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Do suicide terrorists exhibit clinically suicidal risk factors? A review of initial evidence and call for future research
Abstract
Despite growing evidence to the contrary, it is still widely assumed that suicide terrorists are not actually suicidal. However, this review supports recent studies which suggest the opposite, and presents initial evidence that much like other suicidal individuals, many suicide terrorists appear to be driven by clinically suicidal risk factors, including: (1) the desire to escape the world they live in, (2) the desire to escape moral responsibility for their actions, (3) the inability to cope with a perceived crisis, and (4) a sense of low self-worth. By establishing the links between suicide terrorism and suicidality, scholars may be able to better understand the nature of these violent attacks and develop more effective ways to stop them.
... These claims have been echoed by many moderate sources as well: religious authorities, politicians, educators, scholars and security offi cials all around the world ( Israeli, 1997 ;Davies and Neal, 2000 ;Pastor, 2004 ;Gambetta, 2005 ;Pape, 2005 ;Hafez, 2006 ;Townsend, 2007 ). However, recent evidence has increasingly shown that many suicide terrorists indeed exhibit classic suicidal traits, and that their desire to kill themselves is the driving force behind their deadly attacks ( Lester et al , 2004 ;Lankford, 2010aLankford, , 2011Merari et al , 2010a, b ). ...
... Conventional suicide terrorists become suicidal for many of the same reasons other people become suicidal, and generally exhibit the same types of classic suicidal risk factors. Their suicidality can be the product of individual traits, social forces, a recent crisis or any combination thereof ( Lester et al , 2004 ;Lankford, 2010aLankford, , 2011Merari et al , 2010a, b ). ...
... xvi). Conventional suicide terrorists are likely to have displayed many of the classic risk factors for suicide listed earlier, including previous suicide ideation, pre vious suicide attempts, social isolation, depression, low self-worth, guilt, shame, hopelessness and rage ( Lankford, 2010a( Lankford, , 2011Merari et al , 2010a, b ). In turn, indirect suicide terrorists are likely to have established a pattern of risk-taking and selfdestructive behavior ( Farberow, 1980 ;Maris et al , 2000 ). ...
This article proposes that there are four primary types of suicide terrorist: (1) conventional suicide terrorists, who become suicidal owing to classic risk factors, (2) coerced suicide terrorists, who become suicidal because they fear the organizational consequences of not carrying out attacks, (3) escapist suicide terrorists, who become suicidal because they fear being captured by the enemy, and (4) indirect suicide terrorists, who become suicidal at an unconscious level and orchestrate their deaths in ways that disguise their desire to die. It then outlines behavioral expectations for each type, in terms of warning signs, tactical experience and attack styles, and concludes with recommendations for security countermeasures and future research.
... Although 60 percent of the suicide terrorists did not appear suicidal in the conventional sense, previous research on cross-cultural variations of suicidality suggests that some may have been suicidal in a less conventional manner (Holmes 2005;Lankford 2010a). Furthermore, other recent studies have shown that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists appear to have displayed classic risk factors for conventional suicide (Lankford 2010b(Lankford , 2011. As the following evidence will show, in the case of Atta, these risk factors appear to have included social isolation, depression, hopelessness, guilt, and shame. ...
... There is no evidence that Atta ever attempted suicide through conventional means, but this is not surprising, given strict Islamic prohibitions of suicide. In Atta's mind, hanging himself, overdosing on prescription drugs, or killing himself with a firearm would have sent him directly to hell (Lankford 2010b). However, there was a potential loophole which Atta spent a great deal of time thinking about: "martyrdom attacks" had essentially become the only socially-approved form of suicide in the Islamic world (Holmes 2005;Lankford 2010a). ...
... Scholars who subscribe to this view commonly claim that suicide terrorists are motivated by their profound ideological commitment to the cause and are certainly not suicidal (Gambetta 2005;Hafez 2006;Israeli 1997;Pape 2005;Pastor 2004;Townsend 2007). By contrast, growing evidence shows that some suicide terrorists struggle with personal crises, mental health problems, and suicidal tendencies which play a major causal role in their violent behavior (Lankford 2010b(Lankford , 2011Lester et al. 2004;Merari 2010;Merari et al. 2010a, b). This article constructs a psychological autopsy of Atta in order to provide a much more complete explanation of his behavior. ...
Simple logic dictates that some suicide terrorists are more significant than others. However, major questions still remain about the motives and psychology of 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, arguably the most significant suicide terrorist in human history. This article constructs a psychological autopsy of Atta in order to provide a much more complete explanation of his behavior. First, it suggests that accounts which solely attribute Atta’s actions to religious and political ideology appear severely incomplete. It then reviews evidence that Atta may have been clinically suicidal, and that his struggles with social isolation, depression, hopelessness, guilt, and shame were extraordinarily similar to the struggles of those who commit conventional suicide. Finally, it considers how Atta’s ideology may have interacted with his suicidal tendencies to produce his final act of murder-suicide on September 11, 2011.
... For instance, recent psychological assessments of suicide terrorists have suggested that a significant percentage of them are far more prone to suicidal behavior than regular, non-suicide terrorists (Merari 2010). Many suicide terrorists have been struggling with severe personal crisessuch as broken relationships, unwanted pregnancies, substance abuse addictions, serious health problems, or the death of loved onesprior to their decision to volunteer for suicide attacks (Lester et al. 2004, Lankford 2010b, 2011b, Merari 2010, Pedahzur 2005. ...
... By contrast, regular terrorists and terrorist leaders tend to show far more ego strength and far fewer signs of psychological trauma than their suicideseeking counterparts (Merari 2010). Even according to the statements made by suicide terrorists themselves in their martyrdom videos and suicide notes, they intend to trade something they put a low value on (their lives in this transient, unhappy, and corrupt world) for something they value highly (heaven and paradise) (Lankford 2010b). That does not appear to be a 'risk' or a 'sacrifice'it sounds more like an upgrade. ...
... Ultimately, Jaradat and Atta's suicide attacks would not constitute 'sacrifice' unless they were risking something highly valued. Although their cases may not be representative of the entire universe of suicide terrorists, they appear closer to the norm than the exception (Lankford 2010b, 2011b, Merari 2010. In at least one case, a suicide terrorist explicitly admitted that after her marriage plans fell through, she felt like 'my life wasn't worth anything,' which is why she volunteered to blow herself up (Berko 2007, p. 1). ...
For thousands of years people have saved their loudest praise for individuals who made ‘the ultimate sacrifice.’ Recently, however, many people have begun to equate suicide terrorism with sacrificial heroism. These assertions benefit from a general lack of conceptual clarity regarding the nature of sacrificial heroism itself. Therefore, this paper aims to explore, describe, and define sacrificial heroism, arguing that it requires two primary things: the risk of something highly valued; and the attempt to achieve a directly morally positive result. The paper then reviews four representative scenarios, including two types of suicide terrorism and two types of sacrificial heroism, in order to highlight several critical differences between those actions that deserve to be praised as supremely heroic and those which clearly do not.
