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A RELATIONAL MODEL
OF
AUTHORITY
IN GROUPS
Tom
R.
Tyler
E.
Allan
Lind
I.
The
Social
Psychology
of
Authority
A
popular image in novels, films, and biographies is that of a group of people,
typically strangers, thrown together by shipwreck, war, or other calamity, who
must struggle together to survive. William Golding’s novel
Lord
of
the
Flies
(1962) is one example of such a scenario. The novel describes the conflicts
within a group of boys stranded together
on
an island. Under these circumstances
the efforts of groups to survive usually lead them to create rules regulating
interactions or to designate authorities to be responsible for making decisions.
It is not necessary to study groups
on
a desert island to witness the creation of
rules and authority structures. When everyday groups or organizations-legal,
political, managerial,
or
familial-are faced with problems, a common response
is to create rules and empower authorities. This propensity toward structure and
authority has been demonstrated in laboratory experiments
on
rule creation and
social dilemmas, as well as
in
field studies of how people deal with real-world
conflicts and problems of scarcity.
For example, the experimental research of Thibaut and his colleagues shows
that people create rules to preserve profitable, but potentially unstable, rela-
tionships (Murdoch, 1967; Murdoch
&
Rosen, 1970; Thibaut, 1968; Thibaut
&
Faucheux, 1965; Thibaut
&
Gruder, 1969).
In
the seminal Thibaut and Faucheux
experiment, bargaining situations were created that involved two parties whose
power varied along different dimensions: One party had either high or low
influence over the other’s outcomes within the relationship, and the other party
had either good or poor alternatives available outside the group. Thibaut and
Faucheux hypothesized that when one party has high internal power and the other
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. VOL.
25
Copyright
0
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Academic
hss.
Inc.
All
nghls
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reproduclion in
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reserved.
115
116
TOM
R.
TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
has good alternatives, a clear threat to the viability of the relationship exists. The
party with higher internal power is tempted to be exploitative, and the lower
power party is then tempted to exit the group. Thibaut and Faucheux found that
people were especially likely to agree on rules regulating behavior in this high-
threat situation, because both parties were motivated to preserve their mutually
beneficial relationship and both had some power with which to bargain.
Another example of the creation of authority structures is found in the research
literature on social dilemmas. Using an experimentally created renewable re-
source pool, Messick and colleagues studied how groups respond to the pos-
sibility that some group members will deplete a resource that benefits everyone in
the group.
A
frequently observed response is for the group to create an authority
structure in which one person regulates the behavior of all members of the group
(Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte,
&
Wilke, 1984).
A real-world example
of
rule creation
in
response to potential conflict is
provided by public responses to the 1974 energy crisis. A survey conducted at the
time showed that the public supported the creation of laws, such as a law
mandating car pooling, that would require all members of the public
to
engage in
conservation behavior (Sears, Tyler, Citrin,
&
Kinder, 1978). The survey respon-
dents preferred mandatory conservation rules to calls for voluntary conservation.
A real-world example of the empowerment of authorities in response to per-
ceived threat is seen
in
polls on fear of crime. Polls show that when the public
feels that crime is a serious problem, people are especially likely to support
increasing the discretionary authority of the police and courts. People are likely
to support allowing the police
to
stop people on the street for identification, to
hold people
in
jail without charges, and to conduct wiretaps (Block, 1971;
Thomas
&
Hyman, 1977). At such times, public endorsement
of
severe punish-
ments such as the death penalty is also greater ('Qler
&
Weber,
1982).'
These examples show two distinct responses to crisis and conflict in groups:
the
creation of rules and laws and the empowerment of authorities.
As
demon-
strated by the Thibaut and Faucheux experiment and the Sears et al. survey,
groups sometimes create impersonal rules and norms to govern the behavior of
group members. On the other hand, as the social dilemma studies and the surveys
on crime show, another response is to empower one
or
more members of the
group to make decisions and issue directives
to
govern group actions. Although
similar in purpose, creating rules and empowering authorities are distinctly dif-
ferent group responses. The creation of a rule restricts the actions of all group
members, whereas the empowerment of an authority restricts the actions of
'We do not mean
to
suggest that perceived threat is the major force driving
the
empowerment of
authorities. The literature in symbolic politics shows that self-interest effects
of
this
sort
do occur, but
public reactions
are
not dominated by self-interest.
As
will
be
seen later in this chapter, the literature
on reactions
to
authorities shows that the impact of self-interest concerns in that context is also rather
limited.
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
117
ordinary members and simultaneously increases the discretion of the leader.
Thus, enacting rules moves power from individuals to an impersonal norm,
whereas constituting authorities conveys power from some individuals to another
individual or to an institution.* This article is devoted to the latter response-the
creation of authorities-and to issues surrounding the legitimacy of leaders. As
seen
in
the second half of this article, the personal aspect of the authority process
is a key element
in
the psychology of legitimacy and obedience.
Of course, social psychologists recognize that creating authority structures is
not a magical solution to problems within groups. To
be
of value, authorities
must function effectively, actually helping the group to solve its problems. Inef-
fective authority structures will not necessarily facilitate group functioning, and
authorities, once created, may make decisions that prove to be counterproduc-
tive. Hence a key issue
in
the study
of
authority is understanding the conditions
under which authorities
in
fact enhance group functioning (Dawes, Orbell, Sim-
mons,
&
van de Kragt,
1986).
A.
WHAT
IS
NEEDED FOR AUTHORITIES
TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY?
The first precondition for the effective functioning of authorities is author-
itativeness. That is to say, the directives of authorities can only be effective
when, for whatever reason, people obey them. But compliance is not something
that authorities can simply assume will occur: Research suggests that people do
not automatically accept authorities’ decisions. Studies of legal authorities find
that judges and police officers have difficulty securing compliance with a wide
variety of orders and legal decisions (Tyler,
1990).
Research on small claims
courts, for example, shows that judicial orders are accepted and obeyed only
about
50%
of the time (McEwen
&
Maiman,
1984).
In work settings, studies
show that workers often avoid, resist,
or
ignore the policies and decisions of
management (Lissak,
1983).
In political settings, citizens sometimes disobey
authorities’ directives on issues ranging from paying taxes and fighting wars to
recycling waste and conserving resources. Hence, a problem common to all types
of
organized
groups
and their leaders is the creation of conditions under which
*The distinction between rule-making and authority-empowerment is captured in an item on the
F-scale: “What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs,
is
a few courageous,
tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith” (see Robinson
&
Shaver,
1973).
Kelman and Hamilton
(1989)
use
an
interview item that reads “The government must sometimes set
constitutional principles aside in order to deal with problems of the modern
world”.
In some
circumstances these two responses to group crises might be viewed as alternative choices. In other
circumstances both might
be
attempted.
118
TOM
R.
TYLER
AND
E.
ALLAN LIND
leaders will be accepted as authoritative and their decisions obeyed. Understand-
ing these conditions is essential to understanding the psychology of authority.
