinational corporation and its
implications for organised labour (Ramsay 1997). For a long time, Global Union
Federations (then International Trade Secretariats) worked as peak offices of
the international trade union movement, albeit enmeshed in cold war politics;
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coordinated international solidarity; represented labour in global social dialogue,
within the International Labour Organisation (ILO); and tentatively extended
their regional membership base and organisation (Windmuller 2000; Fairbrother
and Hammer 2005).
As global corporate challenges intensified over the last decades, a crucial
tension between organising/campaigning and coordinated social dialogue has
become more prominent in labour’s repertoire, thereby reflecting the emergence
of a new global political economy. At various times, attempts were made to
advance codes of conduct at company level or to develop global campaigns
against MNCs, for example with the World Company Councils of the 1960s
(Greven 2003; Rüb 2002; Herod 2001; Ramsay 1997). At the same time, efforts
to extend social dialogue from established UN forums, from the ILO to the
World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, did not meet with much success. Similarly, the campaign to create a link
between trade and core labour rights in the second half of the 1990s produced
very few positive results (van Roozendaal 2002; Block et al. 2001). Jim Baker,
then of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), located
the problems in conducting international social dialogue in the changing
parameters of the global economy.
‘In order to appreciate the forces that are moving the social partners to
engage in international social dialogue, it is useful to recall the obstacles to
collective bargaining and to social dialogue at the national level. The most
important obstacles involve the failure of government. For various reasons,
including international competition, many governments are not enforcing
existing laws such as those that protect workers seeking to join or form
trade unions and to bargain collectively and some governments overlook
enterprises that avoid their legal obligations as employers.’ (Baker n.d.)
Despite these impasses at the level of international social dialogue, the 1990s
have to be seen as an important turning point in transnational labour strategy.
Parallel to an emerging new global political economy, labour increasingly re-
established itself as an actor in this framework and started to shape new
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practices and institutions of international industrial relations. First, it succeeded
in capturing some of the ‘corporate social responsibility’ terrain through its
critical involvement in formulating codes of corporate conduct and, particularly,
in promoting core labour rights in the so-called social clause campaign (van
Roozendaal 2002; EWCB 2000a; EWCB 2000b). Secondly, labour extended
some of the 1960s’ World Company Councils work. Trade unions established a
number of structures, including councils and networks, in MNCs, thereby laying
the foundations for continuous transnational union cooperation (Rüb 2002;
EWCB 2001; EWCB 2000c). Thirdly, and related to both of these
developments, is the emergence of IFAs (EWCB 2004a; EWCB 2004b).
Building on existing industrial relations fragments, IFAs bind fragmented
structures and practices at the level of international organisations and MNCs
into an interesting governance structure. These agreements
establish Global Union Federations, as well as World Works Councils,
European Works Councils and other regional and national trade union
structures, as industrial relations actors at international level;
extend the reach of company level agreements to suppliers up the global
supply chain; and
tie company level agreements on core labour rights to institutionalised
social dialogue, referring to multilateral instruments such as the ILO
Tripartite Declaration, the principles of the UN Global Compact and the
revised OECD Guidelines on MNCs.
IFAs, although still far from a mature industrial relations tool, need to be located
at the sharp end of transnational industrial relations organising and
campaigning. At this point, their strategic advance lies in focusing on voluntary
standards (codes of conduct, company bargaining) and multilateral legislative
(in the ILO) approaches to labour rights (Block et al. 2001) as well as different
levels, structures and forms of action of the labour movement. Thus, IFAs tackle
the much criticised shortcomings of the codes of conduct (Pearson and Seyfang
2001; Scherrer and Greven 2001) through the use of multilateral social
dialogue, while concurrently allowing trade unions to focus their efforts on
organising, campaigning and negotiating with MNCs.
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The emergence of International Framework Agreements
IFAs developed only slowly throughout the 1980s and 1990s but have recently
gained more attention in the ILO’s Report of the World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalisation (World Commission 2004), an ILO report on
organising (ILO 2004) as well as from the European Commission (2004) and
from the G8 (EWCB 2004a: 8). The first IFAs can be traced back to a social
dialogue between Danone and the International Union of Food Workers (IUF)
that started in the mid-1980s and resulted in a series of agreements. In 1989 a
‘Plan for Economic and Social Information in Companies of the [then] BSN
Group’ and an ‘Action Programme for the Promotion of Equality of Men and
Women at the Workplace’ were signed. These agreements were followed in
1992 by an ‘Agreement on Skills Training’ and, in 1994, by an IFA proper, the
‘IUF/BSN Joint Declaration on Trade Union Rights’. A further very
comprehensive agreement was reached in 1997 in a ‘Joint Understanding in the
Event of Changes in Business Activities Affecting Employment or Working
Conditions’.
