Egoistic and Moralistic Biases in Self-Perception: The Interplay of Self-Deceptive Styles With Basic Traits and Motives

Abstract

The literature on personality traits and defense mechanisms suggests individual differences in two self-favoring tendencies, which we label “egoistic bias” and “moralistic bias.” The two biases are self-deceptive in nature and can be traced to two fundamental values, agency and communion, that impel two corresponding motives, nPower and nApproval. The two sequences of values, motives, and biases form two personality constellations, Alpha and Gamma. Associated with Alpha is an egoistic bias, a self-deceptive tendency to exaggerate one's social and intellectual status. This tendency leads to unrealistically positive self-perceptions on such traits as dominance, fearlessness, emotional stability, intellect, and creativity. Self-perceptions of high Alpha scorers have a narcissistic, “superhero” quality. Associated with Gamma is a moralistic bias, a self-deceptive tendency to deny socially deviant impulses and to claim sanctimonious “saint-like” attributes. This tendency is played out in overly positive self-perceptions on such traits as agreeableness, dutifulness, and restraint. The Alpha-Gamma conception provides an integrative framework for a number of central issues in personality psychology.

Full text

Egoistic and Moralistic Biases in
Self-Perception:
The Interplay of Self-Deceptive Styles
With Basic Traits and Motives
Delroy L. Paulhus
University of British Columbia
Oliver P. John
University of California, Berkeley
ABSTRACT The literature on personality traits and defense mechanisms
suggests individual differences intwo self-favoringtendencies, which we label
“egoistic bias” and “moralistic bias.” The two biases are self-deceptive in nature
andcan be traced to two fundamental values, agency and communion, that impel
two corresponding motives, nPower and nApproval. The two sequences of
values, motives, and biases form two personality constellations, Alpha and
Gamma. Associated with Alpha is an egoistic bias, a self-deceptive tendency
to exaggerate one’s social and intellectual status. This tendency leads to
Journal of Personality 66:6, December 1998.
Copyright © 1998 by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA,
and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford,OX4 1JF, UK.
Preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council to Delroy Paulhus and by National Institute of Mental
Health grant MH-49255 to Oliver P. John. The authors wish to thank Jonathan Cheek,
Jack Digman, Gerard Saucier, and Jerry Wigginsfor their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. This article was written while the senior author was on study leave
at the Institute for Social and Personality Research at the University of California,
Berkeley, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Delroy Paulhus,
Departmentof Psychology,Universityof BritishColumbia, Vancouver,Canada V6T1Z4
or to Oliver John, Department of Psychology, #1650, University of California, Berkeley,
CA 94720-1650.

unrealistically positive self-perceptions on such traits as dominance, fearless-
ness,emotional stability,intellect, and creativity.Self-perceptions of highAlpha
scorers have a narcissistic, “superhero” quality. Associated with Gamma is a
moralistic bias, a self-deceptive tendency to deny socially deviant impulses and
to claim sanctimonious “saint-like” attributes. This tendency is played out in
overly positive self-perceptions on such traits as agreeableness, dutifulness, and
restraint. The Alpha-Gamma conception provides an integrative framework for
a number of central issues in personality psychology.
It is not surprising that many writers and researchers have attempted to
link defense mechanisms to major personality traits. After all, one of the
fundamental assumptions in psychodynamic theory is that defensive
processes play a major role in character formation (e.g., Cramer, 1991;
Haan,1977;Shapiro,1981).Anditfollowsthatsome,ifnotall,important
personality traits are influenced by defense mechanisms (for a recent
review, see Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997).
Defenses and Dimensions of Personality: A
Selective Review
Our review will focus on the few research programs that have been at
once influential and empirical in nature. To organize our discussion of
personality dimensions, we have adoptedthe Five-Factor Model (or “Big
Five”) as our framework of choice. Our labels for the five factors are
consistent with the consensus reached in a recent special issue of this
journal (McCrae & John, 1992), namely, Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness,EmotionalStability(vs. Neuroticism), and Openness
to Experience.
Early MMPI Work
The interplay between defense and personality was evident in early
structural analyses of the MMPI—for many years the most well-tilled
bed of personality items. The clinical scales were developed via the
contrasted groups method and were targeted, of course, at clinical syn-
dromes. When administered to normal samples and factor-analyzed,
however, the MMPI-1 item pool also yielded a set of “content scales”
covering a wide array of normal personality variables (Wiggins, 1966).
1026 Paulhus & John

Thefirstcontentscale,basedon the largest factor,wasusuallyinterpreted
as an overall index of maladjustment, distress, or neuroticism (Block,
1965; Johnson, Null, Butcher, & Johnson, 1984). Its surprisingly high
correlation with ratings of social desirability, however, led some to
believethat the firstMMPI factorrepresented, for themost part, response
style contamination (e.g., Edwards, 1957; Jackson & Messick, 1958):
that is, low scorers were willing to admit negative information about
themselves whereas high scorers were “defensive” and simply gave the
desirableanswer.Tooutsideobservers,this very publicdisagreementwas
an unsettling indictment of the value of personality assessment: The
whole approach seemed dubious because measurement specialists could
not even agree among themselves whether the first factor of personality
representedsubstantivepersonality differencesor some kind of defensive
process.1
Byrne’s Repression-Sensitization
Thewidely used Repression-Sensitization (R-S) scale(Byrne, 1961) was
an early attempt to measure the defensive personality (“the repressor”)
as a trait. Developed from items showing maximum contrast between
groups of clinically rated “defensives” and normals, the R-S scale con-
stituted a rather motley parade of item content (e.g., “Criticism or
scolding hurts me terribly”; “I almost never dream”).
After its refinement, however, the R-S overlapped considerably with
measures of trait anxiety. And neither was empirically distinguishable
from the first factor of the MMPI (Liberty, Lunneborg, & Atkinson,
1964). The final verdict was that, although it may tap repressive style,
the R-S scale is inextricably confounded with trait anxiety (Bonanno &
Singer, 1990). In short, the history of the R-S scale recapitulated the
earlier debate about whether the first factor of the MMPI was substantive
(i.e., differentiating high from low anxiety) or defensive (i.e., differenti-
ating repressive from expressive individuals). It combined features of
both.
1. This particular factor was largest because of the selective content of the MMPI, of
course. In inventories with more representative samples of items, all of the Big Five
loaded on the desirability factor(Saucier, 1994).
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1027

