All for One: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust

Abstract

HE importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social sciences. One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as measured in surveys, it correlates with a number of other variables that are normatively highly desirable. At the individual level, people who believe that in general most other people in their society can be trusted are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic in- stitutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more active in civic organizations. They also give more to charity and are more tolerant toward minorities and to people who are not like themselves. Trusting people also tend to be more optimistic about their own ability to influ- ence their own life chances and, not least important, to be more happy with how their life is going. 1

Full text

ALL FOR ALL
Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust
By BO ROTHSTEIN and ERIC M. USLANER*
INTRODUCTION
T
HE importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the
social sciences. One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as
measured in surveys, it correlates with a number of other variables that
are normatively highly desirable. At the individual level, people who
believe that in general most other people in their society can be trusted
are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic in
-
stitutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more active in civic
organizations. They also give more to charity and are more tolerant
toward minorities and to people who are not like themselves. Trusting
people also tend to be more optimistic about their own ability to influ
-
ence their own life chances and, not least important, to be more happy
with how their life is going.
1
We see the same positive pattern at the societal level. Cities, regions,
and countries with more trusting people are likely to have better work
-
* Part of this research was supported by a grant to Rothstein from the Swedish Science Council
(421-2003-1929) and from the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (F0925/1999).
Rothstein is also grateful for the support from the Society–Opinion–Media Institute at Göteborg
University and in particular to its leaders Sören Holmberg, Lennart Nilsson, and Lennart Weibull.
Part of this research was also supported by a grant to Uslaner from the Russell Sage Foundation and
the Carnegie Corporation under the Social Dimensions of Inequality Project. Some of the data come
from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which is not responsible for
any of the authors’ interpretations. Uslaner is also grateful to the General Research Board, University
of Maryland–College Park, for support on related projects and to assistance from M. Mitchell Brown
and crucial discussions on Central and Eastern Europe with Gabriel Badescu of Babes-Bolyai Uni-
versity, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Both Rothstein and Uslaner would like to thank Janós Kornai and
Susan Rose-Ackerman for making it possible for them to participate in the research project “Trust
and Honesty in the Light of Post-Socialist Transition” at the Collegium Budapest Institute for Ad-
vanced Study. They are also grateful to Markus Crepaz and to the anonymous reviewers and editors
for helpful comments.
1
J. F. Helliwell, “How’s Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to Explain Subjec-
tive Well-Being,” Working Paper 9065 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau for Economic Research,
2002); Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, “Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societ-
ies,” European Societies 5, no. 2 (2003).
World Politics 58 (October 2005), 41–72

42 WO R LD POLI T I CS
2
Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, L. F. Henri de Groot, and B. T. M. Anton van Schaik, “Trust and Eco-
nomic Growth: A Robustness Analysis,” Oxford Economic Papers New Series 56 (2004); Robert D.
Putman, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993); Uslaner (fn. 1); Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack, “Trust and Growth,” Economic Journal
111 (April 2001).
3
The number of articles published in scientific journals with “trust” as a keyword or in its abstract
increased from 129 to 1,956 from 1990 to 2005. Adding the word “growth” to “trust” shows an increase
from 1 to 42 articles, which indicates a stark increase in the use of this concept by political economists;
ISI Web of Knowledge, http://www.isinet.com/.
4
World Value Surveys, http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/.
5
Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, “Social Trust : Global Patterns or Nordic Exceptionalism,”
Working Paper (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2004).
6
Uslaner (fn. 1), chap. 7.
7
There is a huge discussion in political philosophy of how to define ”equality of opportunity.” It is
certainly hard to imagine a society that would, in reality, create equal opportunity for all its citizens.
We employ here a narrow definition that focuses on the establishment of public policies that are in-
tended to create equal conditions for citizens regardless of their income, ethnic/religious background,
sex, and race in areas such as health care, education, and social security and legal protection (“equality
before the law”). Thus, central to our conceptualization of “equality of opportunity” is not whether
there is “equality of opportunity” in general but whether the state does (or does not) promote equality
of opportunity.
ing democratic institutions, to have more open economies, greater eco-
nomic growth, and less crime and corruption.
2
At both the individual
and the societal levels, many things that are normatively desirable seem
connected to social trust. The issue of causality is admittedly a different
question from that of the statistical correlations, but because so many
correlations point in the same direction, social scientists from many dif
-
ferent disciplines have begun to pay attention to trust.
3
Trust varies widely across nations. In Norway, Denmark, and the
Netherlands about 60 percent of people believe most other people can
be trusted, whereas in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey about 10 per
-
cent trust others.
4
Delhey and Newton argue that when people answer
that they think most other people can be trusted, this can be interpreted
as their assessment of the moral standard of their society.
5
It implies
that trust reflects a sense of social solidarity, that they believe that the
various groups in society have a shared fate, and that there is a respon
-
sibility to provide possibilities for those with fewer resources. We see
this connection between social trust and solidarity in the good deeds
that trusters perform (giving to charity, volunteering their time) and in
the policies that trusting societies pursue in helping those with fewer
resources.
6
We argue that social trust is caused by two different, yet interre-
lated types of equality, namely, economic equality and equality of op
-
portunity.
7
This argument has important implications for public policy
because universal social policies are more effective than selective ones

8
In theory, one could imagine a society with huge economic inequality but with perfect equality
of opportunity. In practice, it seems as if these two types go together. For example, in contrast to the
United States, the Nordic states provide all citizens who qualify for college with tuition-free educa-
tion and provide benefits like universal health care and elderly care. One measure of the equality of
opportunity is the level of educational inequality in a country. Using a measure of the standard devia-
tion of educational attainment provided by Daniel Lederman of the World Bank, we found a modest
correlation (r = .367, N = 62) with the Gini index of economic inequality. The correlation is attenuated
by greater economic inequality than predicted for African and Latin American countries and lower
economic equality than expected for countries in the Indian subcontinent. We found almost identical
results using a Gini index of educational inequality (r = .364, N = 55) estimated by Vinod Thomas,
Yan Wang, and Xibo Fan, “Measuring Economic Inequality: Gini Coefficients of Education ” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank Institute, Office of the Vice President, and Economic Policy and Poverty
Reduction Division, January 2001).
9
Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
in creating both types of equality and thereby social trust.
8
However,
we have a somewhat pessimistic conclusion about the political possi
-
bilities of increasing equality by enhancing universal social policies in
developing and postsocialist countries. Since social trust is a measure
of how people evaluate the moral fabric in their society, there is little
reason to believe that countries with low social trust will establish uni
-
versal social programs precisely because such programs must be based
on a general political understanding that the various groups in society
share a common fate. Countries with an initial level of high inequal
-
ity and with dishonest government are less likely to establish univer
-
sal social programs. Such programs increase social trust in three ways.
First, they are more redistributive than means-tested programs and
thus create more economic equality. Second, since they are based on
the principle of equal treatment and minimize bureaucratic discretion,
they increase the sense of “equality of opportunity” within the popula
-
tion.
9
Third, means-tested programs exacerbate class and often racial
divisions within a society—and thus lead to less generalized trust and
more in-group trust. By contrast, universalistic programs enhance social
solidarity and the perception of a shared fate among citizens.
The reason why countries with high (or rising) levels of inequality
are less likely to establish universal programs is that such programs are
usually based on the idea that all groups in society, regardless of their
social and economic status, have a shared fate. People will place their
trust only in their own group or class, and those with fewer resources
will believe that they do not have the same opportunities as people with
greater resources. People reason that the rich got that way by unfair
advantage. Thus, people with less will demand radical redistribution
from the rich to the poor and will seek to exclude those with greater
resources from receiving benefits from the state or society. Ironically,
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 43