In this article we focus on one particular aspect of authoritativeness: voluntary
compliance with the decisions of authorities. Social psychologists have long
distinguished between obedience that is the result
of
coercion and obedience that
is the result of internal attitudes and opinions (i.e., “voluntary” compliance).
Raven and French (1958; French
&
Raven, 1959; see also Collins
&
Raven,
1969) describe
reward power
and
coercive power,
in
which obedience is con-
tingent on positive and negative outcomes, and distinguish both of these types of
power from
legitimate power,
in which obedience flows from judgments about
the
legitimacy of the authority. Legitimate power depends on people taking upon
themselves the obligation to obey and voluntarily follow the decisions made
by authorities (Kelman
&
Hamilton, 1989; Qler, 1990). Kelman (1958) dis-
tinguishes between
compliance,
obedience that occurs in response to the provi-
sion of material outcomes;
identijicarion,
obedience that occurs because the
authority is held
in
high esteem; and
internalization,
obedience that occurs
because the values of the authority are accepted (see also Kelman
&
Hamilton,
1989). In Kelman’s typology either identification or internalization can imbue an
authority with legitimacy, leading to voluntary compliance with the authorities’
directives.
In limiting
our
present analysis to internal, legitimacy-related, authority
pro-
cesses we do not mean to suggest that these are the only reasons people obey
authorities, but we do think that these processes represent the most potent and
most interesting reasons for compliance. We have no doubt that behavioral com-
pliance can
be
obtained, at least
in
the short term, by external threats and
rewards, but there is evidence
in
the social psychological literature (beginning
with Raven
&
French, 1958) that obtaining compliance through the use of reward
and coercive power is unwieldy, costly, and time-consuming. In addition, coer-
cive power ultimately fails to control behavior because it can neither eliminate
private disobedience nor assure continued obedience when the mechanism of
coercion (or reward) is removed. Legitimacy, in contrast, nearly always facili-
tates and is often crucial for the effective exercise of authority. Legitimacy, once
established, functions to enhance acceptance
of
decisions as long
as
the authority
is viewed as legitimate (Qler, 1990).
Evidence of the varying effectiveness of different authority structures and
different types
of
power is seen in a classic study by Lewin, Lippitt, and White
(1939) on democratic and autocratic leadership in groups. Lewin et al. showed
that not all authority structures have the same effect on groups. In particular, their
study demonstrated that authority structures differ in their capacity to generate
voluntary compliance with decisions.
Lewin et al. found that groups of boys obeyed the decisions enacted by
democratic leaders following group discussions whether the leaders were present
or
absent. Because obedience was observed even when the leaders were absent,
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
119
it
is clear that the democratic leadership structure produced voluntary com-
pliance. In contrast, groups with autocratic leaders obeyed the decisions enacted
by the leaders when the leaders were present, but not when the leaders were
absent. Thus, for the autocratic groups there was little evidence of voluntary
compliance. Although Lewin et al. did not measure legitimacy per se,
it
is
reasonable to suppose that differences
in
the legitimacy of the democratic and
autocratic leaders mediated the compliance differences seen
in
the study.
This article focuses on legitimacy because
it
is the social attitude most central
to the effectiveness of authorities. It is important to recognize, however, that
legitimacy is not the only attitudinal factor influencing effectiveness. Effective-
ness is also influenced by other cognitions about the authority, most notably
judgments
of
his
or
her expertise with respect to the problem at hand.3 The
willingness
of
group members to accept a leader’s directives is only helpful when
the leader knows what directives to issue.
B.
WHAT
IS
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
BASIS
OF
LEGITIMACY?
We begin our analysis of the psychology of legitimacy by considering three
theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain how people evaluate their
experiences with organizations and groups: social exchange theories, distributive
justice theories, and procedural justice theories. Theoretical analyses of authority
processes
in
other social sciences, especially
in
political science, make frequent
reference to what is termed “public choice theory” (Laver,
1981),
a utility-based,
outcome-oriented theory that shares many of the assumptions of social exchange
theories
in
social psychology. According to public choice theory-and social
exchange theory-people obey authorities because they view this as the best way
to maximize their outcomes. We contrast these predictions to the predictions of
distributive and procedural justice theories, two alternative explanations of how
people react to social situations.
C. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I.
Social
Exchange
Theories
Social exchange theories offer one theoretical perspective that speaks clearly
to what
it
is that governs evaluations
of
group^.^
Social exchange theories and
related models of behavior view people as motivated by self-interest in their
3In the Raven and French taxonomy of types
of
power, expert power (and an associated source of
influence based on control over information) is distinguished from legitimate power.
4We use the term
social
exchange
to
characterize theories based
on
self-interest and the perception
of outcome contingencies.
It
is important, though, that we not oversimplify the
case.
There
are
120
TOM R. TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
interactions with others (Blau,
1964;
Homans,
1961;
Kelley
&
Thibaut,
1978;
Thibaut
&
Kelley,
1959).
People enter and leave relationships depending on their
judgments concerning the benefits and costs
of
remaining in the relationship
relative to taking other possible actions; people evaluate interactions in which
they are involved in terms of rewards and costs, and, by extension, people
evaluate and react to authorities and their decisions in terms
of
what they gain
and lose from the authorities' decisions.
Some psychological theories
of
leadership evaluation have adopted the social
exchange perspective in positing that the extent to which leaders will be regarded
as authoritative depends on the ability to provide favorable outcomes to followers
(Hollander,
1980;
Hollander
&
Julian,
1978).
A
generic social exchange model
would suggest that reactions to authorities are, in the final analysis, instrumen-
tally based, developing out of expected or achieved gains and losses. Social
exchange models explain the authority-creating behavior outlined at the begin-
ning
of
this article with reference to the outcomes associated with group mem-
bership: People empower leaders
in
an effort
to
develop and preserve beneficial
group interactions. In social dilemma situations, for example, people do not wish
to lose the renewable resource on which they rely,
so
it is
in
their self-interest to
create authorities. The authorities, in turn, are evaluated against a criterion of
self-interest: i.e., how well they solve problems in the group and maintain the
flow of resources to group members.
Social exchange theories suggest some variables that might
be
important to the
perception of legitimacy.
In
particular, legitimacy should be tied to the extent to
which the authority's decisions and the procedures used to generate those deci-
sions are personally fa~orable.~ The idea that outcomes, presumably assessed
relative to the perceiver's expectations (Thibaut
&
Kelley,
1959),
influence eval-
uations of authorities is a straightforward application of the basic assumption of
self-interest, which underlies all social exchange theories.6 Another factor affect-
ing evaluations
of
procedures, according to social exchange theories, is the
desirability of the procedures themselves, by which we mean the procedure's
transaction costs,
the cost, delay, and frustration experienced in using the pro-
outcome-oriented models of social behavior, such as the Kelley md Thibaut
(1978)
theory of interde-
pendence, that are quite sophisticated about the types of outcomes people seek and the way
in
which
actual outcome contingencies
are
transformed by norms and by cognitive processes. Lind and Earley
(1992)
have pointed
out
that many
of
the relational effects and psychological processes we describe
herein
are
in fact consistent with the Kelley and Thibaut theory.