Crowne and Marlowe’s Approval Motive
Certain that defensive style could be measured separately from psycho-
pathology, Crowne and Marlowe (1960) developed a set of items that
referred instead to everyday personal and interpersonal behaviors (e.g.,
“I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake”). The resulting
Marlowe-Crowne (MC) scale was indeed relatively independent of the
first factor of the MMPI.
Rather than simply being an index of questionnaire response style, the
MC scale showed a surprising degree of temporal stability anda clear set
of behavioral correlates: In short, it appeared to bea trait in its own right
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). Accordingly, agreement withthe MC items
cametobe viewedas a symptom of the approval-seekingcharacter.2Such
characters were congenial, conforming, and cautious, although their
self-descriptions seemed to be remarkably free of sin.
The interpretation of the MC as approval-seeking can even explain
why high scorers can be induced to cheat and lie if it isnecessary to avoid
disapprobation from authority figures (Millham & Jacobson, 1978).
Approval-seekingis also consistent with research demonstrating that MC
scores drop considerably if subjects are questioned under bogus pipeline
conditions as opposed to standard conditions (Derakshan & Eysenck, in
press). Developmentally, high scorers on the MC were said to have
acquired a sensitivity to parental approval in childhood. Subsequently,
therefore, their adult behavior is oriented toward avoidance of disap-
proval by being socially normative (Crowne, 1979). Here was a classic
case of the close interplay between defense and personality.
Mostrelevantto the present articleisMcCrae and Costa’s(1983)claim
thatMC scores representaccurate reports ofone’struesocial desirability.
Their argument is based on the finding that self-report MC scores
correlate substantially with ratings of Agreeableness and Conscientious-
ness by knowledgeable peers. Hence, high MC scorers really do have the
agreeable and conscientious personalities that win social approval.3
McCrae and Costa paid less attention, however, to the fact that the MC
correlated much more highly with self-reports of Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness than with peer reports of those same traits. In other
2. Subsequent research suggested that a more accurate interpretation was avoidance of
disapproval (Crowne, 1979).
3. This interpretation as“socially desirable character” makesit difficult toexplain their
cheating and lying (Millham & Jacobson, 1978).
1028 Paulhus & John

words, the MC captures some substance (as McCrae and Costa empha-
size) but also includes self-report method variance on Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness that departs from reality.
Weinberger’s Repressive Style
Weinberger and colleagues have taken adifferent approach to the ambi-
guity over the first factor of the MMPI (e.g., Weinberger, Schwartz, &
Davidson, 1979). They agreed that a fundamental kind of defensiveness,
worthy of the label “repression,” could be attributed to those with low
scoresonmeasuresof distress(traitanxiety)—butonlyiftheyalso scored
high on a measure of restraint. This fertile typological operationalization
yielded a broad array of correlates consistent with the concept ofrepres-
sion (Weinberger, this issue).
For more details, we refer the reader to Weinberger’s contribution and
simply note two points relevant to our article. First, Weinberger and
colleagues have highlighted the importance of the restraint dimension by
naming it as one of the two factors underlying psychopathology and
linking it to defense. Second, some of the research in the Weinberger
tradition has revealed defensive correlates (e.g., symptom denial) for the
Distress and Restraint factors as individualdimensions, rather than only
in combination (e.g., Bonanno, Siddique, Keltner, & Horowitz, 1997;
Jamner & Schwartz, 1987; Warrenburg et al., 1989).
Self-Deception and Impression Management
A competing approach to the role of defense in personality began with
the goal of separating conscious bias from unconscious bias (Sackeim &
Gur, 1978). This distinction motivated the development of a pair of
complementary measures of socially desirable responding (Paulhus,
1984). First was the Impression Management scale, a measure designed
to tap purposeful tailoring of responses to impress an audience. Second
was the Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale, a measure designed to tap
an unconscious favorability bias in self-descriptions. Together these two
measures formed the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding,
which went through several revisions (Paulhus, 1984, 1988, 1998b). It
was recommended that the effects of impression management on self-
reports be controlled whereas self-deception should not be controlled
because of its direct role in personality traits (e.g., Paulhus, 1986, 1991).
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1029

The Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale showed clear evidence of uncon-
scious motivated distortion (Hoorens, 1995; Paulhus, 1988, 1998b), as
well as adaptive value(Bonanno et al., 1997; Jamner & Schwartz, 1987;
Paulhus,1998a).Incontrast,scores on the ImpressionManagement scale
showed a special sensitivity to situational demands, for example, public
versus anonymous administrationconditions (Paulhus, 1984, 1988).
Under relatively anonymous conditions, the two measures of socially
desirable responding show a distinctive pattern of correlates with the Big
Five personality traits (Paulhus, 1988; Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, &
Paulhus, 1998). Self-Deceptive Enhancement correlates positively
with Extraversion and Openness to Experience, and to a lesser extent
with Emotional Stability. In contrast, the Impression Management
scale correlates most strongly and positively with Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness.
Narcissism
Of long-standing interest to clinicians, the concept of narcissism has
recently received close attention as a normal personality characteristic
(e.g., Cramer, 1995; Emmons, 1987; John & Robins, 1994; Raskin &
Hall, 1981). According to the DSM-IV criteria, the defining charac-
teristics of narcissism include a grandiose sense of self-importance, a
tendency to exaggerate accomplishments and talents,and an expectation
to be noticed as “special” even without appropriate achievement. All
clinical accounts of narcissism (e.g., Kohut, 1971; Millon, 1990) concur
thatnarcissisticindividualshold unrealisticallyexaggeratedbeliefsabout
their abilities and achievements. In support of these accounts, research
on nonclinical populations has shown that more narcissistic individuals
respondto threats to their self-worth bypromotingand exaggeratingtheir
assets (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a;John & Robins, 1994; Robins
& John, 1997a, 1997b; Paulhus, 1998a) and by denigrating others (Morf
& Rhodewalt, 1993).
Although these experimental studies clearly demonstrate the strong
self-favoring bias of narcissistic individuals, this bias appears only on
select traits (e.g., Extraversion, Openness, Intelligence), not on other
socially approved traits such as Agreeablenesss or Conscientiousness
(Paulhus & John, 1994). There is little doubt that narcissists actually
believe their claims to superiority (Robins & John, 1997b), consistent
with a self-deceptive bias. Finally, narcissism is substantially and positively
1030 Paulhus & John

correlatedwith self-deception but notwith forms ofdesirable responding
relating to social conventionality, for example, the Marlowe-Crowne or
Impression Management scales (Paulhus, 1998b; Raskin, Novacek, &
Hogan, 1991b).
How is narcissism related to the major personality traits? When
measured by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall,
1981), narcissism can be located at the Arrogant-Calculating position
withinthe two-dimensional interpersonal circumplex (Leary, 1957; Wig-
gins & Pincus, 1994) or in the disagreeable extravert location in Big Five
personality space (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson, & Costa, 1994).4
Other Defenses
There is little research linking larger batteries of defense measures
directly to the Big Five personality traits (see Paulhus et al., 1997). A
notable exception is a recent study by Costa, Zonderman, and McCrae
(1991) that provides Big Five correlates of (1) Haan’s (1977) MMPI
defense and coping measures, (2) Gleser and Ihilevich’s (1969) Defense
Mechanisms Inventory (DMI), and (3) Bond, Gardner, Christian, and
Sigal’s (1983) Defensive Style Questionnaire(DSQ).
Among DSQ correlates, it was found that individuals high in Agree-
ableness use self-sacrificing defenses, whereas use of the more adaptive
(esteem-promoting) defenses was common among individuals high on
Extraversion and Openness, but low on Neuroticism. On Haan’s MMPI
defense scales, high Denial individuals also scored lower on self-reports
(but not peer reports) of Neuroticism. Overall, Costa and colleagues
(1991) concluded that longitudinal studies provide support for the stabil-
ity of defenses and that there is cross-observer evidence that defenses are
related to traits.
Coping Styles
Coping styles have traditionallybeen distinguished from defense mecha-
nisms (e.g., Haan, 1977). Yet this distinction has recently become less
clear-cut, with a number of writers arguing for an integrationof the two
kinds of mechanisms (for a review, see Paulhus et al., 1997). As with the
4. Theclinical version,combining arrogancewithinsecurity,is moredifficult toposition
in normal personality space.
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1031

