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Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine
Catchment Area
Carel Dieperink
a
a
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Version of record first published: 22 Jan 2009.
To cite this article: Carel Dieperink (2000): Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine Catchment Area, Water
International, 25:3, 347-355
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International Water Resources Association
Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, Pages 347355, September 2000
347
Successful International Cooperation
in the Rhine Catchment Area
Carel Dieperink, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Abstract: The international cooperation to control the water quality of the Rhine river is widely
rated as successful. By the turn of the century the cooperation has resulted in a well-elaborated interna-
tional regime. This article reviews the development of the Rhine regime. Explanations for this develop-
ment are found in the policies of the downstream Dutch government, the activities of NGOs, the efforts of
upstream riparian states, and in the activities of the International Commission for the Protection of the
Rhine. The gradual improvement of the water quality also helped the progressive regime development
along.
Keywords: Rhine, water pollution, international water management, International Commission for
the Protection of the Rhine, international regimes.
Introduction
The 1,300 km long Rhine river is located in north-
western Europe and flows from Switzerland to the Neth-
erlands (Huisman et al., 1998). Its basin of 168,000 km
2
not only covers these two countries, but also substantial
parts of Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein
and small parts of Austria, Italy, and Belgium (Figure 1).
The basin includes major European industrial areas, such
as the area near Mannheim, the Ruhr-area, and the
Rotterdam port area. Due to an average discharge of 2,200
m
3
/s and the canalization of parts of the river in France
and Germany, the river could become an important traffic
chain. The river is not only used intensively for shipping,
but also for the disposal of waste from industry. For some
60 million people, the drinking water supply, especially
in the Netherlands, a regional water supply for agricul-
tural purposes (Mostert, 1999).
For the Netherlands, it is very important that the Rhine
water is of a good quality. So, for years the issue of water
quality has been the focus of negotiations with Germany,
France, Switzerland, and Luxembourg, the most impor-
tant upstream riparian states in the catchment area. These
protracted negotiations resulted in the current international
regime for the river, which so far is formalized by four
international agreements. The central question addressed
by this article is: Which factors have had a positive effect
on the development of the regime? The analysis of mate-
rials in the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Transport,
Public Works, and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat),
supplementary desk research, and interviews conducted
with some of the key players involved in the process, show
that the Dutch government, as well as a number of inter-
est groups, had a major influence on the completion of
this regime. Nevertheless, the regime development can-
not be understood without taking into account the posi-
tions of the upstream riparian states in the Rhine
catchment area and developments within the European
Community. The International Commission for the Pro-
tection of the Rhine (ICPR) also played a stimulating role.
Finally, the successful outcome the gradual improve-
ment of the water quality of the Rhine itself proved to
be significant for follow-up steps in the development of
the Rhine regime. These factors are reviewed in the sepa-
rate sections of this paper. Before this is done, a brief
sketch is rendered of the historical development of the
regime. The conclusions emphasize the importance of the
existence of strategic visions and catchment organizations
for the management of international catchment areas.
The Development of the Rhine Regime
The initial international exchange of views concern-
ing the water quality in the catchment area of the Rhine
river dates from the late 19
th
century. It was brought about
by the decline of the salmon population. Overfishing, the
construction of dams in the region of the Alsace, and the
decline of water quality completely eliminated the salmon
from the catchment area (Dieperink, 1997). A more spe-
cific concern over water quality arose in the early 1930s.
