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Die Logischen Grundlagen der Exakten Wissenschaften
... There never is something "given" that is not transformed in the darstellen lassen; in einigen aber vielleicht nicht, wenigstens reichen die mir zugänglichen Pfade der Logik nicht zu allen seinen Resultaten, obwohl zu recht vielen". Natorp's admitted inability to fully reformulate Cohen's "poetic way of philosophizing" in a more sober logical way had the consequence that he did not publish a fuller account of Cohen's Logik in his Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (Natorp, 1910)) as he had originally planned (cf. Holzheyl, 1986, Section II). ...
... In various versions, this equational account of knowledge can be found in virtually all of Natorp's epistemological writings (cf. Natorp, 1902Natorp, , 1910Natorp, , 1912Natorp, , 1927. ...
This paper deals with Natorp’s version of the Marburg mathematical philosophy of science characterized by the following three features: The core of Natorp’s mathematical philosophy of science is contained in his “knowledge equation” that may be considered as a mathematical model of the “transcendental method” conceived by Natorp as the essence of the Marburg Neo-Kantianism. For Natorp, the object of knowledge was an infinite task. This can be elucidated in two different ways: Carnap, in the Aufbau, contended that this endeavor can be divided into two distinct parts, namely, a finite “constitution” of the object of knowledge and an infinite incompletable empirical description. In contrast, and more in the original spirit of Cohen and Natorp, the physicist and philosopher Margenau in The Nature of Physical Reality (Margenau. 1950) conceived the infinity of this “Aufgabe” as an infinite dialectical process, in which relative “data” and “conceptual constructs” determine each other. This dialectical process eliminates the dichotomy between Anschauung and Begriff that distinguished the Marburg Neo-Kantianism from Kantian orthodoxy, namely, the abandonment of the difference between intuition and concept. Finally, the paper deals with the non-Archimedean geometrical systems that played a central role in Natorp’s defense of Cohen’s “infinitesimal” metaphysics.
... De este modo, Natorp retoma -aunque sin parecer ser consciente de ello-una propuesta ya sugerida por Jacob Sigismund Beck y contestada de manera explícita, además, por el propio Kant en su manera creciente el dualismo de la intuición pura y el pensamiento puro y finalmente ha roto con él de manera decidida. Quizás de manera demasiado decidida; puesto que el concepto kantiano de intuición encierra un problema que de ninguna manera hay que dejar de lado [...]», Natorp 1910, p. 2. Cf. Natorp 1918a, p. 429 y Holzhey 1987. ...
... GA 56/57, p. 89 y GA 58, p. 217). La ‹intuición› no constituye ‹comienzo› alguno y tampoco puede fijar un ‹punto de llegada›, puesto que, ella misma, es integrada en un inextinguible proceso cognoscitivo (un «progreso hacia el infinito», Natorp 1910, p. 17. Cf. von Malottki 1929. ...
La presente contribución atiende a la interpretación por parte de Heidegger de la dualidad planteada expresamente por Kant de facultades cognoscitivas y sus respectivos tipos específicos de representación. Intentará mostrar cómo su interpretación fenomenológica da cuenta de esta cooriginariedad de sensibilidad y entendimiento y puede incluso –en un sentido bien determinado– legitimarla. Para ello enfoca su interés en el posicionamiento crítico de Heidegger frente a la lectura neokantiana de este elemento doctrinal de la filosofía transcendental de Kant.
... In the Marburg school, Cohen (1914) and Natorp (1910) had similar insights. Cohen once points to a text passage from Hertz's mechanics (1894, 9) according to which the empirical elements of physics are hidden and merged with theoretical elements in the fundamental laws of physics. ...
... 5 He thus tends to interpret the theory dependence of experimental experience in such a way that even the measured values of theoretical terms like force are constructs of our thinking (Falkenburg 2020b, 14). This constructivist interpretation of physical magnitudes was also shared by Natorp (1910). ...
The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.
... A "metaphysics of the finite," which he pronounces as the program of philosophy at the end of the art essay [14. P. 1019] 17 , was Noeggerath's endeavor from the beginning. ...
Walter Benjamin called Felix Noeggerath (1885-1960) the “universal genius” or simply “genius.” In his 1916 treatise “Synthesis and the Concept of System in Philosophy,” Noeggerath offered a reading of Kant’s concept of synthesis in an original and radical manner. He dares to confront thought with the incommensurability of atheoretical Being. The linkage between logic and incommensurability is what he calls rationalism. In contradiction to this claim, any attempt to exclude atheoretical Being from the realm of logic is anti-rationalism. Noeggerath elaborates on this in a penetrating discussion and modification of epistemological positions, especially those of the Marburg School and Hermann Cohen. Noeggerath constructs a notion of the philosophical system with the help of Kant’s three tables of transcendental judgements, categories, and principles in the Critique of Pure Reason. Each of these tables is known to contain 12 individual elements in four groups of three each. For the systematic division, the third group under the title “Relation” is decisive. Noeggerath assigns one systemic part to each kind of relation: “For it is to be connected: the categorical relation with ethics, the hypothetical with logic, and the disjunctive with aesthetics.” As a result the classical sequence, beginning with logic, is changed. “The order of the limbs is: a) ethics, b) logic, c) aesthetics.” In Noeggerath’s logical outline, specific mathematical concepts of meta-geometry play a decisive role. According to him, philosophy can resemble their preciseness in building a viable concept of the infinite. The prerequisite is that philosophy does not itself behave mathematically but proceeds along its own path in critical distance to the “specialized, act-kindred thinking” of the mathematician.
