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Mood Regulation and Memory: Repairing Sad Moods with Happy Memories

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Abstract

A total of 106 undergraduates participated in a study examining how individuals retrieve memories to repair negative moods. Participants first completed a measure of depression. Two weeks later, participants were assigned to either a sad or neutral mood induction. After mood induction, they recalled two memories, rated their affective responses to the memories, and indicated why they chose the valence and order of the memories. Consistent with mood-congruent recall, participants in the sad condition reported sadder memories than those in the neutral condition. However, participants with prior low depression scores tended to recall more positive second memories, whereas participants with higher prior depression scores recalled consecutive negative memories. Sixty-eight per cent of sad participants who retrieved a negative first and positive second memory mentioned mood repair as motivating the recruitment of the more positive second memory.
BRIEF REPORT
M ood Regulation and M em ory:
Repairing Sad M oods with H appy M emories
Braden R. Josephson
H ofstra University, U SA
Jefferson A. Singer
Connecticut College, U SA
Peter Salovey
Yale University, USA
A total of 106 undergraduates participate d in a study examining how individual s
retrieve memories to repair negativ e moods. Participants ® rst completed a measure of
depression. Two weeks later, participants were assigned to either a sad or neutral
mood induction. After mood induction, they recalled two memories, rated their
affective responses to the memories, and indicated why they chose the valence and
order of the memories. Consistent with mood-congruent recall, participants in the sad
condition reported sadder memories than those in the neutral condition. However,
participants w ith prior low depression scores tended to recall more positiv e second
memories, whereas participants with higher prior depressio n scores recalled conse-
cutiv e negati v e memories. Sixty-eight per cent of sad participants who retrieved a
negativ e ® rst and positiv e second memory mentione d mood repair as motivating the
recruitment of the more positive second memory.
IN TR O D UC TIO N
Bower (1981 ) described a mood congruen cy e f fe ct in which stimuli matching in
aff ective valence with mood are enco ded and recalled better than stim uli of
differ ent va lence. Although many subsequent studies have demonstrated con-
gruency for both happy an d sad moods (Bower, 1981; Gilligan & Bower, 1984 ;
Singer & Salovey 1988), others hav e found congruency only for happ y mo ods and
positively toned material, and more equivo cal results for n egativ e mood con-
gruency (Matt, Vasquez, & Campbell, 1992). Isen (1985) ha s suggested that
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 1996, 10 (4), 437± 444
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jefferson A. Singer, De partment of Psychology,
Conne cticut College, New London, CT 06320, USA.
q
1996 Psychology Press, an impri nt of Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Franc is Ltd
438
J O S E P H S O N , SIN G E R , S A L O V EY
dif® c ulties in demonstrating negative mo od-congruent recall may b e du e to non-
depressed indiv iduals motivation to repair negative mood states by summoning
more positive memories. In support of thi s position, studies from our own and other
laboratories have found th at indi viduals with elevated depression scores demon-
strate less access to positive memories, suggesting a possible de® cit in their
rep arative abilities (Mof® tt, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, & V yse, 1994; Salovey &
Singer, 198 9; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Williams & Broadbent, 19 86; Williams
& Scott, 1988) .
Building on th is argument, m ood researchers h ave proposed a temporal sequence
in mood repair; initial negative mood congruency is follow ed by a repair process
that gathers momentum over time to counteract the sad mood (Forgas, 1995 ;
Se dikides, 199 4; W egner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993) . This reparative shift should
be most obvious in nondepressed individuals and delayed or inactive in more
depressed individuals.
To e xamine this possibility of sequential mood repair and its variation depend-
ing on prior level of depresion, w e ® rst assessed a group of participants self-
ratings of depression. Two w eeks later, w e assigned participants to a sad or neutral
mood induction, asked them to recall two memories, an d then to r ate each memory
for its affe ctive valence. They were then asked to explain their reasons for recalling
the memories they chose. We predicted that both nondepressed and depressed
participants in the sad condition w ould recall a ® rst memory of more ne gative
valence than participants in the neutral condition. How ever, when these same sa d
participants w ere presented with an opportunity to recall a second memory, w e
predicted that those w ith prior low scores in depression would summon a more
positive mem ory, whereas the participants w ith prior higher depr ession sco res
would recall a second negat ive memory.
