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Consciousness: Creeping Up on the Hard Problem

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Abstract

How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between them, these three questions constitute what is commonly known as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Despite vast knowledge of the relationship between brain and behaviour, and rapid advances in our knowledge of how brain activity correlates with conscious experience, the answers to all three questions remain controversial, even mysterious. This book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: (1) The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain. The relationship between the world we perceive and the underlying physical reality is not as close as we might think. (2) Much of our behaviour is accomplished with little or no participation from conscious experience. (3) Our conscious experience of our behaviour lags the behaviour itself by around a fifth of a second: we become aware of what we do only after we have done it. (4) The lag in conscious experience applies also to the decision to act: we only become aware of our decisions after they have been formed. (5) The self is as much a creation of the brain as is the rest of the perceived world.

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... CB5T is based on cybernetics (also known as control theory), the study of principles governing goal-directed systems that self-regulate via feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1998;DeYoung & Weisberg, 2019;Powers, 1973;Wiener, 1961). Organisms are cybernetic systems because natural selection favors those systems that pursue goals facilitating reproduction, and cybernetics provides a crucial perspective for understanding how organisms, including human beings, function (Gray, 2004). All cybernetic systems must contain three elements: (a) A goal (or set of goals) physically instantiated within the system as a controlled variable that the system acts to bring toward a certain value or within a certain range. ...
... Although SDT tends not to consider the existence of individual differences in the strength of these three needs, they should differ in strength between people just like other psychological traits (Sheldon, 2011). SDT theorists have sometimes contrasted "organismic" approaches concerned with basic needs with "cybernetic" approaches concerned with more specific goals, but we do not see these as inherently distinct, given that organisms are fundamentally cybernetic and that goals can be very broad and abstract (Carver & Scheier, 1998;DeYoung & Krueger, 2018a, 2018bGray, 2004). Hence, we consider basic needs to be innate goals. ...
... Various lines of evidence indicate that people can pursue goals at both low and high levels of the goal hierarchy without being consciously aware of them (Latham et al., 2017;Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012;Sheldon, 2014). This should be fundamentally unsurprising given that consciousness has only very limited access to much of the brain's information processing (Gray, 2004;Wilson & Dunn, 2004). It has been estimated that we can process somewhere between 10 and 50 bits of information per second, consciously, whereas our sensory inputs amount to 10 million or more bits per second (Coupé et al., 2019;Nørretranders, 1991). ...
Article
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... As the ugly head of tautology is all-too-ready to be raised, it is important for our understanding of the scientific nature of motivation to consider underlying psychological dynamics: Causal explanation. In this pursuit, as in other areas of science, sometimes it is best to creepup on phenomena in a more tangential fashion especially when they are nebulous (e.g., in the case of consciousness; Gray, 2004). ...
... It might be thought that conscious awareness has no place in any discussion of relatively low-level motivation processes, nor, indeed, any place in psychology! What our RST journey has revealed, once again inspired by Jeffrey Gray (2004), is the need to account for both automatic-reflexive and controlled-reflective processes (Corr & Morsella, 2015). Indeed, the BIS can lay some claim to pointing to the functions of Schematic representation of the causal cascade of influences from distal to proximal levels. ...
... In an attempt to extract the implications of the contents and functions of conscious awareness in relation to RST, Corr (2010a) based his levelof-processing model on foundations of the neuropsychological model of consciousness proposed by Gray (2004). This model states that all behaviors (and related thoughts, feeling, and so on) are automatically organized and executed, without immediate control by higher-level controlled processes (and certainly not conscious processing, which simply takes too long to be generated by the brain to have immediate control over the events it represents). ...
Article
Evolution has bound closely together motivation and personality. Much of personality psychology today is based on the (increasingly neuro) science of fundamental systems of motivation. This is most clearly seen in the family of approach–avoidance theories that describe the major brain-behavioral systems that mediate reactions to stimuli appraised by the animal (including human beings) as falling into appetitive (attractor) and aversive (repulsor) classes. Here “motivation” may be seen as an immediate state process, which is affected by transient internal factors such as drive (e.g., hunger) and external situational constraints and affordances. In contrast, personality may be seen as the corresponding longer-term trait of typical motivation. In the causal cascade, it is emphasized that goal representations are at the heart of true latent motivation, while states are the observed expression of such motivation modified by a host of internal and external factors. Over a century's worth of experimental research leads us to suppose the existence of two major negative-defensive “avoidance” systems, one related to pure avoidance and escape of aversive stimuli, and the other to behavioral inhibition evoked by the detection of goal conflict. A third major, positive-incentive, motivation system is related to exploratory approach, reward sensitivity/reactivity, goal-drive persistence, and impulsivity. These systems of motivation and personality are discussed in terms of Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), which proposes three systems corresponding, respectively, to these basic forms of motivation: Fight-Flight-Freeze System, Behavioral Inhibition System, and Behavioral Approach System. The conceptual foundations of RST are outlined, and the neuropsychological systems delineated, which includes discussion of automatic-controlled processes, as well as the exotica of consciousness. Psychometric measurement systems are then presented and examples of the applications of RST are provided. Finally, the problems for future research are sketched to guide the RST-inspired student of motivation and personality.
... For anger, higher levels encourage collective action to punish those breaching established norms, and mobilizes collective actions to achieve that reparative end. On the other hand, AIT holds that increases in fear have no reliable direct effect, a claim contrary to long established belief in what effects result from increasing fear (Jost et al., 2003;Nussbaum, 2018;Robin, 2004 (Gray, 1987;Gray, 2004). ...
... This suggests that both approaches to emotion have merit. And, the adoption of AIT's view -first proposed by Jeffrey Gray (Gray, 2004)-that people can shift from reliance on habituated patterns of proven reliability to a mind orientated to "error correcting" as the better approach for making choices when conditions are unfamiliar, offers a way of reconciling the two views. When conditions are familiar and, the more common, the conditions suit stable social environments, knowing what you like and what you dislike is an efficient and suitable approach to choice. ...
Conference Paper
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Three different conceptions of emotion are evident in political science research. Each emerged at a different period of time. Each has persevered, remaining influential to this day. These conceptions differ as to what emotions are, what each proposes as the proper taxonomic configuration of emotion, and what functions emotions serve as influences on political judgment and action. Two of these are driven by theory and one is the result of an unanticipated finding. The earliest of these, valence, it theory driven. It advances the claim that emotion serves as a singular rating of any target stimulus on a liking-disliking linear dimension, ranging from approach to avoidance. A later understanding expanded the emotion space from one dimension to two, with one dimension defined as positive, i.e., degree of liking, and the other defined as negative, i.e., degree of disliking. This bipolar finding was unexpected and served to endorse "negativity" as a coherent scientific concept. Lastly, Affective Intelligence theory, emerging in the 1980s, expanded emotion space into three dimensions. We primarily focus on the first, valence, and the third, AIT in and test claims derived from these conceptions using the 2020 ANES's new 'Feelings about the Nation' emotion battery. As the ANES battery has multiple emotion word indicators it is possible to operationalize each of these three conceptions to see to what extent their contributions overlap, augment, or challenge each others findings as to the influence of emotion on political judgment and political behavior.
... Стога је разумљиво што се емпиријска наука донекле повукла из ове области и препустила је духовним учењима, као што је, на пример, модел Успенског који препознаје идентичне четири функције као и Јунгов модел, али их смешта у слободнији интерпретативни оквир, или слични модели развоја интуитивног мишљења који се базирају на фокусираном самоистраживању свести. 8 Ту добијамо корисне идеје о интуицији, али њих није могуће свести на научни контекст. 9 Недостају мостови који би повезали науку и духовност, заправо човека са својим тоталитетом, па се чини да је један од задатака нашег времена проширење научне парадигме и увођење старог знања у нови оквир. ...
... Током развоја природног система, свака врста се у оквиру њега определила за неки облик опстанка који је као и сваки жив систем, динамичан и увек у процесу развоја. Људски модел показује да је током миленијског 8 Swami Kriyananda, Razvoj intuicije: kako prepoznati unutrašnjeg vodiča i verovati mu (Beograd: Esotheria, 2007). 9 Петр Дамјанович Успенски, Че�вр�и �у� (Београд: Езотериа, 1994). ...
Article
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102http://www.muzejnt.rsPhlogiston 28/2020 Bojana Škorc, Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Arts, Belgrade SCIENTIFIC INTUITION AND CREATIVITY The relationship between thinking as a process and intuition is in the focus of this research. The common model of human being exaggerates cognitive functions such as thinking and reasoning, while other human capacities, such as intuition, emotions, motives, personal traits and imagination, are underestimated or neglected. This oversimplified concept prevents us from feeling complete and from using intrapsychic creative resources. In this article, scientific intuition or intuitive thinking has been discussed in relation to psychological findings of subliminal, subconscious mind, defocus of consciousness, implicit knowledge and associative networks. The findings are discussed in the light of psychoanalytic theory (C.G. Jung), connotative meaning (Osgood), theory of higher mental functions (Vygotsky) and psychology of creativity (Sternberg). In addition, main characteristics of the process are illustrated by the Serbian traditional myth of treasure hunting, the process similar to creative, intuitive thinking. Treasure hunting is seen as a task for a chosen individual who is expected to discover a secret place where the treasure is dug, and has to look for it in the middle of the night in silence. Some night creatures will appear and they will try to stop the hunter. If the hunter makes any mistake during the process, when the sun rises, the treasure will be transformed into ashes. From the psychological point of view, this myth is a good illustration of the intuitive thinking — the night represents subliminal, subconscious information, daylight represents conscious cognitive functions, while the treasure is in the form of new ideas, insights and concepts. In conclusion, the importance of understanding the totality of human capacities and the importance of interrelations between intrapsychic and interpsychic realities are stressed. Key words: scientific intuition, symbol, creativity, thinking
... In line with these expectations, previous cross-sectional studies (Hanley et al. 2018;Karl and Fischer 2019) reported negative correlations between BIS and mindfulness facets expressing present-moment awareness of one's behavior and emotions, as well as judgment of one's emotional reactions. This suggests that individuals with higher activation of BIS tend to engage in fast, automatic behavior aimed at avoiding negative stimuli due to increased punishment sensitivity (Gray 2004;Keune et al. 2012), which conflicts with the conscious processing necessary to be aware of one's emotions and actions and, crucially, to non-critically consider them. ...
... Focusing on the positive relationships first, in our sample, we found a positive feedback loop between Acting with Awareness and Goal-Drive Persistence. This indicates that the attainment of long-term rewards (the Goal-Drive Persistence component of the BAS) is enabled and supported by higher level conscious processes (Gray 2004), including those captured by the Acting with Awareness Mindfulness component, which in turn then further increases activation of Goal-Drive Persistence Personality components. Hence, goal pursuit and conscious awareness of one's pursuit of goals mutually reinforce each other. ...