44 WO R LD POLI T I CS
when you need to prove you are poor to get government benefits, the
system creates resentment and distrust rather than empowerment and
trust—and these very “means-tested’ policies fail to alleviate inequality
and therefore fail to increase trust in fellow citizens. Policies designed to
reduce poverty instead create a trap of high inequality, less optimism for the
future, less trust in others, greater in-group identification, and persistent in
-
equities in the distribution of wealth.
One could argue that advocates for low-income groups in societ
-
ies with high inequality will opt for universal social programs because
they realize that such programs will be most beneficial for their groups.
Historically, however, this has seldom been the case.
10
First, the logic
of why universal programs are more redistributive than programs di
-
rected specifically to “the poor” is complex. Many well-known political
philosophers who have ventured into the discussion about social justice
have failed to grasp this logic.
11
Because the redistributive effects of
universal social programs are difficult to explain, it is difficult to get
support for such programs from underprivileged groups. Second, uni
-
versal programs also benefit the more well-to-do groups. Thus, in a
society with an initially high inequality, advocates for underprivileged
groups will have an uphill battle convincing their followers that scarce
public resources should also go to the middle class.
We argue that the roots of generalized trust lie in a more equitable
distribution of resources and opportunities in a society. Countries with
histories of greater equality such as the Nordic nations also had histo
-
ries of less repressive and more honest governments. Greater equality
and less corruption lead to more inclusive (universalistic) social welfare
programs and to greater generalized trust. We also argue that inequal
-
ity stands at the beginning of the causal chain. We see the distribution
of resources and opportunities in a society as the key to the other parts
of our story—honest government, generalized trust, and social welfare
regimes.
Equality and honesty in government stand at the beginning of our
causal chain. Both are necessary to create trust and the universalistic
social policies that lead to a greater level of equality and social cohesion.
The reinforcing effects of inequality and honesty on trust and social
policy—and the “feedback” to greater trust and less inequality—lead
to a positive equilibrium for societies that initially take steps to adopt
10
Michael B. Katz, “In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America,”
in Martin Gilens, ed., Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
11
For examples, see Rothstein (fn. 9), chap. 6.

universalistic social welfare policies. But they lead to a negative equi-
librium—an inequality trap—for countries with high or increasing in
-
equality and corrupt governments. While equality and honest government
come first, the reciprocal effects we posit make it difficult (at best) for countries
to escape the inequality trap.
We support our claims using a variety of methods. First, we show
by a cross-national statistical analysis that inequality is a key factor in
shaping generalized trust but that there is no direct effect of trust on
inequality; rather, the causal direction starts with inequality. Second,
we also examine the connections among honesty in government, trust,
and policy decisions by summarizing the state of research on corruption
rather than presenting new empirical analyses. Third, we examine how
the history of relatively greater equality and honesty in government laid
the foundation for universalistic social welfare policies in Sweden—
and how these policies helped to reinforce a sense of social solidarity.
Fourth, we show how means-tested benefits lead to less trust in a so
-
ciety that has been averse to universalistic policies—the United States.
Finally, using a wide range of findings, we support our argument about
why initially egalitarian societies are likely to remain so—and why it
is so difficult for unequal societies to develop generalized trust, honest
government, universalistic social policies, and greater equality.
T
RUST VERSUS TRUST: THE THEORY
Generalized trust links us to people who are different from ourselves.
It stands in contrast to particularized trust, where people have faith
only in their in-group. Generalized trust reflects a bond that people
share across a society and
across economic and ethnic groups, religions,
and races. Particularized trust reflects social strains, where each group
in a society looks out for its own interests and places little faith in the
good intentions of others. Particularized trusters may be as involved in
civic life as generalized trusters, but they will restrict their activities and
good deeds to their own kind.
Generalized trust both depends upon a foundation of economic and
social equality and contributes to the development of a more egalitarian
society. As social trust links us to people who are different from ourselves, it
reflects a concern for others, especially people who have faced discrimi
-
nation and as a result have fewer resources.
12
In societies with high levels
of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place
12
Uslaner (fn.1).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 45

46 WO R LD POLI T I CS
for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of
different backgrounds. The rich and the poor in a country with a highly
unequal distribution of wealth such as Brazil may live next to each other,
but their lives do not intersect. Their children attend different schools,
they use different health care services; and in many cases the poor can’t
afford either of these services. The rich are protected by both the police
and private guards, while the poor see those groups as their natural en
-
emies. In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have any sense of
a shared fate. Generalized trust is low while particularized (or in-group)
trust is high. In turn, each group looks out for its own interests and is
likely to see the demands of the other as conflicting with its own well-
being. Society is seen as a zero-sum game between conflicting groups.
Government policies have a large impact on economic equality.
13
Uni-
versal social programs that cater to the whole (or very broad sections)
of society, such as we find in the Scandinavian countries, promote a
more equitable distribution of wealth and more equality of opportunity
in areas such as education and the labor market.
14
Both types of equal-
ity lead to a greater sense of social solidarity—which spurs generalized
trust. Generalized trust, in turn, provides at least part of the foundation
for policies (such as universal benefits) that lead to more equality. This
is not to argue that there is a monodirectional relation between inde
-
pendent variables (policies) and dependent variables (norms), since we
admit that there are “feedback mechanisms” and “increasing returns”
between these variables.
15
Instead, we want to capture the logic of how
the causal mechanisms that link these variables work over time or what
factors make the vicious and virtuous cycles cycle the way they do.
W
HY SOME COUNTRIES ARE MORE TRUSTING THAN OTHERS
Why do some countries have more trusting citizens than others? The
most widely cited explanation focuses on participation in voluntary as
-
13
Björn Gustafsson and M. Johansson, “In Search of Smoking Guns: What Makes Income In-
equality Vary over Time in Different Countries?” American Sociological Review 84, no. 4 (1999); An-
thony B. Atkinson, “The Distribution of Income in the UK and OECD countries in the Twentieth
Century,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15 (Winter 1999); Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, “New
Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in
18 Countries, 1975–95,” American Political Science Review 97 (August 2003); Peter Gottschalk and
Timothy M. Smeeding, “Cross-national Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality,” Journal of
Economic Literature 35 ( June 1997).
14
Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality:
Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries,” American Sociological
Review 63 (October 1998).
15
Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Politi-
cal Science Review 94 ( June 2000).

sociations. This explanation has not stood up well against empirical
tests. For example, one recent large-scale empirical study covering sixty
countries concludes that “perhaps most important and most surprising,
none of the four measures of voluntary activity stood up to statistical
rests, in spite of the importance attached to them in a large body of
writing, from de Tocqueville onwards.”
16
Our alternative account holds that the key factor underlying trust is
the level of equality in a society. We conceptualize equality along two
dimensions: economic equality and equality of opportunity. Equality of
results is relatively simple to understand, if not to measure: how equi
-
tably are resources distributed within a society? There are many differ
-
ent measures of inequality in the literature; we use the most commonly
employed measure, the Gini index of inequality, because it is available
for the largest number of countries.
Equality of opportunity, the second dimension of equality we con
-
sider critical, focuses on the chance that people see for economic prog
-
ress in the future—even if society is highly stratified now. Even in cases
when governments cannot immediately reduce inequality, they can en
-
act policies that offer greater opportunities for economic equality. For
example, spending on universal programs for education promises long-
term opportunities for greater equality of results as higher education
opens up opportunities for economic advancement. Education is also
one of the strongest determinants of generalized trust.
17
A perception of shared fate depends heavily upon both types of equal-
ity. Seligman argues that trust cannot take root in hierarchal cultures.
18
Such societies have rigid social orders marked by strong class divisions
that persist across generations. Feudal systems and societies based on
castes dictate what people can and cannot do depending on the cir
-
cumstances of their birth. When economic resources are stratified—or
when people believe that others have unfair advantages—trust will not
develop and the benefits of trust, including policies that reduce further
inequalities, will be elusive. The assumption that others share your be
-
liefs is counterintuitive, since strict class divisions make it unlikely that
people actually have the same values as people in other classes.
The omission of both dimensions of equality in the social trust litera
-
ture is peculiar for several reasons. One is that the countries that score
highest on social trust also rank highest on economic equality—the
16
Delhey and Newton (fn. 5), 27.
17
John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, “Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of
Social Capital,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (July 1997); Uslaner (fn. 1), chap. 4.
18
Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 36–37, 41.
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 47