... A more recent synthesis of evidence on the relation between psychological disorders and radicalisation/violent extremism is found in the study of Gill et al. [287]. Another prominent review from the clinical psychology sector was performed exploring linkages (if any) between suicide and terrorism (Lankford [288] challenging a conventional point of view that assumes suicide terrorists are not actually suicidal people [289]. ...
... Female terrorism has been summarised by two reviews, focusing specifically on the breadth of literature in the field (Jacques and Taylor [290] and female suicide bombers (Brunner [291]. Additionally, a group of review studies have synthesised evidence on what is known as religious-driven terrorism, or suicide terrorism [288] or jihadist terrorism [292] as well as the process during which an individual gradually accepts the legitimacy of an act of terror, i.e., radicalisation. Moreover, other reviews have focused specifically on five major models of radicalisation of Western homegrown Jihadists (King and Taylor [100] and community perspectives of interventions adopted to foster reintegration of former terrorist combatants and militants in Nigeria (Ike et al. [293]. ...
Scholarly literature on terrorism is analysed in its full scope with three main goals: (i) to objectively determine the structural makeup of the field, (ii) to document its current and past temporal trends; and (iii) to identify underrepresented areas. The size of the literature is estimated to have exceeded 18,000 items. At the highest level of aggregation, the field is found to be composed of three major divisions representing: (a) political, ideological and criminological, (b) economic, (s) psychological; and (d) emergency response aspects of terrorism research. The literature has been largely driven and guided by outside political events. Two major spikes in the intensity of this research are distinctly identifiable. The extent of research triggered by and linked to the September 11 attacks has been such that it has generated its own stream of research, although, activities associated with this cluster have notably slowed down since 2010. Two major research streams—one linked to “domestic terrorism” and a newer stream linked to “economic impacts of terrorism (particularly, on tourism and financial markets)”—are identified as currently the trendiest topics of this research. Research on “right-wing/far-right” terrorism, although not new in this domain, shows clear signs of re-emergence and surge of activities. The analyses also identify gaps where further research is required. Most notable on that front is the striking paucity of empirical research on human behavior (i.e., civilian response) during (or in the aftermath of) terror attacks. Largely overlooked in this domain is the potential role of individual mental preparedness and/or peace-time training in mitigating the impact of terror events and increasing communities' self-efficacy in the face of terror. The multitude of dimensions that branch out from this single notion could potentially form a new cluster of terrorism research—possibly, a multidisciplinary crossover between the existing psychology and emergency response divisions—whose findings can help better prepare the public and reduce impacts of terror attacks on civilian communities. Some of these dimensions include (a) developing scales/inventories for measuring public preparedness level to react to terror attacks, (b) determining best response strategies to various forms of terror attacks, (c) identifying public misconceptions about best response, (d) examining public conformity and acceptance of training programs, (e) identifying effective means/media of raising awareness, (f) break down knowledge retainment barriers, and (g) determining best means of utilising bystander role as “zero responders” during terror attacks and capitalising on civilians’ altruistic tendencies for terror impact mitigation.
... Several studies have tried to tackle the etiology of radicalization that could lead to violence from the following risk factors: potentially underlying psychopathological disorders and personal vulnerabilities related to stigmatization and existential fragility [1]; a specific personality profile [2,3]; possible suicidal tendencies [4] among those involved in suicidal operations; psycho-social vulnerability analyzed in terms of group phenomena [5], and in relation to the historical and political context of the Arab World [6][7][8] ; the rationality or irrationality of the terrorist attack, viewed as cognitive distortion [9] and analyzed more broadly in terms of rationality determinants; and finally, possible identity tensions following from the radical discourse. It is generally accepted that there are no common features-apart from the young age and predominantly male gender-of those who become engaged in the radicalization process [10][11][12]: the educational backgrounds, financial resources, social statuses, motivations and reasons are always different [13,14], as are the radicalization trajectories [15]. ...
... Hanane is a practicing girl who wants to join ISIS, convinced that she should do her hijra. 3 It all started with a conspiracy theory: "I remember a sheikh 4 who constantly spoke about the end of the world… He read the news looking for signs of the end of the world, as they were declared in the Koran. But to prevent us from discussing his discourse, he would add hadiths here and there… In so doing, his discourse would be impossible to discuss or to question. ...
... Plusieurs recherches ont tenté d'appréhender l'étiologie de la radicalisation pouvant mener au passage à l'acte violent, sous l'angle des facteurs de risques suivants : des troubles psychopathologiques potentiellement sous-jacents et des vulnérabilités personnelles en lien avec la stigmatisation et avec la fragilité existentielle [3] ; un profil de personnalité spécifique [4,5] ; l'éventuelle existence de tendances suicidaires [6] chez ceux qui sont impliqués dans des opérations kamikazes ; des facteurs de vulnérabilité d'ordre psychosocial, analysés sous l'angle des phénomènes de groupe [7], en lien avec le contexte historique et politique des pays arabes [8][9][10] ; la rationalité ou irrationalité du passage à l'acte terroriste, appréhendée par l'intermédiaire du concept de distorsions cognitives [11] et via une analyse plus large des déterminants de la rationalité [5]. ...
... Ces proportions élevées pourraient signifier que la majorité des jeunes qui se radicalisent, seraient potentiellement suicidaires au moment de leur radicalisation. L'hypothèse des tendances suicidaires pouvant exister chez les jeunes impliqués dans des attentats kamikazes, a par ailleurs déjà été envisagée [6], et plus généralement chez les jeunes concernés par la radicalisation [23]. ...
Les travaux sur l’étiologie de la radicalisation en lien avec l’islam abordent cette dernière sous différents angles. Cette recherche propose une analyse des motifs d’engagement radical, sous-jacents au projet de départ chez Daesh, pour 809 jeunes suivis en désembrigadement par le Centre de prévention, de déradicalisation et de suivi individuel (CPDSI). Cette association, mandatée par le Ministère de l’intérieur comme cellule mobile nationale, pour transmettre sa méthode expérimentale de déradicalisation aux équipes anti-radicalité des préfectures, a accompagné ces jeunes entre 2014 et 2016, suite à leur arrestation à la frontière par la police ou à l’intervention des parents pour les empêcher de partir. Une analyse qualitative des informations recueillies dans le cadre des prises en charge a mis en évidence sept motifs distincts d’engagement relevant tous d’une recherche d’idéal et/ou d’une fuite du monde réel, en plus d’une catégorie transversale concernant les jeunes possiblement suicidaires. Des événements de vie spécifiques se sont avérés associés à chaque motif d’engagement. L’analyse des premières vidéos et supports de propagande conservés par les jeunes a permis en outre d’identifier l’adaptation du discours des rabatteurs à la sensibilité particulière de chacun et apporte un éclairage sur les leviers d’embrigadement opérants pour chaque motif d’engagement.
