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Perspective-Taking
and Self–Other Overlap:
Fostering Social Bonds
and Facilitating Social
Coordination
Adam D. Galinsky
Northwestern University
Gillian Ku
London Business School
Cynthia S. Wang
Northwestern University
The present article offers a conceptual model for how the cognitive processes associated with
perspective-taking facilitate social coordination and foster social bonds. We suggest that the
benefits of perspective-taking accrue through an increased self–other overlap in cognitive
representations and discuss the implications of this perspective-taking induced self–other
overlap for stereotyping and prejudice. Whereas perspective-taking decreases stereotyping of
others (through application of the self to the other), it increases stereotypicality of one’s own
behavior (through inclusion of the other in the self). To promote social bonds, perspective-
takers utilize information, including stereotypes, to coordinate their behavior with others. The
discussion focuses on the implications, both positive and negative, of this self–other overlap for
social relationships and discusses how conceptualizing perspective-taking, as geared toward
supporting specific social bonds, provides a framework for understanding why the effects of
perspective-taking are typically target-specific and do not activate a general helping mind-set.
Through its attempts to secure social bonds, perspective-taking can be an engine of social
harmony, but can also reveal a dark side, one full of ironic consequences.
Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations
2005 Vol 8(2) 109–124
keywords perspective-taking, social bonds,
social coordination, stereotyping and prejudice
G
P
I
R
Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
8:2; 109–124; DOI: 10.1177/1368430205051060
Author’s note
Address correspondence to Adam D. Galinsky,
Department of Management and
Organizations, Leverone Hall, Kellogg School
of Management, Northwestern University,
2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
[email: agalinsky@northwestern.edu]
02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 109
THE FORMATION and maintenance of social
bonds is a critical ingredient for psychological
and physical well-being (Maslow, 1968). Indeed,
humans appear to have a fundamental need to
belong, to be connected to others, forming the
basis for much of social interaction. One way
that social bonds can emerge or be reinforced
is through smooth social coordination. By
creating a psychological sense of similarity and
a feeling of behavioral and mental connected-
ness, social coordination is the glue that binds
and bonds social relationships.
What behaviors, social strategies, and cogni-
tive processes are available to aid in the pursuit
of social bonds? We propose that one simple yet
vital strategy for smoothing the cogs of social
interaction and building social bonds is
perspective-taking. We define perspective-
taking as the process of imagining the world
from another’s vantage point or imagining
oneself in another’s shoes. Although many
scholars have suggested that perspective-taking
increases feelings of sympathy and empathy
(Batson, 1991), we suggest that the cognitive
consequences of perspective-taking are a
critical mechanism behind its ability to facilitate
social coordination and foster social bonds.
When we take the perspective of another, there
is greater overlap between mental represen-
tations of the self and mental representations of
the other (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996;
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). We contend that
as a result of this increased self–other overlap,
perspective-takers are able to effectively coordi-
nate their behavior and to bond with others.
In this article, we offer a conceptual model for
how the processes associated with perspective-
taking aid in the pursuit and maintenance of
social bonds, specifically highlighting its
application to research on stereotyping and
prejudice (see Figure 1). Ample evidence has
demonstrated that perspective-taking leads
individuals to see more of themselves in others
and affects how they evaluate and describe
others. For example, prior research has shown
that perspective-taking can aid in the formation
of social bonds by decreasing prejudice and
stereotyping of target individuals and groups
(Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997; Galinsky
& Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a;
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Through
perspective-taking and the application of the
self to the other, social bias is reduced, allowing
perspective-taking to aid in the creation and
maintenance of social bonds.
Although research has shown that perspective-
takers see more of themselves in the other, one
of the central questions we explore is whether
perspective-takers will also see more of the
other in themselves and come to act more like
the target. By examining how taking the
perspective of a member of a stereotyped group
impacts one’s own self-description and one’s
own behavior, we suggest that perspective-
taking may be an effective means of not only
decreasing stereotyping, but also increasing
behavioral mimicry and coordinating social
behavior. We review some of our recent studies
that show that perspective-taking, while
decreasing stereotyping of others, also impacts
self-description in a stereotypic manner and
results in more stereotype-consistent behaviors.
Thus, not only can perspective-taking increase
social bonds by decreasing prejudice and stereo-
typing, it can also increase social bonds by
creating synchrony and social coordination. We
explore this relationship between perspective-
taking and facilitating social bonds and social
coordination, discussing the role of stereotypes
as an impediment and facilitator to the for-
mation of social bonds. Through both seeing
the self in the other and seeing the other in the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
110
Figure 1. Reciprocal relationship between social bonds and perspective-taking when taking the perspective of
an individual from a stereotyped group.
Inclusion of Other in Self Increased Stereotypical Behavior of Self Social Coordination Social Bonds
Social Bonds
Perspective-Taking
Inclusion of Self in Other
Reduced Stereot
y
pical Jud
g
ments of Others Social bonds
02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 110
self, perspective-takers are able to navigate a
complex social world, coordinating their
behavior with a diverse set of individuals, and
establishing multicultural social bonds.