48 WO R LD POLI T I CS
Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada. Trust and inequal-
ity are strongly related across countries without a legacy of communist
rule.
19
In Figure 1 we show the connection between trust aggregated
to the country level and the Deininger-Squire measure of economic
inequality for forty-three countries in the 1990s. The relationship is
reasonably strong at r
2
= .391 for forty-three cases. Using the newer
Galbraith measures of inequality, the N drops to 32 but the r
2
rises to
.582.
20
These results are thus not confined to one particular data set.
Over time, from 1960 to 2002, the relationship between trust and eco
-
nomic inequality in the United States is also powerful: r
2
= .592 (N =
32). The effects of economic inequality on trust are long lasting, which
is not surprising since neither changes readily. The effect of the 1963
index of inequality on trust across countries is just as powerful as—and
perhaps a bit more so than—the 1996 level of economic stratification.
21
We elaborate on these findings in Table 1, where we reproduce part
of a six-equation model that Uslaner estimates in a study of corrup
-
tion.
22
Showing just the equations for trust and inequality tells the same
story as a simpler two-equation model (with far fewer cases) in Uslaner:
inequality is a strong predictor of generalized trust, but trust has no di
-
rect effect on inequality
.
23
The direction goes from inequality to trust but
not the other way around. These results are
not confined to a single set
of models. Inequality is the strongest determinant of generalized trust over
time in the United States and across the American states.
24
As we move from the low level of inequality in Belgium to the very
high level in South Africa, trust declines by 23 percent. This is equiva
-
lent to moving from the low trust level of Serbia, the Czech Republic,
South Korea, Spain, or Bulgaria to the high levels of the Netherlands
and Canada. To be sure, other factors shape trust as well: Protestant so
-
cieties have higher levels of trust, while former communist nations and
countries that have experienced civil war have lower levels of trust.
19
For the logic explaining why we eliminate countries with a legacy of communism, see Uslaner
(fn. 1), 228–30.
20
This is not an issue of case selection, since we get an R
2
of .560 of the regression of the Galbraith
measure on trust for the thirty cases with nonmissing values on both Gini coefficents.
21
The R
2
for the 1963 measure with levels of trust in the 1990s is .653 (N = 33) compared to .560
for the 1996 index of inequality. The regression coefficients (.022 and .020, respectively) are almost
identical.
22
Eric M. Uslaner, “The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law: Corruption, Inequality, and Trust”
(Paper presented at the conference “The Quality of Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It
Matters,” The Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, Göteborg Univer-
sity, Göteborg, Sweden, November 17–19, 2005), at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/conferences/novem-
ber2005/papers/Uslaner.pdf
23
Uslaner (fn. 1), 233–36.
24
Uslaner (fn. 1), 186–89; Eric M. Uslaner and M. Mitchell Brown, “Inequality, Trust, and Civic
Engagement,” American Politics Research 31 (November 2005).

The model in Table 1 is part of a six-equation model estimated by
Uslaner
25
that includes not only trust and inequality but also corrup-
tion (the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for
2004), whether a country has strangling regulations (from the World
Bank’s governance indicators), the stability of a country’s economy (as
measured by the overall risk measure from the International Country
Risk Guide), and an index of government effectiveness (derived from
a factor analysis of six indicators at the country level from the 2004
World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey). The model was
estimated by two-stage least squares.
The model in Table 1 also shows that countries that have experi
-
enced civil wars are less trusting, as are former communist nations.
Communism made it difficult to trust anyone outside one’s own family
(and sometimes even within one’s family). Protestant societies, which
have more individualistic political cultures, are also more trusting. The
collectivist and hierarchical cultures of Catholic societies lead to less
generalized trust (and more in-group trust). Effective governments do
not lead to more trust among citizens.
26
Corruption leads to greater
25
Uslaner (fn. 22).
26
For the measurement, see Uslaner (fn. 22).
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Gini Index Economic Inequality
r
2
= .391, N = 43
FIGURE 1
TRUST IN PEOPLE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
(FORMER AND CURRENT COMMUNIST NATIONS EXCLUDED)
.6
.4
.2
0
Most People Can Be Trusted
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 49

50 WO R LD POLI T I CS
inequality (the Transparency International measure gives higher scores
to countries with less corruption), while former communist nations and
countries with large Muslim populations have less inequality. The lack
of markets in former communist nations leveled incomes; Islam has
stressed equality. We expected that wealthy Protestant nations might
also have less inequality, but they do not—and the coefficient suggests
that they might even be less equal
.
TABLE 1
TRUST AND INEQUALITY EQUATIONS FROM SIMULTANEOUS MODEL OF TRUST,
INEQUALITY, AND CORRUPTION
Trust Equation
Economic inequality (Gini index) –.461*** .195 –2.36
Civil war –.086**** .025 –3.41
Protestant share of population 1980
.174*** .063 2.79
Former communist nation
-.091** .045 –2.01
Government effectiveness
.028 .024 1.18
Constant
.479**** .077 6.19
Inequality Equation
Trust
–.152 .187 –.81
Corruption
–.028*** .009 –3.23
Former communist nation
–.166**** .025 –6.59
Protestant share of population 1980
.123 .052 2.38
Muslim percentage of population
–.001**** .000 –3.77
Constant
.583**** .035 16.77
Equation R
2
S.E.E. Mean F Statistic
Trust
.664 .081 .296 21.35
Inequality (Gini) .534 .072 .360 12.34
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants); N = 63
SOURCES: Trust includes several imputed values as discussed in Uslaner (fn. 22). The government
effectivness variable is a factor score of six indicators of effectiveness derived from the cross-national
surveys of business executives (the 2004 Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum),
as also discussed in Uslaner (fn. 22). The corruption measure is the 2004 score from Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (where high scores indicate less corruption).
Instrumental variables: Religious fractionalization (from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, andWacziarg, 2003); English legal tradition (from the Levine-Loyaza-Beck data set at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/llbdata.htm ), GNP per capita (State Failure Data),
constraints on the executive branch of government (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 2004); military in politics (at www.freetheworld.com ); terrorism risk (ICRG); bureaucratic
quality (ICRG), parliamentary system and proportional representation (from the Data Base of Political
Institutions at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/wps2283.html).

In a recent study Jong-Sung You finds support for a link between
inequality and trust in individual-level data as well.
27
He estimates hi-
erarchical linear models for generalized trust in eighty countries using
the 1995–97 and 1999–2001 waves of the World Values Surveys. His
models indicate that trust is lower in countries with higher levels of
inequality. In a creative use of aggregate indices of income distribution,
he shows that the skewness (fairness) of the distribution of income sig
-
nificantly lowers trust, while the dispersion of the distribution (which
he calls “similarlity”) does not significantly shape trust. How much
one earns is not critical for trust—but when the income distribution is
highly unequal, social solidarity declines.
The Nordic countries have put a lot of effort into creating equality
of opportunity, not least in regard to their policies for public educa
-
tion, labor market opportunities, and (more recently) gender equality.
One can certainly debate whether these policies have been as success
-
ful as had been hoped, but comparatively these governments have been
ambitious in launching policies and programs in these areas.
28
Our ar-
gument is that by establishing universal social programs, governments
send signals to the citizens that are important for the creation of citizen
solidarity and social trust.
There are good theoretical reasons why both types of equality and
social trust should be causally related. First, optimism about the future
(which is a key determinant of social trust) makes less sense when there
is more economic inequality. When people believe that the future looks
bright, trusting strangers seems less risky.
29
The less fortunate have less
reason to be optimistic about their (or their children’s) future if they
sense that society is not giving them equality of opportunity, especially
in areas such as education and the labor market. People at the bottom
of the scale of income distribution or minorities who feel discriminated
against will be less sanguine about their prospects for sharing in society’s
bounty. How well the country is doing collectively, rather than how well
anyone is doing individually, leads to changes in generalized trust.
30
27
Jong-Sung You, “A Comparative Study of Income Inequality, Corruption and Social Trust:
How Inequality and Corruption Reinforce Each Other and Erode Social Trust” (Ph.D. diss., John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005), chap. 5, esp. 165, at http://ksghome.
harvard.edu/~youjong/dissertation%20contents.htm
28
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2001).
29
Uslaner (fn. 1), chaps. 2, 4.
30
Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The
Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting,” American
Journal of Political Science 23, no. 3 (1979).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 51

52 WO R LD POLI T I CS
Second, the distribution of resources and opportunities plays a key
role in establishing the belief that people share a common destiny and
have similar fundamental values. When resources and opportunities are
distributed more equally, people are more likely to perceive a common
stake with others and to see themselves as part of a larger social order.
If there is a strong skew in wealth or in the possibilities for improving
one’s stake in life, people at each end may feel that they have little in
common with others. In highly unequal societies, people are likely to
stick with their own kind. Perceptions of injustice will reinforce nega
-
tive stereotypes of other groups, making social trust and accommoda
-
tion more difficult.
31
The omission of equality from the literature on social capital and
social trust is something of a mystery. While Putnam points to the im
-
portance of economic inequality in his analysis of the decline of social
capital in the United States, it is not mentioned in his conclusion about
“what killed civic engagement?”
32
Of his seven policy prescriptions for
increasing social capital in the U.S., none touches upon increasing any
form of equality.
33
This is all the more surprising since the decline of
social capital that Putnam finds in the United States since the 1970s
seems to be suspiciously related in time to a dramatic increase in eco
-
nomic inequality.
34
Inequality has increased in the United States since
the 1980s as its welfare state has contracted.
35
The same strange omission can be seen in the Russell Sage Founda-
tion’s large project on trust: among the forty-one chapters in the three
edited volumes, none is about economic inequality and none of the vol
-
umes has an index entry on equality or inequality.
36
The same goes for
the three monographs produced by the project.
37
While political scien-
31
Carles Boix and Daniel N. Posner, “Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Gov-
ernment Performance,” British Journal of Political Science 28 (October 1998), 693.
32
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 359ff. and chap. 15.
33
Ibid., chap. 24.
34
Katherine Neckerman, Social Inequality (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); cf. Theda
Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2003).
35
Jacob S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of
Social Policy Entrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review 98 (May 2004).
36
Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds., Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1998); Karen S. Cook, ed., Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001);
Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, eds., Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimen-
tal Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003).
37
Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Tom R.
Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Karen Cook,
Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, Cooperation without Trust? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2005).