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Objectives We report a pre-registered longitudinal study of emerging adults which examined the links between facets of mindfulness with Big Five and reinforcement sensitivity personality traits with the aim of exploring possible origins of individual differences in trait mindfulness.Methods We investigated the relationship between personality, reinforcement sensitivity (including Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Approach System (BAS)), and mindfulness in a sample of 227 undergraduate students across 8 months, using a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model.ResultsMindfulness, in general, exhibited stronger longitudinal effects on personality than the other way around. We found reciprocal effects between reinforcement sensitivity and mindfulness facets: higher BAS-Goal-Drive Persistence positively predicted increased Acting with Awareness over time (B = 0.369 [.044, .693], p = .026) and higher Acting with Awareness predicted an increase in BAS-Goal-Drive Persistence (B = .173 [.041, .305], p = .010). Higher Non-Reacting Mindfulness predicted a reduction of BIS over time (B = − .132 [− .247, − .017], p = .025), with individuals with more skills to stay calm in emotional situations decreasing their reported levels of anxiety and emotional lability. Additionally, we found that higher Non-Judging mindfulness facets predicted an increase in Conscientiousness (B = .147 [.014, .280], p = .031). Finally, higher levels of Describing Mindfulness predicted an increase in Neuroticism over time (B = .200 [.034, .366], p = .018).Conclusions Overall, our research findings indicate that mindfulness and personality share developmental trajectories over a 4-month period, suggesting avenues for possible personality development via Mindfulness interventions.
... Like many others, I agree with many of the ideas in Chapman & Huffman's (C & H) short article questioning the superiority of humans. But C & H seem to be unaware of the large existing literature on this subject and the considerable amount of thought that has been devoted to this over the last two thousand years (e.g., Aristotle, Xenophon 350 BC, Romanes 1883, von Uexhull 1957, Saponsis 1987, Radner & Radner 1989, Bekoff 1992, Baron-Cohen et al. 1993, DeGrazia 1996, Lea & Kiley-Worthington 1996, Gray 2004, Kiley-Worthington 2011, Morizot 2016. ...
... Nor is it clear why C & H's article appears in a journal about sentience, which concerns feeling and emotion in living beings. Even though most mental attributes involve emotions, there is no discussion of how these fit (e.g., Gray 2004, Robinson 2008, McIntyre 1999, Evans & Cruse 2004. ...
... The awe with which we regard our own conscious powers. A little introspection shows that much of our behaviour is accomplished with little participation of conscious processes (Gray 2004, Custers and Aarts 2010, Kahneman 2011. For many motor tasks, such as returning a tennis ball, the conscious experience of the event lags behind the action by about one fifth of a second (Gray 2004). ...
... A little introspection shows that much of our behaviour is accomplished with little participation of conscious processes (Gray 2004, Custers and Aarts 2010, Kahneman 2011. For many motor tasks, such as returning a tennis ball, the conscious experience of the event lags behind the action by about one fifth of a second (Gray 2004). Consciousness reviews rather than directs. ...
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Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain, there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the possession of complex behaviour must mean that an animal is conscious, and by the misapplication of words such as ‘pain.’
... To this end, we are referring to basic, low-level consciousness (e.g., the subjective experience of pain, breathlessness, nausea, yellow afterimages, or ringing in one's ears). This basic form of consciousness has been called 'sentience' [6], 'subjective experience', 'phenomenal state', and 'qualia' [7]. In this article, when we discuss consciousness, we are discussing this most basic form of consciousness, which is an experience of any kind. ...
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Identifying consciousness in other creatures, be they animals or exotic creatures that have yet to be discovered, remains a great scientific challenge. We delineate the first three steps that we think are necessary for identifying consciousness in other creatures. Step 1 is to define the particular kind of consciousness in which one is interested. Step 2 is to identify, in humans, the key differences between the brain processes that are associated with consciousness and the brain processes that are not associated with consciousness. For Step 2, to identify these differences, we focus on passive frame theory. Step 3 concerns how the insights derived from consciousness research on humans (e.g., concerning these differences) can be generalized to other creatures. We discuss the significance of examining how consciousness was fashioned by the process of evolution, a process that could be happenstance and replete with incessant tinkering, yielding adaptations that can be suboptimal and counterintuitive, far different in nature from our efficiently designed robotic systems. We conclude that the more that is understood about the differences between conscious processing and unconscious processing in humans, the easier it will be to identify consciousness in other creatures.
... Сегодня существуют разные подходы к решению трудной проблемы сознания: от отрицания существования самой проблемы (или утверждения об ошибочности в самой постановке вопроса), вынесения этого вопроса «за скобки» до попыток решения его с помощью применения научных или ненаучных методов [14]. ...
Article
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The research is devoted to justification of the interdisciplinary approach in the study of consciousness. Studying consciousness as a phenomenon is a very divergent project, the mystery of its nature and appearance makes different ways of studying consciousness possible. Besides, consciousness is an umbrella term which may be interpreted differently in different contexts. Various approaches to comprehension of consciousness have been developed nowadays in Philosophy, Psychology, Biology, Medicine, Neurosciences, Sociology, Cognitive and Computer Sciences, Linguistics and a number of other research fields. In the end of the 1980s one can notice an exceptional growth of interest in the problem of consciousness both in Philosophy and Science. The works by Bernard Baars, Daniel Dennett, Roger Penrose, Francis Crick and Christopher Koch, David Chalmers have appeared in these years. They outlined the main approaches to the study of consciousness and demonstrated that study of consciousness became an interdisciplinarity research. The research discusses the features of the phenomenon of consciousness and outlines the main theoretical issues, the most relevant of which are the “hard problem” of consciousness, the problem of mind and body, the problem of “the explanatory gap”, the question of the primacy of the brain in relation to consciousness, the place of consciousness in the modern scientific paradigm, changes of the ethical and worldview interpretation in connection with artificial intelligence, neurochips and neural network. Based on the complexity and multidimensionality of the research field associated with the problem of consciousness, the variety of approaches to studying this problem in Philosophy and Science, the controversial character of the questions raised, and the heated discussion among researches, the author concludes that interdisciplinary studies of consciousness have the greatest heuristic possibilities today.
... Thus, at some stage there would still be a need for further arbitrary decision making regarding which groups deserve welfare protection, and where or when exemptions must be applied to preserve the human population's health and food supply systems (e.g., in wild capture fisheries, use of insecticides to protect crops or control mosquitoes to combat malaria or other vector-borne diseases). Sentience is a "hard problem" (Gray 2004;Humphrey 2022;Mason and Lavery 2022), and these severe shortcomings of the sentience criteria used by Birch et al. (2021) highlight why their utility is questionable, as is more broadly, application of the feelings-based suffering-centered approach to the welfare of fish and aquatic invertebrates. Instead of arbitrary application of intangible, context-dependent concepts that may selectively serve certain ethical positions (no use of animals at all) at the cost of others (sustainable use of animals), pragmatic functional or nature-based operational welfare indicators with quantifiable endpoints that are scientifically validated, reliable and straight-forward to interpret should be used (Arlinghaus et al. 2009;Diggles et al. 2011;Barragán-Méndez et al. 2019;Browman et al. 2019; Table 2). ...
Article
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Psychology and vision science, university of leicester, leicester, uK; j school of veterinary science, Murdoch university, Perth, wA, Australia; k Department of ichthyology, Faculty of Biology, lomonosov Moscow state university, Moscow, Russia; l school of Biomedical sciences, university of queensland, Australia; m Pepperell Research and consulting, noosaville, qlD, Australia; n Kansas Biological survey, and the Biodiversity institute, the university of Kansas, lawrence, Ks, usA; o emeritus (Retired) Department of Zoology and Physiology, university of wyoming laramie, wY, usA; p Britannia heights, nelson, new Zealand; q Biomed sci, Atlantic veterinary college, university of Pei, charlottetown, canada; r the college of william & Mary, virginia institute of Marine science, Gloucester Point, virginia, usA; s emeritus (Retired) tropical Aquaculture laboratory, university of Florida, Gainesville, usA ABSTRACT The welfare of fishes and aquatic invertebrates is important, and several jurisdictions have included these taxa under welfare regulation in recent years. Regulation of welfare requires use of scientifically validated welfare criteria. This is why applying Mertonian skepticism toward claims for sentience and pain in fishes and aquatic invertebrates is scientifically sound and prudent, particularly when those claims are used to justify legislation regulating the welfare of these taxa. Enacting welfare legislation for these taxa without strong scientific evidence is a societal and political choice that risks creating scientific and interpretational problems as well as major policy challenges, including the potential to generate significant unintended consequences. In contrast, a more rigorous science-based approach to the welfare of aquatic organisms that is based on verified, validated and measurable endpoints is more likely to result in "win-win" scenarios that minimize the risk of unintended negative impacts for all stakeholders, including fish and aquatic invertebrates. The authors identify as supporters of animal welfare, and emphasize that this issue is not about choosing between welfare and no welfare for fish and aquatic invertebrates, but rather to ensure that important decisions about their welfare are based on scientifically robust evidence. These ten reasons are delivered in the spirit of organized skepticism to orient legislators, decision makers and the scientific community, and alert them to the need to maintain a high scientific evidential bar for any operational welfare indicators used for aquatic animals, particularly those mandated by legislation. Moving forward, maintaining the highest scientific standards is vitally important, in order to protect not only aquatic animal welfare, but also global food security and the welfare of humans.
... According to advocates of the representational theory, they are inside our heads. ese supposed internal images are variously called representations, copies, replicas, "virtual reality displays" (Gray, 2004) or "controlled hallucinations" (Seth, 2021). e neuroscientist Stephan Lehar takes this position to its logical conclusion by considering what happens when you look at the sky. ...
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ere is a deep divide between people's direct experiences and the standard understanding of vision as taught in biology and psychology. When the looker cannot be seen and other sensory cues are excluded, the sense of being stared at, also called scopaesthesia, is impossible from the conventional point of view. Yet it seems to happen. Here, we suggest that thinking again about this puzzle, instead of ignoring or denying it, could deepen our understanding of vision and stimulate fruitful research in the life and mind sciences. e evolution of brain processes that imply a movement of in uences out of the eyes would make more sense if such in uences actually occur than if they are an illusion. Could sco-paesthesia actually happen? No, not if minds are inside heads. But what if minds are not con ned to brains?
... Šansa da ne primetimo da se radi o različitim ljudima je još manja, ukoliko onaj koji pita ima uniformu. Tada veliki broj ljudi ne primećuje da su razgovarali sa dve različite osobe (Gray, 2006). Izgleda da smo razgovarali sa uniformom koja je očigledno, strukturirala situaciju. ...