... 35 Também por isso eles rejeitavam a tese kantiana de que as intuições -de espaço e tempo -desempenham aqueles mesmos papéis centrais da Crítica da Razão Pura. 36 Cf. a respeito desse ponto: Natorp (1910). Nesta obra, o neokantiano resgata esse debate de matriz kantiana e discute, amplia e aprofunda esse ponto. ...
A tarefa deste artigo é explicitar algumas influências kantianas na filosofia da matemática do neokantiano da escola de Marburgo, Ernst Cassirer. Conforme argumentamos, em sua primeira obra sistemática, Conceito de Substância Conceito de Função: uma investigação sobre as questões fundamentais da Crítica do Conhecimento (1910), certos pressupostos da filosofia transcendental de Kant (tais quais, e.g., seu compromisso anti-metafísico manifesto e sua ideia de “lógica transcendental”) desempenharam papéis importantes na filosofia da matemática de Cassirer, servindo enquanto conceitos complementares ao logicismo-estrutural defendido pelo neokantiano.
... All his forces were directed against that sort of common-sense Kantianism, that had become so popular and deeply-rooted that even the scientists -who were supposed to be the vanguard of mankind's efforts to understand the world -had internalized their own self-defeat, and gave up the task of actually knowing reality. (Hentschel 1990 (NATORP, 1910;PETZOLDT, 1912b). One of his first publications on the theory of relativity (Petzoldt 1914) was also praised by Einstein himself, who recommended its reading for those interested in the "erkenntnistheoretische and naturphilosophische assumptions and implications" of the new physical theory (EINSTEIN, 1914; see also HOWARD, 1992 (SCHLICK, 1918;1915;1921 (REICHENBACH, 1922), which also led to an exchange of letters between the two (HENTSCHEL, 1990). ...
Ernst Mach's claim that the objects are bundles of sensation was (and still is) widely interpreted in a phenomenalistic sense, as if he was asserting that perceptual experiences is the only reality. The talk will reconstruct the philosophical system of Mach's pupil Joseph Petzoldt, to propose a different interpretation of Mach's work, that put it into the wider context of the polemic against the widespread neo-Kantianism of that time.
... All his forces were directed against that sort of common-sense Kantianism, that had become so popular and deeply-rooted that even the scientists -who were supposed to be the vanguard of mankind's efforts to understand the world -had internalized their own self-defeat, and gave up the task of actually knowing reality. (Hentschel 1990 (NATORP, 1910;PETZOLDT, 1912b). One of his first publications on the theory of relativity (Petzoldt 1914) was also praised by Einstein himself, who recommended its reading for those interested in the "erkenntnistheoretische and naturphilosophische assumptions and implications" of the new physical theory (EINSTEIN, 1914; see also HOWARD, 1992 (SCHLICK, 1918;1915;1921 (REICHENBACH, 1922), which also led to an exchange of letters between the two (HENTSCHEL, 1990). ...
A afirmação de Ernst Mach de que os objetos são feixes de sensação foi (e ainda é) amplamente interpretada em um sentido fenomenalístico, como se ele estivesse afirmando que as experiências perceptivas são a única realidade. O artigo irá reconstruir o sistema filosófico do aluno de Mach, Joseph Petzoldt, para propor uma interpretação diferente da obra de Mach, que a coloque no contexto mais amplo da polêmica contra o neokantismo generalizado da época.
... [16] En palabras de Paul Natorp (1910Natorp ( , 1912, el Faktum ha de ser concebido siempre como fieri. Véanse también Luft (2006Luft ( , 2010 que "la dialéctica es un error grandioso y la grandeza de la intención intenta tácitamente esconder el error del resultado" (Trendelenburg 1870, p. 105). ...
Entre las críticas que Johann F. Herbart dirige a Johann G. Fichte, una de las más interesantes es la observación que la libertad trascendental no es nada más que fatalismo. En este artículo se relacionará este argumento con el concepto nuevo del procedimiento científico elaborado por Georg W. F. Hegel y se concluirá planteando la cuestión de si también el propio método hegeliano no implica otra forma de fatalismo.
... [16] En palabras de Paul Natorp (1910Natorp ( , 1912, el Faktum ha de ser concebido siempre como fieri. Véanse también Luft (2006Luft ( , 2010 que "la dialéctica es un error grandioso y la grandeza de la intención intenta tácitamente esconder el error del resultado" (Trendelenburg 1870, p. 105). ...
RESUMEN: Entre las críticas que Johann F. Herbart dirige a Johann G. Fichte, una de las más interesantes es la observación que la liber-tad trascendental no es nada más que fatalismo. En este artículo se relacionará este argumento con el concepto nuevo del procedimiento ci-entífico elaborado por Georg W. F. Hegel y se concluirá planteando la cuestión de si también el propio método hegeliano no implica otra forma de fatalismo.
