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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
... This is significant for developing a more nuanced formal epistemology. For example, it enables a formalization of Clark's solution [2] to Gettier's problem [6]. 2. Faithful formalizations: KT formalizes the principle of veracity more faithfully than how it is formalized in the knower paradoxes, by utilizing both a knowledge and a truth predicate. ...
... So in many natural situations, common knowledge entails some notion of "common justification". 6 As the predicate approach provides a convenient avenue to formalize this intuitive notion, it enables further research clarifying this matter. iii. ...
... In particular, the instantiation of UBF used in the proof of Theorem 5(b) appears to be relatively uncontentious. This suggests that 6 It is possible to cook up an example where an agent knows that another agent knows something, without the former knowing precisely what justification the latter has; and this can be extended to an example of common knowledge without "common justification". However, common knowledge with "common justification" seems more natural, and is certainly of interest to epistemology. ...
This paper provides a consistent first-order theory solving the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague, with the following main features: 1. It solves the knower paradoxes by providing a faithful formalization of the principle of veracity (that knowledge requires truth), using both a knowledge and a truth predicate. 2. It is genuinely untyped i.e., it is untyped not only in the sense that it uses a single knowledge predicate applying to all sentences in the language (including sentences in which this predicate occurs), but in the sense that its axioms quantify over all sentences in the language, thus supporting comprehensive reasoning with untyped knowledge ascriptions. 3. Common knowledge predicates can be defined in the system using self-reference. These facts, together with a technique based on Löb’s theorem, enables it to support comprehensive reasoning with untyped common knowledge ascriptions (without having any axiom directly addressing common knowledge).
... If explainable AI is going to explain anything, it does require clear concepts capable of guiding the discussion to reach valid conclusions. Philosophers usually define knowledge as "justified true belief" [21,25,37]. This means that an agent A knows a proposition p if the following three properties are satisfied: LK1 A believes p, LK2 p is true, LK3 A's belief about p is justified. ...
... is typically different from 1. The vector λ of the formal likelihood in (21) will be chosen to be consistent with the constraints (17) of the optimization problem (16) that data D in (4) provide. ...
... Biased choice of posterior. The likelihood (21) can be motivated in terms of giving a posterior that is in maxent relative to P 0 . For these reasons, we will regard (21) and (12) as the default choices of likelihood and prior. ...
In this paper, we study learning and knowledge acquisition (LKA) of an agent about a proposition that is either true or false. We use a Bayesian approach, where the agent receives data to update his beliefs about the proposition according to a posterior distribution. The LKA is formulated in terms of active information, with data representing external or exogenous information that modifies the agent's beliefs. It is assumed that data provide details about a number of features that are relevant to the proposition. We show that this leads to a Gibbs distribution posterior, which is in maximum entropy relative to the prior, conditioned on the side constraints that the data provide in terms of the features. We demonstrate that full learning is sometimes not possible and full knowledge acquisition is never possible when the number of extracted features is too small. We also distinguish between primary learning (receiving data about features of relevance for the proposition) and secondary learning (receiving data about the learning of another agent). We argue that this type of secondary learning does not represent true knowledge acquisition. Our results have implications for statistical learning algorithms, and we claim that such algorithms do not always generate true knowledge. The theory is illustrated with several examples.
... Piccinini (2022, 406) claims that a major attraction of FGB is that it implies that Gettier beliefs are not instances of knowledge because they "are not grounded in their truthmaker". For example, in Gettier's (1963) famous job/coins case, Smith's belief that someone who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket is not grounded in the fact that makes the belief true-it is not Jones who gets the job, but Smith and it just so happens that Smith has ten coins in his pocket. According to Piccinini (2022, 405-06, 414), FGB solves the Gettier Problem. ...
... Clearly, what makes Laura's belief that her 100 handouts are sufficient true is that there are 52 people in attendance at her talk, but Laura's belief is grounded in there being 53 people in attendance at her talk, which obviously does not make her belief true. While Laura's belief that her 100 handouts are sufficient has a lot of things going for it epistemically in Handout, it is the case that it is not grounded in the fact that makes it true inasmuch as Smith's belief that someone who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket is not grounded in the fact that makes it true in Gettier's (1963) famous job/coins case. Now, a defender of FGB might think that the relevant truthmaker in Handout is that there are approximately 50 people at Laura's talk (or that there are less than 100 people at Laura's talk, or some such fact). ...
Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the view that knowledge is factually grounded belief is inadequate as an account of knowledge.
... Gettier (or Gettier-style 1 ) cases are an influential set of cases in epistemology that are widely taken to be incompatible with the so-called classical analysis of knowledge as justified true belief (Gettier, 1963; for recent overviews, see Borges et al., 2017;Hetherington, 2016Hetherington, , 2019. The reason is that these cases seem to be instances of justified true belief, whereas intuitively, they (allegedly) seem to be short of being instances of knowledge. ...
... In this short report, we contribute to this empirical literature by addressing some methodological issues. For the sake of argument, let us assume that members of some relevant population indeed react to Gettier cases in a way suggested by Gettier (1963). What empirical predictions could we derive from this assumption? ...
We report three studies on knowledge attributions in Gettier cases and their closely matched control cases (CMCs), i.e., scenarios similar in wording but lacking Gettierization. Although there is rich empirical literature on Gettier cases, CMCs are rarely used. Study 1 tested two scenarios that played an important role in the literature and found that most participants deny knowledge in both Gettierized and CMC variants of these scenarios. We hypothesized that these Gettier cases, besides Gettierization, possess another feature that affects knowledge attributions: skeptical pressure. Study 2 tested this hypothesis by employing ‘depressurized’ versions of Gettier cases (scenarios devoid of elements exerting skeptical pressure) and found that depressurization significantly increases knowledge attributions in CMCs. Study 3 is a pre-registered replication of the main findings. We suggest that some previous studies on Gettier cases confounded two factors, Gettierization and skeptical pressure, and that the impact of these factors on knowledge attributions can be separated by the proper design of study materials.