M E TH O D
Particip an ts
Participants in this study were 106 studen ts enrolled in introductory psychology at
Connecticut College (32 males and 74 f emales). All participants receive d course
credit for their participation.
M easures
Beck Depression Inventory (B eck, 1967). The BDI consists of 21 que stions
used to measure state depression. We changed the directions from ``circle the
number (0 , 1, 2, 3) next to the one statement in each group that best describes
how you felt the last wee k including today to ``circle the number that best
describes the w ay you generally feel .
M ultiple Affective Ad jective Checklis Revised (Zuckerma n & Lubin,
1985). Only the depression subscale of the MAACL-R was used; its internal
consistency (Cronbach s alpha) w as 0.82.
M O O D R EG U L A T IO N A N D M E M OR Y R E C A L L
439
M ood Manipulation Check. Induced mood states w ere veri® ed by six items on
7-point Likert scales (1 indicated ``not’ and 7, ``v ery ). The items were happy ,
exhilarated, sad, satis® ed, content, and disappoin ted (Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis,
1981). A positive aff ect score w as created by summ ing the positive and reversed
negative items.
M ood induction
Videotapes from sad or neutral movies were used to induce the mood state.
Participants in the sad moo d condition viewed a 12
Qw
minute melancholy clip
from the motion picture Term s o f Endearment (Palfai & Salovey, 1993). The
participants in the n eu tral condition view ed a 12
Qw
-m inute clip on making a table
from This Old House.
M em ory Rating Sh ee t
Participants indicated their emotional responses to both memories w ith 0± 6 ratings
of 12 emo tions: happy, sad, angry, fear ful, surprised, ashamed, disgusted, guilty,
interested, embarrassed, contempt, and proud.
Procedure
Session 1. In the ® rst session, participants were told that they w ere participat-
ing in a study looking at their creativity and imag in ation. They then completed the
BDI.
Session 2. Participants returned two wee ks later for a grou p session of ® ve
participants. Each participant sat at a desk w ith a large divider b locking any v iew
of the other participants. They were given the MAACL-R before receiving their
mood induction. They then w atched either the sad or neutral videotape (assignment
to mood condition w as random). After mood induction, participants were given the
® rst mood manipulation check. Participants then wrote down a me mory acc ording
to the follow ing instruction: ``Please write dow n a memory that is at least one year
old. This memory should be strongly negativ e or positive. It is completely up to
you to decide w hich memory you choose (i.e. wh ether you write dow n a negative
or positive memory). The order of the modi® ers ``neg ative and ``positive was
counterbalanced. On completing the ® rst memo ry, participants were asked to
write down a second memory. Participants then rated their memories, and after
completing the ratings, rec eived the second mood manipulatio n ch eck. Fi nally,
participants were asked: ``Please describe the reasons w hy you chose to make
your ® rst memory either p ositive or negative, and your second memory either
positive or negativ e .’
440
J O S E P H S O N , SIN G E R , SA L O V EY
RESULT S
M ood M anipulation Check
A separate one-way ANOVA by mood condition (Sad vs. Neutral) revealed no
difference in the MAACL-R scores for the two groups [Sad, M = 66.92; Neutral =
71.91, F(1, 104) = 0.63, n.s.] prior to mood induction. We th en conducted a 2
3
2
analysis on participants mood check ratings w ith mood condition (Sad v s. Neutral)
as a between-subjects factor and Time (Time 1: The ® rst mood check after
induction and Time 2: The second mood check after retrieval of th e tw o memories)
as a w ithin-su bjects factor. This analysis re vealed sign i® cant main effects for both
mood condition [ F(1, 10 4) = 49.28, P < 0 .0001 ] and Tim e [F (1, 104) = 16.24 , P <
0.0001 ] , as w ell as a signi® cant Condition
3
Tim e interaction [ F (1, 104) = 7.91,
P < 0.01] . Participants in the sad condition w ere less happy than participants in the
neutral mood condition (M = 18.24 vs. M = 25.34, respectively) and participants
wer e happier at Time 2 (p ost-memory retrieval) than at Time 1 (post-mood
induction), (M = 23 .01 vs. M = 20.57, respec tiv ely). Analy sis of simple effects
tests revealed that althoug h there was no signi® cant change in mood from the time
of ® rst mood check to the time of second mood check for participants in the neutral
mood condition, participants in the sad condition w ere signi® cantly happier at the
second mood check than immediately after the mood induction [F (1, 10 4) = 21.7 7,
P < 0.000 1] .