ABSTRACT: Among the critical remarks addressed by Johann F. Herbart to Johann G. Fichte, one of the most interesting is the observation that transcendental freedom is nothing more than fatalism. In this paper, this argument will be related with the new concept of scientific method proposed by Georg W. F. Hegel with the aim to question whether also Hegel's own method does imply another form of fatalism.
... In fact, in this respect he followed his teachers in the Marburg School: Hermann Cohen andPaul Natorp (cf. Cohen 1883 andNatorp 1910). However, both Cohen and Natorp make the concept of the in nitesimal central to their accounts of science, while Cassirer shi s to a di erent perspective. ...
Ernst Cassirer was a keen observer of development in the mathematical sciences, especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In this essay, the focus is on his reception of Dedekind’s contributions to the foundations of mathematics, and with it, on Dedekind’s mathematical structuralism. Cassirer adopts that structuralism early on, defends it against a number of criticisms, and embeds it into a rich historical account of the structuralist transformation of modern mathematical science. He also adds some original elements to our understanding of structuralism, e.g., by relating it to the Kantian notion of the “construction of concepts” in mathematics, by introducing a basic distinction between “substance concepts” and “function concepts”, and by tracing the “unfolding” of structuralist aspects far back in the history of thought. Overall, Cassirer’s approach is guided by the conviction that the metaphysics of modern mathematics should be approached by way of its distinctive methodology.
... Abschn. 1), aber auch PAUL NATORP ( [35], p. 128), HERMANN WEYL ( [41], p. 9) und andere behauptet haben? 3 DIOGENES LAËRTIOS hat im 8. Buch, Kap. I, seiner Schrift über ‚Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen' angemerkt, daß es PYTHAGORAS oder vielleicht auch PARMENIDES war, der als Erster behauptet hat, daß der Abendstern und der Morgenstern "dieselben" Gestirne wären: π " ωτóν τε \Eσπε oν αὶ ωσφó oν τóν α ' υτóν ε' ιπε" ιν. ...
... The contemporary debate on Kant's apperception has been less successful in elucidating this phenomenon as a mentally integrated part of intuition. The debate between the proponents of non-conceptualist (Hanna, 2005;Hanna, 2008;Allais, 2007) and the defenders of conceptual contents of intuition (Natorp, 1910;Ginsborg, 2008) does not reach any resolution for Kant's project concerning the possibility of metaphysics. Tolley (2013) tries to recoil the debate with a new approach that intuition contains Frege's sense. ...
What is Kant's concept of apperception? This study argues that apperception is crucially important for philosophy of mind because it is indivisible from the method and outcome of Kant's intuitive thinking for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Then, the concept of apperception is necessarily revisited, reexamined, and reinterpreted by means of recent findings in cognitive and neuroscience. Accordingly, apperception is potentially related to the cognition at receptive mode with certain streams of consciousness. All this is considered as the essential and structurally underlying foundation of Kant's metaphysical legacy is thinking in the service of sensibility. The three Critiques have been constructed and established on this foundation that intuition,-as sensibly connecting faculty of mind at the receptive mode of cognition-, is indispensable and necessary for philosophy. From this point, this study departs its investigation into Kant's texts and attempt to rebuild the relationship between the concept of apperception and other Kant's concepts: understanding, the categorical imperative, and disinterested. All these concepts are pivotal and indispensable to knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics based on non-subjective treatment. In this line of thinking, this study is intended to prepare the engagement of philosophy of mind with the contemporary world.
In this paper, I will deal with the analogy between Cassirer’s interpretation of relativity and his philosophy of culture. As to the structure of the paper, it will be divided into six parts. I will start with a brief introduction, after which I will succinctly outline Cassirer’s reading of Einstein’s theory, and in particular of general covariance. I will then focus on the presentation of his project for a “systematic philosophy” in the last chapter of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and subsequently delve into the lexical references to relativity made in Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. After this, I will tackle Cassirer’s rectorship speech, where relativity and the philosophy of culture are explicitly interwoven, but with the important clarification (already provided in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and Philosophy of Symbolic Forms) that not all kinds of knowledge align with de-anthropomorphized objectivity. The final section contains the concluding remarks.
The direction-theory of parallels was a mathematical theory that gained enormous importance and popularity for about a century, from the 1770s to the 1870s. It was conceived for the purpose of proving the famous Parallel Postulate and establishing the foundations of Euclidean geometry. The development of this geometric theory was intertwined with that of mathematical epistemology. Proponents of the theory discussed at length such topics as the analyticity of mathematics, the role of intuition in geometry, mathematical constructivism, and the relationship between geometry and the structure of space. In the first few decades of its life, the direction-theory of parallels became the most important benchmark on which to test Kant’s philosophy, and Kantians and anti-Kantians alike wrote articles and books on it. The direction-theory was later generally accepted by the leading post-Kantian philosophers of the nineteenth century. It was finally subjected to fatal criticism by Lewis Carroll and Gottlob Frege.
