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The Science of Emotional Intelligence

European Psychologist

January 2008
13(1):64-78

DOI:10.1027/1016-9040.13.1.64

Authors:

Moshe Zeidner

University of Haifa

Richard D Roberts

Research and Assessment Design: Science Solution

Gerald Matthews

University of Central Florida

Almost from its inception, the emotional intelligence (EI) construct has been an elusive one. After nearly 2 decades of research, there still appears to be little consensus over how EI should be conceptualized or assessed and the efficacy of practical applications in real life settings. This paper aims at providing a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in research involving this newly minted construct. Specifically, in separate sections of this article, we set out to distinguish what is known from what is unknown in relation to three paramount concerns of EI research, i.e., conceptualization, assessment, and applications. In each section, we start by discussing assertions that may be made with some degree of confidence, elucidating what are essentially sources of consensus concerning EI. We move then to discuss sources of controversy; those things for which there is less agreement among EI researchers. We hope that this “straight talk” about the current status of EI research will provide a platform for new research in both basic and applied domains.

Multiple conceptualizations of emotional intelligence

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The Science of Emotional Intelligence

Current Consensus and Controversies

Moshe Zeidner1, Richard D. Roberts2, and Gerald Matthews3

1University of Haifa, Israel, 2Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ, USA,

3University of Cincinnati, OH, USA

Abstract. Almost from its inception, the emotional intelligence (EI) construct has beenan elusive one. After nearly 2 decades of research,

there still appears to be little consensus over how EI should be conceptualized or assessed and the efficacy of practical applications in

real life settings. This paper aims at providing a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in research involving this newly minted construct.

Specifically, in separate sections of this article, we set out to distinguish what is known from what is unknown in relation to three

paramount concerns of EI research, i.e., conceptualization, assessment, and applications. In each section, we start by discussing assertions

that may be made with some degree of confidence, elucidating what are essentially sources of consensus concerning EI. We move then

to discuss sources of controversy; those things for which there is less agreement among EI researchers. We hope that this “straight talk”

about the current status of EI research will provide a platform for new research in both basic and applied domains.

Keywords: emotional intelligence, emotions, intelligence, emotional competencies, consensus and controversy

Over the past 17 years or so, emotional intelligence (EI)

has emerged as one of the most visible and high-profile

constructs in individual differences research (Matthews,

Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002, 2007). Broadly defined, EI rep-

resents a set of competencies for identifying, processing,

and managing emotion. Research into EI has prospered, in

part, because of the increasing importance of intelligence

for people in modern society. It has also been claimed that

EI predicts clinical, educational, and occupational criteria

above and beyond that predicted by general intelligence.

However, despite a high level of public and scientific in-

terest, the science of EI is in its early years, with many

issues still being debated and cardinal questions remaining

unanswered.

As the field matures,it has become increasingly common-

place for academic psychologists to reject early, overstated

claims made in popular works about the importance of emo-

tional intelligence. Goleman (1995), for example, claimed EI

may be as important as IQ in determining life success (see

also e.g., Cooper & Sawaf, 1997). Such claims have mainly

been disconfirmed by the decade of rigorous empirical re-

search that has followed. Decisively, Van Rooy and Viswes-

varan’s (2004) meta-analysis showed that, after correcting for

statistical artifacts, the average correlation between EI and

work performance was modest (i.e., around 0.24).

Notwithstanding, research on EI goes back to entirely

respectable and sober research on social abilities and com-

petencies pursued by a line of distinguished intelligence

researchers (Landy, 2006). Contemporary researchers have

also made a persuasive case that EI measures add some-

thing new to conventional understanding of human individ-

ual differences (e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000a,b).

There are now several hundred peer-reviewed journal arti-

cles that deal with key issues, including models of EI, as-

sessment of EI, personality and cognitive ability correlates

of EI, validation of tests of EI against measures of social

functioning and adaptation, and applications in real life set-

tings (especially work, education, and clinical practice).

Although work on EI is open to various criticisms (e.g.,

Matthews et al., 2002), the field may still possess a suffi-

cient groundswell of scientific support to constitute a legit-

imate branch of psychological science.

This paper aims at providing a snapshot of the state-of-

the-art in this newly minted construct. Specifically, in sep-

arate sections of this article, we set out to distinguish what

is known from what is unknown in relation to three para-

mount concerns of EI research, i.e., conceptualization, as-

sessment, and applications. In each section, we start by dis-

cussing assertions that may be made with some degree of

confidence, elucidating what are essentially sources of con-

sensus concerning EI. We move then to discuss sources of

controversy; those things for which there is less agreement

among EI researchers. We hope that this “straight talk”

about the current status of EI research will help the reader

disentangle rhetoric from reality and fiction from fact in

contemporary EI research.

Conceptualization of Emotional

Intelligence

Despite nearly 2 decades of research, there appears little

consensus over how EI should be defined and conceptual-

DOI 10.1027/1016-9040.13.1.64

ized (Matthews et al., 2002; Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner,

2004; Roberts, Schulze, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2005).

Thus, it is presently unclear whether EI is cognitive or non-

cognitive; whether it refers to explicit or implicit knowl-

edge of emotion; and whether it refers to a basic aptitude

or to some adaptation to a specific social and cultural mi-

lieu (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001). Arguably, one

of the primary initial tasks in any scientific endeavor is

systematic mapping of the major components and facets in

the universe of discourse under consideration (Kerlinger,

1973). However, it is difficult to obtain a satisfactory jus-

tification or definitional framework for the construct of EI.

In fact, most researchers would likely agree that popular

definitions are too over-inclusive to be useful. Defining EI

as a “laundry list” of virtually every positive quality of

character except for cognitive intelligence, also accom-

plishes little (cf. Goleman, 1995).

Although research definitions are not immune to over-

inclusiveness, the majority of attempts to operationalize EI

have tried to start from some conceptual analysis of the

construct. The four-branch model of Mayer et al. (2000a)

is the best-known and most influential conceptualization of

this kind. It has inspired not just the ability tests for which

Mayer et al. (2000b) are renowned, but questionnaire mea-

sures as well (see e.g., Schutte et al., 1998). Mayer et al.

(2000b) divide ability models, which view EI as a standard

intelligence, from mixed models that define EI more broad-

ly as a package of personal qualities including both abilities

and personality traits that facilitate expression of EI. A fur-

ther conceptualization, “trait EI” (Petrides & Furnham,

2003), embeds EI exclusively within the personality do-

main, and, thus, separates EI rather sharply from abilities

– as normally defined. It is certainly legitimate to study

stable perceptions of emotional functioning as an aspect of

personality, but the label “trait EI” may be misleading, giv-

en its connotations of ability (O’Sullivan, 2007). Next, we

discuss some sources of consensus, followed by sources of

controversy, in conceptualizing the EI construct.

Conceptualization: Sources of Consensus

Emotional intelligence is a multifaceted construct that may

best be studied from multiple perspectives. A variety of dif-

ferent conceptions and definitions of EI have been pro-

posed, each leading to different operational measures of the

construct. The various psychometrically adequate scales

for EI appear to be measuring several different constructs.

This assertion is supported most clearly by the weakness

of correlations between objective tests and questionnaires

based on self-report (Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004;

Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004), but other instances may be

found. For example, Austin (2005) studied chronometric

(i.e., time-based) measures that, by analogy with cognitive

research, should correlate with scores on EI tests. Although

a distinct emotional-information processing factor was

identified, it failed to correlate significantly with overall EI

scores from two leading assessments.

There is probably a consensus that “trait” EI may be

studied separately from ability-based EI (e.g., Petrides &

Furnham, 2003). However, it remains unclear if there is a

single over-arching general “trait” EI dimension, or if the

various questionnaires may be picking up multiple, largely

independent traits. Some questionnaires do exhibit a strong

general factor (e.g., Bar-On, 2004; Petrides & Furnham,

2003), whereas others do not. Tett, Fox, and Wang (2005)

extracted three independent factors from their question-

naire, which they labeled as self-orientation, other-orienta-

Table 1. Multiple conceptualizations of emotional intelligence

Construct Possible current

measure

Equivalent in

IQ research

Key processes Adaptive significance Developmental

influences

Temperament Scales for Big Five

EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997)

None Neural and cognitive

processes controlling

arousal, attention and

reinforcement sensi-

tivity

Mixed: most tempera-

mental factors confer

a mixture of costs

and benefits

Genetics and early

learning

Information process-

ing

JACBART, Emotion-

al Stroop, RAFL

Choice RT, inspec-

tion time, working

memory

Specific processing

modules

Uncertain: Is speed of

processing necessari-

ly adaptive?

