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... Others within this second body of literature focus on how state power is challenged by increasingly powerful market actors and market processes. They examine: challenges that market actors present to the apparent monopoly of states in shaping the structure of the international financial system (Cohen, 1998;Eichengreen, 1999;Frieden, 1991;Sinclair, 1994;Lindblom, 1977;Underhill, 1997); the challenge international financial markets present to conventional views of state sovereignty (Bienefeld, 1996(Bienefeld, , 1992Gill, 1995Gill, , 1990Helleiner, 1994a;Porter, T., 1993;Martin, 1994;Strange, 1998); and the impact of international financial market processes on social and human rights at the national, international and global level (Birchfield, 1999;Brodie, 1997;Larner 1997). ...
... Drafted in 1944, it sought to establish a world of controlled finance and free trade but it did not survive beyond the early 1970s (Helleiner, 1994a;Triffin, 1978;Strange, 1988). Kapstein describes how the collapse of Bretton Woods system, coupled with the oil shocks of 1972-73, created systemic and seemingly rampant financial instability even as regulators sought ways to prop up the system (Kapstein, 2006:5). ...
... Kapstein describes how the collapse of Bretton Woods system, coupled with the oil shocks of 1972-73, created systemic and seemingly rampant financial instability even as regulators sought ways to prop up the system (Kapstein, 2006:5). But, although it came at the cost of increased financial instability, the end of the par value system generated increased opportunities for international bankers (James, 1996: 351;Helleiner, 1994a). It unleashed global finance as a force, driven by its own market logic. ...
The rules and practices governing international finance are necessarily the product of
political contestation and this research seeks to better understand this process. It draws
on the work of Steven Lukes, Charles Lindblom, Karl Polanyi, Antonio Gramsci, John
Ruggie, Margaret Keck, and Katherine Sikkink. This dissertation examines how the
process of international/transnational contestation is changing. Two case studies, one on
the transnational civil society based campaign for the cancellation of third world debt and
the second on the role of the World Economic Forum in this contestation, are used to
explore how non-state actors have mobilized to change the rules and practices governing
international finance in general and debt cancellation in particular in the period ending
with the Gleneagles G8 summit in 2005.
First, it argues that CSOs and NGOs redefined the global agenda with respect to
finance and debt and produced a crisis in one elite discursive framework and a (partial)
shift to another discursive framework which incorporated the demands of non-elite
actors. Second, CSOs’ and NGOs’ activism and innovative political strategies changed
the process of decision making to include alternative perspectives and actors. Third, this
is part of a Polanyian double movement taking place at a transnational level in which the
effects of international financial markets have produced a societal backlash. Finally, in
the emerging context of transnational civil society based politics moral values and
normative ideas - ideas about how the world should be - are a powerful force in shaping
change, even with respect to such an opaque, highly technical and apparently empirically
based system of rules and practices as those which govern international finance.
... With the prevalence of neoliberalism, the concept of free trade competition has influenced all parts of the world (Helleiner, 1994). In 1987, China was affected by neoliberalism, and the country slowly transformed from a planned economy into a market economy. ...
... With the prevalence of neoliberalism, the concept of free trade competition has influenced all parts of the world (Helleiner, 1994). In 1987, China was affected by neoliberalism, and the country slowly transformed from a planned economy into a market economy. ...
Guided by Marxist theory and Bourdieu's theory of capital, this paper explores the impact of the marketisation of education on society by analysing the case of Hengshui Middle School in China in terms of its expansion in the education market. The paper finds that the impact of the marketisation of education on society is the pro and con side of a coin, as it optimises the allocation of educational resources in society to a certain extent while also having a negative impact on social justice and equity; in addition to this, the paper also compares Marxian and Bourdieu's theories while elaborating on them, finding that Bourdieu's theory is able to embody more insights in explaining educational equity.
... Arrighi (1994Arrighi ( , 2002Arrighi ( , 2007 makes clear that how the Americans responded to this structural crisis was crucial for shaping outcomes such as growing global liquidity and economic imbalances. Political choices liberalized global markets and redistributed power which, in turn, caused economic actors to adopt new strategies (see also Helleiner, 1996;Panitch and Gindin, 2012). As Gabor (2020: 46) succinctly put it, US-led financial hegemony was a structural manifestation of deeper processes-such as growing inequality, the erosion of welfare and tax states, and the rise of aggressive leverage practices-which combined, produce a structural need for new asset classes and liquid liabilities to fill ever-growing, often global, balance sheets. ...
Has global financial integration allowed firms in the so-called “Global South” to profit from financial activity? Financialization researchers have either neglected these countries and the international economic order in general or neglected firm-level dynamics, a broad sample of emerging markets, and a theoretical and historical explanation for this trend. I attempt to fill these gaps using data on all non-financial corporations across 31 emerging market economies to answer this question. To theorize and explain the recent historical origins of this process in a more sociological and global lens, I draw on the work of Giovanni Arrighi. My results show that financial inflows, but not outflows, increase financial accumulation in Global South firms—specifically short-term investments and cross-border lending. Moreover, nearly all financial income is generated by the largest firms. These results help explain how financial power undermines development in the Global South yet simultaneously empowers local economic elites who benefit from financial integration.
... Des interventions analogues sont observables sur l'axe Toulouse Bordeaux dont le district marshallien spécialisé sur l'aéronautique accueille une partie des activités de EADS (Carroué, 2010 : 210). La City de Londres s'est fortement renforcée par la dérégulation engagée par les gouvernements successifs (marché des eurodevises à partir de 1958, libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux dans les années 1970 et la réforme dite « big bang » des activités de la bourse en 1986 sous le gouvernement Thatcher) (Helleiner, 1995 ;Chavagneux, 2012& Shaxson, 2012. ...