... CB5T asserts that any full explanation of human personality must be grounded in the framework of cybernetics, the study of goal-directed, adaptive systems (Carver & Scheier, 1999;Gray, 2004;Powers, 1973;Wiener, 1961). Every cybernetic system must have at least three components: a goal represented by a range of a controlled variable within the system that constitutes the system's "preferred" state; a feedback process that compares the current state to the goal state; and an operator (or set of operators) that the system uses to transform the current state into the goal state. ...
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Objective: According to Cybernetic Big Five Theory (CB5T), personality traits reflect variation in the parameters of evolved cybernetic mechanisms, and extreme manifestations of these traits correspond to a risk for psychopathology because they threaten the organism's ability to pursue its goals effectively. Our theory of autism as a consequence of low Plasticity extends CB5T to provide a cybernetic account of the origin of autistic traits. The theory argues that, because all psychological competencies are initially developed through exploration, typical development requires sensitivity to the incentive reward value of the unknown (i.e., the unpredicted). According to CB5T, motivation to explore the unknown is the core function underlying the metatrait Plasticity, the shared variance of Extraversion and Openness/Intellect. This theory makes predictions regarding the downstream developmental consequences of early low Plasticity, and each prediction maps well onto autistic symptomatology. Method: We surveyed 387 people. Measures included the Autism Quotient (AQ) scale and International Personality Item Pool items that are indicators of Plasticity and Stability. Results: The association between AQ and Plasticity was β = -.64. Conclusion: A strong negative correlation between Plasticity and AQ suggests ASD may be closely linked to a low sensitivity to the incentive reward value of the unknown.
... Figure 23.7, inspired by Grush (2004) and Gerdes and Happee (1994), describes the general framework of the internal model. A similar structure has been presented by Gray (2006). The robot has an internal model of itself and the external environment, allowing it to simulate its interactions with the external world. ...
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The current state of the art in cognitive robotics, covering the challenges of building AI-powered intelligent robots inspired by natural cognitive systems. A novel approach to building AI-powered intelligent robots takes inspiration from the way natural cognitive systems—in humans, animals, and biological systems—develop intelligence by exploiting the full power of interactions between body and brain, the physical and social environment in which they live, and phylogenetic, developmental, and learning dynamics. This volume reports on the current state of the art in cognitive robotics, offering the first comprehensive coverage of building robots inspired by natural cognitive systems. Contributors first provide a systematic definition of cognitive robotics and a history of developments in the field. They describe in detail five main approaches: developmental, neuro, evolutionary, swarm, and soft robotics. They go on to consider methodologies and concepts, treating topics that include commonly used cognitive robotics platforms and robot simulators, biomimetic skin as an example of a hardware-based approach, machine-learning methods, and cognitive architecture. Finally, they cover the behavioral and cognitive capabilities of a variety of models, experiments, and applications, looking at issues that range from intrinsic motivation and perception to robot consciousness. Cognitive Robotics is aimed at an interdisciplinary audience, balancing technical details and examples for the computational reader with theoretical and experimental findings for the empirical scientist.
... Karl et al. (2020) did not explicitly name the two new facets, but observed that the first sub-facet was characterised by items indicating awareness of one's behaviour, and the second sub-facet indicated items specific to one's mental processes. They also alluded to the distinction made by consciousness researchers between public cognitive spaces and private cognitive spaces, since the two sub-facets seem to resemble this distinction (Gray, 2004). Lecuona et al. (2021) have also proposed a similar six-factor structure, where they named the two sub-facets of Actaware as Distractibility and Mindless actions. ...
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Objectives This study aimed to evaluate the psychometric properties of a Sinhalese version of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), including its factor structure, internal consistency and convergent validity, in an exclusively Buddhist population. Methods The FFMQ was translated to Sinhalese using forward and backward translation, expert consensus and pretesting. The translated questionnaire was administered to a sample of 415 nurses (90.8% female; mean age = 39 years; 100% Buddhists), from 4 hospitals in Sri Lanka. The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS)-21 was administered concurrently. A series of empirical factor models were tested for fit using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to explore alternative factor structures. Internal consistency was measured using Cronbach α. Results The original five-factor structure, either as first-order or hierarchical models, showed poor fit in the present population. EFA supported a six-factor structure, where the original Actaware facet splits into two facets, namely, Distract and Autopilot. A 20-item short form composed of 3–4 items from each of the six facets, selected based on factor loadings and item-total correlations, showed excellent CFA model fit. Internal consistencies of the 20-item scale (α = 0.7) and the five subscales (α = 0.67–0.72) were satisfactory. Overall mindfulness showed moderate negative correlations with depression, anxiety and stress; and all facets except Observe and Describe correlated negatively with psychological problems. Conclusions Our findings endorse a six-factor structure of mindfulness, which had been proposed in a few previous studies. A modified 20-item short form with six facets shows satisfactory psychometric properties.
... As for the neural correlates of consciousness, the authors considered different evidence, concluding that both the sensorium hypothesis [142,143] supporting the pivotal role of perceptual regions of the brain along with subcortical structures, and the hypothesis supporting the pivotal role of cortical circuits, are valid. To disentangle the role of cortical regions and perceptual regions, they suggest future research study simple neural systems such as the olfactory one. ...
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The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue. Among the 1130 articles assessed, 85 full texts were included in the prefinal step. Finally, this scoping review analyzed 68 articles that described 29 theories of consciousness. We found heterogeneous perspectives in the theories analyzed. Those with the highest grade of variability are as follows: subjectivity, NCC, and the consciousness/cognitive function. Among sub-cortical structures, thalamus, basal ganglia, and the hippocampus were the most indicated, whereas the cingulate, prefrontal, and temporal areas were the most reported for cortical ones also including the thalamo-cortical system. Moreover, we found several definitions of consciousness and 21 new sub-classifications.
... Public deliberation is constrained if thought and action are tightly interwoven and embedded in deeply engrained partisan habits. When consciousness is in its "error-correcting" mode (Gray, 2004), human judgment turns to reliance on deliberate consideration and reflection. Diverse reflections on alternative understandings is democracy's principal advantage over more rigid regimes (Ober, 2008). ...
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... Lending credence to this proposal, Deliberative decisions are slow, computationally intensive, and thus could reflect executive overhead, a stark contrast to the impulsive and inflexible nature of Pavlovian and Procedural responses. Classic dual-system theories oriented systems hierarchically, with simpler systems functioning autonomously and complex (deliberative, cognitive) systems monitoring ongoing activity and overriding as needed (Bechara & van der Linden, 2005;Eagleman, 2011;Evans, 2008;Gray, 2004;Haidt, 2006;McClure & Bickel, 2014;Mischel, 2014;Redish, 2013). Extending this dual-system story to our three-system story, the resultant hybrid structure retains Deliberative processing atop the hierarchy where it adopts an executive role delegating between Pavlovian and Procedural systems (see Fig. 3). ...
Chapter
Mammalian decision-making is mediated by the interaction of multiple, neurally and computationally separable decision systems. Having multiple systems requires a mechanism to manage conflict and converge onto the selection of singular actions. A long history of evidence has pointed to the prefrontal cortex as a central component in processing the interactions between distinct decision systems and resolving conflicts among them. In this chapter we review four theories of how that interaction might occur and identify how the medial prefrontal cortex in the rodent may be involved in each theory. We then present experimental predictions implied by the neurobiological data in the context of each theory as a starting point for future investigation of medial prefrontal cortex and decision-making.
... Their innovative approach accords well with the conclusion, in vertebrate research, that these states are not a uniquely human phenotype. It has been proposed that, because of what is known today about the phylogenetic continuity of the vertebrate brain, the burden of proof is no longer to demonstrate that the higher mammals possess these states, but rather to demonstrate that these animals do not possess these states (see Gray, 2004;Panksepp, 1998). (This conclusion is arguably already warranted on ethical grounds alone.) ...
... Public deliberation is constrained if thought and action are tightly interwoven and embedded in deeply engrained partisan habits. When consciousness is in its "error-correcting" mode (Gray, 2004), human judgment turns to reliance on deliberate consideration and reflection. Diverse reflections on alternative understandings is democracy's principal advantage over more rigid regimes (Ober, 2008). ...
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... In other words, how matter and consciousness are related (Churchland, 2013)? Many researchers have tried to address and solve it such as (Libet, 1996;Gray, 2004). Hinduism can address this problem (Hari, 2015). ...
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In this paper, we introduce the Hinduism religion and philosophy. We start with introducing the holy books in Hinduism including Vedas and Upanishads. Then, we explain the simplistic Hinduism, Brahman, gods and their incarnations, stories of apocalypse, karma, reincarnation, heavens and hells, vegetarianism, and sanctity of cows. Then, we switch to the profound Hinduism which is the main core of Hinduism and is monotheistic. In profound Hinduism, we focus on the non-dualism or Advaita Vedanta approach in Hinduism. We discuss consciousness, causality, Brahman, psychology based on Hinduism, supportive scientific facts for Hinduism, the four levels of truth, and Maya. The four paths of knowledge, love, karma, and meditation are explained as well as the cosmic mind, the subtle body, and Aum. The risks for every path are also explained. Then, we introduce the orthodox and heterodox Indian schools including Yoga, Nyaya, Advaita Vedanta, Vishishtadvaita, and Dvaita. Connections to some other religions including Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Islamic mysticism, and Zoroastrianism are analyzed. Finally, we explain the connection of Hindu philosophy with the Greek, western, and Islamic philosophies which include the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, Descartes, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra.
... This differentiation of the acting with awareness facet suggests that two different processes might underlie this factor and that it should not be treated as a uni-dimensional construct across cultures. The two-factor structure that emerged resembles the distinction made by researchers of consciousness about private cognitive spaces, in other words awareness of the external world and one's behavior in it, and public cognitive spaces, in other words awareness of internal world, e.g., thoughts and images (Gray 2004). The first sub-factor of acting with awareness was characterized by items indicating awareness of one's behavior, aligning with public cognitive spaces. ...
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Objectives The goal of the current study was to investigate the universality of the five-factor model of mindfulness and the measurement equivalence of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ).Methods The study used FFMQ data from published and unpublished research conducted in 16 countries (total N = 8541). Using CFA, different models, proposed in the literature, were fitted. To test the cross-cultural equivalence of the best fitting model, a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis was used. Further, the equivalence of individual facets of the FFMQ and potential sources of non-equivalence was explored.ResultsThe best fitting models in most samples were a five-facet model with a higher-order mindfulness factor and uncorrelated positive and negative item-wording factors and a five-facet model with a correlated facets and uncorrelated positive and negative item-wording factors. These models showed structural equivalence, but did not show metric equivalence (equivalent factor loadings) across cultures. Given this lack of equivalent factor loadings, not even correlations or mean patterns can be compared across cultures. A similar pattern was observed when testing the equivalence of the individual facets; all individual facets failed even tests of metric equivalence. A sample size weighted exploratory factor analysis across cultures indicated that a six-factor solution might provide the best fit across cultures with acting with awareness split into two factors. Finally, both the five- and six-factor solution showed substantially better fit in more individualistic and less tight cultures.Conclusions Overall, the FFMQ has conceptual and measurement problems in a cross-cultural context, raising questions about the validity of the current conceptualization of mindfulness across cultures. The results showed that the fit of the FFMQ was substantially better in individualistic cultures that indicate that further data from non-Western cultures is needed to develop a universal conceptualization and measurement of mindfulness.