... Following this, can information, generated by LLMs, be described as knowledge? LLMs can generate outputs that appear to be both correct and relevant, but do these outputs constitute 'justified true belief '? Gettier (1963) established that knowledge requires more than correct statements -it demands robust justification, and correctness alone does not guarantee justification (Gettier 1963). Furthermore, the answers generated by LLMs appear to be correct, but it does not mean that they necessarily are. ...
... Following this, can information, generated by LLMs, be described as knowledge? LLMs can generate outputs that appear to be both correct and relevant, but do these outputs constitute 'justified true belief '? Gettier (1963) established that knowledge requires more than correct statements -it demands robust justification, and correctness alone does not guarantee justification (Gettier 1963). Furthermore, the answers generated by LLMs appear to be correct, but it does not mean that they necessarily are. ...
This essay explores the possible contribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) to human cognition. It investigates whether human cognition can be enhanced by advanced AI systems such as LLMs. Can LLMs make people as learners smarter, or, on the contrary, make them reason/think less? The author discusses the concepts of human and artificial intelligence and examines LLMs as advanced AI systems, which use deep learning techniques and can be considered as excelling in neural network architectures, data volume, generalisation and scalability. The author suggests that while LLMs can assist in facilitating numerous cognitive tasks, more research and philosophical inquiry is needed to understand whether such kind of AI assistance would make people cultivate human intelligence more, and not less. Presumably, Large Language Models (LLMs) can contribute to human intelligence and cognition just under strict (addressed existing limitations, questioning prompting, time-sensitivity, etc.) conditions. However, it is important that these theoretical considerations could be verified by experimental research.
... Changes in the structuring of UK higher education adumbrated above, culminating in the art schools being incorporated within the university sector by 1992 (and thereafter eligible for inclusion in the national research assessment exercises, RAE 1996and the research excellence framework, REF 2014, have revealed the confusion over the status of research in the visual arts as a means of contributing to knowledge and understanding. This confusion has been exacerbated because university research regulations still remain vague about what knowledge and understanding mean in the context of the visual arts, while tacitly prioritising propositional knowledge, traditionally assumed to involve "[…] justified true belief […]" (Gettier, 1963), over other types of knowledge. Niedderer (2007a, pp. ...
... However, while virtually all theorists agree that true belief is a necessary condition for propositional knowledge, there is a longstanding refutation of the condition of justification, as demonstrated by Edmund Gettier (1963), famous in Anglo-American epistemology for his article attacking the tripartite definition of knowledge. This defines "S knows that p" as: ...
Purpose-This study aims to offer an original criterion of assessment for examiners of practice-based doctorates in contemporary arts practices, based upon the degree of intrigue, perceptual and conceptual, afforded by the research outputs. It is argued that intrigue is the necessary stimulus for the states of attention required for the recognition of fresh understanding and the acquisition of new knowledge from such outputs. The paper is intended to support doctoral students structuring theses for such research, those responsible for assessing proposals in university cross-disciplinary research committees with limited experience of practice-based research and the examiners of such research. Design/methodology/approach-Acknowledging the several decades of work already published on practice-based research, this study adopts an aesthetic cognitivist position from which the visual arts are construed as powerful means of deepening our understanding, a source of non-propositional knowledge on a par with, although qualitatively different from, the way that the sciences are accepted as the means to propositional knowledge. Findings-A case study demonstrates the efficacy of applying the proposed criterion in the assessment of practice-based doctoral research. Social implications-Within the social context of academic research, the article strengthens the validation of practice-based research. Originality/value-The terms perceptual intrigue and conceptual intrigue are coined as values implicit in aesthetic cognitivism; they are construed as the initial stimuli for the state of attentiveness required for fresh understanding, and the degree of balance between them is proposed as an original criterion for the assessment of practice-based research.
... The classical view, which some trace back to Plato, is that knowledge is simply justified true belief (JTB). There are well-known counterexamples to this view: cases of true justified beliefs that fall short of knowledge, famously highlighted by Gettier (1963). In trying to deal with this problem, many have proposed revisions to the JTB analysis (e.g., Clark, 1963), either adding further conditions or replacing the justification condition altogether (e.g., Goldman, 1967). ...
... While Maxi is away, his sister Anna takes a piece of the chocolate, then considers where to put the rest, and decides to put it back in the green cupboard. Phillips and colleagues argue that, at this point, Maxi has a true belief which is justified yet still "lucky", as in Gettier's (1963) famous cases: it is reasonable for Maxi to expect his chocolate to be where he put it, but in fact his sister Anna moved it and could have decided to put it somewhere else (e.g., in the other cupboard). Four-and-a-half-year-olds performed poorly on this task (Fabricius et al., 2010(Fabricius et al., , p. 1406, suggesting they cannot yet attribute mere beliefs. ...
The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge.
... Tras lo dicho anteriormente, los más sagaces dirán que por la justificación, para poder saber si una creencia verdadera es un conocimiento habrá que comprobar si su justificación es suficiente para considerarlo conocimiento. Esta noción del término perduró durante mucho tiempo; no fue hasta la publicación de "¿Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" de Edmund Gettier (1963) en donde se nos presentan diversas situaciones en las que la definición de conocimiento dada es insuficiente. Si bien justificamos las creencias verdaderas para escapar de la incertidumbre y de tener creencias por mera suerte, las propias justificaciones también son susceptibles de ser por mero azar o suerte. ...