... If the conventional wisdom about suicide terrorists was accurate, there should be very few similarities between suicide terrorists and rampage or school shooters. However, this study's findings suggest the opposite, and thus squarely support other recent scholarship that suggests that many suicide terrorists are in fact suicidal in the conventional sense (Lankford, 2010(Lankford, , 2011Merari et al., 2010). Much like rampage and school shooters, the suicide terrorists in this study exhibited many common risk factors for suicide, such as social marginalization, family problems, work or school problems, and precipitating crises (see Table 1). ...
... For instance, if society someday begins to consider school shootings something that normal people can relate to and casually joke about, perhaps they would also begin to occur more often. Previous scholarship on suicide terrorism has similarly indicated that social approval of that behavior in the contexts where it flourishes directly affects attack rates (Lankford, 2010;Pape, 2005). Ultimately, if social attitudes toward these crimes affect the frequency at which they occur, that suggests that people have a serious responsibility to publicly condemn them-any chance they get. ...
This study presents results from the first combined quantitative assessment and comparative analysis of suicide terrorists and rampage, workplace, and school shooters who attempt suicide. Findings suggest that in the United States from 1990 to 2010, the differences between these offenders (N = 81) were largely superficial. Prior to their attacks, they struggled with many of the same personal problems, including social marginalization, family problems, work or school problems, and precipitating crisis events. Ultimately, patterns among all four types of offenders can assist those developing security policy, conducting threat assessments, and attempting to intervene in the lives of at-risk individuals.
... 2. For example, in South Africa, the introduction of tax-favored mandatory annuitization vehicles to which much of retirement saving has been directed. 4. The 2009 financial crisis has drawn attention to the risks for variable annuity writers resulting in insurers increasing fees, reducing benefits or withdrawing from selling variable annuities altogether (Burns, 2009;Lankford, 2010). ...
The life insurance industry has been exposed to high levels of longevity risk born from the mismatch between realized mortality trends and anticipated forecast. Annuity providers are exposed to extended periods of annuity payments. There are no immediate instruments in the market to counter the risk directly. This paper develops appropriate instruments for hedging longevity risk and providing an insight on how existing products can be tailor-made to effectively immunize portfolios consisting of life insurance using a cointegration vector error correction model with regime switching (RS-VECM) which enables both short-term fluctuations, through the autoregressive structure [AR(1)], and long-run equilibria using a cointegration relationship . We also develop synthetic products that can be used to effectively hedge longevity risk faced by life insurance and annuity providers who actively hold portfolios of life insurance products. Models are derived using South African data. We also derive closed form expressions for hedge ratios associated with synthetic products written on life insurance contracts as this will provide a natural way of immunizing the associated portfolios. We further show how to address the current liquidity challenges in the longevity market by devising longevity swaps and develop pricing and hedging algorithms for longevity-linked securities. The use of a cointergrating relationship improves the model fitting process since all the VECMs and RS-VECMs yield greater criteria values than their VAR and RS-VAR counterpart’s, even though there are accruing parameters
involved.
... Israeli (1997, p. 106) depicts suicide terrorists as marginalized, unsuccessful people striving for personal significance: "Unsuccessful, perhaps self-despising, they find solace in becoming martyrs, thus almost instantly and mythically transforming frustration into glory, failure into victory and self-depreciation into public adoration." Lankford (2010) maintains that suicide terrorists present clinically observable suicidal tendencies. That diagnosis disregards the circumstantial factors that have led individuals to embark on suicide missions, focusing only on deviant personality traits, and therefore cannot explain the surge in suicide missions in the second Intifada (Pedahzur 2005). ...
We analyze the differences in the socioeconomic profiles between suicide terrorists and ‘regular’ militants using a dataset of 1596 militants (including 209 suicide terrorists) from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). We find that suicide terrorists are better educated, younger, less likely to be married or have children, and less likely to live in the Gaza strip than their non-suicide counterparts. Moreover, although the profiles of Hamas and PIJ militants are distinctively different, the suicide terrorists are very similar to one another.
... According to some opinions, there can identified similarities between the suicide bombers and cases of selfless or selfish suicide. Adam Lankford posits that these attackers might have in fact suicidal tendencies, showing some key features of selfish suicide: desire to escape the world; the desire to escape the moral responsibility for their actions; inability to cope with a crisis; feeling of low self-worth [16]. However, individuals overwhelmed by the pain of their own existence do not manifest cruelty against those around them. ...
... Because of their proliferation, suicide attacks in general and suicide bombing in particular have attracted much scholarly interest from investigators using a variety of different theoretical strategies. Some, for example, explain suicide attacks with psychological characteristics such as the personality, motives, and mental states of the attackers (e.g., Araj, 2012;Lankford, 2010Lankford, , 2011Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, & Zakin, 2010;Silke, 2008). Others focus on the external influence of ideology, socialization, and social bonds (e.g., Moghadam, 2008;Pedahzur, 2005;chapter 7;Sageman, 2004). ...
Purpose-In this chapter, I apply theories of conflict and social control derived from the work of Donald Black to explain when suicide attacks will occur and who will carry them out. Methodology/approach-Drawing on the published literature on suicide, suicide terrorism, and social control, I present a structural analysis of suicide attacks that specifies which configurations of social space and social time are most likely to produce them. Findings-I propose that suicide attacks can be explained by structural patterns such as social distance, status inferiority, organization, and large movements of social time. Furthermore, sacrifice is greater among those who are socially marginal individuals whose locations are otherwise conducive to both partisanship and self-destruction. Originality/value-I highlight structural similarities between suicide attacks and other forms of violence, social control, and suicide, thus contributing to the systemization of structural theories of human behavior and suggesting avenues for further study.
... 22 Furthermore, research also suggests lone wolves tend to be suicidal and often view their attacks as suicide missions. 23 Given the similarities between mass murderers and lone wolves, it is natural to wonder if both types of offenses are caused by the same underlying social and psychological processes. Recent research seems to support this idea. ...
This study explores the threat of ideological active shooter attacks in the United States. In particular, to understand if these events constitute a new brand of “lone wolf terrorism” or if they are simply “deranged shooters” that happen to be ideological. The results show that ideological and non-ideological active shooters share very similar profiles. Despite the similarities, ideological extremism seems to influence the way these offenders prepare, execute, and conclude their attacks. Most ideological active shooters are “loners” whose attacks tend to be motivated by ideology. Given their sophistication and lethality, ideological active shooters represent a serious threat to national security.
... It seems quite possible that volunteer suicide bombers are thus assumed to be mentally fit in the Middle East, even though they would have been diagnosed with mental disorders had they lived in the U.S. In fact, there has been growing evidence in recent years that at least some suicide bombers displayed classic signs of mental illness before their deaths. For instance, two Iraqi female suicide bombers who struck in 2008 were reported to have had severe mental disorders, and other volunteer suicide terrorists in Palestine and Afghanistan have displayed classic suicidal traits (Lankford, 2010a(Lankford, , 2010bMcElroy, 2008;Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, & Zakin, 2010). However, given the heroic portrayals of such "martyrs" (Abdel- Khalek, 2004;Charny, 2007;Gunaratna, 2002;Hafez, 2006;Hoffman, 2006;Juergensmeyer, 2008), it is not surprising that their local communities, their family members, and the terrorist groups which armed them attempt to protect their reputations by dismissing any possibility that they may have been mentally ill. ...