Este artigo trata do debate envolvendo a distinção feita por Kant, na controversa nota do §26 da Crítica da Razão Pura, entre formas da intuição e intuições formais, da qual resulta um duplo modo de se representar o espaço e o tempo. Será defendida aqui uma visão não intelectualista da atividade produtiva da imaginação transcendental: tomando como base a referida distinção, nosso principal objetivo é mostrar como esta síntese produz nossas representações objetivas do tempo e do espaço de um modo condizente com a independência entre entendimento e sensibilidade, não sendo a totalidade desta um simples produto daquele. As intuições formais do §26 caracterizam o espaço e o tempo enquanto intuições potencialmente infinitas. Isso nos permitirá divisar um limite preciso entre a espontaneidade do entendimento e receptividade das nossas intuições, o que eu compreendo aqui por não intelectualismo.
После завершения И. Кантом «коперниканского» поворота в метафизике вся последующая европейская философия в той или иной степени находилась под его влиянием. Цель исследования - рассмотреть рецепцию и трансформацию кантовской теоретической философии Марбургской школой неокантианства. Необходимо проанализировать причины интерпретации Г. Когеном и П. Наторпом критицизма Канта. Для этого следует рассмотреть (i) интерналистские и (ii) экстерналистские факторы становления Марбургской школы. Неокантианство, с одной стороны, возникло как ответ на материализм, натурализм и посткантианский немецкий идеализм. Кроме того, Марбургская школа испытала сильное влияние трансформации научной парадигмы в математическом естествознании в конце XIX века. Обоснование марбуржцами априорного учения Канта предполагало тематизацию прежде всего: a) чистоты мышления; b) систематического единства мышления и опыта; c) ориентации философии на «факт науки»; d) трансцендентального метода. В итоге Марбургская школа интерпретировала кантовскую концепцию единства сознания; отказалась от принципа синтетического (реального) единства сознания в пользу систематического (логического) единства; обосновала чистоту научного мышления; выдвинула требование ориентации философии на «факт науки»; разработала концепцию первоначала мышления (Ursprung); отказалась от идеи «данности» предмета познания и доказала его «заданность»; изменила понимание сущности и функций трансцендентального метода; выдвинула концепцию мышления как «порождения» («производства»); сформулировала новое понимание a priori . Изменения, произошедшие в XIX веке в философии, математическом естествознании и математических науках, привели к резкой активизации конструктивизма. Можно сделать вывод о том, что эпистемологической парадигмой Канта был реалистический конструктивизм . Парадигмой Марбургской школы стал чистый конструктивизм .
L’enjeu de cet article est d’exposer les principaux aspects du débat philosophique contemporain autour de la conception de l’ a priori de Michael Friedman. Ce dernier a défendu l’existence de principes constitutifs a priori permettant de coordonner la structure mathématique des théories physiques avec l’expérience sensorielle. Bien qu’il s’appuie sur la conception cassirérienne de l’ a priori pour défendre une continuité entre les structures mathématiques des théories, Friedman, dans la lignée d’Hans Reichenbach, conçoit ces principes constitutifs comme révisables en fonction des changements de théories physiques. Cette conception des principes constitutifs s’est vu reprocher un certain arbitraire dans le choix de ses principes, mais également son insuffisance et son simplisme pour décrire la manière avec laquelle les théories physiques s’appliquent à l’expérience. Enfin, il ne semble pas que l’on puisse, comme Friedman, réduire l’ a priori d’Ernst Cassirer à son rôle régulateur, puisque celui-ci concevrait également des principes constitutifs alternatifs à ceux de Reichenbach.
Heidegger has a reputation for reading himself into the philosophers he interprets, and his interpretation of Kant has therefore had little uptake in anglophone Kant scholarship. In this book, Morganna Lambeth provides a new account of Heidegger's method of interpreting Kant, arguing that it is more promising than is typically recognized. On her account, Heidegger thinks that Kant's greatest insights are located in moments of tension, where Kant struggles to articulate something new about his subject-matter. The role of the interpreter, then, is to disentangle competing strands of argument, and to determine which strand is most compelling. Lambeth traces Heidegger's interpretive method across his reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and situates Heidegger's reconstruction of Kant's best line of argument against other post-Kantian readings. She finally shows how Heidegger's deep engagement with Kant sheds light on Heidegger's own philosophical views.
In this paper, I aim to reconstruct the debate on Leibniz to which Russell’s and Cassirer’s monographs contributed eminently. This task is important both historically and epistemologically. In fact, their interpretations represented the apexes, at least at that time, of the logicist and the neo-Kantian philosophies of mathematics; on the other hand, they also paved the way for later developments of the discussion on the foundations of mathematics. The paper is divided into five sections. The first contained a brief introduction. In the second and third parts, I present Russell’s and Cassirer’s works to explain why they maintained that mathematics is synthetic. In the fourth section, I compare and contrast the reviews that they wrote about their books. Finally, in the fifth section, I propose a perspectivist interpretation of the dispute.