Ante un mundo tecnológico en el cual lo que prima es la ciencia, se vuelve menester hacer un análisis crítico de la misma. Con esta premisa, tiene origen el escrito que hoy presentamos. Nuestro objetivo será buscar mecanismos y esquemas que nos permitan evaluar y comprender el funcionamiento de la ciencia, y, sobre todo, cómo se toman decisiones dentro de ella. Entender cómo se establece el conocimiento científico y qué lo justifica es un eje central dentro de esta explicación. Con ello, nuestra intención será proponer un esquema para evaluar y detectar ciertas situaciones irregulares dentro de la ciencia; las cuales van en contra de la visión que se ha popularizado de la misma, e incluso de la perspectiva que la comunidad científica quiere dar. Nuestro cometido hoy es desmitificar la ciencia, exponer su estructura y desarrollo, con la intención de permitir una visión más cercana a la práctica científica a mano de toda persona que se lo proponga. Para hacernos con esa herramienta de análisis anteriormente nombrada partiremos del conocimiento científico y su justificación; para después centrarnos en un modelo en específico: el coherentismo. A partir del mismo, exploraremos cómo se toman ciertas decisiones que escapan de lo que consideraríamos “científico” y dan lugar a ciertas situaciones que parecen anómalas dentro de la disciplina; y, posteriormente, dan lugar a manipulaciones del conocimiento.
... Philosophers rely on judgments about hypothetical scenarios to analyze the application conditions of many concepts. Early analyses of the concept of knowledge held that a person knows that p (where p is any proposition) if any only if p is true and the person is justified in believing p. Gettier (1963) developed thought experiments that swiftly led nearly all professional philosophers to reject that analysis. We adapt our vignette from Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich's (2001) version of the thought experiment. ...
Humans usually reason in groups. Yet contemporary reasoning research relies almost exclusively on people solving problems alone. This failure of ecological validity partly reflects the difficulty of running group-reasoning studies on crowd-work platforms such as mTurk. In response we developed Socrates: an open-source, easy-to-use, online platform for conducting discussion-based studies on any topic. In four pre-registered experiments (N = 1672) and with a range of canonical reasoning problems, we show that participants who talk with a dissenting peer score three to four times better than those who reason about the same stimuli alone. To our knowledge, these improvements exceed those found using any intervention that does not involve discussion. Our findings underline the importance of studying reasoning in argumentative contexts-its natural home-and we show how this can be done affordably and at scale. We conclude by exploring the implications of this line of inquiry for our understanding of how human reasoning works, how it should be measured, and how it can be improved.
... ¿Es de por sí el testimonio un procedimiento fiable para formar creencias verdaderas o no lo es de por sí, y en consecuencia hay que demostrar que su fiabilidad es prestada por el ejercicio 1 La definición platónica se encuentra en el famoso pasaje de 202c7-8. En cuanto al paradigma contemporáneo el locus classicus es Gettier (1963). Para la historia de este paradigma véase Dutant (2015). ...
El estudio de la epistemología del testimonio en la Ilustración escocesa, especialmente de las posturas que la bibliografía actual considera antagónicas, las de los filósofos coetáneos David Hume y Thomas Reid, puede ayudar a entender en qué debates se columbraban ya entonces algunas de las ideas rectoras del pragmatismo, especialmente las relaciones entre prácticas, aprendizaje y justificación. Una reflexión sobre el acto de habla del testimonio, tal como lo concibió Reid en sus principales obras, puede proporcionarnos una idea de cómo la justificación al aceptar creencias verdaderas mediante la aserción de los demás solo es explicable y deja der ser problemática en el contexto de una red institucional donde la conversación, el aprendizaje y los pactos se hacen bajo la égida de unos principios compartidos y de una idea común del desarrollo humano.
... Thus, in the traditional framework, Plato explores the idea that knowledge is something more than mere true belief, requiring justification. (Chisholm, 1989) However, this definition is limited by its inability to address scenarios like those presented by Gettier, where justified true beliefs may fail to constitute genuine knowledge (Gettier, 1963). Refinements, such as reliabilism (Goldman, 1979) and virtue epistemology (Sosa, 2007), shift the focus to the reliability of belief-forming processes and intellectual virtues. ...
... Logical reasoning is another crucial internalist issue, incorporating deductive inference, mechanism-based thinking and theoretical extrapolation (Suppes 1960;Vasey et al., 2021). Additionally, modifying factors such as cognitive biases, heuristics and decisionmaking fallacies are recognized for their potential to distort judgment (Gettier 1963 The next step consists of numerical assignment of values to each source. This involves the allocation of weighted scores reflecting the relative reliability and influence of each knowledge source. ...
Medical decision-making relies on scientific data to ensure accurate diagnoses and effective treatments. However, in many real-world scenarios, medical data may be incomplete, unreliable or conflicting, leaving clinicians with significant uncertainty. We propose a pragmatic and structured approach to medical judgment when sufficient empirical evidence is unavailable. We build a heuristic model that integrates multiple sources of knowledge-including evidence-based medicine levels, expert consensus, individual clinical experience, logical reasoning and cognitive biases-to derive a quantifiable degree of belief in a given treatment decision. Each source is assigned a weighted value and their cumulative score determines whether a proposed medical intervention should be accepted or rejected. Unlike traditional Bayesian models, which rely on probabilistic updates, our method prioritizes pragmatic decision-making through an aggregation of both statistical and non-statistical evidence. Our approach integrates both subjective and collective knowledge, emphasizing the central role of clinical expertise and contextual factors in medical practice when evidence-based medicine is insufficient. Through a hypothetical case study on antibiotic administration, we illustrate the practical application of our model. We conclude that our heuristic belief-aggregation model, by formalizing the weighting of diverse epistemic sources-including pragmatic reasoning-enhances decision-making in ambiguous medical contexts where conventional empirical validation is unavailable.
