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Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia
... Valery Streletsky, who served as head of the anti-corruption department of the Presidential Security Services, told Klebnikov (2000) in an interview: "The key factor in the privatisation process was the attitude of Tatyana Dyachenko to this or that banker/oligarch…. She would go to the President and say: this man is good man and that man is bad man; this should be supported and that should not be supported… Tatyana Dyachenko is the only person the President listens to." (pp. ...
... In 1995, he also acquired the television channel Channel One, the most commonly watched TV station in Russia which had a tremendous impact on public opinion in the country. Klebnikov (2000) offers a crisp description of his trajectory: "He had a classic career path of a Yeltsin-era business magnate. In 1987, as a top leader of Moscow's Communist Youth League, Khodorkovsky established a trading cooperative financed with Communist Party money; the next year he established a bank. ...
... When theory was put into practice, Yeltsin de facto 'appointed' a handful of billionaires. According toKlebnikov (2000), he relied mostly on advice from his beloved daughter, Tatyana. Public property was often grossly undervalued. ...
... structure, nor a significant civil society capable of keeping state corruption in check. In the 1990s, economic policies have been heavily influenced by a few oligarchs who created alliances with political elites (Klebnikov 2000, McFaul 1997). The Russian state can be viewed as a predatory rather than a developmental one in Evans's definition, , and rarely notice the less powerful majority whose choices are also important (Hass 1999; Burawoy and Verdery 1999). ...
... So why even bother, spending time 72 These practices have been documented in some of the academic literature; see, for example, Levin and Satarov (2000). 73 The Index is based on surveys of business people, academics, and risk analysts. Many respondents pointed out pieces of legislation that they find bewildering, and the only explanation that appears reasonable to them is that such legislation is designed to generate revenue for a particular state office. ...
... Corruption is a broad concept. Examples of corruption--from match-rigging in sumo wrestling Duggan and Levitt (2002) to illegal privatization schemes in the 1990s in Russia Klebnikov (2000)--are abundant. The corruption cases in different sectors or different countries are not all the same. ...
... Individuals or organizations offer bribes to government officials who can make contracts on behalf of the state or make decisions on using public funds to influence their decisions regarding particular tasks. Bribes are also known as kickbacks, gratuities, pay-offs, grease money etc. Outside the budget, the privatization process can be greatly influenced by bribery (Klebnikov 2000). On the revenue side of the budget, tax collection agents can accept bribes to lower the tax liabilities of bribe offering individuals or businesses. ...
... On Berezovsky (Nezavisimaja Gazeta) mainly, but also on Potanin (Izvestija) and Gusinskij (Segodnja), see Klebnikov (2000). . ...
How do media inform our representations of the Other and how does this influence intercultural / international relations? While officially dialogues between different national societies are conducted by diplomats in bilateral and multilateral settings, in practice journalists also participate every day in such dialogues through the phenomenon of the “international media echo” in which they report on each others’ societies. Until now, media have only been investigated for their potential role in the foreign policy of specific states. In a case study involving media in three national cultures and languages (French, American and Russian), this book presents an interdisciplinary framework that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses for the study of the international media echo in an intercultural / international relations perspective. In particular, the fundamental functioning of “spirals of anti-Other rhetoric”, i.e. media wars, is examined in a Critical Discourse Analysis approach completed with Social Identity Theory and International Relations theories.
... After the collapse of the coup, Yeltsin played a crucial role in the dissolution of the USSR. During his presidency of the Russian Federation (1991–1999) weak leadership, chaotic reforms and massive corruption became the most visible symptoms of his failure (Klebnikov 2000), but the earlier role of Yeltsin at the turning point of Russian history cannot be denied. ...
The Tibetan government’s arrival at the horizon of democracy is viewed
as another stone solidifying the foundation of Tibetan freedom movement.
In 2011, the Dalai Lama devolved all his political power and restricted
himself to be the spiritual head only. In the wake of this development,
in 2011, first direct elections were conducted for the post of
Prime Minister and the MPs of Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Recently
concluded elections in April-May 2016 were only the second elections of
this type. This short note looks into the governance structure and functioning
of the Tibetan Government-in-exile and reviews the recently
concluded Tibetan general elections with a view that how through these
democratic political processes the exiled community has transplanted,
institutionalized and democratized its government structures to establish
a state-like polity in a stateless and territory-less exile. [R, abr.]