SRasinski,
bier,
and Fridkin
(1985)
have shown that evaluations
of
authorities
are
based on
performance when the authority's legitimacy is based
on
personal, rather than institutional, loyalty.
6Sophisticated interdependence theories allow for the possibility that "raw" outcome patterns
are
transformed psychologically prior to affecting evaluations and behavior (Kelley
&
Thibaut,
1978;
see
also Lind
&
Earley, 1992).
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
121
cedure (Lissak
&
Sheppard,
1983).
The idea that the desirability of decision-
making procedures affects leader evaluations arises because social exchange
theories view people as willing to sacrifice short-term gain for better long-term
outcomes. That is, people may be willing to accept substantial transaction costs,
as long as they think that the decisions and decision-making procedures of the
authority will benefit them in the long run.
2.
Justice Models
In contrast to social exchange models, justice models suggest that people react
to authorities not by judging whether the authorities’ decisions benefit their
interests, but rather by assessing whether the authority is acting fairly.’ There are
two general classes of justice judgments that have received attention
in
social
psychology: distributive justice judgments, which emphasize the fairness of out-
comes and
of
allocation patterns, and procedural justice judgments, which em-
phasize the fairness of decision-making procedures and other aspects of social
process. Justice theories suggest that authorities will be evaluated positively and
their decisions will be obeyed to the extent that the procedure and the authority’s
decision satisfy justice norms.
There are a number of theories that deal with peo-
ple’s concerns about outcome fairness. This view is represented in psychology by
relative deprivation theories (Crosby,
1976;
Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star,
&
Williams,
1949)
and equity theories (Adams,
1965;
Walster, Walster,
&
Berscheid,
1978).
Theories of distributive fairness suggest that people evaluate
authorities by comparing the outcomes they receive to the outcomes others
receive and using this comparison to determine whether the outcome distribution
accords with accepted principles of fairness.
Distributive justice theories differ in terms of what is seen as the preeminent
principle of justice. Equity theories (Adams,
1965;
Greenberg,
1990a;
Walster,
Berscheid,
&
Walster,
1973;
Walster
&
Walster,
1975;
Walster et al.,
1978)
focus
on proportionality of inputs and outcomes as the sine qua non of justice. Later
distributive justice work has expanded the list of comparative justice principles to
include such criteria as the equality of outcomes across the group or the distribu-
tion of outcomes according to need.
Another class of distributive justice theories includes those that focus on
feelings of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theorists (Crosby,
1976,
a.
Distributive Justice.
7Demonstrating that people evaluate outcomes, rules,
or
authorities in justice terms does not
preclude the possibility that justice judgments are influenced by a concern with self-interest. In fact,
distributive justice theories originally developed within the context of social exchange theory. Justice
theories
are
important here because they suggest factors-distributive and procedural justice-that
have some substantial variation beyond that which can
be
accounted for by simple self-interest.
122
TOM R. TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
1982; Folger, 1986; Masters
&
Smith, 1987; Olson, Herman,
&
Zanna, 1986)
argue that the fundamental source of feelings of injustice is the realization that
one’s outcomes fall short of expectations. Expectations are derived, in turn, both
from imagined outcomes under different circumstances and from the outcomes of
salient others. For relative deprivation theorists, the key questions concern the
generation of expectations and the cognitive process by which people explain
why their actual outcomes fall short of expectations. The end product of these
cognitive processes is the same as that which is of interest to equity theorists,
however: the feeling that outcomes are unfair.
We consider distributive justice judgments as possible factors in legitimacy
because distributive justice theories of all types view outcome fairness judgments
as a critical factor
in
determining people’s satisfaction with the groups and
organizations
to
which they belong. In addition, there is a substantial body of
research linking distributive justice judgments to variables closely related to
legitimacy. For example, relative deprivation studies have linked the perceived
injustice of outcomes to political unrest, and equity studies have shown that
inequity affects satisfaction with work settings and organizations.
People’s reactions
to
authorities’ decisions have also
been linked to judgments about the fairness of the procedures used to make
decisions. Procedural justice theories suggest that people focus on how decisions
are
made, as well as the decisions themselves,
in
making justice evaluations
(Leventhal, 1976, 1980; Lind
&
Tyler, 1988; Thibaut
&
Walker, 1975, 1978).
Since the publication of
Procedural Justice
by John Thibaut and Laurens Walker
(1973, a substantial body
of
research has addressed issues of procedural justice
(see Lind
&
Tyler, 1988, for a recent review).
As
research has accumulated, it
has become evident that fairness judgments concerning informal social process
are
so
similar in cause and consequence to fairness judgments concerning formal
decision-making procedures that they can be considered simply to be different
manifestations
of
the same type of justice judgment (cf. Bies
&
Moag, 1986;
Lind
&
Tyler, 1988, p. 214; Tyler
&
Bies, 1990). The findings of the initial
Thibaut and Walker research-that the procedures used to arrive at a decision can
have profound effects on fairness judgments-have been widely confirmed in
subsequent studies of legal trial procedures (e.g., Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker,
&
Thibaut, 1980),
in
studies
of
nontrial procedures used
in
resolving legal
disputes, such as plea bargaining (Casper, Tyler,
&
Fisher, 1988; Houlden,
1980), mediation, and arbitration (Adler, Hensler,
&
Nelson, 1983; Lind, Mac-
Coun et a]., 1989, 1990; MacCoun, Lind, Hensler, Bryant,
&
Ebener, 1988),
and in studies
of
police officer dealings with citizens (Tyler, 1988, 1990; Tyler
&
Folger, 1980). In addition, researchers have found that concerns about procedural
justice extend to organizational (Folger
&
Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg
&
Folger,
1983; Sheppard, 1984), political (Qler
&
Caine, 1981), interpersonal (Barrett-
Howard
&
Qler, 1986), and educational (Qler
&
Caine, 1981) settings. In fact,
b.
Procedural Justice.
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
123
wherever procedural justice issues have been studied they have emerged as an
important concern.
*
Procedural justice has been shown to be an important factor in the evaluation
of groups and institutions. Studies of legal authorities (Tyler, 1984, 1990),
politi-
cal authorities (Tyler
&
Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski,
&
McGraw, 1985), and
managerial authorities (Alexander
&
Ruderman, 1987; Folger
&
Konovsky,
1989) all provide evidence that judgments about the fairness of procedures shape
evaluations of authorities. At first glance, this may seem unremarkable, since
procedures structure the behavior of authorities, but the link between the evalua-
tions of procedures and the evaluations of those who enact the procedures has
been seen even in circumstances, such as formal legal trials, where the authority
has relatively little leeway
in
deciding which procedure to use.
3.