R-S scale, some critics have argued that coping measures are hopelessly
confounded with neuroticism (e.g., Skodal, Dohrenwend, Link, &
Shrout, 1990). McCrae and Costa (1986) also found associations with
Neuroticism, as well as with other Big Five dimensions, but found these
associations to constitute meaningful trait-initiated coping choices.
More recently, O’Brien and DeLongis (1996) framed these associa-
tions even more positively by demonstrating the utility of trait concepts
for organizing the plethora of coping measures in the literature. First, the
various coping measures could be usefully organized in terms of agentic
and communal strategies. Second, coping outcomes could be understood
intermsofinteractionsbetweenBigFivepersonalitytraitsandsituational
factors.
Dimensions of Self-Favoring Bias
Some recent work conducted by the present authors (Paulhus & John,
1994) introduced a novel methodology to explore the relation between
self-deceptive mechanisms and fundamental personality traits. Our
methodology was predicated on John and Robins’s (1994) notion that a
self-deceptive bias can be indexed by systematic departures from social
reality.5But how canactual personality differencesbe differentiatedfrom
bias?
Measuring such departures from social reality required a new unit of
analysis: the self-criterion residual (SCR). Rather than difference scores
(e.g., Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Wylie, 1961), the bias index is
calculated as the residual variance that remains when a self-report
measure is regressed on a corresponding criterion measure of that same
variable. Thus, all the valid criterion variance is removed from the
self-reports.Forexample,scores on aself-report Agreeablenessscale are
regressed on a set of peer ratings of the same items and the self-report
residual is isolated as a separate variable. Because all the self-report
variance shared with the peer ratings has been removed, the residual
represents only self-report inflation: High scores indicate overclaiming
agreeableness (and low scores indicate underclaiming) relative to the
peer-rating criterion. These self-favoring bias scores can then be corre-
lated with any other variable in the data set.
5. For a recent discussion of the “criterion problem” in research on accuracy and bias,
see Robins and John (1997a).
1032 Paulhus & John

In preliminary work using the SCR approach, we conducted a series
of factor analyses on a comprehensive set of personality and intelligence
biasscores (Paulhus & John,1994). The datasets weretwo large samples
forwhich we hadobtained both self-ratingsand ratings bywell-informed
others on nine traits covering the Big Five domains. For each trait, we
calculated the residual score by indexing the degree to which the self-rat-
ing exceeded the peer-rating criterion.6This procedure yielded nine
self-criterion bias scores (i.e., one for each trait), which we then inter-
correlated. A factor analysis of this matrix showed that there were two,
rather than five, self-favorability bias factors: one was marked by self-
favoring on Agreeableness,Dutifulness, and Nurturance and the other by
self-favoring on Extraversion, Dominance, Intellect, and Openness (see
Figure 1).7Similar factors were found in a Chinese sample from Hong
Kong (Yik, Bond, & Paulhus, 1998).
6. Neuroticism isreverse-scored andlabeled “Stability”to ensure thatall domains point
in the positive direction.
7. We found it useful to separate Conscientiousness into Dutifulness and Ambition
following Paunonen and Jackson (1996). For similar distinctions, see McCrae and John
(1992) and Wiggins and Trapnell (1996).
Figure 1
Two Factors of Self-Favoring Bias
Derived from Nine Self-Criterion Residuals
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1033

These two forms of self-favoring bias seemed to carry connotationsof
“Saints” and “Superheroes.” The first factor captures a tendency to see
oneself as more altruistic and dependable than would seem justified by
others’ judgments: These individuals are overclaiming possession of
traits indicating moral virtue and respect for social convention. The
second factor captures a tendency to see oneself as more competent
sociallyand intellectually than oneis seenby well-informedothers. Such
individuals are claiming superiority over others by overclaiming posses-
sion of traits associated with competence and social status.
Note the extraordinary flexibility of this SCR methodology. Any
self-rated trait that has a credible criterion can be included.The method
is potentially comprehensive in permitting the simultaneous analysis of
discrepancies for a broad range of individual differences.In a sense, the
approach represents the analysis of self-report method variance, that is,
that part of self-reported personality that is unique to the self-report
technique.
Crystallizing Two Themes
In sum, the literature reviewed above reflects a variety of forms of
favorabilitybias in self-perception and self-reports. Inour view,however,
the various versions of self-favorability cluster into two themes. The first
is an egoistic tendency to see oneself as exceptionally talented and
socially prominent; the second is a moralistic tendency to see oneself as
an exceptionally good member of society.
How are these two tendencies related to traditional defense mecha-
nisms, defined here (Cramer & Davidson, this volume) as unconscious
mental operations that minimize anxiety or maintain self-esteem? Cer-
tainly, the two go far beyond “response styles,” that is, tendencies to bias
one’s responses on questionnaires (Messick & Jackson, 1958; Paulhus,
1991). Although they show some departure from reality, the biased
self-descriptions appear to be held honestly—even ontotally anonymous
reports. At the same time, we doubt that the two correspond directly to
any two traditional defense mechanisms. Instead, we allude to Sackeim’s
(1983) argument that self-deception is the common ingredient in defense
mechanisms. Following that argument, we conceive the processes re-
sponsible for the two self-favorability biases as self-deceptive styles.
Sackeim’s (1983) influential article proposed that the efficacy of a
defense mechanism rests on the interaction of two mutually conflicting
1034 Paulhus & John