... After the collapse of the coup, Yeltsin played a crucial role in the dissolution of the USSR. During his presidency of the Russian Federation (1991Federation ( –1999) weak leadership, chaotic reforms and massive corruption became the most visible symptoms of his failure (Klebnikov 2000), but the earlier role of Yeltsin at the turning point of Russian history cannot be denied. ...
The Tibetan government’s arrival at the horizon of democracy is viewed as another stone solidifying the foundation of Tibetan freedom movement. In 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama devolved all his political power and restricted himself to be the spiritual head only. In the wake of this development, in 2011, first direct elections were conducted for the post of Prime Minister and the Members of Parliament of Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Recently concluded elections in April-May 2016 were only second elections of this type. This short note looks into the governance structure and functioning of the Tibetan Government-in-exile and reviews the recently concluded Tibetan general elections with a view that how through these democratic political processes the exiled community has transplanted, institutionalized and democratized its government structures to establish a state-like polity in a stateless and territory-less exile. This study is based on field observation undertaken in Dharamshala. Interviews were conducted with Tibetan government officials, journalists and members of Tibetan electorate.
... The economic-political networks-often referred to as "clans" in Russia-bring together politicians and businessmen linked through special relationships of mutual support. 6 The formation of such groups started under Gorbachev during the process of spontaneous privatization and accelerated later, with the economic reforms of the 1990s (Goldman 2003, Hoffman 2002, Freeland 2000, Klebnikov 2000. These networks embodied the common interests of the politicians, who faced the necessity of being reelected, and the economic actors who sought property as well as protection of their property rights. ...
Working Paper #335 – February 2007 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, originally from Tatarstan (Russia), received a BA in International Relations from Florida International University (1995) and an MA in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (1997). From 1997–98 she was senior officer in the Department on Asia and Africa in the Foreign Affairs Office of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan. She received her PhD in political science from George Washington University in 2004 and was a spring 2006 visiting fellow at the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame. Currently, she is an assistant professor of political science and international studies at Miami University (Ohio). Her research interests include the political economy of post-communist transformation, the Russian regions, and informal institutions.
... The increase in inequality led to considerable scholarly attention on income stratification in Russia, but much of the literature in the 1990s focused on inequality at the national level, or on stratification between social groups and professions in the urban sphere (McAuley 1995;Zaslavskaya 1996;Krasil'nikova 1996;Kukolev 1997;Lapina 1997). Analysts also devoted considerable attention to the emergence of an oligarchic class-a group of individuals who became fabulously wealthy during the heady days of privatisation and were able to obtain control of Russia's riches through corruption, violence, insider privatisation and other unscrupulous means (Handelman 1995;Freeland 2000;Hoffman 2002;Klebnikov 2000;Hough 2001;Goldman 2003). In contrast, relatively little scholarly attention was devoted to inequality and stratification in the rural sphere, although a handful of exceptions could be cited (Shteinberg 1996;Uzun 1999;Wegren 2000). ...
Employing survey data and fieldwork from the Republic of Komi, this article demonstrates that sources of stratification such as food sales, land expansion and household business, that have a significant effect in regions favourable to agricultural production, do not have a similar impact on household stratification in this forested region. The differing effects of entrepreneurial activity in Komi may be attributed to the household employment structure in which agricultural employment is a minority. As a result, the primary source of stratification is employment income, not entrepreneurship.
... Most of those oligarchs headed private corporations formed on the basis of former state enterprises, such as regional oil companies, banks, or metallurgical plants. They typically made their first million through commodity trading, imports of scarce goods, or financial brokering, then grew by acquiring state assets as they were privatized (Brady 1999;Freeland 2000;Klebnikov 2000;Brzezinski 2001). Alfa Group, Inkombank, Rosprom, SBS-Agro, and Rossiiskii Kredit all had their origins in enterprises formed under the auspices of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or its youth branch, the Komsomol. ...
