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... We use the (version 4) 'Gridded population of the world' (Center for International Earth Science Information Network, 2016), which provides population density on a 5-year basis and at high resolution (30 arc-second grid). Moreover, terrorists usually require free and rapid movement by rail or road to move from and to target points (Heyman and Mickolus (1980) and Wilkinson (1979), page 189). We compute the travel time from each terrorist event to the nearest large city (more than 50000 inhabitants) based on travel time to major cities (Nelson, 2008) at a high spatial resolution (30 arc-second grid). ...
... Furthermore, terrorists benefit from high density communication networks (road and rail) in large cities to move freely and rapidly from and to target points (Heyman and Mickolus (1980) and Wilkinson (1979), page 189). It is also quite common that terrorists deliberately target communication network infrastructure, as exemplified by the simultaneous attacks on several commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, on March 11th, 2004, which killed 191 people (Los Angeles Times, 2014. ...
Terrorism persists as a worldwide threat, as exemplified by the on‐going lethal attacks perpetrated by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Boko Haram in Nigeria. In response, states deploy various counterterrorism policies, the costs of which could be reduced through efficient preventive measures. Statistical models that can account for complex spatiotemporal dependences have not yet been applied, despite their potential for providing guidance to explain and prevent terrorism. To address this shortcoming, we employ hierarchical models in a Bayesian context, where the spatial random field is represented by a stochastic partial differential equation. Our main findings suggest that lethal terrorist attacks tend to generate more deaths in ethnically polarized areas and in locations within democratic countries. Furthermore, the number of lethal attacks increases close to large cities and in locations with higher levels of population density and human activity.
... Terörizmi anlayabilmek ve açıklayabilmek için gerek hükümet gerekse akademik topluluklar tarafından birçok tanım, tipoloji ve teori geliştirilmiştir (Hacker, 1978;May, 1974;Poland,1988;Schmind ve DeGraaf, 1982;Thornton, 1968;Wilkinson, 1979). Sıklıkla atıfta bulunulan "bir inanın teröristi diğer bir insanın özgürlük savaşçısıdır" görüşü terörizm kavramı için değişik bakış açlarına ve kavramsal sorunlara yol açmaktadır ( Crenshaw, 1989;Jenkins, 1987Jenkins, , 1988Poland,1988). ...
Anahtar Kelimeler: Turizm Terör Turizm Ekonomisi Terörizm
Dünya ekonomilerine ve özellikle turizm sektörüne yönelik tehditlerin sayısı gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Bu tehditlerin temel sorumlularından biri ise ne yazık ki terörizm olgusu ve terör faaliyetleridir. Bu doğrultuda çalışmanın temel amacı, terör olaylar ile turizm gelirleri arasında ki direkt ilişkiyi ve terör olaylarının turizm gelirleri yolu ile ülke ekonomisindeki etkisini ekonometrik çalışmalarda sıkça kullanılan EVIEWS paket programı kullanılarak irdelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Model bulguları değerlendirildiğinde birinci modelde gerek kısa dönem regresyon analizi gerekse uzun dönem Ko-Entegrasyon ve Nedensellik testlerinde terör indeksi değişkeninin turizm gelirleri üzerindeki etkisinin varlığı saptanmış. İkinci Modelde ise turizm gelirlerinin ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkisinin saptanması amacıyla yapılan uzun dönem Ko-Entegrasyon ve Nedensellik testleri sonucunda; turizm gelirlerinin GSYİH üzerindeki payının ekonomik büyüme ile uzun dönem eş bütünleşme gösterdiği ve aralarında nedensel ilişkilerin var olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.
ABSTRACT Keywords: Tourism Terror Tourism Economics Terrorism
Threats towards world economies and especially tourism sector increase day by day. The main responsible of these threats is unfortunately terrorism phenomenon and terror activities. So, when looking at the existing studies examining the relationship between terrorism and tourism; it can be seen that terrorism influences countries" economic environmental factors directly and/or indirectly, and also it is a critical factor on interrupting tourism industry and decreasing tourism market. With this way, the main aim of this study is to determine the direct relationship between terrorism and tourism income in Turkey and to examine the effects of terrorism incidents in the country economy through tourism incomes using the EVIEWS package program which is frequently used in econometric studies. When the findings of the first and second models are evaluated, it is determined that the existence of the effect of terror index variable on tourism revenues by both short-term regression analysis and long-term Co-Integration and Causality tests of the first model. In the second model, as a result of the long-term co-integration and causality tests conducted in order to determine the effect of tourism revenues on economic growth, it is found that the share of tourism revenues over GDP has long-term cointegration with economic growth and there is a causality relationship between them.
