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Are positive illusions necessary for self-esteem: a research note

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Abstract

Research on variables associated with mental health has recently suggested that the judicious use of positive illusions, rather than an accurate perception of reality, is a significant predictor of self-esteem. This study, using 114 university students, suggested that for certain individuals low use of positive illusions can also be associated with high self-esteem and psychological adjustment.
Person.
indiuid.
Dif. Yol. 13, No. 12,
Pp. 1343-1344,
1992
Printed
in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0l9l-8869/92 $5.00 + o.oo
Copyright @ 1992 Pergamon
Press Ltd
NOTES AND SHORTER COMMUNICATIONS
Are positive illusions necessary for self-esteem: a research note
Wu-rulra C. CouproN
Middle
Tennessee State
Uniuersity,
Department
of Psychology,
Murfreesboro,
TN 37132, U.S.A.
(Receiued 3l January 1992)
Summary-Research on variables associated with mental health has recently suggested that the judicious
use of positive illusions, rather than an accurate perception of reality, is a significant predictor of
self-esteem.
This study, using I 14 university students, suggested
that for certain individuals low use of
positive illusions can also be associated with high self-esteem and psychological adjustment.
The mental health literature has long assumed that an accurate perception of reality is one of the major criteria for mental
health (Jahoda, 1958).
Taylor and Brown (1988), however, reviewed the literature on positive illusions and concluded that:
(a) unrealistically positive views of the self: (b) exaggerated feelings of control over life events; and (c) unrealistic optimism
towards the future were more likely to be associated
with increased mental health and, further, that an accurate perception
of reality was associated
with depression
and not with mental health. While Taylor and Brown's conclusions are intriguing,
the associations between positive illusions and mental health may need further refinement (Baumeister, 1989; Janoff-
Bulman, 1989;
Taylor, Collins, Skokan & Aspinwall, 1989).
In addition, a number of studies have suggested
that mental
health can be associated
with variables quite unlike positive illusions (e.g.
Fitzgerald, 1966; Csikszentimihalyi, 1990; Langer,
1989). Finally, it must also be noted that theorists who postulated an accurate
perception of reality as a criterion for mental
health were theorizing about optimal mental health. Since optimal mental health is a fairly rare occurrence, the expectation
would be that <20o/o of any random sample
would fit the criterion. If this small subset of persons
evidenced
positive mental
health without the use of positive illusions, they might be difficult to detect when statistical tests involved group means.
Therefore, before concluding that an accurate perception of reality is never a useful criterion for mental health, attempts
should be made to locate persons
who might show evidence of positive mental health and also low use of positive illusions.
This research
note reports on preliminary efforts to search
for such a subgroup. The analyses
focused on a variable quite
susceptible to positive illusions-self esteem.
METHOD
Research participants
Fifty-nine undergraduate and fifty five graduate students
completed questionnaires. Mean age was 26.0 years (SD:8.1;
rirlg€ : 18-56). Mean education level was 16.4
years (SD : 2.6; range: 1212). There were 85 women and 29 men in the
final sample.
M aterials and procedure
All ,Ss completed the following measures:
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) (Fitts, 1965),
Trent Attribution Profile
(Wong & Sproule, 1984),
the Beck Depression Inventory-short form (Beck & Beck, 1972), the 36-item measure
of Hardiness
(Kobasa & Maddi, personal communication, 1985) and a self-report measure of preference for self-relevant feedback
(Compton, 1990). Research Ss were recruited by either placing test packets in departmental mail slots or distributing them in
classrboms.
Test packets
were returned via campus mail. Return rates
were 5l7o for undergraduates and 44o/o for graduates.
RESULTS
Four groups were formed by splitting scores
on both the Total Esteem and the Defensive Positive scales
of the TSCS
at their respective
means. The Defensive Positive scale
is an empirically derived measure of the tendency to give positive
descriptioni of self
irrespective of objective realities
(Fitts, 1965,
p. 5). It was used
as a measure of positive illusions. Figure I
showi that 10.5% of the sample fell into the high self-esteem
and low illusions group (HILO) giving support to the
hypothesis that positive illusions are not always necessary
for high self-esteem.
The fact that I l.4oh of the sample were
in the low esteem
and high illusions group also suggests
that the relationships between these variables is more complex
than Taylor and Brown (1988) suggest.
Oneway ANOVAs with the Student-Newman-Keuls procedure found significant
differences between the HILO group and both of the low esteem
groups such that the HILO group was not depressed,
had fewer deviant signs,
was not maladjusted, neurotic, personality disordered, or psychotic (all Ps < 0.05).