... But, plausibly, we sometimes use substantive and contentful concepts even if we are unable to articulate their definition. It is doubtful that we can articulate a definition of knowledge (as shown by the failure of post-Gettier analyses (Gettier, 1963;Williamson, 2000)), but the concept of knowledge still seems substantive and contentful. The same might hold for concepts of cause, existence, goodness, etc. ...
Ulysses, the strong illusionist, sails towards the Strait of Definitions. On his left, Charybdis defines “phenomenal consciousness” in a loaded manner, which makes it a problematic entity from a physicalist and naturalistic point of view. This renders illusionism attractive, but at the cost of committing a potential strawman against its opponents – phenomenal realists. On the right, Scylla defines “phenomenal consciousness” innocently. This seems to render illusionism unattractive. Against this, I show that Ulysses can pass the Strait of Definitions. He should sail straight towards Scylla. Supposedly innocent definitions land a concept that makes illusionism attractive without committing a strawman. Indeed, this concept, which captures what the phenomenal realist means, is explicitly innocent but implicitly loaded. Beyond the Strait lies another danger: the Sirens of Redefinitions. They incite our hero to redefine his terms to salvage verbally (weak) phenomenal realism – judged preferable to overt strong illusionism. Ulysses should resist the Sirens’ songs and choose overt strong illusionism over its weak realist reformulation.
... Tras lo dicho anteriormente, los más sagaces dirán que por la justificación, para poder saber si una creencia verdadera es un conocimiento habrá que comprobar si su justificación es suficiente para considerarlo conocimiento. Esta noción del término perduró durante mucho tiempo; no fue hasta la publicación de "¿Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" de Edmund Gettier (1963) en donde se nos presentan diversas situaciones en las que la definición de conocimiento dada es insuficiente. Si bien justificamos las creencias verdaderas para escapar de la incertidumbre y de tener creencias por mera suerte, las propias justificaciones también son susceptibles de ser por mero azar o suerte. ...
... Tras lo dicho anteriormente, los más sagaces dirán que por la justificación, para poder saber si una creencia verdadera es un conocimiento habrá que comprobar si su justificación es suficiente para considerarlo conocimiento. Esta noción del término perduró durante mucho tiempo; no fue hasta la publicación de "¿Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" de Edmund Gettier (1963) en donde se nos presentan diversas situaciones en las que la definición de conocimiento dada es insuficiente. Si bien justificamos las creencias verdaderas para escapar de la incertidumbre y de tener creencias por mera suerte, las propias justificaciones también son susceptibles de ser por mero azar o suerte. ...
... The closest thing would be the open peer commentary format that exists in, for example, the American Journal of Bioethics. However, philosophical scholarship has also made use of the criterion of brevityas can be seen in notorious and highly cited examples of one-page articles within philosophy (for example, see Carroll 1895;Gettier 1963;Evans 1978). Analysis and Thought are two leading philosophy journals both committed to conciseness in articles, with a maximum cutoff of 4,500 words. ...
Letters to the editor (LTEs) are a versatile short-format forum with unique characteristics to allow for cross-pollination of different kinds of philosophical reflection about medicine. Philosophical LTEs have both benefits and possible drawbacks. We draw on a case study to warn against misuse through "CV inflation," where low-quality ideas may favor a scholar's publishing metrics more than scholarly debate. Factual inaccuracies in LTEs have implications for authors, publishing, and indexing, and we argue for prudence by editors and restraint by scholars, inviting them to focus on quality, rather than the quantity of LTEs published. When writing LTEs, rigor, readability, and relevance are needed.
... The major manifestation of such a tendency is a branch called virtue epistemology (VE). Born in A. Goldman's works (Goldman, 1979) as one of the possible solutions to Gettier's problem (Gettier, 1963), VE was based on the idea that the reliability of justification lies in one's cognitive processes, namely in perception and apperception. These processes Goldman called virtues, because they (a) belong to an individual; (b) provide more knowledge than ignorance (namely, are reliable); (c) may have normative aspect (being good or bad for an agent) derived from their desirability to succesfully obtain knowledge. ...
Review of: Kasavin, I.T., and A.O. Kostina. 2024. Epistemologiya dobrodeteley [Virtue Epistemology]: tsennostno-normativnyy obraz sub’’yekta poznaniya [Value-normative Image of Cognitive Agent] [in Russian]. Moskva [Moscow] and Sankt-Peterburg [Saint Petersburg]: Tsentr gumanitarnykh initsiativ [Centre of Humanities Enterprise Publishing].
... The sorts of hypotheses typically tested by philosophical thought experiments are hypotheses concerning categories of interest for philosophers (such as, MORAL PERMISSIBILITY, CAUSATION, KNOWLEDGE, ETC.). Trolley cases are used to test hypotheses about moral permissibility (Thomson, 1985), preemption cases used to test hypotheses about causation (Hall, 2004), Gettier cases used to test hypotheses about knowledge (Gettier, 1963;Goldman, 1976), zombie cases used to test hypotheses about mental states (Chalmers, 1996), etc. The hypotheses at stake, I will hold, can be characterized as theoretical identifications detailing the instantiation conditions of the targeted categories; otherwise put, theoretical identifications detailing what it takes for any of those categories to obtain. ...