During the rest of the 1990s IFAs were slow to take off. The IUF subsequently
signed an agreement with Accor in 1995, the International Federation of
Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) with IKEA in 1998 and Faber-Castell in
1999, and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General
Workers’ Unions (ICEM) with Statoil in 1998. Thus, 33 out of the 38 existing
IFAs were concluded after 2000 and almost two-thirds were negotiated after
January 2002. Before June 2005, the IMF had signed 11 IFAs, while the ICEM
had concluded 10 agreements. The IFBWW has negotiated 7 and the IUF and
Union Network International (UNI) each have 5 IFAs. At this point IFAs cover
MNCs with a total sales figure of $1 015 550 100 000 at 2003/04 prices and a
workforce of 3.3 million (see Table 1). The size of companies ranges from
Ballast Nedam and Prym with 4 000 employees to Carrefour, DaimlerChrysler
and Volkswagen with more than 300 000 employees. Differences in company
size and sector highlight the challenges faced by labour organisations if they
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are to organise, implement and monitor such agreements, as well as the
potential of extending framework agreements along global supply chains.
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Table 1: International Framework Agreements
MNC
Headquar
ter
Main Activities
Sales
IFA
TU Signatories
ILO Conventions
Employees
Danone
France
Dairy Products
18 558.0
May 1994
IUF
87, 98, 135
89 449
Accor
France
Lodging
8 570.5
June 1995
IUF
87, 98, 135
158 023
IKEA
Sweden
Home Furnishings &
Housewares Retail
12 408.5
May 1998
IFBWW
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138: Rec143
84 000
Statoil
Norway
Oil & Gas Refining,
Marketing & Distribution
50 332.0
July 1998
ICEM, NOPEF
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138
23 899
Faber-Castell
Germany
Office, School & Art Supplies
244.8
Nov 1999
IFBWW, IG Metall
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138; Rec143
5 500
Hochtief
Germany
Construction
13 222.8
March 2000
IFBWW, IG BAU, Hochtief General
Works Council
‘conditions and standards of the following
agreements of the ILO’
34 039
Ballast Nedam
Netherlan
ds
Construction
1 047.6
March 2000
IFBWW
‘the relevant conventions and recommendations of
the ILO ... such as’
4 000
Freudenberg
Germany
Automotive; Energy;
Manufacturing
3 976.2
July 2000
ICEM, IG BCE
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
32 004
Skanska
Sweden
Commercial & Heavy
Construction
18 335.0
Feb 2001
IFBWW
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182; Rec143
53 803
Telefónica
Spain
Telecommunications
Services
42 278.3
March 2001
UNI, UGT, CC.OO
1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135,
138, 155, 182; Rec116
173 554
Carrefour
France
Grocery Retail
88 474.3
May 2001
UNI
87, 98, 135
419 040
OTE
Greece
Telecommunications
Services
6 178.3
June 2001
UNI, OME-OTE
1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135,
138, 155, 167, 182; Rec116, Rec143
17 169
Chiquita
USA
Fresh Fruit & Vegetable
Production
3 071.5
June 2001
IUF, COLSIBA
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
21 000
Indesit
Italy
Appliances
3 775.3
Dec 2001
FIM, FIOM, UILM (IMF)
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
19 000
10
Company
(Merloni)
Endesa
Spain
Electric Utilities
20 925.0
Jan 2002
ICEM; FIA-UGT; FM CC.OO
‘compliance with international labour standards,
and in particular the ILO conventions on trade
union freedom and the right to organise and
international standards on the respect of human
rights’
26 777
Fonterra
New
Zealand
Dairy Products
7 468.3
April 2002
IUF, NZDWU
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
20 000
Volkswagen
Germany
Auto Manufacturing
121 345.5
June 2002
IMF, Group Global Works Council
‘The social rights and principles described in this
declaration take the Conventions of the ILO
concerned into consideration.’