The role of perspective-taking in social
coordination and social bonds
Scholars from Maslow (1968) to Baumeister
and Leary (1995) have considered the need to
belong, or the desire to establish and maintain
social ties, as the most important motivator of
behavior once the basic physiological needs for
nourishment and safety have been fulfilled. The
fundamental and motivating nature of the need
to belong is best demonstrated through the
severe negative consequences that occur when
someone is socially excluded. Social isolation
impacts cognitive, social, and physical function-
ing, with excluded individuals displaying a
decreased ability to exhibit logical reasoning
(Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002), an
increase in self-defeating behaviors (Leary,
Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Twenge,
Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003), and detrimen-
tal physical responses, such as stress, anxiety,
and reduced physical health (Williams, 2001).
The need to belong is so strong that it leads
people to expend great effort to maintain long-
lasting bonds (Bridges, 1980), even when the
relationship is destructive (e.g. abusive spouses,
Strube, 1988).
We contend that perspective-taking, having
long been recognized as critical to proper social
functioning, is a key ingredient in the reduc-
tion of interpersonal conflict and the construc-
tion, maintenance, and preservation of social
bonds. From cognitive functioning (Piaget,
1932) to moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), the
ability to entertain different perspectives is a
crucial mechanism of successful development
and is oftentimes considered the foundation of
human social capacity (Mead, 1934). Davis
(1983) discussed the role of perspective-taking
in social coordination and social bonds, finding
that perspective-taking, as measured by an
individual difference measure, was positively
correlated with social competence. More direct
evidence that perspective-taking is geared
toward facilitating the need to belong and to
form bonds with others comes from research
showing that individuals are more likely to take
the perspective of close others and taking the
perspective of others increases a sense of
psychological closeness (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis,
Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Pickett, Gardner, &
Knowles, 2004). As stated eloquently by Davis,
‘[a] perspective-taking ability should allow an
individual to anticipate the behavior and reac-
tions of others, therefore facilitating smoother
and more rewarding interpersonal relation-
ships’ (Davis, 1983, p. 115).
It is clear that forming rewarding social
bonds is a hallmark of well-being, and being
deprived of these bonds is the epitome of
psychological devastation. Unfortunately, social
bonds are damaged in the presence of inter-
personal conflict and under the specter of
stereotyping. The very thought that one may
stereotype another or that some unintentional
expression could be interpreted as prejudicial
can taint interactions with a palpable feeling of
anxiety, making the prospect of intergroup
contact foreboding (Blair, Park, & Bachelor,
2003; Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton, 2003;
Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Since perspective-
taking has been shown to successfully decrease
stereotyping, prejudice, and social aggression
(Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997; Finlay &
Stephan, 2000; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000a; Richardson, Hammock,
Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994; Stephan &
Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003), it can be used
to improve and build social bonds. Impres-
sively, taking the perspective of a target allows
perspective-takers to decrease stereotyping,
prejudice, and intergroup bias toward the target
and the target’s group (Batson, Polycarpou
et al., 1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Galinsky &
Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a; Stephan
& Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003). By reducing
stereotyping and the palpable concern that one
may display seemingly prejudicial responses,
perspective-taking improves the climate of
social interaction and facilitates the formation
and maintenance of social bonds.
Perspective-taking also appears to facilitate
social coordination. Perspective-taking, as
Galinsky et al. perspective-taking and self–other overlap
111
02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 111
measured by an individual difference scale,
increases one’s ability to mimic others’ behav-
iors, which then produces smoother, more
harmonious interactions (Chartrand & Bargh,
1999), suggesting that behavioral mimicry
serves the need to belong, that it is a signaling
device to communicate interpersonal connec-
tions. Overall, mimicry is associated with
greater rapport (LaFrance, 1982), increases
when the need for affiliation is on active duty,
with people mimicking those individuals whom
they like (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin &
Chartrand, 2003), liking those who mimic them
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and with natural
differences in perspective-taking (Chartrand &
Bargh, 1999) moderating these effects.
Further evidence that perspective-taking,
mimicry, and social coordination are related
comes from research on interdependent, as
opposed to independent, self-construals. Inter-
dependent and independent self-construals
differ in their conceptualization of individuals’
relationships with others, with interdependent
individuals including others in the self-concept,
and independent individuals focusing on a self
that is autonomous from others (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994). As one might
expect, individuals with interdependent self-
construals are more likely to take the perspec-
tive of others (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) and
those with interdependent self-construals,
whether experimentally manipulated or
examined as a cultural difference (e.g.
Japanese vs. Westerners), also display more
behavioral mimicry (van Baaren, Maddux,
Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg,
2003). Through increased mimicry, perspec-
tive-taking serves as a device of social coordi-
nation, helping to cement and form social
bonds.
There is clearly a reciprocal relationship
between perspective-taking, behavioral mimicry,
and rapport. Is there a common underlying
process that connects all of these variables? We
turn to the role of self–other overlap as an
important mechanism in driving the diverse
effects of perspective-taking.
Perspective-taking and self–other
overlap: Application of the self to the
other and application of the other to
the self?
Perspective-taking has been shown to increase
the overlap between mental representations of
the self and mental representations of the other
(Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz,
2000a). Indeed, many of the effects of perspec-
tive-taking can be explained through this
increased self–other overlap in cognitive
representations: the relationship between col-
lectivism and perspective-taking is mediated by
the amount of self–other overlap (Vorauer &
Cameron, 2002); the relationship between
perspective-taking and decreased stereotyping
is mediated by the level of self–other overlap
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a); and the
relationship between perspective-taking and
helping behavior appears to be driven by per-
ceptions of oneness (Cialdini et al., 1997). For
example, Cialdini et al. (1997) found that the
relationship between empathy and willingness
to help was eliminated when the degree of
self–other overlap was statistically controlled.