Kant distinguishes between two methods in philosophy: the analytical method and the synthetic method. According to the analytical method, philosophy starts from a given fact to find its conditions of possibility. On the contrary, the synthetic method starts from an obscure and confused representation to provide clarity and distinction to each concept in order to show its necessary relation with other concepts. Marburg Neo-Kantianism holds that philosophy must begin with the fact of science. These claims have led numerous commentators to identify the Neo-Kantian method as a regressive method. I will show that, according to Paul Natorp’s approach, the progressive method is the fundamental method of philosophy while the analytical method is a second step in the investigation.
The article contributes to the development of an a priori methodology adequate to the legitimate claims of fundamental physics as a mathematical philosophy of nature. Husserl’s phenomenological method of variations - the most important part of this methodology - is seen as a means of bringing to clarity and achieving apodictic evidence, highly relevant in the current conditions of erosion of the empirical criterion of truth, when the invention of hypotheses for the needs of deductive theorization has become the norm of so-called fundamental research. As an example for express testing of the method, a problematic principle is taken that needs to be clarified: the “Mach principle” formulated in many ways since the time of A. Einstein. The result of a clarifying reflection of one of the transitions between versions of the principle is the conclusion that the conceptual development of the general theory of relativity on methodologically clarified grounds, one of which would be a correctly formulated Mach principle, should proceed from a relational understanding of space-time consistent with this principle. Mach’s principle, since it determines the structure of the equations of the theory themselves, the solutions of which are conceived in the modus of the possible, is in no way affected in its truth value by the fact of the existence of vacuum solutions of these equations. In conclusion, the article examines the question of the influence of the Mach theory of thought experiment on the genesis of the phenomenological method of variations.
The aim of this paper is to analyze Dimitry Gawronsky’s doctrine of actual infinitesimals. I examine the peculiar connection that his critical idealism establishes between transcendental philosophy and mathematics. In particular, I reconstruct the relationship between Gawronsky’s differentials, Cantor’s transfinite numbers, Veronese’s trans-Archimedean numbers and Robinson’s hyperreal numbers. I argue that by means of his doctrine of actual infinitesimals, Gawronsky aims to provide an interpretation of calculus that eliminates any alleged given element in knowledge.
Constructive (productive) thinking in the critical philosophy of Hermann Cohen differs significantly from the seemingly similar speculative thinking in J. G. Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) (1794/95). The fundamental characteristics of scientific thinking in Cohen’s teaching include: purity, focus on the “fact of science”, the origin (Ursprung), the infinitesimal method, continuity, movement, production, correlation, intensive magnitude, interrelation of thinking and being. According to Cohen, scientific thinking can only be pure and generated by the origin. The origin is continuous action (movement) of thinking to separate the united and bind the divided content. In this process, thinking and being are correlative. Infinitely small reality contains thinking and being simultaneously as a union and in a divided form. The infinitesimal method is thinking that continuously carries out a) the operations of opposing itself as pure thinking to the results of its own production; b) the coincidence of itself with the products of its own generation. Infinitesimal thinking seeks to eliminate the difference between self and being. Nevertheless, being constantly retains autonomy. Being does not merge with thinking and is not absorbed by it. In Fichte’s Science of Knowledge pure thinking moves in a logical circle, having no access into real being. In an effort to break out of this circle and find its causality, thinking turns not to the being of the world of phenomena, but to the Absolute I. Such a speculative approach to consciousness, thinking and being has little in common with Cohen’s critical position.
Современная философия так богата идеями, направлениями и имена- ми, что написать ее историю почти невозможно. Но Михаил Ми- наков попытался сделать невозможное. Его «История опыта» — это почти детективная, и при этом совершенно академическая, история того, как рождалась современная философская мысль. Минаков прослеживает это рождение на примере эволюции по- нятия опыта. Помещая проблему в центр споров мыслителей по- следних двух столетий, автор показывает, как она разворачива- ется в поисках Канта и Гегеля и ведет за собой философский по- иск в ХIX–XXI веках. Михаил Минаков описывает то, как филосо- фы приобретали «опыт опыта» в неокантианстве, прагматизме, феноменологии и герменевтике, разъясняет базовые положения учений Канта, Гегеля, Когена, Кассирера, Хайдеггера, Гадамера, Беньямина, Батая и Фуко.
Данная книга — настоящая энциклопедия современной философии. «История опыта» рассчитана на ученых, преподавателей и сту- дентов, а также всех, кто хочет разобраться с философскими по- исками нашего времени.
According to heuristic philosophy of mathematics, one of the tasks of the philosophy of mathematics is to give an answer to the question: What is the method of mathematics? And its answer is that the method of mathematics is the analytic method. The chapter examines the analytic method, its mathematical origin and medical origin, its original formulation, features, fortune, and its relation to abduction and reductio ad absurdum.KeywordsAnalytic methodNon-ampliativity of deductive rulesAmpliativity of non-deductive rulesPlausibilityMathematical origin of the analytic methodMedical origin of the analytic methodAnalytic method and abductionAnalytic method and reductio ad absurdum
Contemporary Philosophy in Focus offers a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is probably the best-known and most influential historian and philosopher of science of the last 25 years, and has become something of a cultural icon. His concepts of paradigm, paradigm change and incommensurability have changed the way we think about science. This volume offers an introduction to Kuhn's life and work and then considers the implications of Kuhn's work for philosophy, cognitive psychology, social studies of science and feminism. The volume is more than a retrospective on Kuhn, exploring future developments of cognitive and information services along Kuhnian lines. Outside of philosophy the volume will be of particular interest to professionals and students in cognitive science, history of science, science studies and cultural studies.