Genetics and early

learning

Emotional self-regula-

tion

Selected scales from

questionnaires for EI

(e.g., SSRI, TEIQue)

Self-assessed intelli-

gence

Monitoring and regu-

lation of internal

states; self-efficacy in

such processes

Predominantly but

not exclusively posi-

tive: presumed simi-

lar to self-esteem

Learning and social-

ization: e.g., mastery

experiences, model-

ing, direct reinforce-

ment (in emotive con-

texts)

Emotional knowledge

and skills

MSCEIT Gc and/or Gk Multiple acquired pro-

cedural and declara-

tive skills

Adaptive within con-

text for learning: may

be irrelevant or count-

er-productive in other

contexts

Learning, socializa-

tion and training of

specific skills and

knowledge

M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies 65

tion, and emotional-sharing. As they point out, the first two

factors correspond to Gardner’s (1983) intra- and inter-per-

sonal intelligences, conceived as separate personal intelli-

gences. By contrast, the Mayer et al. (2000a,b) model does

not sharply separate emotion regulation in self and others.

Thus, although it is agreed that EI may encompass multiple

domains (e.g., Austin & Saklofske, 2005), it remains un-

clear how many separate domains should be discriminated,

and whether general factors may be identified within each

domain. Elsewhere (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2006),

we have tentatively distinguished at least four, largely sep-

arate domains, as shown in Table 1.

Emotional intelligence overlaps with other psychological

constructs. A major issue is how EI should be aligned

with other dimensions of ability and personality. The de-

gree of overlap of EI with other constructs appears to be

measure-dependent, with multiple EI constructs appear-

ing to relate differently to other factors. For example, ob-

jective measures of EI such as the Multifactor Emotional

Intelligence Scale (MEIS) and Mayer-Salovey-Caruso

Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), in keeping with

an “ability model,” correlate between 0.30 and 0.40 with

general intelligence, and rather less with personality

traits (e.g., Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). Per-

haps one might envisage including an EI ability factor

inside the multistratum model for ability advanced by

Carroll (1993).

By contrast, questionnaire measures for EI overlap with

standard personality traits to a degree that is often exces-

sive. The most egregious example is Bar-On’s (2004) Emo-

tional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i), which correlates around

0.80 with low trait anxiety and general psychopathology

(e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Newsome, Day, & Catano, 2000).

Most of its reliable variance may be attributed to the Five-

Factor model (FFM) of personality (Dawda & Hart, 2000;

Matthews et al., 2002). Similarly, Petrides and Furnham

(2003) reported that their trait EI questionnaire correlated

at –0.70 with neuroticism and 0.68 with extraversion. Other

questionnaires appear to possess more unique variance, but

still show substantial intercorrelation with personality (see

Matthews et al., 2002, 2004), raising the thus-far unan-

swered question of how personality and EI traits should be

interrelated within a common structural model.

Individual emotional intelligence constructs relate mean-

ingfully to various external criteria. There is a growing

body of evidence showing that various scales for EI corre-

late robustly with a variety of outcomes that plausibly sig-

nal social-emotional success (Day, 2004). Both MSCEIT

subscales and various questionnaires purportedly assessing

EI correlate with measures of well-being and social en-

gagement (e.g., Brackett, Rivers, Shiffmann, Lerner, & Sa-

lovey, 2006; Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003; Saklofske,

Austin, & Minski, 2003). Validity coefficients tend to be

higher for questionnaires, but, in this case, they are ampli-

fied by confounding with personality traits linked to social

adjustment, such as extraversion. Given the overlap with

personality and ability already noted, a critical issue is

whether tests for EI show incremental predictive validity

with key factors, including general intelligence and the Big

Five personality factors, statistically controlled. Evidence

for incremental validity is, however, clearly mixed. Several

studies fail to show that scales for EI predict important cri-

teria (e.g., academic success) with other traits controlled

(Barchard, 2003), while still other studies demonstrate the

obverse (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000; Saklofske

et al., 2003).

Emotional intelligence relates to exceptionality in theoret-

ically meaningful, and practically important, ways. A com-

mon tactic for gathering validity evidence for ability and

personality measures is to show that they discriminate

groups that are exceptional in terms of, for example, their

intellectual capabilities, pathology, or social maladjust-

ment. Support for the validity of EI may be found from

similar sources. Case studies of emotionally gifted individ-

uals provide some informal but persuasive evidence (Oat-

ley, 2004). Quantitative differences in EI scores have been

shown for groups such as therapists, psychiatric patients,

and prisoners (e.g., Bar-On, 2004; Schutte et al., 1988).

These studies have typically, however, neglected the pos-

sible confounding influences of personality and ability. The

association between EI and (lack of) alexithymia has been

important in establishing the clinical relevance of the con-

struct (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2001). However, for each

exceptional group, findings may vary with the measure of

EI employed. For example, Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Mat-

thews, and Roberts (2005) showed that intellectually gifted

children obtained elevated scores on the MSCEIT, but were

lower in self-reported EI, demonstrating a failure of con-

vergence.

Emotional intelligence follows a well-defined develop-

mental trajectory. There is an extensive literature on so-

cial-emotional development in children that predates

work on EI (e.g., Denham, 1998). There appears to be a

fairly well-defined sequence of markers of emotional de-

velopment, beginning with the simple expressive and

regulatory behaviors of the infant, and culminating in ac-

tive, insightful self-regulation sensitive to the social and

cultural environment (Saarni, 2000). We have proposed

that emotional competencies may be attached to the fol-

lowing three aspects of the developmental sequence: (1)

basic temperaments shaped by innate biological attri-

butes; (2) social learning of rule-based adaptive behav-

iors (e.g., emotion display rules); and (3) development of

self-reflective insight (Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, &

MacCann, 2003).

There are empirical literatures focusing on such key is-

sues as the nature of temperament (Rothbart & Bates,

1998), the shaping of emotional competencies by parent-

child interaction (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Loyosa, 1997), and

the role of language in shaping emotional awareness in old-

66 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

er children (Shipman & Zeaman, 1999). The work of Izard

(e.g., 2001) on emotional adaptiveness provides a clear and

convincing link between the developmental literature and

emotional intelligence.

Conceptualization: Sources of Controversy

Are researchers who investigate emotional intelligence on

the right track or following blind alleys? Various commen-

tators have questioned the value of focusing on resolving

the conceptual status of EI. Brody (2004), for example,

challenges the psychometric status and predictive validity

of ability tests of EI. By contrast, Landy (2005) claims that

much of the applied work fails to meet elementary scien-

tific standards, such as availability of data to other re-

searchers. Even if it is accepted that empirical studies are

rigorous, the suspicion may be that the phenomena ob-

served (e.g., rating one’s response to vignettes of doubtful

personal relevance) lack ecological validity and are of little

relevance to real-life emotional functioning.

Is there evidence for multiple emotional “intelligences”

and do they share any common element(s)? We have al-

ready indicated that there seems to be little overlap between

ability-based performance measures of EI and self-report

measures. However, even if we transfer questionnaire mea-

sures to the personality domain, as trait EI, significant dif-

ficulties remain. As we have pointed out in previous cri-

tiques (e.g., Matthews et al., 2002, 2004; Roberts et al.,

2005), there are a variety of distinct ways of conceptualiz-

ing EI as a construct open to objective measurement. These

include as explicit emotional knowledge (as featured in the

MSCEIT), as implicit emotional knowledge and procedural

skills, as an “ecological” construct related to person-envi-

ronment fit in specific social contexts, as components of

information-processing measured chronometrically (Aus-

tin, 2005), and other perspectives (see Table 1). It is un-

known whether constructs measured within each domain

correlate positively with one another; certainly a future re-

search topic that might profitably be explored. A possible

basis for EI in implicit knowledge or processing has been

especially neglected, despite recent interest in implicit fea-

tures of personality and unconscious priming processes.