A vibrant civil society--characterized by the independently organized activity of people as citizens, undirected by state authority--is an essential support for the development of freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Thus it has been one important indicator of the success of post-communist transitions.
This volume undertakes a systematic analysis of the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. An introduction and two historical chapters provide background, followed by chapters that analyze the Russian context and consider the roles of the media, business, organized crime, the church, the village, and the Putin administration in shaping the terrain of public life. Eight case studies then illustrate the range and depth of actual citizen organizations in various national and local community settings, and a concluding chapter weighs the findings and distills comparisons and conclusions.
... 5 The economic-political networks, often referred to as clans in Russia, bring together politicians and businessmen linked through special relationships of mutual support. 6 The formation of such groups started under Mikhail Gorbachev during the process of spontaneous privatization and accelerated later, with the economic reforms of the 1990s (Goldman, 2003;Hoffman, 2002;Freeland, 2000;Klebnikov, 2000). These networks embody the common interests of the politicians who faced the necessity of being reelected, and the economic actors who sought property as well as protection of their property rights. ...
The phenomenon of crony capitalism has been explored primarily with reference to its impact on economic growth. This study investigates the political implications of crony capitalism and, specifically, the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism. Based on a case study of a political trajectory in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, I argue that under crony capitalism political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state authorities and such democratic institution as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during the electoral campaigns unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites engaged in struggle for power and wealth and increases public perceptions of corruption.
... However, precisely because they are based on scarce raw materials, these firms are especially attractive for political capitalism, since they can be run into the ground but still generate huge profits. The history of the Russian metals, gas, and oil sectors and their appropriation in the infamous "loans for shares" privatization (consisting of rigged auctions) attests to this fact (see Klebnikov 2000). ...
This article critiques the dominant neoliberal transition paradigm. The implementation of neoliberal reforms in the postcommunist
world has fostered the creation of two different types of capitalism. Rather than enabling a transition to Western European-style
capitalism, these reforms have produced divergence within the postcommunist world. This article uses comparative firm-level
case studies from Russia and Poland to construct a “neoclassical” sociological alternative to neoliberal theory that can explain
this divergence. In this account, intra-dominant class structure (the pattern of alliances between the Party bureaucracy,
the technocracy, and humanistic intellectuals) at the time of the transition produces different “paths to capitalism,” or
policy regimes, which, in turn, have different effects on the ability of firms to restructure. In Russia, this creates a system
of “patrimonial capitalism” that will produce long-term economic stagnation. In Poland, a variety of modern rational capitalism
emerges. This latter system is distinguished by its very high levels of dependence on capital imports in comparison to the
advanced capitalist countries. As a result, this type of economy will be quite vulnerable to economic shocks.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its one-hundredth birthday in 2021. Its durability poses a twofold question: How has the party survived thus far? And is its survival formula sustainable in the future? This Element argues that the CCP has displayed a continuous capacity for adaptation, most recently in response to the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the collapse of communism in Europe. As the CCP evaluated the lessons of 1989, it identified four threats to single-party rule: economic stagnation; socioeconomic discontent; ideological subversion; and political pluralism. These threats have led to adaptive responses: allowing more private activity; expansion of the social safety net; promotion of indigenous cultural production; and rival incorporation into the party. Although these responses have enabled the CCP to survive thus far, each is reaching its limit. As adaptation stagnates, the strategy has been to increase repression, which creates doubt about the ongoing viability of single-party rule.
Dieser Beitrag fasst die sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsliteratur zum Lobbyismus in Russland zusammen. Weder im russländischen Rechtssystem noch in der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Praxis kann Lobbyismus trennscharf von Korruption oder (il)legitimer Interessenvertretung abgegrenzt werden. Lobbyismus wird folglich anhand von drei Forschungsperspektiven diskutiert, die unterschiedliche Aspekte staatlich-wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen beleuchten: oligarchischer Lobbyismus der 1990er-Jahre, Lobbyismus im Autoritarismus seit den 2000er-Jahren sowie Lobbyismus in der Außenwirtschaftspolitik.