... Therefore, we use the Gridded Population of the World (v3), which provides population density on a yearly basis and at high-resolution (2.5 arc-minute grid) (CIESIN, 2005). Moreover, terrorists usually require free and rapid movement by rail or road in order to move from and to target points (Heyman and Mickolus, 1980; Wilkinson, 1979, p. 189). We compute the travel time from each terrorist event to the nearest large city (more than 50,000 inhabitants) based on Travel Time to Major Cities (Nelson, 2008) at a high spatial resolution (30 arc-second grid). ...
To this day, terrorism persists as a worldwide threat, as exemplified by the ongoing lethal attacks perpetrated by ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. In response, states deploy various counterterrorism policies, the costs of which could be reduced through efficient preventive measures. Statistical models able to account for complex spatio-temporal dependencies have not yet been applied, despite their potential for providing guidance to explain and prevent terrorism. In an effort to address this shortcoming, we employ hierarchical models in a Bayesian context, where the spatial random field is represented by a stochastic partial differential equation. Our results confirm the contagious nature of the lethality of terrorism and the number of lethal terrorist attacks in both space and time. Moreover, the frequency of lethal attacks tends to be higher in richer areas, close to large cities, and within democratic countries. In contrast, attacks are more likely to be lethal far away from large cities, at higher altitudes, in poorer areas, and in locations with higher ethnic diversity. We argue that, on a local scale, the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal attacks are driven by antagonistic mechanisms.
... The first game-theoretical endeavors began with Landes (1978), who identified countermeasures to constrain sky-hijacking in the United States. The epicenter of the academic interest to terrorism devoted to revealing the broader complex concept of terrorism: set up definitions (Crenshaw, 1992;Wilkinson, 1986;Wilkinson & Stewart, 1987), developed (Mickolus, 1980(Mickolus, , 1982 and updated (Fleming, 2001;Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, & Fleming, 1989 datasets, and displayed trends and cycles for newsworthy events for forecasting purposes (Cauley & Im, 1988;Enders et al., 1992;Hoffman, 1998;Yonah & Pluchinsky, 1992). ...
... 18 Entre los mejores análisis sobre el asunto se siguen encontrando los de Martha Crenshaw (1972). También G. Wardlaw (1982), Paul Wilkinson (1986) y Charles Townsend (2002) Desde unos presupuestos y objetivos analíticos distintos es importante Michel Wieviorka (1988). Una obra distinta, pues se plantea desde una reflexión crítica de filosofía política es la de P. Gilbert (1994). ...
... Other scholars dismiss the possibility of a terrorist personality altogether. Wilkinson states that; 'We already know enough about terrorist behaviour to discount the crude hypothesis of a "terrorist personality" or "phenotype"' [33]. Laqueur writes that the search for a unique 'terrorist personality' has been a futile venture [34]. ...
'This paper critiques the claim that terrorists can be profiled – that is to say that terrorists possess distinguishable attributes that can be conceivably identified by an observer. In doing so, the most prominent profiling parameters - racial, gender, age, pathological, psychological and socioeconomic – are investigated. The above approaches are found to have little to no applied value in identifying terrorists from a societal population. The dominant criticisms of these methods emphasise their crude reductionism, an absence of internal and external validity, and their lack of practical application. Current evidence indicates that the profiling of terrorists is a futile venture.'
... The source of insecurity in most countries have to do with unsolvable or unsolved internal ethnic conflicts, power sharing disputes, greater deal of injustice , lack of rule of law, undemocratic and weak institutions, border disputes between countries, religious and cultural differences, poor agricultural reforms, etc. Most terrorist groups that immerged in Africa were more or less based on revolutionary agenda, religious antagonism leading to extremism, appeal to institutional change, claiming recognition from oppressed minority [5]. Fragility of institutions, ephemeral or overstaying governments based on ethnic basis for either election or resources and power sharing. ...