Researchers of time series cross-sectional data regularly face the change-point problem, which requires them to discern between significant parametric shifts that can be deemed structural changes and minor parametric shifts that must be considered noise. In this paper, we develop a general Bayesian method for change-point detection in high-dimensional data and present its application in the context of the fixed-effect model. Our proposed method, hidden Markov Bayesian bridge model, jointly estimates high-dimensional regime-specific parameters and hidden regime transitions in a unified way. We apply our method to Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange’s (1991, American Political Science Review 85, 539–556) study of the relationship between government partisanship and economic growth and Allee and Scalera’s (2012, International Organization 66, 243–276) study of membership effects in international organizations. In both applications, we found that the proposed method successfully identify substantively meaningful temporal heterogeneity in parameters of regression models.
... Similar to what happened at the macro level, DEE states have played a crucial role in the emergence of powerful domestic financial actors. 82 In the short term, this may serve to shore up their own legitimacy, but in the long term it carries the risk of contributing significantly to financial sector moral hazard, creating institutions that are just too big to fail. That being said, it is clear that it is precisely those structural limits to DEE policymakers' agency, imposed by developing countries' position in global economic hierarchies, that push them toward financialized developmental models, often limiting further resources that could be channeled toward industrialization. ...
This article examines the structural power of domestic finance in developing and emerging economies (DEEs) in the context of a shift toward increasingly activist financial development planning and financial sector reform. Focusing on efforts to create large, internationally competitive banks in Malaysia and Nigeria dating to the late 1990s and early 2000s, it highlights that banks have not played their envisaged role in financing structural transformation via industrial growth and economic development. Nonetheless, (large) banks in DEEs have attained considerable structural power over financial policy, supporting their ability to shape growth and investment strategies. Therefore, the article proposes a revised model of the structural power of finance, recognizing its contingent nature. States pursue various forms of financialization both as a substitute to, or in conjunction with, industrial policy. Financialized development strategies enhance the structural power of large banks in DEEs, notwithstanding their limited role in meeting the investment/development imperative.
... Hvad Katzenstein (1985) til gengaeld ikke vier tilstraekkelig opmaerksomhed, er en anden central del af økonomiens internationalisering, nemlig libraliseringen af kapitalmarkeder, som isaer tog fart i 1980'erne og 1990'erne (Helleiner, 1994). En yderligere vigtig tendens i forholdet mellem stater og markeder er mod en stigende statslig afhaengighed af gaeldsfinansiering gennem internationale kapitalmarkeder (Streeck, 2014), som er forbundet med en raekke grundlaeggende aendringer i vestlige økonomier, såsom faldende vaekstrater, stigende udgifter til velfaerdsstaten og en svigtende evne til effektiv skatteinddrivelse (se Schäfer og Streeck, 2013). ...
Til trods for at Irland og Island siden 2008 har gennemlevet nogle af historiens største finansielle og økonomiske kriser, nyder de to små åbne økonomier nu relativt høje vækstrater og lav arbejdsløshed og anses som succeshistorier. I begge lande har krisehåndteringen haft fokus på at genoprette internationale kapitalmarkeders tillid til de to økonomier, men hvor Island har kompenseret befolkningen gennem en socialt afbalanceret sparepolitik og gældseftergivelse, har Irlands sparepolitik fulgt en mere ortodoks europæisk tilgang med betydelige ulighedsskabende effekter. Islands heterodokse tilgang var mulig gennem kapitalkontrol og en devaluering af valutaen, hvorimod Irland hverken kunne devaluere eller nedskrive bankernes gæld. Artiklen viser, hvordan afhængigheden af internationale kapitalmarkeder og opgivelsen af monetær politik begrænser den fleksibilitet, små stater tidligere har nydt, og øger afhængigheden af heldige udviklinger i verdensøkonomien.
... Regulatory reforms further enabled financial investors to "go global." States had a rather visible-even if at times unintentional -hand in fostering financial activity through the elimination of capital controls and deregulation of domestic financial markets (Helleiner, 1994). ...
This dissertation consists of three articles that together seek to deconstruct, or disorder, monolithic treatments of “private sector” participation in the delivery of urban water and sanitation services. The studies interrogate how variation in forms of business ownership and politics not only shape public-private collaboration for service delivery over time but also contribute to re-configuring the institutions that govern service provision markets in global South contexts. Drawing on historical and ethnographic research on the development of private participation in water and sanitation provision in Brazil, my work yields three central insights. First, it illuminates how shifts in business ownership away from family-owned construction business groups towards ownership by financial investors produced a “centralizing” organizational and institutional pull in the governance of private urban water and sanitation services. Once heavily embedded in local politics, private holdings reduced subsidiary autonomy, eschewed close relations with local politicians, and mobilized for regulatory centralization. This finding problematizes the tendency within scholarship on the financialization of urban development to position financial investors as capitalizing on local forms of entrepreneurial politics, suggesting the need to consider how different investors fluidly engage with shifting market contexts. I argue that financial investors perceived centralization as an effective strategy for ensuring stable returns across consolidated operations within otherwise unstable and fragmented local political environments. Second, my work challenges the tendency to portray infrastructure investors as passive onlookers searching for institutionally-stable investment geographies. I show that private investors in Brazil’s water and sanitation sector were able to counter strong opposition and successfully lobby for a centralizing regulatory reform by constructing business power over time. This entailed learning from mistakes and adjusting mobilization strategies, revealing that infrastructure investors do not have fixed preferences, may learn and adapt, and can be key agents of institutional change. Finally, my research unsettles the assumption that profit maximization will override other service objectives. My comparative analysis of the long-term outcomes of different models of public-private collaboration shows that states can still shape service delivery priorities through the work of politically-appointed managers and state allies, what I call “political modulation.” This finding not only problematizes policy advice that prescribes political insulation as a strategy for improving service delivery, it also suggests politics can play a positive role in promoting more equitable service outcomes.