M ood Congruency and A ffe ctive Responses to
M em ories
Participants labelled each o f their tw o memories as either positive or negative.
1
Thirty-six participants in the sadness induction and 19 participants in the neutral
induction recalled a negative ® rst memory; 13 participan ts in the sadness induction
and 38 participants in the neutral induction recalled a positiv e ® rst me mory. Thus,
there w as a strong mood congruen cy e f fect on subject’ s ® rst memory [c
2
(1, N =
106 ) = 16.7 3, P < 0.01] . Twenty-three participants in the sadness induction and 19
participants in the neutral induction recalled a negative second memory; 26 parti-
cipants in the sadne ss induction and 38 participan ts in the neutral condition
recalled a positive second me mory. Evid en ce for mood congruency was not found
in second memories [c
2
(1, N = 106 ) = 2.14, n.s.].
A principal co mpone nts analysis was conducted on the 12 adjectives that
participants used to rate their memorie s. ``Sad , ``Fearful , and the reverse of
``Happy and ``Proud’ loaded on Factor 1, which might be characterised as a
1
Because participants reports of their affective responses to their memories could them-
selves be in¯ uenced by the mood induction, we decid e d to ask independent raters to evaluate
the affective quality of the memories recalled. These raters, blind to condition and hypotheses,
rated 49 memories each and rated their affectiv e quality for distress. The inter-rater rel iability
was 0.89. T he correlation of the raters scores with the parti c ipants own ratings of their
memories was 0.83. This ® nding suggests that the memories were judged appropriatel y by
participants despite any potential affective in¯ uence on their judgement processes.
M O O D R EG U L A T IO N A N D M E M OR Y R E C A L L
441
distress factor (Cronbach s alp ha, after factor scoring using unit weights = 0.85).
``Ashamed’ , ``Disgusted , and ``Guilty loaded on Factor 2, which might be
considered a soc ial anxiety fa ctor (C ronbach s alpha = 0.85). A third f ac tor yielded
just two items, ``Interested’ and ``S urprised , with a Cronbach s alph a of 0.45, and
so these items were excluded from subsequent analyses.
The mean distress and social anxiety scores for ® rst memorie s in th e sad versus
neutral conditions were compared in a one-way MANOV A [ Wilks L = 0.81, F(3,
102) = 7. 96, P < 0.001 ] . Univariate analyses show ed that participants reported a
more distressed ® rst memory when in th e sad condition (M = 3.75) as opposed to
the neutral condition [(M = 2.12), F (1, 104) = 22.40, P < 0.001] . Social anxiety
ratings of memories, howeve r, did not differ [ F (1, 104) = 3.02 n.s.] .
M ood Repa ir
A two-way mixed model ANOV A, Mood Condition (sad vs. neutral in duction)
3
Memory Solic itation (® rst vs. second memory) was conducted on ratings of
memory distress. There was a main effect for mood condition (participants in
the sad condition rated their memories more distressing than participants in the
neutral condition), [ F(1, 104) = 19.25, P < 0.0001] , but none for memory
solicitation [ F(1, 104 ) = 2.36, n.s.]. The interac tion of Condition
3
Memory
Solicitation was signi® cant [ F (1, 104) = 5.59, P < 0.05 ] . Analysis of simp le
effects revealed that participants in the sad mood induction rated their second
memories as less distressing tha n their ® rst me mories [M = 2.8 5 vs. M = 3.76 ,
respectively, F (1, 104) = 7.07, P < 0.01] , but that neutral participants show ed no
change from their ® rst to second memories [ M = 2.13 vs. M = 2.32, respective ly,
F(1, 104 ) = 0.37, n.s.] .