It has been studied that the current wave of a new form of reinforcing the terms of regional integration and cooperation have to find its roots in the real commitment to fight a common enemy, promote a common good. Contemporary regional integration organizations were formed in the aftermath of the Second World War to prevent the escalation of conflicts and focus on economic cooperation to improve trade and industry, exchange of knowledge and technology. The African regional integration was mostly formed in the early days of independence to reaffirm their integrity and sovereignty. The Rome Treaty of 1957 saw a coalition of 12 European countries to create the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC did well prevent wars and conflicts in most European countries, brought about uncontestable steps forward towards prosperity and development of the year 1970’s. It came to its full achievement by the inclusion of the United Kingdom in 1973 marking a great success in what could be termed as regional integration and cooperation. Amadou and Moshood showed how this success in union of nations served as a starting point to other countries in the world especially in Africa
... tuate socio-economic relative deprivation " nennt, und dem Auftreten von Terrorismus hin (Wilkinson 1986, 37). Jan Oskar Engenes bedeutende empirische Untersuchung der Muster des europäischen Terrorismus offenbart, dass rasches Wirtschaftswachstum , gemessen am Wachstum des BIP 12 , eine erkennbare Auswirkung auf die organisierte Herausforderung des ideologischen Terrorismus in Westeuropa hatte. ...
... There is a growing awareness in the terrorism literature that guerilla organizations (i.e. those that avoid attacking civilians or focus on attacking military forces) are different than those which seek to attack civilians (see Ganor 2002, Moghadam 2006, Nolan 2002, Schmid and Jongman 2005, Wilkinson 1986; from Abrahms 2012, p. 369). I also selected on geographic location, or rather, Western and non-Western organizations, functioning as a proxy for difficultto-capture variables like culture or history, to see if it affected the motivations and professed raison d'etre of the terrorist groups. ...
... 20 2. Para garantizar la eficacia del terrorismo se necesita un complemento desarmado y, no obstante, más vigoroso que las bombas. Desde finales de los años setenta del siglo XX quedó claro en los estudios más relevantes que el complemento es la publicidad que consigan sus acciones mediante la difusión que se haga en los medios de comunicación (Alexander, Carlton & Wilkinson, 1979;Wilkinson, 1986;Wright, 1991;Schmid & De Graaf, 1982;Paletz & Schmid, 1992;Leeman, 1991). Este es el segundo pilar. ...
Este artículo estudia el tipo específico de relaciones que establece el terrorismo con el periodismo para construir un régimen informativo propio que le permita dirigir la información sobre terrorismo. El objetivo de este régimen es completar los fines clásicos del terrorismo mediante la información. Este texto propone un modelo exegético construido a partir de los elementos informativo-propagandísticos del concepto de terrorismo, cuyo fin es elaborar una guía práctica que interprete las relaciones informativas del terrorismo, no unas pautas para que los periodistas cubran actos terroristas. El modelo ayuda a detectar si son los terroristas quienes manejan la información, en vez de los periodistas, y qué procedimientos emplean para lograrlo. Palabras clave
Modern debates on the intersection between human rights and counterterrorist measures are deeply rooted in a long history of scholarship on the tensions between states’ obligation to civil and human rights principals on the one hand and their responsibility to provide security to their citizens on the other hand. Already in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes famously argued in Leviathan that individuals must give up some of their rights in order to gain security from the state. Niccolò Machiavelli made a similar claim in The Prince, asserting that individuals are willing to surrender certain powers to the state in return for better personal security. More recently, at the end of the twentieth century, sociologists and political scientists, such as Christopher Hewitt (1984), Paul Wilkinson (1986), Martha Crenshaw (1983), and David Charters (1994), have written extensively on the tradeoffs of counterterrorist policies and rights. They focused on the fight of democracies against terrorism and emphasized the costs of such fights in terms of civil liberties and human rights violations.
Now terrorism became the real threat not only for the certain states, but also for all world community.