Initially Western scholars generally assumed that Russia would become a ‘normal’ democratic state, taking its place in the existing world order. They attributed this to Yeltsin's democratic credentials, but they could do so only by ignoring the clear flaws in Russian democracy as it developed under his presidency. This means that when Russia moved in a more authoritarian direction under Yeltsin’s successor Vladimir Putin, the explanation that most gave for this was the agency of Putin. He was seen as reinstating many of the elements of the Soviet legacy, including the role of the security apparatus. Putin’s rise was also seen as decisive in the shift of Russia’s international position from one seeking accommodation within the existing international architecture to one seeking to revise that architecture in ways objectionable to the West. The result is said to be a new cold war. But there is disagreement about how this should be understood: is Russia acting as a traditional great power, and therefore understandable through the established principles of international relations, or is she still claiming Soviet-style exceptionalism? What is clear, and many do not appreciate, is that even when Putin has gone, Russia’s core interests will likely not change.
Andrew Wedemen argues that China succeeded in moving from a Maoist command economy to a market economy because the central government failed to prevent local governments from forcing prices to market levels. Having partially decontrolled the economy in the early 1980s, economic reformers baulked at price reform, opting instead for a hybrid system wherein commodities had two prices, one fixed and one floating. Depressed fixed prices led to 'resource wars', as localities battled each other for control over undervalued commodities while inflated consumer goods prices fuelled a headlong investment boom that saturated markets and led to the erection of import barriers. Although local rent seeking and protectionism appeared to carve up the economy, in reality they had not only pushed prices to market levels and cleared the way for sweeping reforms in the 1980s, they had also pushed China past the 'pitfalls' of reform that entrapped other socialist economies.
Who are the post-Soviet oligarchs? Have they been members of the nomenklatura before 1991? Did they accumulate their initial wealth before or after privatization? To answer these questions, I have compiled an original dataset of oligarchs drawing on publicly available biographical data in the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union. The dataset covers the period from 1991 to 2011. There are two trends in the literature on oligarchs. One group of scholars argues that the oligarchs represent the former nomenklatura, while the second group claims that the members of the new business elites have diverse career backgrounds.
The findings in this paper disconfirm the nomenklatura capitalism hypothesis. First, I show that many of the oligarchs were initially founders of cooperatives, some of them too young to be part of the party bureaucracy. Second, I parse out the oligarchic career paths, and suggest that most oligarchs made their fortunes by trading various goods during the perestroika period. Trading involved significant risks and was deemed as a quasi-criminal activity, so leading party officials were less likely to jeopardize their party careers by engaging in trading. Third, many oligarchs move from trading to banking and from banking to industry. The future oligarchs were individuals, who took high risks and accumulated their initial capital prior to the privatization rounds in their respective countries. However, numerous oligarchs have used their initial capital to become industrialists. This project contributes to a better understanding of the origins and emergence of oligarchs in the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union.
Re-feudalization or patrimonial capitalism can have a political consequence: the illiberal state, as Russia and China illustrate. Given the specific historical and geographical circumstances, as well as the variations in cultural traditions, Mihályi and Szelényi distinguish three different rent-seeking mechanisms under post-communism as times changed since 1989: market capture by political elites, state capture by oligarchs, and capture of oligarchs by autocratic rulers. The last mechanism is particularly controversial and very difficult to judge from a moral/ethical standpoint because of the widespread practice of selective criminalization of the real or potential enemies of the autocratic rulers. The Putin–Khodorkovsky war put into the limelight a particular nature of the Russian post-communist economy: its strong dependence on world market rents earned from the export of gas and oil.
