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From Passion to Emotion: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category
Abstract
Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon argues that this domination by one single descriptive category is not healthy. Overinclusivity of 'the emotions' hampers attempts to argue with any subtlety about the enormous range of mental states and stances of which humans are capable. This book is an important contribution to the debate about emotion and rationality which has preoccupied western thinkers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has implications for contemporary debates.
... La emoción laudable del pudor facilita la virtud de la castidad al no exponer el cuerpo a las tentaciones de la sensualidad. Así, santo Tomás se sitúa en un plano superior a los dos extremos opuestos frente a las pasiones, representados, por un lado, por el estoicismo que juzga como malas a todas las pasiones y, por otro, por el hedonismo que las glorifica (Dixon, 2006). De esta manera, las pasiones bien reguladas por la voluntad son fuerzas que nos ayudan al bien moral. ...
... Por consiguiente, la emoción se convierte en un campo de estudio específico que interesa tanto a filósofos como a psicólogos, biólogos evolucionistas, antropólogos y, más recientemente, a los investigadores provenientes de las denominadas neurociencias. En este contexto, el término pasión, característico de la reflexión filosófica antigua, medieval y moderna, es sustituido paulatinamente por el concepto secular de emoción, ampliamente utilizado por los nuevos enfoques teóricos (Dixon, 2006). Darwin, como ya lo anotamos, inaugura una comprensión de las emociones con un enfoque evolucionista que influye hasta nuestros días. ...
... En el teatro griego, pathos se asocia con lo patético, es decir, la excitación de pasiones como la tristeza, la indignación, el temor y la compasión, como consecuencia de ver la condición humana sometida a los avatares de la fortuna. La reconstrucción histórica del paso o la transformación de la categoría antigua de "pasión" al concepto contemporáneo de "emoción" se encuentra ampliamente desarrollada porDixon (2006). A pesar de que el término emoción es de uso reciente en la historia de la filosofía, lo usaremos de manera poco delimitada, dejando claro que este concepto solo apareció de manera explícita en el siglo XIX. ...
Although emotions are at the core of who we are, their nature and structure continues to be a broad field of research for different scientific disciplines today. However, like many other topics of current reflection, emotions have a background, a history that should be kept in mind to place the concepts, debates and various theoretical approaches in the cultural framework and traditions of thought that gave rise to them. In this book we take a brief tour of the history of emotions from ancient times to the most recent discussions in the field of studies of the nervous system and the brain, in such a way that the reader can recognize, broadly speaking, the interpretations and original positions that triggered various theoretical understandings around these physical and mental phenomena that make up our existence. In this context, the history of emotions is approached from an interdisciplinary perspective that encompasses psychology, philosophy, anthropology, neuroscience and other fields of study interested in clarifying the nature and structure of our emotional repertoire.
... Para profundizar la comprensión del maestro varón, se recurre a los aportes de los estudios históricos de las masculinidades 2 (Aresti, 2020;Peluffo, 2010Peluffo, , 2013 y de las paternidades (Cosse, 2009;King, 2015;LaRossa, 1997). Asimismo, este escrito se inscribe en el ámbito de indagación abierto por el giro emocional o afectivo 3 , y establece diálogos estrechos con la sociología de las emociones (Hochschild, 2003(Hochschild, , 2011 y la historia de las emociones (Aschmann, 2014;Bolufer, 2007Bolufer, , 2016Dixon, 2003;Stearns, 1994). Vale agregar que, desde hace más de una década, la investigación en historia de la educación se está enriqueciendo con conceptos y abordajes provistos por los estudios sobre emociones, afectos y (Abramowski, 2018;Landahl, 2015;Pimenta Rocha y Toro Blanco, 2022;Pineau, Serra y Southwell, 2017;Sobe, 2012). ...
... En el marco del giro afectivo, particularmente, a partir del despliegue de la historia de las emociones, han surgido estudios que cuestionan la visión prevaleciente de la Modernidad como la «Era de la Razón» (Aschmann, 2014;Dixon, 2003). En esta línea, diversos trabajos sobre el siglo XVIII y la Ilustración europea muestran de qué modo lo sentimental tomó relieve en la escena política y pública, dando lugar a un tipo de personalidad con un «alto nivel de afecto» que recibió el nombre de «hombre de sentimientos» (Stone, 1990, p. 148). ...
A partir de los aportes del giro emocional o afectivo y de los estudios históricos
sobre masculinidades, en este artículo se interroga el perfil afectivo del maestro varón de escuela primaria en Argentina, entre las últimas dos décadas del siglo XIX y las primeras tres décadas del siglo XX. El trabajo con fuentes documentales (en particular, con revistas educativas e informes producidos por el personal directivo de las escuelas normales) deja en evidencia que, en el período en cuestión, había expresas referencias a maestros suaves y cariñosos. La lectura habitual que
establece una equivalencia entre el costado afectivo de la docencia y el estereotipo femenino moderno, resulta insuficiente para interpretar este fenómeno y este artículo busca otras vías de indagación. A lo largo del escrito se deja en evidencia que el proceso de feminización del magisterio no estuvo exento de conflictos y que la demanda de maestros varones fue una solicitud constante. La conclusión propuesta es que, al mirar el costado afectivo del maestro de escuela primaria de
fines del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX con el prisma de las masculinidades disponibles, es posible advertir una yuxtaposición entre, por un lado, el modelo de la masculinidad normativa que resaltaba la virilidad, por el otro, la masculinidad sentimental ilustrada forjada en el siglo XVIII europeo y con efectos en Latinoamérica en el siglo XIX y, finalmente, las reconfiguraciones de la paternidad
perfiladas hacia el siglo XX.
... 82. 5 ad 1). Affections do not seem to be mere attitudes but rather "affectively warm and lively states" (Dixon, 2003; see SCG I sec. 90-91) and so it seems that Aquinas attributes some emotions to God (when emotions are defined in this way). ...
According to one conception of God, God is completely self-sufficient: nothing can affect or influence God outside of God. According to a second conception of God, God is emotionally responsive to others. These two conceptions of God reflect different ideals about agency. For the first conception of God, it is important that God is autonomous; that is, completely self-governing and able to act, unconstrained by any external agents or influences. For the second conception of God, it is important that God has relational agency; that is, that God can be affected by God’s creatures such that God’s creatures can cause God to feel joy or sorrow. Theists face an apparent dilemma in choosing between these differing conceptions of God: either they must forfeit God’s absolute autonomy, or else they must forfeit God’ relational agency. In either case, it seems, they must deny that God has perfect agency. This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, in the form of what I call ‘Denisian passibilism’, according to which God transcends not only positive but also negative language about God.
... Dixon ha estudiado cómo el término emoción ha reemplazado al de pasión. Este segundo estaba más unido a la apertura a la recepción de un don y a una trascendencia (Dixon, 2003). La emoción, en cambio, se centra en el sujeto y en lo que siente, y no asume la dimensión relacional que le abriría a una trascendencia. ...
Se plantea cómo el Magisterio de la Iglesia va profundizando en la naturaleza del amor y lo hace el centro del misterio de la redención del hombre. No la interpretación emotiva del amor (incapaz de construir una verdadera historia personal), sino de ese amor que crece continuamente colaborando con la acción creadora de Dios que genera la cultura.
... . The shift from emotion to a ectivity Dixon (2003) illustrates how the 19th century saw the rise of emotions as a distinct psychological category, replacing older concepts such as appetites, passions, feelings, and affections. By comparing medieval theological psychologies and those of the 18th century with Darwin and William James, Dixon argues that the dominance of a single descriptive category (emotion) is inadequate. ...