To demonstrate mood repair, w e need to look more closely at participants in the
sad mood condition (n = 49 ). Is it possible that all participants experienced an
attenuation of the sad mood regardless of w hether or not they recalled a positive
second memory? The 36 partic ipants in the sad mood condition who recalled a ® rst
negative memory displayed mood congruency after the sad mood induction. We
then split these participants into tw o goupsÐ negative memor y follow ed by posi-
tive memor y (NP, n = 19) and negative memory follow ed by anoth er negative
memory (NN, n = 17).
We expected that the NP group should be in a better mood at the second mood
check after memory r etr ieval than the NN group, c on trolling for differences at the
® rst mood check immediately after induction. At the ® rst mood check, the NN
group w as less positive (M = 13.82) than the NP group (M = 17.16) . At the second
mood check, the difference betw een the groups grew even larger; the NP group’ s
mood check increased to 23.32 (+ 6.16), w hereas the NN group’ s mood check
scores in creased by only 0.59 to 14.41 . An ANCOVA controlling for the difference
in mood immediately after induction w as signi® cant [ F(1, 34) = 10.06, P < 0.005] ,
indicating th at the difference at the second moo d check is not dependent on their
immediate post-induction response and may be, in part, a function of subsequent
memory choic es.
442
J O S E P H S O N , SIN G E R , SA L O V EY
Open-ended R esponses
We ® rst considered the sad mood condition participants reasons for recalling their
® rst memory. Twenty-one of the 36 who recalled a negativ e memory ® rst (58 % )
mentioned the sad video as having in¯ uenced their m emory choice. In c ontrast, 2
of the 13 who recalled a positive memory (15% ) mentioned the in¯ uence of the
mood induction. Turning to the second memory, 13 of the 19 NP participants
(68 % ) indicated a desire to change their ne gative moods as the explicit reason they
selected a positive memory.
2
These participants were able to articulate a conscious
strategy to repair their negativ e mood by retrieving a seco nd memory tha t was
more positive in affect. In comparison, no ne of the 17 NN participants indicated
any mood repair strategies. Considering th e remaining 13 participants in the sad
condition, 33 % of the PN participants (n = 6) described an initial attempt at mood
rep air that was not effective, and 14% of the PP participants (n = 7) mentio ned a
conscious effort at moo d repair.
Depression
We predicted that participants with higher scores on the B DI would have more
dif® c ulty ge ne rating a positive memory to repair negative mo od after the sad
induction. We compared th e BDI scores for the NN group to the NP group in
the sad con dition. The mean BDI score for NNs was 11.00 and for NPs, 6.63; this
difference w as in the predicted direction, but did not reach sign i® cance (t, 34 =
1.62, P = 0.055, one-tailed test). The mean score for the NNs (11.00 ) is consid ered
``partially symptomat ic of depression on the BDI (B r own, Schulberg, & Madonia,
1995). The mean BDI scores were 4.00 and 7.50 for the PP and PN participants in
the sad condition, respectively.
3
DIS CU S SIO N
Although recent papers have postulated a mood repair process in memory, the
present experiment may be the ® rst empirical study to demonstrate that individuals
deliberately recruit positive memori es to counteract negative moods and accom-
panying negative memorie s. After a sad m oo d induction, participants w ho follow ed
a negative memory with a positive one reported a more positive mo od than
participants who rec alled tw o consecutive negativ e memories. Additionally, 68 %
of the participants who recalled a positive memory after a negative m emory made
2
For partic ipants who chose a positive memory after recalling a ® rst ne gative memory
followi ng the sad mood induction, open-ende d responses were examined for possible repair
statements. Those participants who explicitly used a combination or part of the follow ing
phrases: ``I wanted to c hange my bad mood’ ; ``I dec ided to try to make myself feel better’ ;
``I wanted to lift my mood’ ; and ``I did not want to stay in a bad mood’ were classi® ed as
engaging in repair.
3
The mean BD I scores for the neutral c ondition participants were as follow s: NN = 14.00
(n = 6); NP = 5.15 (n = 13); PN = 9.77 (n = 13); PP = 5.28 (n = 13).
M O O D R EG U L A T IO N A N D M E M OR Y R E C A L L
443
explicit statements indicatin g their conscious intention to lift their mood by recal-
ling a more happy experience from their past.