... First, and most fundamentally, it is a crucial and hitherto missing part of the analysis of the turn to neoliberalism near the end of the twentieth century (e.g. Ban, 2016;Best, 2020;Blyth, 2002;Helleiner, 1994). Second, and very related, it is an important addition to the now large and established literature on economic ideas (e.g. ...
Reinterpreting the rise of contemporary macroeconomics, this article argues that what mattered most in the shift away from postwar Keynesianism was a new form of modeling called Real Business Cycles (RBC) – variations of which still dominate mainstream macroeconomics. But how could this form of modeling, championed by a handful of junior economists, affect a disciplinary coup in the face of strong opposition from Keynesian disciplinary powerbrokers? Content analysis, network mapping and deep reading of 197 articles by 331 authors suggest that RBC had a competitive edge as a tool of individual professional advancement, allowing it to rewire pre-existing networks of expertise in the face of strong opposition. Elaborating on the interdependence between individual professional appeal and the rise of new forms of formalized expertise, this article identifies three facets of RBC that made it a ‘super-model’, enabling its improbable takeover of macroeconomics: the ability to bond together a set of disparate ideas into a simple and workable whole (‘glue’), deflect known criticism (‘rubber’), and incorporate modified assumptions (‘putty’).
... In the global financial market, the role of the banking system is significantly accepted in the literature of finance and banking (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999;Zaher & Kabir Hassan, 2001). It is believed that the banking system facilitates all types of economic and financial activities in this global village (Helleiner, 1996;Chienwattanasook & Jermsittiparsert, 2019). Business firms whether working in domestic or international markets are dealing with banks to facilitate and promote their daily transactions. ...
... Selon Gill (1995), de telles options « nationales » n'existant plus, il faut se concentrer sur la construction de mouvements politiques internationaux plus efficaces. D'après Helleiner (1994), les États-nations conservent souvent plus de contrôle que l'on ne pense. Cet auteur est en effet impressionné de constater que l'érosion de la souveraineté nationale s'est produite de manière inégale et que les États-nations ont d'eux-mêmes conclu des accords restreignant leur souveraineté. ...
... Ancak 1971'de ABD'nin almış karar sonucu Amerikan doları altına karşı sabit bir değere sahip olma özelliğini ve altına dönüştürülebilme kabiliyetini kaybetmiştir. Bu kararın sonucunda dalgalı kur politikasının uygulandığı sermayenin daha serbest dolaşabildiği yeni liberal küresel sistem ortaya çıkmıştır (Helleiner, 1996). Sermayenin bu şekilde serbest dolaşabilmesinin altyapısı teknolojik gelişmeler sayesine olmuştur. ...
... On the other hand, the control of capital allowed the governments of the central capitalist countries to control the international movement of short-term capital, to stabilize the exchange rate and stimulate trade integration. This system guaranteed a sufficient degree of autonomy for governments to implement monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to the construction of welfare states, then an objective of national interest, given the existing social pact (Frieden, 2008;Helleiner, 1994). Furthermore, the post-war perspective of economic policy to pursue full employment was fundamental to the Swedish model (Skidelsky, 2009). ...
In general, the literature on the developmental state studies Asia and Latin America, not Scandinavia. This article examines the developmental character of the state in Sweden, distinguishing it as a specific case, because its institutions and policies combine the simultaneous promotion of industrialization and social equity. The paper analyzes the Swedish model of development, centered in Rehn-Meidner Plan (R-M), a political strategy of the national development headed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). It is argued that in Sweden industrialization and the construction of the welfare state were two sides of the same coin. The R-M Plan played a key role in consolidating the Swedish model between 1945 and 1975. It combined and articulated economic development, centered on industrialization, reduction of social inequalities, and fiscal and monetary stability. It increased productive complexity and equality, unified economic policy and social policy, planned industrialization and income redistribution. It was structured through a broad power pact among workers, industry, farmers, political representatives elected by SAP and public bureaucracy. It was institutionalized, above all, by the democratic corporatist arrangement of centralized salary negotiations.
... The first is the rise of the main financial centres -New York, London, Frankfurt, Paris and Tokyo. The second is the encouragement given by the Federal Reserve to US banks to hold foreign deposits offshore (Germain, 1997;Helleiner, 1994). Both played a key role in the development of international finance after the massive international economic changes in early the 1970s. ...
It is common place in academia when appraising the misfortunes and achievements of South America to refer, positively or negatively, to a lineal succession of political and economic stages which have transformed the region from being dominated by authoritarian populism to incorporating neoliberal globalisation. This sequence begins with the identification of authoritarian populism, followed by ISI-ECLA desarrollism, finally ending in the 1990s logic of the Washington Consensus. Briefly, this view offers a particularly elitist and economist character to the explanation of regional developments with two results. First, the social character of power is reduced to institutional-rational constituencies and individual leaderships in an elitist, ahistorical and top-down interpretation of development. Second, it reinforces the traditional divorce between the international and domestic, and approaches economics and politics as isolated empirical units. This paper attempts to provide a re-reading of the main stages and feature of South American development by deploying a new political economy approach able to address five major dominant dichotomies present in mainstream economics and political approaches: 1) the undeniable social nature of development and change; 2) the idea that the domestic represents an independent unit from the international; 3) the analytical dilemma between agency and structure; 4) the conception that the economy and market are an independent social dimension governed by its own rules, detached from society and separate from the state; 5) and the apparent opposition between the regional and the global.