This paper examines the concept of history of philosophy as established in Marburg Neo-Kantianism. It does so by discussing the methodological concepts and principles underlying the formation of the kind of Neo-Kantianism advocated by Hermann Cohen, as well as by looking into the roots of the term ‘problem' as employed in Neo-Kantian ‘problem history'. It turns out that, although Marburg Neo-Kantians valued historical scholarship highly, they were not primarily driven by historical interests; rather, they mainly engaged with past philosophies for philosophical reasons. I further argue that, to the extent they drew attention to scientific or cultural contexts, this should not be taken to imply commitment to some kind of historical contextualism. Their turn to contexts was, on the contrary, motivated by the idealist contention that developments in science and cultural history are shaped by philosophical concepts and tenets. I will conclude by showing how both Cohen and his major student Ernst Cassirer could understand philosophical reasoning as a genuinely historical, and yet irreducibly rational, practice.
W niniejszym artykule została zaprezentowana koncepcja podmiotu w ujęciu filozofii amerykańskiego filozofa Calvina O. Schraga. Autor używa terminu self i rozumie to pojęcie jako wewnętrzne Ja czy też Jaźń. Filozof krytykuje postmodernistyczną dekonstrukcję podmiotu. Jednak z drugiej strony sam tej dekonstrukcji dokonuje. Uważa, że Jaźń musi najpierw upaść aby móc się odrodzić. Koncepcja Schrag’a to próba opisania prawdziwej natury Ja w czterech głównych kontekstach: dyskursie, działaniu, wspólnocie itranscendencji. Autor podkreśla, że narracja jest nie tylko opowiadaniem, lecz przede wszystkim wyznacznikiem dyskursu.
This article describes a new portrait of the human self in the thought of an American philosopher Calvin O. Schrag. He argues with dismal deconstructionist and postmodernist views of the self as something endlessly changing without any destiny or purpose. On the other hand, he is convinced first of all, the existing „corrupt” Self must be dismantled. After that as a consequence of deconstruction, Self can be reborn like a phoenix from the ashes. This process fits perfectly in a popular contemporary current of thought, being an opposition derived from the Cartesian cogito paradigm of science. The self, says Schrag, is open to understanding through its discourse, its actions, its being with other selves, and its experience of transcendence. Calvin O. Schrag analyses the linguistic syntax elements of the discourse. He thinks that a person is capable of an action and this action must evolve person that is way it experiences this effects. What is more, the sense of community is an integral part of the analysis of the Self. Transcendence gives infinity, being the ability to shelter. The self as a subject is not dead, nor are the constitutive features of self-formation and self-understanding. Finally, the philosopher says that the narrative is a kind of human activity that provides context and perspective for the implementation of the self against the tradition of communication practices. Therefore, according to Schrag”s narratology it is a general method of analysis The Self.
O objetivo deste artigo é dar foco a um capítulo específico dentro do amplo contexto de debate entre o movimento neokantiano com a filosofia analítica. Trata-se da discussão entre Ernst Cassirer e Bertrand Russell, que toma lugar na história da filosofia nas décadas finais do século dezenove e iniciais do vinte. Em específico, veremos as posições de cada um dos autores em questão no que se refere a natureza da lógica e ao programa logicista. Para tanto, num primeiro momento, reconstruiremos essa discussão partindo de Russell. Daí, apresentaremos a posição dos neokantianos (com maior ênfase em Cassirer) nessa narrativa. Feito isso, trataremos da crítica do filósofo inglês a noção de “lógica transcendental” e suas implicações na filosofia de Cassirer, bem como a de seus predecessores na escola de Marburgo. Depois traremos ao debate a reposta do neokantiano ao filósofo inglês; para, por fim, tratarmos de alguns aspectos do logicismo defendido por Cassirer.
In this article, I argue that the interpretation of Kant's a priori in Marburg neo-Kantianism involved a historiographical problem concerning the Platonic interpretation of the history of exact sciences. According to Hermann Cohen, the history of modern science supports the philosophical view initiated by Plato and revived by Kant that ‘the diversity of things has to be dissolved in differences of ideas’ and thus points to the “victory of idealism” over empiricism and materialism. I first examine how Cohen and Paul Natorp tried to confirm this epistemological thesis in their historical research on Plato and modern physics. Then I focus on Cassirer's work, which provides the most extensive realization of this historiographical programme and, I submit, clearly shows the problematic gap between the ‘Platonic’ epistemology of the Marburg school and the historical reality of physics from Galileo to the early twentieth century.