There are several alternative explanations for our ® ndings. First, participants
simply may have e xperienced an attenuation of their sad mood, and as a result,
felt better by the time they recalled their second memory, and other participants,
perhaps because they were more affected by the sad vide otap e, remained sad even as
they recalled their sec ond mem ories. Secondly, it is p ossib le that our instructions to
recall a positive or ne gative memory may have caused some participants to attempt
to balance their memories by recalling on e of each va lence. How eve r, only 6% of
the participants stated explicitly that they had engag e d in this strategy.
The ® rst explanation, differential mood attenuation, is militated against by the
fact that only those participants w ho chose to recall a second positive memory
show ed a signi® cantly elevated mood at the second mood check. One co uld say that
for these participants, their mood wore off more quickly or that they also show ed
less of an effect of the mood induction initially, but what does mood attenuation
really mean? Mood may dissipate due to ongoing reparative effects in conscious-
ness. It wou ld be dif® cult for a reseracher to control participants moment-by-
moment co gnitive activity, which may be recruited to change their mood. In
addition to the process studied in this experiment (recruitment of countervailing
memories), individuals might also rely on distracting thoughts and imagery to
change aversive mood states. Future studies will need to distinguish betw een
mood change that is a result of strategic repair versus passive attenuation.
Im plications and Future R esearch
Future studies might employ a less content-driv en mood induction; participants
memories show ed some evidence of association to the ® lm clip s conten t. Addi-
tionally, the request for two memories was an admittedly arbitrary starting point to
examine mood repair; future studies could request a larger number of memories o r
simply employ a thought sampling tec hnique. This more extensive sampling of
participants thought processes would also help to distinguish how often partici-
pants employ m ood repair as a c onscious strategy. Parrott (199 3) has suggested that
some emotional regulation strateg ies may be so w ell learned that they are ac tivated
below the level of consciousness. It wo uld be imp ortant as well to remov e our
req uest for memories of strong affe ctive content in order to see if participants
would spontaneously ge nerate these types of memories.
This study provided support for a temporal model of mood repair (cf. Se dikides,
1994). B y looking at tw o memories in sequence, we replicated an associational
model of mood congruency, but we also identi® ed mediating cognitive activity
after the initial c ongrue nt response. Moreover, the results of this study highlight
Isen s (1985 ) and Singer and Salovey s (1988 ) cautions that mood-memory models
may need to account for motivational in¯ uences. As Isen (1985 , p. 389 ) has
suggested, depression may not be simply about a case of the ``blues , but as
much about a failure to ``chase the blues aw ay .
Manuscript received 9 June 1995
Revised manuscript received 28 Dec ember 1995
444
J O S E P H S O N , SIN G E R , SA L O V EY
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Nostalgia arises from tender and yearnful reflection on meaningful life events or important persons from one’s past. In the last two decades, the literature has documented a variety of ways in which nostalgia benefits psychological well-being. Only a handful of studies, however, have addressed the neural basis of the emotion. In this prospective review, we postulate a neural model of nostalgia. Self-reflection, autobiographical memory, regulatory capacity, and reward are core components of the emotion. Thus, nostalgia involves brain activities implicated in self-reflection processing (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus), autobiographical memory processing (hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus), emotion regulation processing (anterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex), and reward processing (striatum, substantia nigra, ventral tegmental area, ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Nostalgia’s potential to modulate activity in these core neural substrates has both theoretical and applied implications.
... Furthermore, the two strategies that we examined have previously been found to be associated with a number of different costs, such as how difficult they are to implement (e.g., Josephson et al., 1996;Ortner et al., 2016). However, this research has largely focused on the costs incurred when regulating one's own emotions (i.e., in intrapersonal contexts). ...
... For example, participants diagnosed with depression show increased recall of negative, and decreased recall of positive, previously endorsed self-referent adjectives (e.g., Connolly et al., 2016) and are better able to correctly recognize previously encoded images with sad, but not happy, facial expressions (e.g., Ridout et al., 2003;Zhou et al., 2021). Similarly, depressive symptoms, diagnosed depression, or induced depressed mood predict greater recall of negative stimuli or false negative lures (e.g., Bower, 1981;Forgas & Bower, 1987;Joormann et al., 2009;Josephson et al., 1996;Matt et al., 1992). Yet, by focusing on recall of experimental stimuli rather than memories of actual life experiences, experimental studies do not offer insight into whether memory biases emerge in the natural ecology of people's routine life, nor are experimental methods able to examine whether these negative memory biases reinforce depressive symptoms over time. ...