There are additional reasons from emotion theory to

question whether an overarching EI construct is expected

to generalize across different domains and measurement

methods. One feature of many emotions theories (e.g., Oat-

ley & Johnson-Laird, 1995) is that there are multiple basic

emotions supported by distinct neurological and cognitive

systems. For example, anxiety and anger, respectively, are

supported by different fear and rage neurobiological sub-

systems (Panksepp, 1998). Thus, it is not self-evident that

individual differences in the functioning of, say, the fear

system, which is localized in structures including the

amygdala, will relate to individual differences in other sys-

tems, such as anger, or disgust. It could reasonably be ar-

gued that EI relates not to individual emotions but to a su-

per-ordinate emotion-regulation system located anatomi-

cally in the frontal lobes (cf., Rolls, 1999). However, in our

view, EI researchers have done too little to separate emo-

tion from meta-emotional regulation, which may be sup-

ported by different brain systems. Also surprising is the

paucity of research evaluating whether individual differ-

ences in regulation generalize across the basic emotions.

Clearly, these are important research questions that would

advance the field if addressed with rigorously designed

studies.

What are the most appropriate criteria for evaluating the

importance of emotional intelligence? Another fundamen-

tal difficulty confronting researchers is deciding what in-

dependent criteria for social-emotional competence should

be predicted by EI measures (Matthews et al., 2002). Ex-

acerbating this problem, most research uses self-report

scales to assess both the predictors and criteria, with crite-

rion contamination, thus, coming into play. For example,

questionnaires for EI include items that refer to positive

mood, optimism, and confidence; the very same criteria

that many researchers wish to predict. Indeed, too little re-

search has used objective behavioral criteria, though in the

few isolated instances where this information has been col-

lected, evidence tends to be mixed. For example, the

MSCEIT fails to predict attentional and working memory

performance under stress (Matthews, Emo, Funke et al.,

2006). EI questionnaires also fail to predict learning to use

emotional information in a multi-cue discrimination task

(Fellner, Perez, Emo, & Matthews, 2006). By contrast,

studies have linked questionnaire measures to cortisol se-

cretion (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002) and

speed of facial processing (Petrides & Furnham, 2003).

What should the status of ethical and moral behavior be in

emotional intelligence models? Another issue is the extent

to which ethical and moral behavior should be part and

parcel of the EI construct. Equally important is whether it

should be differentiated from character and ethical behav-

ior, and from conformity to social norms. The selfish, Ma-

chiavellian individual may possess EI in the sense of per-

ceiving other’s emotional weaknesses and then proceeding

to manipulate them. At the extreme, individuals with anti-

social personality disorder may possess social skills that

allow them to exploit others (Harpur, Hart, & Hare, 2002),

despite deficiencies in other areas of emotional function-

ing. As recently noted by Waterhouse (2006, p. 253):

“nothing in any EI construct precludes someone with high

EI from being an immoral person.”

There is also a tension between EI in the sense of fitting

in with the social expectations of others and consensus

norms and EI in the sense of making insightful autonomous

decisions about the value of social norms. Some Germans

opposed the Nazis and were executed as a consequence.

Certainly, these people were ethical and even heroic; but

were they emotionally intelligent?

M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies 67

What are the dynamic processes underlying emotional in-

telligence? It is perhaps ironic that much EI research re-

visits one of the less attractive aspects of intelligence re-

search. This a tendency to present ability as a static set

of constructs, while ignoring the processes that support

intelligent interaction with the external environment (cf.

Corno et al., 2002). Describing EI as a list of desirable

qualities, unrelated to any independent psychological

theory, is the most obvious example of this problem.

More subtly, research on EI frequently ignores the per-

son-situation interaction that has become fundamental to

personality research (Magnusson, 1976). The basic point

is that the expression of EI may vary – perhaps radically

– depending on the surrounding environment. Individual

differences in EI may be more apparent in some contexts

than in others, and EI may be adaptive in some settings

but harmful in others (Ciarrochi, Dean, & Anderson,

2002; Petrides & Furnham, 2003).

Borrowing from Caspi and Bem’s (1990) account of

person-situation interaction, we can identify at least three

forms of interaction, related to the above, that remain al-

most entirely unexplored. How do high EI persons filter

and interpret the social world around them (reactive in-

teraction)? What kinds of behaviors does the high EI per-

son provoke in others (evocative interaction)? Perhaps

(consciously or unconsciously), the high EI person elicits

more cooperation and support from other people, where-

as the low EI person rubs them the wrong way. How does

EI relate to choosing and shaping social environments

(proactive interaction)? For example, low EI may be as-

sociated not just with a liking for harmful drugs (Trini-

dad, Unger, Chou, Azen, & Johnson, 2004), but also for

picking friends that are a bad influence.

Is emotional intelligence related to adaptation? Calling

EI an ability signals that it refers to individual differences

in adaptation. Within this perspective, the high EI person

is, in some sense, better adapted to social-emotional func-

tioning than the person of lower EI. This assumption

needs empirical support, especially as self-reports of

competence are sometimes viewed as circumspect (see

Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). The vision of the pio-

neers of tests for EI appears to have been that high EI is

unequivocally adaptive (e.g., Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey,

1999). To enjoy high EI is to enjoy a variety of benefits,

including life satisfaction, emotional connections with

others, and occupational success. As we have previously

shown, researchers differ sharply in their assessments of

whether these predictions have been confirmed (e.g.,

Brody, 2004; Day, 2004; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso,

2004). Furthermore, there appears to be a “dark side” of

EI (or some of its specific operationalizations), including

over-confidence, narcissism, Machiavellian social ma-

nipulation, and inflated self-esteem (Zeidner, Roberts, &

Matthews, in press).

Assessment of Emotional Intelligence

The case that reliable and valid assessment of EI is central

to building a science of EI is straightforward to make (Mat-

thews et al., 2002), and is generally accepted by researchers

(cf. however, Oatley, 2004). As noted above, approaches

to measurement of the EI construct have generally been

understood within Mayer et al.’s (2000b) distinction be-

tween ability and mixed models of the construct. Indeed,

reviews of the various measures of EI (e.g., McCann, Mat-

thews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003) have generally been

structured around this distinction. The ability model sug-

gests that EI may be assessed by objective tests, whereas

mixed models have inspired self-report approaches. Mayer

et al. (2000b) introduce the possibility of measuring abili-

ties by self-report, but we are not aware of any question-

naires for EI that demonstrably measures abilities rather

than personality-like traits.

Several developments suggest that it may be time to

move on from the dichotomy between mixed and ability

models of EI (Mayer et al., 2000b) at least in some respects.

First, some questionnaire researchers (e.g., Petrides &

Furnham, 2003) claim that self-report inventories belong

to the domain of personality (trait EI) and do not measure

abilities, even of the “mixed” kind. Second, questions re-

main about whether Mayer et al.’s (e.g., 2000a,b) tests mea-

sure abilities akin to those assessed by conventional intel-

ligence tests (Brody, 2004; Matthews et al., 2002). Some

fresh thinking on how to measure social-emotional abilities

or competencies may be required. Third, conceptual anal-

yses of the kind discussed in the previous section imply that

the current range of tests for EI may not adequately sample

the full range of constructs that may be labeled as “EI”;

again, new assessment methods may be needed. Thus, a

review of assessment methods needs not only to evaluate

extant tests against standard psychometric criteria, but to

examine the fundamental principles being used to sample

the domain of emotional competence as a basis for test de-

velopment. Next, we take up these issues in more depth by

reviewing sources of consensus and controversy in the as-

sessment of emotional intelligence.

Assessment: Sources of Consensus

The discipline of psychometrics provides relatively uncon-

troversial principles for determining what constitutes

sound assessment practices. Indeed, almost all major orga-

nizations concerned with educational and psychological

testing have endorsed a set of standards for determining the

efficacy of a given measure (AERA/APA/NCME Test

Standards, 1999). These standards lay out a framework for

interpreting reliability and validity; in essence, how the

corpus of research should confirm the status of the instru-

ment. Issues of consequential validity (i.e., demonstrating

that the construct assessed by the test has meaningful soci-

68 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

etal consequences), fairness (i.e., showing that items are

not biased against a particular subpopulation for inappro-

priate reasons), and how to appropriately document test de-

velopment are also critical components of developing an

EI measure (Matthews, Emo, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2006).

All of these various processes are ongoing and should feed

back to guide theoretical refinements, test development,

and future cycles of research. It is equally important to es-

tablish each piece of evidence.

