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Reducing
Emissions from
Deforestation & Forest
Degradation
REDD
REDD
©
e Woods Hole Research Center
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Conference of the Parties (COP), irteenth session
3-14 December 2007
Bali, Indonesia
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM
D
EFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
For more information, please contact
Daniel Nepstad
Senior Scientist
e Woods Hole Research Center
149 Woods Hole Road
Falmouth, MA 02540
USA
508 540 9900, x131
dnepstad@whrc.org
e Woods Hole Research Center uses recycled paper and vegetable-based inks.
“ e designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication,
including delimitation of borders and frontiers, do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of those organizations supporting this research. e sponsors and
supporters of this research do not warrant that the information contained in this publica-
tion is complete and correct, and shall not be liable for any damages incurred as a result of
its use. e views expressed by the authors or editors do not necessarily represent the deci-
sions or the stated policy of the sponsors and supporters of this research.”
Our thanks to Karen Schwalbe, Paul Lefebvre,
Tracy Johns, Wendy Kingerlee, Claudia Stickler, David
McGrath, and Richard Houghton in reviewing, editing,
and preparing this report.
Cover and report design by
Michael Ernst and Elizabeth Braun.
©
e Woods Hole Research Center
149 Woods Hole Road
Falmouth, MA 02540
USA
whrc.org
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
Authors:
Daniel Nepstad (WHRC, IPAM), Britaldo Soares-Filho (Univ. Federal Minas Gerais),
Frank Merry (WHRC), Paulo Moutinho (IPAM, WHRC),
Hermann Oliveira Rodrigues (UFMG), Maria Bowman (WHRC)
Steve Schwartzman (ED), Oriana Almeida (Univ. Federal Para), Sergio Rivero (UFPa),
Sponsors of this report:
e Linden Trust for Conservation,
Joseph H. Gleberman,
Roger and Victoria Sant,
and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Support for the research presented in this report:
e Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation,
e David and Lucile Packard Foundation
US National Science Foundation,
US Agency for International Development,
Blue Moon Fund
and the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF)
T C
Executive Summary
Intr
oduction
Can deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon be reduced to zero?
Premises
e conceptual framework of a Brazilian Amazon REDD program
A spatial map of opportunity costs
e Public Forest Stewardship Fund
e Private Forest Stewardship Fund
e Government Fund
e costs of REDD in the Brazilian Amazon over 30 years
Co-benefi ts of REDD
How will it work?
Conclusion
Literature
L T F
Figure 1. e Brazilian Amazon in 2030
Figure 2. e forests in the Brazilian Amazon
Figure 3. Potential net present value of soy production
Figure 4. Potential net present value of cattle production
Table 1: Opportunity Costs of forest maintenance
Table 2. Carbon stocks and opportunity cost
Figure 5. Potential net present value of sustainable timber production
Figure 6. Forest carbon stocks of the Brazilian Amazon
Figure 7. Net opportunity cost of forest protection in the Brazilian Amazon
Figure 8. Marginal opportunity cost of reductions in carbon emissions
Figure 9. irty-year trajectory of an illustrative, hypothetical REDD program.
Table 3. Summary of costs of Brazilian Amazon REDD program in Year 10
Figure 10. Example of the estimated costs
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 6
Can deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon be reduced to zero? 7
Premises 8
e conceptual framework of a Brazilian Amazon REDD program 9
A spatial map of opportunity costs 10
A deforestation reduction schedule and forest allocation 14
e Public Forest Stewardship Fund 15
e Private Forest Stewardship Fund 19
e Government Fund 20
e costs of REDD in the Brazilian Amazon over 30 years 20
Co-benefi ts of REDD 21
How will it work? 21
Conclusion 22
Footnotes 23
Literature 24
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 1. e Brazilian Amazon in 2030 6
Figure 2. e forests in the Brazilian Amazon 11
Figure 3. Potential net present value of soy production 12
Figure 4. Potential net present value of cattle production 13
Table 1: Opportunity Costs of forest maintenance 13
Table 2. Carbon stocks and opportunity cost 13
Figure 5. Potential net present value of sustainable timber production 14
Figure 6. Forest carbon stocks of the Brazilian Amazon 15
Figure 7. Net opportunity cost of forest protection in the Brazilian Amazon 16
Figure 8. Marginal opportunity cost of reductions in carbon emissions 17
Figure 9. irty-year trajectory of an illustrative, hypothetical REDD program 18
Table 3. Summary of costs of Brazilian Amazon REDD program in Year 10 19
Figure 10. Example of the estimated costs 22
1
E S:
• Tropical deforestation and forest degradation contributed 7 to 28% of world-wide, human-induced carbon
emissions to the atmospher
e in the 1990s (0.5 to 2.4 billion tons) climbing to more than 3.0 billion tons
during years of severe drought and forest fi re. An important new carbon credit regime is under negotiation
within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the post-2012 period that
could compensate tropical countries for their nation-wide reduction in emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (REDD).
• Brazil is a prime candidate for a REDD program because of its ground-breaking successes in reducing
and monitoring deforestation and forest degradation in the Amazon region, where most of its emissions
occur (~70%). Brazil contains more carbon in tropical forest trees than any other country—47±9 billion
tons in 3.3 million square kilometers of forest in the Amazon alone. But there is considerable debate
and discussion over how REDD programs will work, and how much they will cost to the implementing
nations.
• is report presents a conceptual framework for estimating the costs to tropical nations of implementing
REDD programs and applies this framework to the Brazilian Amazon region. We estimate the opportunity
costs of forest conservation and, separately, calculate the annual and 30-year costs of reducing carbon
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in the Brazilian Amazon to close to zero over a ten
year period. We end with an initial assessment of the benefi ts of these reductions to Brazilian society and
elements of the institutional arrangements that will be necessary to manage this new market.
• REDD programs will be complex and must be refi ned through dialogue, debate, and exchange of ideas and
approaches among a diverse, international group of stakeholders. is report is designed to stimulate this
dialogue and “demystify” key challenges of REDD by proposing a practical conceptual framework and an
initial estimate of how much REDD would cost in the Brazilian Amazon.
e purpose of this report is to demystify the key challenges of REDD, and to stimulate
dialogue and innovation toward solving these challenges.