This paper puts forward a new formulation of the experimentalist challenge to the method of cases. Unlike previous attempts to articulate the challenge, the one proposed is based on a clear characterization of the targeted philosophical methodology. The method of cases is explicated as a form of thought experimentation aimed at testing philosophical hypotheses with a distinctive modal force. Given this explication, the empirical evidence gathered by experimental philosophers concerning the instability of case judgments is shown to constitute a stumbling block for the validation of the method as a rational form of hypothesis testing. The experimental challenge is presented as the challenge to compellingly indicate how this stumbling block can be removed, and the method of cases validated as a form of thought experimentation suitable for rationally testing philosophical hypotheses. The challenge, as presented in the text, is shown to be free from all the main criticisms leveled at previous versions of it and as one not yet met.
... The first and second conjuncts formalize the justified true belief, and the third and fourth conjuncts formalize the sensitivity and adherence conditions respectively. It is known that the above account of knowledge resolves the Gettier examples ( [22]). We only formalize Gettier's second example which is more simple. ...
The purpose of this paper is to introduce justification logics based on conditional logics. We introduce a new family of logics, called conditional justification logics, which incorporates a counterfactual conditional in its language. For the semantics, we offer relational models that merge the selection-function semantics of conditional logics with the relational semantics of justification logics. As an application, we formalize Nozick's counterfactual conditions in his analysis of knowledge and investigate their connection to Aumann's concepts of knowledge. Additionally, we explore Gettier's counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis, as well as McGinn's counterexamples to Nozick's analysis of knowledge. Furthermore, we introduce a justification logic that includes a relevant counterfactual conditional and we demonstrate the variable-sharing property for this conditional. We also develop a tableau system for this logic and establish its completeness with respect to Routley relational models. Finally, we formalize Nozick's counterfactual conditions using this relevant counterfactual conditional and represent the sheep in the field example of Chisholm within this logic.
... 2). She argues that belief with such contents constitutes knowledge under the same conditions as belief with non-probabilistic contents, e.g. when the subject is not in a Gettier case or a fake barn case (Gettier, 1963;Goldman, 1976). Correspondingly, MD's risk assessment -his belief that P is not at risk, or has a very low risk of recurring breast cancer -can be taken as a belief with a probabilistic content, which ascribes a low probability to the possibility that P will have breast cancer. ...
Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given the system’s opacity, as well as the possibility of malfunctioning AI systems, practitioners’ inability to check the correctness of their outputs, and the high stakes of such cases, the knowledge of medical practitioners is indeed undermined. They are lucky to form true beliefs based on the AI systems’ outputs, and knowledge is incompatible with luck. We supplement this claim with a specific version of the safety condition on knowledge, Safety*. We argue that, relative to the perspective of the medical doctor in our example case, his relevant beliefs could easily be false, and this despite his evidence that the AI system functions reliably. Assuming that Safety* is necessary for knowledge, the practitioner therefore doesn’t know. We address three objections to our proposal before turning to practical suggestions for improving the epistemic situation of medical doctors.
... Gettier (1963). 2 Si veda quanto scrisse in proposito NiclaVassallo (2013), nella ricorrenza del cinquantennio dell'articolo. 3 L'esperimento mentale di Gettier tratta di datori di lavoro e monete (nel primo esempio) e di auto e luoghi (nel secondo). ...
An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opinion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepticism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemology may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches.
... As we explore the philosophical implications of attributing mental states to AI, it is crucial to examine the epistemological foundations of knowledge and belief through the lenses of developmental psychology and sociology. In traditional epistemology, knowledge is typically defined as justified true belief-a concept that encompasses not only the possession of accurate information but also the justification for believing that information to be true (Gettier, 1963). This tripartite model of knowledge has been central to philosophical discourse, particularly in its attempts to delineate the boundaries between mere belief and genuine knowledge. ...
This theoretical paper offers an in-depth examination of the intersection between Theory of Mind (ToM) and artificial intelligence (AI), drawing on developmental psychology and philosophical analysis. By investigating the key developmental stages at which children begin to understand that others have distinct mental states, the paper provides a framework for assessing the cognitive boundaries of AI systems. It critically interrogates the pervasive human inclination to anthropomorphize machines, particularly through the attribution of complex mental states like “knowing,” “thinking,” or “believing” to AI entities that lack subjective experience. The paper argues that AI, while capable of simulating cognitive processes, operates without the conscious awareness that defines human cognition, raising profound epistemological and ethical questions. It explores the broader implications of this projection for society, considering how our conceptualization of AI affects both technological development and social structures. Ultimately, this interdisciplinary inquiry calls for a more nuanced understanding of the distinctions between human and machine cognition, advocating for responsible approaches to AI as its capabilities evolve.
... Note that to engage with the Gettier problem in the form originally stated by Edmund Gettier[11], being the correspondence of conjunctions and disjunctions on states, we are going to need more advanced Aethic reasoningnamely the Aethic union principle. Such can be an exercise for the reader. ...