... Kada osobe razgovaraju, brzina kojom se razgovor odvija, brzina razmene reči, daleko prednjači ispred vremena koje bi nam bilo potrebno da to obavimo u svesnom stanju. Neuro-istraživanja pokazuju da neuralni događaj (evocirani potencijali i neuronska razmena) kasni za oko 250-350ms za akcijom koju izvodimo (Gray, 2006). Naše aktivnosti teku brže od procesa u korteksu velikog mozga koji je korelat svesti. ...
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Knjiga je organizovana tako da čitaoca uvede u svet simbola i asocijacija kroz lično iskustvo samoistraživanja. Potrebno je prvo pročitati uvodni deo a zatim popuniti upitnik koji se nalazi kao prilog u knjizi. Dalje čitanje upućuje na tumačenje procesa koji se odigravaju tokom ličnog rada na osnovu stvorenih odgovora, gde čitalac preuzima ulogu istraživača sopstvenih procesa. Drugi deo knjige sadrži tumačenja mogućih odgovora i veza između odgovora koje je čitalac-samoistraživač stvorio, posebno u okviru simbolike boja, funkcija svesti i simbolike kruga. Treći deo knjige se bavi tumačenjem značenjskog polja boja, simbolike prostora, odnosa svesnih i van-svesnih funkcija, prikazuje nalaze većeg broja istraživanja na te teme. Otvaraju se putevi proučavanja unutrašnjih mreža značenja u polju dubinske psihologije, estetike, alhemijskog i tradicionalnog nasleđa, kao i kvantnih pristupa čoveku kao bogatom, višeslojnom i samostvarajućem biću . U unutrašnjoj estetici su istraživač i posmatrana pojava unutrašnjeg polja jedno isto. Ova metoda samoistraživanja je zamišljena tako da u sebi ukršta više polazišta koja zajedno odslikavaju unutrašnji simbolički prostor, uključujući u njega sadržaje oba psihološka polja - svesnog i nesvesnog. Sadrži sažete ideje nastale iz rada sa ljudima kao i znanja u oblasti eksperimentalne estetike i psihologije, testova boja i domaćih istraživanja simbolike boje, Jungovog modela svesti, simbolizma mandale sa istoka i nauke o harmoniji.
... Both are essential. One of consciousness's principal purposes is to serve as an "error-correcting space" (Gray, 2004), this provides a vivid representational space wherein we can deliberate and plan for the future by manipulating mental representations of both specific external stimuli and complex social outcomes, past and anticipated, without the immediate necessity of acting on those deliberations. But humans do not spend much of their lives guiding activities reliant on careful deliberation. ...
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After a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid-1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right-wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far-right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.
... Despite its dubious reputation in corners of the field that have a lingering connection to behaviorism, research on consciousness is thriving in both psychology and neuroscience. [48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61] The current wave of research on consciousness began in the 1960s and 70s with results from studies of neurological patients, including people with split-brains (a procedure to alleviate epileptic seizures), 62,63 amnesia, [64][65][66] and blindsight (a condition in which the sufferer responds to visual stimuli without consciously perceiving them). 67,68 Research on each of these groups showed powerful and compelling dissociations between information processing that controls behaviors non-consciously, and the processing that underlies conscious experience. ...
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Editor’s Note The study of subjective experience represents a significant challenge to cognitive scientists, but one that is beginning to be increasingly addressed. Subjectivity renders experience less amenable to traditional objective scientific measurements than other subject matter. Our authors believe that when seeking to understand the mind, subjectivity must ultimately be investigated and understood.
... In this section, we review and elaborate on some explanations for what consciousness does. Many explanations have been suggested, including but certainly not limited to [20]: error monitoring [164], an inner eye [165], saving us from danger [166], later error detection [167], pramodular response [168] and to seem mysterious [169]. ...
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The Hard Problem of consciousness has been dismissed as an illusion. By showing that computers are capable of experiencing, we show that they are at least rudimentarily conscious with potential to eventually reach superconsciousness. The main contribution of the paper is a test for confirming certain subjective experiences in a tested agent. We follow with analysis of benefits and problems with conscious machines and implications of such capability on future of computing, machine rights and artificial intelligence safety.
... See for example the work ofGray (2004) and ofFfytche (2013).44 A projectivist analysis of perception is defended inCoates (2015). ...
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This paper offers a partial defence of a Sellarsian-inspired form of scientific realism. It defends the relocation strategy that Sellars adopts in his project of reconciling the manifest and scientific images. It concentrates on defending the causal analysis of perception that is essential to his treatment of sensible qualities. One fundamental metaphysical issue in perception theory concerns the nature of the perceptual relation; it is argued that a philosophical exploration of this issue is continuous with the scientific investigation of perceptual processes. Perception, it is argued, can, and should, be naturalised. A challenge for any account of perception arises from the fact that a subject’s experiences are connected with particular objects. We need to supply principled grounds for identifying which external physical object the subject stands in a perceptual relation to when they have an experience. According to the particularity objection presented in the paper, naive realism (or disjunctivism) does not constitute an independently viable theory since, taken on its own, it is unable to answer the objection. In appealing to a ‘direct experiential relation’, it posits a relation that cannot be identified independently of the underlying causal facts. A proper understanding of one central function of perception, as guiding extended patterns of actions, supports a causal analysis of perception. It allows us to draw up a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for perceiving that avoids well-known counterexamples. An analysis of this kind is congruent with the scientific account, according to which experiences are interpreted as inner states: sensible qualities, such as colours, are in the mind (but not as objects of perception). A Sellarsian version of the relocation story is thus vindicated.
... And recent experiments have shown that even for spontaneous movements that have already started to manifest themselves as unwilled cortical 'readiness potentials', there is a short window of time (around 800 ms) during which a conscious decision can abort the movement [74,75], though a point of no return is reached after which a conscious decision to abort has no effect. These facts comport with the late Jeffrey Gray's thesis [76] that consciousness functions as a 'late error-detection mechanism'-a domain of perception and evaluation, into which multimodal sensory inputs, objectives, plans and impending motor outputs are channelled by unconscious parts of the brain and integrated into constructs that reveal mismatches and discrepancies, which the executive parts of the brain then use in terminating or correcting future action. ...
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In investigating convergent minds, we need to be sure that the things we are looking at are both minds and convergent. In determining whether a shared character state represents a convergence between two organisms, we must know the wider distribution and primitive state of that character so that we can map that character and its state transitions onto a phylogenetic tree. When we do this, some apparently primitive shared traits may prove to represent convergent losses of cognitive capacities. To avoid having to talk about the minds of plants and paramecia, we need to go beyond assessments of behaviourally defined cognition to ask questions about mind in the primary sense of the word, defined by the presence of mental events and consciousness. These phenomena depend upon the possession of brains of adequate size and centralized ontogeny and organization. They are probably limited to vertebrates. Recent discoveries suggest that consciousness is adaptively valuable as a late error-detection mechanism in the initiation of action, and point to experimental techniques for assessing its presence or absence in non-human mammals. © 2017 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
... Lynn Robertson (2004) also reviewed the ways in which the experience of 3D space can be destroyed in Balint's syndrome, unilateral neglect, and integrative agnosia. As these and other scientists such as Jeffrey Gray (2004) have pointed out, the 3D nature of the phenomenal world is likely to have important consequences for neuroscience, for the obvious reason that the normally functioning brain has to be organized in a way that supports such spatially extended experiences. ...
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This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an alternative, reflexive way of viewing the relations amongst consciousness, brain and the external physical world. It argues that dualism splits the universe in two fundamental ways: in viewing phenomenal consciousness as having neither location nor extension it splits consciousness from the material world, and subject from object. Materialist reductionism views consciousness as a brain state or function (located and extended in the brain), which eliminates the consciousness/material world split, but retains the split of subject from object. The chapter argues that neither dualism nor reductionism accurately describes the phenomenal world; consequently, they each provide a misleading understanding of phenomenal consciousness. Reflexive monism follows the contours of everyday experience, thereby allowing a more unified understanding of how phenomenal consciousness relates to the brain and external physical world that is consistent both with the findings of science and with common sense. The chapter goes on to consider how phenomenal objects relate to real objects, perceptual projection, how phenomenal space relates to physical space, whether the brain is in the world or the world in the brain, and why this matters for science.
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Some theories of consciousness emphasize its relationship to language, its emergent quality, and its causal role. Prominent among these theories is the one that Dennett has been developing for nearly four decades. According to Dennett’s most recent version, consciousness is a kind of cerebral clout. But consideration of examples of pain—arguably the best candidate on offer for a paradigm of consciousness—reveals that clout is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Moreover, pain doesn’t necessarily have the aftermath that is predicted by Dennett’s Clout Theory (CT); pain cannot always be accommodated by Dennett’s methodology; and, pain does not always conform to Dennett’s proposed ontology. Dennett might wish to substitute episodic memory as a preferred paradigm for consciousness, but episodic memory is shown to be non-essential. And, were it to be treated as a paradigm of consciousness, it would create new explanatory problems for CT. Rather than abandoning CT, because it does seem to help explain some pain phenomena and because it does comport well with certain views of language, I propose that some of its more intriguing proposals be retained and treated as hypotheses to guide further empirical inquiry. Finally, I recommend some specific empirical cases wherein relevant research might be pursued.
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The credibility of the scientific theory of two world-renowned scientists, Stuart Hameroff, an American researcher, and Roger Penrose, a British physicist, is at stake. Their quantum theory of consciousness locates what seems to be the human soul in structures called microtubules existing within brain cells (neurons) which, at the moment of death, purportedly flee from the nervous system to enter the universe. What is the credibility of this quantum theory in light of mainstream religious doctrine concerning the soul, its individuality, its immateriality, and its distinctiveness from God and/or universal collective consciousness? Secondly, if quantum material can exist outside the body indefinitely, then how would knowledge of this material contribute to a contemporary understanding of the soul? A topic of significant interest to scientists, theologians, philosophers, and anthropologists across the world is the plausibility of the idea of quantum theory and its consequences for religious orthodoxy regarding the human soul being a verifiable reality, and its professed immortality in light of definitions of the soul by Anthony Quinton, metaphysician and materialist philosopher of the mind, and Richard Swinburne, British philosopher of religion and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, respectively as "mental states connected by continuity of character and memory" and "immaterial subjects of mental properties." Conclusions reached affirm that even though the quantum theory of consciousness may not point to the existence of the divine soul of major religions, it does provide scientific insights into the nature of the rational soul thereby augmenting a more comprehensive understanding of the possibility of human life after death.