In recent decades, there has been an increased interest in psychology to understand the emotional experience. This growing interest has led to a proliferation of terms, among which regulation, intelligence, and emotional competence stand out. Research in these areas has facilitated a better understanding of what emotion entails and how to intervene in it. However, this study highlights that these contributions are insufficient if one aims to understand and intervene in how reality affects each person. In this sense, there is an advocacy for the recovery of the term affectivity, as it addresses all affective experiences and, therefore, is broader and more integrative.
... Los archivos judiciales constituyen una puerta de entrada para observar la evaluación que la sociedad chilena realizó sobre las reacciones emocionales y el mundo de los afectos durante el siglo XVIII. Expedientes de diversa índole nos entregan relatos donde las emociones juegan un papel central para caracterizar el estado anímico 1 Barona, Moscoso y Pimentel, 2003;Dixon, 2003;Bolufer, 2016;Barker-Benfield, 1992 y Reddy, 2001. 2 Bolufer, 2016, op. cit.;Morant y Bolufer, 1998;Frevert, 2011. ...
En este artículo se explora la forma en que en la zona central de la Capitanía General de Chile durante el siglo XVIII se identificó y evaluó el estado emocional de mujeres que, presas de emociones fuertes, reaccionaron de forma violenta y desaforada cometiendo “excesos” considerados fuera del marco de la ley. Para ello, se examinan expedientes judiciales que involucraron acciones violentas, disputas interpersonales y conflictos familiares en los que el estado de ánimo en el cual fueron cometidos los actos bajo escrutinio fue objeto de atención. Interesa explorar sobre todo cómo fueron descritos el exceso pasional o las emociones perturbadas de mujeres, comparado a la forma en que se describía los de los hombres, para poder establecer patrones en esta identificación y la evaluación que de ello hicieron los afectados, jueces, testigos y abogados. Se sugiere que la cultura chilena identificó en el “furor” y la “furia”, traducidos en reacciones que denotaban “voracidad” y “descompostura”, un germen de desestabilización interna que era cercano a la locura o que podía ser asimilado a ella. Este estado de alteración interna podía afectar tanto a hombres como a mujeres; sin embargo, la evaluación de sus implicancias fue en cada caso distinta.
... It was also central to theories that tried to explain animal and human behavior, as looking for pleasure and avoiding pain were thought to be the driving forces behind actions (some scholars even postulated that, strictly speaking, there was only love and its contrary, hate, while all the rest of the passions-hope, despair, etc.-were merely variations depending on circumstances). 40 Feijoo distinguishes three types of love. One is "pure appetite," the passion we feel when we smell a delicious fruit, for instance. ...
... According to one source, "[I]t was the secularization of psychology that gave rise to the creation and adoption of the new category of 'emotions.'" 73 6) Because the generic statement includes loss of self-control among its elements, any theory built around or on that statement will necessarily portray or present the provocation doctrine, in one way or another, as an excusing doctrine. That is, if and when a defendant receives the benefit of the doctrine, he receives that benefit because the state makes his choice to kill (i.e., his formation of an intent to kill) excusable, or at least not punishable, to some extent or another, even if some other condition must also be established before he receives that benefit. ...
... Philip Fisher suggests that it is only through the modern turn (and the split of what is now called psychology from philosophy) that passions have been replaced by the term emotion: "We can see in mid-eighteenth-century English philosophy and rhetoric the banishing of the term 'passion' and its replacement by the new term 'emotion'" (2002, p. 6). For a book length study of this transition from passions in philosophy to emotion in psychology, see : Dixon 2003. Rhetorical scholar Daniel M. Gross does not differentiate between affect, emotion, or passions: "Theory can meaningfully differentiate between different affects (or passions, or emotions) and even between different instances of the same affect, by way of history…" (2006, p. 9). ...
... Frente a la consideración clásica de que los enemigos de las Luces fueron reacios a cualquier cambio científico durante el período de la Ilustración, pretendo demostrar cómo, a la hora de articular sus doctrinas en torno a la comprensión del ser humano y su relación con el cuerpo, se valieron igualmente de los saberes médicos y científicos para justificar sus posturas, moviéndose en el ambiguo espacio entre la contrarrevolución ilustrada y la modernidad reaccionaria 2 (Artola Renedo y Calvo Maturana, 2017). Los siglos XVIII y XIX fueron un período de intenso debate intelectual en torno a la redefinición de las cualidades y atributos físicos y mentales de los sujetos, poniéndose en cuestión desde la filosofía y la medicina categorías teológicas asentadas desde el Medievo como las pasiones, los apetitos o los afectos (Dixon 2003). La preocupación por redefinir al «hombre moral» y el estatuto de sus atributos espirituales fue una de las obsesiones de la incipiente medicina mental y el discurso psicológico del XIX español (Novella 2011(Novella , 2013. ...
El objetivo del presente artículo es ofrecer un análisis de los esfuerzos que la reacción eclesiástica anti-ilustrada y contrarrevolucionaria, así como ciertos sectores del establishment médico hispano emprendieron a finales del siglo XVIII para fijar y definir una comprensión médico-teológica del ser humano acorde a los postulados católicos tradicionales, y contraria a los nuevos modelos de corte ilustrado. Del mismo modo, pretende explorar el reto que los nuevos descubrimientos científicos dieciochescos en torno al cuerpo y a la irritabilidad nerviosa supusieron a la hora de articular una concepción de la espiritualidad, la corporalidad y las pasiones que no podía simplemente ignorar las aportaciones de la medicina ilustrada. Para ello, se centrará en analizar el tratado médico-teológico El hombre físico, o Anatomía humana físico-filosófica (1800) en el cual el exjesuita Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro intentó compaginar los elementos centrales de la comprensión católica postridentina del ser humano y las pasiones corporales con los avances de la medicina dieciochesca. Con ello, se pretende explorar el carácter dialéctico que definió la cultura corporal y emocional de la reacción anti-ilustrada frente a al estilo sentimental de las luces, pero también sus zonas de contacto, préstamos y transferencias.
... Mucho más difícil, sin embargo, es la asimilación del conocimiento victoriano contemporáneo de las emociones, que en este momento ya se está moviendo hacia una somatización y biologización de las emociones (Frevert et.al. 2014;Dixon 2003). El conocimiento práctico del poder colonial y lo que éste presenta como conocimiento científico no sólo apuntan en dos direcciones ligeramente diferentes, también proceden según temporalidades diferentes. ...
Este artículo examina los cambios en los conceptos utilizados en urdu entre 1870 y 1920 para escribir sobre las emociones. Se sostiene que, mientras que al principio del periodo todavía se pensaba a las emociones a partir de premisas de equilibrio y balance que otorgaban un papel crucial a la voluntad y a la racionalidad, cincuenta años más tarde los conceptos celebraban el poder elemental de las emociones y su capacidad para desbordar al individuo. Esto puede ser leído como un factor e indicador de una emocionalización profunda tanto de la vida privada como de la pública. La primera sección analiza textos pedagógicos y éticos, la segunda artículos publicados en revistas asociadas con el reformista Colegio Mahometano Anglo-Oriental en Aligarh, y en la sección final la reconfiguración del conocimiento de las emociones a través de la traducción y adaptación de tratados psicológicos.
... Previous leadership studies have relied heavily on the efforts of field researchers to identify the most appropriate traits that leaders should possess (Dixon, 2003). Thus, qualitative theory, promoting the idea that leadership is an innate ability, aims to identify the physical and mental traits as well as the personality of the person, such as appearance, intelligence, adaptability, aggressiveness, self-confidence, perseverance, initiative, and collaboration (Koontz & Weihrich, 2010). ...
