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The Undoing of Traumatic Life Events
Abstract
Counterfactuals generated by victims of traumatic events were examined to elucidate their significance for the coping process. In Study 1, respondents were interviewed 4-7 years after the loss of their spouse or child in a motor vehicle accident. In Study 2, respondents were interviewed at 3 weeks and 18 months following the death of their child from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Across both studies, (a) counterfactuals were commonly reported; (b) the focus of counterfactuals was typically on one's own (in)actions, rather than on the behavior of others; (c) the more frequently respondents were undoing the event, the more distress they reported; and (d) this relation held after controlling for more general ruminations. These field studies demonstrate that even in situations that lack the highly mutable circumstances described in scenario research, people coping with traumatic events appear unhindered in their ability to generate counterfactuals. Theoretical implications, with an emphasis on field studies of undoing, are discussed.
... In addition, after traumatic life events such as the loss of a loved one, people frequently report ruminating over counterfactual thoughts. In Davis et al.'s [11] seminal work on this topic, subjects were interviewed several years after experiencing the loss of a spouse or child in a motor accident (study 1) and just weeks after the sudden death of an infant (study 2), and then again 18 months later. The majority of respondents (76%) reported mentally undoing the event in the weeks after an infant's death, and almost half reported still thinking 'if only…' thoughts years after the event. ...
... We suggest that there is likely to be an ideal balance in motivation for counterfactual information-too little may lead to willful ignorance and restrict people's ability to learn from mistakes, but too much may result in undue rumination and depressed mood [85,86]. For example, while the persistent counterfactual thoughts that occur after a significant loss [11] may play an important role in future decision making, they can also be extremely disruptive and disturbing. A better understanding of the motivational underpinnings of counterfactual curiosity and how this differs between individuals may provide avenues for addressing such maladaptive information-seeking strategies. ...
Counterfactual information, information about what might have been, forms the content of counterfactual thoughts and emotions like regret and relief. Recent research suggests that human adults and children, as well as rhesus monkeys, demonstrate ‘counterfactual curiosity’: they are motivated to seek out counterfactual information after making decisions. Based on contemporary theories of curiosity and information seeking and a broad range of empirical literature, we suggest multiple heterogeneous psychological processes that contribute to people's motivation for counterfactual information. This includes processes that are identified in the curiosity literature more generally—the potential use of counterfactual information for adaptive decision making (its long-term instrumental value) and the drive to reduce uncertainty. Additionally, we suggest that counterfactual information may be particularly alluring because of its role in causal reasoning; its relationship with prediction and decision making; and its potential to fulfil emotion regulation and self-serving goals. Some future directions have been suggested, including investigating the role of individual differences in counterfactual curiosity on learning and wellbeing.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.
... After loss, longing for, but not being able to obtain closeness to the lost person is the most salient discrepancy. Consequently, people will ruminate about the events leading up to the death and the consequences of bereavement (e.g., Davis et al., 1995;. Indeed, Davis et al. (1995) demonstrated that 4 to 7 years following the accidental death of a partner or child, about half of bereaved people still recurrently thought about how their lives would be better if they had prevented the death. ...
... Consequently, people will ruminate about the events leading up to the death and the consequences of bereavement (e.g., Davis et al., 1995;. Indeed, Davis et al. (1995) demonstrated that 4 to 7 years following the accidental death of a partner or child, about half of bereaved people still recurrently thought about how their lives would be better if they had prevented the death. recently demonstrated that such counterfactual thoughts showed moderate to strong temporal effects on depressive and prolonged grief symptoms 6 and 12 months later, even when controlling for baseline symptoms. ...
Bereavement can precipitate symptoms of depression, prolonged grief disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Targeting repetitive negative thought (i.e., worry, rumination) in treatment may help reduce post-loss psychopathology. Yet, evidence on longitudinal associations of depressive rumination and worry with post-loss psychopathology symptoms has been mixed and the directions of effects are still unclear. Recently bereaved adults (78% female), completed questionnaires assessing depressive rumination (brooding), worry, and depression, prolonged grief and posttraumatic stress symptoms 11 times in 1.5 month intervals. We applied random-intercept cross-lagged panel models (RICLPMs) to examine reciprocal within-person associations between worry and psychopathology symptoms, between rumination and these symptoms, and between worry and rumination. Main findings were that worry showed reciprocal relationships with psychopathology symptoms (although worry did not consistently predict prolonged grief symptoms). Depressive rumination was predicted by psychopathology symptoms, but not vice versa. Worry showed reciprocal relations with depressive rumination. Findings suggest that worry may be part of a downward spiral, enhancing psychopathology symptoms following loss, whereas depressive rumination is solely a consequence of such symptoms.