One question that emerges from the
self–other overlap findings is whether the
overlap is driven more by seeing the self in
the other or by inclusion of the other in the
self. The former, seeing more of the self in the
other, refers to perceiving the other as possess-
ing characteristics of the self, making the other
more ‘self-like’, as suggested by Davis et al.
(1996). The latter, including the other in the
self, on the other hand, refers to the extent the
self comes to include characteristics of the
other. Is the self only applied to the other or is
the other also applied to the self? This question
is particularly difficult to answer based on some
of the methods used to judge self–other
overlap. For example, in the study on the
relationship between perspective-taking and
collectivism (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002),
self–other overlap was measured using the
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS). The
IOS (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) is a
scale that contains seven Venn diagrams repre-
senting varying degrees of self–other overlap.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
112
02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 112
Thus, the scale measures overlap between self
and other but cannot distinguish between
whether the self is being included in the other
or the other is being included in the self.
Despite its name, the scale only measures per-
ceived closeness.
Much of the research on perspective-taking
induced self–other overlap has focused on and
demonstrated that increased self–other overlap
is typically characterized by seeing more of our-
selves in the other, with a greater percentage of
self-descriptive traits being ascribed to the
target (Davis et al., 1996). The representation
of the target constructed by the perspective-
taker comes to resemble the perspective-
taker’s own self-representation. Not only does
perspective-taking result in greater application
of the self to the target (Cialdini et al., 1997;
Davis, 1983; Davis et al., 1996), it also leads to
greater application of the self to the group to
which the target belongs (Galinsky & Ku, 2004;
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). In the Galinsky
and Moskowitz study (2000a), the more the
perspective-taker saw the self in the target,
the more he/she saw the self in the target’s
group, and the less likely the group was to be
stereotyped. Since individuals tend to have
egocentrically biased opinions of themselves,
perspective-takers apply positive self-descriptors
to the target, resulting in an improved view of
the target and decreased prejudiced and stereo-
typing (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In fact, Cialdini
et al. (1997) have suggested that because
perspective-taking leads one to see more of
oneself in the other, perspective-taking induced
helping is not really altruistic, but can be
characterized as egoistically motivated.
Although these studies demonstrate the
importance of applying the self to others in
intergroup and interpersonal relations, they do
not speak to whether the other is also applied
to the self during perspective-taking. Is perspec-
tive-taking bidirectional with true self and other
merging or is the self applied to the other
without reciprocation?
Several lines of research provide some
evidence that others can be included in the self.
For instance, in their self-expansion model,
Aron and colleagues (Aron & Aron, 1986, 1996,
1997; Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001; Aron
et al., 1991; Wright & Tropp, 2002) argue that
humans can satisfy the basic motivation for
interpersonal closeness by expanding their self-
concepts to include others in the self. Thus,
close relationships (e.g. spouses) are character-
ized by including the other in one’s own mental
self-representation (Aron et al., 1991). Simi-
larly, like the work on independent and inter-
dependent self-construals, when the social self
is made accessible (by priming people with the
word ‘we’), individuals assimilate or include
social comparison information into their self-
representations (Stapel & Koomen, 2000).
Additionally, on constructs related to affili-
ation, individuals show inclusion of their inter-
action partners in their own self-descriptions,
suggesting that including others in the self
assists goals related to social connection
(Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003). In an intergroup
context, research has demonstrated that in-
group identification can be measured by the
degree to which the in-group is included in the
self (Tropp & Wright, 2001).
Seeing more of the other in the self also
relates to the concept of self-stereotyping. Self-
stereotyping refers to the extent to which group
members consider traits that are descriptive of
the group to be descriptive of the self—in
essence one possesses a stereotypical self-
perception (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987). Such self-stereotyping often
tends to be selective, with group members more
likely to characterize positive stereotypic attrib-
utes as self-descriptive (Biernat, Vescio, &
Green, 1996). Importantly, self-stereotyping
relates to maintaining social bonds and meeting
the need for inclusion (Pickett, Bonner, &
Coleman, 2002). When one’s need to belong is
on active alert, one is more likely to alter one’s
private and public image to correspond with
the specific stereotypic content of one’s in-
group.
We therefore suggest that self–other overlap
in perspective-taking is not only driven by
applying the self to the other but may also be
caused by including the other in the self, with
perspective-takers applying their own traits onto
others but also viewing the other’s attributes as
Galinsky et al. perspective-taking and self–other overlap
113
02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 113
self-descriptive. We contend that not only will
perspective-taking lead to changes in self-
description, but it should also alter the behav-
iorial tendencies of the perspective-taker to
match those of the target (see Figure 1).
Although some evidence suggests that
perspective-takers mimic the behaviors of
others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), a question
remains of what happens when one takes the
perspective of a member of a stereotyped
out-group. Will one come to see the self as
possessing those traits that are characteristic of
that group, as well as show behavioral tenden-
cies that are consistent with the stereotype of
that group?
Perspective-taking: Becoming and
behaving stereotypically
By applying oneself to the target and the target
group, perspective-taking has been shown to be
an important strategy for decreasing stereo-
typing and prejudice (Batson, Polycarpou et al.,
1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Galinsky & Ku,
2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a; Stephan &
Finlay, 1999; Vescio et al., 2003), and thus,
building and maintaining social bonds. We
have recently begun to explore whether
perspective-taking increases the overlap
between self and other representations by not
only applying the self to others, but also by
assimilating the stereotype of others into the
self. By including the other in the self, perspec-
tive-takers should be more likely to coordinate
behaviors, to increase perceptions of closeness
and connectedness, and ultimately to enhance
social bonds.