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Perceived stress undermines emotional wellbeing, and poorer emotional wellbeing may intensify perceived stress. The current studies examined whether biased memories contribute to the possible reciprocal links between perceived stress and depressive symptoms. Two longitudinal studies compared the stress people perceived for several weeks (Study 1, N = 308) or during a conflict interaction (Study 2, N = 261) with memories of perceived stress gathered in subsequent weeks. People with low depressive symptoms remembered their past as involving less perceived stress than they initially experienced (positive bias). By contrast, people with average or higher levels of depressive symptoms remembered their past as involving exactly as much perceived stress as initially experienced (depressive realism) or, at very high levels of depressive symptoms, more perceived stress than initially experienced (negative bias). These memory biases had important implications. Accounting for initial levels of perceived stress, more negative memories of perceived stress predicted greater weekly depressed mood (Study 1) and greater depressive symptoms across time (Study 2). Evaluating whether life has involved as much perceived stress as now remembered may help facilitate emotional wellbeing in the face of rising perceived stress and depressive symptoms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
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Background: Research has demonstrated that nostalgia can improve self-esteem as a positive psychological resource in Western culture. Moreover, nostalgia is cross-culturally consistent. Therefore, nostalgia triggered by an event reflection task affects self-esteem in Eastern cultures. However, it is unknown whether the collective or personal content of nostalgia affects self-esteem and the role of loneliness in this process. Purpose: This study examined the cross-cultural consistency of nostalgia's impact on self-esteem, whether nostalgic content affects self-esteem levels, and what role loneliness plays in this process. Methods: We conducted two experiments in this study. Experiment 1 used an event reflection task with different instructions to prime the nostalgia and control groups. Participants were asked to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Scale and a revised positive version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale after priming. Experiment 2 used different instructions and pictures to prime the social and personal nostalgia groups. The PANAS, a revised positive version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the Russell Loneliness Scale were then administered to the groups. Results: Experiment 1 showed that in the nostalgic condition, self-esteem was higher than in the control condition. In the nostalgia condition, participants felt more positive than in the control condition. Experiment 2 revealed that self-esteem was higher in the collective nostalgic context than in the personal nostalgic context. Regarding the positive effect, participants felt more positive in the collective nostalgic context than in the personal nostalgic context. Loneliness also had a mediating effect on this process. Conclusion: Results show that nostalgia affects self-esteem through cross-cultural consistency and social nostalgia can be a resource for positive mental health. Moreover, loneliness plays a significant role in mediating nostalgia's effect on self-esteem.
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Day-to-day life is inundated with attempts to control emotions and a wealth of research has examined what strategies people use and how effective these strategies are. However, until more recently, research has often neglected more basic questions such as whether and how people choose to regulate their emotions (i.e. emotion regulation choice). In an effort to identify what we know and what we need to know, we systematically reviewed studies that examined potential determinants of whether and how people choose to regulate their emotions. Eighteen determinants were identified across 219 studies and were categorised as being affective, cognitive, motivational, individual or social-cultural in nature. Where there were sufficient primary studies, meta-analysis was used to quantify the size of the associations between potential determinants and measures of whether and how people choose to regulate their emotions. Based on the findings, we propose that people’s decisions about whether and how to regulate their emotions are determined by factors relating to the individual doing the regulating, the emotion that is being regulated, and both the immediate situation and the broader social context in which the regulation is taking place.
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present an extensive series of empirical investigations on the effects of hypnotically induced emotions on learning and memory (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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The mental control of mood and mood-related thought was investigated. In Experiment 1, Ss reminiscing about a happy or sad event were asked to make their mood positive, were given no instructions, or were asked to make their mood negative. Ss attempting mood control without an imposed cognitive load were successful, whereas those who attempted control while rehearsing a 9-digit number not only failed to control their moods but also showed self-reported mood change opposite the mood they intended to create. In Experiment 2, Ss attempting to control mood-related thoughts under cognitive load showed increased accessibility of those thoughts contrary to the direction of intended control in a Stroop-type color-naming task.