This article examines Cohen’s “transcendental method”, Windelband’s “critical method”, the neo-Kantian distinctions between natural science and the humanities (i. e., human or cultural sciences), and Weber’s account of ideal-typical explanations. The Marburg and the Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism have in common that their respective philosophies of science focused on method, but they substantially differ in their approaches. Cohen advanced the “transcendental method”, which was taken up and transformed by Natorp and Cassirer; later, it became influential in neo-Kantian approaches to 20 th century physics. Windelband distinguished between facts and values, linking the former to the “genetic” method of history and the latter to the “critical” method of philosophy; and between the “nomothetic” and “idiographic” methods of the empirical sciences, a distinction further elaborated by Rickert. The distinction does not give rise to a sharp discrimination but is rather what Weber would later call an ideal type. All these approaches contribute in different ways to understanding the structure of scientific knowledge, focusing on different aspects of the general path of the empirical sciences between rationalism and empiricism.
This paper compares Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge and Cassirer’s Substance and Function in order to evaluate how in these works Cohen and Cassirer go beyond the limits established by Kantian philosophy. In his Logic , Cohen seeks to ground in pure thought all the elements which Kant distinguishes in empirical intuition: its matter (sensation) as well as its form (time and space). In this way, Cohen tries to provide an account of knowledge without appealing to any receptivity. In accordance with Cohen’s project of reformulating the Kantian theory of sensibility, Cassirer undertakes in Substance and Function the task of developing an alternative doctrine of pure and empirical manifolds. But whereas Cohen analyzes the laws of pure thought, Cassirer aims to highlight the functional character of concepts in the development of modern mathematics and physics. I will discuss these two different approaches to the problems raised by Kantian philosophy and I will argue that Cassirer went further than Cohen in the project of critical idealism.
The focus of this paper is Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s conception of unity of space. Cassirer’s neo-Kantian reading is largely in conformity with the mainstream of intellectualist Kant-scholars, which is unsurprising, given his own intellectualist view of space and perception and his rejection of the existence of a ‘merely sensory consciousness’ as a ‘formless mass of impression’. I argue against Cassirer’s reading by relying on a Kantian distinction first recognized by Heinrich Rickert, a neo-Kantian from the Southwest school, between Kenntnis (roughly knowledge by acquaintance) and Erkenntnis (roughly propositional knowledge). Correspondingly, I claim that concepts and categories are conditions for Erkenntnis of objects as such, namely for thinking of and apprehending the pre-existing unity as an object, rather than for the ‘constitution’ of this very unity.
Cassirer and Panofsky: A Philosophical Misunderstanding
This paper argues that German art historian and iconologist Erwin Panofsky unintentionally misused the concept of "symbolic form" coined by his friend and colleague, philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Although both shared the same neo-Kantian background, I contend that Panofsky clung to Kant’s dualistic theory of knowledge, while Cassirer explicitly adopted a non-dualistic way of thinking largely inspired by Goethean morphology. That is why Panofsky could distinguish between the "natural" space of perception and the cultural space of artistic representation, when Cassirer refused such a possibility. In so doing, Panofsky proved that he totally missed Cassirer’s point: according to the philosopher of symbolic forms, there is no such thing as a "nature," unless this "nature" is grasped as inherently cultural and historical.
I document Husserl’s growing interest in the foundational character of Greek philosophy for Western culture and show what is unique about Husserl’s appropriation of certain Greek thinkers and concepts. Specifically, I explain Husserl’s idiosyncratic appropriation of key Greek terms as original building blocks to articulate his own intuitive insights and review critically Husserl’s original appropriation of the history of Greek philosophy as a way of situating his transcendental phenomenology within the Western (“European”) intellectual tradition. Husserl adopted a consistent view of Greek philosophy throughout his life but deepened his engagement in later years. Initially little interested in the history of philosophy as such, he came to see the “breakthrough” into the theoretical attitude as decisive for the development of Western culture. The Skeptics’ epoché is revitalized by Husserl as a permanent way of challenging the dogmatic naivete of life in the natural attitude, motivating the transformation to theoria.
This book covers the history of concept of experience in Western philosophy from Kant to Foucault.
Platon hat vermutlich nach der Rückkehr von seiner ersten sizilischen Reise (387 v. Chr.) am Rande von Athen in der Nähe des ›Akademie‹ genannten Sportund Kultbezirks ein Grundstück gekauft und dort eine Schule gegründet (vgl. Diog. Laert. 4, 20). Nachrichten über die Geschichte der Schule finden sich in dem Philodem von Gadara zugeschriebenen Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis und bei Diogenes Laertius. Umstritten ist, ob die Mitglieder der Akademie auf eine einheitliche Lehre verpflichtet waren und welche Bedeutung Platons ungeschriebener Lehre in diesem Zusammenhang zukommt (s. Kap. II.7).
In the early 20th century, science reveals its instrumental and conventional character. These pragmatic features, according to Sergei Bulgakov, underscore the dependence of scientific claims on human qualities and purposes. Science is anthropologised; therefore, philosophy of science can be regarded as a part of philosophical anthropology. The pragmatic turn of science, Bulgakov argues, had a Kantian impulse. In 1912 book “Philosophy of Economy”, Bulgakov advances a metaphysical view on science in a dispute with his critical interlocutors – Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert, and their prominent predecessor Immanuel Kant. This paper shows that despite a fundamental disagreement concerning the notion of the transcendental subject, Bulgakov does not disprove the utility of Kant’s transcendental theory of knowledge. He rather points out the limits of this theory (Kant primarily insisted on) and overrides those limits as dispensable for philosophy, which does not have to be a formal science.
