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Spoiling the Peace? Peace Process Exclusivity and Political Violence in North-Central Africa
Abstract
Why are some peace processes accompanied by bloody political violence while others are not? Recent scholarship suggests that when factions fear that they will not benefit or will be excluded from a negotiated settlement these groups may protect their interests by sabotaging the peace process through violent tactics. We compare three peace processes in Africa – the negotiations to end armed struggles in Mali, the Western Sahara and Sudan – to investigate why spoilers arise in some contexts and not others. We argue that peace process exclusivity, that is negotiations between only some of the potential parties to a conflict, is more likely to breed violence than inclusive peace negotiations where all relevant groups have a seat at the bargaining table. A key to our argument is that the number and form of combatant groups is endogenous to peace process negotiations; as a result, exclusivity encompasses not just leaving out warring parties but also the exclusion of groups that might object to the terms of the peace should they be left out of the bargaining process. This is particularly important since many peace agreements include provisions regarding the distribution of government services, jobs, and representation that may indirectly impact the availability of those goods for other stakeholders, particularly non-combatant parties. While inclusive agreements may be harder to reach, our findings suggest that international organisations that participate in peace negotiations need to carefully consider the real-world trade-off between the ability to reach an agreement and the sustainability of that agreement over time.
... These theoretical perspectives fall under four streams of research. The first stream of research focuses on the design effect of the peace agreements (Blaydes and Maio, 2010), the inclusion of power-sharing provisions , and the effectiveness of built-in safeguards (Joshi, Lee, and Ginty, 2017). The second stream of investigation concentrates on spoilers (Shedd, 2008;Stedman, 2003;Greenhill and Major, 2007) and the level of security sector reform (Duffy Toft, 2009;Aghedo, 2013). ...
... The key argument of the spoiler model is that the desire to represent group interests drives some groups to engage in violent activities and hinders peace agreements (Blaydes and Maio, 2010). Spoilers are those leaders and parties who use violence to undermine the peace process since they view peace agreements as threats to their power and interests (Stedman, 2003). ...
... The spoiler groups might be small, but they can collapse the peace agreement by committing violent acts (Blaydes and Maio, 2010;Greenhill and Major, 2017 successfully grew mistrust and fear that ultimately derailed the Oslo peace process (Kirschner, 2014;Kyadd and Walter, 2002;Rynhold and Steinberg, 2004). ...
Why do peace agreements work in several democratic countries but not in several other democratic countries? This study addresses this puzzle by investigating the impacts of government turnover, measured by leader turnover and government ideological turnover, on the implementation of peace agreements in democratic countries. The idea is that the alternation of power - which political party comes to power - influences policy continuity. Generally, a completely new government, whose policy preferences differ from the preceding government, is less likely to implement inherited policies. The central theoretical framework of this study offers four explanations concerning the relationship between government turnover and the performance of peace agreements in democratic countries. First, insider leaders continue the incumbent governments' policy and facilitate the implementation of peace agreements. Second, outsider leaders come to power with the support of different electoral bases and impede the implementation of peace agreements which can force rebels to rearm themselves. Third, the left-wing government parties favor peaceful conflict resolution and facilitate the implementation of peace agreements. Fourth, the right-wing government parties prefer hawkish policies and hinder the performance of peace agreements. This study tests the assumptions of its central theoretical framework using a panel dataset and three illustrative cases: Colombia, Israel, and the Philippines. The findings of this investigation demonstrate the positive impacts of insider leader turnover and the adverse effects of outsider leader turnover on the implementation of peace agreements in the sampled countries. The performance of peace agreements becomes better following left-wing chief executives assume office. The sampled countries have witnessed an increase in the implementation of peace agreements following the largest left government parties taking office. These findings suggest that the performance of peace agreements in democratic countries largely relies on government turnover. Hence, this study contributes to the democratic civil peace thesis literature, which has overlooked why democracies differ themselves. Why do some democratic leaders negotiate peace agreements with rebels while other democratic leaders oppose peace agreements? The empirical evidence of this study might benefit international peacebuilding policy. A wide range of actors, from local NGOs and powerful states to intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, European Union, and African Union, administer international peacebuilding missions in conflict-affected countries. A debate remains on why international peacebuilding missions sometimes fail to achieve their core objectives and establish sustainable peace. This study suggests international peacebuilding actors conduct policy research on the government turnover trap - how to save peace agreements from severe failure when unlikely hawkish governments come to power in democratic countries.
... We posit that mediation is more likely to succeed when outside spoilers are kept to a minimum and politically included groups are fractionalized. When peacemakers are working with fewer disenfranchised ethnic groups in the disputant population, mediation is more likely to succeed because these groups are usually excluded from peace talks and often use violence to challenge the fledgling peace (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010;Stedman, 1997). In addition, mediators are more likely to get a settlement when politically included disputants, usually invited to peace talks, comprise various different ethnic groups. ...
... Kydd and Walter (2002) show that in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the negotiations in Northern Ireland, extremist groups on the margins initiated violence to correspond to major events in the peace processes. Furthermore, Blaydes and De Maio (2010) show that in Africa, exclusivity in peace negotiations breeds political violence as groups excluded from the negotiations seek representation at the bargaining table. ...
... It is also possible that mediators, with an eye toward negotiation success, fear that too large of a disenfranchised population might cause the potential peace process to fail by means of spoiler violence. As Stedman (1997) and Blaydes and De Maio (2010) argue, outside spoilers use high levels of violence because they cannot express their dissatisfaction with a proposed peace agreement simply by refusing to sign it. Therefore, if mediators have no intention of making a peace process inclusive of groups on the outside of state power, either because they are unwilling or unable to do so, the possibility of a bargaining failure and its costly consequences might detract them from attempting to mediate in the first place. ...
We investigate the effect of ethnic pluralism on mediation in interstate and internationalized civil crises from 1945 to 2010. We find that mediation succeeds when two conditions are met. First, success is more likely when there are fewer disenfranchised ethnic groups in the disputant population, because these groups are usually excluded from peace talks and often use violence to challenge peace. Second, mediators are more likely to succeed when politically included disputants, usually present at peace talks, comprise various different ethnic groups. Because such groups, numerous as they are, pull and tug for dominance at peace negotiations, they are unable to form decisive coalitions. As a result, third parties have a chance to serve in a more authoritative role and influence a settlement.