Emotional intelligence assessments need to demonstrate

adequate reliability. The vast majority of research on self-

reports has concentrated in particular on establishing inter-

nal consistency reliability (e.g., Bar-On, 1995; Schutte et

al., 1998; Tett et al., 2005). Those subscribing to perfor-

mance-based measures most generally calculate split-half

reliability (e.g., Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough,

2005). Mayer et al. (2004) provide a rationale for the latter

approach when using performance-based assessments ad-

ministered in the fashion that they describe. Of note, we are

unaware of studies that report the standard error of the mea-

surement of any EI test, although this could have been

readily calculated from the summary statistics and test re-

liability coefficient.

It is not incidental that many of the subscales have mar-

ginal (i.e., less than 0.60) reliabilities both for self-report

and performance-based measures, though superordinate

constructs such as Experiential EI, general EI, and the like

have high reliability coefficients (i.e., in excess of 0.90).

Strategies for improving the reliability of subscales, such

as increasing the number of test items, have curiously been

neglected. By way of illustration, the MSCEIT actually has

fewer items than its predecessor the MEIS for several com-

mon subscales; and their reliabilities were marginal. There

are also relatively few studies of the test-retest reliability

of any measure. Moreover, although those that have been

conducted are suggestive, they generally come from stud-

ies with fairly small sample sizes (e.g., Tett et al., 2005).

The jury is still out on whether many existing tests have

high enough reliability coefficients for use in applied set-

tings.

Emotional intelligence assessments require various forms

of validity evidence. The AERA/APA/NCME Test Stan-

dards (1999) acknowledge construct validity as an all-en-

compassing, unifying concept overarching all types of va-

lidity evidence. Regrettably, not all forms of validity evi-

dence have been the subject of extant empirical research

on EI. In the quest for construct validity evidence, research

has tended, instead, to focus on factorial validity, conver-

gent and discriminant validity evidence, and test-criterion

relationships (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007). Next,

we briefly discuss some of the validity evidence for EI mea-

sures.

Factorial validity. Overall, the data attesting to the factorial

validity of virtually every single extant measure of EI are

equivocal. For example, Schutte et al. (1998) postulated a

single, general factor for the self-report inventory that they

developed. However, Petrides and Furnham (2000b) pro-

vide evidence instead for a four-factor solution, while still

other commentators (e.g., Saklofske et al., 2003) have not

been entirely successful in replicating this, or other, factor

solutions for this measure (see e.g., Gignac, Palmer, Ma-

nocha, & Stough, 2005; who lamentably consider their

study the first to address this issue). Similarly, Matthews et

al. (2002) reanalyzed data from Bar-On’s (1995) EQ-i tech-

nical manual to reveal a number of inconsistencies in the

hypothetical structure purportedly underlying this instru-

ment (see also Livingstone & Day, 2005; Palmer, Manocha,

Gignac, & Stough, 2003). Given the high degree of overlap

between questionnaire assessments of EI and standard per-

sonality traits, the onus is on researchers working with a

mixed-model or trait EI to develop factor models that spec-

ify the relationship between EI and standard personality

traits as latent constructs. However, little progress has been

made in this direction. Petrides and Furnham (2001) claim

that trait EI is a lower-order construct within the FFM, but

their factor analytic data actually show that different facets

of trait EI load on different factors. Some facets attach to

the standard Big Five, whereas others define a separate fac-

tor. Researchers have yet to explore the multistratum factor

models that have helped to clarify psychometric confusions

in the standard intelligence field (Carroll, 1993).

Performance-based measures fare no better when it

comes to showing robust, theoretically-defensible factor

structure. For example, although there are several studies

that allege the MSCEIT has four recoverable branches

(Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001), virtually no

published study has been able to find evidence for an inde-

pendent Emotional Facilitation (i.e., using emotions to fa-

cilitate thought) construct (see e.g., Palmer et al., 2005;

Roberts et al., 2006). Problems in factor structure also hold

true for the MSCEIT’s predecessor, the MEIS (Roberts et

al., 2001; Zeidner et al., 2001). Furthermore, research is

sorely needed to test for factorial invariance of current

measures of EI across different sociocultural groups.

Convergent and discriminant validity evidence. Perfor-

mance-based tests show convergent validity against ability

measures, correlating positively with verbal, knowledge-

based tests (i.e., crystallized intelligence), particularly for

Understanding Emotion (Branch 3), while at the same time

being relatively weakly related to tests of reasoning ability

(fluid intelligence; see Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Mayer et al.,

2000b). Generally, the evidence suggests that ability-based

EI-measures index emotional knowledge, which is related

to crystallized intelligence. By contrast, self-report mea-

sures of EI have shown poor convergent validity. For ex-

ample, thus far, they show low (near zero) correlations with

traditional forms of intelligence (see e.g., Davies, Stankov,

& Roberts, 1998; Derksen, Kramer, & Katzko, 2002; Sala,

2002; Zeidner et al., 2005).

There is a growing body of evidence that self-report as-

sessments of EI assess dispositional traits rather than a form

M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies 69

of intelligence. Unfortunately, the magnitude of correlation

between the vast majority of self-report assessments of EI

and (a lack of) Neuroticism (particularly, anxiety) is strong,

with moderate to high correlations also evident between the

self-report assessments and Agreeableness, Conscientious-

ness, and Extraversion, for a good deal of the available

scales (see MacCann et al., 2003; Matthews et al., 2002).

Given correlations with several personality variables it

seems possible that once the variance associated with per-

sonality is partialled out, EI-related variance would be min-

imal. Collectively, these findings suggest that self-report

measures of EI, whether based on mixed or trait models,

have questionable discriminant validity.

A final piece of convergent validity evidence is the re-

lations between different EI assessments. EI measures do

not fare well in this respect. The correlation between per-

formance-based and self-report assessments is surprisingly

low, ranging somewhere between 0.20 and 0.30 across

many studies. More problematic, we have shown that op-

posite conclusions can be reached on the basis of these two

different assessment approaches when one also looks at ex-

ternal variables like intelligence or at group differences

(Zeidner et al., 2005).

Test-criterion relations. The test-criterion relation refers to

what was formally known as predictive validity. For both

self-report and ability scales, this is often mixed. For ex-

ample, Brackett and Mayer (2003) tested both kinds of

measure as predictors of various criteria for emotional

competence, controlling for the FFM and cognitive ability.

In each case, EI predicted only one out of six criteria, with

small effect sizes. By contrast, other studies have demon-

strated modest test-criterion relations. In the ability field,

several studies (see Lopes et al., 2004; Rivers, Brackett,

Salovey, & Mayer, 2007) have shown that the Managing

Emotions branch of the MSCEIT predicts social function-

ing with personality and ability controlled. Likewise, stud-

ies have shown that self-report scales for EI can add mod-

estly to prediction of well-being criteria, with the Big Five

controlled (e.g., Saklofske et al., 2003). Although uncor-

rected validity coefficients for questionnaire assessments

of EI tend to be higher than for the MSCEIT, most of their

predictive validity derives from overlap with personality.

(Some self-report scales, as we have previously argued, are

also vulnerable to criterion contamination, in that they in-

clude items referring to well-being or social success). It is

striking that, with personality and ability controlled, both

types of measure provide only modest incremental validity

at best, typically adding 5% or so to the variance ex-

plained..

Assessments of emotional intelligence need to be premised

on justifiable scoring rubrics. There is little doubt that sim-

ply by virtue of the methods, and the widespread use of this

technique across psychology, investigating self-reported EI

can be justified as a research tactic. However, by contrast,

compared to more traditional intelligence tests (e.g., vocab-

ulary, matrices), the scoring of performance-based EI tests

is difficult, as there is no algorithm for determining the

correct answer (MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner,

2004; Roberts et al., 2001; Zeidner et al., 2001). Objectiv-

ity, or “the problem of the correct answer” (Mayer et al.,

2000b), has proven hugely problematic in investigations of

social intelligence, and has, thus far, proven an equally dif-

ficult issue to traverse in emotional intelligence research.

The MSCEIT (and the earlier MEIS) deal with this problem

in one of three ways: (1) assuming emotion experts know

the answer (expert scoring), (2) assuming that the stimulus

creators know the answer (target scoring), or (3) assuming

that the correct answer is what people generally agree is

correct (consensus scoring). Each of these scoring tech-

niques has problems (see Matthews et al., 2007).