High concentrations of phenol and the fear of progres-
sively high salinity levels inspired the Dutch drinking
water companies to establish contacts with upstream ri-
parian states. In 1950, these contacts resulted in the be-
ginning of informal consultations. A small group of
researchers met once a year to discuss national reports
about the quality of the river. In 1953, a monitoring net-
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348 C. Dieperink
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
work was subsequently set up at a number of strategic
locations in the catchment area. This action marked the
completion of the first step in the development of the
Rhine regime. Subsequent achievements (highlights from
the history of the Rhine regime) are as follows:
1950: Informal consultations on the water quality of
the Rhine
1963: Convention on the International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (the
Bern Convention)
1969: Fish mortality as a result of an accidental spill
of the pesticide endosulfan
1972: First Ministerial Conference of the Rhine ripar-
ian states
1976: Conventions on the Protection of the Rhine
Against Chemical Pollution and Chloride Pollution;
formalization of the involvement of the European
Commission
1979: France refuses to ratify the Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine against Chloride Pollution
1985: Ratification of the Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rhine against Chloride Pollution
1986: Severe pollution and fish mortality caused by
an accidental discharge of 10,000 m
3
of extinguishing
water contaminated with pesticides at the Sandoz Com-
pany near Basle
1987: Rhine Action Program
1991: Additional protocol to the Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine against Chloride Pollution
1995: Severe flooding in the Netherlands and Germany
1998: New Convention on the Rhine
The Bern Convention of 1963 provided a formal struc-
ture for the consultations. This treaty determined the com-
position and the jurisdiction of the International
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). In
1972, the structure was changed when the riparian states
initiated cooperation at the ministerial level. The minis-
ters charged the International Commission for the Pro-
tection of the Rhine with the preparation of two treaties.
In 1976, the negotiations within the ICPR resulted in the
Rhine Chemicals and the Rhine Chlorides Convention.
The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against
Chemical Pollution expressed the agreement among the
riparian states concerning the regulation of emissions. The
discharge of dangerous substances, which were specified
on the so-called black list, was to be terminated and the
discharge of suspected grey-list substances was to be
reduced. The ICPR was charged with the preparation of
detailed recommendations to regulate the discharges.
During the 1980s, the ICPR issued recommendations con-
cerning 17 chemicals from the black list.
The control over the dumping of chlorides in the catch-
ment area is covered by the Convention on the Protection
of the Rhine against Chloride Pollution. This treaty speci-
fies norms for the loads and the concentrations of chlo-
rides, and specifies how the discharges from the Alsatian
potassium mines can be gradually reduced. Various op-
tions for the reductions were contemplated, and it was
not until 1985 that the Rhine Chloride Convention was
finally ratified. The plan of injections has never been
implemented. The current method is to temporarily store
part of the waste salt when the concentration of chloride
at the Dutch border is 200 mg/l and forecasts predict a
reduction in water level. Moreover, measures have been
taken in the Netherlands to reroute the seepage of salt
water in the Wieringermeer polder from the nearby drink-
ing water inlet at Andijk to the Waddensea just to its north
to keep the salinity of the water for the production of drink-
ing water at an acceptable level. The costs for these two
Figure 1. The Rhine catchment area.
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Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine Catchment Area 349
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
measures are shared among the riparian states. The de-
tails of these arrangements have been laid down in a pro-
tocol added to the Rhine Chloride Convention in 1991.
Four years earlier, in 1987, the riparian states in the
Rhine catchment area had reached an agreement on the
Rhine Action Program (RAP). This program was meant
to promote the restoration of the ecosystems of the river.
The return of the salmon by the turn of the century was
introduced as the symbol of the RAP. In the 1992 Eco-
logical Master Plan Salmon 2000 this idea was further
elaborated. To this end, the riparian states agreed upon
far-reaching reductions of the discharges of chemicals and
to take measures to improve the hydrology, the morphol-
ogy, and the safety in the river basin.
An agreement on a new Convention on the Rhine was
reached on January 22, 1998. This Convention is meant
to replace the Bern Convention and the Rhine Chemicals
Convention after its ratification. The broadening of the
perceptions of the problems and the ambitions introduced
by the Rhine Action Program will obtain a formal status
through this new treaty. The goal to decrease the impact
of wastewater discharges on the water of the Rhine as
specified in the Rhine Chemicals Convention has now
been augmented with new goals to increase the diversity
of species, to improve the natural flow in the basin, and
to reconstruct former biotopes. The intention is to work
towards a formal agreement on cooperation to improve
not only the quality of the surface water, but also of the
aquifers and the ecosystems in the catchment area of the
Rhine river. Flood control and bank restorations are also
important issues on the agenda for the future.