342 502
Norske Skog
Norway
Paper & Paper Product
Manufacturing
4 179.9
June 2002
ICEM, Fellesforbundet
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182; Rec143
8 181
DaimlerChrysl
er
Germany
Auto Manufacturing
192 433.0
Sept 2002
DC Enterprise Works Council,
UAW (IMF, DC World Employee
Committee)
‘the nine principles of the Global Compact;
principles orientated at the conventions of the ILO’
384 723
AngloGold
South
Africa
Precious Metals Mining &
Processing
2 026.0
Sept 2002
ICEM, NUM
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182
55 439
Leoni
Germany
Wire & Cable Manufacturing
1 355.4
Oct 2002
IMF, EWC
87, 98
21 392
Eni
Italy
Energy & Utilities
79 084.0
Nov 2002
ICEM; FEMCA-CISL; FILCEA-
CGIL; UILCEM-UIL
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
71 497
ISS
Denmark
Commercial Cleaning &
Facilities Mgt Services
6 097.4
May 2003
UNI
1, 29, 47, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155,
167, 182; Rec116, Rec143
245 000
SKF
Sweden
Industrial Machinery &
Equipment Manufacturing
6 777.7
Nov 2003
IMF, EMF
138
39 867
GEA
Germany
Process & Thermal
2 181.6
June 2003
IMF, EMF, EWC
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182
12 891
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Engineering
Rheinmetall
Germany
Auto Parts Manufacturing
5 332.1
Oct 2003
IMF, EMF, EWC
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182
20 888
Prym
Germany
Engineering
313.2
Nov 2003
IMF, EWC
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182
4 002
H&M
Sweden
Apparel & Accessories Retail
8 000.6
Jan 2004
UNI
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
31 701
Club
Méditerranée
France
Travel Agencies & Services;
Lodging
1 913.6
Feb 2004
IUF, EFFAT
‘building on the principles set out in the ILO’
20 333
Bosch
Germany
Auto Parts Manufacturing
45 635.3
March 2004
IMF, Europa Committee Bosch
Group
98, 100, 138, 182
232 000
SCA
Sweden
Paper & Paper Product
Manufacturing
13 603.0
April 2004
ICEM, EWC, Swedish Paper
Workers’ Union
(guided ‘by ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (core conventions)
and SCA’s Code of Conduct’)
53 000
Lukoil
Russia
Energy & Utilities
33 845.0
May 2004
ICEM, ROGWU
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 156, 182
150 000
Renault
France
Auto Manufacturing
55 535.3
Oct 2004
IMF, Renault Group Works Council
(and various national trade unions)
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138
130 573
Impregilo
Italy
Commercial & Heavy
Construction
3 680.8
Nov 2004
IFBWW, FENEAL-UIL, FILCA-
CISL, FILLEA-CGIL
1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135,
138, 155, 161, 162, 167, 182; Rec116, Rec143
12 998
Electricité de
France
France
Electric Utilities
64 009.8
Jan 2005
ICEM; PSI; IFME; WFIW, (and
various national trade unions)
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182
156 152
Rhodia
France
Chemicals &
Pharmaceuticals
7 154.0
Jan 2005
ICEM
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 156
20 577
Veidekke
Norway
Construction
1 707.6
March 2005
IFBWW, Fellesforbundet, Norsk
Arbeidsmandsforbund
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, 167, 182;
Rec 143
6 130
BMW
Germany
Auto Manufacturing
60 472.9
April 2005
IMF, Euro Works Council
29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182
105 972
Total
1 015 550.1
3 307 075
Notes: 2003 Sales are in Million USD, 2004 figures in italics.
Sources: Global Unions, MNC websites; Hoovers; Faber-Castell, Ballast Nedam, Freudenberg, GEA, Prym: 2002 PPPs.
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In the face of this proliferation of IFAs, a definition of an IFA should be sought.
The IUF/Danone agreement clearly sets an important benchmark in that it
explicitly refers to ILO Conventions (see Table 2 for a list of ILO Conventions
referred to in IFAs). The set of agreements at Danone can still be seen as an
ideal outcome of the most comprehensive contemporary IFAs. From the point
of view of the Global Union Federations, several of which have drawn up
model agreements, the minimum provisions of an IFA are contained in six key
points (Nilsson 2002; Interview 04.11.2003):
it must be a global agreement;
Conventions must be referenced to the ILO;
it has to require the MNC to influence suppliers;
a Global Union Federation should be signatory;
there has to be trade union involvement in the implementation; and
there has to be a right to bring complaints.
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Table 2: ILO Conventions in International Framework Agreements
Number
Name
Adopted
Core
Ratifications
C001
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention
1919
52
C029
Forced Labour Convention
1930
■
163
C047
Forty-Hour Week Convention
1935
14
C087
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
1948
■
142
C094
Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention
1949
59
C095
Protection of Wages Convention
1949
95
C098
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention
1949
■
154
C100
Equal Remuneration Convention
1951
■
161
C105
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
1957
■
161
C111
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention
1958
■
160
C131
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention
1970
45
C135
Workers’ Representatives Convention
1971
75
C138
Minimum Age Convention
1973
■
134
C155
Occupational Safety and Health Convention
1981
42
C156
Workers with Family Responsibilities
1981
36
C161
Occupational Health Services Convention
1985
24
C162
Asbestos Convention
1986
27
C167
Safety and Health in Construction
1988
17
C182
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention
1999
■
150
14
R116
Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation
1962
R143
Workers' Representatives Recommendation
1971
Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm
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IFAs, therefore, establish a platform for international industrial relations in
defining Global Union Federations as legitimate bargaining partners. They
clearly move beyond codes of conduct in that they are not mere unilateral
declarations, but contain obligations, although not legally enforceable ones. In
addition, they deal with government failure by setting global minimum
standards and by getting MNCs to accept some responsibility for the labour
rights situation throughout the supply chain. Finally, labour is one of the main
actors in the implementation as well as a regular monitoring process.