In most of our studies, we contrast perspective-
taking with stereotype suppression because
both are intuitively appealing strategies for
navigating multicultural landscapes. Galinsky
and Moskowitz (2000a) demonstrated that
perspective-taking is a more successful strategy
for controlling stereotyping than is suppres-
sion; whereas perspective-takers, by applying
the self to the target, decrease stereotyping and
prejudice, suppression often ironically and
unintentionally produces the very stereotypic
thoughts one is trying to avoid (Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000a; Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, & Jetten, 1994).
1
By also including the
other in the self and increasing social coordi-
nation, we contend that perspective-taking is,
overall, a more effective approach for securing
social bonds than is suppression.
There are a number of ways that perspective-
taking has been manipulated. In the most
utilized paradigm, participants listen to a
randomly selected interview ostensibly from a
local radio station and are given specific
instructions on how to listen to the tape
(Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Maner et al.,
2002; Vescio et al., 2003). In most cases, the
person in the tape describes a distressing situ-
ation (with the most commonly used tape
involving a woman named Katie Banks who lost
her parents in a car accident and is struggling
to stay in school while having to care for her
younger siblings). In the control condition of
this paradigm, participants are told to listen to
the tape objectively, in a detached manner. In
the typical perspective-taking manipulation,
participants are instructed to imagine how the
person in the tape feels, focusing on how the
events have affected his or her life. This con-
dition is often labeled ‘perspective-taking other
condition’ because the focus is on what the
other person is thinking and feeling. Some-
times, a second perspective-taking condition
has been used, often labeled ‘perspective-taking
self condition’, in which participants are told to
imagine how they would feel if they were the
person in the tape. In this paradigm, the
manipulation checks of perspective-taking
often involve measuring feelings of empathy
(i.e. sympathetic, compassionate, soft-hearted,
warm, tender, and moved) and/or asking
participants to report the degree to which they
remained objective when listening to the tape
and the degree to which they imagined what
the person in the tape was feeling and experi-
encing. This paradigm allows researchers to use
different targets (e.g. from a stereotyped
group) and to describe different types of situ-
ations (e.g. whether the person is treated in a
discriminatory manner by others).
A second paradigm used to induce perspective-
taking involves participants writing a narrative
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
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02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 114
essay about the typical day in the life of a person
in a photograph (Galinsky & Moskowitiz, 2000;
Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In the control condition
of this paradigm, participants are simply told to
write about the typical day of the photographed
individual. In the perspective-taking condition,
participants are told to go through the day as if
they were that person, looking at the world
through their eyes. This manipulation of
perspective-taking is essentially a ‘perspective-
taking self’ manipulation. This paradigm was
adapted from Macrae et al. (1994) who used it
to explore the consequences of stereotype sup-
pression. In the suppression condition for the
‘day in the life narrative essay’ task, participants
are told to actively avoid letting stereotypic
thoughts influence their essays. Whether or not
participants write their essays in the first person
is often used as a manipulation check of
perspective-taking (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In this
paradigm, the person in the photograph is
usually a member of a salient stereotyped group.
The main differences between these two
paradigms is that in the ‘listen to an interview’
paradigm, experimenters control the content
of all information and the participants are a
passive recipient of that information. In the
‘day in the life narrative essay’ paradigm,
participants construct and control the content
of their expressions. Both paradigms represent
different ways that individuals may psycho-
logically interact with others and we used both
paradigms in investigating whether perspective-
taking increases social coordination by increas-
ing the stereotypicality of the perspective-taker’s
behavior.
Seeing the self stereotypically
In one experiment (Galinsky, Wang, & Ku,
2005), we gave participants a photograph of a
cheerleader, replete with pom-poms, and asked
participants to write a day in her life by either
taking the perspective of the woman in the
photograph or by suppressing any stereotypes
of the woman. After the day in the life task,
participants rated how attractive and sexy
they currently felt. We predicted that if
perspective-taking leads individuals to come to
see themselves as more like the target of
perspective-taking, these participants would
feel more attractive than suppression condition
participants, in line with the stereotype of
cheerleaders as beautiful and sexy. This is
exactly what we found—simply taking the
perspective of a cheerleader led participants to
see themselves as more attractive: perspective-
takers became gorgeous in their own minds. In
follow-up studies, we have had participants
write ‘a day in the life’ essays about a photo-
graph of an African-American male or of an
elderly male. Perspective-takers, compared to
both a control condition and a suppression
condition, rated traits that were stereotypic of
African-Americans and the elderly as more
self-descriptive. When we take the perspective
of others we come to include their traits, even
stereotypic ones, as being part of the self.
Behaving stereotypically
We next explored whether perspective-takers,
having come to judge themselves in more
stereotypical terms, would actually behave more
stereotypically. This is a complicated question
because stereotype activation, in and of itself,
often leads to stereotype-consistent behaviors
on the part of perceivers. For example, being
primed with the elderly stereotype led college
students to walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996) and being primed with the
professor stereotype (Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1998) led participants to perform
better on an intellectual task. Thus, the mere
activation of any construct, independent of
perspective-taking, tends to increase behaviors
consistent with that construct.