The cooperation among the riparian states in the Rhine
catchment area has resulted in the development of a pro-
gressive regime. The Dutch government has actively pro-
moted this development.
The Role of the Dutch Government
Because of its location downstream, the Netherlands
was the main victim of the pollution of the Rhine. Dis-
charges from densely populated and highly industrialized
areas upstream (the regions of Basle and Mannheim, and
the Ruhr area) inflicted damage especially to the drink-
ing water sources and the horticulture in the Westland
region, the western part of the Netherlands (Wibaut, 1952).
There was also ecological damage. Migrating fish and
species like water fleas almost disappeared. Much pol-
luted silt settled in the flat Dutch segment of the catch-
ment area. Silt dredged in the Rotterdam port area was
considered so toxic that it could no longer be discharged
in the North Sea (Rotterdam Public Works, 1990).
Chloride Pollution
It is difficult to reach solutions that are satisfactory to
all parties in asymmetrical situations. Generally speak-
ing, the interests of the downstream and upstream parties
are fundamentally opposed. This was shown especially
by the protracted negotiations on the dumping of salt from
the Alsace. During these negotiations which went on for
many years, the Dutch government kept looking for open-
ings to maintain the discussion with its upstream neigh-
bors and to promote cooperation.
The Netherlands initiated informal consultations with
the other riparian states in 1950 for fear of the increasing
salinity of the water of the Rhine river (Brief van het
Rijksinstituut voor Drinkwatervoorziening, 1952). But the
demand on France in 1954 to curb the salt discharges from
the Alsace was parried by its position that the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Rhine was
not authorized to deal with this issue. This was followed
by negotiations on a formal mandate for the ICPR. The
Netherlands proposed a text for a treaty, which was ac-
cepted in an amended form as the Convention of Bern
(1963). The Netherlands also tried to convince France that
damage was inflicted by the increased dumping of salt on
the horticulture of the Westland region. Research was
started with this aim.
To speed up the negotiations, the Dutch government
declared itself prepared in the late 1960s to make a finan-
cial contribution to French research concerning facilities
for the storage of the waste salts and for the measures to
be taken in the Alsace (Dieperink, 1997). The official
working groups of the ICPR investigated the benefits of
several alternatives to reduce the discharge of salt in the
Alsace. When at the instigation of the Dutch government
the negotiations were lifted to the ministerial level in 1972,
it seemed that a solution was approaching. The ministers
reached a consensus on the normative ceiling for the con-
centrations of chlorides at the Dutch border (200 mg/l of
chloride) and on a staged storage of salt in the Alsace.
The negotiations subsequently shifted to the questions of
the location, the financing, and the mode of storage. Fi-
nally it was agreed that the waste salts would be injected
deep in the Alsatian subsoil (Briefwisseling, 1976).
The Dutch government has long attempted to avoid
getting into an open conflict over the salt issue with France.
The difference of opinion, however, escalated when the
French government refused to submit the treaty to parlia-
ment for ratification in December 1979. The French gov-
ernment feared that parliament would not accept the
proposal, as a growing resistance in the Alsace region
against the top-down policy making style of the French
government resulted in a lot of commotion and in a par-
liamentary majority against the injection of waste salts.
The Dutch government reacted by calling its ambassador
back to the Netherlands for consultations (Franse
weigering, 1979). But because the course of action did
not yield any positive result, the negotiations within the
ICPR were subsequently continued. Earlier proposals for
reductions were carefully re-evaluated. The official and
the ministerial attempts to break the deadlock were sup-
ported by two parliamentary Rhine conferences, which were
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350 C. Dieperink
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
convened specifically for that purpose in 1977 and 1979.
The position of the Dutch government proved to be
of great significance for the development of the Rhine
Chloride Convention. Dissatisfied by the implementation
of the first reduction of the discharges after the ratifica-
tion of the Rhine Chloride Convention in 1985, the Dutch
government, on the initiative of Minister Smit-Kroes, re-
fused to agree to French proposals for further reductions.