Assessment: Sources of Controversy

Is the proposed dichotomy between ability and mixed mod-

els useful? The current trend toward relating self-reports of

EI to the personality domain (Petrides & Furnham, 2003)

leaves the earlier mixed models of EI (e.g., Bar-On, 2000)

in limbo. Should we abandon Bar-On’s idea that question-

naires may be used to assess abilities, or does the notion

still have credence? Again, it may be useful to explore dif-

ferentiation of constructs within the self-report domain.

Thus, although the split between performance and ques-

tionnaire tests looms large in the present context, other un-

certainties over the optimal choice of assessment methods

are appearing as the field develops.

For example, assessing one’s geographic knowledge by

asking a series of question along the lines of “what is the

capital city of Greenland” seems more cost-effective and

valid than asking a person to “rate how good you are in

geography on a seven-point scale from awful to brilliant”

(the answer to which might suddenly change if you were

offered a decent sum of money). Given the choice to assess

intelligence with a question that is factually verifiable or a

subjective rating, even the staunchest advocate of the later

approach is forced to concede this is a no-brainer. Besides

having a good deal more face and ecological validity, ve-

ridical items are less impervious to faking, coaching, or

self-deception biases. Notwithstanding, self-estimates of

intelligence (or related constructs, stressing in particular

cognitive engagement) have been used in research settings

to generate a variety of theoretically meaningful findings

(e.g., Ackerman & Goff, 1994; Furnham & Rawles, 1999;

Rammstedt & Rammsayer, 2000). Thus, it is important not

to dismiss self-report approaches to EI out of hand.

Are the stakes at which assessment is targeted defensible?

Basic research aside, psychological testing is generally

conducted for some practical purpose, with varying impli-

cations. In general, practitioners and policy makers talk of

the tests falling into one of three categories, corresponding

to the “fidelity” of the instrument in question for decision-

70 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

making purposes. These are (1) high-stakes (e.g., determin-

ing whether an individual can enter the college of their

choice after taking an assessment); (2) medium-stakes

(e.g., ascertaining whether an individual may move into a

higher position on the corporate ladder on the basis of a test

score); or (3) low-stakes (e.g., a test designed to give the

individual a certain level of self-insight). Currently, there

is considerable push to bring EI measures into the high

stakes testing arena. Clearly, however, in the absence of

more carefully documented validity evidence, such usage

is questionable.

Is it not time for more advanced psychometric analyses?

As alluded to at several points, thus far a good deal of EI

research has been conducted without particularly advanced

psychometrics. We are aware, for example, of no published

study using item response theory (Embertson & Reeise,

2000; van der Linden, 1996), differential item functioning

(Holland & Wainer, 1993), or equating (Kolen & Brennan,

2004), to name but a few of the statistical procedures com-

monly employed in cognitive assessment today. These pro-

cedures are especially important for high-stakes assess-

ment, and feed in to a previous concern that we had that

contemporary EI assessments should be used at a justifiable

level.

Applications of Emotional Intelligence

As alluded to in the introduction, a major driving force fu-

eling the growing public and scientific interest in EI, and

cognate emotional and social competencies, is their poten-

tial for improving personal and societal well-being. Thus,

EI has been claimed to play a pivotal role in such diverse

domains as job performance, interpersonal relationships,

educational achievements, and clinical disorders. This final

section will address applications of EI to these various do-

mains of human endeavor.

As already demonstrated, empirical research has not al-

ways supported many of the validity claims surrounding

this concept. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence for

incremental validity of the better EI measures to suggest

that a focus on EI may be relevant to enhancing personal,

social, and organizational functioning and adaptation

(Mayer et al., 2000a,b). There are also well-validated inter-

vention programs that are designed to improve emotional

functioning, especially in education (Zins, Weissberg,

Wang, & Walberg, 2004). Such programs lend weight to

the idea that elevating EI may be a valuable practical strat-

egy in many real-life settings.

EI has been claimed to be predictive of individual task

performance at the workplace, especially in settings requir-

ing leadership, teamwork, or effective communication, as

well as contextual or tacit performance (e.g., Abraham,

2005; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005). EI may also relate to cit-

izenship behavior, integrity, and effective personal rela-

tionships in organizational settings.

In education, EI skills and competencies that are culti-

vated and trained in social and emotional learning pro-

grams are commonly believed to be able to help motivate

students to reach higher levels of achievement, become

more socially and emotionally competent, and to become

more responsible and productive members of society. It is

thought that elevating EI will impact both overt academic

goals, such as better grades, and the student’s broader per-

sonal development (Zins et al., 2004). Reviews of the evi-

dence on programs for social-emotional learning, including

those using meta-analysis to demonstrate change in out-

come criteria, support their efficacy in improving mental

health, academic performance, and remediation of various

behavior problems (Greenberg, Weissberg, O’Brien, &

Zins, 2003).

EI may also have considerable potential for clinical ap-

plications. Assuming EI is related to disordered affect and

dysfunctional affect regulation (which, in turn, is related to

psychopathology) it might play an important role in clinical

diagnosis and treatment (Parker, 2005). Research on alex-

ithymia highlights how difficulties in understanding and

communicating emotion may be important in affective dis-

orders (Taylor & Bagby, 2004). However, while many

mental disorders are related to emotional dysfunctions and

expressions of negative affect, the diversity of these disor-

ders may mitigate against an unambiguous relationship

with low EI (Matthews et al., 2002).

We now point to a number of areas in which there ap-

pears to be a general consensus about applications, before

again touching on what appear as major sources of contro-

versy.

Applications: Sources of Consensus

There has been irrational enthusiasm surrounding the

practical utility of emotional intelligence. Many scholars

now working in the area agree that there has been an initial,

irrational exuberance regarding the practical value of EI in

applied settings (see e.g., Landy, 2006). Barrett, Gross,

Christensen, and Benvenuto’s (2001) review suggests that

much of the existing evidence bearing on the role of EI in

occupational success is anecdotal, impressionistic, or col-

lected by consulting companies and not published in the

peer-reviewed literature. Further, Zeidner, Roberts, and

Matthews (2002) have pointed out that despite popular

claims, most of the programs touted as effective EI pro-

grams lack clear conceptual frameworks, implementation

analyses and checks, and sound evaluation designs. At pre-

sent, there are few EI training programs that have been sys-

tematically constructed, implemented, and assessed. For

example, some (though certainly not all) EI programs are

being implemented in school settings without sufficient

theoretical grounding, intervention hypotheses, or rigorous

evaluation studies. Nevertheless, the failings of current ap-

M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies 71

plied work and training programs do not negate the possi-

bility that more modest practical gains may be attainable.

EI appears related (albeit weakly) to performance outcomes

in a variety of applied settings. Overall, research suggests that

EI modestly predicts outcomes in a variety of real-life set-

tings, with evidence available mainlyfor occupational (Daus

& Ashkanasy, 2005) and educational contexts (Zins et al.,

2004). In occupational settings, the additional contribution of

EI to prediction over and above personality and ability is

typically limited (Day, 2004). The majority of studies have

used criteria that are based on self-report; objective behavior-

al criteria are regrettably neglected. A concern with the occu-

pational studies reviewed by Van Rooy and Viswesvaran

(2004) is that many use supervisor ratings that may be influ-

enced by the likability of the employee, rather than their job

competence. At the same time, there seems to be growing

confidence among organizational psychologists that tests for

EI predict job performance to an extent that is practically

useful (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005). Our view isthat the scope

and importance of the validity coefficients for EI remains

open for debate, but the proponents of EI have made progress

in demonstrating that the scales have sufficient criterion va-

lidity to be taken seriously.

EI has been claimed to be directly predictive of work

performance and job satisfaction, organizational citizen-

ship, truancy at work, and prosocial behavior. A review by

Daus and Ashkanasy (2005) suggests that for jobs that

would appear logically to require a high level of EI (e.g.,

police officers) relationships between EI and job perfor-

mance and satisfaction may be higher than those where

emotional demands are less obvious. There are, however,

specific problems for the use of EI in occupational settings

(Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004). These include: (1)

failure to provide an adequate theoretical rationale for their

use in a particular occupational setting, (2) lack of occupa-

tional-specificity, (3) absence of normative data for differ-

ent occupational groups, and (4) failure to provide evidence

for predictive and discriminate validity (both within and

among occupational clusters). Thus, the applied psycholo-

gist must fall back on clinical or professional judgment to

gauge the role of EI in many contexts, lacking a proper

science-based analysis.