... Helen Milner has explored under what institutional mostly at the formal levelconditions government commit itself to international cooperation on issues such as trade liberalization. 21 To identify domestic politics factors that are considered to affect policy outcomes, Milner employs three sets of analytical lenses: (1) executive-legislative relations, (2) power structure, i.e. presidentialism versus parliamentarism, and (3) the role of governmental administration structures. From her explanatory scheme can a hypothesis be derived that presidential government harnessed with executive prerogatives and a strong administrative machine is likely to engage in international cooperation in an institutionalized manner. ...
This article examines how changes in• formal political institutions can affect the extent to which a nationally defined monetary policy is committed to an international monetary order by comparing the German and French cases during the period of 1919–1929. There is no dearth of studies that employ domestic political institutional variables to explain policy outcomes regarding international economic relations. And at the same time, for the past decade, a host of “second image reversed” works have improved our understanding of domestic-international interaction. While many scholars of international political economy have written about domestic sources of trade policy, increasing numbers of authors have devoted substantial attention to the explanatory power of domestic variables in monetary issues. Particularly, when accounting for variations on democratic commitment to international monetary cooperation, the importance of executive-legislative relations deserves special attention. Germany and France during the 1920s provide us with an interesting pair of comparison in that their parliamentary democracies had subtle differences in executive-legislative relations.
... It is certainly the case that regulators share a set of normative beliefs, agree on certain causal relationships, have a shared notion of validity and manage a common set of policy actions and practices. 105 As an accounting standard setter has said, in praise of a global set of ethics in accounting, 'sometimes, a set of options just will not do'. 106 Rules, in this telling are insufficient for purpose. ...
The substance of international financial regulation has been created through informal standard setting among regulators acting through networks. This standard setting has frequently been concrete and specific, as the evolving international bank capital rules exemplify. But banking supervisors have recently turned their focus towards the creation of a global set of ethical standards for bankers, only vaguely defined at best. Regulators have emphasized the importance of ‘culture’ set by a ‘tone at the top’, though they have not yet explained what is required by the terms. This new focus of international financial regulation epitomizes the irreducibly informal nature of multinational standard setting, even in a global regime that has tried for precision. It also represents a commitment by financial regulators to cosmopolitanism: the effort to create consistent global ethical standards for financial institutions assumes away differences in industry structure and national cultures in the service of a vision of a consistent financial regulatory regime applied to banks and non-bank financial firms across the world.
... İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası ismine "Bretton Woods Sistemi" denilen uluslararası ekonomik ve siyasal sistemde ülkele-rin ekonomik kararlarda daha etkili olduğu, uluslararası finansın etkilerini sınırlandırmalarına, sermaye kontrolü ve sabit döviz kuru politikaları izlemelerine olanak veren liberal olmayan bir uluslararası sistemin temelleri atıldı (Helleiner, 1996). Bu sistem içinde Amerikan doları uluslararası rezerv para birimi haline geldi ve doların altına dönüştürülebilmesi prensibi kabul edildi. ...
Merkez bankaları uzun yıllardır ekonomik sistemlerin değişmez parçalarını oluşturuyor ve farklı dönemlerde benimsedikleri amaçlar ve hedefler ile iktisadi kalkınmanın en önemli unsurlarından birini teşkil ediyorlar. Merkez bankacılığı tarihine bakıldığında ise değişen koşullara göre merkez bankalarının amaç ve araçlarının değiştiği ve bunun da iktisadi kalkınma alanında önemli etkiler yaptığı görülüyor. Bu bölümde merkez bankacılığına tarihsel bir bakış açısı getirilerek, merkez bankacılığı dönüşümünün ne gibi sonuçları olduğu üzerinde duruluyor.
... In the year 1944, during World War II, representatives from fortyfour countries held a Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire -United States of America, to lay the foundations for what would become a new economic order when the war was over (Helleiner, 1994;Robinson, 2004Robinson, , 2005. As a direct result of the Bretton Woods Conference, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were created (Evans and Makepeace, 1979;Konings, 2010). ...
In this article, we address the problems caused by sport mega events to residents directly affected by development projects associated with such events. To do so, we conducted a survey with residents of 134 chosen randomly residences in a universe of 3465 houses. These residences are located in the impact area of the Tronco Avenue construction, the principal development project associated with the 2014 FIFA World Cup in the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil. We classified such residences according to their location in relation to the works and in relation to the type of possession the residents declared. Such analysis procedures allowed us to point out ways for sport mega events to avoid or mitigate the problems identified from the perceptions of the surveyed residents. The main issues raised by the residents are related to housing, security and living conditions. Our conclusions point to the fact that the discourse associated with sport mega events could be channelled to the more direct impacts of the transformations provoked by such events.
... Gleichzeitig geriet durch die nunmehr immer deutlicher feststellbare Offensive neoliberaler Finanzfraktionen, ausgehend v.a. von den USA, und der damit verbundenen erneuten Liberalisierung der Finanzmärkte das keynesianische Paradigma immer mehr in die Krise (Helleiner 1996;Kannankulam 2008). ...