The quantum measurement problem is one of the most profound challenges in modern physics, questioning how and why the wavefunction collapses during measurement to produce a single observable outcome. In this paper, we propose a novel solution through a logical framework called Aethic reasoning, which reinterprets the ontology of time and information in quantum mechanics. Central to this approach is the Aethic principle of extrusion, which models wavefunction collapse as progression along a Markov chain of block universes, effectively decoupling the Einsteinian flow of time from quantum collapse events. This principle introduces an additional degree of freedom to time, enabling the first Aethic postulate: that informational reality is reference-dependent, akin to the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity. This reference point, or Aethus, is rigorously defined within a mathematical structure. Building on this foundation, the second postulate resolves the distinction between quantum superpositions and logical contradictions by encoding superpositions in a “backend” Aethic framework before rendering observable states. The third postulate further distinguishes quantum coherence from decoherence using a two-generational model of state inheritance, potentially advancing beyond simpler interpretations of information leakage. Together, these postulates yield a direct theoretical derivation of the collapse postulate, fully consistent with empirical results such as the outcome of the double-slit experiment. By addressing foundational aspects of quantum mechanics through a logically robust and philosophically grounded lens, this framework sheds new light on the measurement problem and offers a solid foundation for future exploration.
... La noción de virtud intelectual hizo su debut contemporáneo en el artículo de Ernest Sosa de 1980 "The Raft and the Pyramid". En ese momento, la epistemología analítica estaba repleta de propuestas de soluciones al problema de Gettier (Gettier, 1963), nuevas objeciones tanto al internalismo como al externalismo, y desacuerdos aparentemente intratables entre fundacionalistas y coherentistas. Sosa (1980) llegó a la entonces iconoclasta conclusión de que la noción de virtud intelectual podría ayudarnos a resolver el debate fundacionalismo-coherentismo. 2 Otra fuente autorizada dice aproximadamente lo mismo: ...
Una presentación típica afirma que la epistemología contemporánea de la virtud, concebida como un movimiento distintivo dentro de la epistemología, comenzó con el artículo de Ernest Sosa "La balsa y la pirámide", publicado en 1980. Tal versión es casi canónica. Este artículo presenta una narrativa diferente, es decir, la tesis contrafáctica (tal vez materialmente falsa y de alguna manera ilógica, aunque significativa) de que la epistemología de la virtud puede tener dos puntos de partida distintos y oportunos, respondiendo a los enigmas heredados del problema de Gettier. Por supuesto, nuestra intención no es discutir seis años ni negar la relevancia de "La balsa y la pirámide", sino mostrar que algunas páginas de "¿Cómo lo sabes?", un artículo publicado en 1974, fueron escritas en el espíritu propio de la epistemología de la virtud de Sosa e incluso están relacionadas internamente con su perspectiva general. probablemente incluyendo sus pasos más recientes. Como pretendemos demostrar, Sosa era consciente en 1974 de la novedad de su perspectivismo venidero, especialmente del aspecto normativo de una reflexión propiamente epistemológica, entonces claramente expresada: (1) en su énfasis en la condición del sujeto; (2) en la especificidad afirmada del interés epistémico; (3) en la noción de "estar en posición de conocer" (tanto a través de la cara negativa y prototípica de las situaciones de Magoo como de la descripción positiva de la figura del conocedor); y (4) incluso en una nueva definición de conocimiento, propia del campo de la epistemología de la virtud. Como dijimos en nuestra conclusión, la comunidad filosófica debería celebrar los 50 años de la epistemología de la virtud dos veces, a partir de 2024. Después de todo, 1974 fue un año brillante para la investigación epistemológica; 1980, también. En este espíritu de reflexión, todos nos beneficiamos de celebrar muchas veces la hermosa y singular aventura intelectual de Sosa.
... Gettier cases are the classic example of this sort. In such cases, it is not about the capacity of the knower that is lucky, or that the knower is lucky to have the evidence, or lucky that the fact obtains, but that it is lucky that that belief is true (Gettier, 1963). The luck in question destroys or in some sense undermines the relation between the would-be knower and the fact. ...
Is knowledge a uniform kind? If not, what relation do the different kinds of knowledge bear to one another? Is there a central notion of knowledge which other kinds of knowledge must be understood in terms of? In this paper, I use Aristotle’s theory of homonyms as a framework to make progress on these questions. I argue that knowledge is not a uniform kind but rather a core-dependent homonym. To demonstrate this, I focus on knowledge by acquaintance. I argue that the principles that govern propositional knowledge cannot govern knowledge by acquaintance. I then develop analogue principles for knowledge by acquaintance and show why, despite their different modal profiles, knowledge by acquaintance is nevertheless a form of knowledge. I then show that the analysis of propositional knowledge fundamentally depends on knowledge by acquaintance.
... Thus, Smith's belief in the disjunction is true. (adapted from Gettier, 1963; see de Grefte, 2023, p.533) Given that Smith formulates the second disjunct randomly, he could easily have formed other false beliefs regarding the whereabouts of Brown. Thus, this case involves veritic luck, as defined above. ...
Many agree that Gettier cases have refuted the traditional, tripartite analysis of knowledge. In a recent article, de Grefte (Erkenntnis 88(2):531–549, 2023) offers an interesting and novel defense of the tripartite analysis. As he argues, Gettier cases necessarily involve ‘veritic luck’ and a plausible modal version of reliabilism can exclude such luck. Thus, insofar as the justification condition is understood along this reliabilist line, Gettier cases do not refute tripartite analysis, as the justification condition is unsatisfied in these cases. I argue that Gettier cases do not necessarily involve veritic luck, so an anti-veritic luck justification condition does not succeed in explaining these cases. In the end, I sketch an alternative and more plausible diagnosis of Gettier cases.