What is unfolding in front of our eyes is the greatest emancipatory achievement of humankind since the Enlightenment. The danger is, however, that countries predominantly and lastingly based on rent-seeking tend to be economically stagnating or declining and socially unstable. The purpose of this book was not to make a case against rent-seeking and for profit-seeking. Pareto’s observation seems to be insightful still today: a modern market economy needs both speculators and rentiers: foxes and lions. But too many foxes, too much speculation, too much unrestrained markets can cause instability, The lowest possible VAT and modest taxes on wages and profits compensated by as high tax rates on inheritance and capital gain taxes as practically possible, seem to serve both social justice and economic dynamism.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the housing systems of market countries in Western Europe and countries with transitional economies in Eastern Europe. The research focuses on the housing stratification defined as social inequalities in housing needs. Data were collected from the descriptive statistics of sociodemographic and cross-country differences presented by Eurostat and NGO Housing Europe containing indicators of housing stratification. The study showed a discrepancy between housing conditions in the Eastern European and developed Western countries in meeting housing needs. Exploring differences in the distribution of the population by place of residence and by type of residence, the authors come to a conclusion on the existence of a "cargo cult" formed in the former socialist countries with respect to residential real estate. The concept of "rumanianization" is suggested as a result of the ranking of maturity and effectiveness of housing policies in different countries. It describes the worst case of organizing relationships in the housing sphere. This case presumes that most dwellings remain in unserved and unencumbered private property, that mortgage and housing loans are absent or underdeveloped, and that any types of rentals are unaccounted for by the statistics and thus stay outside of state control. The authors demonstrate that use of the positive European experience in reduction of social inequality in housing may improve the efficiency of the implementation of national and regional housing programs and also may provide a transition to a socially oriented type of economic development in the future.
This paper presents a detailed review dedicated to the special issue of Comparative Sociology "25 Years after the USSR" (2017, vol. 16, iss. 1). The issue includes six original research papers that may be of interest for scholars working in economic sociology. The paper shows how the topic of post-Soviet transformations still remains relevant for economic sociologists, and it highlights the advantages and the shortcomings of the articles presented in the issue of Comparative Sociology. The paper also demonstrates how the dissolution of the USSR and restructuring of social sciences, and economic sociology in particular, are related to the dominance of the sociology of markets as a research program. In short, expansion of market capitalism defines the market exchange as a key paradigm for social action. It has two consequences. On the one hand, economic sociology has been increasingly involved in the study of markets with a particular emphasis on the social structures enhancing market exchanges. On the other hand, this focus on the "scaffolding" structures of markets has made economic sociology an extension, rather than a competitor, to neoclassical economic theory. The paper presents the arguments for this conclusion. Finally, the limitations of comparative analysis of capitalism in different countries are revealed.
The article explores how the rules of state support policy for innovation development arose and were fixed in Russia in the 2000s. The author considers Russian business incubators as a new organizational form that emerged as a result of the institutionalization of those rules. She analyzes this process through the prism of new institutionalism ideas in organizational theory and economic sociology. The author examines the launch of the state technopark and business incubator in the Novosibirsk region on the empirical basis of 26 structured interviews with the main stakeholders of the business incubator. The analysis focuses on the role and resources of the institutional entrepreneurs in the emergence of the new organizational form. The article describes the context of the process itself, the groups and actors who were involved in disputes about the business incubator rules, the results of communication among them, and the importance of social skills. The history of the business incubator development shows features of the institutionalization of the rules of state support policy for innovation development. That is, institution building has a better chance of success if there are not only already existing informal rules and profile practices, but also a working negotiation process between relevant stakeholders in search of suitable motivations for reaching common goals. This fact translates the professional task into a political dimension. Requests for innovation from the federal authorities also gives sociopolitical legitimacy, which is necessary for effective negotiation.
2016 marked the 10th anniversary of the death of a well-known researcher of the Russian society, Yury Levada. His book A Time of Changes: The Subject and Researcher's Attitude was published to commemorate his work. The book consists of both well-known and lesser-known papers, including papers in economic sociology. In "Social Frames of Economic Action" (1980), Levada defines the subject of economic sociology, explains the role of the society and culture in the economy, and demonstrates the historicity of rationality. These ideas are developed in his "Cultural Context of Economic Action" (1984). In this paper, Levada points out that human needs are embedded into culture, whereas economic exchange is loaded by cultural meanings. In "Homo oeconomicus, or The Fate of a Phantom" (1977), the key characteristics of Homo oeconomicus and the prospective use of this model are highlighted. "The Problems of Economic Anthropology by K. Marx" (1983) also includes Levada's reflections on the assumptions of Homo oeconomicus and the discrepancies between this model and real life. What makes Levada's approach unique is that, on one hand, his ideas in economic sociology follow the tradition of the Soviet sociology (a complex mix of Marxism and structural functionalism). On the other hand, these ideas are developed to the micro level, close to the stream of the new economic sociology.