tists and sociologists largely have neglected the importance of equality
for creating social trust, economists have been more interested. Stephen
Knack and Paul Zak at the World Bank have concluded that redistri
-
bution is one important policy option by which governments can try
to increase social trust (but in a way that seems mandatory for econo
-
mists, they add that they worry about the economic inefficiencies such
redistribution can cause).
38
Social capital research has to a large extent
been used by several governments and policy organizations to send a
message to people that the bad things in their society are caused by too
little volunteering.
39
What if the low levels of trust and social capital are
caused by too little government action to reduce inequality?
O
N THE NEED FOR HONEST GOVERNMENT
While our argument puts inequality at the beginning of the causal
chain, we also believe that honest government is essential for the en
-
actment of universalistic social welfare programs. There may not be a
direct tie between effective government and trust, but
dishonest govern-
ment undermines trust at least indirectly
40
—and it makes universalistic
welfare policies difficult to enact.
Honest government is important for the enactment of universal so
-
cial welfare programs, for three reasons. First, corruption is based upon
loyalty to the in-group and
not to the larger society,
41
so universal social
welfare policies are anathema to dishonest government. Corrupt soci
-
eties reflect patron-client relationships and corrupt leaders reward
only
those who show their loyalty rather than the entire society
.
Second, universalistic policies require higher levels of taxation than
do means-tested programs, and dishonest governments will have fewer
resources to spend on public programs. Corruption transfers resources
from the mass public to the elites—and generally from the poor to the
38
Stephen Knack and Paul Zak, “Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust and Economic
Development,” Supreme Court Economic Review 10 (2002).
39
Robert D. Putnam and Lewis D. Feldstein, Better Together: Restoring the American Community
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003). See also, for example, the reports from the Irish Government
2003, “The Policy Implications of Social Capital”; and from the Swedish Government 2002; “En
uthållig demokrati. SOU 2002:1” (Stockholm: Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer). On Australia, see
I. Winter, ed., Social Capital and Public Policy in Australia (Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family
Studies, 2002).
The World Bank has also been very active in this area; see M.Woolcook and D. Narayan, “Social
Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research and Policy,” World Bank Research Boserver
15 (August 2000).
40
Uslaner (fn. 22).
41
Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 53

54 WO R LD POLI T I CS
rich.
42
It is functionally an extra tax on citizens, leaving less money for
public expenditures.
43
Corrupt governments have less money to spend
on their own projects, pushing down the salaries of public employees.
In turn, these lower-level staffers will be more likely to extort funds
from the public purse. Government employees in corrupt societies will
thus spend more time lining their own pockets than serving the public.
When political leaders extract money to line their own pockets, not
only will there be fewer resources to spend on social programs, but the
public will have less confidence in government—people will pay high
taxes only if they believe that they get a reasonable value back in the
form of services and benefits.
44
Third, while universalistic social welfare policies promote general-
ized trust, they are unlikely to be adopted in a society that initially ranks
low on equality and trust. Corruption will exacerbate inequality and
mistrust and lead to social conflicts that militate against universalistic
social welfare policies.
Corruption has an indirect effect on trust in the statistical analysis in
Table 1. Corruption leads to greater inequality, which in turn produces
lower levels of trust. While the aggregate analyses in Uslaner
45
show a
link from low levels of trust to high levels of corruption, but not from
corruption to trust, survey data from Romania and Estonia show that
perceptions of hig-level corruption make people less likely to trust their
fellow citizens.
46
Moreover, recent experimental work shows that both
(high trusting) Swedish and (low trusting) Romanian students—when
confronted with scenarios in which public officials in an “unknown city
in an unknown country” are asking for and also getting bribes—lose
trust not only in these public officials (policemen and doctors) but also
in “other people in general” in that “unknown city.”
47
42
Vito Tanzi, “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures,” IMF Staff
Papers 45 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,, 1998).
43
Paolo Mauro, “Why Worry about Corruption?” Washington: International Monetary Fund (Feb-
ruary 1997), 7.
44
Jan Hanousek and Filip Palda, “Quality of Government Services and the Civic Duty to Pay Taxes
in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Other Transition Countries,” Kyklos 57 (May 2004).
45
Eric M. Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption,” in Johann Graf Lambsdorf, Markus Taube, and Mat-
thias Schramm, eds., Corruption and the New Institutional Economics (London: Routledge, 2004); Us-
laner (fn. 22).
46
Eric M. Uslaner and Gabriel Badescu, “Making the Grade in Transition: Equality, Transparency,
Trust, and Fairness” (Manuscript, University of Maryland–College Park, 2005). The data on Estonia
have not been reported in any publication. They will be discussed in Uslaner, “The Bulging Pocket and
the Rule of Law: Corruption, Inequality, and Trust” (Book manuscript in preparation).
47
Daniel Eek and Bo Rothstein, “Exploring a Causal Relationship between Vertical and Horizontal
Trust” (Paper presented at the conference “Trust and Democracy: A Multidisciplinary Perspective,”
Department of Economics, Department of Political Science, and Department of Psychology, Göte-

Stoyanov et al.
48
report survey data on Bulgaria showing that “the
reasons for being wealthy . . . have to do mainly with the unfair so
-
cial system ensuring better opportunities for the well connected’ and
the unscrupulous. . . . the negative image of wealthy people does not
represent only the communist socialization stereotype, but results also
from recent . . . experiences of corruption, organized crime, and ‘illegal’
wealth.’” While most Westerners believe that the path to wealth follows
from hard work, 80 percent of Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Russians
say that high incomes reflect dishonesty
49
—in direct contrast to West-
erners, who are more likely to say that success comes from individual
initiative.
50
Orkeney and Szekelyi
51
present data showing that people in
transition countries are far less likely than citizens of Western nations
to believe that people have equal opportunities to succeed, are rewarded
for their own efforts, and get what they need; instead, connections and
dishonesty are the principal factors that make people wealthy.
When people think that the only route to prosperity is through dis
-
honesty, social tensions are heightened between those at the top and
those who have less.
52
This creates a situation in which ordinary citizens
reject universal welfare programs and instead call for redistribution of
income away from the rich. In Romania beliefs that corruption is wide
-
spread, personal experiences with corruption (enforced “gift payments”
to public officials or the courts), and perceptions of rising inequality led
to demands to limit the income of the rich.
53
Where there is a dearth
of social solidarity due to class envy, the social bonds of generalized
trust will be weak, and so will the propensity (especially from the mid
-
dle class) to pay high taxes. People will identify more with their class
or ethnic group (or both) than with members of the larger society. And
borg University, Göteborg, Sweden, May 19–20, 2005). The report itself has data only about Swedish
students. The data from our scenario experiments with the Romanian students have just been analyzed
and confirm the result from the experiments conducted in Sweden.
48
Alexander Stoyanov, Maragarita Pavlikianova, Andrej Nontchev, and Galja Krasteva, “Bulgaria:
Political and Economic Crisis; Democratic Consolidation,” in David S. Mason and James L. Kluegel,
eds., Marketing Democracy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
49
James R. Kluegel and David S. Mason, “Market Justice in Transition,” in Mason and Kluegel (fn.
48), 167; cf. Antal Orkeney, “Trends in Perceptions of Social Inequality in Hungary, 1991–1996,” in
Mason and Kluegel, 109.
50
György Csepeli, Antal Orkeney, Maria Szekelyi, and Ildikó Barna, “Blindness to Success: Social
Psychological Objectives along the Way to a Market Economy in Eastern Europe,” in J. Kornai, B.
Rothstein, and S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (New York:
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).
51
Antal Orkeney and Maria Szekelyi, “Views on Social Inequality and the Role of the State: Post-
transformation Trends in Eastern and Central Europe,” Social Justice Research 13 (2000), 206, 208.
52
Csepeli et al. (fn. 50).
53
Uslaner and Badescu (fn. 46).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 55