... The problem is twofold: on the one hand, the black box may be producing false beliefs, and the researchers may not understand enough to reject them; on the other hand, the black box may be producing true beliefs that nonetheless have no understandable justification. In this sense, the black box case bears some resemblance to a so-called "Gettier Case," a case in which random chance nontrivially affects the justification of knowledge (Gettier, 1963). Like a stopped clock may be correct twice per day, a black box model may be correct sometimes but may be incorrect other times, for reasons that may be entirely contingent and independent of justificatory procedure. ...
Imagine that you can summarize and analyze the “Great Unread”, all the works of literature in human history, but only by feeding it through a “Black Box”, an algorithm that nobody fully understands. Does the output have explanatory value? If so, what kind?
... Taking a closer look at some of these cases reveals that it is social reflection, as opposed to individual reflection, that is doing most of the explanatory work. For instance, due to the debate on knowledge provoked by Gettier (1963), most philosophers now subscribe to the negative thesis that whatever else knowledge might be, it is not merely justified true belief. Moreover, most philosophers now have a better understanding of the constraints on knowledge. ...
Against philosophical orthodoxy, Kornblith (2012) has mounted an empirically grounded critique of the epistemic value of reflection. In this paper, I argue that this recent critique fails even if we concede that the empirical facts are as Kornblith says they are, and assume that reliability is the only determinant of epistemic value. The critique fails because it seeks to undermine the reliability of reflection in general but targets only one of its variants, namely individual reflection, while neglecting social reflection. This critique comprises two arguments which have a common structure: they both impose a requirement on the reliability of reflection, but deny, on empirical grounds, that the requirement is met. One argument imposes an introspection requirement, which I reject as superfluous. I show how reflection can proceed without introspection. The other argument imposes an efficacy requirement. This requirement concerns whether reflection is causally efficacious i.e., whether it leads us to change our minds for the better. I accept this as a genuine requirement. Even if we concede that individual reflection fails to meet this requirement, I argue that we have not been given sufficient evidence to believe that social reflection is bound to violate this requirement. Furthermore, my analysis of the conditions under which social reflection works best provides us with prima facie grounds for optimism regarding the reliability of social reflection. Ultimately, then, these arguments fail to undermine the epistemic value of reflection in general.
... Since Gettier[67], most philosophers agree that knowledge requires more than justified true belief, but there is no general agreement on what more is required. Since our focus is on the differences between belief and knowledge, where there is much wider agreement (in particular, concerning the status of truth and justification as necessary conditions for knowledge), we will not assume any particular view on the exact characterization of knowledge. ...
As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.
... are too vague to be answered. Beliefs can be lucky in numerous ways, and scenarios now labeled as "Gettier cases" bear little relation to one another and to those originally discussed by the philosopher Edmond Gettier (1963), who they are named after. Moreover, people are sensitive to these differences. ...
... These cases represent the most common and classical ones in CE and generally concern deficiencies regarding the use of a certain concept in everyday language. Haslanger (2000) on the concepts "woman" and "man," Appiah (1996) on "race," Railton (1989) on moral concepts, Gettier (1963) on "knowledge," and Clark and Chalmers (1998) on the notion of mind 1 are all examples of ameliorative strategies that change the concept, while keeping the lexical item to refer to it. ...
Critical discussions can often require conceptual engineering, a process in which speakers are engaged in revising each other’s concepts. We show that the analysis of conceptual engineering can benefit from integrating argumentation theory with models of conceptual representation. Argumentation theory accounts for the argumentative moves of the discussants, allowing the detection of speakers’ conceptual disagreements, for which some fallacies can be seen as cues. Models of conceptual representation, such as Conceptual spaces and the theory of meeting of minds, allow us to study the cognitive side of engineering practices. However, when this integrated framework is applied to practical scenarios, conceptual engineering faces different challenges. In particular, assuming a psychological view about concepts, revisionary strategies are significantly narrowed down, if not impossible, in practice. These criticisms lead to a kind of dilemma for conceptual engineers, highlighting the necessity of further work on the definition of concept embraced by this research program.
According to the Doctrine of Normative Defeat (‘the DND’), you may lose justification to believe that p if you fail to possess negatively relevant evidence that you ought to possess. This paper presents an objection to the DND as it’s standardly developed: it carries with it an absurd implication regarding how one’s knowledge can be restored once one’s associated epistemic justification is presumed to be normatively defeated. I defend the force of this objection before closing with a note about what my argument means for the DND’s motivation.
Sinopsis: Este libro es una introducción integral y actualizada a la epistemología, concebido como texto de consulta para estudiantes y docentes universitarios. A lo largo de seis capítulos, expone de forma clara y reflexiva las principales corrientes, problemas y enfoques que han dado forma al estudio del conocimiento, desde los clásicos como Platón, Aristóteles, Descartes y Kant, hasta autores contemporáneos como Foucault, Harding, Haraway, Popper, Kuhn y Feyerabend. Cada capítulo ha sido cuidadosamente elaborado con referencias actuales, abordando temas como la epistemología crítica, feminista, decolonial y algorítmica, lo que permite comprender cómo influyen el lenguaje, el poder, la tecnología y los contextos culturales en la producción del saber. Con un lenguaje accesible y rigor académico, este libro no solo explica teorías, sino que invita al lector a cuestionar las bases del conocimiento, sus límites y sus implicancias sociales. Es, por tanto, una obra útil tanto para cursos universitarios de filosofía, ciencias sociales y educación, como para cualquier lector interesado en pensar críticamente sobre cómo construimos lo que llamamos “verdad”.