Great Britain belongs to those countries in which rather successfully fight against extremism and have
certain practices according to prevention of extremist manifestations. In article the conclusion is drawn
that the principles of the organization of fight by extremism, and first of all her preventive character and
broad cooperation with the population are the reason of successful «prevention of youth extremism in
Great Britain». At acquaintance with the documents concerning activities of police of the United Kingdom
for prevention and suppression of extremist activity and when viewing a number of the websites
belonging to offices of police of Great Britain, the fight against youth extremism having generally preventive
character is often conducted not so much globally how many «pointswise» and «precisely». However
when developing practical recommendations in the sphere of communication counteraction to terrorism
in is necessary to consider both positive, and negative experience, therefore studying of various directions
of anti-terrorist activity of the countries of the West is represented relevant and important.
Key words: Great Britain, terrorism, extremism, struggle, IRA, MI5, international, national and religious
minorities, police.
This study examines the role of ideology on terrorist groups' choice of targets. Using the dataset based on the Global Terrorism Database, advanced by Ahmed, 2018, Journal of Applied Security Research, the study seeks to examine the variation in target choice by group type. Six target types are considered in this study: (a) political, (b) civilian, (c) security, (d) business, (e) rival, and (f) infrastructure. The study finds that there are differences in target selection based on ideology, and that over time, all group types are attacking civilian and security targets more often.
Using a new dataset, this study examines the role of ideology on specific operational decisions within terrorist groups, namely choice of tactic. Five groups are considered: nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, and environmental groups. This study posits that ideology is a driving force for tactic choice, while resources mitigate these decisions. It also considers the role of time, namely Rapaport's waves of terrorism, and the role of the Internet on group decision making. Results indicate that group types are distinct in terms of their tactic choices, conveying the importance of introducing ideology as context when examining terrorist group behavior.
In liberal democracies the relationship among communities, state authorities and by extension the political establishment and broader society, to a large extent determines the success of counterterrorism (CT) operations. Communities’ engagement with authorities is damaged by covert surveillance, and practices that appear to undermine perceptions of procedural fairness, weakening individuals’ and communities’ perceptions of legitimacy and trust in the state and society. Political debates about national identity, migration, and othering further enhance a sense of alienation felt by Muslim communities and erodes their shared sense of identity and affinity with the wider society. Such barriers, a lack of trust and perceptions of alienation decrease the likelihood of engagement, necessitating more intrusive surveillance measures to obtain the intelligence to reduce the threat of terrorism. Thus, perceptions of procedural fairness are further undermined, affecting trust and the perceptions of legitimacy, stifling future engagement with the state and the wider society, which are crucial for successful CT operations.
There are seven essential prerequisites for mounting terrorism. There must be some main aim or motivation among the perpetrators, even if it ultimately amounts to little more than an intense hatred of their perceived enemies or a desire for violent revenge against some alleged injustice. There must be leaders to instigate and direct the struggle. In any sustained and significant campaign, there will also need to be some degree of organisation, some training in the special skills of terrorism, and cash which helps to buy weapons and ammunition and other essential needs. Finally it is clearly vital for the terrorists that they should have access to the target country and the precise targets selected within that country. Of course, we know of numerous groups which possess considerable resources over and above those listed above. Some succeed in building up large numbers of supporters/sympathisers among the general population. Many obtain the substantial advantages of sponsorship by one or more states. In certain circumstances, terrorists can attain sanctuaries or safe bases beyond the reach of security forces or opposing factions; for example, in the remote terrain of the interior.But these are bonuses for the terrorists. We know that the majority of terrorists operating in the contemporary international system do not have these advantages.
Terrorism can no longer be seen as a limited form of behaviour, but as an escalating form of behaviour of which the ultimate result may prove fatal for the international community. It would appear that in some instances it may be easier to fight a war than to fight terrorism. One can only wonder to what extremes it may yet develop, especially in the nuclear era. This article is a detailed discussion of terrorism as an instrument for international political bargaining.
In the study of terrorism, there is a widespread belief that I call the "Strategic Model". It posits that groups adopt terrorism because it offers the best chance of having their grievances redressed. More specifically, the Strategic Model maintains that attacking civilians with acts of terrorism is a successful way for groups to pressure governments into meeting their political demands. Despite the prevalence of this rationalist perspective, it actually rests on very weak empirical foundations. In the face of terrorism, target countries seldom make strategic concessions to the perpetrators of the attacks. On the contrary, they generally dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. This article looks at why so many scholars assume that terrorism pays despite its political futility.