2
P
• #1.
e costs vs. the value of reduced emissions. Our goal is to estimate the cost of developing a REDD
program in the Brazilian Amazon, not the value of such a program. e value of Amazon forest conservation
far exceeds the costs of protecting it, although these values are diffi cult to monetize. e ultimate price of
REDD carbon credits and, hence, the fl ow of money into REDD, will be determined by the size of the
world carbon market which is, in turn, defi ned by the emissions reduction targets that developed countries
commit to.
•
• #2. National opportunity costs.
e costs of REDD programs should be bounded by the nation-
wide opportunity costs of forgone profi ts from forest-replacing agricultural and livestock production
systems applied to forest lands and potentially forested lands less profi ts/savings associated with forest
maintenance.
• #3. All forest lands. Opportunity costs should be estimated for all forest lands since parks, forest concessions,
and forest law can be undone to permit forest-replacing agriculture. e portion of these opportunity costs
that are recovered through carbon payments may vary by land category (e.g. protected areas vs. private
forests).
• #4. Compensating forest stewards. Forest-based cultures, including indigenous groups, traditional societies,
and some smallholder farmer communities, should be compensated for their historical and ongoing role—
or potential role—as forest stewards.
• #5. Current government budget outlays continue. Payments to the government are for costs above and
beyond current budget outlays for the management and protection of forests.
• #6. Carbon payments for governance. Within REDD, payments for the ecosystem services of carbon
retention in forest biomass are applied to the entire REDD program, including payments to forest stewards
and to government.
• #7. e deforestation scenario. We assume that the REDD program reduces deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon to approximately zero over a ten year period from a current baseline of 20,000 km
2
per year.
• #8. A century-long payment schedule. Brazil should receive REDD payments at a rate that is commensurate
with the rate of reductions in emissions. At current rates, it would take more than a century to clear the
forests of the Brazilian Amazon, hence payments should continue over this period.
3
T F
• Our approach envisions three major components of a R
EDD program:
(a) a Public Forest Stewardship Fund,
(b) a Private Forest Stewardship Fund, and
(c) a Government Fund.
In this report, we present one scenario of illustrative estimates of the costs of each fund. More detailed
presentation of the methods can be found at http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement/
F
• In the scenario presented here, the eventual allocation of the 3.3 million km
2
of forest remaining in the
region would be: 40% “Social” Reserves; 30% “Biological/Ecological” and “Production” Reserves; and
30% private land reserves.
O
• We estimate the opportunity costs (OCs) of complete forest conservation as an initial upper benchmark
for assessing the cost of REDD. OCs are calculated using spatially-explicit models of potential rents
from soy, cattle and timber production. For each forested parcel (4 km
2
), rents for each competing land
use (soy, cattle, timber) are summed for 30 years assuming a 5% discount rate and a pre-determined
schedule of highway paving. Considering only the maximum opportunity cost of forgone profi ts from
soy vs. cattle ranching, the OC of preserving the remaining forests of the Brazilian Amazon (3.3 million
km
2
and 47 billion tons of carbon) is $5.5 per ton of carbon, and a total of $257 billion. is cost
declines to $2.8 per ton of carbon and $123 billion overall if forest conversion to soy and cattle ranching
is permitted on the 6% of remaining forested lands that have the highest opportunity costs (370,000
km
2
of forest containing 3 billion tons of carbon). One fourth of this high potential forest land would
be cleared during the fi rst ten years of the program. e subtraction of potential revenues from timber
management reduces opportunity costs by only 4%.
4
P F S C
• Indigenous groups, rubber tappers, and other forest-based populations defend public forests—or could
potentiall
y become forest defenders—but have rarely received compensation to do so. ey control
26% of the forests of the Brazilian Amazon, and we assume will eventually control 40% through the
creation of new reserves. e Public Forest Stewardship Fund would compensate these populations
with the goal of increasing the viability of forest-based livelihoods and strengthening their role as forest
stewards. Payments would be tied to performance. To provide the annual equivalent of a 1/2 minimum
salary ($1,200 per year) to all ca. 150,000 forest steward families living in “social” reserves (indigenous
lands, extractive reserves, sustainable development reserves) would cost $180 million per year. Another
$13 million would be needed to support these groups in perimeter patrol of their reserves. Annual
compensation equivalent to one half of a minimum salary would enable an additional 50,000 smallholder
families ($60 million per year) living in government agricultural settlements to restore forests on
degraded land as they shift to high-carbon, stable production systems. Payments would decline over
time as forest stewards shift to forest-based economies.
P F S C
• Private forest stewards in the Brazilian Amazon are private landholders with legal titles to their land. ey
ar
e currently required to maintain 80% of their land in forest, but compliance is low and repeal of this law
is frequently threatened. We assume that current legal
1
private landholders receive partial compensation
(20%) of the opportunity costs of their private land forest reserves that are required for compliance with
the law, and higher compensation (100%) of the opportunity costs of their private land forest reserves in
excess of the legal requirement. If we also assume that half of the forests that are cleared each year in the
Brazilian Amazon are privately, legally owned, annual compensation of private forest stewards would begin
at $9 million, climbing to a maximum of $90 million after ten years. ereafter, payments to private forest
stewards would decline as the pool of legally owned, uncompensated private forest land diminishes. ose
who acquire their private forests after a cut-off date do not qualify for the compensation of private forest
opportunity costs, since these costs should be refl ected in the land sale price.
G C
• e governments of Brazil (federal and state) will incur added costs to achieve lasting reductions of
carbon emissions. We estimate the annual added costs of monitoring, protecting, and managing existing
public forests at $25 million, with an additional $8 million per year to establish new public forests. e
development of a private forest monitoring and licensing system would cost $16 million per year to establish
and implement. Additional services to forest steward families beyond current levels of support (an added
$700 per family per year for improved education, health, justice, and technical assistance services) would
cost an additional $140 million per year for 200,000 rural families. Total, additional, annual government
fund outlays would be a maximum of $190 million per year.
5
A -
• Over the fi
rst 10 years of a Brazilian REDD program, annual costs to Brazil would climb from $72 million
per year to $530 million per year as annual emissions fall from the 250 million ton carbon baseline to
roughly zero. Ongoing costs after year 10 decline as public forest stewards shift to forest-based economies,
the pool of uncompensated private forest declines, and government costs decline through greater effi ciency
and tax revenues. Over the 30-year period, carbon emissions would be approximately 6 billion tons below
the historical baseline and 13 billion tons below projected emissions at a cost of $8 billion. Full payment
of the opportunity costs of these reduced emissions would be approximately $18 billion. ere is therefore
a margin for adjusting the three cost categories upward. Carbon emission reductions would climb from
~25 million tons in year 1 to ~250 million tons in year 10 and beyond.