56 WO R LD POLI T I CS
they will not trust the government to distribute resources in a fair and
honest way. Rother summarizes this dilemma in Latin America:
I don’t think there is any more vital issue in Latin America right now. . . . It’s a
vicious cycle that is very hard to break. People don’t want to pay taxes because
they say government doesn’t deliver services, but government institutions aren’t
going to perform any better until they have resources, which they obtain when
people pay their taxes.
54
In low-trust societies with high degrees of economic inequality, uni-
versal programs are likely to fail for lack of political support. Even when
such policies are adopted, there is a strong possibility that they will
fail in the implementation process. Education, health care, and social
insurance benefits (as well as the police and the courts) may very well
become commodities for sale because corruption is pervasive. Parents
“buy” their children’s way into good schools, especially universities, and
then pay even more for good grades. Extra “gift payments” to doctors
are routine in countries with high levels of economic inequality. Police
will stop drivers for invented traffic infractions and pedestrians for at
-
tempting to cross in the middle of traffic and demand payments in
lieu of tickets. Each of these actions subverts trust in government and
thereby the notion that they could implement universal social policies
in a fair and equal way. Instead, suspicion that bureaucrats will give ex
-
tra advantage to those willing and able to make the “extra” payment is
likely to be pervasive.
55
In countries with high levels of corruption, the public is hostile to peo-
ple who have more. Where corruption is high, voters are likely to believe
that the poor are treated unfairly by society in general and by governmen
t
institutions in particular. Low income groups are therefore likely to opt
for left-wing parties that present a case for more “radical” redistribution
of resources than would occur under universal social welfare programs.
56
In such a situation, it is easy for “radical” political entrepreneurs to argue
that dispensing justice to those who prosper illegitimately (for example
due to various forms of corruption) means taking resources away from
the poor and needy. Thus, inequality and corruption breed mistrust,
which produces no support for the very type of social welfare programs
that are most effective in reducing disparities of income.
54
Larry Rother, “Where Taxes Aren’t So Certain,” New York Times, March 21, 1999, 3.
55
Janos Kornai, “Hidden in an Envelope: Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors in Hungary”
(2000), at http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/kornai/pub01.PDF.
56
Rafael DiTella and Robert MacCulloch, “Why Doesn’t Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?”
(Manuscript, Harvard Business School, 2003).

INSTITUTIONS FOR EQUALITY AND SOCIAL TRUST:
H
OW DID IT START?
Different countries operate in different causal cycles between their in
-
stitutions for social policies and their level of social trust. This certainly
raises the difficult question of how this causal logic got started. Did the
Scandinavian countries develop broad-based (universal) social policies
because of an initially high level of social trust and less social inequality,
or was it the other way around? As we have no survey data about the
level of social trust from the 1920s, this is difficult to answer. However,
we have quite a few historical studies about the character of the Scan
-
dinavian societies that existed before the univers
al type social policies
were launched.
First, in the beginning of the modern era, the Scandinavian countries
had a more equal social structure than the rest of Europe.
57
The Swed-
ish and Norwegian peasants were not subject to a continental-style feu
-
dalism but were legally independent. Until the reform of the Swedish
Parliament in 1867, Swedish farmers had their own estate, a situation
that was unique in Europe. According to Charles Tilly, “[t]win facts
. . . strongly affected the path of the Swedish state formation: first, the
overwhelming presence of a peasantry that held plenty of land well
into the eighteenth century.
58
Second, the relative inability of landlords
either to form great estates or to coerce peasant labour on their lands.”
This also holds for Norway, which was in a union with Sweden until
1905 and had no aristocracy. In Denmark farmers had joined in an
alliance with the urban bourgeoisie in the successful overthrow of ab
-
solutism in 1849. The political strength of the farmers grew gradually
over the decades. They consolidated themselves as an independent and
powerful political class by joining in producer organizations, insurance
associations, savings banks, cultural and educational services, and many
other organizations. They did so, moreover, on a much greater scale
than in other countries. Politically, the farmers united in the late nine
-
teenth century in the Liberal Party (Venstre), which came into power
in 1901.
59
Second, during the late nineteenth century a Weberian-style, rule-
governed, mostly meritocratic, and fairly uncorrupted civil service
57
Peter Flora, ed., Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States since World War II, vol.1
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986); cf. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1900 (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1992).
58
Tilly (fn. 57), 27.
59
Tim Knudsen, Dansk statsbygning (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1995).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 57

58 WO R LD POLI T I CS
had developed in the Scandinavian countries.
60
When the social re-
forms that formed the beginning of the universal principles of social
policy were launched, there were few suspicions that the civil service
that would manage the programs might be corrupt. The reforms were
hotly disputed, but the argument that the civil service was corrupt and
therefore could not be trusted was never put forward—or at least, has
never been reported in the historical studies of the early stages of the
Swedish welfare state.
61
The Scandinavian countries are hardly without
class conflict. It was especially severe in the mid-1930s and Sweden lost
many days per worker due to industrial strife already in the 1920s.
62
Yet ultimately the conflicts in Sweden were resolved peacefully—clearly
due to the country’s long history of greater equality than elsewhere in
Europe and to confidence in governing authority that stemmed from a
history of honest government.
A detailed account of the historical development in the Swedish case
indicates that it was the impartiality of the government institutions,
especially those handling policies related to the labor market and social
policy, that made the development of a “historical compromise” be
-
tween labor and capital possible. This compromise was to a large extent
built on “a spirit of trust”
63
that developed into the well-known “Swed-
ish Model” that came to mark Swedish society after 1936.
64
There is much to suggest that it was the existence of impartial, un-
corrupted, and fairly efficient government institutions that laid the
foundation for the elite accommodation that helped to create strong
norms about trust in Sweden. Public confidence in the integrity of its
leaders and institutions was the basis for the compromise that provided
for universal policies that would reduce inequality and increase social
cohesion and trust. The Scandinavian countries were historically less
unequal than the countries on the Continent. Moreover, they had lower
levels of corruption and more honest government institutions.
60
Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, ”State-Building in Scandinavia,” Comparative Politics 26 (Janu-
ary 1994); Tim Knudsen and Ditlev Tamm, eds., Dansk forvaltningshistorie indtil 1901 (Copenhagen:
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2000).
61
Cf. Sven E. Olsson, Social Policy and Welfare State in Sweden (Lund: Arkiv, 1993).
62
Nils Elvander, Scandinavian Social Democracy: Its Strength and Weakness (Stockholm: Almqvist &
Wiksell International, 1979).
63
This is how the agents of the time, both union leaders and the leaders from the employers’ fed-
eration, described what happened in the mid-1930s; see Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem
of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 7. Of particular importance was that
the leaders of the Social Democratic Party could make “credible commitments” toward the Employ-
ers’ Federation that they would not use their political power over the state administration to favor the
union side, for example, in labor disputes.
64
Rothstein (fn. 63); cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Eu-
rope (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

SOCIAL POLICIES AND SOCIAL TRUST
Universal welfare policies fare much better at reducing inequality than
do simple redistribution schemes that imply selective policies.
65
This is
a paradox because one would assume that universal policies that give
everyone the same service or benefits—for example, universal child al
-
lowances or universal health care—would not have a redistributive ef
-
fect, whereas redistributive policies that tax the rich and give to the
poor would be the most efficient way to reduce poverty. But the facts
are exactly the opposite.
66
The technical reason for the greater efficiency
of universal systems in reducing economic inequality is that taxes are
usually proportional or progressive, but services or benefits are nomi
-
nal—you get a certain sum or a certain type of service.
67
The net effect of proportional (or progressive) taxes and nominal
services/benefits is a considerable redistribution from the rich to the
poor. The political reasons for why universal policies are more effective
at alleviating poverty are that if a state is going to tax the rich and give
to the poor, the rich (especially the middle class) will not agree to pay
high taxes because they perceive that they do not get enough in return.
68
They will perceive such programs as policies only for “the poor,” and
the middle class (who are also the swing voters) in particular will turn
away from political parties that argue for increasing taxes and social
policies.
69
Additionally, the implementation of universal programs follows two
important equality principles. First, these programs treat everyone in
the same situation equally. Second, because they are given without
means testing, universal programs do not have to organize a large bu
-
reaucracy to determine eligibility. Selective welfare programs often stig
-
matize recipients as “welfare clients.” They demarcate the rich and the
poor, with those at the bottom made to feel that they are less worthy,
not least because of the bureaucratic intrusion entailed in the process of
implementation.
70
Universal programs are connected to citizens’ rights,
65
Rothstein (fn. 9); Korpi and Palme (fn. 14).
66
Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
67
Rune Åberg, “Distributive Mechanism of the Welfare State,” European Sociological Review 5
(April 1989); Karl-Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, “Targeting and Political Support for Welfare
Spending,” Economics of Governance 2 (March 2001).
68
Korpi and Palme (fn. 14); Swank (fn. 66).
69
Rothstein (fn. 9); Swank (fn. 66).
70
Staffan Kumlin and Bo Rothstein, “Making and Breaking Social Capital: The Impact of Welfare
State Institutions,” Comparative Political Studies 38 (May 2005).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 59