This chapter differs somewhat from the previous two, as it explores the impact of the Prevent policy on Maybury’s Muslim communities. Five semi-structured focus groups with members of Maybury Muslim communities were used to gather the required data and explore Prevent’s impact and how perceptions about it have formed. (More information about Maybury and its communities can be found in Chapter 5.) Three focus groups were divided by age and gender, one focus group was a mixed one, and the final focus group was an all-male group which included community leaders, voluntary workers, and imams (see Appendix). The data not only suggests that to a large extent negative media discourses of Islam, Muslim communities and Prevent appear to have shaped the public’s perceptions about Prevent in Maybury, but also suggests that the media in general has had an important role in shaping the perceptions of the local Muslim communities vis-à-vis themselves. This chapter argues that these perceptions have been reinforced by negative personal and vicarious experiences of counter-terrorism and Prevent; it is the perceived impact of stop-andsearches and other terrorism powers, rather than their implementation, which appears to have influenced and perpetuated negative perceptions and stereotypes about Prevent. The hostile media discourses of Prevent, and the local counter-terrorism policing activity, appear to have led to a degree of alienation from mainstream British society and other local communities in Maybury.
The previous chapter focused on the way in which violence in the form of rioting has been used to enable the ‘underclass’ to seek the recognition by policy-makers of their grievances or concerns. The violence demonstrated in these events may be seen as a way to force policy-makers to sit up and take notice of social groups who would otherwise be ignored. This chapter continues with the theme of violence in the form of terrorism. This, as with rioting, may be viewed as a means to secure political, social or economic change and provide for the empowerment of those who perceive themselves or the cause they advocate to be marginalised by those who wield power, but there are a number of significant differences between the two forms of violence. Rioting is often (although not always) (Keith, 1993: 235) spontaneous in nature, involving large numbers of persons willing to take to the streets in order to demand some kind of reform. Terrorism, however, typically involves a small number of persons whose actions are usually more meticulously planned. Unlike rioting, terrorism is generally pursued in the name of an ideology and may involve extreme violence causing the death and injury of large numbers of persons as happened on 11 September 2001 when the attack by Muslim extremists on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon Building in Washington caused the deaths of several thousand people all of whom were the victims of indiscriminate violence.
Proponents of the current war, as of past wars, against terrorism depict their struggle as a defense of the core values of civilization against an amoral barbarism in which it is impossible to be neutral.1 Terrorists, as stereotyped by counterinsurgent theorists, are “dedicated to violence and destruction” for its own sake; under terrorist brutalization, “headstrong youths can become so hooked on the life of terrorist murder that they perform their tasks in a kind of sacrificial ecstasy.”2 The limitations of the approaches of critics of wars against terrorism are perhaps more surprising. Specifically, such critics implicitly share with counterinsurgent writers a characterization of state violence as being less chaotic than that of resistance movements. The violence of the modern state may be more powerful, but in contrast, in the Foucauldian sense, it is “ordered.”3 States, especially first world states, claim their violence is legitimate and possess an ability to disguise their violence by applying it in ways that are of a lower intensity, such as military deployments, surveillance techniques, and legal or illegal detention.4 Where wars against terrorism are criticized in such analyses, it is to suggest that states of the first world, especially the United States, have helped to generate the conditions for the emergence of terrorism owing to the ruthless pursuit of their own interests.
In this study, strategy is taken to be the plan by which a terrorist group seeks to deploy and use its resources with the aim of achieving its political objectives.1 The role of strategic thought in determining the activities of terrorists differs greatly between groups. Since their actions are generally dictated by their own perceptions there are dangers in assuming that terrorists — or other actors in politics — always behave in a way which seems objectively rational in retrospect. In practice, the pressures connected with surviving can distort terrorists’ ability to make rational decisions. However, except where their actions are wholly expressive, most terrorists do try to relate their violent acts to specific objectives.