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The split of the brain into two hemispheres is pivotal to human existence, enabling incompatible versions of the world, with quite different priorities and values, to exist concomitantly. Neuroimaging techniques are usually the adopted methods to assess hemispherical bias. However, can differences in thinking orientation, behavioural style, and personality emerging from laterality be observed without the use of neuroimaging techniques? This paper investigates whether a personality test based on the Five-factor model (FFM) is also able to identify hemispherical bias. It does so by testing five hypotheses on personality differences related to handedness. The aim is to contribute to the instantiation of the FFM in neuroscience by testing its validity against the neuroscientific literature on brain laterality. The findings pointed to no statistically significant differences due to handedness in three out of five personality traits (namely, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness and Extraversion). As to the other two traits – Openness and Agreeableness – the hypotheses were only partially confirmed by the data, as the relevant difference found was not between left-handed and right-handed groups, but between ambidextrous and the others.
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Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) is a major neuropsychological personality theory. However, a detailed introduction is lacking in Japanese. Therefore, this paper provides an overview of RST and discusses future perspectives. First, this paper introduces the original form of RST, a personality theory that introduced punishment sensitivity and rewards sensitivity. Second, this paper describes RST and Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) revised version of the RST. Third, this paper summarizes the relationship between RST and emotional disorders. Fourth, review of the Japanese literature in this study revealed that a comparison of the changes made by the revised RST with descriptions of the current RST aimed at Japanese speakers tended to show a lack of explanation of the major changes in the revised RST. Based on these findings, the author proposed a Japanese-translation of the key concepts in RST. Finally, future directions for RST research are discussed.
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Dieses Grundlagenwerk soll die Fundamente der Erkenntnistheorie und philosophischen Ethik vollständig neu herleiten, sowie den aktuellen Forschungsstand kritisch zusammenfassen. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, inwiefern Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit möglich ist, sowie die Suche nach elementaren, rationalen Rechtfertigungen, auf denen jegliche Erkenntnis aufbaut. Über fünfzehn Jahre hinweg habe ich dazu das Rechtfertigungsproblem ergründet, sowie herkömmliche Theorien und Argumentationen umfassend analysiert. Mit diesem Grundlagenwerk will ich einen voraussetzungsfreien, vollständig hergeleiteten Erkenntnisstand schaffen und ihn auf ein sicheres Fundament stellen. Mein Ziel ist es, eine moderne Erkenntnistheorie aufzustellen, die eine vollständige Rechtfertigung auf allen Ebenen liefern kann. –––––––– Programm (mit fachlichen Begrifflichkeiten): Der erkenntnistheoretische Teil untersucht die ontologischen und epistemischen Fragen des Realismus von Wirklichkeit und Bewusstsein. Es zeigt sich, dass sich die physikalische Wirklichkeit möglicherweise fundamental und damit auch ontologisch von (phänomenalen) Bewusstsein unterscheidet, welches durch die Wirklichkeit determiniert zu sein scheint (psychophysische Supervenienz; Epiphänomenalismus). Es wird untersucht, inwiefern die Existenz und Erkennbarkeit der Wirklichkeit aus einem direkten, naiven – aber rechtfertigungstheoretisch grundlegenden – Realismus logisch übertragen werden kann (externalistische, realistische Rechtfertigung), sowie ob sich die Realismus-Hypothese der Wirklichkeit auch aus selbstevidenten Basisüberzeugungen einer Fundierungstheorie (unseren momentanen Bewusstseinsinhalten) sowie fundamentalen Schlussmethoden rational begründen lässt (internalistische Rechtfertigung). Unsere fundamentalen Schlussmethoden, um von Gegebenen auf Unbekanntes zu schließen, lassen sich als bestimmte Arten von Induktion und Abduktion identifizieren, deren herkömmliche Begründungsversuche untersucht werden. So werden unsere induktiven, abduktiven, rationalen und logischen Grundlagen für Erkenntnisse, Annahmen und Theorien analysiert. Da Überzeugungen über Basisüberzeugungen hinaus immer unsicher sind, muss ihre Rechtfertigung nach dem Regressproblem in fundamentalen Schlüssen bzw. Rechtfertigungen enden, die schlicht gegeben sind, und nicht weiter gerechtfertigt werden können. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Schlüsse (bzw. Rechtfertigungen von nicht-Gegebenen) möglicherweise unserer fundamentalen intuitiven Rationalität bzw. Logik entspringen (Intuitionismus) – bzw. nur dadurch gerechtfertigt werden können, dass sie dieser entsprechen. (Dies entspricht einer intuitionistisch bzw. internalistisch-naturalistisch erweiterten Fundierungstheorie.) Diese rein idealistische Argumentation, wird durch die Annahme, dass wir in einer physikalischen Wirklichkeit leben, „bestätigt“, da unser gesamtes Denken letztlich durch die Strukturen unseres Gehirns determiniert ist (Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie). Abduktion und Induktion scheinen der rational alternativlosen, fundamentalen kognitiven Disposition zu entspringen, Gleichheiten bzw. sich wiederholende Unterschiede zusammenzufassen, und logische Verknüpfungen zu erkennen. Dies entspricht einer Reduktion gegebener Evidenz auf einen Informationsgehalt. Die realistische Rechtfertigung von Abduktion und auf ihr basierender Induktion scheint ebenfalls aus unserer fundamentalen Rationalität zu entspringen, und in ihrer Überzeugungsstärke an die Stärke der reduktiven Abduktivität gekoppelt zu sein. So nehmen wir reale, notwendige, induktiv fortgesetzte Gesetzmäßigkeiten an. Jeder externalistische Erkenntnisanspruch scheint nur internalistisch gerechtfertigt werden zu können. Auch eine Rechtfertigung mittels Kohärenz (Kohärentismus) scheint auf Abduktion zu gründen. Die alltäglichen Verwendungen der Begriffe Wahrheit und Wissen verweisen aufgrund ihrer verschiedenen, aufeinander aufbauenden, fehlbaren Rechtfertigungsarten bzw. -stärken auf einen Kontextualismus des Begriffs der Rechtfertigung. Wahrheit und Wissen scheinen also möglicherweise für ein Subjekt nur unvollständig gerechtfertigt sein zu müssen, bis die Unvollständigkeit bzw. Fehlbarkeit ihrer Rechtfertigung begründet aufgezeigt wird (Epistemic Conservatism). Der Teil zur philosophischen Ethik untersucht das Konzept der Normativität und ethische Begriffe wie das Sollen, der Wertung und das Gute. Ethische/moralische Inhalte werden hinsichtlich ihrer Ontologie, Bedeutung, Wahrheit und Objektivität untersucht. Dazu zählt eine Analyse ethischer Theorien und Konzepte, wie Sensualismus, Subjektivismus, Relativismus, Realismus, Teleologie, Deontologie, Utilitarismus und moralischer Status. Dabei wird unter anderem geklärt, ob normative Fragen letztlich in kausalen Fakten gründen müssen (Naturalismus, Nonkognitivismus), und insofern rein beschreibend beantwortet werden können. Zuletzt wird eine präzise Definition des Begriffs der Gerechtigkeit aufgestellt.
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Explicitly or implicitly, psychopathology is often defined in terms of statistical deviance, requiring that an affected individual be sufficiently distant from the norm in some dimension of psychological or neural function. In recent decades, the dominant paradigm in psychiatric research has focused primarily on deviance in neural function, treating psychopathology as disease of the brain. We argue that these conceptualizations are misguided. We recently proposed a novel theory of psychopathology, based in cybernetics and drawing additionally from neuroscience, psychometrics, and personality theory (DeYoung & Krueger, 2018a). In this theory, deviations from the norm in psychological and neural functioning serve as important risk factors for psychopathology but are not in themselves necessary or sufficient to identify psychopathology, which requires the presence of cybernetic dysfunction. Psychopathology is defined as persistent failure to move toward one's goals, due to failure to generate effective new goals, interpretations, or strategies when existing ones prove unsuccessful. We argue that adopting a cybernetic theory to replace conceptualizations of psychopathology as statistical deviance or brain disease would facilitate improvements in measurement, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of psychopathology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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Psychotherapy research shows that-in individual therapy as in family therapy-some therapists are more effective than others. This highlights the crucial role the therapist plays in a client's improvement. Furthermore, it seems that training may make a difference, as deliberate practice can improve the therapist's effectiveness. In the context of the current renewed awareness of the importance of the person of the therapist in the psychotherapy field, this paper's focus is specifically on the therapist in family therapy practice. There is a long tradition of reflecting on the person of the therapist in the family therapy field, often inspired by the metaphor of the wounded healer. In contrast, focusing on the person op the therapist in the present moment of the therapy session is fairly new. In this paper, we use of the dual process models from cognitive psychology as a frame to reflect on the person of the therapist. We review these dual process models and propose that the intuitive responsivity of the therapist relies on the fast, implicit cognitive system (system 1) and the therapist's self-reflection on the slow, deliberate system (system 2). The therapist's actions in therapy practice then emerge moment-by-moment as an echo of the way these two cognitive systems balance each other. It is optimal if the therapist, attuned to the family's rhythm, can flexibly oscillate between the two systems. In the concluding comments of this paper, reflective questions are posed about what this perspective may mean for family therapy practice, training, and supervision.
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For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.
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I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail to distinguish between statements that are true about conscious states in virtue of their phenomenality, and statements that are true in virtue of other properties of conscious states. I review empirically informed arguments by scientists Bernard Balleine and Anthony Dickinson, Stevan Harnad, and Jeffrey Alan Gray, arguing that each of them makes errors based on the ambiguity. I conclude with some tentative suggestions for avoiding further confusion about the ambiguity.