representations of the same information (see also Sackeim, 1988): that
is, some representation of the threatening information is required to
effectively avoid or distort it. But unawareness of one representation is
also a necessary condition (p. 245). In short, the distortion process
involves exploiting information about the discrepancy without acknowl-
edging it. Evidence that such self-deception can occur was established
in the widely cited article by Gur and Sackeim(1979).
Ourpresent arguments derivefroma parallel discrepancy between two
social realities—one defined by the self and one defined by informed
observers. Rather than verifying that the self is aware (at some level) of
the observer perspective, we study social information that should be
continually available to the self, namely, basic traits. Two forms of such
departures from reality were isolated in our research on self-criterion
residuals detailed earlier: two tendencies to believe that one possesses
positivequalitiesthat are not corroborated byclose acquaintances.Below
we present further evidence that these biases are self-deceptive in nature
and broad in scope.
Assembling the Constellations of
Alpha and Gamma
After examining related literatures, we became convinced that the two
self-deceptive mechanisms identified above were components of two
larger constellations of constructs linked with motives and basic traits.
Below we attempt to delineate these two constellations of variables,
which we titled Alpha and Gamma, and then integrate them into a
two-factor model. We then go on to review some empirical work consis-
tent with the model.
Over30yearsago,Wiggins(1964) andBlock(1965) applied the labels
“Alpha” and “Gamma” to distinguish two social desirability-laden di-
mensions resembling those that we address here. Unfortunately, this
important distinction was not pursued, largely, it appears, because com-
mentators could not agree whether Alpha represented distortion (Ed-
wards, 1957; Messick & Jackson, 1958) or personality content (Block,
1965). Believing that both characterizations apply, we see the noncom-
mittal nature of the labels as a virtue. And we find the labels apt for at
least two other reasons. First, they were proposed by two influential
contributors who labored at the intersection between personality and
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1035

self-evaluative processes. Second, the use of connotation-free Greek
names requires, as yet, no commitment to interpretation.
With this two-factor template to guide our literature review, we pin-
pointed Alpha and Gamma themes in research on personality traits,
motives,and defensivemechanisms. The breadth of their application may
be seen in the four sections of Figure 2, that is, Response Styles,
Self-Evaluationand Self-Favoring,Values andMotives, and Self-Perceived
Personality.
Social Desirability Response Styles
As we noted above, early work on socially desirable responding empha-
sized one factor (Edwards, 1957; Jackson & Messick, 1958). It was
Wiggins (1964) who factor-analyzed all the available measures of so-
cially desirable responding and named the two distinct forms “Alpha”
and “Gamma.” Damarin and Messick (1965) interpreted them as autistic
bias and propagandistic bias.8Some time later, Paulhus (1984) factored
a wider array of measures yielding essentially the same factors. Unlike
earliernoncommittalapplicationofGreek letters, Paulhusconcludedthat
the two dimensions should be interpreted as self-deception and impres-
sion management.
In a later refinement, Paulhus and Reid (1991) concluded that the
self-deception items could be partitioned into two distinct factors: This
research led to the development of two relatively orthogonal subscales,
Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Self-Deceptive Denial (Paulhus, 1988,
1998b). Although both tendencies show demonstrable distortions in
self-perception, neither is responsive to audience effects.
Interestingly, the Denial scale, but not the Enhancement scale, is
positively and highly correlated with the Impression Management scale.
The fact that denial responses (“I never enjoy my bowel movements”)
and impression management responses (“I always pick up my litter”)
tend to co-occur suggests that the same individuals tend to exhibit both
conscious and unconscious versions of exaggerated moralism and social
conventionality—atleast under anonymous conditions.
In sum, the current literature indicates two forms of self-deceptive
socially desirable responding, interpretable as self-enhancement and
denial. That is, people can unconsciously distort the favorability of
8. This work was later publishedin a more accessible medium (Messick, 1991).
1036 Paulhus & John

ALPHA GAMMA
Response Styles
Damarin/Messick (1965) autistic bias propagandistic bias
Paulhus (1984) self-deception impression management
Edwards (1970) social desirability faking, lying
Roth/Snyder/Pace (1986) attributive repudiative
Paulhus/Reid (1991) self-deceptive enhancement self-deceptive denial
Self-Evaluation and Self-Favoring
Messick (1960) narcissistic exhibitionism Protestant ethic
Rosenberg/Sedlack (1972) intellectually good socially good
Jones and Pittman (1982) self-promoter exemplifier
Higgins (1987) ideal-self ought-self
Millon (1990) narcissistic personality dependent personality
disorder disorder
Raskin/Novacek/Hogan(1991b) grandiose self-enhancement need for approval
John/Robins (1994) narcissism __
Paulhus/John (1994) superheroes saints
Tellegen/Waller (1987) positive valence negative valence
Values and Motives
Freud (1894/1953) id superego
Adler (1939) superiority-striving social interest
Murray (1938) need for superiority need for affiliation
Atkinson/Litwin (1960) approach success avoid failure
Bakan (1966) agency communion
Triandis (1978) individualism collectivism
Wiggins (1979) dominance nurturance
Gilligan (1982) achievement relationships
Hogan (1983) getting ahead getting along
Bond (1988) competence personal morality
Markus/Kitayama (1991) independence interdependence
Schwartz (1992) self-enhancement conservation
Woijciszke (1994) competence morality
Winter (1996) need for power need for affiliation
Self-Perceived Personality
Block (1965) ego-resiliency ego-control
Gough (1957) ach’t via independence ach’t via conformity
Leary (1957) dominance nurturance
Tellegen (1982) social potency social closeness
Wiggins (1979) dominance nurturance
Holden/Fekken (1989) perceived capability interpersonal sensitivity
Weinberger & Schwartz (1990) (lack of) distress restraint
Digman (1997) personal growth socialization
Figure 2
Manifestations of Alpha and Gamma Constellations
at Four Levels of Personality
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1037

questionnaire responses in two ways: by exaggerating their talents and
by minimizing their sins (for a review, see Paulhus, in press).
Self-Evaluation and Self-Favoring
One-dimensional models of self-evaluation have long dominated the
self-perceptionliterature(e.g.,Anderson,1968;Edwards,1957; Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Peabody, 1984; Saucier, 1994; Taylor &
Brown, 1988). Overlooked were a pair of factors that recurred consis-
tently in workexploring qualitativelydifferent formsof evaluation.Messick
(1960), for example, found multiple points of view in how subjects rated the
desirability of traits: The two largest factors were labeled “narcissistic
self-promotion” and “Protestant ethic.” Using multidimensional scaling,
Rosenberg and Sedlak (1972) found that two evaluative dimensions
resulted from scaling the perceived similarity of traitadjectives: One was
interpreted as “intellectually good” (e.g., intelligent,determined) and the
other as “socially good” (e.g., reliable, helpful). Subsequent research
documented the same two primary factors (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1985;
Wojciszke, 1994).
In the domain of self-reported personality, a parallel pair of evaluative
factors have been isolated (Benet & Waller, 1995; Tellegen & Waller,
1987). The first, labeled Positive Valence, contrasts narcissism-flavored
itemssuchas“outstanding”and“superior”with“normal”and“average.”
The second factor, labeled Negative Valence, emphasizes extreme and
socially deviant characteristics such as “cruel” and “deserves to be
hated.” Both represent exaggerated forms of self-evaluation different in
tone from the common view of high self-esteem. And both resemble the
factors of self-favoring bias emerging from our own factor analyses of
self-criterion residual (SCR) scores, namely, an egoism regarding one’s
status and prominence, on the one hand, and a moralism regarding one’s
virtue as a dutiful and agreeable person, on the other (Paulhus & John,
1994).
To summarize: Contrary to the earlier view that evaluation is unidi-
mensional, the work reviewed here documents the repeated emergence
of the same two dimensions in research on self-evaluations and self-
favoring. One dimension reflects individual differences in the narcissis-
tic, egoistic tendency to claim exceptional qualities, that is, superior
status and competence. The second factor reflects an exaggerated tendency
1038 Paulhus & John