A
• Substantial co-benefi
ts of this program include: the doubling of income of 200,000 rural forest-based
families, a reduction in fi re-based costs to society (respiratory illness, deaths, agricultural and forestry
damages) of $10 to $80 million per year, and protection of the rainfall system that may supply much of
the Brazilian grain belt and hydro-electric energy production of the industrial southwest of the country.
Substantial non-monetized benefi ts include biodiversity conservation, such as avoidance of the near-
elimination of fi ve ecoregions.
• Emissions reductions from deforestation or fossil fuels combustion made today may always be cancelled
tomorrow, if a country or fi rm that has traded reductions later emits beyond its target. Any emissions
trading regime needs mechanisms to insure against such failures. In the case of REDD, a carbon credit
insurance reserve could be created, such that some of the reductions achieved and demonstrated would be
held in reserve as carbon insurance in case of future increases in deforestation or fi res.
C
6
1. Introduction
Tropical deforestation and forest degradation released 0.5 to 2.4 billion tons of c
arbon each year during
the 1990s (Houghton 2005), and was therefore 0.8 to 2.8% of the annual worldwide human-induced emission
of carbon to the atmosphere. During El Niño episodes, when severe drought aff ects large areas of tropical
forests in the Amazon, SE Asia, and elsewhere, emissions can double through fi res that burn forests and tropical
peat soils (Page et al. 2002, Alencar et al. 2006). Tropical deforestation emissions may increase in the coming
decade as rising worldwide demand for animal ration, meat, and biofuel places new pressures on potential
agricultural lands in the tropics (Soares-Filho et al. 2006, Nepstad et al. 2006c, Nepstad et al. in press). We
estimate that in a business-as-usual scenario, 55% of the forests of the Brazilian Amazon will be cleared, logged,
or damaged by drought by the year 2030, releasing 20±5 billion tons of carbon to the atmosphere (Figure 1).
ese predictions do not include the eff ects of regional or global climate change.
Figure 1. e Brazilian Amazon in 2030, showing drought-damaged, logged, and cleared forests. is map assumes that
deforestation rates of 1997-2003 continue into the future, and that the climatic conditions of the last 10 years are repeated
into the future. From Soares-Filho et al. 2006, Nepstad et al. 2004, 2007, Nepstad and Stickler in press, Merry et al. in
review. (See Supplemental Online Material for description of methods at http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement
7
Although greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation were excluded from the UN Framework
Conv
ention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol (Fearnside 2001, Moutinho
and Schwartzman 2005, Gullison et al. 2007, Schlamadinger et al. 2007a), such a system is part of the current
negotiations focused on the post-Kyoto (post-2012) period (Schlamadinger et al. 2007a). A proposal to
compensate tropical countries for nation-wide reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (referred to here as “REDD”), fi rst presented at the Milan Conference of the Parties in 2003
(Santilli et al. 2005). A similar proposal was advanced by Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica, and other tropical
nations at the Montreal COP in 2005 (Silva-Chavez and Petsonk 2006, Schlamadinger et al. 2007b, Skutsch et
al 2007, Sedjo and Sohngen 2007). Brazil endorsed a similar “tropical forest fund” at the Nairobi COP, but did
not support a market mechanism for supplying this fund (Government of Brazil 2006, Griffi ths 2007). SBSTA
2
negotiations on REDD will conclude with recommendations to COP 13 in Bali.
e Brazilian government’s opposition to the carbon market-funded compensation of reductions in
carbon emissions from deforestation is surprising since it is superbly positioned to benefi t from a REDD
program. Roughly two thirds of Brazil’s annual carbon emissions come from deforestation, mostly in the
Amazon (Moutinho and Schwartzman 2005), and Brazil has been a world leader in developing innovative and
successful approaches to forest conservation, as described below.
One of the obstacles to the eventual approval of a REDD mechanism within the UNFCCC process is
uncertainty about how REDD would work, how much it would cost, and how much carbon would potentially
come into the carbon market at what price. In this report, we provide a conceptual framework for the
development of a REDD program for the Brazilian Amazon, an initial estimate of the cost of implementing this
program over a thirty year period, and the amount of carbon that could enter the carbon market. We complete
the report with a preliminary assessment of the co-benefi ts of a Brazilian Amazon REDD program.
e purpose of this report is to help move discussions of REDD forward by providing a practical
framework for assessing costs and volumes of carbon at stake. e actual costs of developing and implementing
a REDD program in Brazil would depend upon several premises and refi nements of cost analyses.
2. Can deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon be reduced to zero?
One of the biggest questions of the REDD dialogue is: can it be done? Brazil has provided several
important examples that illustrate the feasibility of lowering deforestation. For example, from January 2004
through December 2006, 23 million hectares of public forest reserves in the Brazilian Amazon were created,
including large forest reserves at the edge of the active agricultural frontier (Campos and Nepstad 2006,
Nepstad et al. 2006a). Brazil’s Mato Grosso state has a sophisticated system of private forest reserve monitoring
(Fearnside 2003, Chomitz and Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2005, Lima et al. 2005) and one of the world’s most
advanced systems of rainforest monitoring (INPE 2007). An ambitious federal government program to reduce
Amazon deforestation succeeded in cutting rates in half from 2004 to 2006, (aided by the plummeting prices
of soy and beef). More recently, the “National Pact for Valuing the Amazon forest and Ending Deforestation”
3
,
with political support from the Federal Government, four Amazon state governors, the environmental NGO
community, and segments of the private sector, has proposed a seven-year target to reduce deforestation to zero.
Among the Pact’s supporters is Blairo Maggi, Governor of the state of Mato Grosso State, which emits more
greenhouse gases from deforestation than any other state during most years. e Brazilian Congress has also
developed legislation proposals that would establish national deforestation emission reduction targets.