However, some evidence suggests that
whether stereotype-consistent behaviors occur
may be connected to whether social bonds are
desired or avoided. When there is conflict or
competition with an out-group, intergroup
comparisons result in behavioral contrast
effects, with one’s own behavior becoming less
similar to the stereotype of the out-group
(Spears, Gordijn, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004).
For example, when social identities and an ‘us
vs. them’ mentality are salient, one is likely to
walk more rather than less quickly following
activation of the elderly stereotype. In contrast,
Galinsky et al. perspective-taking and self–other overlap
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02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 115
the amount of contact with members of a
stereotyped group has been shown to increase
the propensity to behave in ways that are
stereotypical of that group (Dijksterhuis, Aarts,
Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000). The fact
that contact and amount of experience also
tends to increase perspective-taking suggests
that perspective-taking may increase stereotyp-
icality of an individual’s behavior. These
findings of behavioral contrast away from the
activated stereotypes when intergroup distinc-
tions are high and of behavioral assimilation
when previous experience with the outgroup is
extensive provide some preliminary evidence
that concerns over social bonds may play a role
in whether one acts more or less like the
target’s stereotype. Building off both the
behavioral mimicry work and the finding that
experience with stereotyped groups predicts
the amount of stereotype-consistent behavior,
we contend that perspective-taking will
be likely to lead to stereotype-consistent
behaviors.
Additionally, Wheeler, Jarvis, and Petty
(2001) found that having participants write a
day in the life of a person with a stereotypically
African-American name (Tyrone) led to more
stereotype-consistent behavior (i.e. poor
performance on an intellectual task), with this
effect strongest when individuals happened to
write their essays in the first person. Since
writing narrative essays in the first person is
often used as a manipulation check for perspec-
tive-taking (Galinsky & Ku, 2004), those partici-
pants who wrote in the first person in the
Wheeler et al. study may have been taking the
perspective of the target person, causing them
to display more stereotypical behavior. However,
because Wheeler et al. did not manipulate
perspective-taking, the hypothesized relation-
ship between perspective-taking and stereo-
typicality of behavior is open to a number of
alternative explanations.
We specifically tested whether perspective-
taking leads to an increase in stereotype-
consistent behavior (Galinsky et al., 2005). We
manipulated perspective-taking by telling
participants that they were going to listen to an
audiotape of a person describing a typical day
in his life and that they would later be asked to
give their impressions of the person in the
audiotape. The person in the tape described
himself as an assistant professor of political
science, a stereotypically analytical person. We
used the common perspective-taking manipu-
lation (Batson et al., 1997; see also Vescio et al.,
2003) of having participants imagine how the
person in the tape was feeling and thinking
(perspective-taking other condition) or
imagine how they themselves would feel and
think if they were that person (perspective-
taking self condition). Non perspective-
takers/control participants were told to listen
to the tape objectively. After listening to the
tape, we had participants complete a sup-
posedly unrelated task. The second task was
described as a pilot test to develop materials for
another study exploring hemispheric differ-
ences in cognition. Participants were instructed
to complete 24 analytical questions adapted
from the Law School Admissions Test as quickly
yet accurately as possible in 20 minutes. We pre-
dicted that participants would perform signifi-
cantly better on the analytic task after taking
the perspective of the professor. Consistent
with this prediction, our results showed that
taking the perspective (both perspective-taking
self and perspective-taking other conditions) of
a stereotypically analytical individual improved
analytical reasoning ability. Becoming smarter
after taking the perspective of a professor
should facilitate interaction with such a person,
allowing the perspective-taker to riff seamlessly
in conversation.
Increasing stereotypicality of one’s own
behavior while decreasing stereotypicality
in judgments of others
Perspective-taking appears to increase the
stereotypicality of behavior when the stereo-
typic characteristics are positive and socially
valued (e.g. analytic ability for professors).
The question of whether negative stereotypic
traits will also affect perspective-takers’
behavior is particularly interesting. One
response by perspective-takers may be to
decrease stereotypicality of their behavior to
compensate for the negative stereotypic
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
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02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 116
attribute. For example, when interacting with
an elderly person, a perspective-taker’s
memory might become particularly active and
accurate. However, Tiedens and Jimenez
(2003) have found that imagining interacting
with a familiar other who is agreeable leads to
more agreeable self-perceptions, but that
imagining interacting with a familiar other
who is quarrelsome leads to more quarrelsome
self-perceptions, suggesting that even negative
attributes of others can become part of the
self. Similarly, Galinsky et al. (2005) found
that after taking the perspective of an African
American, both positive (athletic and
rhythmic) and negative (loud and aggressive)
traits that are stereotypic of African-Americans
were deemed more self-descriptive. The
findings by Dijksterhuis et al. (2000) that indi-
viduals become more forgetful after having
spent time with the elderly suggests that behav-
ioral compensation for the target’s negative
stereotypic behavior may be unlikely. Negative
stereotypic traits, having become momentarily
self-descriptive, may drive behavior, with
perspective-takers acting in a stereotype-
consistent fashion even when that behavior has
potentially negative connotations.
Considering the effects of self–other overlap,
we might thus see that perspective-takers are
likely to walk more slowly after taking the
perspective of an elderly male to calibrate their
behavior with the expected behavior of an
elderly person (through inclusion of the other
in the self). However, taking the perspective of
the elderly should also decrease stereotyping of
the elderly (through application of the self to
the other). Perspective-taking should improve
social bonds by both decreasing social bias and
by increasing social coordination.