to see oneself as a good person, that is, dutifully adhering to social norms
and avoiding antisocialbehavior.
Values and Motives
Disputes about the number of important human values have a long
history. Yet two, above all, are never overlooked on lists of values. They
are agency and communion (Bakan, 1966), or variants thereof. Agency
is the positive value placed on individuality, personal striving, growth,
and achievement. Communion is the positive value placed on relation-
ships,intimacy, and benefitingothers,eventhesocietyasawhole.Similar
dimensions appear as the latent structure underlying the most compre-
hensive, cross-cultural analyses of values (Bond, 1988; Lonner, 1980;
Schwartz, 1992). In the argot of everyday life, the values have been
felicitously labeled as “getting ahead” and “getting along” (Hogan,
1983).
These two broad cultural values are assumed to promote the sociali-
zation of two sets of value-consistent traits. Different histories of
socialization, then, play a major role in the dramatic individual differ-
encesobservedinthese traits.9As a result, researchers in the personologi-
cal tradition have consistently emphasized in their lists of needs some
versionofpower and affiliation(McAdams, 1985; Murray,1938;Winter,
1996). The dual-motive framework has also been highlighted in the
extensive empirical and theoretical work by Wiggins and his colleagues:
There, agency and communion are held to be the primary motives giving
rise to personality traits (Wiggins, 1991; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996).
Inshort,whenlimitedtotwo values,conceptualandempiricalanalyses
usually yield constructs akin to agency and communion. Individual
differences in these values then induce observed differences in the
motives of need for power and need for approval.
Self-Perceptions of Personality
Under most circumstances, comprehensive analyses of self-report person-
ality items exhibit five factors (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1987; John, 1990).
9. Alternatively, the two dimensions may derive fromdistinctive adaptive strategies. In
this view, evolution has endowed humans with two powerful, but independent, motives
that enhance reproductive success (Buss, 1997; Gangestad & Simpson, 1990). Genetic
variation on these motives may explain the prominence of agenticand communal traits.
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1039

Over the years, however, there have been repeated indications of small
but systematic intercorrelations among thefive factors.
This pattern led Digman (1997) to reanalyze several diverse data sets,
by factor-analyzing the intercorrelations among Big Five measures. He
concluded that the five factors can be organized into two themes or
superfactors, namely, Personal Growth (Extraversion and Openness) and
Socialization (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stabil-
ity).10 Drawing on Digman’s data and other literature, Wiggins and
Trapnell (1996) also argued for the primacy of two themes underlying
the Big Five dimensions. According to their analysis, the facets of each
Big Five dimensioncan be linked to either agency or communion.
Finally, it is not uncommon to find (sometimes substantial) intercor-
relationsamong the Big Fiveinselect samples orunder select conditions.
The possibility that a high demand for desirable responding might be
responsible for these intercorrelations is supported by experimental
evidence showing that high intercorrelations can be induced by instruc-
tions to respond in a socially desirable fashion (Paulhus, Bruce, &
Trapnell, 1995). But this lack of orthogonality sometimes appears under
standard “straight-take” conditions. Nonetheless, the operation of a
social desirability response set has been cited as one possible cause for
thesometimes exaggerated intercorrelations among BigFiveself-reports
(e.g., Digman, 1997; McCrae & Costa, 1989, p. 435). To summarize:
Under certain conditions, nonzero intercorrelations are observed among
measures of the Big Five traits. This systematic and replicable conver-
gence suggests the intrusion of two evaluative superfactors.
Integrating Each Constellation
According to Anna Freud, where there is motive, there is distortion and
defense (1936). Perhaps it is coincidence that similar pairs of dimensions
are implicated whether we look at response styles, personality, motives,
or self-evaluation. We think not. Instead, we propose that Alpha and
Gamma are two constellations of values, motives, and biases that influ-
ence self-perceived personality. Our hypothesis is that they interrelate in
10. Although his factors bear some resemble to ours, Digman (1997) used the labels
Alpha and Beta to name the factors that we would label Gamma and Alpha. He assigned
the names arbitrarily (personal communication) whereas we followed the historical
precedents set by Block (1965) and Wiggins (1964).
1040 Paulhus & John

the sequence depicted in Figure 3: Two fundamental human values,
agency and communion, give rise to two motives, need for power and
need for approval. The latter motives dispose some individuals to an
egoistic tendency to exaggerate agentic qualities and a moralistic ten-
dency to exaggerate communalqualities, respectively. Individualdiffer-
ences in these two self-favoring tendencies, in turn, influence
self-perceptions of personality in a systematic fashion.The egoistic and
moralistic biases are both self-deceptive styles in that they operate
unconsciously to preserve and amplify a positive self-image. In this
model, then, values lead inexorably to biases.11
Factor Alpha
We hold that the list of concepts under the Alpha factor in Figure 2 are
all connected with a self-favoring bias that we think is best captured by
the term “egoistic bias.” This mechanism entails an exaggerated self-
worth with regard to social and intellectualcompetence. It is played out
in a self-favorability bias influencinghow people perceive themselves on
personality dimensions related to competence and social status (see
Figure 1). Empirically, the concept is closely related to “normal narcis-
sism” as operationalized by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI;
Raskin & Hall, 1981). For example, John and Robins (1994) found that
the NPI (and three other measures of overt narcissism) predicted the
degree to which subjects overestimated how well they performed on a
11. Of course, there are other plausible sequences. We placed biases at the end of the
sequence primarily because they are the focus of attention here.
Value Mo tiv e Self-Deceptive
Mechanisms Self-Favoring
Bias on
ALPHA
GAMMA
agency
communion
need for Power
need for
Approval
egoistic bias
moralistic
bias
Extraversion
Openness
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Figure 3
The Constellations of Alpha and Gamma
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1041