Previous research comparing rampage shooters in the U.S. and volunteer suicide bombers in the Middle East appears to be virtually non-existent. When these two types of suicidal killers have been mentioned in the same context, it has primarily been to dismiss any possible connections. Rampage shooters are generally assumed to be mentally unbalanced, while suicide bombers are seen as extreme, but rational, political actors. However, this review explores the possibility that the primary differences between the two types of killers are cultural, not individual, and that in terms of their underlying psychology and motivation, they are actually quite similar. In both cases, substantial evidence indicates that these perpetrators of murder–suicide share many of the following characteristics: (1) they had troubled childhoods, (2) they lived in oppressive social environments, (3) they suffered from low self-esteem, (4) they were triggered by a personal crisis, (5) they were seeking revenge, and (6) they were seeking fame and glory.
... " Merari (2010, p. 221) in this regard concluded that suicide terrorism " differs sufficiently from ordinary suicide to be recognized as sui generis. " Only a small proportion of individuals involved in terrorism choose to be involved in suicide terrorism (Crenshaw, 2007; LaFree & Dugan 2009; cf Lankford, 2010): the great majority of terrorists only detonate bombs that they are not wearing. ...
I attempt to identify the central conceptual and methodological challenges that must be overcome if the risk assessment of terrorism is to make the same progress that in recent years has distinguished the risk assessment of other forms of violence. Four principal conclusions are offered. First, clarity from the outset on what is being assessed — the risk of terrorism in the aggregate, or of specific types of terrorism, or of specific phases in the process of becoming a terrorist, or of specific roles in terrorist activity — is a prerequisite to progress in research.Second, one current approach to the risk assessment of more common violence (e.g., assault) — the approach known as structured professional judgment — usefully may be applied to the risk assessment of terrorism. However, given that many known risk factors for common violence are in fact not risk factors for violent terrorism, the substantive content of any instrument to assess the risk of terrorism will be very different from the substantive content of current instruments that address common violence. Third, since there is little existing evidence supporting the non-trivial validity of any individual risk factors for terrorism, the highest priority for research should be the identification of robust individual risk factors. Promising candidates include ideologies, affiliations, grievances, and “moral” emotions. Finally, it is highly unlikely that an instrument to assess the risk of terrorism can be validated prospectively. An infrastructure for facilitating access to known groups of terrorists and non-terrorists from the same populations may be crucial for conducting a program of scientifically rigorous and operationally relevant research on the individual risk assessment of terrorism.
... For years, the conventional wisdom among most scholars has been that suicide terrorists are not truly suicidal, and that much like ordinary soldiers they are motivated by a selfless commitment to their organization's cause, rather than a desire to end their lives. However, evidence increasingly indicates that some suicide terrorists do exhibit classic suicidal traits (Lankford, 2010;Merari et al., 2010). It is difficult to quantify the overall percentage of suicide terrorists who appear suicidal, because the requisite biographical and motivational data on individual attackers are often missing. ...
Introduction
Radicalization among adolescents is a rising phenomenon that has become a public health concern in Europe. According to some authors, violent radicalization by resorting to self-violence could be a form of suicidal behavior. However, evidence-based studies to support this assertion are lacking.
Objective
The aim of this study was to investigate the issue of suicidality among adolescents engaged in violent radicalization.
Methods
We compared a group of radicalized adolescents convicted of criminal association to commit terrorism (AMT) in France (N=15) with hospitalized adolescents who have attempted to end their lives (N=320). This comparative study is based on two samples from two studies that used the same instruments to assess psychiatric diagnoses, suicide risk, reasons for living, and coping.
Results
AMT adolescents were significantly less suicidal and less depressive/hopeless than adolescents with suicide attempts (SAs). AMT adolescents showed fewer instances of depressive and borderline personality disorders but more manic and psychotic episodes than SA adolescents. They also had much more efficient coping strategies than SA adolescents, especially for the following strategies: seeking professional help, relational support and spiritual support. All the subscores of the reasons for the living scale were significantly higher for AMT adolescents than for SA individuals, apart from the subscore on peer acceptance and support.
Conclusion
Adolescents engaged in violent radicalization cannot be considered suicidal adolescents who have found an opportunity to end their lives through the process of radicalization. Understanding this phenomenon within a social, political and cultural context is necessary.
Background
The link between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour has been the subject of debate for the last 50 years. Studies that report prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples or compare rates for those involved and not involved in terrorism, can inform this debate and the work of those responsible for countering violent extremism.
Objectives
To synthesise the prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples (Objective 1—Prevalence) and prevalence of mental health disorders pre‐dating involvement in terrorism (Objective 2—Temporality). The review also synthesises the extent to which mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement compared to non‐terrorist samples (Objective 3—Risk Factor).
Search Methods
Searches were conducted between April and June 2022, capturing research until December 2021. We contacted expert networks, hand‐searched specialist journals, harvested records from published reviews, and examined references lists for included papers to identify additional studies.
Selection Criteria
Studies needed to empirically examine mental health difficulties and terrorism. To be included under Objective 1 (Prevalence) and Objective 2 (Temporality), studies had to adopt cross‐sectional, cohort, or case‐control design and report prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples, with studies under Objective 2 also needing to report prevalence of difficulties before detection or involvement in terrorism. For Objective 3 (Risk Factor) studies where there was variability in terrorist behaviour (involved vs. not involved) were included.
Data Collection and Analysis
Captured records were screened in DisillterSR by two authors. Risk of bias was assessed using Joanna Briggs Institute checklists, and random‐effects meta‐analysis conducted in Comprehensive Meta‐Analysis software.
Results
Fifty‐six papers reporting on 73 different terrorist samples (i.e., studies) (n = 13,648) were identified. All were eligible for Objective 1. Of the 73 studies, 10 were eligible for Objective 2 (Temporality) and nine were eligible for Objective 3 (Risk Factor). For Objective 1, the life‐time prevalence rate of diagnosed mental disorder in terrorist samples (k = 18) was 17.4% [95% confidence interval (CI) = 11.1%–26.3%]. When collapsing all studies reporting psychological problems, disorder, and suspected disorder into one meta‐analyses (k = 37), the pooled prevalence rate was 25.5% (95% CI = 20.2%–31.6%). When isolating studies reporting data for any mental health difficulty that emerged before either engagement in terrorism or detection for terrorist offences (Objective 2: Temporality), the life‐time prevalence rate was 27.8% (95% CI = 20.9%–35.9%). For Objective 3 (Risk Factor), it was not appropriate to calculate a pooled effect size due the differences in comparison samples. Odds ratios for these studies ranged from 0.68 (95% CI = 0.38–1.22) to 3.13 (95% CI = 1.87–5.23). All studies were assessed as having high‐risk of bias which, in part, reflects challenges conducting terrorism research.