The aim of writing this paper is to examine and analyze issues related to knowledge from traditional and socio cultural perspectives-Social epistemology. Social epistemology or Social theory of Knowledge is an understanding of knowledge from social perspectives and it attempts to answer epistemological questions in a systematic and satisfactory manners. It is argued that traditionally maintained conditions of knowledge are not sufficient since they are more individualistic in nature. Social conditions of knowledge, on the other hand, are based on social values that emphasize more on utility of knowledge in a social context and its connection with the social structures and power relations.
En este artículo se estudia la epistemología del filósofo mexicano Luis Villoro y se propone que la suya no es una epistemología relativista sino una que da importancia al aspecto práctico del conocimiento, que se construye desde la perspectiva de los sujetos en un contexto práctico. Luego de evidenciar este aspecto, se dan a conocer los novedosos puntos de vista que ofrece Villoro a dos argumentos contemporáneos en el contexto anglosajón, que son “la ética de la creencia” y “la epistemología de la virtud”.
This article evaluates the increasing prominence of morphological analysis as an approach within ideology studies. It explores sixteen different ways to analyse ideas and ideologies through a morphological lens, which are the result of four successive analytical choices. The first choice is between looking at ideologies or at the concepts they comprise. The second concerns whether these are to be analysed in either a holistic or disaggregated way. The third choice is about whether to look at the denotative meanings or the connotations of ideological and conceptual labels. The final choice is about examining how the meanings of ideologies and concepts are determined by either their internal logic or their surrounding context. Ideology theorists can follow these four choices down a total of sixteen "decision tree" pathways to reach the particular form of morphological analysis they decide to use. These forms can also be framed as sixteen morphological "roles" that ideology theorists can choose to play when they carry out ideological analyses.
Review: Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23.6 (1963)
The JTB definition of knowledge has been shown by Gettier to be incomplete:
its three conditions are necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. We argue that the JTB definition can be completed with a very simple fourth condition, namely that the justification for the belief in p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. It is shown that the resulting JTB+S definition solves the Gettier problem without giving rise to the opposite problem.
Every construction in a public language, every word, syntactic structure, idiom, every complex expression that is copied whole rather than reassembled by each speaker, has a stabilizing function. Performance of this stabilizing function is the reason for which, the explanation of why, the construction is retained in the language over time.
O presente trabalho demonstra, através de um argumento modal-epistêmico, que o ceticismo forte de Freud (compreendido aqui nos seguintes termos: não é possível saber que a interpretação analítica é o caso & não é possível dizer que a interpretação analítica não é o caso) em Construções em Análise é contraditório. Uma vez constatada esta contradição, propusemos um modelo Fuzzy como alternativa para avaliar o valor de verdade da interpretação psicanalítica. A metodologia utilizada seguiu uma perspectiva estruturada, começando com a revisão do conceito de interpretação, no texto Construções em Análise (Freud, 1937-1939). Em seguida, adaptamos a estrutura do argumento modal-epistêmico de Bertato (2023) ao ceticismo forte de Freud. Posteriormente, definimos nosso modelo Fuzzy para a força da interpretação bem como suas respectivas variáveis de entrada (reação do paciente & o que se segue à interpretação) e a variável de saída (força de interpretação). Por fim, apresentamos três simulações para validação do nosso modelo. Acreditamos que este trabalho oferece uma importante revisão do conceito freudiano de interpretação, contribuindo assim para o progresso do conhecimento psicanalítico.
The article analyzes the epistemological and ontological role of philosophical reflection. Philosophical reflection is defined as knowledge about knowledge, or knowledge of the second order, which is built over knowledge of the first order. The question is raised whether philosophical reflection is lim-ited to the field of epistemology. The traditional epistemological concept of philosophical reflection is considered, accord-ing to which reflection carries out the justifi-cation of knowledge, separating justified true beliefs (knowledge in the true sense) from doubtful or false opinions. The connection of this concept with philosophical fundamental-ism is analyzed. It is shown that anti-fundamentalist tendencies in modern analyti-cal epistemology lead to skepticism about philosophical reflection. The infinite regress argument, put forward by H. Kornblith, demonstrates that there is no finite limit to epistemological (reflexive) justification of knowledge. Two perspectives of overcoming skepticism about reflection are presented. Both of these perspectives are defined as on-tological. The first relates to the philosophical project of naturalization of knowledge and, in particular, reflection. Naturalization of reflec-tion presupposes its translation into terms of actually existing, i.e. observed physical pro-cesses. It is shown that with this approach, the specificity of reflection as second-order knowledge is erased. Knowledge of the sec-ond order, translated into terms of observa-tion, has no qualitative difference from knowledge of the first order and does not carry any normative meaning. The second per-spective of preserving the constructive role of reflection is called transcendental. It is shown that with this approach, philosophical reflec-tion is interpreted as second-order knowledge, revealing the conceptual condi-tions of the possibility of first-order knowledge. Knowledge of the second order, translated into terms of observation, has no qualitative difference from knowledge of the first order and does not carry any normative meaning. The second perspective of preserv-ing the constructive role of reflection is called transcendental. It is shown that with this ap-proach, philosophical reflection is interpreted as second-order knowledge, revealing the conceptual conditions of the possibility of first-order knowledge. It is shown under what conditions this transcendental work of reflec-tion can be considered an ontological work.
This paper presents a counterexample to the view that moral knowledge is necessary for moral worth. Justified true beliefs that an action is right confer the same degree of moral worth, whether or not they constitute knowledge. This is demonstrated with an example called "Texting the Rabbi" in which two people receive answers to moral questions – one from a wise rabbi, the other from a thief who stole the rabbi's phone and gives the same answer as the rabbi by chance. While this makes the questioners differ in moral knowledge, it creates no difference in moral worth.
Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions.
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