8
3. Premises
• #1.
e costs vs. the value of reduced emissions. Our goal is to estimate the cost of developing a REDD
program in the Brazilian Amazon, not the value of such a program. ( e value of Amazon forest
conservation far exceeds the costs of protecting it, although these values are diffi cult to monetize.) We
assume that nations estimate the acceptable carbon price for their REDD programs in a way that is
commensurate with the cost of achieving these reductions less the economic benefi ts that accrue to that
nation through forest conservation. is report contributes to discussions on the amount of carbon that
could come into the carbon market from tropical forests, and at what minimum price. e ultimate price
of REDD carbon credits and, hence, the fl ow of money into REDD, will be determined by the size of the
world carbon market which is, in turn, defi ned by the emissions reduction targets that developed countries
commit to.
• #2. National opportunity costs.
e maximum costs of REDD programs should be constrained by the
nation-wide opportunity costs of forgoing forest clearing and thinning less profi ts from low-emissions
forest-based economic activities. ese costs include forgone profi ts from forest-replacing agricultural and
livestock production systems applied to forest lands and potentially forested lands. ese costs are off set
by revenues from forest-based economic activities, such as timber production, and other local and national
benefi ts that are often more diffi cult to monetize, such as reduced economic damages from fi re. is report
considers opportunity costs incurred over a 30-year time horizon.
• #3. All forest lands. Opportunity costs should be estimated for all forest lands and potentially-forested
lands, not just those that are privately held. Parks and forest concessions can be undone to permit forest-
replacing agriculture. Land laws can be modifi ed to liberate landholders to clear their forests. Ongoing
positive economic incentives are needed to keep forests standing.
• #4. Compensating forest stewards. Forest-based cultures, including indigenous groups, traditional societies,
and some smallholder farmer communities, should be compensated for their historical and ongoing role—
or potential role—as forest stewards (Nepstad et al. 2006b, Griffi ths 2007). is compensation should be
designed to foster the development of forest-based livelihoods, maximizing the social and environmental
benefi ts of the REDD program. Similarly, REDD must provide positive economic incentives to agricultural
and livestock producers who hold legal
1
titles to their land and demonstrate their commitment to sound
forest stewardship and compliance with the law.
• #5. Current government budget outlays continue. Payments to the government are for costs above and
beyond current budget outlays for the management and protection of forests. We assume that governments
maintain current investments, thereby increasing the additionality of the REDD program. is premise
carries the moral hazard of rewarding countries that have invested little in natural resource conservation in
the past.
• #6. Carbon payments for governance. Within REDD, payment for the ecosystem service of carbon
retention in forest biomass is applied to the entire REDD program, including payments to forest stewards
and to the government. is expanded concept of payments for ecosystem services is necessary since
REDD is a nation-wide program.
9
• #7.
e deforestation scenario and forest allocation. We estimate that a well-designed REDD program
could reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon to approximately zero over a ten year period from
a current baseline of 20,000 km
2
and approximately 250 millions tons of carbon emissions per year. e
allocation of forest land at the end of the REDD program would be 40% social reserves, 40% biological
and production forest reserves, and 30% private property, from the current distribution of 26%, 31%, and
20%, respectively. ( e remaining forest land is undesignated.) e allocation of forested land defi nes the
cost estimates, since costs vary among social forests (and their inhabitants), biological reserves, production
reserves, and private forested lands. ese premises will be the subject of considerable analysis and debate.
We use a 20,000 km
2
/year deforestation baseline since average deforestation from 1997 through 2006 was
19,200 km
2
/year (INPE 2007) and deforestation is projected to increase in the future (Soares-Filho et al.
2006).
• #8. A century-long payment schedule. Brazil should receive REDD payments at a rate that is commensurate
with the rate of reductions in emissions. At current rates (20,000 km
2
/yr), it would take more than a
century to clear the forests of the Brazilian Amazon (3.3 million km
2
). is simple premise creates a long-
term incentive for tropical countries to invest in maintenance of their forest carbon stock, and it reduces
the risk that a large fl ow of REDD carbon credits would dilute the carbon market.
4. e conceptual framework of a Brazilian Amazon REDD program
Most eff orts to quantify the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from tropical deforestation
and forest degradation have focused on estimating the opportunity costs associated with forgone profi ts
from agriculture and livestock production that are incurred when restrictions to forest clearing are imposed.
ese analyses have employed equilibrium and partial equilibrium global economic models to estimate these
opportunity costs and have had to make simplifying assumptions about potential rents from agriculture and
livestock on tropical forest lands (Kremen et al. 2000, Sedjo et al. 2001, Sathaye et al. 2006, Obersteiner et al.
2006, Sohngen and Sedjo 2006, Kindermann et al. 2006). We are unaware of published analyses that estimate
the opportunity costs of REDD programs from the ground up, beginning with the biophysical, climatic, and
infrastructure constraints to agriculture and livestock expansion in tropical forest regions, and then refi ning
these costs through analysis of a REDD program framework. In this report, we present results of a model
of opportunity costs of forest maintenance estimated using spatially-explicit rent models for high-carbon
(timber) and low-carbon (agriculture, ranching) uses of Brazilian Amazon forests. (Additional details on the
methodology used to make these estimates can be found on-line at http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement)
We estimate opportunity costs of forgone profi ts from non-forest land uses as an upper limit benchmark
to the cost of REDD programs. e actual costs of REDD programs should be considerably lower than full
compensation of these opportunity costs since Brazilian society has already taken steps to remove much of
these forests from the agricultural/livestock land market through the creation of formal forest reserves. e
cost of REDD should also be lower than full compensation of opportunity costs because of the benefi ts of
forest protection that accrue to Brazilian society. For example, there is some evidence that the rainfall system
of central and southwestern Brazil is partially dependent upon moisture coming from the Amazon region and
that this moisture is, in turn, dependent upon Amazon forest evapotranspiration (Clement and Higuchi 2006).
Hence, the rains that feed Brazil’s grain belt and extensive hydroelectric reservoir network appear to depend, in
part, upon Amazon forests.
10
e institutional steps to achieve lasting reductions in carbon emissions from tropical deforestation and
forest degradation are also in need of a clarifying conceptual framework. REDD programs will depend upon
eff ective governance of remote forest regions and an equitable, effi cient system of channeling these incentives
to the people who control tropical forests. We propose three general targets of REDD funding to help meet
these goals. First, a “Public Forest Stewardship” fund would compensate those people who have defended forests
against forest-replacing economic activities, or who could potentially defend forests. is funding targets forest-
based indigenous groups, traditional rural populations (such as rubber tappers, Brazil-nut gatherers, and others),
and some smallholder populations that are taking steps towards stable land-use systems that maintain or expand
carbon stocks in forest vegetation.