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This thesis studies how second-language and conceptual development emerge through interactions in Swedish preschool environments. It studies how types of interaction, such as play, can scaffold children towards such developments. The studies view interaction as multimodal and embodied and examine how children come to use and develop their second language or understanding of abstract concepts, through a range of communicative means other than language. The data collection has been carried out in two separate periods. The first fieldwork followed two newcomer children learning a second language during their days at the preschool. The second fieldwork was conducted with a group of children during a science project about spinning. The results concerning second-language development show how children can engage in play activity even before they share a common language, and that this can be afforded by the character of play activity based on rules and tacit understanding of relevant cultural patterns. Teachers also engage in play, so called guided play, which affords scaffolding for children. It is suggested that play activities in the preschool can function as an arena for children to interact, imitate the cultural rules and patterns around them and emergingly use their second language. Moreover, the results show how the preschools are structured for children’s participation through their cultural patterns and imitable structures. As such, the preschool provides children with cultural affordances, and it is shown how these are also used by children in their play. The results concerning conceptual development build on the notion that children develop in relation to cultural tools and artefacts, and that this is a highly perceptual and embodied process for the preschool child. It is exemplified how preschool’s provide environment and activities that can afford conceptual development, not least through use of digital tools, which also allows teachers to appropriate children’s play worlds to a pedagogical project. The teacher’s scaffolding interactions and use of the affordances of tools and the environment enable children to reason about the concepts in more conceptually conscious ways. The conclusion of these results point out the importance of non-verbal resources for interaction that might lead to second-language and conceptual development. The thesis thus highlights how these are embodied processes for the developing child, which are notably integrated with social scaffolding and environmental affordances. On these grounds the thesis proposes an extended view of scaffolding that include the perceptual and affordances of the environment, a notion of possible concern for both researchers and practitioners.
Chapter
In this chapter the human embrained systems starting with the memory, the multimodal processes (visual, auditory, haptic, proprioceptive, vestibular olfactive, gustative, spatial), and the action via the neuron mirror system are analysed. These structure-function systems, which are considered to be in permanent interaction with each other are non verbal processes and are the basis of oral, written language, number and calculation action, i.e. the verbal processes. Their interaction with emotional process is given from a neurocognitive point of view. Self-consciousness and consciousness are analysed as emerging high level processes.
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Behavioral systems and emotional regulation are key components of adolescents’ emotional development. However, little is known about their role in addiction potential. This research was conducted to evaluate the role of behavioral inhibition systems (BIS), behavioral activation systems (BAS) and difficulty with emotional regulation (DER) in adolescents’ addiction potential. The present work is applied correlative research. The 1,900 participants included male adolescents from high schools in the north, south, east, and west of Tehran were the society of this research. The sample was randomly selected by using Morgan’s table for as many as 320 students. The entry criteria were gender, age, grade of education, and non-drug abuse. The research measures were behavioral activation and inhibition systems scales, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, as well as the Addiction Prone Personality scale. The results showed the correlations among BIS, BAS, and DER were positively significant (p < .05). The correlation between BIS and addiction potential was significantly negative (p < .05). Finally, BAS, BIS, and DER, respectively, predicted 57%, 20%, and 22% of the addiction potential?s variance. According to the findings, BAS is the best predictor of the addiction potential. It seems that reward responding and seeking pleasure, which were behavioral activation systems subscales, and DER most contributed to predicting addiction potential.
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Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that “consciousness” contains no top-down control processes and that “consciousness” involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view, psychological processing and psychological products are not under the control of consciousness. In particular, we argue that all “contents of consciousness” are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or influenced in any way by the “experience of consciousness.” This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective “internal broadcasting” of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information, and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense, personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage—not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself.
Conference Paper
The aim of the present study is to analyse conscious and unconscious processes using the paradigm of listener-speaker in neurotypical children aged 6 and 9 years old. The speaker was always a child; the listener was a human or a robot, i.e., a small robot which reacts to speech expression by nodding only. Physiological data, i.e., heart rate, as well as behavioral data, i.e., number of words in addition with reported feelings, were considered. The results showed that (1) the heart rate was higher for children aged 6 years old than for children aged 9 years old when the listener was the robot; (2) the number of nouns and verbs expressed by both age groups was higher when the listener was the human. The results are consistent with the idea that conscious and unconscious development would not only depend on natural environments but also on artificial environments represented by robots.
Chapter
Reasoning about consciousness concerns theoretical connections between the etiology of consciousness and philosophical theories of its nature. Discussions concerning the origins of consciousness are different from those about the origins of hearts, lungs, and stomachs. And it is these lines of reasoning that concern this chapter. Before examining some arguments concerning the evolution of consciousness, we need to understand what a good explanation of the adaptation of consciousness would look like. The chapter outlines a few explanations of the etiology of consciousness that attempt to go beyond just-so stories. It uses the terminology of evolutionary theory, the theory of the origins and natural histories of organisms and their traits. The chapter then evaluates the role that evolutionary explanations are claimed to play in broader theorizing about consciousness. It also considers some of the most prominent questions that arise in evolutionary reasoning about consciousness.
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Participants playing the computer game Tetris reported intrusive, stereotypical, visual images of the game at sleep onset. Three amnesic patients with extensive bilateral medial temporal lobe damage produced similar hypnagogic reports despite being unable to recall playing the game, suggesting that such imagery may arise without important contribution from the declarative memory system. In addition, control participants reported images from previously played versions of the game, demonstrating that remote memories can influence the images from recent waking experience.
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This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) 'How could conscious experiences affect brains', a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although 'preconscious free will' might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain. I consider alternative interpretations of how 'conscious free will' might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.
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Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds (and brains) in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.
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Primates are apparently unique amongst the mammals in possessing trichromatic colour vision. However, not all primates are trichromatic. Amongst the haplorhine (higher) primates, the catarrhines possess uniformly trichromatic colour vision, whereas most of the platyrrhine species exhibit polymorphic colour vision, with a variety of dichromatic and trichromatic phenotypes within the population. It has been suggested that trichromacy in primates and the reflectance functions of certain tropical fruits are aspects of a coevolved seed–dispersal system: primate colour vision has been shaped by the need to find coloured fruits amongst foliage, and the fruits themselves have evolved to be salient to primates and so secure dissemination of their seeds. We review the evidence for and against this hypothesis and we report an empirical test: we show that the spectral positioning of the cone pigments found in trichromatic South American primates is well matched to the task of detecting fruits against a background of leaves. We further report that particular trichromatic platyrrhine phenotypes may be better suited than others to foraging for particular fruits under particular conditions of illumination; and we discuss possible explanations for the maintenance of polymorphic colour vision amongst the platyrrhines.
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Visual spatial resolution is limited by factors ranging from optics to neuronal filters in the visual cortex, but it is not known to what extent it is also limited by the resolving power of attention. To investigate this, we studied adaptation to lines of specific orientation, a process that occurs in primary visual cortex. When a single grating is presented in the periphery of the visual field, human observers are aware of its orientation, but when it is flanked by other similar gratings ('crowding'), its orientation becomes impossible to discern. Nevertheless, we show that orientation-specific adaptation is not affected by crowding, implying that spatial resolution is limited by an attentional filter acting beyond the primary visual cortex. Consistent with this, we find that attentional resolution is greater in the lower than in the upper visual field, whereas there is no corresponding asymmetry in the primary visual cortex. We suggest that the attentional filter acts in one or more higher visual cortical areas to restrict the availability of visual information to conscious awareness.
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A recent estimate suggests that we can potentially distinguish 2.3 million colors (1), and yet we achieve this by comparing the rates at which photons are absorbed in just three classes of retinal photopigment (Fig. 1 Lower). The photopigments consist of 11-cis-retinal bound to different “opsins,” which are members of the large family of G-protein-coupled receptors or heptahelicals. But our exquisite discrimination of hue requires that the three different opsins should be cleanly segregated into different cone cells in the retina. A new paper by Yanshu Wang et al. (2) bears on how such segregation may be maintained. The research group is led by Jeremy Nathans, whose now classic papers laid the basis of the molecular genetics of the cone pigments (3, 4).
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To analyse an image, the visual system must decompose the scene into its relevant parts. Identifying distinct surfaces is a basic operation in such analysis, and is believed to precede object recognition. Two superimposed gratings moving in different directions (plaid stimuli) may be perceived either as two surfaces, one being transparent and sliding on top of the other (component motion) or as a single pattern whose direction of motion is intermediate to the component vectors (pattern motion). The degree of transparency, and hence the perception, can be manipulated by changing only the luminance of the grating intersections. Here we show that neurons in two visual cortical areas--A18 and PMLS--synchronize their discharges when responding to contours of the same surface but not when responding to contours belonging to different surfaces. The amplitudes of responses correspond to previously described rate predictions for component and pattern motion, but, in contrast to synchrony, failed to reflect the transition from component to pattern motion induced by manipulating the degree of transparency. Thus, dynamic changes in synchronization could encode, in a context-dependent way, relations among simultaneous responses to spatially superimposed contours and thereby bias their association with distinct surfaces.
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Some memories are linked to a specific time and place, allowing one to re-experience the original event, whereas others are accompanied only by a feeling of familiarity. To uncover the distinct neural bases for these two types of memory, we measured brain activity during memory retrieval using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. We show that activity in the hippocampus increased only when retrieval was accompanied by conscious recollection of the learning episode. Hippocampal activity did not increase for items recognized based on familiarity or for unrecognized items. These results indicate that the hippocampus selectively supports the retrieval of episodic memories.
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Vivid visual images can be voluntarily generated in our minds in the absence of simultaneous visual input. While trying to count the number of flowers in Van Gogh's Sunflowers, understanding a description or recalling a path, subjects report forming an image in their "mind's eye". Whether this process is accomplished by the same neuronal mechanisms as visual perception has long been a matter of debate. Evidence from functional imaging, psychophysics, neurological studies and monkey electrophysiology suggests a common process, yet there are patients with deficits in one but not the other. Here we directly investigated the neuronal substrates of visual recall by recording from single neurons in the human medial temporal lobe while the subjects were asked to imagine previously viewed images. We found single neurons in the hippocampus, amygdala, entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus that selectively altered their firing rates depending on the stimulus the subjects were imagining. Of the neurons that fired selectively during both vision and imagery, the majority (88%) had identical selectivity. Our study reveals single neuron correlates of volitional visual imagery in humans and suggests a common substrate for the processing of incoming visual information and visual recall.
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Synaesthesia is an unusual perceptual phenomenon in which events in one sensory modality induce vivid sensations in another. Individuals may 'taste' shapes, 'hear' colours, or 'feel' sounds. Synaesthesia was first described over a century ago, but little is known about its underlying causes or its effects on cognition. Most reports have been anecdotal or have focused on isolated unusual cases. Here we report an investigation of 15 individuals with colour-graphemic synaesthesia, each of whom experiences idiosyncratic but highly consistent colours for letters and digits. Using a colour-form interference paradigm, we show that induced synaesthetic experiences cannot be consciously suppressed even when detrimental to task performance. In contrast, if letters and digits are presented briefly and masked, so that they are processed but unavailable for overt report, the synaesthesia is eliminated. These results show that synaesthetic experiences can be prevented despite substantial processing of the sensory stimuli that otherwise trigger them. We conclude that automatic binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia arises after initial processes of letter and digit recognition are complete.