Thus, it is possible that perspective-taking will
result in an intriguing dissociation between
judgment and behavior. Although some
theorists assume a direct perception to
behavior link (e.g. Wheeler & Petty, 2001),
others have postulated separate schemas for
perception and behavior. Carver, Ganellen,
Froming, and Chambers (1983) suggested that
individuals use interpretive schemas for per-
ceiving and understanding behaviors, but use
behavioral schemas for producing manifest
behaviors. Similarly, Mussweiler and Förster
(2000) have suggested that when an indi-
vidual’s perceptual and behavioral experiences
with a stimulus diverge, judgments and
behavior may become dissociated from each
other. We contend that not only can differen-
tial perceptual and behavioral experiences with
a stimulus lead to a systematic dissociation
between judgments and behavior, but that this
dissociation can also result from the strategies
and goals (e.g. perspective-taking) that an indi-
vidual has.
To examine this potential judgment/
behavior dissociation, we had participants take
the perspective of an elderly man, evaluate an
ambiguously dependent (a trait stereotypical of
the elderly) individual, and then walk down a
hallway (Galinsky et al., 2005). Participants
came to the lab and were first shown a photo-
graph of an elderly man and were asked to write
a day in his life by either taking the perspective
of the man or by suppressing any stereotypes.
After the day in the life task, participants read
a paragraph adapted from Banaji, Hardin, and
Rothman (1993), in which a woman named
Donna performs a series of ambiguously depen-
dent behaviors. To measure stereotype accessi-
bility and application, participants were then
asked to evaluate Donna’s level of dependency.
After rating Donna, participants were told that
the first part of the experiment was over and
they could walk down the hall to the next part.
To measure stereotypicality of behavior, we sur-
reptitiously timed how long it took participants
to walk down the hallway because walking
slowly is a behavior that is stereotypic of the
elderly. Since we believe that perspective-taking
is a strategy geared toward social coordination,
we predicted that perspective-takers would use
the stereotype in behavior, but would not use
the stereotype perceptually. We found exactly
that. Perspective-takers walked more slowly,
using the stereotype to coordinate their behav-
iors; however, perspective-takers also showed
less stereotypicality in their judgments of how
dependent Donna was, presumably using the
activated self-concept (rather than the stereo-
type) in perception and judgment. We believe
Galinsky et al. perspective-taking and self–other overlap
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02 Galinsky (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:06 pm Page 117
the reduction in stereotypicality of judgments
and the simultaneous increase in stereotypical-
ity of behavior is driven by the fact that perspec-
tive-taking is a strategy geared toward
smoothing the cogs of social interaction and
securing social bonds.
Discussion
Humans are social creatures who necessitate
and actively seek out interactions with others to
satisfy the fundamental need to belong. In this
article, we have explored how perspective-
taking is a simple and subtle strategy that can
form and strengthen social bonds through a
number of means. Perspective-taking is able to
improve social relationships by decreasing
stereotyping and prejudice toward the target
and target’s group. In addition, perspective-
taking smoothes the cogs of social interaction
by facilitating social coordination. These
benefits of perspective-taking can be explained
through a simple process: increased self–other
overlap. During perspective-taking, represen-
tations of the self and representations of the
target of perspective-taking come to share an
increased number of features. We have dis-
cussed how this increased self–other overlap is
the product of two different processes. First, the
self is applied to the other, so that the other
becomes more ‘self-like’; the representation of
the target constructed by the perspective-taker
comes to resemble the perspective-taker’s own
self-representation. Second, the other is
included in the self, so that the self becomes
more ‘other-like’. Features of the target of
perspective-taking are now considered to be
self-descriptive. When considered simul-
taneously, we see that application of the self to
the other increases social bonds (through
decreased prejudice and stereotyping) whereas
application of the other to the self increases
social coordination (and hence, social bonds).
Through self–other merging—application of
the self to the other and inclusion of the other
in the self—social coordination is facilitated
and social bonds strengthened (see Figure 1).
Davis et al. (1996) and Galinsky and
Moskowitz (2000a) have both suggested that
there are two separate processes involved in
perspective-taking—a conscious, explicit effect
and a nonconscious, implicit effect. Feelings of
sympathy and increased liking are intended,
conscious, explicit effects of perspective-taking.
However, during perspective-taking, the self-
concept is also implicitly activated and applied
toward the target. Evidence that this overlap
occurs implicitly comes from research showing
that the increased self-target overlap following
perspective-taking is not mediated by increased
liking and is generally impervious to the
availability of cognitive resources (Davis et al.,
1996). One question that remains for future
research is whether the inclusion of the other
in the self also occurs implicitly, whether bi-
directional self–other merging is independent
of the availability of cognitive resources.