France has implemented the first reductions by tempo-
rarily storing the salts. The fact that the stored salts would
be discharged later on was unacceptable for the Dutch
(Verslag Nederlandse Delegatie, 1988). Besides, new tech-
nologies had made the Dutch horticulture less dependent
on chloride free Rhine water. Subsequently, the Nether-
lands formulated a new proposal that eventually succeeded
in removing the salt problem from the agenda. At low
water levels in Lobith on the Dutch border, the dumping
of chlorides in the Alsace would be stopped. In addition,
the salt concentration at a drinking water inlet in the
IJssellake is reduced by diverting brackish seepage from
this inlet to the Waddensea.
Chemical Pollution
The Dutch government adequately played on the pub-
lic commotion following various disastrous conditions.
This commotion facilitated the transformation of dormant
ideas into changes of the regime. The American political
scientist Kingdon designates such situations metaphori-
cally as the opening of a policy window (Koppenjan,
1993). Kingdon derived this concept from the field of
space exploration. In order for a satellite to reach set in-
terplanetary targets, there must be a specific constella-
tion of celestial bodies, which occurs only during a brief
period. Calculating back to the moment of the launch, a
rocket can only be launched during a limited period. Such
a period is dubbed the launch window. The registration
of the presence of high concentrations of mercury and
cadmium and the widespread awareness of the threat these
signify, in combination with the massive fish death caused
by the 1969 endosulfan spill, resulted in the opening of
such a policy window. The Dutch government reacted
immediately and intensified the contacts with the other
riparian states about a cleaning program for the Rhine.
During the subsequent ministerial conference in 1972, the
ministers of the riparian states promoted this program.
The framework for a more systematic approach was
subsequently elaborated in the Rhine Chemicals Conven-
tion. These agreements included the stipulation that the
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
was authorized to propose further anti-pollution measures.
In exchange for this stipulation, the Netherlands agreed
to extend the geographic coverage of the Rhine Chemi-
cals Convention to include the port area of Rotterdam
(Dieperink, 1997). With this decision, the Netherlands gave
in to the pressure of the upstream countries to impose on
itself to take the necessary action to reduce water pollution.
When the ICPR actions based on the Rhine Chemi-
cals Convention were in an impasse in the mid-1980s, a
disastrous fire at the Sandoz factory near Basle in Swit-
zerland offered the Dutch government another policy
window to take the initiative to carry the negotiations
further. Extinguishing water containing colorants and
pesticides not only turned the water red, but also eradi-
cated the eel population over a distance of over 200 km.
Improvements in the water quality seemed to disappear
completely. Immediately following the disaster, the highly
involved Minister of Transport and Public Works Smit-
Kroes went to the other riparian states and successfully
converted dormant ideas on the improvement of the eco-
systems in the Rhine catchment area into the Rhine Ac-
tion Program (Perdok, 1992). The high water levels
reached in 1995 underlined the importance of a broader
perspective on water quality by taking into account hy-
drological and morphological measures. Following the
initiative of the Dutch Minister of the Environment, the
ministers of the riparian states agreed that the upstream
retention of water, the enlargement of the storage capac-
ity of the floodplain, and the restoration of the riverbank
forests need to be closely matched (Meuleman, 1995).
Innovative Research
The Netherlands has always maintained its high pro-
file in the ICPR. New knowledge was continuously pre-
sented to the delegates of the other riparian states. The
Institute for Inland Water Management and Wastewater
Treatment (Rijksinstituut voor Integraal Zoetwaterbeheer
en Afvalwaterbehandeling, RIZA) was most innovative
in the field of quality monitoring. New measuring and
monitoring techniques were typically first introduced at
Lobith, before they were gradually disseminated to the
measuring sites in the other riparian states (Dieperink,
1997). The frequency of sampling and the number of qual-
ity parameters included in the monitoring protocol in-
creased steadily over the years, thanks to the introduction
of the technique of gas chromatography, and the
SIVEGOM system. SIVEGOM is a Dutch acronym for
signalizing elevated levels of organic micro pollutants.
This system significantly reduced the complexity of the
demonstration of the existence of elevated levels of or-
ganic micro pollutants (Internationale Kommission zum
Schutze des Rheins, 1986). Within two hours, the con-
centrations of seventy types of organic micro pollutants
could be established.