In education, EI appears a rather weak predictor of aca-

demic success per se. Thus, based on a limited number of

studies, the best estimate of the true validity coefficient for

the relationship between EI and academic success (i.e.,

grades) is small (around 0.10). In fact, of all the perfor-

mance domains, academic success may be the one where

EI has the least potential. Furthermore, the EI-performance

relationship appears to be both measure dependent (higher

for self-report than ability measures), as well as criteria de-

pendent (Van Rooy, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2006).

A more compelling argument, though, may be that EI in-

directly mediates success by protecting students from bar-

riers to learning such as mental distress, substance abuse,

delinquency, teen pregnancy, and violence (Hawkins,

Smith, & Catalano, 2004). Equally, the criterion space for

studying academic success has so far been narrow; there is

more to academic success than grades. Thus, retention, cit-

izenship, and psychological well-being all appear impor-

tant outcome variables to consider in the educational sec-

tor, each of which have so far received short shrift (Roberts

et al., 2005).

It has also been claimed that EI has merit and practical

utility in predicting a broad set of outcomes in the social

domain, such as quality of social relationships, marital suc-

cess, prosocial behaviors, and delinquent behaviors. Com-

pared to academic performance and occupational criteria,

these outcomes have often been difficult to measure and

operationalize (Van Rooy et al., 2006). Clearly, as we sug-

gested earlier, the theoretical rationale for why EI should

be predictive of criteria in the social realm needs to be more

fully delineated. Thus, a broadside approach should not be

adopted whenever EI is used to try to predict any possible

outcome without specifying how and why these outcomes

are important.

Systematic approaches are required to match emotional in-

telligence (sub)constructs to applications. In the special

contexts of organization and industry, there is currently no

empirically validated taxonomy of job types corresponding

to separate components of EI. Thus, we cannot ascertain

what facets of EI are requisite for any given job cluster.

Generally, the level of EI apparently critical for occupa-

tional success should be a function of how central EI may

be to work activities. Thus, EI may be more important in

service organizations than others. Furthermore, EI may be

more important for those occupying lower positions in the

hierarchy relative to those much higher up in the organiza-

tional chain (Daus, 2006). Thus, a more systematic ap-

proach to matching emotional competencies to career com-

ponents is needed. For example, a fine-grained analysis of

the emotional demands imposed on police officers might

support development of a measure of emotional regulation

that could be used to assess and select police officers. This

measure, in turn, could be validated against job-specific

behavioral criteria, such as frequency of angry verbal be-

haviors during encounters with the public. Just as tradition-

al job analysis is increasingly being supplemented by cog-

nitive task analysis, so too there appears a need for “emo-

tional task analysis” to ascertain the affective requirements

of different occupations. At present, practitioners may need

to rely on a relatively superficial dissection of emotional

requirements. However, as theories of emotional compe-

tence become more fully articulated, more theory-driven

analysis of emotional tasks at work may become possible.

Applications: Sources of Controversy

Are current research designs adequate? Studies assessing

the predictive validity of EI have failed to employ measures

of EI that predict career success or other important educa-

72 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

tional and social criteria. The most basic task for validation

research is to show that EI measures reliably differentiate

between low- and high-performing groups on particular

criteria. In the occupational domain, such studies should

focus on predicting success both across jobs and within

jobs, identifying the occupations for which EI is more and

less important (e.g., social workers vs. financial analysts).

The use of EI component sub-tests also needs to be val-

idated using large-scale, trait-performance validation de-

signs. It is highly plausible that effective performance in

different occupations involves different patterns of emo-

tional (or social) characteristics. The criteria against which

EI predictors in occupational selection and placement are

validated should likewise be valid, reliable, and uncontam-

inated. The same holds for educational, clinical, and social

outcomes (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004).

The impetus of proponents of EI in applied settings should

be on testing the validity of EI in predicting a wide array of

meaningful criteria. As a first step, it would seem important

to look for the variance explained by EI with regard to con-

ventional criteria (e.g., in the workplace: supervisor’s ratings

of performance, objective criteria such as absenteeism) and

whether EI remains predictive with general intelligence and

personality factors statistically controlled.

To what extent is the predictive validity of emotional intel-

ligence moderated by the nature of the applied setting? Be-

fore employing EI measures in a particular setting, it is

essential to precisely identify the specific contexts, needs,

and purposes for which the EI test is being used. Without

sounding trite, different jobs call for varying levels of social

and emotional involvement and activity. Disparate occupa-

tions also require different types of interpersonal interac-

tion. In some jobs (e.g., social work), one interacts emo-

tionally with others during most of the time on the job. In

such professions, there is a real need to have frequent in-

terchanges with clients at an emotional level. Incumbents

in some jobs not only need to talk with others face-to-face

and exhibit positive, prosocial behavior (e.g., receptionist),

but also assess the reactions of others, and attempt to influ-

ence others’ emotions and motives (e.g., insurance agent).

Some jobs require matching one’s own behavior to the

needs of others (e.g., psychotherapist), creatively influenc-

ing others by engaging their emotions, and transforming

one’s own emotions and also those of others. In other jobs

(e.g., statistician), one interacts with people a smaller per-

centage of time, such that the need to be able to recognize

and manipulate others’ feelings is relatively unimportant,

but one may need to manage personal frustrations. By the

same token, EI may be effective in predicting educational

outcomes in some domains (e.g., social sciences) yet not

be predictive of outcomes in others (e.g., math and physical

sciences).

How are emotional intelligence measures best used in

practical situations? Should EI measures be used together

with other variables in the predictor stock in a multiple re-

gression prediction equation of relevant job or educational

performance criteria, or used in a noncompensatory “mul-

tiple-hurdle” framework? In this case, a sequential model

is adopted for integration of multiple measures used in any

test battery that assesses, in turn, job or educational-rele-

vant abilities, performance-relevant issues, and appropriate

measures of EI. While time consuming, this process will

most likely result in more accurate assessment.

To what degree can we develop and train emotional intel-

ligence? Programs for helping managers and would-be

leaders, as well as students, to become more emotionally

intelligent have mushroomed in recent years. Although

many of these programs are promising, few have been

modeled upon EI theory or designed in a way that is likely

to lead to long-term change. Furthermore, intervention pro-

grams that seek to raise EI sometimes lack a clear theoret-

ical and methodological rationale, and employ a miscellany

of techniques, whose psychological bases are not always

clear (Zeidner et al., 2002). EI, and the competencies linked

to it, are based on temperament, learning experiences, and

reflective goal-oriented experiences. One-day seminars or

workshops can be valuable in educating people and raising

awareness, but they may not by themselves lead to the kind

of reprogramming that is required for significant improve-

ment (Cherniss & Adler, 2000).

Which components of emotional intelligence are the most

malleable or susceptible to intervention(s)? At present, it

remains uncertain which of the components of EI are most

malleable and responsive to training; what the threshold

level of EI is for training; or what age level EI components

are most responsive to instruction and training. Equally,

little is known of the following key facets of training: spe-

cific goals, specific EI components most responsive to

training, most effective interventions to use for low vs. av-

erage EI clients, and the minimal level of EI that a client

needs to benefit from therapy. There is also a need for de-

veloping standards for program implementation as well as

employing cost-benefit analysis for assessing the return for

costs associated with delivering EI programs.

Discussion

Our review suggests that there are several difficulties in

trying to evaluate the overall scientific contribution of EI

research (Matthews et al., 2002). These are summarized,

using the three key domains covered in the main body of

this review – concepts, assessments, and applications – in

the passages that follow. Because we believe some of these

represent tractable research issues, these passages also con-

tain suggestions for future research directions.

M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies 73

Conceptualization

Currently, there is no agreed upon definition of the EI con-

struct. Thus, it is presently unclear whether EI is cognitive

or noncognitive; whether it refers to explicit or implicit

knowledge of emotion; and whether it refers to a basic ap-

titude or to some adaptation to a specific social and cultural

milieu (Zeidner et al., 2001). Arguably, one of the primary

initial tasks in any scientific endeavor is the systematic

mapping out of the major components and facets in the

universe of discourse under consideration (Kerlinger,

1973). However, it is difficult to obtain a satisfactory jus-

tification or definitional framework for the construct of EI

(Zeidner et al., 2001).