Author's Conclusions
This review does not support the assertion that terrorist samples are characterised by higher rates of mental health difficulties than would be expected in the general population. Findings have implications for future research in terms of design and reporting. There are also implications for practice with regards the inclusion of mental health difficulties as indicators of risk.
A suicide attack is any violent attack, usually involving an explosion, in which attackers accept their own death as a direct result of the attacking method used. Suicide attacks have occurred throughout history, often as part of a military campaign (as with the Japanese kamikaze pilots of 1944-1945 during World War II), and more recently as part of terrorist campaigns (such as the September 11 attacks in 2001). ***** For archiving purpose only *****
Background
Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1) why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter‐radicalization take a risk‐protective factor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important.
Objectives
This review has two primary objectives.
1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radicalization outcomes are, without any predeterminations.
2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors.
The review's secondary objectives are to:
1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalization outcomes.
2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between (a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies.
Search Methods
Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary searches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies.
Selection Criteria
The review included observational studies assessing the outcomes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual‐level risk and protective factors.
Data Collection and Analysis
One‐hundred and twenty‐seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta‐analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta‐regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differences across studies.
Results
Studies were primarily cross‐sectional, with samples representing 20 countries OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right‐wing, and left‐wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes. With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors.
Authors' Conclusions
While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest estimates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significant reductions in risk through targeting by interventions. Conversely, traditional criminogenic factors, as well as psychological factors tend to display the largest estimates. These findings suggest the need to broaden the scope of factors considered in both risk assessment and intervention, and this review provides much needed evidence for guiding the selection of factors.
Terrorist attacks, school shootings, and other man-made incidents are demanding situations for first responders and society as a whole. Currently used concepts, like “active shooter” and “mass killing,” are typically created from the point of view of the perpetrator(s) or based on the incident site or the number of victims. In this paper, six police pretrial investigation records and four reports by the Investigation Commission are analyzed using inductive content analysis. The aim of the research is to determine attributes of violence resembling terrorism by approaching the subject from the position of first responders. Based on these attributes, the concept of violence resembling terrorism (VRT) is then created. VRT as a research unit produces essentially more empirical data, which is an advantage for research both on the academic level and in the more practical branches of security education.
This article articulates that the terrorists in Indonesia are basically a group of normal people who have sound minds and a long-term goal to establish an Islamic government system based on the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. This study employed qualitative approach by acquiring the data through interviews, document analysis and media information covering terrorists and terrorism. A former terrorist involved in Bali bombing I served as the research informant. Data from in-depth interviews and document analysis were analyzed by utilizing social identity and social cognition theory about ideology of jihad. The article concludes that the changing process from the ordinary people into the terrorist strongly relates to jihad ideology and search for identity.
Negotiation in mass casualty attacks is rare but creates positive utility in all circumstances. In this empirical study the benefit of negotiation during mass casualty attacks is examined in 12 attacks perpetrated between 2000 and 2017 in which significant dialogue took place with the attackers. Interviews with the negotiators or others associated with these attacks were conducted and analyzed in conjunction with any recordings, transcripts, or detailed notes related to the negotiations. Findings indicate that although negotiation is rare in mass casualty attacks, attackers tend to initiate dialogue, discuss perceived grievances, and in some circumstances surrender as a result of negotiations. Negotiations provide law enforcement tactically useful information,. The research was limited to the small sample size of incidents in which significant dialogue took place. In addition, data collection relied on recollection of events as opposed to real-time recording in some instances. This research adds value to the existing literature related to hostage and crisis negotiations by highlighting the utility of negotiations within significant high-profile events, absent a negotiated surrender. Negotiations are more productive the earlier they are introduced and should be incorporated into standard crisis response protocols.
Resumen: El presente trabajo trata de la relación entre la misión suicida y el concepto de suicidio. Las misiones suicidas se han convertido en un importante instrumento de lucha política en la era contemporánea. Desde el punto de vista del atacante, el suicidio es una condición para el éxito de la acción y, desde el punto de vista del análisis, un concepto regulador que permite comprender las relaciones entre el individuo y la sociedad. Ahora bien, el concepto de suicidio puede ser insuficiente o tener cargas ideológicas que hacen difícil cernir las características esenciales de dicho tipo de acto. Revisaremos, con criterios contemporáneos, algunos de los principales aspectos de la noción de suicidio definida por Durkheim, y cómo la llamada teoría del progreso es un instrumento teórico utilizado políticamente para desacreditar las misiones suicidas.
In the last 40 years, social scientists have provided important insights into the different characteristics of mass public shootings. Despite these efforts, we still lack a fundamental understanding of the processes that shape its incidence and spatial distribution. In this chapter, the author argues that the failure to tap into these dynamics is rooted in our inability to escape a risk-factors paradigm in which this phenomenon has been examined. The goal of this study is to step away from this paradigm and recast these shootings as a social phenomenon, shaped by social forces. This investigation is couched on two major sociological/criminological theoretical perspectives: social integration and social disorganization. A continuous-time event history model (or hazard/survival model) is used to test the influence of social integration and social disorganization forces on the prevalence of mass public shootings in the contiguous United States for the 1970-2014 period. The results paint a mixed but rather interesting picture.
More than 15 years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a comprehensive re-examination of the 9/11 attackers is now warranted. Research on the psychology of terrorists has evolved dramatically, and there is also new information on some offenders. The present study provides the available psychological and psychiatric evidence on each of the 9/11 pilots, muscle hijackers, and thwarted hijackers who intended to participate in the “planes operation.” Overall, findings suggest that the 9/11 terrorists may have had significantly more mental health problems than previously assumed, and the leaders who planned 9/11 personally approved suicide attackers with prior histories of mental illness. By widely publicizing this information, security officials may be able to more effectively delegitimize suicide terrorism and reduce the number of individuals who would consider funding, supporting, or committing these deadly attacks.
Thoroughly revised and updated, this third edition offers a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the social psychology of aggression, covering all the relevant major theories, individual differences, situational factors, and applied contexts. Understanding the causes, forms, and consequences of aggression and violence is critical for dealing with these harmful forms of social behavior. Addressing a range of sub-topics, the firstpart deals with the definition and measurement of aggression, presents major theories, examines the development of aggression and discusses individual and gender differences in aggressive behaviour. It covers the role of situational factors in eliciting aggression and the impact of exposure to violence in the media. The second part examines specific forms and manifestations of aggression, including chapters on aggression in everyday contexts and in the family, sexual aggression, intergroup aggression, and terrorism. The new edition also includes additional coverage of gender differences, gun violence, and terrorism, to reflect the latest research developments in the field. Alsodiscussing strategies for reducing and preventing aggression, this bookis essential reading for students and researchers in psychology and related disciplines, as well as practitioners andpolicy makers.