... This inconsistency with regard to Stedman's definition has had critical implications for how other scholars and policymakers have interpreted and utilized the spoiler concept. Much of the subsequent literature on spoilers has focused exclusively on actors that use violence for the purpose of undermining peace efforts (for example, Ayres 2006; Johnston 2010; Blaydes and De Maio 2010). These studies link up with a more extensive research field that examines how violence influences peace processes more generally and in these discussions occasionally make reference to the spoiler concept (for example, Darby and Mac Ginty 2000;Darby 2001Darby , 2006Sisk 2006;Höglund 2008). ...
... Many subsequent writers on the topic, particularly those who are concerned with explaining the emergence of violent spoiler behavior, unintentionally tend to do the same. Blaydes and De Maio (2010), for example, focus on explaining the emergence of insurgent violence in the conflicts in Mali, the Western Sahara, and Sudan, indicating that such violence is directly linked to the outcome of the peace process. However, they do not explicitly spell out the theoretical linkage between the presence or absence of spoiler violence and the success versus failure of a peace process and it remains unclear whether spoiler violence should be considered an explanatory variable for failed peace processes or an indicator of the same, or perhaps both (2010:7). ...
... In subsequent works, he appears to have narrowed his position on this issue even further by underlining that ''in the absence of an agreement, the concept of spoiler should not apply' ' (2002:13). Many subsequent studies on spoilers, however, have adopted a somewhat wider approach, including peace negotiations without such explicit commitments or the context of a peace process more generally (Aggestam 2006;Höglund and Zartman 2006;Menkhaus 2006;Greenhill and Major 2007;Shedd 2008;Blaydes and De Maio 2010). Newman and Richmond (2006b:102) place themselves somewhere in the middle, suggesting that the concept should apply to situations ''where some form of peace process is underway and where at least one of the parties to the conflict is either engaged in, or committed to, a peace process.'' ...
Nilsson, Desirée and Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi. (2011) Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace Processes. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2011.01080.x
In a seminal article, Stedman (International Security, 22, 1997, 5) suggested that the greatest source of risk to civil war peace processes comes from so-called spoilers, leaders, and groups that perceive peace as threatening and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. The spoiler concept has since gained significant ground and widespread legitimacy both in the academic literature and in critical policy circles. In the footsteps of this development, however, we suggest that the spoiler concept has been stretched beyond its original meaning and given raise to a number of ambiguities concerning its definition and empirical applicability. This lack of clarity in regard to some of the key aspects of the spoiler concept does not only risk undermining the usefulness of the concept itself, but also risks hampering the accumulation of valuable research on this pertinent topic. This article presents a reflection on a burgeoning research field and aims to contribute to the same by attempting to offer greater conceptual clarity in regard to a number of issues that are the core of the spoiler debate and by presenting a conceptual framework for analyzing spoilers in future research.
... Stedman's article and the research debate that followed generated a strand of additional work on this topic, particularly regarding his spoiler typology, as well as why spoilers emerge in the rst place (e.g., Zahar 2003Zahar , 2006aNewman and Richmond 2006 ;Greenhill and Major 2007 ;Johnston 2007 ;Pearlman 2009 ;Blaydes and De Maio 2010 ). 1 However, only a few of these studies focused on what was essentially the key purpose of his article, namely to discuss various strategies for spoiler management and identify which responses are the most useful under different circumstances. With some exceptions (e.g., Schneckener 2009 ;Zahar 2010 ), most subsequent works on spoilers have come to focus on why and when we observe spoiler behavior rather than which strategies to use for spoiler management (e.g., Greenhill and Major 2007 ;Blaydes and De Maio 2010 ). ...
... Stedman's article and the research debate that followed generated a strand of additional work on this topic, particularly regarding his spoiler typology, as well as why spoilers emerge in the rst place (e.g., Zahar 2003Zahar , 2006aNewman and Richmond 2006 ;Greenhill and Major 2007 ;Johnston 2007 ;Pearlman 2009 ;Blaydes and De Maio 2010 ). 1 However, only a few of these studies focused on what was essentially the key purpose of his article, namely to discuss various strategies for spoiler management and identify which responses are the most useful under different circumstances. With some exceptions (e.g., Schneckener 2009 ;Zahar 2010 ), most subsequent works on spoilers have come to focus on why and when we observe spoiler behavior rather than which strategies to use for spoiler management (e.g., Greenhill and Major 2007 ;Blaydes and De Maio 2010 ). Stedman did consider the intra-party dimension as critical for correctly diagnosing spoiling behavior, speci cally emphasizing the importance of identifying whether the spoiler behavior was primarily generated by the leader or the followers inside the movement. ...
Civil war peace processes are frequently accompanied by spoiler behavior relating to intra-party divergence, such as leadership struggles or breakaway groups, which risk undermining the implementation of a peace accord. However, previous literature has not sufficiently explored how third-party actors can address spoiler behavior linked to such intra-party aspects. This study addresses this gap by providing an empirical analysis of a few illustrative cases of spoiler behavior by armed actors in two peace processes in West Africa—Sierra Leone after the 1999 Lomé peace accords and Liberia after the 2003 Accra peace agreement. We find that in contexts where there is a vertical divergence between the leader and the rest of the group, divisive strategies—aimed to divide and rule or marginalize—are effective. In contrast, in situations of horizontal divergence between different factions that are more equal in power, integrative strategies—aimed at unifying the ranks or reconciling a divided leadership—are more appropriate. This study enhances our understanding of how third-party strategies can be devised to manage intra-party divisions that otherwise may threaten a transition from war to peace.
... En el ámbito de los medios empleados, originariamente Stedman (1997) abarcó exclusivamente el empleo de técnicas violentas que socavasen el proceso de paz. A partir de esta línea, una parte de la literatura ha centrado el análisis en el impacto que tienen las estrategias saboteadoras violentas sobre los procesos de paz, bajo qué condiciones los hacen más vulnerables y los desestabilizan o las motivaciones que mueven a las partes al empleo de estas estrategias (Licklider, 2001;Zahar, 2006;Blaydes y De Maio, 2010;Reiter, 2016). Paradójicamente, a pesar de que el objetivo de este comportamiento sea socavar el proceso, las partes, a menudo, no lo descartan, toda vez que terminan empleándolo como una estrategia de guerra más con el fin de obtener mayores recursos militares, mayores apoyos, aliados o reconocimiento, más tiempo, forzar una victoria mientras se demandan mayores concesiones a las otras partes, acceso a organizaciones internacionales o regionales y a sus recursos o, incluso, evitar sanciones. ...
