ArticlePDF Available

Abstract

El artículo parte del supuesto de que la situación de pobreza global existente es moralmente rechazable. El acuerdo existente sobre esta afirmación no implica que exista un acuerdo acerca de los deberes que se infieren de ella. En este trabajo, no se discute la naturaleza de estos deberes. Se discute un problema metodológico previo que se plantea cualquiera sea el punto de vista general acerca de la justicia global que se adopte (cosmopolita o asociacionista). El problema consiste en determinar cuál es el papel de las teorías empíricas dentro de una teoría normativa que, como mínimo, impone un deber general de eliminar o, al menos, de reducir, en la mayor medida posible, la pobreza global extrema. El objetivo del trabajo es crítico: mostrar que algunas de las teorías actuales más importantes acerca de la justicia global no toman en cuenta del modo adecuado las teorías empíricas acerca de la pobreza global.The paper assumes that global poverty is morally objectionable. The widespread agreement on this claim does not entail an agreement about the nature of the duties involved. However, I do not discuss the nature of those duties. Rather, I address a methodological problem that arises, whatever position about global justice we might endorse. The problem is about the status of empirical theories within a normative theory that, as a minimum, imposes the duty to eradicate, or at least to reduce, global poverty. The purpose of this paper is critical: I hold that some of the most important current theories on global justice do not take adequately into account empirical theories about global poverty.
Article
Full-text available
En este trabajo reconstruyo la estructura argumentativa del asociacionismo coercionista defendido por Michael Blake, que consta de dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica. Sostengo que ambas premisas pueden ser rechazadas, de manera indirecta (en el caso de la premisa empírica) o directa (en el caso de la premisa normativa). La conclusión es que el asociacionismo coercionista no prueba la existencia de una discontinuidad normativa entre el plano doméstico y el plano global.
Article
El debate acerca de la tortura puede dividirse, siguiendo la clasificación de McMahan, en dos niveles: teórico y práctico. En el primero se discute acerca de la permisibilidad moral de la tortura en circunstancias excepcionales y las características que la convierten en una práctica, prima facie, inmoral. En el segundo se evalúan las posibles consecuencias de diferentes modelos de legislación (absolutista, institucionalista y legalista) para dar una respuesta a las situaciones del mundo real. El presente trabajo se inscribe en este segundo nivel y se propone analizar críticamente las propuestas legislativas de Jeff McMahan y Alan Dershowitz. Asimismo, busca ofrecer una exploración preliminar de las ventajas del modelo legalista.
Article
The debate about torture can be divided, following McMahan’s classification, into two levels: theoretical and practical. In the first, there is a discussion about the moral permissibility of torture in exceptional circumstances and the characteristics that make torture a practice, prima facie, immoral. In the second, the possible consequences of different models of legislation intending to address the situations that obtain in the real world (absolutism, institutionalism and legalism) are evaluated. In this second level, this paper aims to critically analyze the legislative proposals of Jeff McMahan and Alan Dershowitz. It also seeks to offer a preliminary exploration of the advantages of the legalistic model.
Article
In this article I question David Miller and Laura Valentini's reasons to claim that duties to reduce inequalities inside the State should be prioritized over duties to reduce extreme global poverty. According to Miller, global duties, unlike domestic ones, cannot be legitimately enforced, and they are therefore mere humanitarian duties that weigh less than domestic duties, which are duties of justice. According to Valentini, domestic duties should be prioritized over global humanitarian duties because the former are duties not to harm, while the latter are mere duties to help. I argue that both views fail in their attempt to show that duties to reduce extreme global poverty are not duties ofjustice too.
Article
Full-text available
This article discusses the question of poverty and wealth in light of several theses put forward by Larry Temkin. The claim that there is a sort of cosmic injustice involved when great disparities of ability or of wealth are found. He is concerned especially about disparities that are undeserved. It is agreed that this is unfortunate, but not agreed that they are unjust in a sense that supports the imposition of rectification on anyone else. Nor is poverty typically undeserved in the only really relevant sense: the poor simply do not produce enough to earn them high incomes, and probably correct incomes they derive are indeed what such efforts are worth in the circumstances. That persons with very low incomes may merit our sympathy is accepted, but sympathy leads to charity, rather than to the involuntary exploitation of the better off. The essay concludes with further observations about the relevance of free markets, and points to the iniquities of the restrictions on commerce that are the most potent source of perpetuated poverty today.
Article
The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examination of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by three responses to the cosmopolitanism, – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals, the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national interest.