The paper explores the striking similarities between some of Wittgenstein’s core claims in On Certainty (1969), including the famous hinge metaphor, and Cassirer’s Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1921). Moreover, it suggests that Wittgenstein’s remark on relativity in On Certainty might have been triggered by his reading of Cassirer’s book.
This chapter presents an overview of the Neo‐Kantian movement in philosophy that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that was concentrated geographically in Germany. Following a summary of the institutional and intellectual context surrounding Neo‐Kantianism, the chapter explores the core philosophical principles associated with the movement, attending in particular to the ways in which Neo‐ Kantian philosophers appropriate and depart from the core tenets of Kant's critical philosophy. After briefly surveying the context in which Neo‐Kantianism took shape, the chapter surveys the two major “schools” into which the movement crystallized around 1880: the Marburg School, comprised primarily of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, and the Baden, or Southwest School, comprised principally of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Both schools of Neo‐ Kantianism are marked by a rich and fascinating process of internal conceptual development.
The Natorp's reception by the students of the JAE (1906-1916): republican revisionism of socialism, political and educational elitism and comprehensive school Resumen: El artículo explora las condiciones de posibilidad y usos político y educativos de la recepción de Paul Gerhard Natorp entre 1906 y 1916 por los pensionados españoles en Marburgo. Para perfilar estas, analiza las ideas que rechazaron en posibles alternativas como John Dewey: naturalismo, moral definida socialmente y escuela comunitaria y participativa. El neoidealismo era un posicionamiento político contrario al conservatismo, individualismo, liberalismo y positivismo. Su gnoseología defendía un organicismo trascendente al individuo y la superioridad de la filosofía como ciencia normativa que reunía las leyes naturales y morales, lo que permitía reformular un ideario republicano-reformista, que denominan «liberalismo socialista», que concede un papel directivo a las élites filosóficas y les permite realizar una revisión republicana del socialismo. Natorp también les provee de la «religión de la humanidad» y la educación social, que permiten justificar la dirección de la regeneración del país por las élites reformistas burguesas y atacar a la Iglesia y su poder educativo, este si un elemento común a la escuela única. Natorp no fue recibido en este periodo fundamentalmente para apoyar ésta, pues su gnoseología y pedagogía respaldaban discursos tradicionales que justificaban el papel de una élite intelectual dirigente distinta del práctico, el maestro, y de una pedagogía academicista que reforzaba la reproducción social impidiendo la democracia educativa. Cómo referenciar este artículo / How to reference this article Martínez Valle, C. (2018). La recepción de Natorp por los pensionados de la JAE (1906-1916): revisionismo republicano del socialismo, elitismo político y educativo, y escuela unificada. Foro de Educación, 16(25), 95-118. doi: http://dx.
Den Mittelpunkt des folgenden Diskurses bildet ein Projekt des Neukantianers Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), das dieser unter dem Titel „Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte“ 1883 präsentiert hat. Sein Vorhaben, die Fruchtbarkeit der infinitesimalen Größe in der Mathematik und den Naturwissenschaften auch für die Philosophie, vor allem die Kantische Transzendentalphilosophie, nutzbar zu machen, erwies sich zu damaliger Zeit als wenig populär. Infolge von Schwierigkeiten mit der Interpretation seiner komplizierten Schrift und heftiger Kritik führender Mathematiker blieb sein Werk weitgehend unbeachtet. Anhand eines Blickes auf den Gang der Wissenschaft der Infinitesimal-Mathematik soll diese Kritik im Folgenden entkräftet und neu bewertet werden. Es zeigt sich hierbei, dass, anders als zu Lebzeiten Cohens, heute gezielt versucht wird, die infinitesimale Größe in die mathematische Lehre zu integrieren – auch wenn dies mit erheblichen, vor allem philosophischen Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Hierbei soll auch das wieder erstarkte Interesse an den Infinitesimalien in der Nonstandard-Analysis als Anreiz dienen, die Philosophie Cohens am heutigen Forschungsdiskurs teilhaben zu lassen. In jüngerer Zeit spielt zudem auch in der Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis die Position des Intuitionismus wieder eine Rolle, welche der um Hermann Cohen und Paul Natorp entstandenen „Marburger Schule“ nahesteht. Auf den folgenden Seiten soll anhand Cohens „Logik der reinen Erkenntnis“ (1902) eine Lesart für eine „Infinitesimal-Logik“ Cohens präsentiert werden, die die Gedanken Cohens zur Infinitesimal-Methode in ein philosophisches System eingliedert. Wie schon in Cohens "`Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte"' soll es auch hier als "`unmittelbar nützlich"' erscheinen, "`zugleich mit der Durchführung eines systematisch entscheidenden Gedankens seine geschichtliche Entwicklung zu verfolgen."' [Cohen 1883, Vorwort] Dieser Rückblick auf die bewegte Historie des Infinitesimal-Begriffs soll grob die Entwicklungen hin zur Schaffenszeit Cohens umreißen und sodann als Prüfstein für dessen Ideen gelten.
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