... Así, Zahar (2003: 114) defiende que el spoiler típico actuará o negándose sistemáticamente a la negociación o accediendo al acuerdo, para posteriormente incumplir sus promesas de implementación. A estos actos se agregan otras estrategias que pueden afectar la fortaleza del proceso y, eventualmente, conducirlo al fracaso: la asimetría en el estatus de las partes, en cuyo seno juega el veto a la contraparte como interlocutor legítimo, o las dinámicas de participación (Aggestan, 2012), donde la exclusión de otros actores o rechazar la propia participación atacan la inclusión del proceso y, por ende, la consistencia de un eventual acuerdo (Linklider, 2001;Blaydes y De Maio, 2010;Nilsson, 2012). ...
The Syrian mediation process has repeatedly been characterized by its fragility. This fragility does not only stem from its inability to produce tangible results but it also rests on other dimensions such as its instability, the lack of impartiality of its mediation structure, or its lack of representativeness and capacity for action, all of which have been studied more tangentially. The purpose of this article is to determine the explanatory factors of these other dimensions of the fragility of the process. In order to do so, and based on the spoiler literature, it first opera- tionalizes the spoiling behavior, distinguishing violent acts from non-violent ones. In the second place, their impact on the process is analyzed, identifying the relationship between them and fragility. In the third place, the mandates of the four Special Envoys assigned by UN to date (January 2020) are evaluated from this perspective. The results of this research show that the violent spoiling behavior in the Syrian mediation process explains the drastic reactions both by the mediating activity itself (suspension of the observation mission, withdrawal of the mediator or postponement of the opening of talks) and by the intervening parties (withdrawal or suspension of conversations), while non-violent behavior tends to attack the process in a more subtle way, threatening its relevance or impartiality. The most evident consequence is a weak mediation process, that may raise doubts on the ability of international mediation in the face of intractable armed conflicts.
... This stands in contrast to interstate wars, in which the parties are recognized states. It is generally argued that all major armed groups need to be represented (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008;Hampson, 1996;Licklider, 2001, p. 701;Blaydes and De Maio, 2010;Sisk, 2009), yet there may also be small fringe groups that are excluded (Newman and Richmond, 2006;Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008). The excluded groups may be more likely to become spoilers-that is, to sabotage the peace through postagreement violence (Nilsson, 2008). ...
... Some argue that this trend toward inclusiveness makes agreement less likely to be reached (Cunningham, 2011), but the involvement of such groups seems to add to the durability of resulting agreements (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008;Nilsson, 2012;Blaydes and De Maio, 2010). ...
... The contention that inclusion helps sustain peace is based on the notion that broadening the scope of participation in the peace process will make agreements more legitimate (Binningsbø, 2013). From this perspective, inclusion of all participants in the conflict, even those that were not directly engaged in the violence, will ensure that there will not be those left out who will seek to destabilise an agreement (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007;Nilsson, 2008Nilsson, , 2012Blaydes & De Maio, 2010;Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011;Marshall & Ishiyama, 2016;Reiter, 2016;Raffoul, 2019). In particular, the inclusion of civil society organisations can be particularly helpful in ensuring the transparency and legitimacy of the peace process (Nilsson, 2012;Zanker, 2014). ...
... Research on failed or partial inclusion in peace mediation generally traces resistance from groups holding military, political, economic, and other forms of power in the conflict context and their motivations and strategies (Çuhadar, 2020;Hellmüller, 2019a;Jonas, 2000;Lorch, 2017;Marchetti and Tocci, 2009;World Bank, 2006). Moreover, research on spoiling has explained how conflict parties resort to arms to be included in the peace process or boycott the talks as leverage against their rival conflict parties (Blaydes and de Maio, 2010;Hellmüller 2019a;Paffenholz, 2015a;Stedman, 1997;Zahar, 2010). As a response, research focused on engaging with armed actors and recommends that mediators bulk up their mandate, resources, and strategies to counter such leverage (de Waal, 2017;Hirblinger and Landau, 2020;Paffenholz, 2014a;Pring and Palmiano Federer, 2020). ...
Research on resistance to the inclusion of civil society in peace mediation focuses on armed parties and elites as sites of resistance. Such focus grounds policies that prescribe various strategies and process designs that mediators could employ. The mediation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in South Sudan from 2012 to 2015 featured such strategies and attempts at various formats, including strong leverage from South Sudan’s neighbors and top development partners. However, civil society’s inclusion did not fully materialize, and armed clashes continued. Examining this mediation process, this article examines two structural challenges to civil society inclusion under-examined in mediation research. First, divisions within civil society can perpetuate divisions among warring parties and hinder the expected benefits of civil society inclusion. Second, the norms of consent and protecting lives considered definitional in peace mediation prioritize armed parties over civil society, limiting mediators’ ability to promote the latter’s inclusion and potentially encouraging further violence.
... These references mainly involved discussions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of some fractions (such as armed groups) from the negotiation process, and the question of whether and how to include actors outside of the primary parties to the conflict, such as the civil society. One common argument regarding inclusivity is that all major political fractions should be included in the negotiation process with the purpose of securing a more inclusive and thus successful process where the concerns of all parties are addressed (Blaydes and De Maio 2010). ...
The article examines the Democratic Progress Institute’s (DPI) Turkey program as a Track Two comparative consultation initiative applied in the case of Turkey’s peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict, commonly known as the ‘resolution/peace process’ (2012–2015). Based on interviews with high- and middle-level actors participating in events organized by the DPI, the article investigates the extent the initiative reached its purposes of building capacities for peace through the dissemination of comparative insights on peacemaking and generating a joint understanding between the conflict representatives. While Turkish and Kurdish participants adopted comparative insights they gained from the DPI study trips and workshops, by learning lessons related to the negotiation process and practical matters, they partially sought to ‘fit’ those insights into their own perspectives and prior beliefs. The findings point to motivated reasoning and confirmation bias for issues that remained controversial throughout the public peace process in Turkey, mainly Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) and transitional justice.