IFAs normally commit MNCs to what has become known as core labour
standards within the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work: that is, ILO Conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and
182, the latter of which was only added in 1999. The distinct advance of IFAs
is further highlighted when examining the specific status of these core
conventions. The International Labour Conference has come to define these
principles as so fundamental that it assumes all ILO members to be bound by
them, as opposed to only those who ratified the Conventions in question. IFAs
thus transform global unions into bargaining parties vis-à-vis MNCs and make
global unions part of a voluntary enforcement mechanism.
A closer analysis of the agreements reveals a number of differences with
regard to their form and procedure. Whereas some IFAs emphasise the
establishment of fundamental rights, there are others that come much closer
to bargaining agreements, in that they contain detailed provisions about
regular meetings, deal with a range of issues beyond core labour rights and
are meant to be discussed, renegotiated or prolonged after certain intervals.
This should not be taken as an exclusionary distinction, but as an analytical
one: rights logically constitute the precondition for bargaining and bargaining
at international level is not necessarily congruent with established notions of
national bargaining.
The early IUF agreements with Danone and Accor can be seen as classic
‘rights’ agreements in that they first establish the conditions for an ongoing
social dialogue and the right to bring up issues with the management. This
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definition, however, does not prevent further evolution after the signature of
the agreement. In the case of these two IFAs it was continuing dialogue
during a number of conflicts and, in Danone, a further set of agreements,
which created the context for regular negotiation over a broader range of
issues (Oswald n.d.; Wills 2002). The brief listing of ILO Conventions in the
Carrefour and H&M agreements would suggest that they also should be
placed in this category. These MNCs, however, had already defined a great
deal of ‘social responsibility’ in codes of conduct, so that the framework
agreements merely ‘caught up’ with regard to the labour dimension.
A number of the ICEM and UNI agreements come much closer to ‘bargaining’
agreements in that the function, procedure and structure of annual meetings
as well as the costs are defined in detail. Works council-style arrangements
seem to be the industrial relations model for the bargaining agreements in so
far as meetings take place once a year or more often upon request, the
headquarter unions have a strong position and, normally, a representative of
each of the company’s foreign operations (countries) is invited to attend. A
number of agreements contain procedural provisions on the administration of
the IFA (often it is the signatory parties that jointly discuss questions of
interpretation) as well as the resolution of disputes. The Skanska agreement
is probably the most explicit as it provides for an arbitration board which will
issue binding decisions. In fact, a large number of IFAs not only look like
extended European Works Councils, but were actually established on the
back and on the initiative of the headquarter union’s activities in their
European Works Council (Tørres and Gunnes 2003; Müller and Rüb 2002)
1
.
What’s in it? Substantive issues in IFAs
All IFAs operate on the principle of respecting minimum standards for labour
and human rights, as well as complying with national legal and industry
1
Of all those European MNCs that signed framework agreements only Ballast Nedam, Telefónica, OTE, Endesa
and Impregilo do not have a European Works Council.
17
regulations. In the light of the number of ratifications of ILO conventions (see
Table 2), the potential for IFAs to raise minimum standards in MNCs’ foreign
operations is vast. This mechanism, however, is mainly valid for the core
conventions dealing with fundamental rights; that is, nondiscretionary
freedoms or protection. Where IFAs deal with more traditional bargaining
issues, such as employment, wages, working time, health and safety, training
or restructuring, the phrasing tends to be more opaque and often retreats to
the safer ground of ‘national legal and industry standards’.
In addition to referring to minimum standards for labour rights, IFAs very often
declare a compliance with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
UN Global Compact, the ILO Tripartite Declaration on the Fundamental Rights
of Workers, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and, again in a
vaguer version, support ‘fundamental human rights in the community and in
the place of work’ (Statoil) or ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘social
justice’ (Freudenberg). The agreement with GEA includes a particularly
ambitious statement:
‘[GEA] will support to the best of its ability the combating of
underdevelopment in third world countries and stands by its social
responsibility. In this context it welcomes the principles of the “Global
Company” and within the continuing process of internationalisation
supports all the internal and external initiatives of a corporate social
responsibility (CSR). It agrees to observe, secure or further extend the
generally accepted ILO core working standards and human rights. The
guiding principles of the OECD for multinational companies are thus
applied by GEA AG!.’
The key areas of IFAs clearly lie in the acceptance of the ILO core
conventions regarding
freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining
(C87, C98);
equality and non-discrimination (C100, C111);
18
the prevention of forced labour (C29, C105); and
the prevention of child labour (C138, C182).