Summary: Factors Affecting Legitimacy
The three sets of theories outlined above suggest a number
of
factors that
people might use when they evaluate the authorities with whom they deal. These
factors can be differentiated
in
terms of the extent to which they concern outcome
versus procedures and the extent to which they involve assessments of the benefit
or cost of outcomes or procedures versus assessments of fairness. Figure
1
illus-
trates the dimensions and factors that serve as the focus of
our
review of research
on legitimacy.
We
turn
in the next section to a review of research on legitimacy and the
evaluation of leaders. The key empirical question is how four factors-outcome
favorability, procedural desirability, distributive fairness, and procedural fair-
ness-affect reactions to authorities.
A
second question, which is essential to
understanding the implications of the findings for the psychology of authority,
takes
us
one step back the causal chain. Once we have determined which of these
four factors are most important to legitimacy, we
will
explore the psychological
processes underlying that factor.
We will examine two general types of studies: those that address specific
experiences with authorities (e.g., “When
I
was stopped by a police officer last
month and given a traffic ticket”) and those that explore overall judgments based
on multiple encounters with the authority
in
question (e.g., “My supervisor
generally makes decisions following fair procedures”). Because
our
interest is in
cross-situational determinants of legitimacy, we examine research conducted
in
a
variety of settings, looking for patterns of findings that appear to be general and
not restricted to a particular setting.
*See Qler and Lind
(1990)
for
a discussion
of
some potential limits
to
the procedural justice
effect.
It
is an empirical question whether procedural justice concerns affect the treatment
of
indi-
viduals outside the boundary
of
the
group.
124
Proc4Ursl
Desirablllty
TOM
R.
TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
Procedural
Falrneas
Outcomes
fairness
Fairness
What types of reactions are of concern?
As
already noted, attitudes about the
legitimacy of authorities appear
to
be a key antecedent of compliance. Hence, we
are interested in legitimacy and related judgments
of
leaders and other au-
thoritie~.~ Of course, data showing compliant behavior per se are of interest. We
also report findings
on
attitudinal and belief variables that seem closely linked to
legitimacy and on behaviors that seem likely
to
be associated with either legiti-
macy or compliance.
D.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Studies of authority, legitimacy, and compliance have used nonexperimental
research designs more frequently than is the case in many other areas of social
psychology. The reliance
on
nonexperimental designs is logical: Authority by its
very nature implies a certain level of group structure, and the short-lived and
undifferentiated groups used
in
most laboratory research
on
group processes are
not well-suited for the study of such a phenomenon (Sears,
1986).
Researchers
have generally found
it
easier and more fruitful to study existing authorities in
real-world settings, even though these settings often preclude the use of experi-
mental designs. But this aspect
of
authority research raises some special prob-
lems. Social psychologists have traditionally viewed the findings of nonexperi-
%us,
we do not examine the large literature on the antecedents
of
personal reactions
to
deci-
sions, i.e., personal satisfaction and affective reactions to experiences.
We
are
only concerned with
such feelings
to
the extent they affect evaluations
of
authorities.
A
negative outcome might leave one
unhappy, but this unhappiness only has implications
for
authority processes if the authority is held
responsible.
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
125
mental studies with skepticism. In particular, they have been loath to draw causal
inferences from correlational data. Fortunately, the literature on the psychology
of authority offers a solution: Although a majority of the studies are single-shot
survey studies, wherein causal inference is admittedly problematic, most of the
key findings have been confirmed
in
studies that offer much more “leverage” on
causal issues. We will point out, as we review the literature, these critical stud-
ies-laboratory experiments and panel studies designed to resolve causal ambi-
guity-and we will attempt to give the reader a clear picture of which findings
can lay claim to clear causality and which cannot.
1.
Attitudes toward Authorities
a. Legal Authority.
51er (1984) examined the relationship between people’s
judgments of outcome favorability, distributive fairness, and procedural fairness
in
small claims court experiences and their attitudes about the legitimacy of the
legal authorities they encountered. He found that procedural fairness had a signif-
icant relationship to legitimacy
(p
=
.19,
p
<
.001), as did distributive fairness
(p
=
.24,
p
<
.001). Outcome favorability had no significant relationship
(p
=
.03, nonsignificant [n.~.]).
This finding was replicated
in
another study of experiences with legal au-
thorities, which included experiences with both judges and police officers (Tyler,
1990). The study used a cross-sectional design that involved interviewing a
random sample of Chicago residents
(n
=
1575). Tyler analyzed the attitudes of
those respondents in the sample who had had recent personal experience with
legal authorities
(n
=
652). He found that the respondents’ views about the
legitimacy of the legal authority were correlated with judgments of the pro-
cedural justice of their recent experience
(r
=
.19,
p
<
.001) and the distributive
justice of the outcome of the experience
(r
=
.15,
p
<
.001),
but were not
strongly related to the favorability of the outcome
(r
=
.08,
n.s.).
Tyler, Casper, and Fisher (1989) examined the relationship between evalua-
tions of criminal justice system experiences and general attitudes about the
legitimacy of law and government. Their study used a panel sample of defen-
dants on trial for felonies
in
criminal court
(n
=
329). The defendants were
interviewed both before and after their encounter with the courts. The results,
including a causal model diagrammed in Fig. 2,’O indicate that procedural justice
judgments show the strongest relationship to attitudes about the legitimacy of
legal authorities, law, and government, and that neither distributive justice judg-
ments nor the favorability of sentences had much direct impact on attitudes about
“JFigure
2
presents only a portion
of
the
Qler,
Casper,
and
Fisher model.
The
full
path model
can
be
found in the original
article.
TOM
R.
TYLER AND E. ALLAN LlND
Sentence
Fig.
2.
Effects
of
sentence on attitudes toward law and legal authorities. From
Sler,
Casper,
and Fisher
(1989).
authorities. The panel design used in this study allows for strong causal
inferences because it can control statistically for prior attitudes about author-
ities.
Although these findings suggest that procedural justice is an important factor
in
legitimacy, it is important not to overstate the case. In both the Vler (1990)
and the Tyler et al. (1989) studies, outcome factors were found to influence
procedural fairness judgments (i.e., those who won were more likely to think
that the process was fair). Through their influence on fairness judgments, out-
come factors had an indirect influence on attitudes about authorities and rule-
related behavior. We will return to this issue later in this article.
Alexander and Ruderman (1987) examined the
relationship between distributive and procedural fairness and trust in manage-
ment
among
2800
federal employees. The employees were interviewed about
various aspects of the job environment, including the fairness of decision-making
procedures and outcomes. Their judgments about the job environment were then
used to predict their overall evaluations of management. Alexander and Ruder-
man (1987) found that evaluations of management were influenced both by
employee assessments of the fairness of outcomes (unique variance explained
=
5%)
and by their assessments of the fairness of decision-making procedures
within their work setting (unique variance explained
=
11%).
Several studies have examined the factors that influence commitment to orga-
nizations, a positive attitude toward the organization that is similar in concept to
legitimacy (see O’Reilly
&
Chatman, 1986). Studying manufacturing workers,
6.
Managerial
Aurhorify.