... 8 The political programmes of armed groups are relevant to their inclusion: studies of spoilers have converged around the principle that groups 6 Reiter finds that violence during peace negotiations is committed by parties excluded from the process almost twice as often as by included parties (Reiter, 2011: 89). Blaydes and De Maio (2010) also find that more inclusive agreements (of armed groups) were associated with less spoiler violence. ...
Set against a global context of rising violent conflict and the changing nature of conflict driven by a broad range of factors, including a wider spectrum of involved parties, this report considers lessons drawn from key literature on recent peace processes and multilateral settlements, and international donor support to such mechanisms.
... Power-sharing research initially focused narrowly on the role of armed actors and political elites, seeing elite cooperation and elite bargains as an important precondition for peace (Lindemann, 2008(Lindemann, , 2011Mehler, 2009;Norris, 2008). The question of inclusion further focused on so-called 'spoilers': actors that can derail agreements if excluded (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010;Nilsson, 2008;Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, 2011;Reiter, 2016). From this perspective, horizontal inclusion of all -usually armed -actors ensures that incentives are not created for those left out to destabilize an agreement (Raffoul, 2019). ...
‘Inclusion’ has emerged as a prominent theme in peacemaking. However, its exact meaning remains vague, as do assumptions about the relationship between inclusion and peace. This article seeks to problematize the research, policy and practice of inclusion. Focusing on United Nations (UN) peacemaking, we ask how the object of inclusion has been framed, and based on what strategies and underlying rationales. We do so against the backdrop of emerging debates about an agonistic peace, which suggest that violent antagonistic relationships can be overcome if peace processes enable contestation between adversaries. This requires that peacemakers recognize the constitutive role of difference in political settlements. We identify three distinct strategies for inclusion, with corresponding framings of the included. Firstly, inclusion can be used to build a more legitimate peace; secondly, to empower and protect specific actor groups; and thirdly, to transform the sociopolitical structures that underlie conflict. The first strategy frames the included in open terms that can accommodate a heterogeneity of actors, the second in closed terms pertaining to specific identity traits, and the third in relational terms emerging within a specific social, cultural and political context. In practice, this leads to tensions in the operationalization of inclusion, which are evidence of an inchoate attempt to politicize peace processes. In response, we argue for an approach to relational inclusion that recognizes the power relations from which difference emerges; neither brushing over difference, nor essentializing single identity traits, but rather remaining flexible in navigating a larger web of relationships that require transformation.
... Scholarship suggests promoting popular ownership of peace processes can boost their legitimacy and reduce the likelihood that agreements fail (McKeon, 2005;Prendergast & Plumb, 2002). Indeed, Nilsson (2012) finds that agreements inclusive of civil society actors are less likely to lead to conflict resurgence, and Blaydes & De Maio (2010) argue that broad societal participation is key to conflict resolution. This is relevant in the Colombian context, where a prior attempt by the FARC to form a political party resulted in an extermination campaign by threatened factions of Colombian society (Dudley, 2004). ...
Conflict negotiations are often met with backlash in the public sphere. A substantial literature has explored why civilians support or oppose peace agreements in general. Yet, the terms underlying peace agreements are often absent in this literature, even though (a) settlement negotiators must craft agreement provisions covering a host of issues that are complex, multidimensional, and vary across conflicts, and (b) civilian support is likely to vary depending on what peace agreements look like. As a result, we know much less about how settlement design molds overall public response, which settlement provisions are more or less controversial, or what citizens prioritize in conflict termination. In this article, I identify four key types of peace agreement provisions and derive expectations for how they might shape civilian attitudes toward conflict termination. Using novel conjoint experiments fielded during the Colombian peace process, I find evidence that citizens evaluate agreements based primarily on how provisions mete out justice to out-group combatants, and further that transitional justice provisions produced sharp divisions among urban voters in the 2016 referendum. Additional analysis suggests that material, distributive concerns were particularly salient for rural citizens. The results have implications for understanding the challenge of generating public buy-in for conflict termination and sheds light on the polarizing Colombian peace process.
... More recently, some have examined the "downstream effects" of including such former rebel groups into the post war political process (Suazo 2013;Marshall and Ishiyama 2016;Rudloff and Findley 2016;Lyons 2016). Nonetheless, this work has largely examined whether the inclusion of rebel groups leads to a sustainable peace or democracy, rather than specifically how such rebel parties behave in the post-war political environment (Stedman 1997;Blaydes and De Maio 2010;Joshi and Mason 2011;Suazo 2013). ...
In this paper, we examine whether former rebel parties are more likely to engage in electoral violence when compared to other parties. In many ways because of combat experience and a trained cadre of former fighters, it may be the case that former rebel parties are more likely to rely on violent acts in order to pursue electoral objectives, particularly in the first elections after the end of a civil conflict. Further, we also suggest that certain types of rebel parties, particularly those that are based more on “resource capture” are more likely to engage in violent acts during elections than those that are based on popular mobilization.
... More recently, some have examined the "downstream effects" of including such former rebel groups into the post war political process (Suazo 2013;Marshall and Ishiyama 2016;Rudloff and Findley 2016;Lyons 2016). Nonetheless, this work has largely examined whether the inclusion of rebel groups leads to a sustainable peace or democracy, rather than specifically how such rebel parties behave in the post-war political environment (Stedman 1997;Blaydes and De Maio 2010;Joshi and Mason 2011;Suazo 2013). ...
... To promote inter-group contact, we believe peacekeepers could play an important informational role in facilitating contact by signaling what is acceptable behavior and a reputational role due to their monitoring and enforcement of cooperative norms and standards. In this sense, they work to deter potential opportunistic "spoilers" of the peace (Fearon and Laitin 1996;Stedman 1997;Doyle and Sambanis 2006;Greenhill and Major 2007;Blaydes and De Maio 2010). Through their ability to monitor and enforce cooperative norms of behavior and deter opportunism, the presence of peacekeepers reduces fears and uncertainties that prevent groups from engaging one another, keeping them parochially divided. ...