Although all IFAs are referenced to the ILO Conventions, not all IFAs refer to
the conventions by number. Differences range from mentioning C138 in the
SKF agreement to record numbers in the IFBWW agreement with Impregilo
(20 conventions and recommendations) or the UNI agreements with ISS (15),
Telefónica (16) and OTE (18). Regardless of reference by number, however,
all IFAs, with the exception of the Danone, Accor and Carrefour agreements,
commit the MNC to respect all core labour standards. The logic of the
exceptions can be seen as ‘rights’ agreements, that is they refer to the
freedom of association and right to organise (C87), the right to organise and
collective bargaining (C98) as well as standards on workers’ representation
(C135). These ‘rights’ agreements are thus based on the premise that IFAs
can be used to establish a platform for union strength, which, in turn, is the
basis for seeking further advances. As indicated above, a large number of
IFAs go beyond these core provisions, in particular with regard to workers’
representation, child labour, employment and restructuring, wages, working
time, training, and health and safety.
Underlining the ‘rights’ aspect of IFAs, 18 agreements refer explicitly to
Convention 135 on workers’ representatives and 8 agreements mention the
corresponding recommendation (R143). Whereas ILO Conventions 100 and
111 normally constitute the standard with regard to equality and non-
discrimination, Lukoil has further subscribed to ILO Convention 156 on
workers with family responsibilities. A more complex situation exists with
regard to the fight against child labour. Whereas the majority of framework
agreements contain Convention 138 on the minimum age, they also accept
the latter’s exceptions for some developing countries (the general minimum
age of 15 is thereby lowered to 14). Beyond this, companies such as
Carrefour and H&M have drawn up codes of conduct that set out strategies to
tackle child labour and develop alternative projects.
19
Many IFAs include provisions about employment: for example, restating
employer obligations under labour and social legislation or expressing a
preference for stable and permanent employment. Very interesting in this
respect are agreements with clauses on restructuring, seemingly a speciality
of IUF agreements. Apart from the separate 1997 agreement with Danone,
the IFAs with Fonterra and Chiquita also regulate information, consultation
and training plans in the case of restructuring. The agreement with Club
Méditerranée is also noteworthy as it regulates the international mobility of
Club Med employees (in particular that of staff from Turkish villages):
‘The parties recognise the need to develop solutions to allow Club
Méditerranée service personnel with the required experience and
qualifications to hold employment in Club facilities in countries other than
their country of origin, inasmuch as this satisfies the needs of the
organisation and the wishes of the employee concerned and provided
that such arrangements do not imperil employment, working conditions,
salary levels and other social conditions for employees in the host
country.’
In addition, the agreement provides for a representative from the European
Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT) to
monitor this initiative and commits the company to pay expenses and a set
day rate.
The IFA with OTE refers to Conventions 95 and 131 on the protection of
wages and minimum wage fixing respectively. A large number of other IFAs
contain provisions on national legal and industry standards concerning wages
and benefits, or outlaw wage deductions unless expressly regulated by law.
The OTE and Telefónica agreements refer to ILO Convention 131, and thus
go even further by including common wage standards and a living wage. The
OTE agreement reads:
‘No worker shall be paid less than the legal minimum wage and [this]
shall always be sufficient to meet basic needs of workers and their
20
families and to provide some discretional income. (ILO Conventions 94,
95 and 131)’
On working time IFAs often refer to national laws and agreements, and
sometimes include a statement about paid holidays. Overtime should be
voluntary (OTE, Telefónica, ISS) and overtime pay should not be a substitute
for insufficient remuneration (OTE, Telefónica, ISS, GEA). The UNI
agreements with OTE, Telefónica and ISS contain further explicit references
to ILO Conventions 1, 47 and Recommendation 116. Just under half of the
existing IFAs specifically mention education and training, mostly though in a
very general sense. Whereas the SCA and SKF agreements expressly
support job enrichment, the 1992 Danone agreement on skills and training is
probably the most extensive. The IFAs in Statoil and Lukoil also include a
provision for specific training regarding the implementation of the IFA. The
former, for example states that:
‘NOPEF/ICEM and Statoil will cooperate in developing joint training
arrangements covering those issues – and their implementation – dealt
with in this agreement. This will include appropriate training in health,
safety and environmental best practice for union delegates from
countries where Statoil is the operator. It will also include management
training programmes within Statoil. The cost of NOPEF/ICEM
involvement in Statoil training programmes may be covered by Statoil,
subject to agreement.’
Finally, about three-quarters of IFAs commit to provide safe and healthy
working conditions. A good number of agreements also refer to environmental
standards. Again, it is the OTE, Telefónica and ISS agreements that expressly
refer to the ILO Convention 155, OTE and ISS further include ILO Convention
167.
Overall, three levels of substantive provisions can be distinguished. First, core
labour rights are referenced to ILO Conventions and other multilateral
standards. Secondly, for issues such as employment, wages, and working
21
time, IFAs tend to accept national legislation. Thirdly, health and safety,
training or restructuring are dealt with differently depending on the
circumstances of the company and the agreement. ‘Rights’ agreements do not
necessarily contain fewer issues, but tend to focus on trade union rights.