In the framework of the Rhine Action Program, the
measuring of biotic parameters was also started. Together
with the National Institute of Public Health and the Envi-
ronment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en
Milieuhygiene RIVM), and the Netherlands Institute for
Fisheries Research (Rijksinstituut voor Visserijonderzoek,
RIVO), the RIZA embarked upon a concerted research
program. Bio-monitoring yielded insight in the diversity
of species and the quality of the natural habitats in the
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Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine Catchment Area 351
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
Dutch part of the Rhine catchment area. By this attempt
at expanding the knowledge, the Dutch government at-
tempted to increase its power of persuasion.
The Role of Interest Groups
In addition to the important role of the Dutch govern-
ment, the contributions of interest groups were also im-
portant for the creation of the Rhine regime. In the national
context, they influenced the viewpoints of the Dutch gov-
ernment. Internationally, they used their networks to in-
fluence the governments of the riparian states upstream.
Dutch drinking water companies proved to remain
actively involved throughout the long period of negotia-
tions. Since the 1930s they have warned the Dutch gov-
ernment about the effects of the increased dumping by
the potassium mines for the salinity level of the IJssellake
and about the risks entailed by other substances for the
drinking water supply in the western part of the Nether-
lands (Brief van de Gezondheidsraad, 1932; RIWA, 1951;
IAWR, 1981). In periodic consultations, the participants
in the Rhine Commission of Drinking Water Companies
(Rijncommissie Waterleidingbedrijven, RIWA) expressed
their concerns to the Dutch government. Moreover, the
RIWA started several lawsuits against the French potas-
sium mines in the early 1980s.
The RIWA could embark upon this trajectory because
of the activities through which the Clean Water Founda-
tion (Stichting Reinwater) gained a high profile since its
inception in 1974. Because of its disenchantment over
the repeated moves in the intergovernmental negotiations
on the salt issue, Reinwater started a lawsuit with finan-
cial backing from the Dutch government. The foundation
joined forces with several horticulturists from the
Westland region whose cucumbers and other products had
suffered damages from the high salt load. These long
drawn-out suits eventually had some success. First of all,
the option to claim compensation through legal proce-
dures was in 1976 boosted by a court ruling that within
the European Community, the courts at both the location
where the damage was incurred and where it originated
had jurisdiction on the matter. This ruling offered new
opportunities for starting lawsuits. Moreover, in 1988 the
horticulturists actually received financial compensation
from the potassium mines (Dieperink, 1997).
Once this favorable outcome had taken place, the
Dutch government was in a position to stop defending
the interests of the horticulturists. The issue of the dump-
ing of salt was thereby narrowed down to purely a drink-
ing water issue. Within this narrow context, the Provincial
Water Control Agency of the province of North Holland
(Provinciale Waterstaat van Noord-Holland, PWN) man-
aged to have its specific problem a too high concentra-
tion of sodium in the drinking water source at Andijk
incorporated into the Dutch position in the negotiations.
After some further intergovernmental negotiations and in
a move to link various issues, this integration was in 1991
effectuated. One part of the deal was the already men-
tioned diversion of the salt seepage from the Wieringer-
meer polder to the Wadden Sea. PWN thus successfully
prevented excessive concentrations of sodium in the drink-
ing water intake at Andijk. In combination with the tem-
porary storage of waste salt in the Alsace, this option
proved to be less expensive than the permanent reduction
of discharges from the Alsace, on which agreement had
already been reached earlier. A win-win situation could
hereby be attained.
The city of Rotterdam also benefited from the judi-
cial opportunities created by Reinwater. Through the
Rhine Research Project (Project Onderzoek Rijn, POR)
the city managed in 1984 to trace the companies which
could be held accountable for the heavily polluted silt that
settled in the Rotterdam port (Peels, 1995). The citys
threat to sue the upstream companies which were dump-
ing the waste resulted in the closing of several contracts
with those upstream parties that promised to cut their
dumping practices drastically. The Rotterdam threat to
sue was joined by the Dutch government. During the ne-
gotiations on the Rhine action program, in 1987 Minister
Smit-Kroes threatened to bill the upstream countries for
the removal of the silt, that is to pass the cost of the con-
struction of a special depot, the Slufter works, on to them
(Verslag delegatieleidersoverleg, 1987). This proved to
be an incentive for the German government to agree to
the Dutch proposals for an action program with ambi-
tious ecological goals.