Potential drawbacks of perspective-taking:
Egocentric bias, target specificity, and
producing conflict and miscoordination
Thus far, we have suggested that both appli-
cation of the self to the other and inclusion of
the other in the self generally have positive
effects on social relationships. However, these
processes are not without their own potential
costs. Increased application of the self to the
other suggests a potential irony in the ability of
perspective-taking to reduce intergroup biases:
perspective-taking builds off egocentric biases
to decrease stereotyping and improve out-
group evaluations (Galinsky, 2002). During
perspective-taking both positive and negative
self-descriptive attributes are applied to the
target (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). Thus,
the positive effects of perspective-taking on
prejudice depend on the possession of high
self-esteem. When perspective-takers feel posi-
tively about themselves, their positive self-
concepts are activated and applied, elevating
opinions of the target group. However, when
individuals suffer from low self-esteem, no
reduction in prejudice occurs. Galinsky & Ku
(2004) found across two experiments, that
evaluations of a stereotyped group were only
improved when the perspective-taker had
positive self-esteem, either chronically or exper-
imentally manipulated. Applying the self to the
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other is not a panacea for prejudice reduction,
but is only effective when perspective-takers feel
positively about themselves.
Similarly, we have focused on the role of
perspective-taking in building social bonds.
However, unlike a multitude of other cognitive
processes and mind-sets, from counterfactual
mind-sets (Galinsky & Kray, 2004; Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000b) to implemental mind-sets
(Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990),
which persist when activated and are utilized in
unrelated contexts, perspective-taking tends to
produce target-specific effects. Thus, perspec-
tive-taking does not create a general helping
attitude; instead perspective-taking appears to
assist in the formation and maintenance of
specific social bonds. Taking the perspective of
one target person neither decreases stereo-
typing nor improves evaluations of a different
social category, nor does it activate a more
general tendency to help. For example,
Dovidio, Allen, and Schroeder (1990) found
that, following the induction of empathy, assist-
ance only increased for the problematic situ-
ation for which empathy was induced and did
not activate a more general tendency to help.
In intergroup conflicts, taking the perspective
of one stigmatized group does not improve atti-
tudes toward other stigmatized groups
(Galinsky & Ku, 2005; Vescio et al., 2003). As a
result of its target-specific nature, the social
bonds that result from perspective-taking can
conflict with other normative beliefs, such as
justice, fairness, and equity. Because the target
of perspective-taking is accorded ‘favored’
status, perspective-taking can lead to preferen-
tial treatment of the target, even when this
favoritism leads to fewer contributions to the
overall collective (Batson, Batson et al., 1995;
Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995).
Who we take the perspective of has import-
ant short- and long-term consequences for how
the effects of perspective-taking play out. If we
consider an individual taking the perspective of
a skinhead, one might imagine the perspective-
taker empathizing with and forming tighter
social bonds with the skinhead, as well as
forming more positive evaluations toward skin-
heads in general. Although decreasing our
stereotypical judgments of skinheads may be an
initial step toward improving overall social
harmony, the perspective-taker may become
inadvertently linked with the negativity of the
skinhead and may be unjustly condemned by
society. That is, perspective-taking can lead to
stigma by association, what Goffman (1963)
referred to as courtesy stigma, a belief by
observers that the perspective-taker embodies
the negative characteristics of the target of
perspective-taking.
Taking the perspective of individuals that are
deemed objectionable is further complicated
when they are members of a salient out-group.
For example, in the movie American History X,
actor Ed Norton plays a skinhead who forms a
bond in prison with a Black inmate and is
attacked by his fellow skinheads for this new
bond. In real life, Susan Sontag and Bill Maher
were both condemned following the terrorist
attacks on September 11th for taking the
perspective of the hijackers and suggesting that
the hijackers demonstrated courage and not
cowardice. Through perspective-taking, they
and others considered the broader social
context, suggesting that American foreign
policy may, at least in part, have contributed to
the fury that motivated Osama Bin Laden and
the hijackers. Bill Maher lost his job and Susan
Sontag endured vicious verbal attacks. Taking
the perspective of salient out-group member
may strengthen the bond with that person, but
may cost individuals credibility and bonds
within the in-group, and can lead to social
exclusion.
These examples also relate to the claim that
perspective-taking increases moral relativism,
that it reduces reliance on moral universals in
the long run. Critics of perspective-taking argue
that perspective-taking induced tolerance of
potentially objectionable behaviors can lead to
a slippery slope: with appropriate and con-
structive horror placated and reduced, noxious
behaviors become increasingly acceptable. Too
much perspective-taking by too many people
can lead society away from moral absolutes, a
world of blacks and whites, toward a moral
twilight, a world of grays.
Not only can perspective-taking produce
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stigma by association, but by impacting self-
description and behavior in the service of social
coordination (Galinsky et al., 2005), it might
also produce warranted condemnation. For
instance, the perspective-taker may take on
characteristics of the skinhead to coordinate
their behaviors and further social bonding with
the skinhead. In so doing, the perspective-taker
may behave in racist or biased ways that are not
only counternormative but could also distance
him or her from the rest of the world. Thus,
when we consider the role of self–other overlap
and target specificity in perspective-taking, it
becomes apparent that who the target is
becomes an important moderator of the effects
of perspective-taking. Although walking more
slowly down a hallway after taking the perspec-
tive of an elderly man is essentially harmless,
hating the world after taking the perspective of
a skinhead is a frightening and socially mal-
adaptive consequence. Perspective-taking can
have a dark and ironic side, one that may
impair rather than facilitate social bonds.