A precondition for any large-scale applications of EI in

applied settings is the development of well-defined theo-

retical frameworks and assessment tools. We believe that

resolving uncertainties over the conceptualization and the-

ory of EI requires better structural models than are present-

ly available or being employed in EI research. The analysis

represented in Table 1 suggests that there may be quite dif-

ferent “EI” constructs to be found in different research do-

mains. Various accounts of the key components of EI exist,

but these models are in need of systematic comparison and

integration. We also see a need for weeding out those con-

structs that are not well-supported by research or lack a

sound theoretical base. Building better conceptual models

of EI also requires better psychometric models that specify

both the overlaps and the uniqueness of EI constructs in

relation to personality and ability.

Assessments

Presently, it is uncertain how EI may best be measured or

assessed. Various tests of the construct fail to converge and

these diverse measures may, in fact, be assessing different

constructs. There is less consensus regarding appropriate

vehicles and methods for assessing EI than there appears

to be for even the rather under-developed conceptual mod-

els that saturate the field. Arguably, this is an unsatisfactory

state of affairs, one that may be conceived as inhibitory to

the development of a systematic framework for conducting

EI research. Certain points of consensus are virtually dic-

tated by the scientific community, most especially with re-

spect to standards set for psychological and educational

measurement.

The two different approaches taken by researchers to the

assessment of EI has led to two separate scientific litera-

tures emerging on the topic. Often the findings coming out

of these two emerging research traditions do not converge.

Thus, it is perhaps an important undertaking of future re-

search to provide a synthesis of these approaches, should

this be possible. Conversely synthesis may not really be

possible; perhaps it is best to adopt one approach over an-

other according to a cogent set of arguments. Oatley (2004)

has suggested over-emphasis on measurement issues has

led to neglect of the psychology of EI. The initial question,

of course, calls for a Kuhnian answer, namely, only time

will tell whether the evidence is sufficient to persuade the

research community that a paradigm-shift is required.

Regardless, the sheer number of self-report measures so

far developed in this field, without attendant concerns for

the procurement of compelling validity evidence, suggests

that it is time to call for a moratorium on the development

of still further instruments of this type. By contrast, the

number of performance measures is surprisingly small

(though clearly some of those used by emotions researchers

could be reconceptualized as measures of specific EI con-

structs). Developing further objective measures of EI

would appear to be an important future research endeavor.

Applications

Clearly, the practical utility of tests of EI is limited by the

conceptual and psychometric deficiencies described above.

Thus, available tests generally have questionable validity

evidence for the tests to be used with confidence in making

real-world decisions (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts,

2004). Moreover, intervention programs targeted to en-

hance EI in educational (Zeidner et al., 2002) and occupa-

tional settings (Zeidner, Matthews & Roberts, 2004) appear

sometimes to lack clearly articulated theoretical and meth-

odological rationales.

Arguably, in order for EI to be useful in applied settings,

the theoretical foundations of EI need to be secured first;

otherwise it will remain a fuzzy and slippery construct,

with little practical value. It is critical that definition issues

are settled before proceeding to operationalize and apply

the construct in real-life settings. Of note, research has yet

to demonstrate the added value of using EI measures in

applied settings relative to narrower measures of individual

differences.

There is a danger that EI may beno more than a fad ofthe

type common in business and education (Murphy & Side-

man, 2006). The explosive growth of EI matches the three

defining characteristics of such fads identified by these au-

thors: (1) a fast growth trajectory, (2) promise of a great deal

more than can be delivered, and (3) provocation of intense

reactions, both positive and negative. Such fads, Murphy and

Sideman (2006) go on to argue, generally follow a natural

life-cycle. Interest tends toplateau, followed by a precipitous

decline, although the fad may re-emerge years or decades

later. While the optimist may believe EI is here to stay, the

pessimist may believe that EI will burn out before too long.

Concluding Comments

Finally, research surrounding EI is still new, and the optimist

may take the diversity of concepts and measures as a sign of

the vitality of the field. As research addresses the controver-

74 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

sies we have highlighted here, we can expect to see a shake-

out of misconceptions, the maturing of the science,and great-

er consensus between advocates for EI and skeptics. Progress

depends on greater rigor in conceptualization and measure-

ment, and invalidation of scales against objective criteria for

social-emotional functioning. In applied fields, the focus

should be on evidence-based studies that show that interven-

tions specifically directed toward EI improve over other,

well-attested techniques for improving social functioning.

The spirit of “letting a hundred flowers bloom” should not be

used as an excuse for poor science or for practical interven-

tions thatpromise more than they deliver. Will EI stay or will

it go? Only time will tell.

Authors’ Note

This paper is an expanded version of a presentation given

by the author at the 26th International Congress of Applied

Psychology, Athens, 2006. The views presented are those

of the authors and do not represent the views of their insti-

tutional affiliations.

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About the authors

Moshe Zeidner, Ph.D., is Professor of Educational and Personal-

ity Psychology and Director of the Center for the Interdisciplinary

Research on Emotions at the University of Haifa, Israel. His main

research areas are personality and individual differences.

Richard D. Roberts, Ph.D, is a Principal Research Scientist in the

Center for New Constructs at the Educational Testing Service in

Princeton, NJ. His area of specialization is applied psychology,

with a special emphasis on psychological and educational mea-

surement.

Gerald Matthews, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at the Uni-

versity of Cincinnati. His research focuses on the use of cognitive

science models to understand the interplay between personality,

emotion, and information processing.

Professor Moshe Zeidner

Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Emotions

University of Haifa

Mt. Carmel, 31905

Israel

Tel. +972 4 824-0897

Fax +972 4 824-0911

E-mail zeidner@research.haifa.ac.il

78 M. Zeidner et al.: EI: Consensus and Controversies

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This study explores the potential of Pokémon GO, a popular augmented reality (AR) game, in fostering emotional intelligence (EI). EI involves recognizing, understanding, and managing emotions, which are crucial for relationships and well-being. Given the game's blend of interactive gameplay and social interaction, this research examines how Pokémon GO may develop EI skills. Using a bibliometric study approach, it will analyze literature on the game's impact on EI, reviewing academic publications from major databases like Scopus. The analysis will focus on citation counts, publication trends, and co-authorship networks to identify key studies and themes. The research will explore core elements of Pokémon GO, such as collaborative tasks, real-time feedback, and social dynamics, and their correlation with emotional learning. This systematic review aims to highlight the educational potential of AR games in promoting EI, contributing to digital learning discourse, and guiding future interventions for developing social and emotional skills through interactive platforms.

Emotional intelligence and the dark triad: a latent profile analysis to investigate the Jekyll and Hyde of the emotionally intelligent manager

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2024

Managers sometimes have a bad reputation as they are often perceived as more manipulative than other employees. This study focuses on the Dark Triad (DT)—comprising psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism—and its connection with managers’ “Ability” Emotional Intelligence (AEI). The link between DT (measured through the Dirty Dozen) and managers’ AEI (measured through QEPro, an AEI performance test) was examined through a Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). We identified two AEI latent profiles within a heterogeneous population of 231 French managers. Our results show that managers with the FEP (Full Emotional Processing) profile are less Machiavellian (relative to the MEP -Minimal Emotion Processing- profile). Our results show that identifying AEI profiles may be a practical way to prevent toxic Management.

Secular Changes in Intelligence

Chapter

May 2011

James R. Flynn

This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date compendium of theory and research in the field of human intelligence. Each of the 42 chapters is written by world-renowned experts in their respective fields, and collectively, they cover the full range of topics of contemporary interest in the study of intelligence. The handbook is divided into nine parts: Part I covers intelligence and its measurement; Part II deals with the development of intelligence; Part III discusses intelligence and group differences; Part IV concerns the biology of intelligence; Part V is about intelligence and information processing; Part VI discusses different kinds of intelligence; Part VII covers intelligence and society; Part VIII concerns intelligence in relation to allied constructs; and Part IX is the concluding chapter, which reflects on where the field is currently and where it still needs to go.