Both the drinking water companies and the environ-
mental movement repeatedly argued the need to intervene
in the problems of the Rhine. The drinking water compa-
nies opted for the initiation of joint umbrella organiza-
tions, the Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
Wasserwerke im Rheineinzugsgebiet (IAWR), and the
French-inspired Eureau. The IAWR attempted to influ-
ence public opinion in the riparian states concerning the
pollution of the river through the publication of white
papers containing policy statements, and the convening
of conferences. Eureau initiated similar initiatives within
the European Community. Since 1974 the environmental
movement channeled its lobbying efforts in Brussels
through the European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
Throughout the entire catchment area, environmental
organizations collaborated as the International Rhine
Group.
The Positions of the Upstream Riparian States
and the European Community
With respect to the pollution problems of the river
Rhine, the Dutch government has always been very pro-
active. The Netherlands was behind most of the initia-
tives, yet it was certainly not the only state focusing on
the quality of the river. In spite of the sometimes troubled
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352 C. Dieperink
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
negotiations, various clean-up initiatives were taken at
the national level in the upstream riparian states. Also
outside the Netherlands, the politicians were fully aware
of the importance of the Rhine. It may be concluded that
in this respect, the Netherlands is surrounded by good
neighbors.
Even before World War II, throughout the Rhine
catchment area there were legislative initiatives, and clean-
up measures were implemented and research was carried
out. Even though it is located downstream, the Nether-
lands was in this sense not always the most progressive
among the riparian states. That honor belongs rightly to
Germany and Switzerland. The first sewage treatment
plant was built in the Ruhr area (Karnap) in Germany by
the end of the last century (Van der Zee, 1959) and mea-
sures against eutrophication were first introduced in the
Swiss lake district (Wetgeving en organisatie, 1962).
However, this history was not always reflected in the
negotiations. The specification of the Rhine Chemicals
Convention in international norms by elements and by
industries moved ahead very slowly because Germany
insisted on linking it directly to the elaboration of the
European Framework Directive for Surface Waters
(Böhmer, 1990). Since 1976, the European Commission
has been a formal member of the International Commis-
sion for the Protection of the Rhine, to enable the coordi-
nation of the specification of the norms in the official
consultations. In the International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine, the Germans were only willing
to formalize the norms after a consensus on this had been
reached by the Member States of the European Commu-
nity in Brussels. This consensus building was complicated
because the United Kingdom on the one side and the other
Member States on the other side had fundamentally op-
posing views on the approach to be chosen. The United
Kingdom opted for a formalization of water quality stan-
dards, by which a maximum allowable concentration of
substances in surface water was specified, while the other
European countries preferred uniform emission standards
to harmonize the conditions of competition. So, the ne-
gotiation between the riparian states of the Rhine during
the 19761986 period resulted in emission norms for only
six elements (mercury, cadmium, DDT, HCH, PCP, tetra).
In spite of this paucity of formal results, substantial clean-
up results were attained at the level of individual companies.
During the 1980s, support for an international con-
certed effort to improve the ecosystem of the Rhine in-
creased. Initiatives were taken not only in the Netherlands,
with the plan Ooievaar concerning the possible return of
the black stork to the catchment, but also in Germany with
the plan Naturnahe Gewässer in the state of Hessen, and
independently from these initiatives, a more ecological
model of water management had emerged in the French
Agence de Bassin Rhin-Meuse. Because of such initia-
tives, there was almost always a ground for the exchange
of views within the ICPR.
The Role of the International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine
The most important conditions for a successful de-
velopment of the regime for the river Rhine were perhaps
found in the combination of a downstream party which
showed much initiative and cooperative upstream parties.