Corporations with stable financial performance are those that can stay in the business world for a long time, therefore leadership enables this financial performance to be achieved efficiently and sustainably. The purpose of the research is to evaluate the impact of four leadership styles on the financial performance of corporations in Kosovo, because the country's economy is in transition, and this phase of the development of corporations in Kosovo will be helped more by the implementation of leadership styles. Corporations in Kosovo have started to implement the corporate governance system and within this governance, an important part based on the results of the research is the implementation of leadership styles. The research is built on Classical leadership, Transactional leadership, Visionary leadership, and Organic leadership and financial performance of corporations in Kosovo, based on the OLS econometric model. The research data is primary, and the selected research sample is 478 respondents in the selected corporations in Kosovo, through a structured questionnaire that answers the corporate system in Kosovo.
... Un acercamiento desde la teoría política Será a partir de la década de los 2000 cuando las emociones reciban una mayor atención en la Ciencia Política de nuestro país, al hilo de la aparición de las obras de Michael Walzer (2004), Cheryl Hall (2005) y Martha C. Nussbaum (2013). En este sentido, los esfuerzos más relevantes los encontramos en el terreno de la teoría política, una atención que, en muchos de los primeros trabajos, está determinada por el eterno debate terminológico y conceptual entre pasiones, sentimientos y emociones, un debate, arduo y complejo, del que no será objeto este trabajo, pero que todavía se encuentra vigente en la actualidad dentro de la academia (Dixon, 2003). ...
El estudio del papel de las emociones en política no es nuevo, pero es en las últimas décadas, cuando hemos asistido a un renovado y creciente interés por reflexionar e investigar sobre el impacto que las emociones tienen en los comportamientos y discursos políticos. Será a partir de los años 80, con el denominado affective turn, cuando el estudio de las emociones llegue a la ciencia política de la mano de otras disciplinas de las ciencias sociales, particularmente, de la psicología política.
... Sterne'ün kitabının orijinal başlığında bulunan ve Türkçeye "duygu" olarak çevrilen "hissî" kelimesinin burada kısaca üzerinde durarak, yeni bir çeviri arayışının kitabın anlaşılmasında neden gerektiğini açıklamak gerekir. Avrupa dillerinde yapılan duygu çalışmalarında, farklı tarihsel dönemlerde ortaya çıkmış ve farklı kavramlaşmalara işaret eden his sözcükleri, yani passion, sentiment, feeling, affect, ve emotion gibi kelimeler üzerinde durulmuştur; fakat bu hususta tam bir mutabakata varmak yerine, yazardan yazara değişen kullanımlar görülmektedir (Boddice, 2018(Boddice, , 2019Dixon, 2006;Massumi, 2002;Plamper, 2015;Reddy, 2001;Rosenwein, 2019). Bu sözcüklerin ayrımlarına bu makalede girmek mümkün olmasa da, Türkçede "duygu" kelimesinin karşılığı olarak kullanılan ve kullanımı baskın hâle gelen emotion kelimesinin sadece on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Batı dillerine girdiğini ve yirminci yüzyılda özellikle psikoloji olmak üzere çeşitli bilimsel alanlarda yaygınlaştığını, yirmi birinci yüzyılda ise nörobilim için yüksek önem taşıyan psikolojik ve fiziksel bir ifade olarak kullanıldığını belirtmek gerekir (Dixon, 2023;Plamper, 2015, ss. ...
Bu makalede, Laurence Sterne’ün Duygu Yolculuğu eserinin adında geçen “sentimental” kelimesinin ve içinde bulunduğu kelime öbeğinin “Duyarlılık Çağı” olarak da adlandırılan on sekizinci yüzyılda kazandığı anlam ve önemin hem etimolojik hem de felsefî açıdan ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu kelime öbeğinin Türkçe çevirileri, kelimenin Latin dillerindeki etimolojisi ve Osmanlıca çeviriler üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Türkçeye yapılan çevirilerde bazı anlamların yitirildiği ve duygusal açıdan özgül bağlamlandırmaların eksik kaldığı gösterilmektedir. Ayrıca, çevirilerdeki tutarsızlıkların sadece kaotik bir kavramsal alan yaratmakla kalmayıp, yanlış yorumlamalara da yol açtığı savunulmaktadır. Duyarlılık kültünün ve onun içerdiği hissiyatın Latin dillerine özgü olup onların entelektüel geleneklerinden kaynaklanmasından yola çıkarak, Yorick karakterinin hislerinin önemi; Duygu Yolculuğu’nun ayrıntılı metin analizi, eserin alımlanması ve felsefî arka planının incelenmesi yoluyla analiz edilmektedir.
... Allí, las reflexiones en torno al fenómeno afectivo están atravesadas por el surgimiento de la voz emoción que amalgama en sí la totalidad de un contexto de significados determinado por dicotomías que oponen lo afectivo tanto a la acción como a la razón, y lo acaban por desplazar al ámbito privado del fuero íntimo, o bien, médico-patológico (Máiz 2010, Kalberg 2013. En el caso de la lengua inglesa Dixon (2003) ubica el surgimiento de la voz emoción entre 1800 y 1950. Allí, el autor identifica cómo las discusiones respecto al miedo, la esperanza, el amor y el odio dejan de referirse a ellos como pasiones, afecciones del alma, o sentimientos para pasar a denominarlos emociones. ...
La historia conceptual de Koselleck es un instrumento al servicio de una teoría de la historia que busca desarrollar categorías que hagan inteligible por qué acontecen y cómo pueden cumplimentarse las historias. Estas categorías se desprenden del análisis existencial de Heidegger cuya determinación antitética fundamental delinea el horizonte de temporalidad e historicidad. El artículo propone una reflexión genealógica en torno a la voz emoción en tanto concepto antropológico fundamental del lenguaje científico moderno. Con ello, perseguimos el objetivo de ampliar la oferta de categorías que definen nuestras experiencias de finitud; es decir, proponemos incorporar el fenómeno afectivo como fundamento antropológico básico y, de este modo, desarrollar el par dicotómico de miedo y esperanza en tanto categorías metahistóricas cuya fluctuación moviliza tensiones, conflictos y fracturas que revelan la estructura temporal de la existencia.
... It should be noted that the Steam reviews do not have a rating system between a scale of 1-10 (or [1][2][3][4][5]. This means that every review is either positive or negative. ...
The emotions and experiences of players are complex as they can vary due to many factors, such as the difficulty of a video game. However, after finishing video games, most players write reviews of them in which their experiences are described. To understand these better regarding challenging video games, sentiment and textual analyses were conducted on Steam reviews. 993932 reviews were scraped from its website and were imported into R. Using several packages available in R (syuzhet, dplyr, tidytext, ggpubr) and the NRC Emotion Lexicon, the data were investigated. Reviews were grouped into negative and positive ones. According to the results, the following can be concluded regarding player experience in challenging video games: 1) Significant differences exist in case of all emotions and sentiments between the two groups; 2) The emotional valence among both groups significantly differs as well: of negative reviews, it is below zero, and of positive ones is above it; 3) In case of positive reviews, the commonly used words better detail player experiences than in case of negative ones; 4) Regarding the number of votes on and words in both negative and positive reviews, no correlation can be found between them. However, negative reviews are more likely to be agreed with.
... Nicolae Sfetcu gives us an excellent review of the meanings and evolution of the modern concept of emotion. We thus learn that in research, the modern understanding of the notion of "emotion" denotes passion, feeling and affection (Dixon, 2003), unlike what was explained before the 1830s. ...
... Creo que es en la traducción demasiado familiar, es decir en el presentismo de nuestros cómodos "lugares comunes" emocionales, en donde podemos encontrar el principal escollo para localizar diversidad emocional en el pasado que nos sirva, también, como veremos más adelante, de "yacimiento de saber" para nuestros dilemas presentes, y herramienta reveladora de la variedad existente de ideologías, sistemas y comunidades de relaciones emocionales. En este sentido es importante destacar que no sólo de la teoría, también del pasado, se pueden rescatar visiones no duales de nuestros sentimientos antes de que las "pasiones" fueran transformándose en "emociones" entre los siglos XVI y XVII (DIXON, 2003). Como historiadoras, nuestro trabajo sobre el pasado puede desalojarnos de nuestros propios lugares naturalizados -y hasta cierto punto confortables-, siempre que seamos conscientes de la base interpretativa en la que nos situamos. ...