... Researchers can easily interpret one word-criteria such as 'blame', 'anger' and 'denial' differently, which may in turn affect results on the characteristics of PGD. For example, self-blame is much more prevalent following loss than blaming others (Davis et al., 1995) and repetitive thought on self-blame relate to increases of prolonged grief symptoms, whereas repetitive thought on blaming others does not . Relatedly, there is no diagnostic algorithm for PGD per ICD-11, making it difficult to determine the optimal number of accessory symptoms for research purposes Stelzer et al., 2020b). ...
Prolonged grief disorder has recently been added to the International Classification of Diseases, 11th edition and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5, Text Revision. This historical development is often presented as a linear process culminating in the inclusion of valid, clinically relevant prolonged grief disorder criteria in diagnostic handbooks. The present contribution provides an overview of work contradicting this dominant narrative. First, I show that the developmental history of prolonged grief disorder has been nonlinear and that this yields questions on generalizability and problems with measurement of the newest criteria sets. Second, I highlight an important gap in the validity evidence: the distinction of prolonged grief disorder from normal grief. Third, I discuss concerns relating to the societal effects of the inclusion of prolonged grief disorder in diagnostic handbooks, including the medicalization of grief, development and adverse effects of pharmacotherapy and stigmatization. A more realistic, balanced view on the history, validity and societal impact of prolonged grief disorder appears appropriate. I recommend stringent validation of assessment instruments for prolonged grief disorder, convergence of criteria-sets, closing gaps in validity evidence and developing strategies to mitigate the negative effects of grief diagnoses.
... Participants' upward counterfactuals were finally categorised into self-referent (80.1%), otherreferent (8.5%), combined other and self-referent (8.1%), and non-referent (3.3%). In line with past results (e.g., Davis et al., 1995;, self-referent upward counterfactuals were the most commonly generated thoughts in the current sample. This finding corresponds to the view that spontaneous upward counterfactuals generated by participants after being prompted to think counterfactually tend to focus on the self's culpability , which reflects the ruminative characteristic of upward counterfactuals that can be distressing . ...
Upward counterfactual thinking involves imagining favourable situations that could have changed the outcome of a negative event. Although it has been reliably positively associated with depression, a causal relationship has not yet been investigated. This study addressed this gap in the literature by examining whether upward counterfactual thinking causally increases state depression. The online experimental study was conducted on 469 Philippine residents (Mage = 29.45; SD = 10.35; Range 18–72). As predicted, individuals who were induced to engage in an upward counterfactual thinking writing activity regarding a previous negative experience related to an unattained goal reported higher state depression relative to individuals who completed a neutral writing task. Consistent with the sequential negative cognitions-to-affect framework articulated by theories of depression, regret mediated the link between upward counterfactual thinking and depression. Contrary to expectation, induced upward counterfactual thinking increased state depression when perceived personal control over the negative experience was low or moderate but not when high. Future opportunity to change the negative experience was independently associated with decreased state depression but did not interact with upward counterfactual thinking to influence responses. Implications of these findings are discussed.
... Epstude and Roese (2008) suggested that counterfactual thinking could prepare an individual for the future through causal inference, which means that the individual judges the likelihood of a certain future through counterfactuals. Other researchers have suggested that counterfactual thinking produces self-efficacy and mastery (Roese, 1999) as well as alternative actions to outcomes (Markman & McMullen, 2003;Roese, 1997), ameliorates regret and blame, and prevents future failure, which involves rebounding from failure (Boninger et al., 1994;Davis et al., 1995). Although the conditions of these effects have been depicted differently (e.g., controllable, self-mutable, and perceptions of opportunity) and the purposes of these researchers differed, the belief in an attainable future through counterfactual thinking and the accordingly positive developmental state can play an important role in organizing these data in a coherent way. ...
Counterfactual thinking puts a negative reality and better or worse alternative outcomes in the mind simultaneously. The implicit theory of intelligence considers whether individuals believe that intelligence can be promoted by effort or not. Previous studies suggest that counterfactual thinking interacting with the implicit theory of intelligence would evoke a belief in an attainable future or a belief that a certain future could one day be reality, thereby producing positive effects. Three studies examined the hypothesis that belief in an attainable future through counterfactual thinking would predict psychological capital, which is a positive developmental state of individuals. In Study 1 ( N = 62), belief in an attainable future was operationalized by introducing the implicit theory of intelligence and counterfactual thinking. Incremental theorists had higher psychological capital when engaged in counterfactual thinking than controls. In Study 2 ( N = 71), belief in an attainable future was operationalized by introducing the likelihood of the antecedents and of the outcomes, which were conceptualized as how people believe in their counterfactual thinking. Belief in an attainable future predicted psychological capital even after controlling for the influence of future time perspective and present-fatalistic time perspective, two concepts that depict how individuals process time-related information. In Study 3 ( N = 76), we conducted an intervention study. Participants in the experimental group were directed to construct attainable counterfactual thinking for one week. The experimental group had higher psychological capital than the control group. Across three studies, the findings consistently provided primary support for the hypothesis that belief in an attainable future would predict psychological capital.