The author explores the discussion about political consumerism in modern society and offers a broader approach to the politics of consumption from a historical perspective. After the cultural turn in consumption studies, the development of political consumerism as a new analytical framework has become a productive step forward for deeper understanding of consumption and the notion of the consumer. In particular, this paper reviews the main reasons for the emergence of an economic understanding of consumption and how this understanding has led to an opposition between politics and consumption. The theory of political consumerism softened the antagonistic relations between the passive and self-interested consumer and the active citizen who cares about social prosperity. According to this approach, consumption is a new creative form of political participation during the societal shift to more post-materialist values and increasing demand for individual autonomy. Consumers use markets as an alternative arena for political action, where their purchasing power becomes a tool for restoring social justice without government intervention. However, the author argues that the theory of political consumerism is too linear and too narrow a framework for analyzing the variety involved in the politics of consumption. The politics of consumption reflect the dynamics of the relationship between the state and its citizens. The notion of the consumer is shaped not only by the market economy, but also by the directive power and interests of the state. Based on historical evidence from different countries, this paper shows the proliferation of genealogies of consumerist policy and the understandings of the citizenship norms represented by consumers.
Naked City is a continuation of Prof. Sharon Zukin's earlier books (Loft Living and Cultures of Cities) and updates her views on how people use culture and capital in New York. Its focus is on a conflict between city dwellers' desire for authentic origins and new beginnings, which many contemporary megalopolises meet. City dwellers wish to defend their own moral rights to redefine their places for living given upscale constructions, rapid growth, and the ethics of standardization. The author shows how in the frameworks of this conflict they construct the perceived authenticity of common and uncommon urban places. Each book chapter tells about various urban spaces, uncovering different dimensions of authenticity in order to catch and explain fundamental changes in New York that emerged in the 1960s under the mixed influences of private investors, government, media, and consumer tastes. The Journal of Economic Sociology published "Introduction. The City That Lost Its Soul," where the author explains the general idea of the book. She discusses the reasons for the emergence and history of the social movement for authenticity, having combated both the government and private investors since the 1960s. Prof. Zukin also traces the transformation of the concept of authenticity from a property of a person, to a property of a thing, to a property of a life experience and power.
This paper presents an overview of the Moscow market of centers for sexual well-being (CSWB), which is a new niche in the market of psychological services, providing counseling services on the issues of sexual and psychological well-being. Human notions of happiness and sexual wellbeing have been commercialized and have become a commodity that can be purchased for a certain price, like any product or service. Centers for sexual well-being use divergent strategies to legitimize their activities and create a sustainable demand for their services. These legitimation strategies are embedded in the culture of society. Data were collected from a qualitative content analysis of the websites of eight centers for sexual well-being in Moscow. It was revealed that this market is small and underdeveloped, with services being provided in the form of trainings and consultations, whereas there are no established standards for professional skills, educational background, and seniority. The cost of training varies from 1,500 rubles up to 80,000 rubles per person, while almost all the centers are targeted at females. On the basis of the coding matrix, the main strategies of legitimation were identified and described as follows: the way to achieve happiness in the personal and family sphere (1); the tool for the development of human capital (2); the educational project of public discourse about sex (3); and the form of leisure (4). These strategies can be combined by the centers, and they are not mutually exclusive. The study resulted in a detailed description of the CSWB market, the rules and principles for the functioning of market participants, and a description of their legitimation strategies. This work can be useful for scholars interested in exploring new emerging markets.
Many companies demonstrate a low level of corporate responsiveness to environmental safety issues. The existing literature indicates egoistic behavior of companies as the main cause. However, these conclusions are based on cases from the developed countries. What determines the low corporate responsiveness to environmental safety in developing and transition economies, for which the very concept of environmental business responsibility is new? Responding to this question, this paper explores the experience of a large Russian oil company in ensuring environmental safety in the development of an oil field located in Russia . Data were collected from the documented sources of information and 15 in-depth interviews with managers who make decisions on the environmental safety of the project as well as with external experts who cooperate with this company in the field of environmental safety. The study showed that the low responsiveness to environmental safety of Russian companies is not due to their selfish behavior, as it is suggested in the existing literature, but due to the illiteracy of their top managers and their lack of understanding of environmental safety issues. Following the approach of Richard Whitley, the author explains this illiteracy as a cognitive derivative of the national business system. The author shows that illiteracy of top managers regarding environmental issues is backed by the Russian culture, education, financial, and political systems. A theoretical explanation is offered for how environmental irresponsibility is formed within a context where the very concept of environmental business responsibility is new. Governmental intervention in decision-making on environmental safety issues and the activities of regulatory authorities are discussed.