group task, as indexed by three different criteria (see Robins & John,
1997a, 1997b).
Such measures of normal narcissism overlap conceptuallyand empiri-
cally with a measure designed specifically to tap egoistic bias, namely,
PaulhusandReid’s(1991) Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale. Typically,
the two measures intercorrelate in the .50 range (McHoskey, Worzel, &
Szyarto, 1998; Paulhus,1988). More important, Paulhus (1998a) found a
complex pattern of observer-rating correlates of the NPI that were
remarkably similar to those of the Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale.
Factor Gamma
We propose that the list of concepts listed under Gamma in Figure 2 is
associated with a bias best described as moralistic. This second self-
deceptive style serves a self-protective function, best indexed by the
Marlowe-Crowne or Impression Management scales. This style entails
anavoidanceofdisapprovalby conforming tosocialnorms.Weinberger’s
notion of “restraint,” one of two primary dimensions underlying psycho-
pathology, is closely related. In fact, Weinberger’s original operationali-
zation of this dimension was the Marlowe-Crowne scale (Weinberger et
al., 1979). Later, he developed a broader measure (Restraint) with items
better capturing the personality aspects, rather than the bias aspects, of
this dimension (see Weinberger, this volume).
The nature of the Gamma factor may be further clarified by an
examination of the self-evaluative dimension with which it is strongly
(and negatively) associated, namely, Negative Valence (Tellegen & Wal-
ler,1987). Theitems on this measureconsist primarily ofsocially deviant
behaviors (cruel, violent, immoral). The moralistic disapprobation that
humans feel toward such characteristics is essential to society because
they threaten affiliation and harmony. In other words, such behaviors
threaten society itself by undermining the communal forces that keep it
unified.
We suggest that excessive motivation in this domain, however, may
lead to (1) exaggerated “saint-like” self-conceptions (Paulhus & John,
1994), and (2) attempts to ensure a Gamma-like image in the eyes of
others (Millham & Jacobson, 1978). This tendency should be manifested
in self-perceptions on personality dimensions such as Agreeableness and
Dutifulness.
1042 Paulhus & John

Some Empirical Evidence for the
Alpha-Gamma Model
Recently, we put the Alpha-Gamma Model to the test in two ways. One
approachanalyzedtherelationofself-favorabilityfactorstootherpossible
indicators of Alpha and Gamma. The second approach examined the
structure of the Big Five under high and low demand for self-presentation.
Factor Analytic Studies
To further test the two-dimensional structure assumed to underlie the
elements in Figure 2, we attempted (1) to replicate the factor structure
of the self-criterion residuals shown in Figure 1 and (2) to relate the
resulting factor scores to direct measures of as many as possible of the
variables related to Alpha and Gamma. Here we can provide only a
review of a series ofsuch factor analyses.
The data sets were two large samples of both self- and peer ratings on
theBigFiveInventory(John,Donahue, & Kentle,1991),a well-validated
measure of the Big Five trait domains. First, we confirmed that the
self-rating data and the peer-rating data showed the usual five factors.
Then, for each factor, we indexed self-favorability as the residual self-
rating after all peer rating variance has been removed. This procedure
yielded five self-favorability scores that we intercorrelated. A factor
analysis of this matrix yielded two self-favorability factors, one marked
by Extraversion and Openness and the other marked by Agreeableness
and Conscientiousness. In short, this result replicated the factors labeled
“Saints” and “Superheroes” by Paulhus and John (1994). These findings
suggestthatthestructure of self-favorabilitymeasures (2-D) is noticeably
smaller than the structure of the Big Five (5-D) appearing in both the
self-rating and peer-rating domains.
We computed factor scores for those two factors and examined their
associations with a number of the independent indicators of Alpha and
Gamma listed in Figure 2. Regression analyses showed that the two
self-favorability factors could be predicted from the Alpha and Gamma
indicators with substantial multiple Rs. The simplest way to summarize
these associations is to project them onto the two-space defined by the
self-favoring bias factors. As Figure 4 shows, the external correlates
marking Factor 1 included the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, Self-
Deceptive Enhancement, and Positive Valence. External correlates
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1043

marking Factor 2 included Self-Deceptive Denial and Negative Valence
(reverse-scored), and (to a lesser extent) the Marlowe-Crowne scale. A
comparison of Figures 1 and 4 shows that biases in self-perceived
personality are differentially related to independentmeasures of person-
ality and self-evaluation.More generally,the findings begin to flesh out
the coherence of the Alpha and Gamma patterns we have proposed in
Figure 2.
In short, the two-factor solution for the five self-favoring bias scores
yielded the predicted Alpha and Gamma structure; this solution con-
trasted dramatically with the five-factor solution required for either the
self-ratings or peer-ratings factored separately.
Faking Studies
Another series of studies examined the structure of self-favorability
scores under different levels of demand for self-presentation (Paulhus &
Notareschi, 1993). Subjects were asked to respond to standard personal-
ity inventories under varying instructions to create a socially desirable
impression(see Paulhus et al., 1995).Factor analyses showed a reduction
Figure 4
Relations of the Two Self-Favoring Biases to Various Measures
of Personality and Self-Evaluation
1044 Paulhus & John

in dimensionality from five to two factors under high demand. Moreover,
the factors appearing under high demand closely resembled the two
factors of self-favorability found by Paulhus and John (1994), namely,
Alpha and Gamma. That is, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness be-
came much more highly correlated with each other (indicating Gamma)
whereas Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness became more highly
intercorrelated (indicating Alpha).
Summary and Implications
We have argued that self-reports on normal personality traits are inter-
twined with two self-deceptive styles, that is, egoistic bias and moralistic
bias. We hypothesize that these styles, in turn, derive from two mo-
tives—the need for power and status and the need for approval—which
result from the fundamental human values of agency and communion.
Together, these two constellations of associated values, motives and
biases havebeen labeled Alpha and Gamma.
The Scope of Alpha and Gamma
Egoistic Bias. This self-deceptive style entails an exaggerated self-
worth with regard to social and intellectual status. This self-perception
has a “superhero” quality (Paulhus & John, 1994). Our research
suggests that individual differencesare best operationalized by normal
narcissism scales such as the NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1981) or the
Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale (Paulhus, 1991). Elsewhere, we
have shown that high scorers on these measures have short-term
advantages of self-confidence and positive first impressions (Paulhus,
1998a). In the long term, however, both their interpersonal appeal and
their mental health are evaluated negatively by others (Robins & John,
1997a; Paulhus, 1998a).
The effects of an egoistic bias are played out in exaggerated self-
perceptions on personality dimensions of Extraversion and Openness, as
well as on ability dimensions of intelligence and creativity. These attri-
butes all involve agentic qualities, that is, prominence and status. Put
another way, such individuals seek to stand out from the crowd.
Future research may show that thispattern varies across specific facets
of these variables (see McCrae & Costa, 1995). For example, egoistic
bias may operate on (1) the Extraversion facets of assertiveness, activity,
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1045