I will not venture to suggest exactly what factor or combination of factors may be necessary to turn political violence into terrorism, but perhaps when either the intention to spread fear or the intention to harm non-combatants is primary, this is sufficient.1
Tujuan asli dari hukum adalah untuk mencapai keadilan. Untuk pencapaian keadilan di masyarakat, order terlebih dahulu harus dibuat. Gangguan dan kekacauan dapat dihasilkan dari gerakan terorisme. Saat ini, gerakan terorisme di Indonesia meningkat, baik dalam frekuensi dan akselerasi. Bahkan, sudah ada undang-undang yang menyediakan untuk pemberantasan kejahatan terorisme, yaitu Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003. UU telah berlaku sejak 2003 dan dilaksanakan oleh penegak hukum Indonesia, khususnya Kepolisian Indonesia. Namun, karena beberapa kendala psikologis dan teknik yuridis, penanganan kejahatan terorisme belum berhasil secara optimal. Secara umum, peran penegak hukum belum efektif dan optimal belum dalam mencegah terorisme di Indonesia, karena gerakan terorisme tidak hanya gerakan lokal tapi juga jaringan internasional dengan menggunakan teknologi tinggi, dan gerakan terorisme di Indonesia didasarkan pada ideologi fundamental, yaitu, Islam. Oleh karena itu, tidak bisa didekati oleh paradigma represif dan pendekatan yuridis, melainkan harus dilengkapi dengan pendekatan psikologis dan sosiologis-agama. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode yuridis normatif, dan itu ditulis oleh seorang metode deskriptif-analitis. Tujuan dari makalah ini adalah sebagai kontribusi untuk ilmu hukum dan masyarakat luas.
In its everyday use, “violence” refers to “acting with or characterized by great physical force, so as to injure, damaging or destroy; [or] ... force unlawfully or callously used” (Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, second college edition, 1979). Violence is therefore the use of great physical force oriented at producing damage. In the same vein, the classical social science definition of violence refers to “behavior designed to inflict physical injury on people or damage to property” (Graham & Gurr, 1969:XVII), or “any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance” (Tilly, 1978:176).
The main tasks of the Chaplain Branch of the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) are to
“advise commanders on spiritual, religious, moral and ethical issues affecting Canadian Forces
personnel and their families during operations and in static situations.” This paper explores the
nature of one particular facet of this mandate, ethical expertise, in the complex ethical
environment of the contemporary military organization. The study lists criteria necessary to
evaluate and substantiate ethical expertise (knowledge, skills, abilities), and relates these to the
chaplain’s dual accountability to her or his faith tradition as well as to the military. The study
examines the traditional role of the chaplain, the expectations (implicit and explicit) that attach to
that role; the role conflict of being a faith group representative and at the same time being
embedded in the military organization; the role of faith-based ethics in a pluralistic and public
arena; an examination of the criteria that would define “effective” provision of ethical advice;
and a discussion of the implications for equipping new and existing chaplains to fulfill this role.
The secular and pluralist military environment, dual accountability, and traditional role
expectations, all increase the complexity of the task of advising the commander. Moreover,
giving ethical advice is on a different plane of moral complexity than that of being personally
ethical, and requires a level of expertise that is here defined by specific attributes.
This chapter aims to provide a critical overview of the United Kingdom’s contemporary counter-terrorism strategy, highlighting its main strengths as well as its shortcomings, and devoting particular attention also to the effects of UK counter-terrorism on the wider society. More in detail, the first section of the chapter contains a reflection on the scale of the terrorism threat in the country as well as on the challenge it may pose in the future. The second section focuses on CONTEST, the counter-terrorism strategy that the United Kingdom has designed to deal with the issue. The third section investigates the sociopolitical effects of these policies on 'suspect' communities and individuals. The chapter ends by identifying what lessons can be learn from evolving understandings of and responses to national and international security threats of a country that is both a target of terrorism but also as an exporter of terrorism.
Terror is a state of mind which can be induced and then exploited by an individual or group wishing to dominate any other individual or group, or even a whole society, in order to promote a sectional interest. It is also used by states as a tool of domestic and of foreign policy.
In seeking an understanding of the nature of politics we begin by considering those features of human society out of which the need for politics arises. We then move on to examine whether, as some people allege, certain spheres of human life are inherently non-political. In this section, we ask and seek to answer the question ‘What makes a disagreement political?’ The chapter ends by analysing the role of violence in politics. Is politics a particular non-violent way of resolving disagreements or does it comprehend all methods including force?