60 WO R LD POLI T I CS
while selective welfare programs have trouble with legitimacy because
they have to single out the “deserving” from the “nondeserving poor.”
This will always imply discretionary decisions by street-level bureau
-
crats who may intrude on the personal integrity of clients.
People who receive selective welfare benefits often feel demeaned
and apart from others in society. Recipients of means-tested benefits,
for example, from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (
AFDC) in
the United States, are more likely to believe that the government was
distant and unresponsive—and that efforts on their part to participate
in the political process would be futile. In the United States, recipients
of benefits that are
not means tested, such as, for example, disability
insurance under Social Security, did not differ from the broader popu
-
lation that received no government benefits.
71
Soss writes of means-
tested benefits in the United States through
AFDC: “The act of welfare
claiming, especially in a public assistance program, can be mortifying.
The degraded identity it conveys can effectively strip individuals of full
and equal community membership.”
72
One AFDC recipient spoke of the
how she felt when applying for benefits:
They’re the cowboys and you’re a cow. . . . You go all the way through this line to
do this, and then this time to do that. It’s like a cattle prod. . . . I felt like I was
in a prison system . . . these people are like, “I’m helping you. This is something
I’m doing for you. So just be quiet and follow your line.”
73
People who receive Social Security disability benefits in the U.S., the
universal program, are not required to answer detailed questions about
their personal life, do not feel threatened with loss of benefits, and be
-
lieve that their case workers treat them with respect—and are not alien
-
ated from others.
74
Denigrating beneficiaries of means-tested government programs
leads to social strains in two ways: the poor feel isolated and feel that
others deem them unworthy. The denigration of welfare recipients
feeds on public perceptions that the poor truly are responsible for their
own poverty. Neither side sees a shared fate with the other. In contrast,
universal programs do not cast aspersions on
any recipients of benefits
and thus do not undermine trust. When they work well, they can even
71
Joe Soss, “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action,” American
Political Science Review 93 (June 1999).
72
Joe Soss, Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2000), 46.
73
Ibid., 99.
74
Ibid., 144–45, 154.

help to create it by increasing feelings of equal treatment and equality
of opportunity.
The 1992 American National Election Study (
ANES) asked people if
they received means-tested benefits such as welfare and Medicaid (tar
-
geted medical assistance to the poor). People who received
only these
means-tested benefits—and not universal payments such as Social Se
-
curity or Medicare (both for the aged of all incomes)—were less likely
to trust other people than people who did not receive such benefits:
21 percent of people receiving means-tested benefits trusted others,
compared with 49 percent of Americans who received no means-tested
benefits. We estimate a multivariate statistical (probit) model of trust
based upon the analysis of Uslaner.
75
The model includes standard predictors of trust—education (sepa-
rate measures for high school and college), sociability with neighbors,
race, age, and economic status (own your own home), as well as the
social psychological roots of trust: optimism about life twenty years in
the future, feelings of efficacy in politics, attitudes toward your own in-
group (particularized trust), perceptions of desirable traits for children
(being curious rather than simply having “good manners” and being
considerate as opposed to simply being “well behaved”)—and the belief
that one would be better off worrying less about inequality. Income was
insignificant and we excluded it from this model. If you are optimistic
about the future and believe that you can make a difference in politics,
if you want your children to be kind and curious more than simply well
behaved, you will be more trusting. If you are committed to equality and
not overly committed to your in-group, you will also be more likely to
trust others. Even after we take into account all of these other factors,
we find that people who receive means-tested benefits are 9 percent less
likely to be generalized trusters than people who do not receive such
benefits (see Table
2).
When people do not see themselves as part of the same moral com
-
munity with a shared fate, they will not have the solidarity that is es
-
sential for building up social trust. Means-testing stigmatizes the poor
and makes them feel that they are “apart” from others in the society
in critical ways and that the government is less concerned for their
welfare than for those with more resources. Evidence from the U.S.
shows that instead of increasing equality, a welfare state built mainly on
75
Uslaner (fn. 1), 100. The model is based upon Uslaner (fn. 1), 100. We dropped trust in govern-
ment as a predictor since it is likely endogenous to receipt of means-tested benefits; see Soss (fn. 71).
For a description of the measures, see Uslaner (fn. 1), 99–101.
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 61

62 WO R LD POLI T I CS
means-testing programs perpetuates feelings of inequality among both
the poor and the more affluent.
If we compare this evidence from the United States with Swedish
data, the similarities are striking. People in Sweden who are the target
of selective measures such as determining eligibility for social assistance
and disability pensions have significantly lower trust in other people
than the rest of the population.
76
In a survey about Swedish citizens’
contacts with various welfare state programs, respondents were asked to
state whether they had dealt with a number of selective welfare institu
-
tions. The minority of Swedes who had been in contact with selective
programs had significantly lower social trust than the rest of the popu
-
lation. The negative effect on social trust caused by interactions with
means-testing institutions remained statistically significant controlling
76
Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, “Social Capital, Impartiality, and the Welfare State: An Insti-
tutional Approach,” in M. Hooghe and D. Stolle, eds., Generating Social Capital: The Role of Voluntary
Associations, Institutions and Government Policy (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003).
TABLE 2
PROBIT ANALYSIS FOR TRUST, 1992 AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error t Ratio
Effect
a
Receives means-tested benefit –.273** .154 –1.77 –.090
Standard living better in 20 years
.090**** .018 4.96 .122
Have no say in politics
–.068*** .024 2.83 –.092
In-group trust
–.006*** .002 –3.04 –.168
Worry less about inequality
–.038** .025 –1.54 –.051
Talk to neighbors
.239**** .083 2.88 .080
African-American
–.606**** .117 –5.17 –.199
High school education
.056**** .014 4.13 .202
College education
.064**** .010 6.03 .369
Own home
.168** .078 2.17 .057
Child should be curious
.085**** .019 4.35 .117
Child should be considerate
.077**** .020 3.89 .106
Age .009*** .002 4.13 .163
Constant –1.048*** .257 –4.08
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001
–2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2063.578 Estimated R
2
= .299 N = 1753
Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit Model 70.0 Null Model: 54.5
a
Effect is the difference in estimated probabilities from the minimum to the maximum values of
the independent variable (except for age, where we use the range 18–75). For a description of the
data and variables, see Uslaner (fn. 1), chap. 4.

for many other variables that are known to affect social trust (the level of
education, social class, income, activity in voluntary associations, inter
-
est in politics, general happiness, political ideology, and employment).
The Swedish data show that contacts with means-testing welfare state
institutions seem to reduce interpersonal trust even when a large num
-
ber of other factors are taken into consideration
77
—just as we reported
for data from the United States.
U
NIVERSAL PROGRAMS AND SOCIAL TRUST
Part of the answer as to why countries with large and mostly universal
welfare state programs have more social capital is that these programs
create societies with less economic inequality. But the benefits may be
more substantial than that. First, universal programs are delivered with
less bureaucratic hassle and control. Second, universal programs may
create a feeling of social cohesion in society. Patients, people in elderly
care, preschoolers, and schoolchildren are not separated into differ
-
ent services based on whether they are designated as being “the poor.”
These programs are supported by the poor, but also by the middle class
and by highly educated professional strata.
78
Periods when the center
and right parties have been in power in Scandinavia (which they have
been for a long periods, especially in Denmark and Norway) have not
changed the universal character of these welfare states.
79
Preferences for
“economic leveling”—for a more equitable income distribution—are
much stronger in the Scandinavian countries than elsewhere among
the advanced industrial countries—and they are weakest in the United
States and the United Kingdom, which have long histories of means-
tested benefits.
80
Third, the existence of high-quality universal programs, especially
when it comes to areas such as education and health care, may increase
a feeling of “optimism” and “equal opportunity” among large segments
of the population. The Nordic countries are comparatively high spend
-
ers on social services and education. Even college/university education
is supported by taxes: the governments provide relatively generous stu
-
77
Kumlin and Rothstein (fn 70).
78
S. Svallfors, “Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight West-
ern Nations,” European Sociological Review 13, no. 3 (1997), 283–304.
79
Swank (fn. 66); Evelyne Huber and John D.Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
80
Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding, “Social Values for Equality and Preferences for State Inter-
vention in the USA and Europe” (Manuscript, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse
University, 2005).
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 63