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
127
Folger and Konovsky (1989) examined the relationship between judgments of the
distributive and procedural fairness of pay raises and workers’ organizational
commitment. They found that procedural justice explained significant variance in
organizational commitment
(r
=
.43,
p
<
.001), as did distributive justice
(r
=
.33,
p
<
.001). The actual dollar amount of raises had no impact on organiza-
tional commitment
(r
=
.11,
n.s.1. Tyler and Schuller (1990) studied organiza-
tional commitment and evaluations of supervisors by employees
in
a variety of
work settings. They interviewed a random sample of 409 workers
in
the Chicago
area about recent personal experiences with a supervisor. Attitudinal reactions to
supervisors were found to be more closely related to procedural justice judg-
ments than to favorability
or
distributive justice judgments (see Table I).
All of these studies suggest that procedural justice judgments play a central
role
in
determining how authorities are viewed in organizational settings. An
experimental study by Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, and Lind (1987) confirms the
direction of causality. Kanfer et al. had student subjects work on a task that was
evaluated using either fair or unfair procedures. The subjects rated their super-
visor higher when the procedure was fair than when
it
was unfair.
Tyler and Caine (1981) used both experimental and
correlational methods to study the factors affecting evaluations of political lead-
ers.
In
an experimental scenario study they manipulated the fairness of the
procedure that a political leader used to make a decision. The scenarios also
manipulated the favorability of the decision. The results showed that both pro-
cedural justice and outcome favorability influenced evaluations of the leader.
In
a
second, correlational, study Tyler and Caine asked respondents about the fairness
of the political decision-making process and about the favorability and fairness of
political decisions. The survey results showed that procedural fairness judgments
c. Political Authority.
TABLE
I
EXPERJENCES
WITH
SUPERVISOR: ATTITUDINAL REACTIONP
Supervisor Supervisor Management Organizational
competence trust evaluation commitment
Outcome favorability
-.Ol
.04
.oo
.I3
Relative outcome favorability
-.I1
-
.06
.
00
.04
Relative procedural desirability
.06
.02
.05
.oo
Distributive justice
.06
.oo
.I0
.08
Procedural justice
.73**
.77**
.39**
.21*
Total
R2
.56
.60
.22
.I4
“N
=
409.
Entries are standardized regression coefficients
for
an equation including all five predictors.
From
Tyler
and Schuller
(1990).
*p
<
.01.
**p
<
,001.
I28
TOM R. TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
were significantly correlated with evaluations of political leaders, whereas out-
come fairness and favorability showed smaller, and often nonsignificant, correla-
tions with leader evaluations.
vier,
Rasinski, and McGraw
(1985)
studied the relationship between outcome
favorability, distributive fairness, and procedural fairness and trust in the national
government. They found that procedural justice showed a strong independent
relationship to the trust measure
(p
=.61,
p
<
.001;
see Table
II),
with lesser
relationships for measures of absolute outcomes
(p
=.
11,
n.s.) and distributive
fairness
(p
=
-.01, n.s.).
TABLE
I1
JUSTICE
AND
THE
ENDORSEMENT
OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES"
Evaluations of Reagan Trust in national government
P
R2
P
R2
Outcome level
Absolute
Relative
Total
Fairness
Distributive
Procedural
Total
Demographics
Party
Liberalism
Age
Education
Race
Sex
Total
Total
Outcome beyond fairness and
Fairness beyond outcome and
Demographics beyond
demographics
demographics
outcome and fairness
.09
-
.04
.lI*
.47***
.20***
.16***
-
.Ol
.oo
.06
.13**
.I1
-
.04
.08***
.07*
*
*
-.01
.61***
.45*** .34***
-.I0
-
.03
.oo
-
.02
.oo
-.05
.30***
.oo
.54*** .34***
Usefulness analyses
.oo
.01***
.19***
.28***
.09***
.oo
"Entries in
p
columns are standardized regression coefficients; entries in
R2
columns are squared adjusted
*p
<
.05.
**p
<
.Ol.
***p
<
,001.
multiple correlation coefficients. From
Tyler,
Rasinski, and McGraw
(1985).
AUTHORITY
IN GROUPS
129
2.
Legitimacy and Behavior
Several studies show that the effects of procedural justice extend beyond
attitudes to include compliance and related behaviors.
a.
Behavior in the Legal Arena.
MacCoun et al.
(1988)
studied litigants in
cases involving automobile claims in the New Jersey courts and found that
judgments of procedural justice correlated with intentions to accept
or
reject the
arbitrator's award
(r
=
.40,
p
<
.001),
as did ratings of the favorability of the
award
(r
=
.30,
p
<
.001).
Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and Park
(1991),
in
a study that examined dispute
resolution by authoritative decision
in
federal court, found that procedural justice
judgments have strong effects
on
the acceptance of legal decisions. Lind et al.
studied a court program
in
which arbitrators issued awards that the parties to the
lawsuit were free
to
either accept
or
reject. Figure
3
shows the result of structural
equation analysis of the influence of outcome favorability, relational process
concerns (of the sort described later
in
this article), and procedural justice judg-
ments
on
acceptance of the arbitration award. The values in the figure are
standardized path coefficients. Two features of the final path model are important
here. First, there was
no
direct path from outcome favorability to acceptance of
the award; the only outcome effects were those mediated by procedural justice
Judamaar
Fig.
3.
Effects
of
procedural justice on acceptance
of
arbitration awards. n.s., not significant.
From Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and Park
(1991).
130
TOM R. TYLER
AND
E.
ALLAN LIND
judgments. Second, the link between procedural justice judgments and accep-
tance of the award was very strong indeed, as shown by the large path coeffi-
cient. When procedures were viewed as unfair,
54%
of the awards were accept-
ed, but when procedures were viewed as fair
77%
of the awards were accepted.
The study is especially noteworthy because the cases
in
question involved
amounts ranging from
$5000
to
$5,000,000
and because the decision to accept
an arbitration award resulted
in
the transfer of tens, or even hundreds, of thou-
sands of dollars.
Tyler
(1990)
studied compliance with laws using a panel design in which
respondents were interviewed at two points
in
time,
1
year apart. In one part of
his
study, Tyler examined the views of the respondents in the panel sample who
reported having some experience with legal authorities during the interval be-
tween the two interviews
(n
=
291).
The results
of
a causal analysis of these data
are shown
in
Fig.
4.
There are no significant paths from outcome favorability to
evaluations of authorities
or
compliant behavior. This indicates that the outcome
of experience did not directly affect evaluations of the authority
or
obedience to
laws. The significant causal paths
run
from judgments of fairness to attitudes and
behaviors. Procedural justice judgments affected views about the legitimacy of
legal authorities. And legitimacy judgments, in turn, affected compliance with
laws. In addition, distributive justice judgments directly affected compliance
with laws.
compliance
&lam,
Fig.
4.
Panel analysis
of
experience, views about legal authority, and compliance.
From
Sler
(
1990).
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
131
6.
Behavior
in
Organizational Settings.