Existing research suggests that international peacekeeping contributes to conflict resolution and helps sustain peace, often in locations with hostile ethnic divisions. However, it is unclear whether the presence of peacekeepers actually reduces underlying ethnocentric views and parochial behaviors that sustain those divisions. We examine the effects of NATO peacekeeper deployments on ethnocentrism in postwar Bosnia. While peacekeepers were not randomly deployed in Bosnia, we find that highly ethnocentric attitudes were common across Bosnia at the onset of peacekeeper deployments, reducing endogeneity concerns. To measure ethnocentrism, we employ a variety of survey instruments as well as a behavioral experiment (the dictator game) with ethnic treatments across time. We find that regions with peacekeepers exhibit lower levels of ethnocentrism in comparison to regions without peacekeepers, and this effect persists even after peacekeepers have departed. The peacekeeping effect is also robust to a sub-sample of ethnic Bosnian Serbs, suggesting that peacekeeper deployments can have positive effects on diminishing ethnocentrism, even when local communities are especially hostile to their presence. Our results speak to the potential long-term role of peacekeepers in reducing tensions among groups in conflict.
... sodes of conflict tend to occur on dates very close to major negotiation events within peace processes. This is because violence is used by groups or subgroups as a means to protect their interests perceivably threatened by the progress of negotiations (Blaydes & De Maio, 2010;Sisk, 1993). With the exception of becoming cause for initiating negotiations (Kelman, 2007a), these almost always have the effect of derailing a peace process. ...
The concept of representational contamination is introduced to account for psychological changes in the public sphere after a local armed clash deflects a national peace process. Although representational contamination is fundamentally psychological, our conceptualization of this phenomenon merges ideas from other social science disciplines such as media communication, political derailment, and intergroup conflict. We push psychology to more macro layers of analyses, and increase its theoretical utility for social issues such as peace and conflict. As a case in point, we take the Muslim-Christian peace process in the Philippines, as positive representations of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) shift dramatically and negatively after an armed clash in the remote municipality of Mamasapano. Our research innovates a methodological mix of qualitative and quantitative strategies to access natural data in the real world, obtain mathematical accuracy, and add discursive depth. We employ a sequential mixed methods strategy on a data corpus of 178 news reports about the BBL, 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after the Mamasapano clash. Text-mining calculations yield word association scores of support (range 57%–89%) and confidence (consistently 100%), indicating a high discursive overlap between BBL and Mamasapano. Computed word association maps also show how BBL is associated with positive words before Mamasapano and negative words after the military encounter. We end by raising practical questions on how to deal with representational contamination, and discuss issues of psychological containment in the public sphere.
... Peacekeepers help ensure compliance with peace agreements through their ability to monitor and police behavior and interactions between former combatant groups and their supporters. Scholars have argued that such sanctioning mechanisms work in part by neutralizing the potentially harmful effects of opportunists and committed ''spoilers'' of the peace (Stedman 1997;Doyle and Sambanis 2006;Greenhill and Major 2007;Blaydes and De Maio 2010). In more hostile environments, monitoring missions may be insufficient to prevent opportunism and restrain spoilers, requiring peacekeepers to pursue more active enforcement strategies (Doyle and Sambanis 2000;Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). ...
To what extent can international peacekeeping promote micro-foundations for positive peace after violence? Drawing on macro-level peacekeeping theory, our approach uses novel experimental methods to illustrate how monitoring and enforcement by a neutral third party could conceivably enhance prosocial behavior between rival groups in a tense, postconflict peacekeeping environment. Using a laboratory experiment in postwar Kosovo, we find that third-party enforcement is more effective at promoting norms of trust between ethnic Serbs and Albanians than monitoring alone or no intervention at all. We then consider real-world extensions for building positive peace across different intervention environments. Using a dictator experiment that exploits heterogeneity in NATO peacekeeping in different regions of Kosovo, our inferences about monitoring and enforcement appear robust to ecological conditions in the field.
... 64 The exclusive nature of the early phases of the peace process led directly to spoiling attempts and contributed to the regime's overthrow, but peace was eventually achieved when the government took an approach of broader inclusion. 65 In sum, some weak rebels groups are incorporated into the peace agreement at a later date. In addition, while splits in rebel movements following peace agreements and subsequent termination spoiling are common, it does not pose a significant threat to peace agreements, and negotiations continued with the termination spoilers, leading to separate peace agreements in the future. ...
Scholars and policymakers argue that violent actors – termed ‘spoilers’ – pose a significant threat to civil war peace agreements. Yet existing research, which is overly reliant on single-case studies, has not effectively determined how prevalent spoiling is, or thoroughly examined what its ultimate effects are on peace agreements. This article draws on a newly constructed cross-national dataset of spoiling following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era to analyze spoiling. It finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not as common as typically assumed, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements. Moreover, most actors who resort to this strategy typically fail in their goals and the agreement is not at risk, despite the high publicity and attention given to these threats. Yet particular types of actors, most notably paramilitaries and state security forces excluded from the agreement, can pose a significant threat to peace.
This article discusses the relationship between gendered inclusion in peace processes and Track Two peacemaking. It responds to recent policy discourse that explicitly associates linking Track Two to Track One negotiations as a way to increase the inclusion of people identifying as women (United Nations Women 2015). However, the mechanisms through which Track Two leads to more “inclusive” outcomes is complex and unclear. To understand what these mechanisms are and how they can be studied, this article draws from existing theories on transfer in Track Two and inclusion literature in peace and conflict studies to present a novel conceptual model of “linkage.” This model explores the micro-dynamics of gendered inclusivity between different tracks of dialogue engagement and how transfer is facilitated between them.
Over the last three decades, mediation processes have become more political and the role of international norms matters more than ever. For many who follow the field, the role of mediators shifted from peace-broker to a peacebuilder, especially in regard to whom they include in peace negotiations. So if mediators are pressured to promote norms, the more interesting question becomes: can they (Hellmüller, Sara, Julia Palmiano Federer, and Jamie Pring. 2017. Are mediators norm entrepreneurs? Bern: swisspeace. https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Working-Papers/b59c7cb279/Are-Mediators-Norm-Entrepreneurs-17-swisspeace-sara_hellmueller-julia_palmiano_federer-jamie_pring.pdf. Accessed 14 December 2022.)? How does this work in practice and what are the consequences? In this chapter, I present an analytical framework around a mediator’s normative agency: the ability to which they can promote norms in the first place I start with a discussion of what norm diffusion theory (theories about how norms spread) have to say about mediators acting as norm entrepreneurs in peace processes.