Der Terrorismus setzt sich durch drei grundlegende Eigenschaften von anderen Formen der gewaltsamen sozialen Interaktion ab, die es uns zusammengenommen ermöglichen, ihn von diesen zu unterscheiden. Als Erstes ist ein Akt dann als terroristisch einzuordnen, wenn seine psychische Auswirkung innerhalb einer bestimmten Population oder eines gesellschaftlichen Aggregats zu grassierenden emotionalen Reaktionen wie Furcht und Angst führt, welche möglicherweise Einstellungen und Verhalten in einer bestimmten Richtung verfestigen und somit weit über das Ausmaß des tatsächlich oder potenziell erlittenen materiellen und physischen Schadens an Menschen und Dingen hinausgehen (Aron 1962). Zweitens muss diese Gewalt, um eine solche Wirkung erzielen zu können, systematisch und möglichst unwägbar sein, und sie richtet sich in den meisten Fällen gegen Ziele, die innerhalb ihres kulturellen Rahmens und institutionellen Kontextes einen gewissen Symbolwert haben (Hardman 1962; Thornton 1964; Walter 1969). Drittens wird die Beschädigung derartiger Ziele dazu genutzt, Botschaften und Drohungen zu vermitteln, die den Terrorismus zu einem Mechanismus der Kommunikation und der sozialen Kontrolle machen (Roucek 1962; Crelinsten 1987).
This chapter aims to provide a critical overview of the United Kingdom counter terrorism strategy. The first part of the work contains a reflection on the scale of the terrorism threat in the country as well as on the challenge it may pose in the future. The second part focuses on CONTEST, the counter-terrorism strategy that the UK has designed to deal with the issue. Finally, the chapter critically assesses the effectiveness of the UK counter-terrorism approach in actually containing the threat and investigates the socio-political effects of these policies on 'suspect' communities and individuals to then identify what lessons can be learn from evolving understandings of and responses to national and international security threats. Attention is devoted to both the UK as a target of terrorism but also as an exporter of terrorism.
This chapter explores the U.S. response to the terrorist actions carried out by Cuban exiles and Puerto Rican extreme right-wing organisations during the pre and post 9/11 era. Rooted in the perspective of the critical studies on terrorism, it takes as a point of departure the fact that after the Cuban Revolution, Puerto Rico (PR) became one of the main destinations of Cuban exiles and their terrorist organisations supported by both the U.S. and PR governments. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section traces a depiction of the historical and socio-political conditions that determined the formation of Cubans exiles’ organisations in the U.S. The second section provides an outline of some of the terrorist actions perpetrated by these organisations against Puerto Rican independence movements. The third part addresses the positions and responses adopted by the governments of the U.S. and PR in the post 9/11 era. The overall aim of the chapter is to show how counter-terrorist policies implemented by democratic states in pre and post 9/11 are not equally effective or consistent when dealing with actions that contribute to their geopolitical interest and the control of left-wing and independent movements.
Es ist zweifelhaft, ob sich Bedingungen und Ursachen des Terrorismus in Deutschland überhaupt zufriedenstellend klären lassen. Zwar ist längst en detail bekannt, wie in der zeitgeschichtlichen Ausnahmesituation am Ende der sechziger Jahre einige militante Zirkel entstanden sind. Auch lassen sich gesellschaftliche Hintergründe der politisch motivierten Gewalt benennen und bestimmte psychologische Dispositionen der Akteure vermuten. Doch ein zwingender Grund für die Entstehung des Terrorismus in der freiheitlich-demokratischen Bundesrepublik ist nirgends ersichtlich. Ausgerechnet das politische System, das den Deutschen bisher unbekannte Freiheiten und ungeahnten Wohlstand garantiert, soll der Nährboden des gewaltbereiten Extremismus sein? Eine auf den ersten Blick einsichtige Erklärung des „Terrors im Schlaraffenland“63 steht bis heute aus, ja noch nicht einmal auf eine allseits akzeptierte Definition des Terrorismus konnten sich die Sozialwissenschaftler bisher einigen.64
The actions of terrorist organisations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality.1 Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories. The psychological and ideological factors that constitute the terrorist’s world-view are only part of a complex web of determinants of terrorist behaviour, one of which is surely a strategic conception of means and ends. It is clearly mistaken, however, to assume that terrorists act in terms of a consistent rationality based on accurate representations of reality. In fact one of the aims of terrorist organisations is to convince sceptical audiences to see the world in their terms. An important aspect of the struggle between governments and terrorists concerns the definition of the conflict. Each side wishes to interpret the issues in terms of its own values.