Strategic issues
Despite their recent proliferation, the development of IFAs as an industrial
relations practice is in its initial stages. This is particularly the case regarding
the division of labour within the labour movement in the processes of
implementation, representation and monitoring of IFAs. Clearly, it is in the
context of their potential as a focus of global trade union practice that IFAs
raise numerous exciting questions. This section deals with the scope of IFAs,
trade union capacity and global supply chains and explores the implications
for campaigning, organising and negotiation.
The scope of IFAs
At this point it is interesting to revisit the earlier narrow definition and ask ‘what
constitutes an IFA?’ Historically, Global Union Federations (GUFs) were the
leading actors in negotiating IFAs, sometimes supported by the national union
at the headquarters of the MNC. The administration of the agreement was a
matter for the GUF and the MNC. This definition has been widened in more
recent IFAs that include global structures, World Works Councils or employee
committees, together with regional structures, such as European Works
Councils and European Industry Federations. The Renault and EdF
agreements were signed by French industry federations, two smaller
confederations, and various other national unions that organise in the major
operations of the companies. Furthermore, the EdF agreement is also the first
IFA signed by two GUFs, ICEM and the Public Services International (PSI), as
well as two other global bodies, the International Federation of Mining and
22
Energy (IFME) and the humanist World Federation of Industry Workers
(WFIW)
2
.
The history of negotiation of IFAs is normally reflected in the signatories (that
is, the GUF on its own, with a national headquarter union, the European
Works Council or World Works Council) and, more crucially, in their
procedural arrangements. The agreements with Bosch, Club Med, GEA,
Leoni, Rheinmetall, SCA and Skanska integrate the respective EWC or a
corresponding European structure into the monitoring procedures.
DaimlerChrysler, SKF and Volkswagen reserve a similar role for their World
Works Councils. For the remaining IFAs it is the respective GUF, often in
alliance with the trade unions from the national headquarters, which has the
decisive role in this process.
There are a number of material issues behind these developments. First,
European Works Councils and global bodies have taken more initiatives to
negotiate IFAs, based on their institutional presence and resources. So far,
this development is confined to sectors represented by the IMF and ICEM.
Second, pushing this point further, a number of international agreements were
signed in recent years that do not include a GUF as a signatory. Allowing such
a wider definition of IFAs would, according to a survey by the EWCB (2004b;
EWCB 2000a, EWCB 2000b), add at least another 7 framework agreements
to the list (Air France, CSA Czech Airlines, Ford Europe, General Motors
Europe, Suez, Triumph International, Vivendi/Veolia).
Part of such questions can be answered by asking ‘how many ways exist to
an IFA?’. Müller and Rüb (2002) analyse different routes to World Works
Councils and distinguish between those based on the World Company
Councils of the 1960s and 1970s, those that extend EWCs onto the global
level, and those that potentially follow the negotiation of global agreements.
Turning to framework agreements, there are clearly different institutional
2
The WFIW is an international trade federation of the World Confederation of Labour, a global trade union
confederation with Christian roots; the IFME results from a 1994 split from the International Federation of Miners
which was created 1985 in the aftermath of the British miners’ strike.
23
platforms and constellations in the negotiation process. Equally, depending on
the company and the sector, there are different forms of ‘social responsibility
governance’, for example the commitments and codes of conduct by
Carrefour and H&M that predate framework agreements.
While this diversity of institutional platforms and paths towards framework
agreements needs to be used in positive ways, without becoming worked up
about purist definitions of IFAs, there is an important point about the global
character of these agreements. Ultimately, trade union cooperation across
global supply chains can only be successful if it is global. Important ways to
gain such representation and to link different (North-South) positions within
the labour movement is to accord GUFs a central role in this process and to
integrate ‘Southern’ unions. If advances from regional or national platforms
(European Works Councils or national agreements) can be extended onto the
global level, it is crucial to distinguish the process of negotiating an agreement
with the actual representative structures and processes of this agreement.
Trade union capacity and IFAs
The question ‘how many ways to an IFA?’ can also be used to think about
trade union capacity to negotiate agreements with MNCs, to monitor the
agreement and to follow-up grievances at a global level. Manifest in many
agreements are the structures of the region and industry, as well as the
histories and internal power structures of the trade union movement. The IFAs
on the ‘bargaining’ end of the spectrum are normally based on a good
institutional representation of the national union within the MNC headquarters
and/or the European Works Council. This set-up requires specific capacities
at different levels, capacities that are clearly attached to certain structural and
strategic choices.