This study proposes a novel methodology for the study of the mindset, motives, and cognitive style of individual suicide bombers in Israel/Palestine, based on a comprehensive corpus of personal farewell letters (which also serve as last wills) that were written by suicide bombers to their family during the Second Intifada (2000–2006). To avoid privileging certain a priori sentiments, motivations, or concepts over others, I used a programmatic “bottom-up” sequence of quantitative psycholinguistic procedures, in which prominent themes or concepts from one level of analysis are further qualified and contextualized in the next. This afforded a minimally biased view of the cognitive content of Palestinian suicide bombers, including the sentiments, motivations, and concepts that they were more preoccupied with, and the context in which these ideas were expressed. The results are largely consistent with theories of political violence that place pro-social sentiments at the forefront of the motivations for suicide terrorism, and paramount to antisocial sentiments such as hatred and revenge. Since the linguistic patterns that were uncovered in this analysis cannot be controlled consciously, and the farewell letters of suicide bombers have rarely been rigorously analyzed linguistically, this study may provide an unprecedented glimpse into the cognitive style and content of individual suicide bombers—a glimpse that is minimally biased by political, partisan, or sectarian preconceptions.
The widely held premise that godly religion is important if not critical to maximizing the socioeconomic success of societies while suppressing criminal violence and war is undergoing growing historical and scientific scrutiny. Research indicates that theism is not reliably efficacious even when moderate or progressive, and often contributes to societal dysfunction and war when it is conservative or reactionary in nature. Theism cannot be part of the solution because theism is popular only when socioeconomic conditions are sufficiently defective to compel the majority to relieve their chronic anxiety by petitioning supernatural forces for aid and protection. The most successful and pacific societies in history have been the most nontheistic modern democracies, in part because a high level of secure prosperity always suppresses mass religion. So rather than being universal and integral to human psychology, religious supernaturalism is superficial and elective, and it is poorly developed even in some hunter-gatherers. The best human option is atheistic liberal democracy.
This paper deals with the empirical-explanatory analysis of contemporary global phenomenon known as suicide bombing terrorism. Suicide bombings are one of the ways to fight asymmetric warfare by Islamist terrorist organizations. Suicide attacks are the most virulent and terrifying form of terrorism in the modern world. In addition to the analysis of the preparation, implementation and direct consequences of these attacks, this paper is focused on the inevitable theological, and also psycho-social, dimension of actors in suicidal activities. The paper includes also a detailed analysis of other causes that bring young Muslims to make the decision to resort to the execution of these types of terrorist activities, thereby giving them a new dimension in relation to their historical predecessors.
While the analyses of who engages in terrorism have largely evolved away from early psychopathological accounts, studies that focus on suicide bombers still emphasize personality characteristics as the cause of involvement and contain static interpretations of motivation. This article provides a review of such approaches before offering a number of alternatives that potentially contain more value for moving terrorism research forward. These approaches are illustrated by a series of analyses of a data set of 219 Palestinian suicide bombers: a descriptive analysis of the socio‐demographic characteristics of suicide bombers, their pathways into terrorist organizations, their spatial patterning and issues concerned with lethality. Collectively these analyses show how bringing together different theoretical frameworks can provide a stronger basis for the management of conflict and terrorism.
This is a critical review of five arguments against the scholarly consensus that individual suicide terrorists are rational actors. The first three arguments are analytic, meaning that they hold that suicide terrorism is inherently irrational, based on assumptions regarding the nature of the perpetrators' interests as individuals. The fourth argument is empirical, based on alleged evidence of suicide terrorist psychopathology. And the fifth argument is pragmatic, based on the strategic implications of ‘conceding’ the status of rationality to enemies. This article highlights weaknesses in these arguments and considers assessing the rationality of suicide terrorists by measuring their act to cultural or community goals subject to a division of labor principle.
Recent work by Ariel Merari argues that, while certain contextual factors increase the probability of suicide attacks, they do not explain why particular individuals become suicide bombers. Merari seeks to demonstrate that suicide bombers are motivated by an unusually high prevalence of depression and suicidal tendencies. This article questions the representativeness of Merari's sample. It raises the possibility that interviewer and contextual effects contaminated his findings. Finally, it presents evidence that challenges Merari's conclusions. This evidence is drawn from interviews with immediate family members and close friends of a 25 percent random sample of Palestinian suicide bombers who conducted attacks between 2000 and 2005. Based on their analysis, the authors question the value of a psychological approach to the study of suicide bombers and assert the importance of focusing on the political and social roots of the phenomenon.
For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again.
Research on the characteristics of suicide bombers is reviewed. Contrary to previous commentary, it is suggested that suicide bombers may share personality traits (such as the "authoritarian personality") that psychological profiles of suicide bombers might be feasible, and that the suicide bombers may be characterized by the risk factors that increase the probability of suicide.‐
In the United States, it seems unlikely that a foreign terrorist group would be able to assemble and maintain the required infrastructure within our borders that would provide a platform for a sustained campaign of suicide bombings. However, a strategy of infrequent suicide bombings supplemented by psychologically manipulative rhetoric during the intervals between attacks is plausible and could amplify the fear level. Attacks against high-value targets, use of weapons of mass destruction, or maintenance of an infrastructure on foreign soil with an operational capability for suicide attacks within our borders, would further amplify the psychological fallout. In either case, the potential psychological effects on society - including pervasive insecurity, reduced travel, commerce, and long-term investment, and foreign policy shifts in acquiescence to terrorist pressures - easily dwarf the potential physical effect of suicide terror on American soil. Therefore, identifying strategies to counter the psychological effects of suicide terror and promote resilience is an indispensable aspect of taking away its potential value to terrorist organizations around the world. Who becomes a suicidal terrorist and why is, perhaps obviously, a multifactorial "etiology" including significant developmental, psychodynamic, social, cultural, biological, temperamental, situational, and tactical-instrumental determinants. In other words, multiple "ingredients" often are needed in the manufacture and delivery of a suicide terrorist, or "human bomb" (Table 1, see page 706). For direct victims of terrorism and mass disasters, the principles of psychological support are relatively well developed. For the wider, societal target of the suicide bomber, psychological response is less well defined. Focusing on the intended effects of suicidal terror provides empowering insights to potential victims, enabling them to identify the boundary between rational and irrational fear and to neutralize the primary weapon of the suicide bombers (Table 2, see page 705).