It is a terrible fact of this time, not much lessened by there having been similar facts in the past, or by the likelihood of there being more in the future, that men make uses of destructive force against persons and things, force condemned by ordinary law but directed to changing societies in certain ways. Certain of these changes in societies, although typically they are sought for themselves, may be taken to make for progress toward a certain goal, well-being for all persons without exception, all persons in whatever societies. The uses of force related in this way to the goal of well-being are of a general course political violence of the Left. My purpose in this essay is to say some things in advocacy of a certain response, in good part a sceptical one, to the general moral question of what is to be said against such violence, and what for it.
Im Alltagsverständnis bezeichnet das Wort ‚Gewalt’ neben der Amtsbefugnis ein „unrechtmäßiges Vorgehen, wodurch jemand zu etwas gezwungen wird; ... gegen jemanden, etwas rücksichtslos angewendete physische Kraft, mit der etwas erreicht wird“ (Duden, Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 1993). Gewalt bedeutet die Anwendung von großer physischer Kraft, die Schaden verursachen soll.1 In diesem Sinne spricht die klassische sozialwissenschaftliche Definition bei Gewalt von „behavior designed to inflict physical injury on people or damage to property“ (Graham/Gurr 1969: XVII), oder von „any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance“ (Tilly 1978: 176).
Terrorism is a phenomenon that is increasingly coming to dominate our lives. It influences the way governments conduct their foreign policy and corporations transact their business. It causes changes to the structure and role of our security forces and necessitates huge expenditures on measures to protect public figures, vital installations, citizens and, perhaps in the final analysis, our system of government. It affects the way we travel, the places we visit and the manner in which we live our daily lives. Our newspapers, radios and televisions saturate our every waking moment with the lurid details of the latest terrorist spectacular.
Proactive Community Oriented Policing makes use of computerized information systems for data collection. Many police departments are faced with three major problems: (1) how to mine the vast amounts of data produced by these systems, (2) sharing of interagency data and, (3) how to use this data to provide information that supports proactive law enforcement. Although police managers ensure that their crime analysts are properly inducted into the police environment and that their analytical work is fully integrated into departmental operations The authors' hypothesis is that interagency data sharing allows for an interagency intervention response that can impact crime statistics.
This book explores the successes and failures of the Prevent strategy, which was developed by the UK Government to help stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It provides a holistic overview of the policy's formation, delivery, and impact on Muslim communities. Based on interviews with former Ministers, senior policy makers, frontline professionals and community focus groups, Joshua Skoczylis also analyses the various impacts of policy and organizational tensions. These include the ambiguous scope of Prevent, the idea of community cohesion, and funding and evaluation issues. The Local Prevention of Terrorism highlights the difficulties in applying terrorism prevention policies and the limitations of their impact. It shows that strategies such as Prevent may have particularly negative effects on Muslim communities, undermining their trust and perceptions of legitimacy. In its use of a large body of primary data and up-to-date analysis, the book will be of great interest to policymakers as well as scholars studying terrorism and security. Includes a foreword by Clive Walker, Professor Emeritus, School of Law, University of Leeds, UK.
Terrorists are supposed to be influenced by opportunities for news coverage, but does this mean that groups initiate foreign attacks in response to the absence of press freedom in their country or inattention to that state by foreign media organizations? Using Asal and Rethmeyer’s BAAD1 data on terrorist organizations, we find that increasing levels of attention by the international press reduce the odds of groups launching cross-border attacks. The propensity of groups to launch foreign attacks appears unrelated to press freedom. These results suggest that the protections that states provide for the press motivate foreign terrorism less than the way the media determines newsworthiness.