The manner in which perspectives are taken
can also have a crucial impact on the conse-
quences and effects of perspective-taking
(Galinsky & Ku, 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001). For example, Galinsky and Ku (2005)
found evidence that perspective-taking reduces
the drive toward expectancy confirmation, but
only when the perspective-taking instructions
were especially vivid, process-oriented, and
descriptive. The beneficial outcomes of
perspective-taking did not survive minimal
manipulations: simply telling people to take
another’s perspective, without telling them how
to do so, does not seem to have a discernable
impact on social behavior. Perspective-taking
that lacks deep deliberation, however, can
actually be costly to the self and others. An
example of how cursory consideration of
other’s perspectives can lead individuals and
groups down ill-conceived paths is the story of
the Abilene Paradox. In what Jerry Harvey
(1988) calls the ‘mismanagement of agree-
ment’, the Abilene Paradox is a story of a family
from a small town in Texas that is enjoying a
cool and relaxed time of sipping lemonade on
their porch. One family member proposes that
they go out for dinner and they decide to leave
the languid luxury of the porch to go to hot
and dusty Abilene for a substandard dinner. As
it turns out, none of the individuals had a
desire to go to Abilene, including the person
who made the original suggestion, but each
expresses agreement only because they assume
the others are enthusiastic about the idea. The
Abilene Paradox suggests that pallid perspec-
tive-taking might increase pluralistic ignorance,
the tendency to see the overt behavior of
others, despite being the same as one’s own, as
having different underlying causes (Miller &
McFarland, 1987). In the case of Abilene, the
overt expressions of support and agreement by
others are presumed to correspond to an
underlying enthusiasm even though the same
overt behavior by the self is underpinned with
ambivalence. Each person considers the others’
perspective, but only cursorily and not in a way
that understands or appreciates everyone’s
ambivalence. By trying to do right by others
and not expressing one’s true underlying
feelings, right is done by and for no one. The
absence of or superficial perspective-taking can
create situations that nobody desires, leading to
frustration and the potential for future conflict.
Another potential irony of perspective-taking
can result when we consider what might
happen if two parties take each other’s per-
spectives. Thus far, we have only considered a
situation with one perspective-taker and one
target—the perspective-taker adapts his or her
behavior to the target. What might happen if
two individuals are both perspective-takers and
simultaneously targets of perspective-taking?
Interpersonal bias should decrease according
to previous findings, but ironically, both parties
might attempt to mimic the others’ behaviors,
resulting in social miscoordination. As both
sides attempt to predict each other’s thoughts,
desires, and actions, they can pass each other in
the night. Negotiations, for instance, are one
context in which such miscoordination can play
out. Perspective-taking by one negotiator in a
dyad has been shown to lead to the creation of
value and the construction of creative agree-
ments that meet both parties’ interests (Galinsky
& Ku, 2005). However, perspective-taking by
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both parties of a dyad may lead to poorer
coordination than if only one negotiator took
the perspective. For example, in the context
of cross-cultural negotiations, Japanese and
American negotiators use very different
methods for acquiring information at the bar-
gaining table. Americans tend to exchange
information directly by discussing and sharing
information, whereas Japanese negotiators
tend to seek and share information indirectly
by inferring preferences from offers and
counteroffers (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001).
If both parties are taking the perspective of the
other and adopting the other’s behavior, the
Americans may exchange information indi-
rectly and the Japanese may use more direct
methods of information acquisition. Not only
might the well-intentioned negotiators pass
each other in the night, but each negotiator will
also be using an unfamiliar strategy, potentially
leading to poorer performance than if neither
had taken the perspective of the other side!
Conclusion
This article recommends perspective-taking as a
simple and subtle strategy to form and
strengthen social bonds. The benefits of
perspective-taking are numerous—it reduces
stereotyping and prejudice, encourages helping
behavior, and promotes behavioral mimicry
and social coordination, all through increasing
self–other overlap. Since perspective-taking
assists in the formation and maintenance of
specific social bonds, it does not activate a
general helping mind-set, and therefore, is not
a panacea for reducing all social bias—
although specific bonds are built, others may be
damaged.
Despite its potential drawbacks, we contend
that perspective-taking is a useful tool for
forming and supporting specific social bonds.
By walking a mile in another’s shoes, perspec-
tive-takers can apply their own self-concepts to
stereotyped targets, thereby improving evalu-
ations and preventing stereotyped judgments in
most cases. At the same time, perspective-takers
often utilize the targets’ stereotypes in the
service of social coordination, leading them to
behave in ways stereotypic of the target’s group.
Who knew walking in the shoes of another
could be so comfortable?
Note
1. Stereotype suppression can sometimes be a
successful strategy for controlling stereotyping
when individuals have abundant cognitive
resources and are highly and internally motivated
to control stereotyping (Gordijn, Hindriks,
Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2004;
Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998).
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Biographical notes
ADAM D. GALINSKY is an associate professor of
management and organizations at the Kellogg
School of Management at Northwestern
University. His research interests include strategies
(especially perspective-taking and suppression) to
overcome the effects of stereotypes on perceivers,
the impact of stereotypes and stigma on targets,
counterfactual thinking, and the possessions and
experience of power.
GILLIAN KU is an assistant professor of
organisational behaviour at London Business
School. She is interested in the role of emotions
and arousal in decision-making, auction fever,
affective and behavioral forecasting, and
perspective-taking and intergroup relations.
CYNTHIA S. WANG is a doctoral student in
management and organizations at the Kellogg
School of Management at Northwestern
University. Her research interests include the
impact of leadership and power within
organizations, intergroup relations and
interactions, and the effects of perspective-taking
on social interaction.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
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