Several studies show procedural jus-
tice effects on behaviors related to legitimacy and compliance
in
work settings.
An
experimental demonstration of the behavioral effects of unfair procedures
in
work settings is found
in
Greenberg (1989).
In
that study college students
in
a
work experiment experienced either fair
or
unfair work evaluation procedures.
Later, the participants were placed
in
a room that had a poster with telephone
numbers for reporting unfair treatment to an “ethical responsibility board.”
Greenberg found that experiencing an unfair procedure led participants to take
slips of paper with the telephone number attached, suggesting an intention to
report the unfair procedure to the ethics board. The study also showed a pro-
cedure by outcome interaction, with both an unfair procedure and an unfairly
negative outcome necessary for protest behavior to occur.
I’
The behavior in
question, a type of protest against the authority in question, is not compliance per
se, but rather a behavioral indicator of perceptions of legitimacy,
or
more pre-
cisely perceptions of the absence of legitimacy.
Tyler and Schuller
(
1990) also examined influences
on
organizational behav-
iors related to legitimacy (decision acceptance, rule following, turnover inten-
tion, and grievance filing). The behaviors in question were measured using self-
reports
in
a general population survey of working people. Table
111
reports the
results of regression analyses predicting the behaviors from ratings of outcome
and procedural desirability and distributive and procedural justice
in
recent expe-
riences with supervisors.
As
can be seen from the table, some of the behaviors
showed significant links to outcome favorability and distributive justice, but
procedural justice was the strongest and most consistent predictor of all four
behaviors.
Earley and Lind (1987) examined the influence of the fairness of task assign-
ment procedures on people’s acceptance of task assignments
in
both a laboratory
and a field setting; experimental methods were employed in both settings. Causal
analyses of the results of the study showed that ratings of the acceptance of the
task assignment decision were affected by procedural justice judgments in both
settings. In both studies, either the procedural justice manipulation
or
measures
of perceived procedural fairness were found to cause differences in performance
that mirrored the findings for acceptance of the decision.
Lind, Kanfer, and Earley (1990) report similar findings
in
a laboratory experi-
ment on the acceptance of goal assignments in a simulated work setting: The
manipulation of a variable-the opportunity to voice one’s views about the
assigned goal-that is closely linked to procedural justice judgments resulted
in
higher rated acceptance of the goal and better performance. Unfortunately, in
neither the Earley and Lind nor the Lind, Kanfer, and Earley study was the
perceived legitimacy of the supervisor measured. Thus, although all three of the
”For
a
more
detailed discussion
of
such interaction effects, see Lind and Qler
(1988,
pp.
67-68).
132
TOM R. TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
TABLE
I11
EXPERIENCES
WITH
SUPERVISOR: BEHAVIORAL
REACTIONS~
Accept
Follow
Intention Intention to
sue
decision rules
to
quit organization
Outcome favorability .22**
.I2
-
.02 -.13
Relative outcome favorability
.12*
.07
.oo
.07
Relative
procedural
desirability
.09
.01
.03
-.I1
Distributive justice
.08
.23*
-
.09
-
.02
Procedural justice
.37**
.26*
*
-.28**
-
.20*
Total
R2
.48
.05
.I1
.03
"N
=
409.
Entries
are
standardized regresssion coefficients
for
an
equation including
all
five predictors.
From
Sler
and Schuller
(1990).
*p
<
.Ol.
**p
<
.WI.
studies establish rather clearly that there is a causal link between procedural
justice and ratings
of
decision acceptance, they do not establish that perceived
legitimacy mediated acceptance
of
the decision. However, taken together with
the 51er and Schuller survey findings and the findings reported in the previous
sections showing that judgments of procedural justice enhance the legitimacy of
leaders, these three studies point to procedural fairness as a major factor in
compliance with authorities.
Procedural justice judgments have also been found to
influence behaviors associated with the acceptance of political authorities.
Rasinski and Tyler
(1
987)
conducted two studies exploring the relationship
be-
tween procedural justice judgments and political behavior in the
1986
presiden-
tial election. In both studies citizens' vote choices were correlated with judg-
ments about the relative procedural fairness of the two presidential candidates.
Judgments about past benefits and costs associated with government policies also
correlated with vote choice.
Rasinski
(1988)
examined the relationship between justice concerns and politi-
cal behaviors, using a sample
of
398
residents of Chicago. He studied both
general political activity (e.g., working on a political campaign, displaying
campaign buttons) and activism related to government benefits and services
(e.g., contacting a political official about benefits or services, demonstrating for
benefits or services). Both types of behavior showed substantial links to pro-
cedural justice judgments. The strongest relationship was found for political
activity related to specific benefits government benefits and services (logistic
coefficient
=
0.42,
p
<
.05).
A
weaker relationship was found for general
political activity (logistic coefficient
=
0.32,
p
<
.lo).
Political activity relating
to specific benefits and services was also linked to outcome favorability concerns
c.
Political
Behavior.
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
133
(coefficient
=
.025,
p
<
. lo), but not to distributive fairness (coefficient
=
0.22,
n.s.). General political activity did not show substantial links to either outcome
favorability (coefficient
=
0.15,
n.s.)
or
distributive fairness (coefficient
=
0.43,
n.s.). The studies on litigants’ reactions to court pro-
cedures, which we reviewed above, show that procedural justice plays a consid-
erable role
in
the decision to accept an arbitration judgment. There is evidence
that procedural justice is also important for compliance
in
less formal dispute
resolution settings. Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Castrianno (1990)
also found that long-term compliance with mediation outcomes was linked to
judgments of the fairness
of
the mediation procedure
(r
=
.32,
p
<
.05).
In fact,
procedural justice was a more potent determinant of compliance than was the use
of joint problem solving, a factor that has long been thought to be the cornerstone
of
successful mediation.
d.
Disputing Behavior.
3.
Summary and Implications
The research described above shows that a key factor affecting legitimacy
across a variety of settings is the person’s evaluation of the fairness of the
procedures used by the authority
in
question. The studies that have included
behavioral measures show much the same pattern of results with respect to
measures of obedience and other behaviors linked to authority. Evaluations
of
both the favorability of the authority’s decision and its distributive fairness have
occasionally been found to exert an effect on legitimacy independent
of
that
exerted by procedural fairness. It is clear, though, that
in
terms of both the
strength of effects and the ubiquity of effects, neither outcome factor is nearly as
important as procedural justice in determining whether an authority is viewed as
legitimate.
l2
Why is procedural justice
so
central to legitimacy? One explanation can be
found
in
some of the original theorizing on the psychology of procedural justice.
In
their discussion of the problems of dispute resolution in groups, Thibaut and
Walker (1975) noted the potential harm that the process of resolving disputes
could do to social relationships within a group
or
society: poorly resolved dis-
putes can threaten enduring relationships. They argued that the use of procedures
regarded as fair by all parties facilitates the maintenance
of
positive relations
among group members, preserving the “fabric of society,” even
in
the face of the
‘*As noted above,
it
is important
to
distinguish personal satisfaction from attitudes such as
legitimacy. We are not saying that people
are
happy if they receive unfavorable outcomes through a
fair procedure. We are saying, however, that they
(I)
are more likely
to
accept the decision and
(2)
are
less likely
to
blame the authorities and/or institutions they have dealt with.