While the HILO
and the high self-esteem
high illusions (HIHI) groups showed a significant differences on self-esteem
[l(55.57):6.95,
P < 0.011,
ihere were no significant differences between these groups on measures of depression, hardiness, and the
attribution scales
(all Ps > 0.05). I-tests between
the HILO and HIHI groups showed mixed results on the following scales:
Number of Deviant Signs, Psychotic, Personality Integration, General Maladjustment, Neurotic, Personality Disordered,
and Preference
for Positive Self-Relevant Feedback. Finally, since all group means for the HILO and HIHI groups were
in the normal ranges on the TSCS, the question of clinical significance
was examined by comparing means with + I SD
unit. Three meanJ were clinically significant: the HILO mean was at - I SD on the Psychotic scale, at * I SD on the
Personality Integration scale, and at * I SD on the Self-Criticism scale.
The high mean on the Self-Criticism scale indicated
1343
1344 NOTES AND SHORTER
COMMUNICATIONS
Self-Esteem
High Low
High
376.5
50
43.9%
330.9
13
11 .4o/"
355.4
12
1
0.5olo
319.5
39
33.9o/"
Positive
illusions
Low
Fig. L Self-esteem means, number of Ss, and percentage
of total sample for each group. Total Esteem
mean for normal population on TSCS
:345.6, SD:30.7.
a "normal, healthy openness and capacity for self criticism" (Fitts, 1965, p. 2). These results suggested that, on some
measures,
the HILO group was functioning much better than the average person who completes the TSCS.
DISCUSSION
The results give initial support to the hypothesis that while the use of positive illusions to enhance self-esteem is often
associated
with mental health, their use is not necessary to higher self-esteem. Further, the infrequent use of positive illusions
was not associated
with depression for the HILO group in this sample.
Since a portion of the Total Esteem
scale
is composed of the Defensive Positive scale, it is not surprising that the HIHI
and the HILO groups were significantly different. The item overlap, however, meant that those in the HILO group had
to score lower on the specific items associated
with the Defensive Positive scale
while also scoring high on Total Esteem.
Therefore, the item overlap increased confidence in the HILO group as a distinct high esteem group who use positive
illusions infrequently.
Further research is obviously necessary before behavioral and personality differences
between persons who tend to use,
or not use, positive illusions can be adequately understood. These preliminary results, however, suggest that the final
understanding of the appropriate use of positive illusions for self-esteem will involve interactions rather than simple main
effects.
Rf,FERENCES
Baumeister, R. (1989). The optimal margin of illusion. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8(2), 176-189.
Beck, A. & Beck, R. (1972). Screening depressed
patients in family practice: A rapid technic. Postgraduate Medicine, 52(6),
8 l-85.
Compton, W. (1990). Development of a self-report measure of self-relevant feedback: Initial validation. Psychological
Reports,
67,641-642.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience.
New York: Harper & Row.
Fitts, W. (1965). Tennessee
Self-Concept Scale: Mannual. Nashville, TN.: Counselor Recordings and Tapes.
Fitzgerald, E. (1966). Measurement of openness to experience:A study of regression in service in service to the ego. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 4,655-663.
Jahoda, M. (1958). Current concepts of positiue mental health. New York: Basic Books.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1989). The benefits of illusions, the threat of disillusionment, and the limitations of accuracy. Journal
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8(2), 158-175.
Langer, E. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Taylor, S. & Brown, J. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective
on mental health. Psychological
Bulletin, I 03
(2), 193-210.
Taylor, S., Collins, R., Skokan, L. & Aspinwall, L. (1989).
Maintaining positive
illusions in the face
of negative
information:
Getting the facts without letting them get to you. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8(2), ll4-129.
Wong, P. & Sproule, C. (1984). An attribution analysis of the locus of control construct and the Trent Attribution Profile.
In Lefcourt H. (Ed.) Research with the Locus of Control Construct (Vol. 3), NY: Academic Press.
... This was a result of efforts to distort reality, which also inhibited awareness of emotional functioning. Conversely, Compton (1992) found that individuals can demonstrate a high level of self-esteem, being one's attitude towards their own worth (Rosenberg 1965), without demonstrating a high level of positive illusions. More importantly, this group also showed greater self-esteem, self-criticism, and personality integration, in conjunction with lower psychoticism than those who had high self-esteem associated with a high levels of positive illusions (Compton 1992). ...
... Conversely, Compton (1992) found that individuals can demonstrate a high level of self-esteem, being one's attitude towards their own worth (Rosenberg 1965), without demonstrating a high level of positive illusions. More importantly, this group also showed greater self-esteem, self-criticism, and personality integration, in conjunction with lower psychoticism than those who had high self-esteem associated with a high levels of positive illusions (Compton 1992). These findings suggest that those who do not rely on positive illusions to maintain high SWB and self-esteem have the highest levels of mental health. ...
... The findings of the current study are in line with those by Compton (1992). He found that positive irrational beliefs are not necessary for high self-esteem. ...
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