En este trabajo me propongo plantear un mapa orientativo y personal del conjunto de debates y dilemas en los que navegamos hoy en día quienes indagamos en la historia de los sentimientos. En lugar de exponer una historiografía de las emociones circunscrita al territorio que trazan las escuelas tradicionales en historia, he planteado una topografía de debates porque, como argumento en este trabajo, permite presentar cuestiones que presentaré como historiográficas, pero que, además, ayudan a tomar conciencia de diversos dilemas vitales de nuestro presente particularmente trascendentes en la vida de las mujeres.
... This makes the study difficult. In fact, the meanings of "emotion", "feeling" and other comparable words have also evolved (Dixon, 2003;Leys, 2017). I use "fear" here to describe a variety of emotions described in the French sources on the expedition as peur or crainte, but also inquiétude, as well as expressions like broyer du noir when the context indicates that they refer to worry or anxiety. ...
This article makes the case for applying recent developments in the history of emotions, and in particular the concept of “emotional arena”, to the study of past polar expeditions. It focuses on the first Antarctic expedition of Jean-Baptiste Charcot (1903–1905), showing how, despite a lack of ideal sources, attention to the role of emotions in his expedition, and in the way it was communicated to the public provides a new understanding of the culture of exploration of the time. The article pays particular attention to two groups of emotions: first, those related to fear, an emotion that Charcot initially was reluctant to say that he had experienced (his position changed under the influence of journalists who saw the emotion as an interesting selling point); and second, anger and hate, emotions that were deemed inappropriate and were omitted from hidden in published accounts of the expedition, even though they appear in other sources.
... As de Boise (2015) points out, for example, there is little evidence of actual changes in male behaviour in, for example, conducting domestic duties. More importantly, research has challenged the notion that men have not previously been 'emotional' or 'sensitive', with strong evidence to suggest that, despite stereotypes, men have always engaged in these behaviours (Dixon, 2005;de Boise and Hearn, 2017;Wester et al., 2002;MacArthur and Shields, 2015). ...
... SOFIA, VITÓRIA (ES), V.12, N.2, P. 01-26, e12242542 Dez/2023 O poder emocional não é homogêneo, ele possui uma longa e variada história que está associada a diferentes concepções gerais sobre a vida "emocional". Exemplos dessas designações históricas, com usos teóricos e estratégicos distintos, são termos como paixões, sentimentos morais e emoções (Dixon, 2003;Desjardins e Dumouchel, 2012;Andrade, 2014Andrade, , 2016Andrade, , 2020. Se adotarmos "emoção" como o termo geral que engloba as diferentes designações históricas específicas, tal como faz a sociologia atualmente, podemos dizer que as artes de governo, ao explicarem o que é a "emoção", quais são as suas fontes causadoras, como ela se relaciona com as demais faculdades da mente e com o corpo e como ela se expressa e determina as condutas, estabeleciam dispositivos de poder "emocional" inseparáveis de um ideal antropológico e de ordem social. ...
O artigo discute a transformação da principal regra emocional do Ocidente: o amor. As leituras que Reforma e Contrarreforma fizeram da obra de Santo Agostinho colocaram a regra do amor no centro dos tratados de governo das paixões do século XVII. O período de guerras religiosas e unificação dos Estados nacionais fez com que a regra agostiniana fosse deslocada para a política, com o amor-próprio operando como uma grade de leitura pessimista das condutas de súditos e adversários. Se na primeira metade do século a condenação cristã do amor-próprio e o governo neoestoico das paixões se confundiu com a nascente Razão de Estado, na segunda metade ocorreu uma reversão da regra emocional. A concepção jansenista de como a providência divina dispôs dos amores-próprios para colocar a satisfação de um a serviço das necessidades dos outros operou como modelo para a Economia Política e o nascente liberalismo. Com isso, o amor-próprio esclarecido foi afirmado como norma política, mediado pelo dispositivo emocional do comércio.
Solidarity is an elusive concept used and abused for varieties of meaning-making purposes. Compelling cases have competed to characterize it. By definition, solidarity refers to a complexity in terms of theoretical categorization and empirical conceptualization. Therefore, the “fate of solidarity” has somehow remained indeterminate over the course of world history. By revisiting non-Cartesian pragmatics and quantum-logical approaches, this chapter explores transversal implications of solidarity mobilizations. Seen from pragmatist quantal lenses, morphogenetic traits of “solidarity complexions” are mobilized by co-extensive socio-physical/psycho-social constellations. Transnational solidarities move through concurrent dynamics beyond social space–time. “Moving memories” and “traveling imageries” encompass past, present, and future solidarity experiences. Solidarity waves flow thru some quantic patterns like entanglement, indeterminacy, and non-locality. Running fluidly at deeper dimensions, sentimental solidarity streams are founded by and establish psycho-social habitats. Working plastically at surface layers, phenomenal solidarity tides appear athwart socio-physical fields and practices. Plainly put, there is not any clear-cut boundary that separates betwixt the inner lives of “virtual” altruisms and the outer worlds of “real” sacrifices. Hence, “solidarity complexes” (interior virtualities) and “complex solidarities” (exterior realities) should be investigated in combinatorial manners. By way of conclusion, four sentiments (joy-love-lust-pain) are found significant for reconfiguring four (mechanic-organic-parochial-pluriversal) solidarity pathways.
El artículo parte de constatar la actual proliferación de pedagogías afectivo-emocionales de diverso signo y, para comprender este fenómeno, establece relaciones entre estas iniciativas y la narrativa romántico-sentimental configurada en los albores de los sistemas educativos modernos. La hipótesis sostenida es que el entramado precedente funciona de sostén de las actuales pedagogías afectivo-emocionales, al configurar un terreno propicio para su instalación. Luego de presentar el papel que jugaron los sentimientos en la configuración de las subjetividades modernas hacia los siglos XVIII y XIX, y de describir la trama romántico-sentimental que se fue tejiendo en los orígenes del sistema educativo argentino, el artículo se detiene en las críticas formuladas hacia el sustrato romántico-sentimental, en particular, aquella que focaliza en el sentimentalismo.
The first volume of A Comparative Literary History of Modern Slavery explores literary representations of enslavement with a focus on the emotions. The contributors consider how the diverse emotions generated by slavery have been represented over a historical period stretching from the 16th century to the present and across regions, languages, media and genres. The seventeen chapters explore different framings of emotional life in terms of ‘sentiments’ and ‘affects’ and consider how emotions intersect with literary registers and movements such as melodrama and realism. They also examine how writers, including some formerly enslaved people, sought to activate the feelings of readers, notably in the context of abolitionism. In addition to obvious psychological responses to slavery such as fear, sorrow and anger, they explore minor-key affects such as shame, disgust and nostalgia and address the complexity of depicting love and intimacy in situations of domination. Two forthcoming volumes explore the literary history of slavery in relation to memory and to practices of authorship.
In this paper, we provide a brief survey of the history of the concepts of emotion and emotion regulation and compare two of the leading scales of emotion regulation—the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). Our purpose is to determine where there might be room for improved conceptual clarity in the study of emotion regulation research today. We conclude by suggesting that the conceptual difficulties within and between these scales are symptomatic of a deeper problem in psychological research, that of reductionism, and suggest a nonreductive read of the concepts in question.