and excitement seeking, but not on sociability; (2) the Openness facets
of fantasy, ideas, and actions, but not on feelings; (3) the Neuroticism
facets of depression and self-consciousness (both reverse scored); and
(4) those Conscientiousness facets that involve competence and
achievement-striving. These predictions are consistent with recent
speculation by Wiggins and Trapnell (1996) that facets related to agency
and communion facets may be found within Conscientiousness, Emo-
tional Stability, and Openness, the last two factors of the Big Five. The
first two factors of the Big Five, of course, map directly onto agency and
communion, respectively.
Moralistic Bias. This self-deceptive style entails an exaggerated self-
positivity with regard to being a “nice person” and a “good citizen”—in
short,goodcharacter.Withsufficientexaggeration, such self-perceptions
reveala sanctimonious“saint-like” self-image. Thesetendencies arebest
measured by the Self-Deceptive Denial, Impression Management, or
Marlowe-Crowne scales. Although some high scorers on these measures
strive for and indeed even achieve many desirable communal attributes,
they can also exaggerate and lie, if necessary, to ensure that others
recognize this saintly impression (Millham & Jacobson,1978).
Moralistic bias is played out in inflated scores on traits related to
Agreeableness (cooperativeness, warmth) and self-control aspects of
Conscientiousness (e.g., responsibility, dutifulness, order). These traits
all involve avoidance of disapproval by adhering to social norms and
persevering at assigned tasks.
Somepeoplestriveto be “saints”: Theybelievethey can control earthly
impulses to a greater degree than their morally weaker peers. Others
strive to be “superheroes”: They believe they can accomplish great feats
that are unattainable by their contemporaries (Damarin & Messick,
1965). And we do not deny that both types fulfill theirideals to a certain
degree.
Broader Implications. Other writers have argued for the fundamental
importance of Alpha and Gamma in terms of their underlying values,
agencyand communion(e.g.,McAdams,1985;Wiggins,1991).Notonly
are both forces adaptive, but a tension between the two forces allows for
an optimal balance of goal-striving activities within the individual and
within societies. The bias mechanisms can contribute to single-minded
1046 Paulhus & John

striving12 observed in some individuals: Those who see themselves as
superheroes or saints can both be influential.
At a macro level, Alpha and Gamma map onto several larger dynamic
tensions in contemporary society. One correspondence is with the bal-
ance of political forces typicalof modern, flourishing societies,namely,
capitalism and socialism (Kerlinger, 1984). That is, growth in economic
systems is said to be driven by the “engine” of capitalism whereas the
“human face,” that is, the concern with those suffering from the system,
is provided by socialist activism. Another relevant contrast, especially
between Western and Eastern cultures, is often couched in the parallel
labels of individualism-collectivism (Triandis, 1978) or independence-
interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Given such a clear con-
nection between fundamental biases and political attitudes, it is not
surprising, then, that the biasing effects of political orientation are so
powerful (Paulhus, 1996; Tetlock, 1994).
Finally, it may not be a coincidence that Alpha and Gamma are
consistent with traditional sex-role distinctions. After all, the traditional
male role emphasizes individual achievement outside the home whereas
the female role emphasizes maintaining harmony in home, family, and
relationships.13 Not surprisingly, then, the clearest sex differences in
traits correspond to these value differences: Males score higher on
agency-related values and traits, and women score higher on communal-
related values and traits (Helgeson, 1997; Schwartz, 1992; Wiggins,
1991).14 Similarly, men score higher on egoistic biases (Aube & Koest-
ner, 1994; Beyer & Bowden, 1997) and women score higher on Gamma
biases (Paulhus, 1988, 1998b).
12. Rhodewalt and Morf (1995) demonstrated the low cognitive complexity of those
with an egoistic bias (narcissists). We predict that individuals with a moralistic bias will
similarly exhibit low cognitive complexity.
13. Given the contrast in socialization, Gilligan (1982) has gone so far as to argue that
men and women’s moral development should be evaluated on different criteria,namely,
achievement-orientation and relationship-orientation, respectively. Furthermore, well-
being in men and women appears to depend more on agency and communion, respec-
tively (Helgeson, 1994).
14. In fact,Bem’s (1974)influentialMasculinity andFemininityscales havebeenshown
to correspond almost directly with measures of agency and communion (Wiggins &
Holzmuller, 1981).
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1047

Mechanisms for the Biases
Levels of Consciousness. The present model departs substantially from
that espoused earlier by one of us (Paulhus, 1986). The earlier model
claimed that the critical difference between the two major forms of
self-report bias was the level of conscious awareness, with Gamma-like
measures implying more conscious forms of self-serving distortion and
impression management. We now interpret Alpha and Gamma differ-
ences as referring to different content, that is, agentic and communal
aspects of personality. Moreover, Alpha and Gamma constellations in-
clude both conscious (impression management) and unconscious (self-
deceptive) forms of bias.
At least two pieces of research justify this reinterpretation. First,
correlations between self-reported personality and Alpha and Gamma
bias measures are evident even under anonymous conditions where
conscious efforts at impression management are implausible (Paulhus&
John, 1994). Second, our research has shown that both Alpha bias and
Gamma bias can be manipulated with appropriate instructions (act agen-
tic vs. act communal) (Paulhus & Notareschi, 1993; Paulhus, in press).
In retrospect, we suspect that, in past studies, typical faking instructions
tended to have more effect on Gamma measures because the instructions
typically emphasized communal rather than agentic qualities (e.g., “give
the socially desirable response”), thus invoking the “morally good”
attributes of the good citizen and worker.
Given that the self-ratings in our own SCR data (see Figure 1) were
relativelyanonymous, we suggest thatboth factors involveself-deceptive
(i.e., nonconscious) processes. When combined with the faking studies,
the results suggest that both Alpha and Gamma characteristics can be
consciously and unconsciously inflated. In general, the unconscious bias
should push in the same direction as the trait: One reason is that
self-perceptions are often exaggerationsofakerneloftruth.Forexample,
highly agreeable people strive to be saint-like but, as the peer ratings
suggest, they do not succeed quite to the extent that they would wish.
Thus individuals are also more likely to show self-perception biases in
the same direction as their traits. However, rather than five independent
self-perception biases, one for each of the Big Five, we found evidence
for only two underlying biases.
The conscious versions of Alpha and Gamma bias (Alpha and Gamma
management) are likely to be more flexible and tailored to suit the
1048 Paulhus & John

audience (Paulhus, in press). Conscious promotion of one’s assets is
usually labeled “bragging.” Consciousdefense of one’s publicimage or
“good name” is commonly labeled “impressionmanagement” (Jones &
Pittman, 1982). These conscious versions are less relevant to this article
than are the self-deceptive components, but we plan to pursue this form
in future research. They are of particular relevance in addressing recent
claims that conscious distortion is of no concern in job applications
(Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996).
Competence Domain versus Moral Domain. The critical difference
between Alpha and Gamma bias measures now appears to correspond to
the different values and motives of the Alpha and Gamma constellations.
Different biases derive from valuing different goals: To the extent that
one values status and prominence, then an egoistic bias is more likely
(although certainly not necessary). And to the extent that one values
cooperation and dutifulness, one may overlook one’s own deficiencies in
that regard.
It can be argued that both biases are defensive styles (see Raskin et al.,
1991a). Following classic explanations of narcissism originating with
Freud, the observed self-promotion derives from deep-seated insecurity.
If a child’s parents provided attention and affection only upon demon-
strationsofcompetence,itiseasyto understand howtheconsequentadult
character would show an excessive need to self-promote. Similarly, if
withdrawal of affection followed any deviation from parental rules, then
excessive concern with being “naughty” could dominate one’s adult
character (Rank, 1945).
Attribution Versus Denial. Analternativetothecontent-drivenexplana-
tion for the distinction between Alpha and Gamma bias is the distinction
between claiming positive attributes and denying negative ones
(Sackeim, 1983; Roth, Snyder, & Pace, 1986). Both are self-favoring
strategies, but the attributional form focuses on claiming rare positive
qualitieswhereasthe denial form emphasizes never having deviatedfrom
common good behaviors. Presumably individual differences in these
dimensions would correspond to individualdifferences in (1) sensitivity
to reward and (2) sensitivity to punishment. Sackeim (1983) made this
same argument in developing his claim thatself-deception can be either
offensive or defensive in function.
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1049