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Depressed and elated mood states may produce distinct information processing styles that can affect performance on deductive and inductive reasoning tasks differentially. Seventy-two undergraduates were asked to view a set of two film clips designed to induce either elated, neutral or depressed moods. One clip preceded each of two reasoning tasks, a deduction task and an induction task. We predicted that subjects in a depressed mood would exhibit impoverished performance relative to the other two conditions on the inductive reasoning problems but enhanced performance on those that involved deductive reasoning. Conversely, we expected subjects in an elated mood to perform worse than those in depressed and neutral moods on the deductive reasoning task, but better on the inductive reasoning task. Response times provided partial support for these hypotheses. Subjects in the elated mood condition performed significantly slower than those in both the neutral and depressed conditions on deductive reasoning problems, whereas subjects in the depressed mood condition performed significantly slower than those in the neutral condition on inductive reasoning problems. Implications for understanding mood-influenced cognitive styles are discussed.
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Describes experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in Ss by hypnotic suggestion to investigate the influence of emotions on memory and thinking. Results show that (a) Ss exhibited mood-state-dependent memory in recall of word lists, personal experiences recorded in a daily diary, and childhood experiences; (b) Ss recalled a greater percentage of those experiences that were affectively congruent with the mood they were in during recall; (c) emotion powerfully influenced such cognitive processes as free associations, imaginative fantasies, social perceptions, and snap judgments about others' personalities; (d) when the feeling-tone of a narrative agreed with the reader's emotion, the salience and memorability of events in that narrative were increased. An associative network theory is proposed to account for these results. In this theory, an emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categorization. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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A subset of the published research on mood-congruent memory in normal nondepressed, subclinically depressed, clinically depressed, induced depressed, and induced elated persons is examined with meta-analytic techniques. We estimated the magnitude of mood-congruent recall for these mood states, examined their robustness, and studied within each mood state the extent to which the strength of mood-congruent recall was related to self-referenced encoding and mood intensity. Asymmetric recall favoring positive stimuli appears to be part of the normative pattern of memory performance among individuals that have been labeled normal nondepressed (d(h)BAR = .15; p < .001); subclinically depressed individuals show symmetric recall of positively and negatively valenced material (d(h)BAR = - .02; p > .20). Clinically depressed, induced depressed, and induced elated subjects display mood congruent recall (d(h)BAR = -.19; p < .05; d(h)BAR = - .12, p < .05; d(h)BAR = .08; p < .10). With the exception of induced elated mood, effect estimates derived from different studies are robust in that sampling error accounts for the entire variability among effect estimates obtained from different studies. In studies on induced-elated mood, self-referent processing was associated with stronger mood-congruent recall as compared to other studies. Caveats and implications for future research on mood and memory are discussed.
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Three studies investigated the effects of mood on recall of events from an individual's life. In Study 1, with 60 undergraduates, induced moods (happy, sad, or neutral) had only marginal effects on the recall of any type of childhood experience. However, Study 2, with 36 undergraduates, indicated that happy mood promotes the recall of recent happy memories. Sad mood had a weaker impact on recent memory recall. Study 3, with 66 undergraduates, replicated the finding that mood congruent recall (MCR) is much stronger for recent than for childhood memories. However, unlike in Study 2, asymmetries in MCR were not noted when comparing happy and sad mood states. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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[centers] on the types of mood regulation and on the reasons that can motivate them / show how consideration of these motives broadens our understanding of self-regulation and influences our conception of the nature of mood itself / concentrates on why someone might want to regulate moods / [argues] that moods inherently involve a complex of cognitive and motivational tendencies as well as hedonic qualities (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Research suggests that, whereas induced happiness tends to facilitate the recall of positive material, induced mild sadness often does not facilitate the recall of negative material symmetrically. These results are compatible with those reported by L. Hasher et al (see record 1986-03061-001) but also suggest that their failure to observe effects of mild depression on recall should not be overgeneralized to conclude that affective states other than mild sadness have negligible effects on cognitive processes. Possible mediators of these phenomena are discussed, and their potential relevance to the understanding of clinical depression and of the cognitive representation of various affective states is considered. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)