This article presents a critical bibliographical review of the central characteristics of the medieval doctrine of passions of Augustine and Aquinas. Philosophers of the Middle Ages viewed emotions from a Christian perspective, in addition to physical and ethical bodily speculations derived from ancient Greek philosophy. Just as in Hellenic texts that preceded them, the term "emotions" was not used in classical Latin doctrine, nor in the Bible. The main words used by Augustine and Aquinas derive from passiones and affectiones animae. For Christian theological language, passions are degenerate and conflicting states of human beings as the result of Adam and Eve's punishment due to their disobedience to God, i.e., fruits of the original sin. In this sense, Aquinas describes 11 species of passions - six of the concupiscible appetite and five of the irascible appetite - defined as movements of the sensitive appetite originating from the lower parts of the soul, accompanied by bodily or organic changes, which correspond, respectively, to the decline of the soul, and the disobedience of the “fallen” body.
Automatic Face Emotion Recognition (FER) technologies have become widespread in various applications, including surveillance, human–computer interaction, and health care. However, these systems are built on the basis of controversial psychological models that claim facial expressions are universally linked to specific emotions—a concept often referred to as the “universality hypothesis”. Recent research highlights significant variability in how emotions are expressed and perceived across different cultures and contexts. This paper identifies a gap in evaluating the reliability and ethical implications of these systems, given their potential biases and privacy concerns. Here, we report a comprehensive review of the current debates surrounding FER, with a focus on cultural and social biases, the ethical implications of their application, and their technical reliability. Moreover, we propose a classification that organizes these perspectives into a three-part taxonomy. Key findings show that FER systems are built with limited datasets with potential annotation biases, in addition to lacking cultural context and exhibiting significant unreliability, with misclassification rates influenced by race and background. In some cases, the systems’ errors lead to significant ethical concerns, particularly in sensitive settings such as law enforcement and surveillance. This study calls for more rigorous evaluation frameworks and regulatory oversight, ensuring that the deployment of FER systems does not infringe on individual rights or perpetuate biases.
This paper aims to incorporate Greimassian semiotics of passions in current cognitive science. Concepts such as passional codes, the canonical passional schema, and other central Greimassian notions in the domain of passions are mapped against ideas such as frames and layers of meaning within cognitive science. By integrating the two fields artificially kept apart, the authors endeavour to show how the resulting synergy could shed new light on the study of passions.
Education is the continual organization of experience, and philosophy has, among its tasks, the capacity to provide the criterion for such organization. The educational consequences of a philosophical reflection enable the distinction between philosophical proposals that are mere dilettante abstractions from those that amplify the meaning of experience. As Dewey explains, “[t]he educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophical problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice” (MW 9:338). This means that it is when we trace the impact of philosophical conceptions in education that we best realize the gravity of philosophical misconceptions.
The layered theory of emotions is a hypothetical proposal that aims to best capture the dynamic nature of emotions. It is designed to describe emotions in light of the situations in which they arise.
Isaac Watts (1674-1748) argued that the passions, understood synonymously with the affections, were an essential component of the Christian experience. Watts designed a system of hymnody which allowed the worshipper to excite, cultivate, and express their passions. This paper traces the history of the passions and affections in those who were to influence Watts’ thought, before considering the ways Watts’ hymns allowed the passions to be experienced and articulated.
In the past two decades, the rejection of the fidelity criterion has led to the release of a multitude of films that rework and appropriate canonical literary works to suit local political goals. The works of William Shakespeare have been some of the main beneficiaries of this new direction, as indicated by the significant number of appropriations, remediations, and ‘tradaptations’ (translations-adaptations) that have turned Shakespeare into a global figure. In this article I focus on two film adaptations of Othello , O (Nelson, 2001) and Omkara (Bhardwaj, 2006), that recontextualize the play’s narrative content into two different settings at the turn of the millennia: the American South and India. My aim is to highlight the manner in which the two films repurpose the content of the play in order to reveal the tensions that mark the two local cultures. Early modern concerns such as miscegenation, female sexuality, and religious and racial otherness are appropriated and represented along new cultural coordinates that reflect the anxieties of the two new local cultures. For example, in O , the issue of miscegenation is translated in accordance with the racism that marks the conservative American South, while in Omkara miscegenation is translated as the conflict between two Indian views on marriage: the traditional one that advocates arranged marriages, and the modern one that supports love marriages.
Os cistercienses, uma ordem beneditina reformada do século XII, valorizaram a dimensão afetiva nas relações sociais e espirituais. O termo affectus representava um movimento espontâneo em direção ao outro, refletindo a conexão com o mundo social e transcendente. A linguagem emocional e os conceitos afetivos, como pathos e passio, eram centrais na antropologia religiosa da época. A pesquisa destaca a ligação entre afetividade e educação monástica, principalmente nos escritos de Aelredo de Rievaulx, que integrava esses elementos na formação espiritual e interpessoal dos monges, influenciando a pedagogia cisterciense. Como os cistercienses moldaram a educação monástica por meio da afetividade e espiritualidade?
Yrjö Hirn (1870–1952), art researcher and professor of aesthetics and modern literature, was one of the most internationally renowned Finnish scholars of his time. This chapter examines Hirn’s theory of the emotional and social origins of art as presented in his major work, The Origins of Art: A Psychological and Sociological Inquiry (1900). I focus on the psychological and sociological dimensions of Hirn’s aesthetics, which are very close to Westermarck’s sociology. By ‘psychological’ origin, Hirn refers to the human effort to regulate their emotions by sharing them with others. The underlying mechanism is sympathy or, in today’s terms, emotional empathy. By ‘sociological’ origins, Hirn means the practical reasons that influence the emergence and existence of art. There are related to conveying information, erotic attraction and sexuality, encouragement to work, and beliefs in the magical effects of artistic creations. In addition, the chapter sheds light on Hirn’s debt to the Scottish Enlightenment, especially Adam Smith’s moral philosophy.
Historically, emotions have been treated as basic bodily mechanisms present in living organisms, which are responsible for their survival and growth. They are oftentimes viewed as mediating the course of engagement with the environment by shaping processes like attention, memory, thinking, communication, etc. Today, there is consensus that emotions play a key role in organizing everyday life by regulating the pattern of both approach and avoidance tendencies. It is often held that emotional responses energize us and make us aware of the happenings around us and are expressed and communicated in a flexible manner. They may be healthy and adaptive but can also be destructive. The perception, experience, and expression of emotions do share similarities and differences across cultures. The essentialist view of emotions is insufficient to account for the pattern of happenings in the realm of emotions. A constructionist view is emerging that presents a viable account of emotional phenomena. The meaning and representation of emotions in language also varies across cultures. The Indian approach to emotions in terms of bhāva and rasa proposes a dynamic view of their emergence. They challenge the dichotomy between reason and emotion. Indeed, emotions are at the core of what it means to be human. They are indispensable and have the potential to augment positivity by self-transformation. A human form of important role in shaping everyday lives.
Background: The study of emotions in engineering education (EEE) has
increased in recent years, but this emerging, multidisciplinary body of research
is dispersed and not well consolidated. This paper reports on the first systematic
review of EEE research and scholarship.
Purpose: The review aimed to critically assess how researchers and scholars in
engineering education have conceptualized emotions and how those conceptualizations
have been used to frame and conduct EEE research and scholarship.
Scope/Method: The systematic review followed the procedures of a configurative
meta-synthesis, mapping emotion theories and concepts, research purposes
and methods, and citation patterns in the EEE literature. The review
proceeded through five stages: (i) scoping and database searching; (ii) abstract
screening, full text sifting, and full text review; (iii) pearling; (iv) scoping
review, and (v) in-depth analysis for the meta-synthesis review. Two hundred
and thirteen publications were included in the final analysis.
Results: The results show that the EEE literature has not extensively engaged
with the wide range of conceptualizations of emotion available in the educational,
psychological, and sociological literature. Further, the focus on emotion
often seems to have been unintentional and of secondary importance in
studies whose primary goals were to study other phenomena.