researchers have identified two subtypes of aggression. reactive aggression is characterized by impulsive angry retaliation and has been associated with narcis-sism while proactive aggression is calculated and linked to psychopathy. how-ever, these aggression subtypes commonly co-occur and little is known about fac-tors that underlie each subtype or their overlap. the present study examined the relationship of psychophysiological factors, psychopathic, and narcissistic traits to proactive and reactive aggression during an experimental paradigm. among men, proactive aggression was predicted by low physiological reactivity to anxi-ety/punishment. Conversely, reactive aggression was associated with narcissistic traits and poor decision making under risk and rewards conditions for both sexes. Manipulative and egocentric features of psychopathy were related to proactive physical aggression among men but to reactive indirect aggression among wom-en. these data point to factors that uniquely influence each aggression subtype and their co-occurrence, and highlight the role of gender in the expression of aggression. Increasingly, research suggests that aggression is best conceived as a continuum with adaptive correlates such as social status and goal attainment in its normative range, and maladaptive outcomes at
Many people judge suicide to be immoral. We have found evidence that these moral judgments are primarily predicted by people’s belief that suicide taints the soul and by independent concerns about purity. This finding is inconsistent with accounts that define morality as fundamentally based upon harm considerations. In this commentary, we respond to a critique of our finding, and we provide further support for our original conclusions. Even when applying new exclusion criteria to our data, an examination of effect sizes demonstrates that concerns about purity robustly and meaningfully explain variance in moral judgments of suicide. While harm concerns sometimes predict moral judgments of suicide alongside purity concerns, they reliably explain a much smaller proportion of the variance than do purity concerns. Therefore, data from six studies continue to suggest that the relevance of harm concerns for moral judgments of suicide is substantially overshadowed by the contribution of purity concerns.
How does one effectively fight suicide bombers? What threat do they hold for Western society? How do people who love peace reconcile the need for war? Noted genocide expert Israel W. Charny addresses these questions in this highly personal description of suicide bombings and terror as the opening salvos of a Third World War. Charny first seeks to understand what makes suicide bombers tick, as well as the culture from which they emerge. Taking this understanding of what he calls human evil, he then proposes a hawkish campaign that ultimately emphasizes peace rather than irrational fear.
By deeming suicide bombing and terrorism as necessary subjects in the study of psychology, Charny presents yet another weapon in the war against terrorism-a war that he believes will only escalate without drastic action. Ultimately, he calls for a worldwide campaign for life led by religious and secular leaders across the globe. He concludes the book with a vignette from Islamic culture that speaks nobly to furthering peace and life.
Suicide bombers are often compared to smart bombs. From the point of view of their dispatchers, they are highly effective, inexpensive forms of weaponry, and there is no need to invest in their technological development. Suicide bombers are in fact smarter than smart bombs because they can choose their own target—and they can react to circumstances on the ground, changing their target, or their timing, in an instant, to ensure the maximum damage, destruction, and death. Of course, unlike smart bombs, suicide bombers think and feel, they have histories, stories, beliefs, desires—in short, they have an inner world. Exploring the inner world of suicide bombers has been the focus of Anat Berko's research for years. She has worked to understand the thought processes of a people who can choose to place explosives on their bodies and kill themselves, taking as many other people with them as they can.
Do male bombers really believe that death will transport them to a paradise where they will be greeted by virgins? Are they victims of unbearable pressure to commit this act of terror? What are female bombers promised in the hereafter? Is there something that links all suicide bombers? Berko also explores the world of those who drop the smart bomb—the dispatchers: who are these people who persuade others to go calmly to their horrific deaths?
Self-deception occurs because we often see the world the way we would like it to be, rather than the way it is. Our brains so long for things the way we want them, we might not even be aware we are fooling ourselves, explains author Harry Triandis, a widely known Professor Emeritus of Psychology. Across cultures and around the world, self-deception is a phenomenon that has subtle and profound effects on everyday life, explains Triandis, also former president of the International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology. In this work, he not only explains how and why self-deceptions occur in three areas - politics, religion, and terrorism - but also how to recognize and reduce the frequency of fooling ourselves.
Insights here include consideration of personal and societal self-deceptions, as well as extensive understanding of how politics, ideologies, and religions can frame reality for each of us in such a way that it is, in our minds, warped so the stage is well-set for self-deception. This text will be of special interest to general readers drawn to politics and religion, as well as scholars of psychology, anthropology, and sociology.
Antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders are forms of persistent maladaptive personality styles that interfere with a person's functioning. Antisocial personality disorder is characterized by a disregard for the rights of others often exemplified by criminal behavior and a lack of remorse. Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by a grandiose sense of self and pathological self-centeredness. Antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders often co-occur with one another and with other personality disorders and substance use disorders. The causes of antisocial and NPDs include both genetic and environmental influences. Success in treating these disorders often proves difficult.
Some Thoughts on Human Extinction, Kin Recognition, and the Impact of Patriotism on Inclusive Fitness - Volume 4 Issue 2 - Gary R. Johnson
The Role of Kin Recognition Mechanisms in Patriotic Socialization: Further Reflections1 - Volume 8 Issue 1 - Gary R. Johnson
We address leadership emergence and the possibility that there is a partially innate predisposition to occupy a leadership role. Employing twin design methods on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we estimate the heritability of leadership role occupancy at 24%. Twin studies do not point to specific genes or neurological processes that might be involved. We therefore also conduct association analysis on the available genetic markers. The results show that leadership role occupancy is associated with rs4950, a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) residing on a neuronal acetylcholine receptor gene (CHRNB3). We replicate this family-based genetic association result on an independent sample in the Framingham Heart Study. This is the first study to identify a specific genotype associated with the tendency to occupy a leadership position. The results suggest that what determines whether an individual occupies a leadership position is the complex product of genetic and environmental influences, with a particular role for rs4950.
Antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders are forms of persistent maladaptive personality styles that interfere with a person's functioning. Antisocial personality disorder is characterized by a disregard for the rights of others often exemplified by criminal behavior and a lack of remorse. Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by a grandiose sense of self and pathological self-centeredness. Antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders often co-occur with one another and with other personality disorders and substance use disorders. The causes of antisocial and NPDs include both genetic and environmental influences. Success in treating these disorders often proves difficult.
Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.
The commonly accepted interpretation is that a religious motive—the desire to please God—is the principal reason why people volunteer for suicide missions. American political scientist Robert A. Pape rejects this view. For him the common thread linking suicide bombers is a political objective— driving out an occupier from one’s homeland, which they see as furthering the common good of their society. In arriving at this theory, Pape relied on the concept of “altruistic suicide,” developed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his pioneering work Suicide (1897). These ideas are discussed in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005), from which the passage below is taken.
The letter to the September 11 terrorists is analyzed in an effort to understand the state of mind of a religious suicide-killer. Contrary to what would be expected, the letter exudes a solemn, serene, even joyful tone that is infused with love of God and a strong desire to please Him. The author suggests that incessant incantation of prayers and religious sayings while focusing attention on God led to a depersonalized, trancelike state of mind that enabled the terrorists to function competently, while dwelling in a euphoric state of enthrallment with God. On a psychodynamic level, the theme of father son love is used to explain the ecstatic willingness of the terrorists to do what they saw as God's will and to undergo transformations from hatred (towards »God's enemies« projected from oneself) toward love (of God), and from pervasive discontent and anxiety to a focused and circumscribed fear of God. Homoerotic bonding and longing, coupled with repudiation of »femininity«, explain an inability to »kill« the primal murderous father, as the mythological Primal Horde did. Freud's description of the sons' (the group members') hypnotic love for their father-leader, which, when not reciprocated, turns into masochistic submission, seems pertinent for the understanding of the sons' »return« to an archaic, cruel father imago. »Regression« to the father is compared with classical maternal regression.