A “Private Forest Stewardship Fund” would compensate those legal private landholders who retain
forest on their properties. ( is fund is complicated by the diffi culty of defi ning land ownership in the Brazilian
Amazon.) We propose a diff erential rate of compensation for forest conservation on private land, with lower
compensation going to forest reserves that are legally required, and higher compensation going to reserves that
are above and beyond this legal requirement.
A “Government Fund” would compensate government programs and expenditures that are necessary
for REDD above and beyond current budget outlays. ese expenditures include heightened monitoring and
management of public forests, expansion of the protected area and indigenous land network of public forests,
improved provision of services (education, health, technical assistance) to rural populations, and the expansion
of existing systems for environmental licensing and monitoring of private land forests to the entire Brazilian
Amazon region.
5. A spatial map of opportunity costs
e opportunity costs of maintaining the forests of the Brazilian Amazon (Figure 2) was mapped using
spatially-explicit models of potential rents for soy, cattle, and timber production. ese models were developed
as part of the “Amazon Scenarios” program of the Woods Hole Research Center, the Universidade Federal de
Minas Gerais, and the Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazonia. e soy model integrates a biophysical
yield model, a transportation model, and a production cost model in estimating the economic returns to soy
production for the Brazilian Amazon (Vera Diaz et al. in press). Soy expansion is constrained by a soil and
climate suitability map that is applied as a fi lter (http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement). Soy rents are
positive only in areas where suitability is high. e cattle ranching model integrates a herd development model,
a production cost function (that includes land purchase, herd establishment, and periodic pasture reformation),
and a transportation cost model (Merry et al. in preparation). e timber model integrates a transportation
model, a harvesting and processing cost model, and simulates the expansion, contraction, initiation, and
extinction of timber processing centers depending upon each center’s neighborhood of timber stocks that
could be profi tably harvested (Merry et al. in review). (See online supplemental information for more details
(http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement)
ese three rent-based models are integrated within the “SimAmazonia” modeling system (Soares-
Filho et al. 2006). In this report, the net present value of each of the three competing land uses is estimated
over a 30-year time period by summing rents into the future for each forested pixel of the Brazilian Amazon
(Figure 3-5). Future rents are discounted at a 5% annual rate. All three models are highly sensitive to changes
in transportation costs. We therefore developed a schedule of highway paving based upon an analysis of current
policies and capital availability (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Hence, the rent of each forested pixel changes
diff erentially through time for each competing land use depending upon expansion of the paved highway
network as prescribed.
11
We estimate the opportunity cost of maintaining forest for each 4-km
2
forest “pixel” as the maximum
net present value of deforestation-dependent land use (the maximum, discounted, 30-year rent of soy vs. cattle
ranching). We also estimate the “net” opportunity cost, in which the net present value of timber production is
subtracted from that of soy or cattle, since timber maintains most of the carbon stock of forests. In this report,
we “force” the timber industry into a sustainable mode by limiting annual harvest for each processing center
to 1/30
th
of the total timber volume around each processing center that could be profi tably harvested. ( is
assumes that each forested pixel can be harvested every thirty years because of tree growth.) is opportunity
cost is divided by the carbon stock for each forested pixel using the forest carbon map developed by Saatchi et
al. (2007, Figure 6), to estimate the payment per ton of carbon that would fully compensate the opportunity
costs of forest maintenance (Figure 6, 8). e net opportunity cost is calculated by dividing the diff erence in net
present value (soy or cattle minus timber) by the diff erence in carbon stock of agriculture/livestock vs. timber
4
.”
Figure 2. e forests in the Brazilian Amazon. is 5-million square kilometer region has 3.3 million square
kilometers of forest, with roughly half (49%) in public forests, including indigenous reserves, biological reserves
and parks, “sustainable use” (community development forests and production forests), and military reserves.
Source: (http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement)
12
Figure 3. e potential net present value (2007 through 2037) of soy production on the forested lands of the
Brazilian Amazon. (http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement, Vera Diaz et al. 2007.)
e 3.3 million square kilometers of forests in the Brazilian Amazon contain 47±9 billion tons of forest
carbon (excluding soil carbon) (Saatchi et al. 2007, Soares-Filho et al. 2006). e opportunity cost of protecting
this forest all at once, in 2007 dollars, is $257 billion and $5.5 per ton of carbon. Only 6% of the forests of the
region have opportunity costs of more than $10 per ton carbon, however. If these forests are removed from our
estimate, the cost of fully compensating OCs declines to $123 billion and the per-ton cost to $2.8 (Tables 1, 2).
Outside of protected areas, there are 24 billion tons of carbon in forests with opportunity costs of $137 billion
($6.05 per ton carbon). By excluding the high-rent forest parcels (representing 6% of total forest area outside
of protected areas), it would be possible to fully compensate OCs of 22.2 billion tons of forest carbon for $56
billion ($2.75 per ton C) (Tables 1, 2).
ese surprisingly low per ton values for carbon are attributable to the low profi tability of cattle ranching
in the Amazon (Figure 4). e animal grazing density of Amazon cattle pastures averages 0.8 animal units per
hectare, and yields profi ts that are generally well below $50 per hectare per year (Arima et al. 2006, Margulis
2003, Mattos and Uhl 1994). e opportunity costs of forgone profi ts from soy production (Figure 3) represent
the steep part of the carbon supply curve in the fi nal 6% of the forest carbon stock (Figure 8). ese OCs
decline by 4% if profi ts from sustainable timber management (Figure 5), which can retain at least 85% of forest
carbon stocks, are subtracted from the OC estimate (Table 1).
Figure 4. Potential net present value of cattle production (2007-2037) on the forested lands of the Brazilian
Amazon. (http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement).
Table 1. Opportunity Costs of
forest maintenance outside of
protected areas, inside of PAs, and
for the entire Brazilian Amazon.