Conclusions: More research adopting intentional, theorized approaches to
emotions will be crucial in further developing the field. To do justice to complex
emotional phenomena in teaching and learning, future EEE research will
also need to engage a broader range of conceptualizations of emotion and
research methods, drawing on diverse disciplinary traditions.
Feelings of injustice and political engagement are often connected, sometimes unquestioningly; the idea being that one generates the other along a sort of continuum. This article examines the links that surface between moral feelings – as a specific form of political emotional experience – and engagement, starting with a decentring of current Western democratic contexts and a shift towards coercive or authoritarian contexts, using field research from the Middle East. Clearly, the emotional intensification linked to violent political experiences must be taken into account, but this emotional intensification does not alone establish any necessary continuity between the shock of certain experiences, a feeling of injustice, and engagement. Activist articulations of a feeling of injustice are in fact three-layered: expression of a feeling fed by lived or transmitted experiences, a reference to ideological frameworks that both legitimise their forms of engagement and help give meaning to their situation, and inscription within a general moral argument. Available on: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/N5MXBY8JH9GENACAFTYT/full?target=10.1080/03906701.2024.2335151
Hughlings Jackson’s work formed a significant link in the transfer-network of Spencerian Lamarckism and neo-Lamarckism models and mechanisms that proved to be so generative for the emerging social sciences of the late nineteenth century, particularly psychology. I discuss Jackson’s endeavor within the contemporary medical context, showing how he constructed meticulous modes of following his patients, while drawing on Spencer’s notions of evolutionary hierarchies, applying them to the nervous system. Yet, he uncoupled the Spencerian direct relation between degree of plasticity, complexity, and organization and inversed the relations among them. This inversion impacted his choice of ‘methodological parallelism,’ and he later on deleted ‘unconscious states’ from his theorizing. Thus I deal with a cluster of philosophical issues of concern to a clinical evolutionary scientist: the relations of brain, mind, body, consciousness, the unconscious, and evolutionary ‘self/person’.
My argument is two-pronged:
When medical specialization in Britain was just beginning, Jackson created a new role, a new scientific persona, that of a clinical scientist. As I show, his clinical activity was in constant interaction with his scientific-neurological endeavor (and vice versa). I discuss the particular role that the description and analysis of medical cases played in this project.
Jackson’s search for an epistemological foundation for neurology resulted in opening up a new investigative space—neurology—discarding both anatomy and soul psychology as explanatory tools and constituting an innovative “medical-biological fact and classification of epilepsy” and a “medical-biological fact and classification of aphasia.”
It is sometimes said that Charles Darwin has a theory of emotional expression, but not a theory of emotion. This paper argues that Darwin does have a theory of emotion. Inspired by David Hartley and Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin claims that an emotion is a train of feelings, thoughts, and actions, linked by associations. Whereas Hartley and Erasmus insist that these associations are learned, Charles proposes that some of these associations are inherited. He develops this theory in his private notebooks from 1838–1839 and then assumes it in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872).
When the third global plague pandemic reached Sydney in 1900, theories regarding the ecology and biology of disease transmission were transforming. Changing understandings led to conflicts over the appropriate response. Medical and government authorities employed symbols like dirt to address gaps in knowledge. They used these symbols strategically to compel emotional responses and to advocate for specific political and social interventions, authorising institutional actions to shape social identity and the city in preparation for Australia's 1901 Federation. Through theoretical and historical analysis, this Element argues that disgust and aversion were effectively mobilised to legitimise these actions. As an intervention in contemporary debates about the impact of knowledge on emotion and affect, it presents a case for the plasticity of emotions like disgust, and for how both emotion and affect can change with new medical information.
Revisión crítica de la psicología positiva
The central thesis of this chapter is that, for E.S. Dallas, the primary recipient of literary meaning is the reader’s unconscious in a process whereby this meaning erupts in the conscious mind, always fragmented, vague and enigmatic. For Dallas, this vagueness does not point to the end of literary analysis, but highlights the reasons why we continue to analyse a literary work: there will always be something that we feel we understood but that remains unsaid. The name he gave to the locus of this pristine, unconscious meaning is the “hidden soul” as a means to suggest that just as the soul is a cognate for the conscious mind, the hidden soul refers to the existence of a hidden or unconscious mind.
Con arreglo al trabajo de Barbara Cassin y Emily Apter sobre la noción de intraducibilidad, en este ensayo tomaré desasosiego, portugués desassossego, por un intraducible. En la primera parte del ensayo analizaré los contornos semánticos del término según Teresa de Ávila en el Libro de la vida y las Moradas del castillo interior, por un lado, y Fernando Pessoa en el Livro do desassossego, por el otro. Discutiré después sus connotaciones, a fin de utilizarlo como matriz comparativa más allá de sus usos específicos en la prosa de Teresa y Pessoa. De ese modo, en la segunda parte del ensayo vincularé el concepto de desasosiego/ desassossego a una constelación de textos literarios y filosóficos de distinta índole.
It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct natural class of organisms whose behavior and development are governed by emotion. These are emoters. Two arguments for the natural kind status of emotion are considered. Both converge on the existence of emotion as a distinct natural domain governed by its own laws and regularities. There are then some reasons for being optimistic about the prospects for consilience in emotion theory.
The Darwinian Challenge: During his Cambridge years, Darwin was preparing to become a priest in the Anglican Church. Later in life he saw the irony: 'Considering how fiercely I have been attacked by the orthodox it seems ludicrous that I once intended to be a clergyman'. Why he was attacked by the orthodox has never been difficult to explain. Offering a naturalistic account of the emergence of human beings from ape-like ancestors, Darwin offended religious sensibilities as well as common sentiment. His theory of evolution by natural selection reinforced doubts about biblical authority at a particularly sensitive time. It could easily be interpreted as an affront to human dignity and it called for a serious re-thinking - not necessarily a rejection - of traditional Christian doctrines. Despite friction between competing Christian traditions, and despite political tensions in England between the established Anglican Church and socially disadvantaged dissenters, there were features of a Christian creed that transcended party lines. These were belief in an all-powerful, merciful God on whom the world depended for its creation and continued existence. Humankind had been made in God’s image and had been granted the privilege of free will. The privilege extended to dominion over, and responsibility for, the rest of creation. The Christian God was an active, living God, to whom prayers were directed and whose providence was not confined to an original creative act. Central to most Christian belief was the doctrine that human nature had been tainted through Adam’s disobedience and that in the life of Jesus Christ was a special revelation of the nature of God.
Human Evolution Through Humboldtian Eyes: From the beginning of his theorising about species, Darwin had human beings in view. In the initial pages of his first transmutation notebook (Notebook B), he observed that 'even mind & instinct become influenced' as the result of adaptation to new circumstances. Considering matters as a Lyellian geologist, he supposed that such adaptations would require many generations of young, pliable minds being exposed to a changing environment. After all, Captain FitzRoy had attempted to 'civilise' the Fuegian Jemmy Button by bringing him to London and instructing him in the Christian religion; but back in South America, Button reverted to his old habits, demonstrating, in Darwin's words, that the 'child of savage not civilized man' - transmutation of mind was not the work of a day. Darwin had nonetheless quickly become convinced that over long periods of time human mind, morals and emotions had progressively developed out of animal origins. As he bluntly expressed it in his first transmutation notebook: 'If all men were dead, monkeys make men. - Men make angels.' Presumably the transmutation of human beings into those higher creatures remained far in the future. From July 1837, when he jotted these remarks in the first few pages of his Notebook B, to the early 1870s, with the publication of his Descent of Man and Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin gradually worked out theories of the evolution of human mentality that, in the main, we still accept. In the case of moral behaviour, he produced a theory of its evolution that stands as a most plausible empirical account, and displays the range and subtlety of his thought. These theories merit close examination in their own right.
writes Samuel Johnson, and the term, as used by Hume (and its French near-equivalent, as used by Descartes), is indeed reserved for mental disturbances and "vehement" passions. Our current usage of "emotional" preserves this older meaning. So should I change my title to "what passions are about"? The trouble with this proposal is that we today tend to think of passions as vehement emotions, so I might gain intelligibility with the ghosts of Descartes, Johnson and Hume, but lose it with my contemporaries. We speak of the "emotive theory of ethics" where Hume, perhaps even vehemently, would have eschewed this term, doubtless preferring "passionate theory of ethics" (if theory has to be foisted upon him), or perhaps
The effect of container capacitance on the thermal response of plane walls, infinite cylinders, and spheres subjected to sudden changes in ambient temperature is analyzed. A series solution is presented for each geometry which can be obtained by the method of separation of variables. The first three eigenvalues necessary for the numerical evaluation of the series are tabulated for each configuration. Analytical curves are presented which enable the engineer to determine whether the exact solution must be used or whether an additional approximation can be made which allows a simplification to results commonly found in heat transfer textbooks.
