1. E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen (Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1950) p. 47.
2. E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle, Niemeyer, 1929) p. 8.
3. Cart. Med., p. 9.
4. E. Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", Logos, I (1910) p. 341.
5. Cart. Med., p. 63.
6. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Halle, Niemeyer, 4. Aufl., 1928) B. II, Teil I, p. 1.
7. E. Husserl, Erfahrung und
... [Show full abstract] Urteil (Hamburg, Claasen & Goverts, 1948) p. 38 ff.
8. The use of the term "natural" in Husserl signifies the spatial, sensible, non-metaphysical, non-spiritual, and includes the realm of the positive sciences, what is knowable and measurable by the methods of these sciences.
9. Erfahrung, p. 40 ff.
10. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, I, (1913), (Neue Aufl., Ausg. Biemel, 3. Bd., Haag, Nijhoff, 1950, 1952), B. I, p. 43. (Note: All references from the first book of Ideen corresponds to the pagination of the earlier edition.)
11. M. Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. P., 1943) pp. 448 ff.
12. Ideen, I, p. 74 f.
13. To hold that this aspect of Husserl's description of the knowledge process is the same as that of the Empiricists in the sense of a scientific sensism, seems to be an unwarranted interpretation, based on the assumption that there is no similarity between empirical knowledge and essential knowledge in Husserl. This position is advanced by A. Brunner, La personne incarnée, (Paris, Beauchesne, 1947) pp. 83 ff.
14. E. Husserl Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Ausg. Biemel, Haag, Nijhoff, 1950) p. 31.
15. Farber, Found., pp. 459 ff.
16. This interpretation of intuition in a universal sense seems to me more in accord with the basic intention of phenomenology than the other which would exclude intuition from the later "constitutional" phenomenology.
17. Erfahrung, p. 398.
18. Ideen II, p. 91.
19. Die Idee, p. 70.
20. Variations are diverse modes in which one and the same thing can appear, and are intended as a technique of finding the one in the manifold of its manifestations, a problem common to all knowledge.
21. Ideen II, p. 34.
22. E. Husserl, Mss. K III 12 (1935) p. 12, in: Husserl-Archiv, (Louvain).
23. Erfahrung, p. 419.
24. Ideen II, par. 15-18; Mss. K III 12, pp. 12-20.
25. Apparently the methodology of free variation is merely a specific application (or possibly merely a different terminology) for the basic phenomenological concept of the intentionality of conscious processes and their correlative objects. Actually the method of free variation is primarily limited by Husserl to the investigation of the eidetic sciences, the formal and material ontologies, which would seem to be identical with the noematic aspect of intentional analysis, spoken of in Cart. Med. and the static intentional analysis of Formale und transcend. Logik. The actual unfolding of variants is due to the intentionality of the experienced content. In the eidetic sciences no attempt is made to trace back the eidos to their origins in constitutive noetic-noematic functions of transcendental consciousness.
26. Cart. Med. p. 60.
27. Husserl's analysis on intentionality and the attitude toward given phenomena are not only of psychological utility in explaining one's interests and pursuits, e. g., different intentionalitics motivating a doctor and politician dealing with the same person, but also of theoretical significance in opening new fields of investigation through the discovery of the hidden intentionalities in the givenness of certain phenomena.
28. Ideen I, par. 30.
29. Ideen I, p. 12.
30. Ideen I, p. 16.
31. Ideen I, p. 13.
32. Ideen I, p. 39.
33. Ideen I, p. 280. Elsewhere in an apparent attempt to go beyond a descriptive statement to an ontological consideration Husserl says that eidetic existence is the relation of noema to essence, since every noema has a definitely determined sense. Must the sense of things be identified with its being? It is hardly intelligible that no connection would hold between the sense of a thing and its being. I understand the sense itself and at the same time attribute a certain ontological status to it, an ideal being, because it is unthinkable to suppose that the signification...