64 WO R LD POLI T I CS
dent benefits and loans and there is no tuition. Controlling for most
other background variables, survey data from a wide variety of nations,
from Sweden to the United States to Romania, indicate that high levels
of education result in high levels of generalized trust.
81
Bjornksov shows
a powerful cross-national relationship between the level of education in
a country and its share of generalized trusters.
82
Consistent with the emphasis on individual initiative in its politi-
cal culture,
83
the United States has lagged behind European countries
in providing universal benefits.
84
The great exceptions were the Social
Security system and Medicare, the old-age pension and medical insur
-
ance for the elderly. In the 1970s and 1980s, as trust was declining, the
United States Congress passed legislation that shifted much of the “risk
of investment” (in retirement benefits for both programs) onto workers.
According to Hacker, the cuts in benefits spread “by far most rapidly
among the lowest paid workers, who already had the lowest coverage
levels.”
85
Even though Medicare is a universal policy without means testing,
the quality of services to Medicare patients varies substantially across the
American states. Some states, especially those in New England, deliver
high-quality care to Medicare patients, as measured by the Washington
Post in a series of articles in 2005.
86
High-quality care was determined
by twenty-four indicators from the Centers for Medicare and Medic
-
aid Office of Clinical Standards for Quality and include the share of
hospitals that give heart attack patients aspirin and beta blockers within
twenty-four hours of admission as well as back and open-heart surger
-
ies per thousand patients.
87
The worst-performing states were in the
American South. More generally, the highest level of care occurred in the
states with the lowest levels of economic inequality and the highest levels of
trust. Together, the levels of inequality and trust account for two-thirds
of the total variation in the quality of Medicare services across forty-
81
Brehm and Rahn (fn. 17); Knack and Zak (fn. 38); Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: Ameri-
ca’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1995), 65–78; Uslaner (fn. 1), chap. 4;
Eric M. Uslaner, “Trust and Civic Engagement in East and West,” in Gabriel Badescu and Eric M.
Uslaner, eds., Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy (London: Routledge, 2003).
82
Christian Bjornskov, “Social Trust and the Growth of Schooling” (Manuscript, Aarhus School of
Business, Aarhus University, Denmark, 2004).
83
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955).
84
Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
85
Hacker (fn. 35), 255.
86
Gilbert M. Gaul, “Bad Practices Net Hospitals More Money,” Washington Post, July 24, 2005,
A1, A12, A13.
87
See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/custom/2005/07/22/CU2005072201387.
html. Details of the statistical analysis below are available from the authors.

four states. The most equal state ranks 34 (of 44) places ahead of the
least equal state and a state with the highest level of generalized trust
ranks 27 places ahead of the least trusting state. Even though Medicare
is a universal social policy in the United States, its administration is shaped
by the underlying social forces in each state. Where inequality is high and
trust is low, there is insufficient social solidarity to provide high-quality care
to all citizens.
Here we see evidence of the inequality trap we posited above: as
inequality has increased in the United States, growing pressures to do
more for the poor have given way to budget cuts for programs designed
to benefit those with the greatest needs. Inequality produces lower lev
-
els of trust. In 1960, 58 percent of Americans believed that “most peo
-
ple can be trusted,” while between 33 percent and 40 percent have held
this view since the end of the twentieth century. This declining level of
trust translates into growing polarization and competition for govern
-
ment resources—and less support for programs that benefit the most
needy. The higher levels of equality and trust have sustained the welfare
state in the Scandinavian countries. Unequal societies are caught in a
social trap of high inequality and low trust, with trust levels too low to
sustain the universal policies that would reduce inequality.
T
HE STICKINESS PROBLEM
Trust, inequality, and corruption are all sticky: none of them changes
much over time. The r
2
between generalized trust, as measured in the
1981, 1990–95 World Values Surveys across between 1980 and the
1990s is .81 for the twenty-two nations included in both waves (see
Figure 2)—the r
2
between generalized trust in 1990 and 1995 is also
robust (.851, N = 28). Inequality similarly moves little over time. The
r
2
for the most commonly used measures of economic inequality
88
be-
tween 1980 and 1990 is not quite as strong as the connection with trust
over time, but it is still substantial at .676 for a sample of forty-two
countries (see Figure 3). A new inequality database developed by James
Galbraith extends measures of inequality further back in time and
across more countries.
89
The r
2
between economic inequality in 1963
and economic inequality in
1996 is .706 (for thirty-seven countries; see
Figure 4). Inequality persists over time—it does not move easily. More
-
88
Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” World Bank
Economic Review 10, no. 3 (1996), 565–91.
89
The data can be obtained at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/web/.
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 65

.2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Most People Can Be Trusted: World Values Survey 1980
r
2
= .81, N = 22
FIGURE 2
TRENDS IN GENERALIZED TRUST: 1980–90 WORLD VALUES SURVEYS
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
Most People Can Be Trusted:
World Values Survey 1990
20 30 40 50 60
Gini Index of Economic Inequality Deininger-Squire Data Set 1980
r
2
= .676, N = 42
FIGURE 3
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY: GINI INDICES 1990 AND 1980
60
50
40
30
20
Gini Index of Economic Inequality
Deininger-Squire Data Set 1990

over, this persistence leads to lower levels of trust and an unwillingness
to adopt the policies that might alleviate inequality.
We see a similar dynamic for corruption. The r
2
between the 2004
Transparency International estimates of corruption and those of the
ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) in 1980–85 across fifty-two
countries is .742. And the r
2
between trust and corruption in 2004 is
.440 for eighty-four countries. (See Figure 5.) Trust, inequality, and cor
-
ruption are all sticky—and they seem to form a common syndrome.
There seem to be multiple equilibria. In the virtuous cycle, some
countries have low inequality, high trust, honest governments, and uni
-
versal social welfare policies. These countries are continually “blessed”
as they begin with a more level playing field and have the social fabric,
the well-functioning institutions, and the policies that will keep in
-
equality in check. In the vicious cycle, countries seem mired in high (or
increasing) inequality, low trust, corrupt governments, and demands
for more radical redistribution—a policy that will only increase social
strains further and that will not yield the goal of reducing economic
inequality. When inequality is very low (the twenty-seven cases where
the Gini index is .35 or lower), the
r
2
between inequality and trust is
minuscule (.013); we see the same phenomenon when inequality is high
20 30 40 50 60
Gini Index of Economic Inequality: Galbraith Data Set
1963
r
2
= .706, N = 37
FIGURE 4
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY: GINI INDICES 1996 AND 1963
50
45
40
35
30
Gini Index of Economic Inequality:
Galbraith Data Set
1996
Galbraith Data Set
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 67

(greater than .42): the r
2
is just .013 (N = 23). In the middle, there is
also not much movement (
r
2
= .051, N = 14). This is the essence of the
inequality trap: it is not easy to make a Brazil into a Sweden or a Fin
-
land. Indeed, it is not so easy to make Brazil into a Portugal or a United
States into a Sweden or even a Canada.
T
HE SOCIAL TRAP OF UNIVERSALISM, TRUST, AND EQUALITY
Perceptions of inequality lead the poor to demand redistribution and
lead the rich to reject those demands. We see this inequality trap very
clearly in Central and Eastern Europe, where countries are making the
transition from communism to democracy, although the story is likely
to be much the same in other developing countries with high levels of
poverty and inequality as well as low levels of trust.
The growth of a market economy has meant displacement of many
former state workers guaranteed employment and a living wage. Com
-
munism already had depressed levels of generalized trust. Overcoming
both poverty and low levels of trust loomed large on the political agenda
of these countries—but there has been little support for the universal
policies that might create a more vibrant economy and society. Instead,
0 .2 .4 .6
Most People Can Be Trusted (Imputed)
r
2
= .440, N = 84
FIGURE 5
CORRUPTION BY TRUST
10
8
6
4
2
T1 Corruption Perceptions Index 2004
68 WO R LD POLI T I CS
Corruption by Generalized Trust (Imputed)