Peace agreements are a tool used to terminate conflict. Definitions of the concept span a broad spectrum; it can be defined broadly to include any understanding between actors related to a conflict or narrowly to only include signed agreements between the main warring parties in a conflict, solving the main conflict issues. Research works on peace agreements have, for example, concerned if peace agreements result in a more stable peace than victories, and how to make peace agreements more lasting by, for example, including provisions on peacekeeping, verification, and power-sharing.
Peace processes that include the voices of civil society and the full array of armed groups (at least those representing a substantial constituency) in a given conflict are more conducive to durable peace than more exclusive ones. The key value of civil society inclusion is to maintain focus on the underlying sources of conflict and on the impacts of conflict on the population, as opposed to a narrow focus on sharing power among the armed leaders. The rationale for inclusion of all major armed groups rests on prevention of spoiling behavior, the difficulty of bringing peace by negotiating with only one group at a time to the exclusion of others, and the tendency of participation in negotiation to moderate extreme positions. Inclusivity can bring practical challenges, but there are many established methods for managing these. Questions remain around such challenges as inclusion of extremist groups and negotiation with nonviolent movements.
This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.
Almost six decades since the emergence of Track Two diplomacy, a form of informal and unofficial dialogues between conflicting parties facilitated by scholar‐practitioners, scholarship on the field has grown exponentially. Originally conceived of as a discreet complement to Track One official negotiations between armed actors in conflict, Track Two has become an established and professionalized form of broader conflict resolution. Specific scholarship on Track Two has occupied the liminal space between theory and practice, in which theoretical propositions are often born out of observations from practical applications in empirical cases. Analyzing how Track Two theories reflect these paradigms can give greater insights into the theoretical evolution of the field and where it is headed. This begets a need to regularly and systematically survey the relevant literature on Track Two given the large‐scale changes occurring in its practice. This article discusses the evolution of Track Two theories as embedded in conflict resolution paradigms, namely, strategic bargaining and problem solving; conflict transformation; and liberal and post‐liberal peacebuilding. In particular, I focus on how the recent "normative turn" in conflict resolution literature has impacted Track Two scholarship. Following the analytical framework of a mediation process applied to Track Two scholarship, I organize relevant literature into “generations” and compare what are identified as the main constitutive components of a Track Two initiative in order to understand how the theories have evolved in this second generation of literature. My analysis finds that conceptions of Track Two have moved from “narrow” to “broad”: influenced by a normative imperative toward more inclusive and participatory peace processes in conflict resolution, activities labeled as Track Two have expanded from small, discreet dialogues between unofficial actors to include more robust forms of civil society inclusion and participation.
Much of the literature on the history of liberal peace-and state-building in South Sudan focuses most directly on the actions of the international community as being responsible for the intractable conflict and issues of state fragility. Implicit in such arguments is the assumption that, if Western donors, states and organizations simply remained more committed to their liberal ideals or devised more effective strategies, the situation would be more stable and prosperous. The central argument here is that state formation is primarily an internal process that cannot be manufactured effectively by foreign actors. Civil war and the inability to implement the liberal model are primarily explained by structural factors, within South Sudan and the international states system, that are not amenable to external manipulation. These include: the incipient and informal nature of the state, the character of relevant rebel and militia groups, the presence of oil, the country's interactions within anarchic global systems and the arbitrary make-up of African states. These conditions also inhibit indigenous actors from achieving lasting peace and consolidating state power. While this analysis scrutinizes the liberal paradigm, the argument is not that the model of political and economic liberalization is mainly responsible for the persistence of conflict and state fragility. Instead, although efforts to implement the liberal model have arguably been counterproductive at times, they have in fact been largely inconsequential to the outcomes in South Sudan.
Since 2011, numerous peace initiatives have been initiated out by several actors to end the Syrian civil war in a peaceful way. This article presents the “Astana Peace Process” brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran in early 2017 as a case study of a mediation and examines its predecessors to understand the reasons for the failures of those attempts and develops an assessment of the Astana peace process itself. To gain a better understanding of the Astana peace process, this article incorporates the efforts of main actors, their approaches, and the context of the war. In doing so, the article begins by describing the background of the civil war and then uses traditional concepts in mediation theory to elucidate the limitations of the unsuccessful attempts. Next, it investigates how the Astana peace process was different and the driving factors that encouraged the states to engage in this process and argues that Astana peace process’s overall effectiveness is likely to remain limited due to the conflicting interests of the mediators.
O artigo objetiva analisa o caráter de enforcement da Missão Multidimensional Integrada das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização do Mali (MINUSMA), com foco em discutir criticamente essa nova tendência normativa das Nações Unidas, problematizando as possíveis consequências dessa modalidade de operações de paz para que haja uma resolução permanente do conflito no Mali.
O artigo objetiva analisa o caráter de enforcement da Missão Multidimensional Integrada das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização do Mali (MINUSMA), com foco em discutir cri-ticamente essa nova tendência normativa das Nações Unidas, problematizando as possíveis consequências dessa modalidade de operações de paz para que haja uma resolução perma-nente do conflito no Mali. Palavras-chave: Mali; MINUSMA; Imposição da Paz
This article analyzes the enforcement character of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and it is focused on critically discussing this new normative tendency of the United Nations, problematizing the possible consequences of this modality of peace operations so that there is a permanent resolution of the conflict in Mali.
Although scholars agree that ethnically divided societies are generally more prone to political violence, critics of consociationalism suggest that proportional representation and parliamentarism provide poor solutions for ethnically heterogeneous settings. I argue that extant findings about the impacts of powersharing institutions on conflict likelihood assume that institutions have a linear relationship with ethnic diversity, whereas in reality, the relationship is more complex. I demonstrate that proportional representation and parliamentarism are associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict at mid-range levels of diversity but are associated with a decreased risk of conflict in more extremely divided settings, while federalism is independently associated with greater conflict risk at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The results underscore that the peace-promoting effects of institutions may depend on how polarized societies are, encouraging scholars to think more seriously about the effectiveness of consociationalism for mitigating violence where there is greater ethnic diversity.