Eine Stärke materialistischer Staatstheorie liegt darin, Staat und Gesellschaft nicht als dualistisch voneinander getrennte Sphären zu verstehen. Dies macht es möglich, im Gegensatz zu vielen in der Politikwissenschaft geführten Debatten, ökonomische und politische Veränderungen im Zusammenhang zu diskutieren und Macht nicht auf politische Macht zu reduzieren. Gerade um Globalisierungsprozesse angemessen verstehen zu können ist dies von Bedeutung.
Dass die Transformationsprozesse politischer Herrschaft
nur im gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhang verstehbar werden,
zeigt sich mittlerweile auch in einer Entgrenzung der Disziplin
der Internationalen Beziehungen (vgl. Albert 2003), aber auch
in einem Revival der Politischen Ökonomie (vgl. hierzu den o.g.
AkG-Band sowie Bieling 2007; Schirm 2006; ten Brink 2008).
Werden diese Zusammenhänge nicht thematisiert, erscheint die
Globalisierung als quasinatürlicher und unaufhaltsamer Prozess,
der über die Nationalstaaten komme und diesen die Handlungsfähigkeit
bzw. „Problemlösungsfähigkeit“ raube. Vergessen wird dabei
nicht nur, dass es führende Industriestaaten sind, die den Prozess
der neoliberalen Globalisierung vorantreiben, sondern auch,
dass Staaten selbst nicht zu verstehen sind, wenn sie nicht systematisch
mit den gesellschaftlichen Widersprüchen in Beziehung
gesetzt werden. Nur so kann Globalisierung auch als politische
Strategie entschlüsselt werden, mit der die im Fordismus erkämpften
Klassenkompromisse aufgebrochen werden konnten. Und nur
so kann der scheinbare Widerspruch zwischen nationalen Staaten
und globalen Kapitalverhältnissen dahingehend aufgelöst werden,
dass es die nationalen Staaten sind, die sich zunächst innerlich internationalisieren,
womit sich auch die Kräftekonstellation in den
Nationalstaaten nachhaltig zuungunsten der Subalternen verschieben
(Poulantzas 2001; Wissel 2007). Globalisierung ist in diesem
Sinne kein äußerlich auf die Nationalstaaten wirkender Prozess.
Der Staat wird aus materialistischer Perspektive daher nicht
einfach nur als verselbstständigte Institution konzeptualisiert,
sondern als soziales Verhältnis betrachtet. Seine Eigenständigkeit
ist dabei auch immer das Ergebnis von sozialen Kämpfen und
kann nicht einfach vorausgesetzt werden.
... That disadvantage is heightened when investors contrast those risks with the many opportunities afforded by capital mobility and financial deregulation: investments in hedge funds, private equity, subprime mortgages, various kinds of arbitrage, and many others [71]. Harry Dexter White, the co-designer of Bretton Woods, noted that owners of capital tended to be flighty, "motivated either by prospect of speculative exchange gain, or desire to avoid inflation, or evade taxes", quoted in Helleiner [9] p. 33. Consequently finance, Mazzucatto and Wray note, has not been financing the capital development of the economy; rather, it has been financing itself [71], even as the investment needs of carbon mitigation projects go unmet. ...
This article explains how the liberation of finance from the Bretton Woods constraints imposed after World War II has shaped the resulting “neoliberal” political economy into a political economy that is inhospitable, if not hostile, to the kind of regulation and public investment necessary to address the climate emergency and other environmental problems, and has contributed to levels of inequality that constitute a social crisis in their own right. Using the United States as an example, the author explains how mobile finance and the accompanying neoliberal ideology impose “checks” on a range of governmental policies, and moreover, have led to inadequate levels of public and private investment, both generally and in areas crucial to reduce carbon emissions. The article concludes with a discussion of how a new set of international monetary and financial arrangements along the lines that Keynes originally envisioned could support a “Green New Deal” sustainability strategy or, absent such an international agreement, how capital controls imposed nationally could constitute a temporary solution to the problems of insufficient regulation and investment.
By the turn of the 1990s, tax competition among national governments had emerged as a powerful law-making practice. The possibility of tax competition essentially depends on the design of transnational law, such as European law. This Article examines the change of economic, political, and legal ideas that have shaped responses by the European Communities and the European Union (EU) to income tax competition. It asserts that under the post-war settlement of embedded liberalism and moderate market integration, tax competition was not perceived as a fully developed phenomenon. Under increased cross-border economic mobility in the 1990s, tax competition became a critical concern but received a liberal and permissive reaction from the EU. In the 2010s, governing tax competition in the EU became a more vital topic. Still, in the contemporary EU, turning political ideas into legal rules capable of addressing tax competition remains hampered by the EU law requirement of unanimous decision-making. The European choice of whether and how to address tax competition involves profoundly contrasting ideas on the means by which to govern the socio-economic reality. The decision between spontaneous and regulated income tax integration is therefore a salient political question, but the unanimity rule undermines political contestation over tax competition and over the European model of fiscal federalism. The Article comes to a close by reflecting on whether the EU legal order offers means to overcome the deadlock of unanimity and whether it could accommodate a more properly political contestation over the Europeanisation of income taxation.
Oscar Sanchez-Sibony reveals the origins of our current era in the dissolution of the institutions that governed the architecture of energy and finance during the Bretton Woods era. He shows how, in the second half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union sought to dismantle the compartmentalized nature of Bretton Woods in order to escape its material ostracism and pave a path to global finance and exchange that the United States had vetoed during the 1950s and 1960s. Through the construction of a set of pipelines that helped Europe's energy regime change from coal to oil and gas, the Soviet Union succeeded in developing market relations and a relationship with Western capital as durable as the pipelines themselves. He shows how a history of the development of capitalism needs to integrate the socialist world in bringing about the new form of capitalism that regiments our lives today.