Where Are We? Where Are We Going? Reflections on the Current and Future State of Research on Intelligence

Chapter

May 2011

Earl Hunt

Society and Intelligence

Chapter

May 2011

Promotion and Public Relations in the Sports Market (Promocija i odnosi s javnošću na sportskom tržištu)

Book

Full-text available

Oct 2024

The aim of this book is to present the basic aspects of promotion and public relations, as well as to familiarize its readers with the fundamental principles of their application in the sports industry. Highlighting trends and perspectives is present throughout the text, both through theoretical concepts and a large number of examples from sports practice.

Competencias emocionales y formación inicial docente en la Universidad de Playa Ancha

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2024

Alejandro Gallardo

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo elaborar, implementar y evaluar una propuesta de incorporación de competencias emocionales en el currículum de las carreras de Pedagogía. Con un enfoque mixto, mediante un diseño cuasi-experimental con medidas pre-test/post-test, se evalúa la aplicación del programa, que contempla una evaluación inicial, una final y una deproceso.Los resultados aportan evidencias empíricas de la educabilidad de las competencias emocionales en los estudiantes, que demuestran avances significativos en las dimensiones y habilidades trabajadas como parte de su formación pedagógica. Desde una perspectiva cualitativa, se destacan aspectos positivos en cuanto a los aprendizajes, los logros y la importanciapara su formación, y reconocen tanto los aportes, como los aspectos a trabajar.

THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS AND CLASSROOM CLIMATE

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2023

Dipti Baghel

Abstract Purpose: This research paper aims to explore the significance of emotional intelligence (EI) in shaping teacher effectiveness and its impact on creating a positive classroom climate. The study investigates the relationship between emotional intelligence, teaching competence, and the overall learning environment to shed light on the crucial role emotions play in the educational setting. Theoretical framework: The research paper builds on the framework of emotional intelligence theory, drawing on Daniel Goleman's model, which encompasses self-awareness, self-regulation, empathy, and social skills. The authors use this theoretical foundation to investigate how emotional intelligence influences teaching practices and classroom dynamics. Findings: The findings of this research reveal a strong positive correlation between emotional intelligence and teacher effectiveness. Teachers with higher emotional intelligence scores demonstrate better classroom management, stronger teacher-student relationships, and improved communication. Furthermore, emotionally intelligent teachers tend to create a positive and inclusive learning environment, fostering student engagement and academic success. Research, Practical & Social implications: The implications of this research are significant for various stakeholders in the education sector. For researchers, the study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on emotional intelligence and its influence on teacher effectiveness. Educators and school administrators can benefit from the findings by recognizing the importance of emotional intelligence in professional development programs and hiring practices. Integrating emotional intelligence training for teachers may lead to improved teaching methods and enhanced student outcomes. Additionally, understanding the role of emotional intelligence in classroom climate can contribute to better educational policies and practices. Originality/value: This research paper adds value to the field of education by focusing on the relatively underexplored area of emotional intelligence and its impact on teacher effectiveness and classroom climate. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between emotions, teaching practices, and learning outcomes. The findings contribute to the emerging emphasis on emotional intelligence in educational contexts and pave the way for further research in this domain.

Slow Down, You Move Too Fast: Emotional Intelligence Remains an “Elusive” Intelligence

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2001

Commentators on the R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) article on the measurement of emotional intelligence (EI) made various pertinent observations that confirm the growing interest in this topic. This rejoinder finds general agreement on some key issues: learning from the history of ability testing, developing more sophisticated structural models of ability, studying emotional abilities across the life span, and establishing predictive and construct validity. However, scoring methods for tests of EI remain problematic. This rejoinder acknowledges recent improvements in convergence between different scoring methods but discusses further difficulties related to (a) neglect of group differences in normative social behaviors, (b) segregation of separate domains of knowledge linked to cognitive and emotional intelligences, (c) potential confounding of competence with learned skills and cultural factors, and (d) lack of specification of adaptive functions of EI. Empirical studies have not yet established that the Multi-Factor Emotional Intelligence Scale and related tests assess a broad EI factor of real-world significance.

Emotional Intelligence or Adaptive Emotions?

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2001

Carroll E. Izard

R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) challenged the adequacy of the psychometric properties of the principal performance measure of emotional intelligence (EI). They raised doubt about the existence of emotion-related abilities that influence behavioral outcomes and social competence after controlling for general intelligence and personality. I agree with Roberts et al. that demonstrating the discriminant and predictive validity of a measure of EI in the context of rival predictors will require more research. I agree with the proponents of EI that emotion-related abilities do exist and show that such abilities in children account for unique variance in measures of adaptive behavior and social competence. However, evidence from developmental and clinical research suggest that these emotion-related abilities and their influence on socioemotional competence stem more from the direct effects of emotions than from a special form of intelligence.

Emotional Intelligence as a Standard Intelligence

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2001

The authors have claimed that emotional intelligence (EI) meets traditional standards for an intelligence (J. D. Mayer, D. R. Caruso, & P. Salovey, 1999). R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) questioned whether that claim was warranted. The central issue raised by Roberts et al. concerning Mayer et al. (1999) is whether there are correct answers to questions on tests purporting to measure EI as a set of abilities. To address this issue (and others), the present authors briefly restate their view of intelligence, emotion, and EI. They then present arguments for the reasonableness of measuring EI as an ability, indicate that correct answers exist, and summarize recent data suggesting that such measures are, indeed, reliable.

Emotional Intelligence: In Search of an Elusive Construct

Article

Full-text available

Oct 1998

The view that emotional intelligence should be included within the traditional cognitive abilities framework was explored in 3 studies (total N = 530) by investigating the relations among measures of emotional intelligence, traditional human cognitive abilities, and personality. The studies suggest that the status of the emotional intelligence construct is limited by measurement properties of its tests. Measures based on consensual scoring exhibited low reliability. Self-report measures had salient loadings on well-established personality factors, indicating a lack of divergent validity. These data provide controvertible evidence for the existence of a separate Emotion Perception factor that (perhaps) represents the ability to monitor another individual's emotions. This factor is narrower than that postulated within current models of emotional intelligence.

Does emotional intelligence meet traditional standards for an intelligence? Some new data and conclusions.

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2001
EMOTION

Slow down, you move too fast: Emotional intelligence remains an "elusive" intelligence.

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2001
EMOTION

Measuring Emotional Intelligence: Promises, Pitfalls, Solutions?

Chapter

Nov 2006

In the short time since the publication of the Handbook of Positive Psychology, research results on the psychology of human strengths have proliferated. However, no major volume has documented the methods and theory used to achieve these results. Oxford Handbook of Methods in Positive Psychology fills this need, providing a broad overview of diverse contemporary methods in positive psychology. With contributions from both leading scholars and promising young investigators, the handbook serves to illuminate and, at times, challenge traditional approaches. Incorporating multiple levels of analysis, from biology to culture, the contributors present state-of-the-art techniques, including those for estimating variability and change at the level of the individual, identifying reliability of measurements within and across individuals, and separating individual differences in growth from aspects of phenomena that exhibit shorter-term variability over time. The volume covers such topics as wisdom, health, hope, resilience, religion, relationships, emotions, well-being, character strengths, and laughter. It enhances our understanding of the balance between human deficits and strengths and demonstrated their connections to other problems. Oxford Handbook of Methods in Positive Psychology will be the essential reference for methods in positive psychology.

Emotional Intelligence: Science and Myth

Book

Nov 2002

Emotional intelligence (EI) is one of the most widely discussed topics in current psychology. Although first mentioned in the professional literature nearly two decades ago, in the past five years it has received extensive media attention. The term "emotional intelligence" refers to the ability to identify, express, and understand emotions; to assimilate emotions into thought; and to regulate both positive and negative emotions in oneself and others. Yet despite the flourishing research programs and broad popular interest, scientific evidence for a clearly identified construct of EI is sparse. It remains to be seen whether there is anything to EI that researchers in the fields of personality, intelligence, and applied psychology do not already know. This book offers a comprehensive critical review of EI. It examines current thinking on the nature, components, determinants, and consequences of EI, and evaluates the state of the art in EI theory, research, assessment, and applications. It highlights the extent to which empirical evidence supports EI as a valid construct and debunks some of the more extravagant claims that appear in the popular media. Finally, it examines the potential use of EI to guide practical interventions in various clinical, occupational, and educational settings. Bradford Books imprint

Promoting Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

Book

Jan 2000

Personality continuity and change across the life course

Article

Jan 1990

The Science of Emotional Intelligence

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