Nevertheless, the International Commission for the Pro-
tection of the Rhine has also provided strong incentives.
The ICPR has proved to be especially helpful with re-
spect to the development and exchange of knowledge
concerning the quality of the Rhine. Furthermore, it of-
fered a setting for conducting the negotiations.
The ICPR was able to assume the role of the pivot of
the international knowledge community, because it man-
aged to fill the gaps in the knowledge base. It promoted
the insight in the nature, the development, and the origin
of the pollution by harmonizing measuring and analysis
methods, the development of a network of measuring sta-
tions, and of a signaling and alert system. The insight was
greatly boosted by the collection and exchange of infor-
mation on area-specific details. Within the ICPR there
was a lively exchange of the knowledge needed for the
correct interpretation of the sampling results. This pro-
moted the growth of unanimity on the exact effects of the
concentration of certain substances for the various func-
tions of the water system. Agreement grew on such is-
sues as the need to deal with specific problems. Moreover,
the ICPR activities yielded a greater insight in the techni-
cal and financial options to diminish the pollution. The
principle that the best available technology should be
used to reduce the pollution was thus given concrete form
in certain sectors. Furthermore, the development of eco-
logical knowledge was promoted through the activities
of the ICPR. One example of this is the inventory that
was made by organizations of the ICPR members of the
potential spawning sites for migratory fish and of the bar-
riers which these fish might encounter on their journeys
upstream. The results of this inventory were published in
a special Rhine Atlas (International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine, 1999a).
The ICPR offered the riparian states a setting for
meetings to discuss the problems and elaborate the strat-
egies for their resolution. To this end, the permanent sec-
retariat of the ICPR provided for the necessary support. It
prepared the minutes of the meetings, the translation of
submitted documents, and the draft versions of reports
and treaties. Moreover, it was instrumental in the attempts
to increase the political and public participation in deal-
ing with the pollution of the Rhine, which were promoted
especially by the Netherlands. It tackled this task by the
publication of annual reports and by issuing many reports
on various aspects of the issue of quality (approximately
100 such publications since 1987), as well as by circulat-
ing its periodical Rhine-Aktuell. Through easily acces-
sible publications about the salmon and its own website,
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Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine Catchment Area 353
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
the secretariat also supported the popularization of the
ecological approach (International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine, 1999b).
The Improvement of the Water Quality
The development of a progressive regime was also
facilitated by the declining urgency of many of the problems
over the years, as various forms of restructuring took effect.
The pollution of the Rhine has declined significantly.
In the early 1970s, the Rhine was a dead river; it was the
sewer of Western Europe. Currently, the concentrations of
chemicals carried by the river have declined to levels that
many consider to be acceptable (International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine, 1999c). Even its salt load,
for years the dominant issue of the Rhine, has been de-
clining in recent years. Consequently, the Dutch drinking
water companies and the Foundation Reinwater have
gradually shifted their attention to the quality of the river
Meuse, as well as to problems that are less typical for spe-
cific regions areas, such as the pollution from diffuse sources.
These considerations were acknowledged by the Con-
ference of Ministers in January 1998 (International Com-
mission for the Protection of the Rhine, 1999d). This
conference showed a broadly shared agreement that the
goals of the Rhine Action Program had been largely at-
tained. Although the program had been only politically
and not legally binding, it yielded an active tackling of
the discharges in the catchment area. The discharges of
most of the substances specified in the Rhine Action Pro-
gram from industrial and communal sources have been
reduced by more than half (and in some cases by even 80
percent). No less than 95 percent of the fifty million in-
habitants in the catchment area have been connected to
largely third-stage sewage treatment plants. Consequently,
the load of nitrates has been diminishing since the early
1990s. Moreover, the incidence of accidental spills has
been diminished substantially, because extensive safety
measures have been put in place.