As mentioned earlier, a key innovation of IFAs lies in the recognition of GUFs
as negotiation and bargaining partners by MNCs. It is important to recognise,
however, that the transnationalisation of bargaining arrangements, or the
export of national industrial relations models, can be in the interest of
24
management and a strong national union. A Volkswagen spokesperson, for
example, is reported as saying:
‘We have enshrined our corporate attitude to conflict resolution ... That
approach has been very successful in Germany, and this agreement is
now helping us to transfer it to other parts of the world.’ (quoted in
Graham and Bibby 2002: 6)
Another crucial issue arises where different capacities at different levels of the
labour movement touch on the structures and practices of representation and
participation. Although the right of trade unions to bring grievances and to be
involved in the monitoring is a key point of framework agreements and is
guaranteed in all agreements, there are nonetheless important differences
between agreements. A large number of agreements state a subsidiarity
principle: that is, a preference to discuss and solve matters at local level
before referring them to headquarter management and the relevant GUF. This
procedure clearly has to be analysed on a case-by-case basis, depending to
what extent regular IFA meetings take place in conjunction with the meeting of
the European Works Council or World Works Council. It is noteworthy that
some ICEM agreements (Norske Skog, Freudenberg and AngloGold) tailor
the monitoring very much to the signatory partners whereas others (GEA and
Rheinmetall) state that ‘all the employees have the right to address subjects
and problems in conjunction with the agreed principles’.
UNI’s framework agreements illustrate two different approaches. There are
some agreements, such as those with Carrefour and H&M, which only contain
the basic reference to core labour conventions (the Carrefour agreement only
lists ILO Conventions 87, 98 and 135). These IFAs fit on half a page and
contrast markedly with UNI’s Telefónica, OTE and ISS agreements. The latter
contain extensive substantive and procedural aspects and integrate local
trade unions (in the case of OTE and Telefónica) in the administration of the
IFA. These different approaches can be traced to UNI’s organisational and
political history. UNI is the result of a merger in 2000 between
Communications International, the International Federation of Commercial,
25
Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees, the International Graphical
Federation and the Media and Entertainment International.
Although the relevance of an IFA crucially depends on union organising
strength at the local level, it is the inclusiveness in the implementation and
monitoring process that guarantees the truly global dimension of IFAs.
Normally, even agreements with extensive procedural provisions leave much
discretion regarding participation at the review meetings. The Endesa
agreement, for example, contains the phrase ‘one ICEM representative for
each country’. The IFA between Endesa and ICEM is also noteworthy insofar
as a large number of trade unions in Endesa’s Latin-American operations are
affiliates of UNI, rather than ICEM, highlighting the issue of representation on
the global level. The significance of this inclusive procedural aspect of IFAs
can only be mentioned here and requires further case study research (see, for
example, the problems of international campaigning discussed by Miller
2004).
The terms and the practical use of IFAs clearly depend on the resources,
forms of organisation and repertoires of action of trade unions at all levels.
Apart from the necessity to harness different strategic capacities, there is also
a case to reflect on how to link different approaches and forms of action. It is
pertinent, for example, that so far no IFAs have been negotiated with North-
American MNCs. The absence of such agreements raises the question if it
was only employers that were able to resist such initiatives or if North-
American labour’s established practices of pattern bargaining could be at
odds with the agreement-based works council approach. Equally, beyond
material constraints of local trade union strength, the ‘rights’ vs. ‘bargaining’
distinction could be conceived as a political choice, with different implications
for participation and representation.
IFAs across the supply chain
Arguably, one of the most important innovations of IFAs is that they allow
trade unions a grip on the global supply chain, thereby extending (core) labour
26
rights beyond national borders. There is considerable potential in using
concepts of commodity chain analysis to think about global trade union
campaigning and organising (Fichter and Sydow 2002).
Regarding the extension to the supply chain, a number of different concepts
can be distinguished. Monitoring stretches from integration of the agreement
into the internal corporate audit (Leoni and DaimlerChrysler) to being included
in the work of a separate compliance organisation (IKEA). MNCs at the end of
buyer-driven commodity chains find advantages in making the framework
agreement part of the contractual obligations of suppliers and subcontractors,
together with a host of other obligations (Gereffi 1999). A cluster of MNCs can
be discerned in this respect which put very concrete obligations onto their
suppliers and to some extent established a complex governance structure of
monitoring ‘social responsibility’. H&M, for example, obliges suppliers ‘to let an
independent party, for example, an NGO, of our choice make inspections’ (my
emphasis):
‘8.2 Monitoring. All suppliers are obliged to always keep H&M informed
about where each order is produced. H&M reserves the right to make
unannounced visits to all factories producing our goods, at any time. We
also reserve the right to let an independent third party (e.g. a NGO) of
our choice make inspections, to ensure compliance with our Code of
Conduct.
8.3 Non-compliance. Should we find that a supplier does not comply with
our Code of Conduct, we will terminate our business relationship with this
supplier, if corrective measures are not taken within an agreed time limit.
If we find repeated violations, we will immediately terminate the co-
operation with the supplier and cancel our existing orders.’