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Patients with lesions in the primary visual cortex (V1) may show processing of visual stimuli presented in their field of cortical blindness even when they report being unaware of the stimuli. To elucidate the neuroanatomical basis of their residual visual functions, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging in two hemianopic patients, FS and GY. In the first experiment, a rotating spiral stimulus was used to assess the responsiveness of dorsal stream areas. Although no response was detectable within denervated or destroyed early visual cortex, motion-sensitive areas (hMT+/V5) ipsilateral to the lesion showed a strong sustained hemodynamic response. In GY, this activation was at least as strong as that of his contralesional hMT+/V5 to the stimulus in the normal hemifield. In the second experiment, coloured images of natural objects were used to assess the responsiveness of ventral stream areas. Again, no activity was detectable in ipsilesional early visual areas, but extrastriate areas in the lateral occipital cortex (hMT+/V5 and LO) and within the posterior fusiform gyrus (V4/V8) showed a robust sustained hemodynamic response. In both experiments, we observed that ipsilesional areas responded to stimuli presented in either hemifield, whereas the normal hemisphere responded preferentially to stimuli in the sighted hemifield. As only one subject occasionally noticed the onset of stimulation in the impaired field, the unexpectedly strong sustained activity in ipsilesional dorsal and ventral cortical areas appears to be insufficient to generate conscious vision.
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We studied two otherwise normal, synaesthetic subjects who 'saw' a specific colour every time they saw a specific number or letter. We conducted four experiments in order to show that this was a genuine perceptual experience rather than merely a memory association. (i) The synaesthetically induced colours could lead to perceptual grouping, even though the inducing numerals or letters did not. (ii) Synaesthetically induced colours were not experienced if the graphemes were presented peripherally. (iii) Roman numerals were ineffective: the actual number grapheme was required. (iv) If two graphemes were alternated the induced colours were also seen in alternation. However, colours were no longer experienced if the graphemes were alternated at more than 4 Hz. We propose that grapheme colour synaesthesia arises from 'cross-wiring' between the 'colour centre' (area V4 or V8) and the 'number area', both of which lie in the fusiform gyrus. We also suggest a similar explanation for the representation of metaphors in the brain: hence, the higher incidence of synaesthesia among artists and poets.
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Although it is largely accepted that visual-mental imagery and perception draw on many of the same neural structures, the existence and nature of neural processing in the primary visual cortex (or area V1) during visual imagery remains controversial. We tested two general hypotheses: The first was that V1 is activated only when images with many details are formed and used, and the second was that V1 is activated whenever images are formed, even if they are not necessarily used to perform a task. We used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (ER-fMRI) to detect and characterize the activity in the calcarine sulcus (which contains the primary visual cortex) during single instances of mental imagery. The results revealed reproducible transient activity in this area whenever participants generated or evaluated a mental image. This transient activity was strongly enhanced when participants evaluated characteristics of objects, whether or not details actually needed to be extracted from the image to perform the task. These results show that visual imagery processing commonly involves the earliest stages of the visual system.
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The dearth of studies on amnesia in children has led to the assumption that when damage to the medial temporal lobe system occurs early in life, the compensatory capacity of the immature brain rescues memory functions. An alternative view is that such damage so interferes with the development of learning and memory that it results not in selective cognitive impairments but in general mental retardation. Data will be presented to counter both of these arguments. Results obtained from a series of 11 amnesic patients with a history of hypoxic ischaemic damage sustained perinatally or during childhood indicate that regardless of age at onset of hippocampal pathology, there is a pronounced dissociation between episodic memory, which is severely impaired, and semantic memory, which is relatively preserved. A second dissociation is characterized by markedly impaired recall and relatively spared recognition leading to a distinction between recollection-based versus familiarity-based judgements. These findings are discussed in terms of the locus and extent of neuropathology associated with hypoxic ischaemic damage, the neural basis of 'remembering' versus 'knowing', and a hierarchical model of cognitive memory.
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A subject (D.B.) who had no experience of visual stimuli in a field defect caused by visual cortex damage but could discriminate them ('blindsight') nevertheless reported visible after-images of the stimuli when they were turned off ('prime-sight'). This was investigated using projected visual stimuli of varying colors, contrasts, shapes and spatial frequencies, and by measuring the properties of the after-images, including their duration, size scaling, color and interocular transfer, comparing the capacity of the blindsight and prime-sight modes. These phenomena offer a unique opportunity to compare conscious and unconscious neural events in response to the same visual events.
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In 'colored-hearing' synesthesia, individuals report color experiences when they hear spoken words. If the synesthetic color experience resembles that of normal color perception, one would predict activation of parts of the visual system specialized for such perception, namely the human 'color center', referred to as either V4 or V8. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we here locate the region activated by speech in synesthetes to area V4/V8 in the left hemisphere, and demonstrate overlap with V4/V8 activation in normal controls in response to color. No activity was detected in areas V1 or V2, suggesting that activity in primary visual cortex is not necessary for such experience. Control subjects showed no activity in V4/V8 when imagining colors in response to spoken words, despite overtraining on word-color associations similar to those spontaneously reported by synesthetes.
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The directness and vivid quality of conscious experience belies the complexity of the underlying neural mechanisms, which remain incompletely understood. Recent work has focused on identifying the brain structures and patterns of neural activity within the primate visual system that are correlated with the content of visual consciousness. Functional neuroimaging in humans and electrophysiology in awake mokeys indicate that there are important differences between striate and extrastriate visual cortex in how well neural activity correlates with consciousness. Moreover, recent neuroimaging studies indicate that, in addition to these ventral areas of visual cortex, dorsal prefrontal and parietal areas might contribute to conscious visual experience.
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The world is experienced as a unified whole, but sensory systems do not deliver it to the brain in this way. Signals from different sensory modalities are initially registered in separate brain areas — even within a modality, features of the sensory mosaic such as colour, size, shape and motion are fragmented and registered in specialized areas of the cortex. How does this information become bound together in experience? Findings from the study of abnormal binding — for example, after stroke — and unusual binding — as in synaesthesia — might help us to understand the cognitive and neural mechanisms that contribute to solving this 'binding problem'.
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A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the absence of an alternative neurophysiologically plausible model, I propose a perceptual modeling approach, to model the percept as experienced subjectively, rather than modeling the objective neurophysiological state of the visual system that supposedly subserves that experience. A Gestalt Bubble model is presented to demonstrate how the elusive Gestalt principles of emergence, reification, and invariance can be expressed in a quantitative model of the subjective experience of visual consciousness. That model in turn reveals a unique computational strategy underlying visual processing, which is unlike any algorithm devised by man, and certainly unlike the atomistic feed-forward model of neurocomputation offered by the Neuron Doctrine paradigm. The perceptual modeling approach reveals the primary function of perception as that of generating a fully spatial virtual-reality replica of the external world in an internal representation. The common objections to this "picture-in-the-head" concept of perceptual representation are shown to be ill founded.
Article
• Two patients had automatonlike movements of their left hands and arms (alien hand syndrome) following damage to the brain. Autopsy findings in one patient demonstrated gunshot wound damage to the medial frontal white matter bilaterally, as well as the corpus callosum, right basal ganglia, internal capsule, and thalamus. The other patient had a ruptured anterior communicating aneurysm, with subsequent resection of the right frontal gyrus rectus. We postulate that this syndrome is due to the combination of a partial callosectomy and mesial frontal lesions.
Article
Common marmosets ( Callithrix jacchus , n = 18) were trained to discriminate between rewarded and non-rewarded objects (simple discriminations, SDs) and to make conditional discriminations (CDs) when presented sequentially with two different pairs of identical objects signifying reward either in the right or left food well of the Wisconsin General Test Apparatus. After bilateral N -methyl-d-aspartate (0.12 M) lesions through the cornu ammonis-1 (CA1) field (7 μl in five sites), marmosets showed profound impairment in recall of CDs but not SDs, and were assigned to lesion only, lesion plus CA1 grafts and lesion plus Maudsley hippocampal cell line, clone 36 (MHP36) grafts groups matched for lesion-induced impairment. Cell suspension grafts (4 μl, 15–25 000 cells/μl) of cells dissected from the CA1 region of foetal brain at embryonic day 94–96, or of conditionally immortalized MHP36 cells, derived from the H-2Kb-tsA58 transgenic mouse neuroepithelium and labelled with [3H]thymidine, were infused at the lesion sites. The lesion plus MHP36 grafts group was injected five times per week with cyclosporin A (10 mg/kg) throughout testing. Lesion, grafted and intact control marmosets ( n = 4–5/group) were tested on recall of SDs and CDs learned before lesioning and on acquisition of four new CDs over a 6-month period. Lesioned animals were highly impaired in recall and acquisition of CD tasks, but recall of SDs was not significantly disrupted. Both grafted groups of marmosets showed improvement to control level in recall of CDs. They were significantly slower in learning the first new CD task, but mastered the remaining tasks as efficiently as controls and were substantially superior to the lesion-only group. Visualized by Nissl staining, foetal grafts formed clumps of pyramidal-like cells within the denervated CA1 field, or jutted into the lateral ventricles. MHP36 cells, identified by β-galactosidase staining and autoradiography, showed neuronal and astrocytic morphology, and were distributed evenly throughout the CA1 region. The results indicate that MHP36 cell grafts are as functionally effective as foetal grafts and appear to integrate into the host brain in a structurally appropriate manner, showing the capacity to differentiate into both mature neurons and glia, and to develop morphologies appropriate to the site of migration. These findings, which parallel the facilitative effects of foetal and MHP36 grafts in rats with ischaemic CA1 damage, offer encouragement for the development of conditionally immortal neuroepithelial stem cell lines for grafting in conditions of severe amnesia and hippocampal damage following recovery from cardiac arrest or other global ischaemic episodes.
Article
The problem of how physical systems, such as brains, come to represent themselves as subjects in an objective world is addressed. I develop an account of the requirements for this ability that draws on and refines work in a philosophical tradition that runs from Kant through Peter Strawson to Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that the ability to represent oneself as a subject in a world whose existence is independent of oneself involves the ability to represent space, and in particular, to represent oneself as one object among others in an objective spatial realm. In parallel, I provide an account of how this ability, and the mechanisms that support it, are realized neurobiologically. This aspect of the article draws on, and refines, work done in the neurobiology and psychology of egocentric and allocentric spatial representation.
Article
The suggestion that semantic activation can occur without conscious identification of the priming stimulus is still controversial. Many studies supporting such a contention, especially those where primes were auditorially presented, suffer from methodological shortcomings, frequently with regard to threshold measurement. In the study reported here 24 subjects underwent a considerably more rigorous thresholding procedure than has been usual, prior to engaging in a forced-choice sentence completion task. The results show that semantic priming operates when subjects were unable to detect the presence of primes and that phonological (but not semantic) priming operates when the primes were invariably detected but never correctly identified. The relevance of these qualitatively different effects of primes, as a function of the level at which they are presented, in discussed in the light of recent accounts of unconscious processing.