The effect is noted in the apparent recovery of the
ecosystems in the catchment area of the river Rhine. In
1996, some 20 salmon have been reported to return to the
upstream spawning grounds in Germany (International
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, 1999c). Fish
ladders constructed in the Rhine and several of the tribu-
tary streams have made this possible. This indicates that
the Rhine is considered as a major axis for animal migra-
tion and leisure. In 1998 some 44 species of fish popu-
lated the river in addition to the salmon. Also the
development of plankton, crustaceans, and waterfowl
point to the improvement of the quality of the waters.
Conclusions
A strong involvement of downstream parties, in com-
bination with condescending upstream parties, proved to
be crucial for the development of the Rhine regime. But a
consensus of downstream proposals could only be attained
at the moment that all parties would benefit. For this, the
time had to be ripe. The salt issue could be removed from
the agenda because after years of open conflict a more
flexible and advantageous solution came within reach. The
Rhine Action Program was considered attractive because
the time had come for a more ecologically-inspired ap-
proach and because the Sandoz disaster had clearly re-
vealed the vulnerability of the Rhine ecosystem to the
public at large.
The Rhine Chloride Convention, the Rhine Chemi-
cals Convention, and the Rhine Action Program expressed
strategic visions (goals and instruments) that offered the
riparian states a framework for change. Within and out-
side the ICPR, these visions stimulated a broad involve-
ment in the issue of the Rhine river. Due to the ICPR,
contacts were established among national research orga-
nizations. Within the ICPR, the visions promoted the dis-
cussion of the quality parameters and the measuring
methods, the norms for emissions and immissions, the
prevention of calamities in the catchment area, the imple-
mentation of measures for the management of the river,
and the construction of fish passages. Beyond the ICPR,
the visions stimulated the self-regulation of the private
sector that was revealed in the development of environ-
mental technology and the formation of some joint pub-
lic-private initiatives. These visions also contributed to
the increase of the public involvement in the issue of the
quality of the Rhine. This became especially obvious when
a recognizable goal was selected in the form of the return
of the salmon. To be meaningful, a strategic vision must
be connected to dormant national initiatives.
The case of the Rhine river also shows that an organi-
zation at the level of the catchment area can serve to col-
lect information on such initiatives. The participation of
high-ranking officials in the organization is needed to
develop an optimal interaction of national and interna-
tional developments. Where necessary, the ministers
themselves should resolve impasses. The negotiations on
the Rhine have revealed that a constructive dialogue does
not need an organization with supranational features. The
recommendations issued by the ICPR were always unani-
mous.
The existence of an organization at the level of a catch-
ment area as an important condition for the development
of a progressive regime has not only been underlined in
the literature (LeMarquand 1977; Trolldalen 1992; Wessel
1996; Mostert, 1999) but also in daily practice. The Eu-
ropean Commission has specified the catchment area as
the only logical scale for the management of a river in its
new Framework Directive (Commissie van de Europese
Gemeenschappen, 1996). This is underlined by the Com-
mission by granting funds to the Danube states to set up a
catchment area organization (Danube Programme Coor-
dination Unit, 1995). In addition, commissions were es-
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354 C. Dieperink
IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 3, September 2000
tablished for the Elbe, Oder, Meuse, and Scheldt rivers
during the 1990s. Currently, these commissions are elabo-
rating experimental action programs.
Acknowledgement
The author expresses his gratitude to four anonymous
referees for their constructive commentary on an earlier
version of this article.
About the Author
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Dr. Carel Dieperink is a re-
searcher at the Centre for Environ-
mental Law and Policy and lecturer
at the Department of Environmen-
tal Studies of the Faculty of Geo-
graphical Sciences, Utrecht Univer-
sity, The Netherlands. His interests
include water and environmental
policies, and the methodological as-
pects of policy analysis. This article
is based on the authors Ph.D. thesis on the Rhine regime
(Tussen zout en zalm, Lessen uit de ontwikkeling van het
regime inzake de Rijnvervuiling [Between Salt and
Salmon, Lessons from the Development of the Regime to
Control Pollution of the River Rhine]). Dr. Dieperink can
be reached at Environmental Studies, Utrecht Univer-
sity, P.O. Box 80.115, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands,
email: C.Dieperink@geog.uu.nl.
Discussions open until March 31, 2001.
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