With Timber
Rents
($B)
Without
Timber Rents
($B)
Percent
Reduction
Outside protected areas 137.5 143.4 4.1
Outside protected areas, <$10/ton 56.3 61.5 8.5
Inside protected areas 120.8 121.6 0.7
Inside protected areas <$10/ton 60.4 61.1 1.1
Total 247.3 257.1 3.8
Total <$10/ton 114.6 123.3 7.1
Table 2. Carbon stocks and
opportunity cost per ton C outside
of PAs, inside of PAs, and for the
entire Brazilian Amazon.
Carbon Stocks $ per ton C
Outside protected areas 23.8 6.03
Outside protected areas, <$10/ton 22.2 2.75
Inside protected areas 23.1 5.26
Inside protected areas <$10/ton 21.7 2.81
Total 47.1 5.65
Total <$10/ton 44.1 1.56
13
14
6. A deforestation reduction schedule and forest allocation
Our analysis is based upon a ten-year timetable for lowering deforestation to ~zero kilometers per year
f
rom an historical baseline of 20,000 km
2
per year (Fig. 8). We use a 20,000 km
2
per year rate as our baseline
since deforestation for the last 10 years was 19,200 km
2
but reached an average of 24,000 km
2
per year during
the 2002-2004 period (INPE 2007). Deforestation is projected to increase in the future under business-as-usual
assumptions (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Deforestation is assumed to be reduced by 2,000 km
2
per year until year
ten, when deforestation is reduced to ~0 km
2
per year. e deforestation reduction schedule is presented for 30
years, which is the time period for which opportunity costs were estimated. In practice, compensation would
continue into the future at a rate that is commensurate with ongoing emissions reductions. During the 30-year
period, the deforested area would be reduced by 490,000 km
2
below the baseline and carbon emissions would
be reduced by 6.3 billion tons. If the 90,000 km2 of deforestation that takes place during the fi rst ten years of
this period is on forested lands with high opportunity costs of forest maintenance, then the remaining area of
potentially high-profi t forest declines to 280,000 km
2
.
Our calculations also depend upon the ultimate allocation of forest land. Roughly one third of Brazilian
Amazon forests today are without formal designation (called “terra devoluta”, Lentini et al. 2003). irty-one
percent of forests are public forest reserves (26% of these being “social” reserves, including indigenous lands,
extractive reserves, and sustainable development reserves). e remainder of the land is private. We assume
that remaining forests of the Brazilian Amazon will be allocated as: 40% social forests (where the public forest
stewardship fund applies), 30% biological and production forest, and 30% private land.
Figure 5. Potential net present value of sustainable timber production (2007-2037) for the forests of the Brazilian
Amazon. Processing centers in this run of the timber rent model are restricted to annual harvests of 1/30
th
of the
profi tably harvestable timber stocks, thereby “forcing” the industry into sustainable, 30-year rotations. See http://.whrc.
org/Brazilcarbonsupplement for model description.
15
Figure 6. Forest carbon stocks of the Brazilian Amazon. Aboveground and roots. (Assumes that root biomass is 21% of
live aboveground biomass and that dead biomass is 9% of live aboveground biomass.) Source: Saatchi et al. 2007.
7. e Public Forest Stewardship Fund
Indigenous communities inhibit deforestation at the same level as biological reserves and parks (Nepstad
et al. 2006b), providing an important rationale for strengthening their role as stewards of these public forests.
is rationale is further supported by the fact that 25% of current Brazilian Amazon forests are allocated to
some form of “social forest” use (indigenous land, extractive reserve, sustainable development reserve), and these
social reserves are much more common in active deforestation frontiers than are biological reserves and parks
(Nepstad et al. 2006b). e “Aliança dos Povos da Floresta” (the Forest Peoples’ Alliance) has defi ned several
forms of compensation that it expects from a REDD program
5
. ese forms of compensation include economic
incentives for forest-based livelihoods, improved health, education, technical assistance services, and payments
for patrolling reserve perimeters, and are described in greater detail in supplemental online information (http://
whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement).
We estimate the cost of providing incentives for forest-based livelihood on a per-family basis. We
simplify this calculation by assuming that a payment of one-half of a minimum salary ($1,200 per year) would
be suffi cient to provide a strong incentive to stabilize agricultural systems (through a shift to swidden fallow
that does not depend upon primary forest clearing) and to develop forest-based economies (e.g. McGrath et al.
2006). e exact form of compensating forest stewards will depend upon a deeper analysis, and may include
16
price subsidies for non-timber forest products such as have already been established in Acre and Amazon
states for nativ
e rubber. Direct payments to forest families also have a precedent in the Amazon through the
Proambiente program and, more recently, through the Amazonas state “bolsa fl orestal” program. In the case
of Proambiente, payments of $50 per month (half of our estimate) were suffi cient to foster changes in farmer
agricultural strategies. In Amazonas, payments are $25 per month. A payment of $1,200 per year for all 50,000
indigenous families, all 50,000 extractivist families, and for 50,000 forest-margin smallholder families would
cost $180 million per year (Table 3). We assume that it would take ten years of linearly increasing payments to
reach all families contemplated.
We estimate the cost of perimeter control based at $10 per square kilometer upon estimates from the
Aliança dos Povos da Floresta at $10 per square kilometer. e 1.3 million square kilometers of social reserves
would require $13 million per year to be monitored by their residents (Table 3).
An additional incentive is included for those smallholder families that are in public settlement projects
that hold potential for forest restoration and a shift to stable agricultural systems. Sixty million dollars per year
would be necessary to compensate 50,000 smallholder families (out of a total of 650,000 smallholder families
across the Brazilian Amazon) (Table 3).
Figure 7. Net opportunity cost of forest protection in the Brazilian Amazon. Calculated as maximum net present value
of soy or cattle production minus NPV of timber. e value was then divided by forest carbon stocks (Figure 6).
17
Figure 8. Marginal opportunity cost of reductions in carbon emissions for the Brazilian Amazon. is graph plots the
opportunity cost per ton of carbon, as described in Figure 7, from the cheapest to the most expensive emissions reductions.
Ninety percent of the opportunity costs are less than $5 and 94% are less than $10. e total opportunity cost to
maintain the entire forest is $257 billion (if paid all at once in 2007 dollars) for 47 B tons of C; the cost of compensating
94% of the “cheapest” forests is $115 billion, with carbon stocks of 44 billion tons C.
18
Figure 9. Trajectory of deforestation, reduced deforestation, the opportunity costs of this reduction, and an initial
estimate of the cost of achieving the reduction (the sum of the Public Forest Stewardship, Private Forest Stewardship,
and Government funds) in the Brazilian Amazon for a thirty-year period. e values of each fund are found in Figure
10.