Using survey data from 900 rural households, this article assesses the degree to which Soviet-era workplace inequality between rural males and females has been remediated by the introduction of democratic and market reforms. The overall effects of reform institutions are mixed. Concerning male-female workplace inequality, three continuities were found with the Soviet period. First, rural males have larger total incomes than do rural females. Second, equal pay for equal work does not exist: females holding similar positions to males earned less in all categories of employment. In addition, males continue to dominate numerically the ranks of farm managers and leaders. Third, managers and leaders of both sexes are the most entrepreneurial, measured by income from private business. Male managers, however, have over three times the income from private business as do female managers. Concerning intragender inequality, it was found that females with advanced education and specialized knowledge or skills have significantly higher incomes than women with lower skill sets.
The term‘unintentional humour’ is frequently invoked when something that was not meant to be funny is perceived as such. Remarkably, an atmosphere of this kind permeates the debate about the so-called ‘new Russian’ phenomenon which began to emerge in the USSR at about the time of its breakdown.
St. Petersburg has not been successful in overcoming a large number of social and economic obstacles inherited from its Soviet past. St. Petersburg is missing an important set of pre-conditions that are critical to attain a level of global interaction required to be considered for secondary city status in a semi-peripheral country. Only the city’s cultural activities appear to qualify the city for world city status. As long as Russia itself remains “stuck in transition,” world city status for St. Petersburg will remain elusive.
This article has four main objectives. First, it introduces the ideal types of domination of Weber. Contrary to the received wisdom, which knows only “three ideal types” (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) I present the “fourth” type of domination, Weber called “Wille der Beherrschten” as an important correction of his ideal type of legal-rational authority. Next I make a novel, critical distinction between patrimonial and prebendal types of traditional authority. Third, I discuss various ways that communist regimes tried to legitimate themselves and how they entered eventually a legitimation crisis, leading to the collapse of communism. In the next section, I explore the different ways post-communist capitalisms seek legitimacy (with various combinations of legal rational authority and patrimonialism), and finally I conclude with a trend of re-convergence of some post-communist systems (especially Russia and Hungary, but with signs for similar trends elsewhere) into an illiberal, prebendal quasi-democratic system.
Yeltsin’s oligarchy
1
was 15, or even 20 or even 50, very rich people who featured all the time in the mass media. They were very ambitious. They were prepared to go openly i1nto the government or Duma, or to finance a political party. They were well known because they were popular. However, it would be difficult to argue that they controlled any part of the real economy.
When in October 2011 the Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili announced that he was going into politics, discussions focused on whether he is a “Kremlin project” or not. Even if there were evidence of that, it would not be enough to explain Ivanishvili’s eruption into Georgian politics. This biographical sketch charts the rise of Ivanishvili and explores his previous business career in Russia, his professional relationships and key transactions, and his views on the future of Georgian-Russian relations.
Security degree and specification level of property rights are keys for successful economic and social modernization in Russia. In the research, the attempt of evaluating the nature of political influences on evolution of property rights is made. Chronologically research captures the period from 1985 (period of Perestroika) to 2012. According to the author’s claim, such political parameters, as the way of power legitimation, actors’ access to the economic, military and symbolical resources, made major impact on the formation of property rights in Russia.
DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n10p241
This article does not have an abstract
An American expert on Russian politics analyzes prominent claims that American “Russia-watchers” have mischaracterized and misunderstood the post-Soviet situation, contributed to the dissolution of the USSR, and helped cause Russia's socioeconomic crisis. Assertions that a change in the mind-set of American scholarship on Russia and that a transfer of billions of dollars to the Russian government are necessary to ameliorate the situation also are examined. The article draws upon a large body of contemporary scholarly work and newspaper articles as well as United Nations and World Bank statistics.