The normative framework in mediation processes is growing. Mediators are increasingly expected by their mandate-givers to incorporate liberal norms such as inclusivity into their overall strategy. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001, and the policy shifts that accompanied the “Global War on Terror”, mediators find themselves simultaneously pressured to design mediation processes actively excluding armed groups proscribed as terrorists and consequently incorporating this illiberal norm of “exclusivity”, barring proscribed groups’ access to negotiations. This article asks what consequences this development has on the normative agency of mediators, based on if and how they incorporate proscribed armed groups into their mediation strategies. It argues that the dichotomy between liberal and illiberal norms has important consequences on a mediator’s normative agency. First, the dichotomy constrains mediators to a single normative standard, rendering only liberal and illiberal views possible. Second, the assumption that liberal norms are “good” and illiberal norms are “bad” engenders a double dichotomy that greatly constrains a mediator’s normative agency. Third, these constraints on a mediator engender new mediation practices such as outsourcing and risk-sharing in an attempt to salvage normative agency. The article contributes to scholarship on norms, terrorism and mediation through providing a more nuanced view of normative parameters in mediation practice.
Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie's theoretical model of power-sharing's four dimensions—political, territorial, military, and economic—is used here to analyze successive peace processes in South Sudan. This multifaceted power-sharing strategy was utilized within both the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), designed to resolve Sudan's intractable North-South conflict, as well as the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan (ARCISS) that addressed a continuation of intra-South violence. This study investigates the breakdown between the expected outcome of this power-sharing model and its implementation. Despite the international community's stated objective of building a post-conflict order in which these four levers of state power are guided by liberal democratic principles, South Sudan's peace processes have descended into an elite bargain over how the spoils of patronage are dispersed. This divergence is explained by the interference of strategic interests at the national, regional, and global levels.
This study analyzes when, how, and under what conditions the inclusion
of a broad range of actors in peace and political transition processes
contributes to the prevention of violence and armed conflict. It has been
produced as a contribution to the United Nations–World Bank Study
“Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict.”
Within the framework of UNSCR 2282 on Sustaining Peace, we use a broad
definition of prevention that includes attempts to prevent the outbreak,
continuation, escalation, or recurrence of violence.
Although informal and traditionally driven practices of mediation have existed for many generations, institutionalized and African-driven mediation became more important following the end of the Cold War. Mediation initiatives undertaken over the past 25 years, partly as a consequence of the increase in intra-state conflicts on the continent, have resulted in the generation of a deep body of knowledge and the evolution of a community of practitioners. This article examines two of the first post-1990 African-driven mediation processes-The Arusha Peace Process for Burundi and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (icd) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc)-to highlight key lessons that emerged, including the choice of mediator, who to include in the mediation, the impact of regional and international dynamics on the mediation, the importance and challenges of addressing the root causes of the conflict in a mediation process, and the role of non-state actors and Track ii diplomacy.
The literature on conflict resolution has devoted a great deal of time and resources to the study of inclusion in peace processes. Yet concentration has focused mostly on inclusion within the framework of a peace agreement and has not paid sufficient attention to the long-term aspects of inclusion that affect sustainable peace after the implementation of the peace agreement. This study addresses this gap in knowledge by investigating the effects of long-term inclusive strategies on sustainable peace. To do so, this study makes a conceptual differentiation between short-and long-term inclusion, followed by a comparative analysis of three cases where a set of exploratory variables will help scrutinize the effects of long-term inclusion on sustainable peace. It concludes that long-term inclusion has an effect on sustainable peace, but that this effect differs based on the type of inclusive strategy an agreement proposes.
The conclusion summarizes the key findings from the book and then proceeds to discuss the policy implications of the work for dealing with spoilers. The policy implications are four-pronged, centering on the accurate prediction of where spoilers will emerge, a strategy of targeted inclusion in peace negotiations, continued negotiation with actors during the implementation phase, and coercion as a last resort for particular types of spoilers. The chapter concludes with thoughts on future research to continue to improve our understanding of spoiling.
By qualitatively examining the impact of various types of spoiling, Chap. 4 shows that most termination spoilers are simply too weak to derail the peace agreement on their own, and in many cases, their behavior is anticipated, blunting any effect they might have on popular opinion. Most are ignored by insiders, though in some cases, outsiders use spoiling to demonstrate their power and importance, which leads to them signing separate peace agreements with the government in the future. Termination spoiling presents a danger to peace only when outsiders are acting on behest of a government that is disinterested in complying with the agreement or key powerful actors were excluded from the initial accord.
Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.
We address the incidence and correlates of mutual veto institutions by examining a global dataset on power-sharing provisions. Our data show that mutual veto provisions are relatively rare and found mostly in diverse societies that are more highly developed than the world average. We find that mutual veto arrangements must be (a) enforceable, (b) inclusive to pacify all potential spoilers and (c) compatible with the interests and incentives of those groups to which they would apply. Mutual veto provisions often fail to meet one or more of these conditions. They are difficult to enforce, as conflict-prone societies often have ineffectual political institutions and weak administrative capacity. It is difficult to make them incentive-compatible, as incumbent power-holders will not benefit from them. Finally, they are often not credible, as the dominant political coalition would find it in its interest to punish any actual exercise of a veto. These conditions jointly explain the near absence of effective mutual veto regimes outside relatively prosperous polities with well-established political institutions.
This paper examines the persistence of violent conflicts in the two Sudans. It examines standard macro-approaches to conflict resolution—democracy, inclusiveness, intervention, secession, as well as the more radical “let-them-fight” thesis—to demonstrate the limitations on the ability of outsiders to manage the conflicts. It concludes that relying on these approaches alone is not likely to lead to meaningful and lasting conflict resolution. The causes of Sudan's and South Sudan's wars run deeper than a failure to be inclusive and are instead connected to the nature of the state in Africa.
Nowadays, civil wars frequently end with the signature of a peace agreement, whichoften includes power-sharing provisions distributing political, military, economic and territorial power. While most research focuses on these provisions, their dimensions and their impact on durable peace, little research has been done on the question of who is sharing power with whom. Therefore, this study critically discusses the current theoretical debate and develops three categories of inclusion. The study links our previous comparative research on seven implementation processes after the signature of a peace agreement with an empirical analysis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 in Sudan by discussing the effects ofinclusion and the (negative) effects of exclusion. In particular, the study examinesin how far the elite-focused power-sharing arrangement included relevant stake-holders. The results indicate that inclusion refers not only to the parties involved ina peace process, but also is based on involving rank-and-file members as well asproviding an inner-core of power-sharing. Moreover, our empirical analysis suggests, that the implementation of the accord, e.g. materialized benefits, are decisive. Based on our findings, we develop a model for inclusion in power-sharing agreements.