there seems to be support for a more radical redistribution of income
that would exacerbate tensions and make the transition more difficult.
Every country for which there are data on changes in economic in
-
equality save one (Slovakia) showed an increase in economic inequality
from 1989 to the mid-1990s.
90
As inequality rises, we see a clear link
between perceptions of growing inequality and the belief that the only
way to prosper is to be corrupt. As an example,
Mateju argues:
The long-lasting presence of an egalitarian socialist ideology and a functioning
“nomenclatura system” associated with various social and economic privileges
mean that those countries undergoing the post-communist transformation will
show a low tolerance for the growth of inequality . . . individuals who feel that life
-
chances for their group or class are declining in relation to those of other groups or
classes may tend to consider such changers as the result of social injustice.
91
Attributions of success in life matter for two reasons. First, general-
ized trust depends heavily upon optimism and control—the beliefs that
life is good and going to get better and that you can help make it better.
When people fear for the future and see rising inequality, they are less
likely to be optimistic.
92
Believing that you need special connections or
luck to succeed means that you do not believe that you are the master
of your own fate. This pessimism about personal control over your own
fate leads to lower levels of generalized trust in societies as diverse as
the United States and Romania.
93
Societies in transition are already low in trust. As inequality increases,
there are more demands for redistribution of wealth and confiscation of
the fortunes of the newly rich. When Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Kho
-
dorkovsky confessed his sins of relying on beeznissmeny (stealing, lying, and
sometimes killing) and promised to become scrupulously honest in early
2003, Russians regarded the pledge as “startling.” When he was arrested
and charged with tax evasion and extortion under orders from President
Vladimir Putin ten months later, the average Russian was unfazed: about
the same proportion of people approved of his arrest as disapproved of it.
94
90
J. Barkley Rosser, Marina V. Rosser, and Ehsan Ahmed, “Income Inequality and the Informal
Economy in Transition Countries,” Journal of Comparative Economics 28, no. 1 (2000).
91
Petr Mateju, “Beliefs about Distributive Justice and Social Change: Czech Republic 1991–1995,”
Working Paper from the research project Socialni Trendy/Social Trends (Prague, June 1997), 4–5.
92
Uslaner (fn. 1), chaps. 4–8.
93
Uslaner (fn. 1), chaps. 4, 6; Uslaner (fn. 85); cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Public Participation in
Consolidating Democracies: Hungary and Poland,” in J. Kornai and S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., Building
a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).
94
Serge Schemann, “In Going Legit, Some Russian Tycoons Resort to Honesty,” New York Times,
January 12, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/weekinreview/12SCHM.html (accessed
January 14, 2003); Sabrina Tavernise, “Russia Is Mostly Unmoved by the Troubles of Its Tycoons,”
New York Times (Washington edition), November 3, 2003, A3.
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 69

70 WO R LD POLI T I CS
The best policy response to growing inequality is to enact univer-
salistic social welfare programs. However, the social strains stemming
from increased inequality make it almost impossible to enact such poli
-
cies. Demands for redistribution will thus lead to inefficient strategies
for poverty reduction—and ever increasing social strains. Starting from
a base of relative equality, the transition states had a golden opportu
-
nity to enact universalistic social welfare policies. Yet these states also
had corrupt governments with widespread tax evasion and little public
confidence. Transition states had only one of the key elements (rela
-
tive equality) for the enactment of universalistic policies. Lacking the
other (honest government), they have been unable to stem the growing
inequality and increased social strains that follow from it. Many tran
-
sition states had universalistic social welfare policies under communist
regimes, and most still do as official policy—but the implementation
of such policies in transition has focused more on targeted benefits and
health care often depends upon the ability to pay for insurance.
95
Most
transition countries have alternated between governments of the right
and governments of the left in search of economic stability. Such politi
-
cal instability, veering from one pole to the other, reflects the lack of a
social consensus on finding common ground.
C
ONCLUSIONS
If social trust is generated by the two types of equality that we have
pointed to and if universal policies are the best way to increase these
types of equality, many countries with low levels of social trust and
social capital may be stuck in a sort of social trap.
96
The logic of such
a situation is the following. Social trust will not increase because mas
-
sive social inequality prevails, but the public policies that could remedy
this situation cannot be established precisely because there is a lack
of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other people” and the gov
-
ernment institutions that are needed to implement universal policies.
Since social trust is an important intrinsic value (personal happiness,
optimism about the future) and also has political value (support for fair
institutions, minority rights, tolerance, and so on) and economic value
(its positive relation to individual earnings and aggregate economic
95
European Commission Employment and Social Affairs, Social Protection in the 13 Candidate
Countries: A Comparative Analysis (Luxembourg: European Commission Directorate-General for Em-
ployment and Social Affairs Unit E.2, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_so-
cial/publications/2004/ke5103649_en.pdf .
96
Rothstein (fn. 63).

growth), it may be that dysfunctional governmental institutions are the
worst social ill of all.
Poor and inegalitarian countries thus find themselves trapped in a situa
-
tion of continuing inequality, mistrust, and dysfunctional institutions. High
levels of inequality contribute to lower levels of trust, which lessen po
-
litical and societal support for the state to collect resources for launch
-
ing and implementing universal welfare programs in an uncorrupted
and nondiscriminatory way. Unequal societies find themselves trapped
in a continuous cycle of inequality, with low trust in others and in gov
-
ernment and policies that do little to reduce the gap between the rich
and the poor and to create a sense of equal opportunity. Demands for radi
-
cal redistribution, as we see in many of the transition countries, exacer
-
bate social tensions rather than relieving them.
There will be no political support for universal programs since the
rich benefit from high-level corruption and see the poor as the “unde
-
serving poor.” The poor see almost
all success in the market economy
as evidence of dishonest behavior and believe that those who are well
off already have taken more than enough from the state. From this per
-
spective, the idea that the better off should also have access to public
services and benefits seems awkward. Moreover, even if you could gen
-
erate enough political support to enact universal programs, people may
not have enough confidence in government institutions to deliver them
fairly and without corruption. Persistent petty corruption may make
“gift payments” appear to be rational responses to an unresponsive serv
-
ice sector. You may feel more secure in knowing that you can buy your
children’s way into a good school and to good grades, rather than risk
-
ing more neutral assignment and grading criteria. You may well prefer
to make an extra payment at a doctor’s office rather than wait your turn.
Corruption feeds upon economic inequality, low trust, and poor gov
-
ernment performance. But it generates alternative ways of coping that
may inhibit the adoption of programs that might alleviate inequality.
Our message is admittedly a pessimistic one, with good reason, we
believe, given the stickiness over time of both inequality and low levels
of social trust. Too many of the policy prescriptions that have come
out of the social capital agenda have been overly optimistic, as in the
proposition that if people just got more actively involved in voluntary
associations, things would improve. We think this approach is wrong,
for three reasons. First, the evidence that generalized trust is created by
joining associations is simply not there. Second, it relieves governments
from having to take responsibility for dysfunctional public institutions
and unfair or ineffective public policies. Third, governments and the
EQUALITY, CO RRU P T I ON , SOC I AL TRU ST 71

72 WO R LD POLI T I CS
political elite can use this demand for increased participation in civic
groups for blaming the victims in society.
97
Even though inequality is sticky, it can be moved. Generalized trust
may be a critical path to redistribution, but it is not the only one. So
we temper our pessimism just a bit. The East Asian “tigers” achieved
dramatic economic growth and reduced economic inequality through a
series of policy choices that included high levels of spending on educa
-
tion, land reform, increased agricultural productivity, expanded avail
-
ability of health care, and more open markets.
98
Each of these policies
made services to the public more widely available, as universal programs
do. Economic growth and lower rates of population expansion, in turn,
lead to less inequality.
99
There is a dearth of data that would allow us to test whether a rise
in economic equality leads to greater trust or whether a country might
create greater trust by adopting universal social welfare policies in the
absence of either relative economic equality or honest governments. We
worry that the boost in equality necessary to raise generalized trust by
a significant amount may be greater than we have witnessed in recent
decades. We also worry that the stickiness of corruption may put hon
-
est government out of reach for countries that rank low on equality
and trust. We do not know how to rid ourselves of corruption through
institutional fixes.
100
But we do know something about how to reduce
inequality—through universalistic social policies. Getting there is more
difficult, however, and our prognosis is not optimistic. It seems as if the
old saying is true: Once the system gets there, it stays there.
97
If we had a choice, governments in high inequality/low social trust societies should opt for high-
quality universal education programs. There are several reasons for this. One is that universal public
education both creates a sense of equal opportunity and generates more economic equality. Second, it
should give parents a sense of optimism for the future or their children, and since optimism is strongly
connected to social trust, this would have positive effects. Third, such programs would bring children
and young people from different ethnic, religious, and social groups together. Results from social
psychology show that this is one important generator of social trust; Toshio Yamagishi, “Trust as a
Form of Social Intelligence,” in K. S. Cook, ed., Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2001).
98
Vinod Ahuja, Benu Bidani, Francisco Ferreira, and Michael Walton, Everyone’s Miracle? Revisit-
ing Poverty and Inequality in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).
99
Uslaner (fn. 1).
100
Uslaner (fn. 2).