As
a consequence, they
are
more likely
to
follow the authority’s directives
in
the future. See Lind and Earley
(1992)
and
Messick and Sentis
(1983)
for discussions of the distinction between satisfaction and fairness.
134
TOM R. TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND
conff ict of interest that exists in any group whose members have different prefer-
ence structures and different beliefs concerning how the group should manage its
affairs (Thibaut
&
Walker,
1975,
p.
67).
A
second reason for the preeminence of procedural justice concerns in judg-
ments of the legitimacy of authority is found
in
a later analysis by Thibaut and
Walker
(1978).
In many social situations
it
is not at all clear what decision or
action is correct
in
an objective sense. Indeed, it could be argued that most group
decisions concern questions for which, at least at the time the decision is made,
there is no way of knowing what course of action will work out best. In these
circumstances, Thibaut and Walker argue, what is critical to good decision-
making is adherence to norms of fairness, and fairness is most evident when
procedures that are accepted as just are used to generate the decision. In other
words, absent objective indicators of the correctness of a decision, the best
guarantee of decision quality is the use of good-which is to say fair-pro-
cedures. In terms used by Lind and Earley
(1992;
Lind et al.,
1991),
procedural
fairness serves as a social heuristic that allows people to determine whether an
action (e.g., obeying the decision of an authority) is correct without really
weighing all the benefits and costs associated with the action.
For an example of the difficulty of clearly establishing the “correct” solu-
tion to allocation problems in an organizational setting, consider the problems
involved in using equity criteria to determine whether one is fairly compen-
sated. According
to
equity theory, relevant inputs must be compared to relevant
outcomes, and the resulting ratio must be compared across other members of
the workplace group. But how can one compare and weight outcomes such as
interestingness of work, office size and amenities, vacation options, parking
spaces, pay, and the myriad other aspects of work life? Similar problems exist for
comparing inputs across individuals. Imagine the difficulty of managing a psy-
chological “equation” of this
sort
to determine the extent to which one’s out-
comes are fair.
A
much simpler approach is to assume that fair outcomes result
from fair procedures, and to look for signs that the procedure used to allocate a
given outcome is fair or unfair.
A related reason for the importance accorded procedural justice concerns in
judgments of legitimacy has to do with links between perceptions of procedures
and other cognitions about groups. In an earlier analysis (Lind
&
’Qler,
1988)
we
have argued that procedures are widely viewed as essential elements of any
lasting group and that perceptions of procedures are therefore key cognitions
about groups. It is no accident, for example, that the drafting
of
a constitution is
generally one of the first enterprises of any group that intends to function on a
continuing basis. Through the design of its procedures a group gives itself form
and makes manifest its values and goals. Because procedures are widely viewed
as manifestations of group values, we argue, they take on enormous symbolic
significance for other cognitions about groups. According to this line of thought,
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
135
perceptions of procedures have greater impact on evaluations of groups than do
perceptions of outcomes, because outcomes are generally viewed as one-time
responses to particular situations whereas procedures have an enduring quality;
this makes an unfair
procedure
much more threatening than a single unfair
outcome.
In much the same way, the procedures used by an authority to reach a
decision might be seen as an expression of the authority’s values, and the judg-
ment that an authority uses unfair procedures might be viewed with greater
concern than the judgment that
a
particular decision is unfair. This explanation of
procedural justice processes can be combined with the Thibaut and Walker and
Lind and Earley arguments to explain why
it
is
procedural
fairness, rather than
distributive
fairness that is the critical element of the fairness heuristic and, thus,
central to the decision to obey authority.
Whatever the explanation, the results reviewed above suggest that the use of
fair procedures is an important element, perhaps the key element, for the effec-
tive exercise of legitimate authority. If we want to understand the dynamics of
authority, we must explore the psychology of procedural justice as
it
relates to
authority. We turn to this task after a consideration of some of the societal
implications of the findings described above.
4.
Authority from a Societal Perspective
Effectively exercising authority is a core issue
in
any organized group. Hence,
the questions that we have been examining are always important. They become
especially important
in
situations of resource scarcity, when social conflict is
more likely and when allocation is more problematic. As we noted above, the
empowerment of authorities seems to be a common response of groups to social
conflict and the need to allocate scarce
or
diminishing resources, and yet it is
precisely
in
such situations that the actions of authorities are most likely to be
controversial.
It is certainly the case that periods of social conflict and resource scarcity have
prompted social psychologists to devote particular attention to problems of au-
thority. In the period around World War
11,
a central social concern in America
was understanding how to manage ethnic, racial, and industrial conflict. Re-
search at that time addressed the nature of rules and authority structures and the
relation of authority structures to the interactions occurring among group mem-
bers (Lewin et al.,
1939)
and between groups (Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood,
&
Sherif,
1961;
Sherif
&
Sherif,
1953).
A
common theme in much of this research
was that effectively designed social structures could dampen destructive social
conflict, an argument that encouraged the development of substantial literatures
on leadership and group dynamics (Cartwright
&
Zander,
1953).
Another period during which concerns about scarcity emerged as important
social issues was the
1970s.
During this period, issues of scarcity and natural
136
TOM
R.
TYLER AND
E.
ALLAN LIND
resource management were highly salient, with many authors suggesting that the
United States was moving into an new era of social conflict stimulated by
resource scarcity and economic decline (Blumberg, 1980; decarufel, 198 1;
Deutsch, 1981; Greenberg, 1981; Lerner, 1981; Ophuls, 1977). Growing social
conflict seemed likely to increase political and social instability and unrest.
Examples of heightened conflict during this era include disputes concerning
the allocation of scarce energy resources and debates over the use of nuclear
power.
The possibility of heightened social conflict was viewed as especially prob-
lematic for American government authorities during the 1970s because the
United States was
in
a historic period during which
it
seemed particularly vul-
nerable to social unrest. Alienation from and distrust of legal, political, and
industrial authorities was quite high (Caddell, 1979; Citrin, 1974; Lipset and
Schneider, 1983; Miller, 1974, 1979, 1983; Wright, 1981). Because the legiti-
macy of authorities is often viewed as a “cushion of support” that helps societies
to survive difficult periods in history (Easton, 1965), the weakness of the support
underlying the American legal, political, and economic systems seemed to point
to a potentially dangerous vulnerability to destructive social unrest.
Responses in the social and behavioral sciences to the concerns about scarcity
and conflict during the 1970s included the expansion of research on social dilem-
mas and procedural justice. The research on social dilemmas flowed directly
from a concern with developing ways to manage exhaustible supplies of natural
resources. Similarly, psychologists’ initial interest
in
procedural justice devel-
oped from a concern with conflict over resowes.