19
Table 3. Summary of costs of Brazilian Amazon REDD program in Year 10
Public Forest Stewardship Fund (Forest People)
a. Forest steward compensation
Annual payment per family $1,200
100,000 indigenous and extractivist families $120,000,000
50,000 qualifying forest margin smallholders $60,000,000
b. Forest monitoring, protection, management
Average annual cost per square kilometer $10
1,000,000 km
2
indigenous reserves $10,000,000
200,000 km
2
extractive reserves $2,000,000
100,000 km
2
community reserves $1,000,000
c. Forest settlement restoration
Average annual cost per family $1,200
50,000 smallholder families $60,000,000
d. Total annual forest people payments
$253,000,000
Private Forest Stewardship Fund
Opportunity costs compensation, extensive ranching
$90,000,000
e Government Fund
a. Public forest protection, management, creation
Monitoring: average annual cost per square kilometer $20
Maintenance of current public forests $24,800,000
Cost to create new protected area ($/km
2
) $50
Creation of new protected areas (10%/yr) $7,800,000
b. Private forest registration, monitoring
Env’l registration system establishment (10%/yr) $10,000,000
Cost to register private lands ($/km
2
) $50
Property registration (10% per year, $200 per km
2
) $6,000,000
c. Services (health, education, justice, technical support)
Annual payment per family $700
Annual payments for forest peoples $140,000,000
d. Total Government Fund $188,600,000
Total cost of all funds in year 10 $531,600,000
8.
e Private Forest Stewardship Fund
It is very diffi cult to quantify the area of Amazon forests that are legally owned or that could be legalized
without rewarding fl agrant fraud (Alston et al. 1999). Antiquated titling processes, competing land claims, and
sophisticated illegal land grabbing operations make it virtually impossible to map legal land claims. For the
purpose of this report, we assume that one half of the forests cleared each year are on private properties that are
legally held or that will eventually be legalized. ose who purchase forest lands in the future do not qualify for
compensation of their opportunity costs, since these costs should be refl ected in the sale price of the land. (If
we assume that Brazil will enter a regime of forcefully lowering deforestation rates, land prices should decline
as the possibility of forest conversion to agriculture or livestock declines.) Landholders are legally required to
maintain 80% of their property as private forest reserve. However, there are frequent attempts to turn back this
legislation and compensation of these legally-mandated forest reserves is therefore appropriate. We estimate
compensation of 20% of the opportunity costs of forest maintenance for these legally-mandated private forests.
Compensation of opportunity costs should be higher for forests held in excess of this 80% requirement, but the
number of properties with more than 80% forest cover is too small to aff ect these estimates. We estimate that
compensation of private forest stewards increases linearly until year 5, when these payments would equal $90
million per year (Table 3).
20
9. e Government Fund
e cost of government monitoring and management of existing public forests is estimated at $20
per km
2
and would cost an additional $28 million per year to be accomplished successfully. We assume
that protected area expansion would take place over 10 years to achieve the fi nal land allocation of 40% in
social reserves and 30% in biological and production reserves, adding 36,000 km
2
each year. If protected area
creation costs an additional $50 per km
2
, this cost would be $7.8 million per year. ( e added burden on the
government of an expanding protected network is counterbalanced by the growing capacity of public forest
stewards to defend and manage these areas.) Development of state-run private land environmental licensing
and monitoring systems, similar to Mato Grosso State’s “Sistema de Licensiamento Ambiental de Propriedades
Rurais” (Rural Property Environmental Licensing System) (Fearnside 2003, Lima et al. 2005, Chomitz and
Werth-Kanounnikoff 2005), would cost $10 million per year for ten years, with an additional $50 per km
2
to
bring new private properties into the system ($6 million) (Table 3, http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupplement).
e largest governmental cost would be enhancement of its services provided to forest stewards.
Additional investments in and improvements to public health, education, and technical support programs are
estimated at $700 per family, for a total of $140 million per year (Table 3, http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbonsupple
ment). ese additional funds would be channeled through existing institutions, such as the “Sistema Única de
Saúde”, in the case of health for non-indigenous families.
10. e costs of REDD in the Brazilian Amazon over 30 years
We estimate the costs to Brazil of carrying out this REDD program over 30 years, which is the period
for which opportunity costs were calculated (Figure 7, 8). We assume that the Public and Private Forest
Stewardship Fund increases linearly over ten years to their maximum values presented in Table 3 (Figure 10).
Government costs must build up more rapidly to provide necessary law enforcement early in the program. We
assume that the Government Fund builds up linearly over a fi ve-year period. First year combined expenditures
of $72 million climb to $530 million in year 10 as deforestation declines from 20,000 km
2
to ~0 km
2
and
emissions decline from ~250 million to ~0 tons of carbon per year. After the initial ten-year period, ongoing
costs are incurred as Brazil continues to compensate remaining private land forest stewards, and for protecting/
managing the 2.3 million km
2
public forest estate. ese ongoing payments are theoretically justifi ed as the
continuing, partial compensation of opportunity costs that will end >100 years into the future. is long time
horizon is necessary to fully compensate these opportunity costs because compensation is commensurate with
emissions reductions, which are determined by the 20,000- km
2
per year baseline. is long payment schedule
also provides an ongoing incentive to Brazil to continue its forest governance. We assume that the cost of
achieving forest governance declines over time as institutional effi ciency increases, and as the tax base of the
government expands through a thriving timber industry.
Over the thirty-year period, $8.2 billion are expended to reduce emissions of carbon by 6.3 billion tons.
In other words, for a bit more than a dollar per ton of carbon, emissions of carbon to the atmosphere could
be reduced by an amount equivalent to about seven months of worldwide emissions (which, in 2006, passed
10 billion tons per year, Canadell et al. 2007) while conserving the world’s largest tropical rainforest. e full
opportunity cost of avoiding the emission of 6 billion tons of carbon would be $3 per ton, or $18 billion, if we
assume that the highest 6% of opportunity costs are not compensated (Table 2, Figure 8). Part of the diff erence
between these two estimates of REDD costs ($8 vs. $18B) is diminished by the benefi ts to Brazilian society of a
REDD program. In other words, there are substantial benefi ts to Brazilian society of protecting Amazon forests
that should be counted against opportunity costs as the real cost of a REDD program is estimated.