Journal of the History of Ideas 57.2 (1996) 277-295
Hutcheson was an able philosopher, but philosophical analysis was not his only purpose in writing about morals. Throughout his life his writings aimed at promoting virtue; his changing philosophical views often had to conform, if he could make them, to that rhetorical end. But a mind which understands philosophical argument cannot always control the conclusions at which it arrives. The result for Hutcheson was often tension in his thought -- which in the end produced a farrago when he tried to create a system of moral philosophy.
Throughout his writing career, Hutcheson's views on the problem of moral motivation were a combination of change and development against a background of certain constant views. A close examination of his views on moral motivation throws light on the development of his thought, including his growing Stoicism, and some of the changes he made to the moral sense theory.
The phrase "moral motivation" can refer to either of two issues. On the one hand there is the question of what motivates virtuous actions, and the usual answer for Hutcheson is benevolence. Because they are approved by the moral sense, actions motivated by benevolence are morally good or virtuous (terms which I will use interchangeably). Hutcheson in his late writings calls such actions "formally good" to distinguish them from actions which do in fact promote the greatest happiness, or the natural good, of others; these latter actions are "materially good." On the other hand there is the question of how our knowledge of the virtuousness of certain actions can motivate and how in particular such knowledge can motivate morally good actions. For Hutcheson we know which actions are morally good because we have a moral sense, but how this knowledge motivates morally good actions is a question Hutcheson made several attempts to answer. This second question, how the moral sense can motivate morally good actions, is the focus of this paper. The development of Hutcheson's idea of benevolence will be commented on briefly, but first we need to look at some of the unchanging aspects of Hutcheson's thought and purposes to provide background to the issue of motivation.
Virtuous actions are the result of virtuous character. Hutcheson maintained this from his earliest publications (Reflections, par. 5) to his posthumous System. A virtuous character cannot be directly chosen, even if we wanted to, because we cannot choose to have benevolent desires: "[N]either benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition" (Inquiry, IV, 139; revised from first edition).
But virtue can be cultivated:
We can cultivate virtue in ourselves; and through writing, teaching, conversation, and social interaction, we can cultivate it in others. At the start of his career, when announcing in Reflections the purpose of his writing on moral theory, Hutcheson regrets that the moral systems common in his day are not conducive to promoting virtue: they are written, he says, by moralists who are "sour and morose in their deportment;... easily put out of humour...; dejected with common calamities, and insolent upon any prosperous change in fortune" (Reflections, par. 4). He promises that his forthcoming Inquiry will not have this fault. In the preface to the Essay he complains about the writings of the ethical egoists because "many [people] have been discouraged from all attempts of cultivating kind generous affections in themselves, by a previous notion that there are no such affections in nature ..." (I, v; III, v). Throughout all the rest of his writings on morality Hutcheson advocates both the private and communal cultivation of virtue, and at the same time he contributes to that cultivation.
The other constant which dominates the moral motivation issue is Hutcheson's rejection of egoism. Benevolence is a natural part of the human character, is the motive for virtuous actions...
Addresses the question: If an intellectual change is truly fundamental, how can it be socially comprehensible? Claims that the question is particularly pressing in the case of Darwin's "Origin." Argues that the answer lies in an understanding of how scientific revolutions depend on continuity with an existent cultural grammar. (JD)
Recent discussion has brought out certain great facts about the psycho-physics of emotion. The service of the 'peripheral' theory as announced by Lange and James, and especially as argued by the latter, has been to set this problem in evidence. Undoubtedly the stimulating and highly valuable influence of James's treatment--here as on many other points--has been due to a certain frankness and
naïve clearness which has concealed in a measure the real complexity of the problem. The outcome of a discussion in which this 'peripheral' theory has had able but, I think, very inadequate criticism takes form about two or three general principles which I am now aiming to state in their general bearing upon the origin of emotional expression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes the nature and inter-relation of emotion, desire, and interest. Both emotion and desire consist of 4 elements. Content of emotions and desires refers to the intellectual interpretation of stimuli. Once the stimulus is interpreted, an attitude develops, either toward or against it. Feeling is the direct and immediate answer to the stimulus as it is being interpreted. Finally, the color tone refers to the pain or pleasure associated with the emotional state. In situations where the individual cannot express an emotion directly, the volition becomes transformed in a harmonious way into an acceptable reaction to stimulation. Both emotions and desire call for active attention to rapidly seek the way in which to react, but unlike emotions, there is harmony in desire. Free unimpeded action is pleasurable and interesting. However, momentary interests pass over into deep life interests, and constitute habitual reactions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
It is customary to associate Jonathan Edwards with the town of Northampton. That he was born in East Windsor (Conn.), was graduated from Yale College in New Haven, served a Presbyterian church in New York City, wrote his great treatises – A Careful and Strict Enquiry into … Freedom of Will (1754) and The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (1758) – in Stockbridge (Mass.), and died as president of the College of New Jersey in Princeton does not mitigate the local association. For it was in Northampton where Edwards came of age theologically. He served as its minister from 1729 to 1750, following his grandfather Solomon Stoddard, who had served the same parish for the preceding sixty years. As with the one, so with the other: Northampton was Stoddard and it was also Edwards, a dynasty holding sway for over eighty years and commanding the religious spirit up and down the length of the Connecticut Valley.
This paper argues that a recurrent mistake is made about Scottish moral philosophy in the 18th century with respect to its account of the relation between morality and feeling. This mistake arises because Hume is taken to be the main, as opposed to the best known, exponent of a version of moral sense theory. In fact, far from occupying common ground, the other main philosophers of the period—Hutcheson, Reid, Beattie—understood themselves to be engaged in refuting Hume. Despite striking surface similarities, closer examination reveals a deep difference between Hume's and Reid's conception of ‘the science mind’ which marked the philosophy of the period. Properly understood, this difference shows that mainstream Scottish moral philosophy, far from subscribing to Hume's dictum about morality being ‘more properly felt than judged of’, held that morality is ‘more properly judged than felt of’.
It was the observation of Princeton's James McCosh that ‘the reconciliation between the philosophy and the religion of Scotland was effected by Thomas Chalmers’. That Chalmers’ roots run deep in the soil prepared by the philosophy of Common Sense is indisputable. The Reid-Beattie-Stewart tradition in philosophy provided the backdrop against which the formation and development of Chalmers’ theology was framed. The important questions, however, are how Chalmers appropriated this philosophical tradition, for what ends he employed it, and to what extent it informed the content of his theology. It is certainly the case that Chalmers embraced Reid's repudiation of Locke's theory of ideas on both moral and religious grounds. The ‘constancy of nature’ whose rational and empirical demonstrability David Hume had called into question was crucial for Chalmers, and he attempted to reinstate it with the aid of every intellectual weapon the Scottish philosophers could provide. Furthermore, Chalmers accepted much of the programmatic work of the Common Sense philosophers in their efforts to ground morality and the ‘moral sense’ on a priori laws constitutive of the mind itself.
Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) lectured in astronomy and
political economy, held the chair
of mathematics at Edinburgh University from 1775 to 1785, then the chair
of moral
philosophy from 1785 to 1810, and wrote extensively on metaphysics,
political economy,
ethics, philology, aesthetics, psychology and the history of philosophy
and the experimental
sciences. He is commonly regarded as the last voice of the Scottish
Enlightenment, the
articulate disciple of Thomas Reid, father of Scottish common sense
philosophy. Recently
some historians have begun to rediscover elements of the contribution
Stewart made to
early nineteenth-century British intellectual culture, and his
Collected
Works have been
republished with a new introduction by Knud Haakonssen.
Early in Freedom of the Will Jonathan Edwards formulates a description of logical necessity that has important implications for the way we understand both his philosophical and theological method. He describes the principal forms of necessary meaning, delineating three modes of necessity: philosophical, moral and natural. Of these, the first is most important, for it indicates that, at the highest level, meaning is determined according to the structure of a proposition. Edwards states that “philosophical necessity is nothing different from certainty,” and the form of certainty, he tells us, “[is] nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition.”
The nineteenth-century transition from talk of passions and affections of the soul to talk of “emotions” in English-language psychological thought is taken as a case-study in the secularisation of psychology. This transition is used as an occasion to re-evaluate the methodologies of John Milbank and Richard Webster, who interpret certain secular scientific accounts as forms of theology or anti-theology “in disguise”. It is suggested, in the light of the study of the emergence of the secular concept of ‘emotions’, that the category of “atheology” be used to supplement their methodology. “Atheological” texts are not merely theology or anti-theology in disguise but are a novel form of discourse, which is alienated from the assumptions and metaphors of traditional theologies (and which replaces them with physiological evolutionary narratives) but which is not necessarily atheistic or anti-theological.
This paper traces three paradigmatic responses to the presence of evil in nature. Thomas Henry Huxley depicts nature as the enemy of humanity that morality combats “at every step.” Henry Drummond views nature as benevolent, a friend of humanity, and the ultimate basis for morality. The paper argues that a third view, that of Thomas Aquinas, regards nature as creation, capable of being neither enemy nor friend of humanity but rather the context within which relations of enmity or friendship develop between human beings and God.
The place of man in Darwin's development of a theory of transmutation has been obscured by his manner of disclosure. Comparing the 1837–1839 period to his entire career as a theorist suggests that it was Darwin's practice to present himself and his work only before the most select scientific audiences, and then in accordance with their expectations. The negative implications of this rule for his publication on man are clear enough: finding no general invitation in science to publish as a theorist and no contemporary scientific audience for the sorts of inquiries he was making on man, he was silent, at least until such time as he could publish on the strength of reputation alone. Now, with the availability of manuscripts from the early period, what was once hidden stands revealed. It is clear from Darwin's notebooks that man played a dual role in the formation of his theory: as a zoological species to be incorporated into the theory and as the primary vehicle for the study of behavior. On the first score, integrating man into the theory provoked Darwin to break with the traditional view of man's place in nature and to reject a major element in the scientific notion of progressive development. On the second score, the study of behavior led Darwin outside natural history and thence, unexpectedly, to Malthus and natural selection.
One is left with the certainty that the subject of man was a central element in Darwin's formulation of his species theory. To an extent, then, the public judgment of Darwin was right all along, for the public had always sensed that Darwin spoke to a larger audience than that formed around science. On the basis of new evidence, we can add that Darwin drew from that larger audience as well. There are of course ironies to this conclusion: that Darwin the professional drew so heavily from fields where he was the amateur, that as a transparent man his inner life should prove so at odds with the manner in which he presented himself, and that his arrival at a strong sense of himself—the revolutionary “I” of his notebooks—should occur just as he stepped beyond science to engage the general culture. But when one considers the inherent difficulties of Darwin's subject and the magnitude of his claims respecting man, these ironies are perhaps not surprising at all but those of a kind which might be anticipated.
Conventional wisdom teaches that Thomas Huxley discredited Richard Owen in their debate over ape and human brains. This paper reexamines the dispute and uses it as a test case for evaluating the metaphysical realist, internal realist, and social constructivist theories of scientific knowledge. Since Owen worked in the Kantian tradition, his anatomical research illustrates the implications of internal realism for scientific practice. As an avowed Cartesian, Huxley offered a well developed attack on Owen''s position from a metaphysical realist perspective. Adrian Desmond''s political retrospective on the dispute affords the additional opportunity to contrast internal realism with social constructivism. I argue that since Huxley ultimately based his attack on his valuing Europeans as superior to blacks, his argument illustrates the hazards of accepting the metaphysical realist promise of value free science. Desmond overlooks this racial dimension of the dispute, and his work shows how social constructivism can distract the historian and philosopher from even the social meaning of science. As internal realists like Putnam have argued, values enter science not from without, but from within the very process of science itself.
Contradictory versions of Reid's faculty psychology have been presented. A reexamination of Reid's writings suggests that the term, faculty, was used not as a classificatory device but rather to refer to innate, universal, and active mental powers. Being active, the faculties are one of the basic causes of observable psychological phenomena. The relation of the faculties to other mental powers is considered. A new listing and classification of such powers is compared with that presented in 1936 by H.D. Spoerl which has been used as the basis for much of the subsequent analysis of Reid's faculty psychology.
The author is indebted to his colleague James Nyce for his very cogent comments on an earlier version of this paper.
This is a story about the New Psychologists who strove at the turn of the century to institutionalize a new science and to create a new set of professional roles. More particularly, it is about the rhetorical fabric they wove around the nascent science of psychology. The article focuses, one by one, on different strands of this fabric – on (1) what persuaded the first generation of American psychologists to take an interest in the New Psychology; (2) the arguments these aspiring psychologists presented to presidents and trustees to insure that they could pursue their interest within particular institutional settings; (3) the arguments they put forth against the rights of other persons to engage in similar, competing pursuits; (4) the arguments they laid before various administrators, officials, interest groups, and the general public to guarantee continued and even increased support; and (5) the arguments they presented in the form of theories and practices developed between approximately 1880 and 1920. In this way, it attempts to construct a likely story about the establishment of the New Psychology in America.1
In 1879 G. H. Lewes described the state of current British mental science. There were, he maintained, three main ‘schools’ of psychology. The first of these Lewes called the ‘ontological’ school; its members traced their lineage to Thomas Reid and to the common sense philosophers of the early nineteenth century, especially Dugald Stewart and William Hamilton. The second school was the ‘empirical’, which stood in the tradition of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Hartley, and James Mill. The ontologists and the empiricists differed in their theories of knowledge: the former held that certain beliefs were native to the mind; the latter that all ideas originated, mediately or immediately, from experience. However, both schools agreed on the object of psychological enquiry. They ‘quietly ignore the complex conditions of the living organism, and treat mental facts simply as the manifestations of a Psychical Principle’. Further, the ontological and empiricist schools concurred on the means by which this principle should be studied; both made introspection the ‘exclusive method of research’.
Using the interpretative device of triangulation, it can be shown that Darwin's psychological theorizing was not derivative from his evolutionary theorizing, and that his efforts to articulate a naturalistic model of the living world encompassed interacting theories of evolution and habit.
Turning to works in literary fields, see Hilton (), -; Shuttleworth ()
- Weiner
Weiner
(). Turning to works in literary fields, see Hilton (), -; Shuttleworth
(); Pinch ();