As
Thibaut and Walker noted
at the very beginning of their book on procedural justice:
One prediction that can be advanced with sure confidence is that human life on this planet
faces a steady increase in the potential for interpersonal and intergroup conflict. The rising
expectations of a continuously more numerous population in competition for control over
rapidly diminishing resources create the conditions
for
an increasingly dangerous exis-
tence.
It
seems clear that the quality of future human life is likely
to
be
importantly
determined by the effectiveness with which disputes can
be
managed, moderated,
or
resolved. Procedures
or
methods that may be put
to
this task of conflict resolution there-
fore claim
our
attention. (Thibaut
&
Walker,
1975,
p.
1)
We believe that the social issues that are likely to emerge as central concerns of
the 1990s also demonstrate the importance of legitimacy and authority processes.
The enormous changes occurring in the governments of Eastern Europe, the
former Soviet Union, and East Germany illustrate dramatically the fragility of
authority without legitimacy. The efforts to reconstruct the governments of these
nations as well as the creation of new authorities in the European Economic
Community illustrate the importance of understanding what makes a political
authority legitimate. Efforts to discover how a nation-state can command the
allegiance and obedience of various ethnic and regional constituencies, a prob-
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
137
lem illustrated by ethnic conflicts
in
the United States, the former Soviet Union,
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Canada, also point out how important it is
to understand the psychological foundations of authority processes.
In the United States many commentators expect that conflict over resource
allocation and social values will be intensified as we become a more multiethnic,
multicultural society. There is little doubt that the years ahead will see heightened
conflicts over the balance between a “melting pot” model of American society,
in
which immigrants are expected to assimilate into existing culture, and a model
in which immigrant groups preserve their unique cultures. Conflict of this sort
has already emerged in both the United States and Canada in discussions of
bilingualism. Conflicts over resource allocation will also be intensified by the
efforts of traditionally disadvantaged groups-Blacks, Native Americans, and
women-to secure policies that correct historical injustices.
Perhaps the most dangerous conflicts
of
the
1990s
are those that turn
on
the
definition of legal rights, because rights cannot
be
easily compromised and
therefore solutions to rights conflicts are particularly difficult to find. One of the
most visible
of
these conflicts is that concerning abortion rights, but similar
struggles are occurring over issues such as gay rights and the death penalty. As
these conflicts are played out in the courts and in the electoral process, authorities
must struggle to govern
in
the face of a substantial diversity of attitudes, beliefs,
and values. Legitimacy becomes an especially important, but perhaps also an
especially elusive, quality of government.
Authority and legitimacy
are
issues of great importance in organizational
settings as well. Supervisors often find themselves trapped between a desire not
to “micromanage” and concerns that subordinates will not do what they are told.
Close monitoring of subordinates’ actions entails substantial costs and, paradox-
ically, leads to even less confidence on the part of supervisors that their orders
will
be obeyed (Strickland,
1958).
In addition,
if
obedience is obtained by the
use of coercive power, resentment and private disobedience are likely to pose
new problems for the organization.
A
better solution is the establishment of
legitimacy on the part of supervisors
in
order to obtain voluntary compliance.
11.
The Social Psychology
of
Procedural Justice
The research described above suggests that people evaluate legitimacy for the
most part in procedural justice terms. Thus, to understand what drives legiti-
macy, we must understand what drives procedural justice judgments. In the
following sections we review briefly existing theory and research on what makes
procedures appear to be fair, devoting particular attention to those features that
seem likely to affect procedural justice judgments in the context of interactions
with authorities.
138
TOM R. TYLER AND
E.
ALLAN LIND
A. THEORIES
OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In the
20
years since social psychologists began to study procedural justice
judgments, a number of theories and models have been advanced to explain
procedural justice phenomena. In reviewing these explanations, we divide them
into two general categories. One category includes theories that view procedural
justice judgments as determined largely by outcomes and by concerns external to
the procedure and the interaction with authority. These theories, which we term
instrumental models,
view procedural justice judgments as founded ultimately on
how well the procedure in question serves interests external to the experience of
the procedure. The second category includes what we term
relational models,
which focus on relationship issues, especially perceptions of the relationship
between the authority and those subject to his or her decision.
I.
Instrumental Models
of
Procedural Justice
Thibaut and Walker
(1975,
1978)
advanced a control-oriented model of what
drives judgments about the fairness of dispute resolution procedures. The
Thibaut and Walker analysis argues that the key procedural characteristic shaping
people’s views about the fairness of the procedures is the distribution
of
control
between disputants and the third-party decision-maker. Thibaut and Walker dis-
tinguish between two types of control: process control and decision control.
Process control refers to the extent and nature of a disputant’s control over the
presentation of evidence. Decision control refers to the extent and nature
of
a
disputant’s control over the actual decisions made.
Thibaut and Walker assume that disputants are primarily concerned with the
problem or dispute that brings them to third parties. Judgments of the fairness of
various dispute resolution procedures are based on
instrumental concerns
in
the
sense that disputants are thought to view procedures as means to the end
of
improving either their own outcomes or their relationship with the person with
whom they have a dispute. Thibaut and Walker do not devote much attention to
disputants’ concerns about their long-term relationship with the authority who
serves as a third party in the dispute resolution procedure. Implicit
in
the Thibaut
and Walker analysis is the assumption that by and large disputants view their
experience with the judge and the court system as a one-shot encounter.
These assumptions manifest themselves in the view that disputants are most
concerned with control as they assess the fairness of procedures. According
to
Thibaut and Walker, disputants want control-either process control or decision
control-because they see control as instrumental to attaining the fair outcomes
they
desire. Process control is important to disputants, according to this line of
thought, because
it
assures that each party to the dispute can see to it that the
third party receives information on contributions and outcomes, and this in
turn
AUTHORITY
IN
GROUPS
139
allows the third party to use equity rules to resolve the dispute fairly. Decision
control allows the disputant to accept only those decisions that he or she regards
as desirable. (Folger [I9771 introduced the term
voice
to describe procedural
qualities very similar to those termed
process control
by Thibaut and Walker.)
More recently, other procedural justice theorists have offered additional
control-oriented models. Brett
(1986),
for example, argues that decision control
is one of the most important elements of a fair dispute resolution procedure
because people wish to maintain a feeling of control over what will happen to
them once the dispute is resolved. Vidmar
(1990)
and Leventhal (1976) view
people as motivated primarily by the desire to obtain favorable outcomes. Ac-
cording to both of these theorists, decision control is valued because
it
allows
unfavorable outcomes to be rejected, and process control is valued because
it
allows one to persuade the third party to rule
in
one's favor.
Some theories of procedural justice go beyond perceptions of control and
discuss other factors that might drive procedural justice judgments but that are
nonetheless instrumental, because procedures are viewed as means to achieve
goals outside the encounter with the procedure. For example, Leventhal (1980)
identified six potentially important procedural justice rules
in
outcome allocation
contexts: consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representa-
tiveness, and ethicality. The consistency rule says that allocation procedures
should be applied consistently across people and over time. The bias suppression
rule says