21
11. Co-benefi ts of REDD
e proposed REDD program would have direct impacts on the livelihoods of 200,000 low-income
rural families, including all of the indigenous and traditional families of the Brazilian Amazon. ese families
would more than double their incomes as they shift to forest-based economic activities. ey would also receive
$700 per family per year in added educational, health, and technical support services. e program would reduce
the likelihood of deforestation-driven reductions in rainfall in the Brazilian grain belt (Clement and Higuchi
2007), and would also reduce the likelihood of drought-driven energy shortages, such as the one that crippled
the Brazilian economy in 2003 when hydroelectric reservoirs dried up. By reducing the incidence of fi re, the
program would avoid $11 to 83 million dollars per year in fi re-related costs associated with respiratory ailments
and deaths, agricultural damages, and damages to timber if we assume that the incidence of fi re in the region
will decline together with the reductions in emissions (Mendonça et al. 2004 and http://whrc.org/Brazilcarbon
supplement).
e slowing of deforestation would also prevent the devastation of at least fi ve ecoregions whose
ranges would decrease by at least 85%. ese ecoregions include the Maranhão babaçu forest, the Marañon dry
forest, and the Tumbes/Piura dry forest (Soares-Filho et al. 2006).
12. How will it work?
Detailed analysis of the mechanics of a Brazilian REDD program is beyond the scope of this report. Instead,
we propose a few key characteristics of the REDD program that would make it more likely to succeed.
• Carbon credit insurance reserve. Emissions reductions achieved today for deforestation or fossil fuel may
always be cancelled tomorrow if a country or fi rm that has traded reductions later emits beyond its target.
is problem is particularly important for REDD because of the risk of forest fi re. Any emissions trading
regime needs mechanisms to insure against such failures. In the case of REDD, a carbon credit insurance
reserve could be created, such that some of the reductions achieved and demonstrated would be held in
reserve as carbon insurance in case of future increases in deforestation or fi res. Contractual liability rules
should be established as part of the REDD negotiation to determine whether the seller, the buyers, or both
are responsible for the insurance reserve. If Brazil were to assume responsibility for a very conservative ratio
of insurance reserve to marketable reductions, of 1:1, this would in eff ect double the cost of implementing
REDD. e greater the seller’s willingness to provide such insurance, the more competitive its reductions
would be in the market.
• Transparency and oversight. e Brazilian Amazon REDD program will depend upon major strides in
improving the effi ciency of government institutions. e success of the program will depend upon the design
of effi cient, transparent systems for managing REDD funds, for issuing and implementing deforestation
permits during the fi rst ten years of the program, for managing the timber sector, for developing programs
that support a transition to forest-based economies among public forest stewards, and for determining the
fair compensation cost to private forest stewards will be central to the success of the program.
• Monitoring and validation. Brazil has developed the world’s most successful system of rainforest monitoring
(INPE 2007). is system could become even better as it begins to incorporate recent innovations in the
mapping of Amazon forest degradation (Asner et al. 2005, Oliveira et al. 2007) and cloud-free mapping
of land cover and biomass using new radar sensors, such as ALOS/PALSAR (Kellndorfer et al. 2007,
companion report). In the near term, Brazil’s “PRODES” monitoring program could be supplemented
with annual mapping of the entire Brazilian Amazon forest formation, with no interference from clouds
and with biomass estimates for a large portion of cleared lands, for a price that is well below optical sensor
methods.
Figure 10. Example of the estimated costs of the Public Forest Stewardship Fund (Forest People), the Private Forest
Stewardship Fund, and the Government Fund over a thirty-year period using the premises set forth in this report.
13. Conclusion
is analysis indicates that carbon emissions from the Brazilian Amazon might decrease by six billion tons over
a thirty-year period through a fairly modest fl ow of funding into the region—about $8 billion. is estimate
is lower than previous estimates of REDD (Sathaye et al. 2006, Obersteiner et al. 2006, Sohngen and Sedjo
2006, Stern 2006), largely because opportunity costs are not fully compensated, and spatially-explicit modeling
of land use rents demonstrates that most carbon emissions carry very low opportunity costs. A REDD program
that compensates at a level that is less than opportunity cost is justifi able given the very substantial benefi ts that
this program would provide to Brazilian society. ese include the doubling of income and improved health,
education, and technical assistance services for 200,000 forest-dwelling families. e benefi ts also include a
more secure rainfall system for central and southern Brazil, and the avoidance of $11 to 83 million per year
in fi re-related damages to the Amazon economy. e successful reduction of emissions to nearly zero over a
decade is a daunting task, and will depend upon innovation and major strides in the development of effi cient,
transparent institutions.
22
F
1
Landholders are “legal” if they have clear title to their property or have been issued legal declarations (“Termo de Ajuste de
Conduto”) through which they commit to take the necessary steps to legalize their properties.
2
Subsidiary Body for Scientifi c and Technological Advice
3
e Pact was launched on October 3
rd
2007 within the National Congress (Committee of Environment and Sustainable
Development). is launching session was attended by the Minister of Environment, Marina Silva, two state governors (Mato Grosso
and Amapá), Secretaries of two others states (Amazonas and Acre) and the main environmental relevant congressmen. e Pact
establishes an agreement among diff erent sectors (State Amazon governors, Federal governor, representatives from the rural producers,
from the agribusiness industries, socio-environmental organizations, social movements, indigenous and traditional population living in
the forests) to acknowledge the value of the standing forest and eliminate the deforestation in Amazonia over the next seven years.
4
We assume that logging decreases carbon stocks by 15% (Asner et al. 2005) while soy and pasture reduces stocks by 85% (Fearnside
1997). Carbon emission reduction is taken as the diff erence between these two for a given forest pixel that is not cleared.
4
We assume that logging decreases carbon stocks by 15% (Asner et al. 2005) while soy and pasture reduces stocks by 85% (Fearnside
1997). Carbon emission reduction is taken as the diff erence between these two for a given forest pixel that is not cleared.
5
is report is not an offi cial representation of the expectation of the Aliaca dos Povos da Floresta, but is
informed by discussions with its members.
23
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24
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Ortiz (2004), e economic costs of the use of fi re in the Amazon, Ecological Economics, 49(1), 89-105.
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