Article
Functionalism offers an account of the relations that hold between behavioural functions, information and neural processing, and conscious experience from which one can draw two inferences: (1) for any discriminable difference between qualia there must be an equivalent discriminable difference in function; and (2) for any discriminable functional difference within a behavioural domain associated with qualia, there must be a discriminable difference between qualia. The phenomenon of coloured hearing synaesthesia (in which individuals see colours when they hear or see words) appears to contradict the second of these inferences. We report data showing that this form of synaesthesia is genuine and probably results from an aberrant projection from cortical language areas to a region (V4/V8) specialized for the perception of colour. Since functionalism purports to be a general account of consciousness, one such negative instance, if it can be further sustained empirically, is sufficient to invalidate it.
Article
WE report two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments which reveal similarities and differences between perceptual and imaginal networks within the single visual submodality of colour. The first experiment contrasted viewing of a coloured and grey-scale Mondrian display, while the second contrasted a relative colour judgement with a spatial task and required the generation of mental images. Our results show that colour perception activates the posterior fusiform gyrus bilaterally (area V4), plus right-sided anterior fusiform and lingual gyri, striate cortex (area V1), and the left and right insula. Colour imagery activated right anterior fusiform gyrus, left insula, right hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, but not V4 or V1. The findings reconcile neurological case studies suggesting a double dissociation between deficits in colour imagery and perception and point to anterior fusiform, parahippocampal gyri and hippocampus as the location for stored representations of coloured objects.
Article
We measured the increment threshold sensitivity to 2°, 200-ms targets presented at a lateral and radial eccentricity of ≈ 20–26° in both visual hemifields of three macaque monkeys whose left striate cortex had been removed 5 years earlier, and in one normal control. As in patients with blindsight, sensitivity of the hemianopic field for blue, green and red stimuli was reduced by as little as 0.5 log units. With increasing light adaptation from scotopic to mesopic to photopic levels, there was a progressive increase in the sensitivity to long wavelengths relative to that for short and medium wavelengths. This shift in relative sensitivity (‘Purkinje shift’) shows that rod and cone mechanisms operate in both the normal and hemianopic fields and that the sensitivity that remains following removal of striate cortex is not mediated exclusively by rods.
Article
What is consciousness? Conventional approaches see it as an emergent property of complex interactions among individual neurons; however these approaches fail to address enigmatic features of consciousness. Accordingly, some philosophers have contended that “qualia,” or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being composed of “occasions of experience.” To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of spacetime—as described by Einstein's general theory of relativity, and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter—as described by quantum theory. Roger Penrose has proposed a new physics of objective reduction: “OR,” which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline.1,2 Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific “objective” criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness which distinguishes our minds from classical computers. Each OR is taken as an instantaneous event—the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental spacetime—and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead “occasion of experience.” How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate a quantum computational OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons 3–5.
Article
We introduce a distinction between cortical dominance andcortical deference, and apply it to various examples ofneural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally orintramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases butnot others, cortical activity `defers' to the nonstandard sourcesof input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, andpropose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that thisdistinction is important and worthy of further study, bothphilosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turnsout to be correct. In particular, the question of how the distinction should be explained is linked to explanatory gapissues for consciousness. Comparative and absolute explanatorygaps should be distinguished: why does neural activity in aparticular area of cortex have this qualitative expressionrather than that, and why does it have any qualitativeexpression at all? We use the dominance/deference distinction toaddress the comparative gaps, both intermodal and intramodal (notthe absolute gap). We do so not by inward scrutiny but rather by expanding our gaze to include relations between brain, body andenvironment.
Article
In the circumscribed, long-standing, clinically absolute visual field defects of three patients with vascular lesions that involved the optic radiation and visual cortex, forced-choice discrimination between coloured stimuli was tested. Paired stimuli were matched for luminous efficiency on the basis of previous measurements of increment-threshold spectral sensitivity made in the same patients and at the same retinal positions. To different extents all patients could discriminate between narrowband wavelength stimuli. The results imply that despite the effects of retrograde degeneration on thalamic and retinal colour-processing channels, neurons which process wavelength information are still functional, although the information they transmit is not consciously perceived.
Article
The functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) technique can be robustly used to map functional activation of the visual pathway including the primary visual cortex (V1), the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and other nuclei of humans during visual perception stimulation. One of the major controversies in visual neuroscience is whether lower-order visual areas involve the visual imagery process. This issue was examined using fMRI at high magnetic field. It was demonstrated for the first time that the LGN was activated during visual imagery process in the human brain together with V1 and other activation. There was a tight coupling of the activation between V1 and the LGN during visual imagery.
Article
We review recent evidence from studies of patients with unilateral neglect and/or extinction, who suffer from a loss of awareness for stimuli towards the affected side of space. We contrast their deficit with the effects of damage to primary sensory areas, noting that such areas can remain structurally intact in neglect, with lesions typically centred on the right inferior parietal lobe. In keeping with preservation of initial sensory pathways, many recent studies have shown that considerable residual processing can still take place for neglected or extinguished stimuli, yet without reaching the patient's awareness. This ranges from preserved visual grouping processes through to activation of identity, semantics and emotional significance. Similarly to 'preattentive' processing in normals, such residual processing can modulate what will enter the patient's awareness. Recent studies have used measures such as ERPs and fMRI to determine the neural correlates of conscious versus unconscious perception in the patients, which in turn can be related to the anatomy of their lesions. We relate the patient findings to neurophysiological data from areas in the monkey parietal lobe, which indicate that these serve as cross-modal and sensorimotor interfaces highlighting currently relevant locations as targets for intentional action. We speculate on the special role such brain regions may play in perceptual awareness, seeking to explain how damage to a system which appears primarily to code space could eliminate awareness even for non-spatial stimulus properties at affected locations. This may relate to the extreme nature of 'winner-takes-all' functions within the parietal lobe, and their correspondingly strong influence on other brain areas.
Article
This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.
Article
What happens in the brain when you conjure up a mental image in your mind's eye? We tested whether the particular regions of extrastriate cortex activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the image. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRRI), we demonstrated selective activation within a region of cortex specialized for face perception during mental imagery of faces, and selective activation within a place-selective cortical region during imagery of places. In a further study, we compared the activation for imagery and perception in these regions, and found greater response magnitudes for perception than for imagery of the same items. Finally, we found that it is possible to determine the content of single cognitive events from an inspection of the fMRI data from individual imagery trials. These findings strengthen evidence that imagery and perception share common processing mechanisms, and demonstrate that the specific brain regions activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the visual image.
Article
Visual field defects result from postgeniculate lesions. It is generally assumed that absolute defects are caused by total destruction or denervation of primary visual cortex (V1) and that the degraded but conscious vision that remains or returns in relative or partial defects is mediated by compromised V1 cortex that retains a sufficiently large population of functional neurons. We here report the results of three patients with long-standing postgeniculate lesions who underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while their partial defect was stimulated with high-contrast reversing checkerboard stimuli. Although the stimulation evoked conscious visual impressions in all three, in only one patient did it activate perilesional V1. In the other two we found no evidence for perilesional activation, indicating that some conscious vision may return in the absence of functional ipsilesional V1.
Article
To what extent are we conscious of everything going on in our brains? Nietzsche and Freud popularized the notion of the unconscious as a realm of the mind that controls human behaviour but is not itself accessible to conscious introspection or knowledge. By 'unconscious' we mean any neuronal activity that does not give rise to conscious sensation, thought or memory. Although many of Freud's ideas, involving penis envy, the Oedipus complex, the Id and other fanciful creations, are mere myths that lack objective standing, science has provided credible evidence for the existence of sensorimotor systems in the primate brain that function in the absence of consciousness.
Article
Research has revealed facts about human memory in general and episodic memory in particular that deviate from both common sense and previously accepted ideas. This paper discusses some of these deviations in light of the proceedings of The Royal Society's Discussion Meeting on episodic memory. Retrieval processes play a more critical role in memory than commonly assumed; people can remember events that never happened; and conscious thoughts about one's personal past can take two distinct forms-'autonoetic' remembering and 'noetic' knowing. The serial-dependent-independent (SPI) model of the relations among episodic, semantic and perceptual memory systems accounts for a number of puzzling phenomena, such as some amnesic patients' preserved recognition memory and their ability to learn new semantic facts, and holds that episodic remembering of perceptual information can occur only by virtue of its mediation through semantic memory. Although common sense endows many animals with the ability to remember their past experiences, as yet there is no evidence that humanlike episodic memory-defined in terms of subjective time, self, and autonoetic awareness-is present in any other species.
Article
Commonalities and differences in findings across neuroimaging studies of autobiographical event memory are reviewed. In general terms, the overall pattern across studies is of medial and left-lateralized activations associated with retrieval of autobiographical event memories. It seems that the medial frontal cortex and left hippocampus in particular are responsive to such memories. However, there are also inconsistencies across studies, for example in the activation of the hippocampus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. It is likely that methodological differences between studies contribute to the disparate findings. Quantifying and assessing autobiographical event memories presents a challenge in many domains, including neuroimaging. Methodological factors that may be pertinent to the interpretation of the neuroimaging data and the design of future experiments are discussed. Consideration is also given to aspects of memory that functional neuroimaging might be uniquely disposed to examine. These include assessing the functionality of damaged tissue in patients and the estimation of inter-regional communication (effective connectivity) between relevant brain regions.
Article
Procedural learning (PL) is a type of rule-based learning in which performance facilitation occurs with practice on task without the need for conscious awareness. Schizophrenic patients have often (though not invariably) been found to show impaired PL. We performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during a blocked, periodic sequence-learning task with groups of: (i) healthy subjects, and (ii) schizophrenic patients on conventional antipsychotics. Healthy subjects showed significant PL, but patients did not. In healthy subjects, PL was associated with increased activation in the striatum, thalamus, cerebellum, precuneus, medial frontal lobe, and cingulate gyrus. The power of activation in the thalamus, striatum, precuneus, cingulate gyrus and BA 6 was related to the magnitude of PL in these subjects. No regions, except the anterior inferior gyrus, were significantly activated in patients. The caudate nucleus, thalamus, precuneus, and sensorimotor regions were activated significantly differently between the two groups. The findings demonstrate the involvement of the striatum, cerebellum, thalamus, cingulate gyrus, precuneus, and sensorimotor regions in PL. Further fMRI studies of PL in normal subjects treated with conventional antipsychotics, drug naïve patients, and patients given atypical antipsychotics would help to clarify the roles of schizophrenic disease processes and antipsychotic medication in impaired PL and associated brain abnormalities in schizophrenia.