The specific dynamics of buyer-driven commodity chains can explain many of
these arrangements and that the supplier-oriented codes of conduct are often
more comprehensive and detailed than the respective framework agreement
(for example, H&M and Carrefour). Still, it is the framework agreements that
open the door to supply chain monitoring for trade unions.
27
Provisions regarding suppliers are less mandatory in other IFAs. The MNC
normally commits to encourage its suppliers to adopt similar principles and
standards and will regard such arrangements as a favourable basis for future
business relations. In practice, what is more important is that the continuing
violation of fundamental rights is seen, in the last instance, as reason to
terminate business relations and/or contracts. Again, reflecting the specificity
of the construction industry, the agreement with Ballast Nedam comprises
very strong formulations about the company’s responsibilities and those of
companies at the different tiers of the supply chain:
‘Ballast Nedam acknowledges that it not only bears responsibility for the
conditions under which its own employees work but also shares
responsibility for the conditions under which the employees of its
contractual workers do their work; ... Ballast Nedam requires that its
contractual partners shall support this agreement and shall also ensure
that it is adhered to by any of their contractual partners who are in any
way active in connection with the business activities of Ballast Nedam.’
Agreements such as those at Ballast Nedam and ISS include reference to the
specific structure of the sector and suggest that the respect of fundamental
labour rights can be an advantage in an industry continuously discussing
public procurement regulations and blacklisting:
'The IFBWW and FNV BOUW will attest Ballast Nedam vis-à-vis state
and international institutions and major private clients a particularly
positive role as setting a good example of responsible corporate
management, the yardstick of which is the implementation of this
agreement.’
Observing the different approaches in IFAs, it is interesting to note that trade
unions that campaign globally usually have a thorough knowledge of the
global supply chain of their target company. One consequence of this is that
campaigns integrate trade unions across space and scale, and are used to
28
develop networks with NGOs (Miller 2004; Greven 2003; Herod 2001; Russo
1999). To make an (very schematic) analytic distinction, it may be argued that
IFAs in buyer-driven supply chains function more as ‘rights’ agreements,
reflecting a flatter but more flexible supply structure and a ‘social responsibility
governance’. In contrast, IFAs in producer-driven chains (with longstanding
relations with suppliers and R&D connections) function more as ‘bargaining’
agreements, some monitoring of which is integrated into the internal corporate
audit.
Conclusion
To sum up, it is reasonable and useful to locate IFAs on a continuum of
consultation - negotiation - bargaining. Whereas agreements are designed to
open up negotiations over minimum standards and ‘spaces for bargaining and
organising’, the exact position in each case depends precisely on the process
of organising and bargaining. IFAs have the potential to provide a substantive
focus in the form of core labour rights as well as a global reference point
constituted by the MNC and its supply chain.
At the same time, IFAs constitute a complex industrial relations tool that
requires broad involvement at all stages, from negotiation, implementation,
monitoring through to continuous representation, and at all levels of the labour
movement. This work can only be achieved in harnessing and combining the
strengths of institutional platforms in more flexible campaigns, networks and
coalitions with sympathetic NGOs. The experiences of the 1960s and 1970s
(Tudyka et al. 1978) suggest that networked capacities have to be developed
in order to establish concrete practices of internationalism at different levels of
the labour movement. Some recent campaigns have illustrated the benefits of
such approaches (Wills 2002; Herod 2001). One scenario for a differential
focus, based on recent developments, locates the institutional centre with
(European) works councils and probably the European industry federations in
their involvement in the European social dialogue. The Global Union
Federations and national unions, although involved in negotiating and
29
administering IFAs, take on more of a global coordination and campaigning
role, allowing for a more versatile alliance of forces.
With regard to strategy and capacity it is important to reflect on the twofold
logic of IFAs. Whereas the actual agreement is concluded with an MNC, often
with the involvement of a national union and/or the European Works Council,
the extension of the IFA along the supply chain emphasises an industrial
aspect and certainly a global one. For IFAs to have potential one should
remember that the diversity of industrial relations systems (company vs.
industry bargaining; single vs. dual channel representation) as well as the
uneven distribution between capacity and global legitimacy can only be
exploited in a networked approach. IFAs combine multilateral labour
standards with MNC-focused negotiations and (potentially) extend labour
rights from an MNC to the whole supply chain. Equally, they do not create
new actors as such but rather provide platforms and entry points for labour
across different spaces and scales, advances that can only be based on the
basis of cooperation and organising.
#*# Lecturer in Employment Studies at the Centre for Labour Market Studies,
University of Leicester
E-mail: nh80@leicester.ac.uk
This paper benefited from support by the Cardiff School of Social Sciences
and the ILO’s International Institute for Labour Studies. The author would also
like to thank Ron Blum, Reynald Bourque, Finn Bowring, Steve Davies, Heike
Döring, Peter Fairbrother, Peter Unterweger and Jeremy Waddington for
valuable suggestions and discussions.
30
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