Differences in content might then follow from differences in function.
After all, attribution is only self-favoring if one claims to have rare,
exceptional qualities. Such individuals will exaggerate qualities that will
raise their social status and their social prominence, that is, power,
intellect, and extraversion. With a Gamma bias, being “good” is con-
strued as being normal or appropriate, that is, not standing out from the
crowd.Hence, theself-favoringprocess willinvolvethe denial of socially
unacceptable aspects of the self, for example, antisocial behavior such as
crueltyanddishonestyand Id-related impulses such asaggression toward
parents and authorities and sexual indiscretions.This notion is consistent
with the operation of a “feared self” (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Sullivan,
1953) as well as with traditional psychoanalytic ideas (Cramer, 1995).
The Structure of Self-Perceived Personality
When correlations are observed among the Big Five, they are systematic.
For example, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness will often correlate
positively (Digman, 1997; Eysenck, 1993) and Extraversion and Open-
ness often show positive correlations (McCrae & Costa, 1989; Goldberg,
1993).
In the faking studies reported above, such correlations were induced
by a high demand for self-presentation. Although instructions in those
studies aimed to promote a global self-positivity (i.e., “fake good”), we
suspect that Alpha and Gamma biases can be activated independently.
Gamma-bias activation might occur in public or family contexts where
avoiding shame and loss of affection are the primary concerns. Under
such circumstances, people will be cooperative with peers and obey
authorities. Alpha-bias activation, in contrast, may occur in competitive
circumstances where potential glory or sexual partners are the primary
concern. Here people will exaggerate their boldness, risk-taking, and
creativity.
The Self-Criterion Residual (SCR) Method
Development of the Alpha-Gamma theory was greatly facilitated by our
new method for evaluating the structure of self-favoring biases. The
method was modeled on John and Robins’s (1994) residual measure of
self-enhancement. We extended their single-measure analysis to a com-
prehensive collection of many such measures and examined their
1050 Paulhus & John

structure. Our long-range plan is to explore the utility of the SCR
technique in resolving the conundrum of content versus style.
The SCR method certainly has more face validity than traditional
self-report measures of social desirability response styles because it
indexes directly the degree to which the self-perception deviates from
scores on an independently assessed criterion, such as reports by well-
informed observers or other relevant criteria. As a result, it provides a
model for the self-deceptive process underlying defense mechanisms.
According to Sackeim and Gur (1978), the self-deceptive process re-
quires two conflicting representations ofthe same information. In SCR,
the two representations of reality are that of the self and that of a (more)
objective criterion such as clinical ratings or behavior recorded on-line
by objective observers (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998).
ConsidertherecentstudybyRobins andJohn (1997b), however. When
narcissists were shown videotapes of their actual performance, their
inflated self-evaluations actuallyincreased, rather than decreased. Such
research suggests that narcissists are not merely overlooking objective
criterion information but actively distorting it. Further research of this
sort should be fruitful in uncovering themechanisms behind such moti-
vated distortions.
Relation to Weinberger Model
There is some similarity between our Alpha-Gamma Model and the
two-factor theory of defense developed by Weinberger (1990, this vol-
ume). Like us, Weinberger argued that there are two fundamental dimen-
sions in personality that bear on defensive processes; for him, they are
trait differences in distress and self-restraint. To analyze defensive style,
he partitions distress into two levels and restraint into three, yielding six
“typological” combinations. Although one particular combination, low
distress and high restraint (repressors), receives special consideration,
the two dimensions themselves have implications for defenses as well
(Weinberger, this volume).
It is certainly possible to draw a parallel between our Alpha and
Gamma and Weinberger’s dimensions of (low) Distress and Restraint.
Our Gamma dimension is clearly similarto Restraint in describing high
scorers as oversocialized. Moreover, low scorers on his Distress dimen-
sion bear a similarity to high scorers on our Alpha dimension (in fact,
distress measures correlate highly negatively with Alpha, consistent with
Self-Deceptive Styles: Egoistic & Moralistic Bias 1051

narcissists’ low levels of self-reported anxiety and distress). The clear
difference is that we emphasize the self-deceptive aspect of each dimen-
sion. So how do Weinberger’s repressors fall out in our system? They are
likelyto be highon bothAlpha andGamma: that is,they are bothegoistic
and moralistic. Being self-deceptive in two ways, they are doubly prone
to the advantages and disadvantages of self-deception (see Lockard &
Paulhus, 1988).
CONCLUSIONS
We hope that we have convinced the reader that defensive biasesintrude
into self-perceptions of personality and ability. The reader might even
find some credibility in our more ambitious proposition that values and
motivesserveas antecedents in this sequence. Torecap:Alphaisourlabel
for the sequence starting with individual differences in the tendency to
value agency, that is, social status andprominence. These differences
then induce differences in motivation to excel; differences in this motive
may then alter self-perceptions of intelligence, extraversion, and open-
ness. Similarly, Gamma is our label for the sequence beginning with
individual differences in valuing communion, that is, membership in
one’s social group. Value differences then induce differences in need for
approval, which in turn may induce a moralistic bias. This bias, in turn,
distorts self-perceptions of conscientiousness and agreeableness.
We would argue that, empirically, the case is strongest for the connec-
tion between corresponding traits and self-deceptive biases. Badly lack-
ing, however, is research connecting measures of our egoistic and
moralistic biases with measures of traditional defense mechanisms (e.g.,
Davidson & McGregor, 1996; Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969). With regard to
the antecedent role of values and motives in the Alpha or Gamma
sequences, the empirical case is yet to be made. Research that induces
or, at least, triggers agency and communion motives is necessary to make
that case. Among the possibilities is research involving the activation of
one motive or the other by subtle means such as trait priming (Bargh &
Pratto, 1986) or ought-self versus ideal-self priming (Higgins, Roney,
Crowe, & Hymes, 1994).
In the end, the prudent reader may hesitate to grant the full sweep
of our arguments. But an acceptance of our central claim—that there
are egoistic and moralistic forms of self-favoring bias—goes a long
way toward a resolution of several contentious issues in personality
1052 Paulhus & John

psychology. These include understanding: (1) theconceptualbasis of
bias in self-reports, (2) how to operationalize these biases, (3) the
distinction between promoting and defending one’s self-image, and (4)
why the (orthogonally extracted) Big Five factors often intercorrelate. If
ourlofty claims seem todepart from reality, however, egoisticbiases may
be at fault.
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