Globalization does not only reduce to the economic sector, is also not an predominantly or almost exclusively by private actors driven networking of the world. It rather requires—as already mentioned in the context of the liberalization of foreign trade and capital flows—the political enablement through elimination or reduction of national obstacles of cross-border interaction. In the positive sense, the participation in globalization requires the political creation of conditions, so that societies can successfully network globally, for example the creation, maintenance and administration of cross-border infrastructure, the conclusion of inter-state, regional or global cooperation agreements, the agreement of certain product, process and legal and financial standards in transnational exchange, certainly also the empowerment of national actors in order to be able to compete internationally or to cushion its consequences.
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European governments intervened to support domestic financial systems; several years later, peripheral European economies were at greater risk of having domestic financial crises transform into fiscal crises. While mainstream economic thinking predicts financial markets will punish risky bank behavior with higher interest rates and punitive resolution measures, in fact, banks in core European economies, which engaged in riskier activity in the subprime mortgage market, faced preferential treatment in the aftermath of the GFC. This article argues that financialization, the increased structural economic power of financial institutions, increased the structural power of core members of the Eurozone to direct supranational policies after the GFC. It supports these claims with financial data from balance sheets for a sample of EU economies, as well as institutional analysis of the financial aspects of European integration, and the financial, monetary, and fiscal responses that followed the onset of the GFC. While banks in the Eurozone core were more likely to have engaged in risky behavior, they were more likely to receive liquidity assistance from monetary authorities like the Federal Reserve due to their activity in the US. As Eurozone governments consider how to respond to crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic going forward, policies that more equitably support governments rescuing domestic financial actors should be considered in tandem with broader financial regulations of structurally important economic institutions.
Globalisierung reduziert sich nicht nur auf den wirtschaftlichen Bereich, ist auch nicht eine vornehmlich oder nahezu ausschließlich von privaten Akteuren vorangetriebene Vernetzung der Welt. Sie bedarf vielmehr – wie bei der Liberalisierung des Außenhandels und des Kapitalverkehrs schon angesprochen – der politischen Ermöglichung durch Beseitigung oder Verminderung nationaler Hemmnisse der länderübergreifenden Interaktion. Im positiven Sinne bedarf die Teilnahme an der Globalisierung der politischen Schaffung von Voraussetzungen, damit sich Gesellschaften erfolgreich global vernetzen können, also etwa der Schaffung, Wartung und Administration der grenzüberschreitenden Infrastruktur, des Abschlusses zwischenstaatlicher, regionaler oder globaler Kooperationsvereinbarungen, der Vereinbarung bestimmter Produkt-, Verfahrens- und rechtlicher und finanzieller Standards im transnationalen Austausch, sicher auch der Ermächtigung nationaler Akteure um im internationalen Wettbewerb bestehen zu können bzw. dessen Folgen abzufedern.
The concept of globalization or globality became fashionable in academic research in the early 1980s. Since the 1990s the fashion has become hyped and “[c]ountless academics have rushed to claim the cliché of the day” (Scholte 2005, 51). However, until today the term globalization is not only poorly conceptualized (Scholte 2005, 52), but it is also unclear whether this concept describes any real phenomenon or not. In this paper I will provide definitions of the term globalization in connection to economic, political, and cultural questions, and I will discuss the relevance of this concept for an adequate description of reality. My arguments in relation to the three dimensions (economic, political, and cultural) will follow the same structure. I will first describe three different scenarios for each dimension: the first scenario defines globalization, the third scenario emphasizes the strengthening of national or local elements, whereas the second scenario describes a mixture between these two extremes. The definition of these three alternative scenarios will make it easier to judge whether globalization is really the predominant phenomenon in each dimension. The surprising result of this broad analysis is that globalization is not in even one of the three dimensions predominant. Therefore, my conclusion is that globalization does not exist as an established fact.
Scholarship in International Political Economy (IPE) has traditionally explored the systematic nature of global economies and, due to its founding moment in the 1970s, placed a particular emphasis on global capital movements. Famously, Susan Strange, one of the founders of the discipline, examined the new troubles around currency and monetary systems and called for a deliberate linking of the political and the economic, as well as the domestic and the international. Even though this call could not be timelier in the 21st century, already ridden with crises – contemporary mainstream IPE scholarship has shied away from examining complex relations of the domestic and the global, focusing instead on rational interests of voters, sectors and factors of production. The state, while relevant as an entity that aggregates these interests, is not included as an independent agent. This commentary argues that there is already important scholarship which places ‘the state’ at the centre of a complex global economy. But we need to delve deeper. In order to understand what ‘states do’, we also need to understand what ‘what state actors do’ and assess them as fundamentally purposive and independent agents. To make sense of the nexus of the economic and the political, the global and the domestic, we need to understand the interests, relationships and conflicts of individual state actors in the global political economy.
WTO Law and Policy presents an authoritative account of the emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the basic principles and institutional law of the WTO. It explores how political economy has shaped the WTO’s legal philosophy and policies, and provides insights into how international trade law at the WTO has developed.
This textbook examines the legal obligations of the Member States of the WTO under the multilateral trade agreements, the legal remedies available under the rules-based dispute settlement system, and incorporates the most relevant case laws from the WTO’s jurisprudence. It outlines several key contemporary issues which the WTO faces as well as areas that need reforming. Each chapter covers a specific topic in relation to the framework and functionality of the WTO, with particular focus on the legal aspects of the multilateral trade order. The book is guided by the legal pronouncements of the Dispute Settlement Body (Panels and Appellate Body), and the commentaries on the interpretation of the provisions of the covered agreements.