After a civil war, there is a keen interest in ‘getting the institutions right’. This article summarizes our knowledge of one particular institution, the electoral system, through a review of the literature on power sharing and electoral systems in post-conflict societies. Surprisingly, there is little statistical support for the conviction that proportional representation (PR) contributes to inclusive political institutions and thereby to peace and democracy. More positively, a closer look at electoral system design as integral part of peace agreements reveals that PR is the standard choice, that it works as intended, and has a good record in securing peace, though less so of democracy. Future research should look at electoral system design as part of the peace process to explain these findings and draw lessons.
Is peace more likely to prevail when the peace accord includes civil society actors such as religious groups, women's organizations and human rights groups? This is the first statistical study that explores this issue. The article develops key claims in previous research regarding the role of civil society actors and durable peace, and proposes a set of hypotheses that focus on legitimacy in this process. The hypotheses are examined by employing unique data on the inclusion of civil society actors in all peace agreements in the post-Cold War period. The statistical analysis shows that inclusion of civil society actors in the peace settlement increases the durability of peace. The results further demonstrate that peace accords with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail. The findings also suggest that inclusion of civil society has a particularly profound effect on the prospects for overall peace in non-democratic societies.
When politicians use ethnic identity to mobilize support, why are they frequently successful? Why do ethnic security dilemmas develop in states even when the government still exists? When we say that ethnopolitical competition has a variety of consequences, what do we mean by competition? These are related questions, and they are necessary for understanding the sources of the disintegrations of the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Czechoslovak federations. These three states broke apart almost simultaneously through very similar political processes. By analyzing these processes, we can predict whether other states will disintegrate and what outsiders can do to influence these dynamics.
On Sunday 25 February 1996 a Palestinian student stepped onto acrowded bus in Jerusalem and detonated a bomb, killing twenty-sixIsraelis. One week later a second Palestinian detonated a bomb on aJerusalem bus, killing eighteen Israelis. The following day a knownMuslim extremist lay down on a busy street in Tel Aviv and blew himselfup along with ten Israelis. These attacks were designed to undermine andhalt what extremist groups viewed as the humiliating and misguidedPalestinian Israeli peace process, and within three months they hadachieved this goal. On 26 May 1996 Israelis replaced Prime MinisterShimon Peres with the more hawkish Benjamin Netanyahu, and soonthereafter negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authoritystalled. Although the bombings were clearly the work of a small band ofPalestinian extremists, these extremists were able to convince amajority of Israeli citizens to walk away from a peace process most ofthem strongly supported.
Negotiations to end wars are never simple. They involve compromises, consensus-building and some level of mutual trust. Often parties negotiate because they recognise the gains that can be made, but even "interest-based" negotiations require enemies to trust each other. For people affected by violence, or those who have fought for a cause, accepting an opponent's demands is difficult. But for peace to take root, negotiations are an essential starting point. As agreements are reached on key issues, the foundations of peace are strengthened. In many instances the decisions reached at the peace table set the course for the socioeconomic and political transformation of a country. Negotiated agreements are in effect a blueprint for the future. If gender perspectives are absent at this stage, it becomes more difficult to insert them later. It is never too early to engage in peace processes—but sometimes it can be too late. This chapter explains the different types of negotiations that occur primarily at the national level, highlighting the challenges facing women, the strategies they have developed to gain their place at the peace table and the contributions they make.
In 1996, George Mitchell became the co-chairman of the All-Party Talks in a polarized Northern Ireland where the extremes had the dominant voice while the center was relatively mute politically. In analyzing Mitchell's actions, we seek to break new ground in the study of mediation. First, we explicitly assess the context to identify key barriers and opportunities. Second, we move beyond general categories of mediator approach - such as communication, formulation, and manipulation - to match classes of mediator action to barriers. Finally,we place these discrete actions in service of a larger purpose by exploring the "mediator as coalition-builder."Whether explicit or implicit, Mitchell's overarching approach in the All-Party Peace Talks can be interpreted as a drive toward creating an outward rippling "coalition of the center against the extremes."Mitchell's effort to forge a coalition of the center led him to follow coordinated and multi-pronged process, issue and timing strategies, which are the main focus of this article. In principle, Mitchell might have sought to forge agreement via very different potential coalitional approaches: for example, seeking to bridge the extremes, seeking consensus among all parties, seeking to forge a dominant coalition on one side or the other that could have prevailed over its opponents, or seeking a sequential divideand-conquer approach to isolate and overwhelm the opposition, etc. Yet for this particular context, the centrist coalitional approach led to significant progress.
This paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy. Conventional audience-cost models suggest that state leaders must go public with their threats in international crises because leaders cannot tie their hands if signals are issued privately. I present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience. The equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat, albeit of limited credibility, can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat. The analysis suggests that secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational inefficacy. Secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war. The logic of efficient secrecy helps shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises. The Alaska Boundary Dispute illustrates this logic.
When official representatives of more than 170 countries adopted the principle of the responsibility to protect (RP) at the September 2005 World Summit, Darfur was quickly identified as the test case for this new doctrine. The general verdict is that the international community has failed the test due to lack of political will. This article argues that the failure is real but that it is more fundamentally located within the doctrine of RP itself. Fulfilling the aspiration of RP demands an international protection capability that does not exist now and cannot be realistically expected. The critical weakness in RP is that the responsibility to react has been framed as coercive protection, which attempts to be a middle way between classic peacekeeping and outright military intervention that can be undertaken without the consent of the host government. Thus far, theoretical and practical attempts to create this intermediate space for coercive protection have failed to resolve basic strategic and operational issues. In addition, the very act of raising the prospect of external military intervention for human protection purposes changes and distorts the political process and can in fact make a resolution more difficult. Following an introductory section that provides background to the war in Darfur and international engagement, this article examines the debates over the RP that swirled around the Darfur crisis and operational concepts developed for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its hybrid successor, the UN African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), especially during the Abuja peace negotiations. Three operational concepts are examined: ceasefire, disarmament and civilian protection. Unfortunately, the international policy priority o bringing UN troops to Darfur had an adverse impact on the Darfur peace talks without grappling with the central question of what international forces would do to resolve the crisis. Advocacy for the RP set an unrealistic ideal which became the enemy of achievable goals.