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C-TPAT: major challenges
Abstract
Since its implementation after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT) has grown to be one of the largest public/private partnerships in the world. The focus of C-TPAT is on the United
States’ vulnerability to the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across its borders. As a system, C-TPAT has achieved
great success; however, there remain a number of serious deficiencies that C-TPAT, by itself, cannot overcome. Very few cargo
containers are currently being inspected by Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This is due to lack of funding and manpower
deficiencies as well as the practical need to allow the flow of trade to continue as swiftly as possible. Instead of mass
inspection of containers, CBP relies on its ability to identify and further question or inspect “high risk” containers before
they are shipped or prior to their entry to the United States. Identifying “high risk” containers results in a far lower number
of CBP inspections, thereby offering less interference with the trade process. It is well known amongst shipping experts that
the contents of many containers are mislabeled or misdeclared. Combine the fact that many cargo containers contain misdeclared
contents with the current model of inspecting very few containers and one can conclude that the potential for problems is
enormous. Furthermore, concerns over specificity of standards related to C-TPAT security requirements and the likelihood that
membership in C-TPAT increases an organization’s potential for attack and the situation continues to deteriorate. C-TPAT began
as and remains an initiative with honorable goals; however, we cannot rely upon increasing numbers of C-TPAT members as a
measure of its effectiveness.
... The purpose was also to consolidate a technically solid analytical framework, easy to use by practitioners through a spreadsheet in their task to improve supply chain security. Even though reactive initiatives as C-TPAT are useful, proactive initiatives that develop solutions for a formalized approach to security management within the firm are needed (O'Connell, 2009;Hintsa et al., 2010). ...
... Many of these initiatives were incorporated into the US Safe Port Act. O'Connell (2009) discusses current challenges to these security programs. ...
This study focuses on the economic implications of positive externalities in new technology investment for underwater security of ports and waterways. The evidence on the magnitude of positive externalities in this area is reviewed. Positive externalities exist when a product or service provides benefits to the society in excess of the private benefits of the decision-makers. Port security investments involve direct benefits as well as positive externalities. Direct benefits of security investment are the result of preventing port closure and are observed by port decision-makers. Direct positive externalities include the benefit of preventing the stoppage in shipping and are reflected in avoidance of production and sales decreases. Indirect positive externalities result from prevention of supply-chain stoppages at suppliers and customers of affected firms. Finally, indirect positive externalities include the avoidance of induced costs that result from loss of income to communities whose members work in the affected industries. Ports are part of critical infrastructure. Underwater security threats pose specific new challenges and require new technology investment. Accurate economic evaluation of such security investment promotes efficiency and security of resources. This study advocates applying the concept of social net present value to enhance evaluation of port security investment.
The spread of disease is a significant threat to the health and safety of all global citizens. Recent events show that disease migration is a never-ending struggle for the international community. In December 2019, the global community came face-to-face with another deadly, persistent, and resilient threat: the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). COVID-19 is caused by the SARS-CoV-2 novel coronavirus. COVID-19 is multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual, and has no geopolitical, religious, socio-economic, or cultural bias. While man insatiably looks for ways to elevate himself above others who may not look like him, segregate himself from those who earn less than him, or marginalize those less fortunate than him, COVID-19 is on World tour, like a sadistic music band. All are welcome; regardless of ethnicity, religion, or economic status, admission is free. The United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO), the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the British National Health Service, the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federal, the Chinese Center for Disease and Prevention, and the French Santé publique France and other public and global health organizations worked tirelessly; collaborating, sharing data and resources to slow the spread COVID-19 to create and distribute vaccines. The collaboration was adequate but reactionary; it was too late for some. COVID-19 has killed over 6 million people globally. Although the convergence of data in the global health community was effective, it was reactionary, contact tracing was difficult, and frontline health providers and non-clinical workers were not prepared. However, making computational convergence a priority in global healthcare in the United Nations Agenda 30 Sustainment Development Goals (SDG) will prepare and empower global health organizations to take appropriate and timely steps, not if but when the next pandemic arrives.
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the motives for and the benefits of authorized economic operator (AEO) certification in the supply chain. Also, whether there are significant differences in the perception of the AEO status as a necessity or privilege among cargo owners and service providers.
Design/methodology/approach
The research design includes an international survey of 159 AEO-certified companies from four European Union (EU) countries performing various roles in the supply chain. The data are analyzed using quantitative methods, including factor analysis and analysis of variance.
Findings
Based on factor analysis, the research reveals the motives for and benefits of AEO certification. This reveals significant differences between two distinct groups of supply chain participants, namely, cargo owners and service providers. Service providers are mainly driven by the need to gain or maintain their competitive advantage and treat AEO certification as a standard that is required by customers. Cargo owners are relatively more focused on the improvement of internal processes and treat AEO certification as a privilege that helps them achieve a high level of efficiency.
Originality/value
The study fills the existing literature gap as it focuses on the differences between two distinct groups (cargo owners and service providers) in terms of their perception of the AEO certification. As empirical research in this area is scarce, especially at the cross-country level, this study also significantly complements knowledge on AEO certification in the EU.
Port security is an increasing concern given the significant role of ports in global commerce and today’s increasingly complex threat environment. Current approaches to port security mirror traditional models of accident causality – ‘a series of security nets’ based on component reliability and probabilistic assumptions. Traditional port security frameworks result in isolated and inconsistent improvement strategies. Recent work in engineered safety combines the ideas of hierarchy, emergence, control and communication into a new paradigm for understanding port security as an emergent complex system property. The ‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)’ is a new model of causality based on systems and control theory. The associated analysis process – System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) – identifies specific technical or procedural security requirements designed to work in coordination with (and be traceable to) overall port objectives. This process yields port security design specifications that can mitigate (if not eliminate) port security vulnerabilities related to an emphasis on component reliability, lack of coordination between port security stakeholders or economic pressures endemic in the maritime industry. This article aims to demonstrate how STAMP’s broader view of causality and complexity can better address the dynamic and interactive behaviors of social, organizational and technical components of port security.
This research is a literature survey on the Supply chain security. International organization and governments have build security regulations to improve the security in the shipment through supply chain. The researches on supply chain security were increasing during last 10 years. We were surveyed 53 research including Korean and international papers. ills study was classified by research subjects, security regulation, and research methods. Korean researches were focused to introducing and reviewing on the security regulation, but the researches on specific security reinforcement were very rare. International researches were concerned with the subject of the airport security scanning problem, transportation security problem, port selection problem.
As U.S. maritime security adapts to the terrorist threat, we argue that quantitative analysis should be used to evaluate security initiatives and present a case study of one proposed measure: 100 percent scanning of containers entering the United States. By assessing the minimum attack likelihood required to justify increased inspection costs, we conclude that 100 percent scanning is cost-effective only if the attack damages or likelihood of an attack are quite high. Even so, additional land and labor transaction costs could render adoption infeasible unless scanning technologies improve significantly.
Presentation on “risks of misdeclared cargoes
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Misdeclared ship cargo still big problem
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It may not be perfect but C-TPAT’s here to stay; DC Velocity
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Joint publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
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Retail container traffic sinks
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President of the world Shipping Council; testimony regarding Maritime Transportation Security Act Oversight before the Senate Committee on Commerce
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Importers: security gaps to impact cargo costs and delivery. Supply Chain Brain
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Presentation on “risks of misdeclared cargoes”, International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) Conference
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CBP Plans C-TPAT changes in response to GAO critique. Barnes Richardson and Colburn, barnesrichardson.com
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Director, homeland security and justice issues; “Homeland security: Key cargo security can be improved” Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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