... This pattern was thought to manifest because negative outcomes are more likely to be exceptional than positive outcomes (Landman, 1987). Davis et al. (1995) conducted a long-term study on people who had suffered the tragedy of losing their spouse or children in a car accident. Interviews revealed that participants' reported negative emotions could accurately predict individuals' frequency of counterfactual thoughts. ...
Speculative thinking refers to thinking about past or future possibilities; it includes counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and other types. In this narrative review, we discuss the traditional function of speculative thinking in improving future performance (i.e., the preparatory function). We also explore several non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking that have not been widely covered, namely the functions of conveying information and of supporting lying. In addition, we address temporal asymmetry; one perspective focuses on psychological distance in speculative thinking about the past and future, while another focuses on temporal asymmetry and reality/hypothetical differences in the preparatory function of speculative thinking. Overall, this review suggests that a broader functional theory is needed to address non-preparatory functions and the traditional preparatory function. Such a theory should cover all speculative thinking about the past and future rather than simply counterfactual thinking.
... In line with our own cognitive exhaustion model (Kofta and Sedek, 1998), we assume that some of the cognitive impairments observed in depression can be explained in terms of experienced uncontrollability. This experience may stem from past, irreversible life events, from subsequent ruminating, or from counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal et al., 1994;Davis et al., 1995). It is hypothesized that uncontrollability and, in particular, ruminative thoughts about uncontrollable conditions, lead to a depletion of those cognitive resources that support generative and flexible, constructive thinking. ...
Previous research provided consistent evidence for the existence of the unique cognitive limitation in depressed mood: the impairment of the construction of mental models. In the current research, we applied the classical paradigm using categorical syllogisms to examine the relationship between depressed mood and integrative reasoning, aiming at gathering research evidence on the moderating role of the operation span of working memory. Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that high working memory capacity is a buffering variable and acts as a protective factor preventing the negative impact of depressed mood on syllogistic reasoning. A categorical syllogism, in the simpler evaluative form, consists of two premises (that are assumed to be true) and a conclusion that is to be evaluated as valid (when it follows logically from the premises) or invalid (when it does not follow from the premises). In the cover story, we informed participants that they would read about some observations carried out in a normal garden (believable conclusions) versus in a garden with radical genetic transformations (unbelievable conclusions) in order to stimulate the emergence of belief bias. The participants were 115 high school students who filled out the BDI scale and completed the OSPAN task. In line with predictions, there were main effects of depressed mood and operation span on the accuracy of performance (worse performance in the group with a high in comparison to a low level of depressed mood and much worse performance in low compared to high OSPAN participants). The analyses yielded a strong interaction effect of Depressed mood × OSPAN × Conflict. For participants with high levels of working memory capacity, there were no limitations related to a high level of depressed mood in syllogistic reasoning. On the other hand, a different pattern emerged for participants with low working memory span. In this group, participants with a high level of depressed mood in comparison to those with a low level of depressed mood showed much higher limitations in syllogistic reasoning, especially in reasoning concerning conflict syllogisms. We discuss the implications of this research for recent therapeutic programs using computerized cognitive tasks aimed at individuals with a high level of depressed mood.
Infectious diseases resulting in pandemics remain one of the biggest threats to the wellbeing of the human race. Apart from physiological damage, pandemics have an adverse psychological impact on the victim. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential psychological and behavioral reactions of H1N1 swine flu pandemic in India 50 individuals residing in India were studied in 2 equivalent groups. The authors performed a comparative analysis of 25 individuals impacted by the H1N1 swine flu pandemic while other group was not impacted by H1N1 swine flu. Two standardized self-report questionnaires were administered to these groups in order to measure the level of stress and fear of personal death. Descriptive statistical analysis was used (mean and standard deviation) and two sample t-test was employed and results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in level of stress and fear of personal death between the impacted and non-impacted groups.
For a long time I have had the gnawing desire to convey the broad motivational sig nificance of the attributional conception that I have espoused and to present fully the argument that this framework has earned a rightful place alongside other leading theories of motivation. Furthermore, recent investigations have yielded insights into the attributional determinants of affect, thus providing the impetus to embark upon a detailed discussion of emotion and to elucidate the relation between emotion and motivation from an attributional perspective. The presentation of a unified theory of motivation and emotion is the goal of this book. My more specific aims in the chapters to follow are to: 1) Outline the basic princi ples that I believe characterize an adequate theory of motivation; 2) Convey what I perceive to be the conceptual contributions of the perspective advocated by my col leagues and me; 3) Summarize the empirical relations, reach some definitive con clusions, and point out the more equivocal empirical associations based on hypotheses derived from our particular attribution theory; and 4) Clarify questions that have been raised about this conception and provide new material for still further scrutiny. In so doing, the building blocks (if any) laid down by the attributional con ception will be readily identified and unknown juries of present and future peers can then better determine the value of this scientific product."