Suicidal attacks are a warfare tactic rooted in lethal altruism, a highly damaging drift away from people's more generous tendencies. Martyrs who commit these acts are extreme altruists by definition: They offer their lives as a supreme investment for others' interests. Individual differences in altruism have been measured using scales and economic games that have led to a growing understanding of their genetic and neurohormonal basis. Analyzing that in relation to suicide martyrdom leads to a question: Are there pockets of individuals among all populations who are willing to make high-cost investments of trust/sacrifice in nonkin others, particularly at war? Disentangling the neurocognitive attributes of altruism and its relationship to other traits mediating martyrdom proneness is a vital task to understand the genesis of suicidal attacks. A temperamental workspace for warriors encompassing the trait dimensions of dominance- submission, Machiavellianism-gullibility, and selfishness-altruism is outlined to frame the main clusters mediating violent martyrdom.
We cannot explain why people kill themselves. There are no necessary or sufficient causes for suicide, so rather than explaining suicide (looking for causes), perhaps we can understand suicide, at least in one individual, a phenomenological approach. This book begins by examining the diaries from eight individuals who killed themselves. Using qualitative analyses, supplemented in some cases by quantitative analyses, Lester seeks to uncover the unique thoughts and feelings that led these individuals to take their own lives. Lester has also studied suicide notes, the poems of those who died by suicide (both famous poets and unpublished poets), the letters written by suicides, blogs and twitter feeds, and one tape recording of a young man who killed himself just an hour or so after he recorded the tape. This book will give you insights into the "I" of the storm, the suicidal mind.
This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is there a logic driving those behind them? Are their motivations religious or has Islam provided a language to express essentially political causes? How can the perpetrators remain so lucidly effective in the face of certain death? And do these disparate attacks have something like a common cause? It focuses on four main instances: the Kamikaze, missions carried out by the Tamil Tigers in the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the Middle East, and the al-Qaeda 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For more than two years, the authors have pursued an unprejudiced inquiry, investigating organizers and perpetrators alike of this extraordinary social phenomenon. Close comparisons between a whole range of cases raise challenging further questions: If suicide missions are so effective, why are they not more common? If killing is what matters, why not stick to 'ordinary' violent means? Or, if dying is what matters, why kill in the process?
The Third Reich met its end in the spring of 1945 in an unparalleled wave of suicides. Hitler, Goebbels, Bormann, Himmler and later Göring all killed themselves. These deaths represent only the tip of an iceberg of a massive wave of suicides that also touched upon ordinary lives. As this suicide epidemic has no historical precedent or parallel, it can tell us much about the Third Reich's peculiar self-destructiveness and the depths of Nazi fanaticism. The book looks at the suicides of both Nazis and ordinary people in Germany between 1918 and 1945, from the end of World War I until the end of World War II, including the mass suicides of German Jews during the Holocaust. It shows how suicides among different population groups, including supporters, opponents, and victims of the regime, responded to the social, cultural, economic and, political context of the time. The book also analyses changes and continuities in individual and societal responses to suicide over time, especially with regard to the Weimar Republic and the post-1945 era.
When it comes to explaining, predicting, and preventing suicide terrorism, there is a lot more important work to be done. This paper draws on the most recent evidence about where suicide terrorism occurs and why to propose a basic explanatory framework. Taking a bottom-up approach, it first identifies the minimum requirements for a suicide terrorism attack, and then outlines additional facilitators for the deadliest attacks and most prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns. Next, it applies these variables to clarify popular misunderstandings about foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide terrorism. Finally, it shows how security officials can use this framework to develop a series of short term and long term countermeasures and begin to reduce the prevalence of suicide terrorism worldwide.
Human altruism in non-kin, unreciprocated contexts is difficult to understand in evolutionary terms. However, neo-Darwinian theories remain a potentially useful means of illuminating this behavior. In particular, induced altruism, wherein cues of genetic relatedness are manipulated to elicit costly behaviors for the benefit of non-kin, appears highly relevant. This article reviews cross-cultural data on several examples of extremely costly altruism-vows of celibacy, suicide bombings, and combat suicide-as exhibited in organizational and institutional contexts. Two predictions are used to test the relevance of induced altruism to the reinforcement of altruistic commitment to these behaviors. First, different organizations requiring costly sacrifice by their members should employ similar practices involving patterns of association, phenotypic similarity, and kinship terminology that are associated with kin cue-manipulation. Second, these organizational practices should be adopted as a consequence of recruit pools growing increasingly larger and, thus, less genetically related. There appears to be support for both predictions, suggesting that cross-cultural analyses could provide an effective avenue through which to test this and other evolutionary theories related to human unreciprocated altruism in non-kin contexts.
Extending data reported by Mohammed Hafez in 2007, we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. From 2003 through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of non-suicide insurgent attacks, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar. This biphasic pattern indicates that suicide attacks sometimes warrant separate analysis but sometimes are just one tactic in a larger envelope of insurgent violence. We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, members of the Anbar Awakening Movement, Iraqi security forces, and government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign occupation, and caution that “smart bombs” may be more often sent against soft targets than hard targets. More generally, our results indicate that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.
This article proposes that there are four primary types of suicide terrorist: (1) conventional suicide terrorists, who become suicidal owing to classic risk factors, (2) coerced suicide terrorists, who become suicidal because they fear the organizational consequences of not carrying out attacks, (3) escapist suicide terrorists, who become suicidal because they fear being captured by the enemy, and (4) indirect suicide terrorists, who become suicidal at an unconscious level and orchestrate their deaths in ways that disguise their desire to die. It then outlines behavioral expectations for each type, in terms of warning signs, tactical experience and attack styles, and concludes with recommendations for security countermeasures and future research.
For years, scholars have claimed that suicide terrorists are not suicidal, but rather psychologically normal individuals inspired to sacrifice their lives for an ideological cause, due to a range of social and situational factors. I agree that suicide terrorists are shaped by their contexts, as we all are. However, I argue that these scholars went too far. In The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers, I take the opposing view, based on my in-depth analyses of suicide attackers from Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America; attackers who were male, female, young, old, Islamic, and Christian; attackers who carried out the most deadly and the least deadly strikes. I present evidence that in terms of their behavior and psychology, suicide terrorists are much like others who commit conventional suicides, murder-suicides, or unconventional suicides where mental health problems, personal crises, coercion, fear of an approaching enemy, or hidden self-destructive urges play a major role. I also identify critical differences between suicide terrorists and those who have genuinely sacrificed their lives for a greater good. By better understanding suicide terrorists, experts in the brain and behavioral sciences may be able to pioneer exciting new breakthroughs in security countermeasures and suicide prevention. And even more ambitiously, by examining these profound extremes of the human condition, perhaps we can more accurately grasp the power of the human survival instinct among those who are actually psychologically healthy.