This book is ideal for all students studying international trade law, including those coming to international law, international trade law, and WTO law for the first time.
Das globale Finanzsystem befindet sich in einer tiefen Krise. Die Hüter des Geldes, Zentralbanken wie die EZB oder die US-amerikanische Fed, sind inzwischen zu seinem eigentlichen Rückgrat geworden und haben eine neue Ära eingeläutet: die des Zentralbankkapitalismus. Dafür mussten sie ihre Geldpolitik revolutionieren sowie als Marktmacher der letzten Instanz agieren.
Joscha Wullweber steigt in den Maschinenraum des modernen Kapitalismus hinab, diskutiert die neuen Instrumente der Zentralbanken und erklärt, auf welch komplexe Weise Staat und Finanzmarkt heute verschränkt sind. Dabei nimmt er auch das Schattenbankensystem unter die Lupe, von dem die globale Finanzkrise ausging und das dennoch immer bedeutender wird. Ein unverzichtbarer Beitrag zum Verständnis aktueller globaler Geld- und Finanzpolitik.
Many economies in the Western world have been through a regime shift towards fiscal austerity since the 1970s. Existing scholarship ascribes trends in austerity to globalisation or the influence of a new economic paradigm. This paper develops a different approach by stressing the strategic intervention of central banks in governments’ fiscal decisions. It analyses archival documents from the German Federal Cabinet and the Bundesbank Council over more than two decades (1960–1981) and finds that the fiscal regime was shaped by changes in transnational institutions which the central bank used to strategically expand its institutional power within the larger macroeconomic framework. With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the Bundesbank was able to greatly increase its power resources while the government’s powers diminished. The Bundesbank used its new powers to strategically ‘overreach’ into the fiscal sphere and ‘bargain’ with the government to achieve fiscal reforms. By shedding light on the interactions of global legal and economic developments and the micro-level strategies of state actors, the paper proposes a more complex view of the role of the state and brings state-actor strategies into our understanding of the grand shifts in economic policymaking.
본고의 목적은 이론적 연구를 통해 대안적 국제정치경제학 이론의 유의성을 비판적으로 검토, 현재의 미중 갈등 상황 하 한국이 궁극적으로 추구해야 할 평화와 통일을 실현하기 위한 단초를 모색하는데 있다. 그리고 본 연구 결과, 본고는 한국문제를 해석할 이론의 존재론적 전회의 필요성을 제시한다. 미중 통상갈등으로 외화 되는 미국 패권 쇠퇴는 한국에게 미중 양자택일을 강요로 이어지고 있다. 이는 세계 평화와 한반도 평화가 비대칭적 상황임을 보여주는 것으로 본고는 이에 대한 문제제기와 해답의 추구과정일 것이며, 이것이 본고의 유의성과 시의성이다. 본고는 대부분 논의가 패권 불안정성이 전쟁 가능성으로 해석되고, 미국 패권의 안정을 지향하는 이론적 속성을 폭로해 내고, 이에 대한 반박과 국제질서의 역동적 해석을 통해 질서 변화 가능성의 이론적 타당성을 이론의 존재론적 전회에서 찾는다. 이를 위해 본 고는 주류 국제정치경제학 이론을 비판적으로 검토, 즉 패권 안정적 속성을 지닌 인식론적 토대의 주류이론에 대해 비판적으로 살펴보고, 그 대안으로 네오그람시주의의 가능성을 비판적으로 검토하고, 이를 기반으로 미국 패권을 분석해 본다. 결론에서는 앞선 논의를 기반으로 한반도가 마주한 현실을 재해석하고 이를 극복하기 위한 단초를 찾아본다. 핵심어: 국제정치경제학, 중상주의, 자유주의, 네오그람시주의, 패권
The purpose of this article is that in order to realize the peace in the Korean Peninsula, the article attempts to criticize the mainstream theories and examine an alternative theory such as neo-Gramscianist approach in the field of international political economy. This attempt will show the crews what Korean Question should be analyzed by, and how ontological turn of Korean Question is crucial to establish the peace in Korean Peninsula. In this sense, this study will be significant, especially under the situation, the US and China are competing in the all of the fields. In the 1980s, in order to avoid the decline of US hegemony, the US attempted to drive neo-liberal economic policies toward the world, and it helps to reinforce US hegemony. The US' reactions to the challenges in 1970s, is similar to recent trade tension between the US and China. This shows this theoretical discussion about the hegemonic conflicts will be meaningful. Thus, the research examines the mainstream discussion of international political economy, especially focusing on searching a significant theoretical framework from the field.
RESUMO No último quarto do século XX, as reformas econômicas na semiperiferia do sistema mundial alteraram as trajetórias econômicas de países de industrialização tardia, como o Brasil e a Índia. Este artigo analisa o desenvolvimento econômico dos setores de tecnologia da informação destes dois atores, a natureza e a extensão das mudanças nas áreas intensivas em tecnologia neste período de transformações relevantes tanto institucionais como econômicas. Busca-se compreender as diferentes trajetórias e empenha-se em delinear os caminhos trilhados por esses países, apresentando os aspectos gerais das estratégias das políticas setoriais desenvolvidas, assim como fatores específicos de ações isoladas empreendidas. A metodologia para análise será a de levantamento bibliográfico a respeito do tema, além de avaliação de dados existentes do Banco Mundial e aqueles divulgados pelos governos, especialmente no que diz respeito ao padrão e ao fluxo de investimento no setor. Os resultados parciais da pesquisa são que os arranjos político-institucionais e o padrão de investimento diferiram ao longo do tempo, o que acarretou em resultados díspares. A Índia apresenta um setor de tecnologia razoavelmente desenvolvido, relativamente autônomo e competitivo. Já o Brasil, com as descontinuidades apreendidas, não obteve a mesma dinâmica. Assim, apesar de similares em características majoritárias, esses estados demonstraram trajetórias econômicas divergentes, relevantes para o estudo do processo de desenvolvimento econômico comparado.