The chapter examines the influence of norms dominated by postcomputed representations on perceptions of social events. The aim is to simply encourage consideration of the role that counterfactual thinking plays in the process. To accomplish this, show that people's reactions to social events that evoke the same precomputed representations will vary if those events evoke different postcomputed counterfactual representations. The chapter focuses on three factors that influence the relation between the target event and the postcomputed representations it evokes. These factors are (1) the ease with which actions leading to the event can be undone mentally, (2) the ease with which the event itself can be undone mentally, and (3) the ease with which the event can be replicated mentally. Reality is also compared to the postcomputed representations that are neither consciously nor unconsciously held prior to an event but are generated post hoc by the event itself.
Presents a theory of norms and normality and applies the theory to phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it with the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. (3 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Close counterfactuals are alternatives to reality that "almost happened." A psychological analysis of close counterfactuals offers insights into the underlying representation of causal episodes and the inherent uncertainty attributed to many causal systems. The perception and representation of causal episodes is organized around possible focal outcomes, evoking a schema of causal forces competing over time. A distinction between 2 kinds of assessments of outcome probability is introduced: dispositions, based on causal information available prior to the episode, and propensities, based on event cues obtained from the episode itself. The distinction is critical to the use of almost, which requires the attribution of a strong propensity to the counterfactual outcome. The final discussion focuses on characteristic differences between psychological and philosophical approaches to the analysis of counterfactuals, causation, and probability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This article focuses on self-blame in victims of violence. Various types of victim self-blame are delineated (e.g., blame for causing the violence, blame for not being able to modify the violence and blame for tolerating the violence) and speculations are offered as to how each of these might be related to the affective state and coping ability of victims. Additional distinctions are made between the acts of: 1) blaming oneself for being a cause vs simply being an occasion for the violence and 2) blaming one's abuse on personal characteristics about which one feels positively vs characteristics about which one feels negatively. The implications of these distinctions for an understanding of the victimization process are discussed.
Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) identifies factors that determine the ease with which alternatives to reality can be imagined or constructed. One assumption of norm theory is that the greater the availability of imagined alternatives to an event, the stronger will be the affective reaction elicited by the event. The present two experiments explore this assumption in the context of observers' reactions to victims. It was predicted that negative outcomes that strongly evoked positive alternatives would elicit more sympathy from observers than negative outcomes that weakly evoked positive alternatives. The ease of counterfactual thought was manipulated in the first experiment by the spatial distance between the negative outcome and a positive alternative, and in the second experiment by the habitualness of the actions that precipitated the victimization. Consistent with norm theory, subjects recommended more compensation for victims of fates for which a positive alternative was highly available. Implications of the results for various types of reactions to victims are discussed.
In their research on decision under uncertainty, Kahneman and Tversky (1982a) examined whether, given the same negative outcome, there is any difference in the experience of regret, depending on whether the outcome follows action or inaction. This study attempted to replicate Kahneman and Tversky's (1982a) finding of greater regret for action than inaction and to determine whether this pattern extends to the parallel case of joy over happy outcomes, to different life domains, and to both genders. Through a vignette experiment, the previousfinding of a strong tendency to imagine greater regret following action than inaction was replicated. The same pattern was observed in the case of joy over positive outcomes. In two of the three vignettes presented, this "actor effect "was stronger for negative than for positive outcomes. In a third vignette, explicit knowledge of a missed negative outcome seems to have magnified the usual joy over having made a good decision, causing the expected joy over acting and succeeding to rise to the typically high level of regret over acting and failing. Suggestions regarding the future study of these issues are offered.
The role of counterfactuals in judgments of affective reactions to outcomes was examined. Subjects read about individuals who experienced gains or losses as a result of either deciding to take action and make a change or deciding not to take any new action. In addition, the salience of the counterfactual alternative was manipulated. Past results were replicated in the case of negative outcomes: Individuals who lost money on the basis of action were judged as feeling worse than those who lost money on the basis of inaction. This occurred under both high and low salience of the counterfactual. With positive consequences, however, exaggerated affect for outcomes associated with action rather than inaction occurred only when the counterfactual alternative was made highly salient. Implications for the construction and use of counterfactuals are discussed, and a process model is developed on the basis of the data and the proposed conceptualization.