The more important Vladimir Putin is said to be for mobilizing support for the Russian regime, the greater the potential void when he leaves office. This article empirically tests the impact that Vladimir Putin has had on public opinion through an original analysis of New Russia Barometer data. After reviewing the multiple roles of a president, it reports how the Russian public has evaluated President Putin's popularity during his period in office. It then tests the extent to which this evaluation has added to support for the Federation regime. Based on these findings, it draws conclusions about the impact of succession on the consolidation of the institutions of the Russian Federation.
Privatization constitutes one of the most successful achievements in Post-Soviet Russian reform. However, apparent great successes notwithstanding, the privatization program tainted with distortions of its original ideas, political compromises and collusions between political leaders and business elites produced tremendous criticisms and distrust as well. Given those negative aspects of privatization, some people raised the necessity of review of the privatization programs conducted during the 1990s. But despite such criticisms and negative evaluations of the privatization program, as was shown in the case of the Yukos affair, the Russian government never denied the principle of private ownership nor reexamined the privatization results. To explain such a trend in Russian privatization, this paper adopts the concept of policy learning, in which reconceptualization of policy agendas-adopting private property as an essential element of the market economy, for example-take place.
Ten years ago, John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics summarized a recipe for structural adjustment in Latin America into ten ingredients. According to Williamson the recipe was 'generally applicable' elsewhere, and universally agreed upon in Washington institutions. However, the Washington Consensus is increasingly under attack from different camps. We discuss the Russian crisis in August 1998 as a case history of the breakdown of the Consensus among economists, within and outside the international organizations. While several economists have contributed to the current critical mood, we focus on how Joseph Stiglitz, then chief economist at the World Bank, reacted to the Russian crisis, before his resignation at the end of the same year. We contrast his views with those of other economists at the IMF and other international organizations. Looking at this debate, we suggest that the Russian crisis, following the Asian crisis in the previous year, marked a watershed of intellectual perceptions, gave voice to dissenters, and openly broke the Consensus within international organizations. We also discuss the reasons for and implications of this change in the intellectual climate within the economic profession.
An American political scientist investigates the redistribution of property in Russia after the 1998 financial crash. Making extensive use of Russian and Western documentary sources, as well as three research trips that included formal and informal discussions with politicians, scholars, and journalists, the article examines both the rise of new major players in the Russian political economy and the transformation of old ones. The study includes both industrial and agricultural economic groups, as well as the ambiguous role of the state in both sectors.
The interplay between the state and the super rich has been a subject of intense debate since the time of Aristotle, who introduced the notion of oligarchs and the oligarchic regime as the ruling of a few rich people. The ideologically loaded debates about the role of wealthy people in society can be found in each country in the contemporary world. In recent times, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi is both Italy’s prime minister and the richest person in the country (who has almost complete control over Italian TV) has aroused intense debates about the impact of big business on politics (Stille, 2003). It is not surprising that the case of the Italian prime minister draws attention in Russia, where he is often compared to both the Russian president as well as to the oligarchs (Remnik, 2003). A dramatic struggle between Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whose wealth was estimated before his arrest at eight-billion dollars,11No. 26 on the Forbes list of the world’s richest people (www.forbes.com/lists/results; Bushueva, 2002). unfolded in the summer and fall of 2003. This conflict will likely be recounted in any future textbook that discusses the relationship between political power and big money.
This paper focuses on an analysis of the factors that contribute to differences in political attitudes and political participation of Russian capital owners. Such factors may include different size and type of capital, the degree of past political socialization, the respondents’ age and generational experiences, past/present well-being comparisons and education. The paper begins with a discussion of different theories that make hypotheses about the political behavior of capital owners. These hypotheses were tested in a small, exploratory study of Russian capital owners that I conducted in Russia in the late 1990s. The results of the study are then analyzed within two different but closely interrelated contexts: the wider historical context of social, political and economic changes of the first decade of post-Soviet transformation, and the micro-context of the respondents personal political, economic and social history. In the end, I return to the analyses of the original hypotheses and conclude with a discussion of which theory comes closest to predicting and explaining the results of the study.
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