This chapter critiques the foundation of neoliberal capital formation theory, the neoclassical theory of investment, only to later highlight how China re-invented its own course of development. On its own, the system has proven explosive, while by the law of value, capital has to immiserate labour for profits. The real system is not a formal network between inanimate subjects proxying human relations, it is a historical system anchored in a historical subject organising social reproduction, always in line with the vested interest of the dominant class. The attempt here is to shed light on the interface of agency-policy, and social outcome.
Resumo Hyman Minsky é, em geral, conhecido por sua teoria da instabilidade financeira. Na sua visão, as crises no sistema capitalista moderno têm origem endógena, por causa da tendência de empresas e bancos a adotarem um comportamento cada vez mais especulativo, na medida em que a estabilidade econômica se prolonga. Outros conceitos originais e igualmente relevantes desenvolvidos por Minsky são menos tratados pela literatura, inclusive pós-keynesiana. É o caso da “restrição de sobrevivência”. Esse texto pretende cobrir essa lacuna, apresentando e discutindo a relevância da restrição de sobrevivência do ponto de vista da teoria da moeda e da conformação hierarquizada que o sistema monetário globalizado tomou a partir da Crise de 2008.
Investment law was not always about investor–state arbitration. Based on British and German archival materials from the Cold War, this paper shows how aims and priorities in the investment treaty regime changed over time. We find important differences in the role and relative importance of different legal rules then and now. Most notably, national treatment and free transfer clauses were key in early investment law, whereas fair and equitable treatment was regarded as relatively unimportant. At the same time, early drafters did anticipate some of the most contentious issues in modern investment law, including treaty shopping, shareholder protection, and the ‘no greater rights’ proviso.
Recent contributions on ‘financial repression’ and ‘money illusion’ have referred to Maynard Keynes's How to Pay for the War as a supporting document. This article discusses whether Keynes prescribed policies of ‘financial repression’ that were implemented in the United Kingdom, and other countries, following World War II. It seems reasonable that Keynes's writings were instrumental in translating British monetary experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policymakers during and after World War II, including a belief in ‘money illusion’ that suggested the use of inflation for driving down real interest rates of public bonds. If this was the case, How to Pay for the War could indeed provide an important explanation for the why and when of ‘financial repression’. This article argues that How to Pay for the War only partly provided support for a policy of ‘financial repression’, and none for using inflation as a ‘tax gatherer’ to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting Keynes as a source for widespread ‘money illusion’ is also out of line with the historical record.
This research argues that an imagined artifact, the IS coins, serves as a transhistorical artifact, condensing the larger ideology of the violent extremist organization of legitimacy and sovereignty. This paper conducts a qualitative content analysis on all references to IS Coin within Dabiq, al-Naba, Rumiyah and all the official videos publicized in the above magazines from April 2014 to September 2018. The power of one artifact, in this case, coin, embodies the whole ideology of ISIS and transports the ideology from the past to the present to the future and the artifact belongs to daily life, amplifies its power.
Este artigo parte de insights de Minsky para apontar a importância da “restrição de sobrevivência” na gênese da regulação financeira. Nossa análise centra-se nas contribuições do autor a partir da sua visão centrada nos fluxos de caixa, na Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira e em suas análises sobre a experiência norte-americana. O risco de um colapso sistêmico, levou o Estado capitalista moderno, na prática, a suspender a aplicação da penalidade relacionada à restrição de sobrevivência – a falência – aos bancos comerciais e aos atores financeiros mais importantes. Essa medida é operada por meio de instituições que atuam como gigantescos colchões públicos de segurança, a exemplo dos fundos garantidores de depósitos e do banco central na qualidade de emprestador de última instância. Essa suspensão, em contrapartida, permitiu que esses agentes financeiros pudessem, na busca por lucros, tomar decisões alocativas ainda mais arriscadas, aumentando o nível de fragilização que poderiam tolerar. . Para mitigar esse comportamento adverso o governo passou a regular o sistema financeiro, determinando limites que, em princípio, deveriam emular o comportamento que esses agentes deveriam ter caso ainda estivessem sujeitos à restrição de sobrevivência. Mesmo assim, a experiência história mostra que a regulação financeira não foi capaz de evitar que a contradição entre estabilidade financeira e o objetivo de lucro, movendo os agentes financeiros na direção de crises sistêmicas.
Milton Friedman’s idea of flexible exchange rates was heresy for Americans until the mid-1960s. However, by the late 1970s the idea became embedded in academic thought, policymaking, and business practices. This article analyzes how floating currencies, once eschewed, became embraced as legitimate in the US through the late 1960s and early 1970s. It demonstrates how business leaders’ economic interests and laissez-faire economists’ framework for causes of and solutions to business hardships contributed to society’s acceptance of currency flexibility. Increasing societal support of flexible currencies strengthened the power of float-advocates within the US government, facilitating the transition of the international monetary system from fixed exchange rates to floating. This study highlights how material interests and policy discourses contributed to America’s new policy orientation. It also addresses the origins of the neoliberal international financial order by documenting how American elites reconstituted the state-market balance in global finance while navigating monetary crises.