ArticlePDF Available

Competitive Altruism: Development of Reputation-based Cooperation in Groups

Authors:
  • VU University Amsterdam and University of Oxford
Competitive Altruism
1
Competitive Altruism:
Development of Reputation-based Cooperation in Groups
Mark Van Vugt, University of Kent
Gilbert Roberts, University of Newcastle
Charlie Hardy, University of Kent
Please do not cite or quote without permission from the authors
In R. Dunbar & L. Barrett (forthcoming), Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology
Oxford University Press: Oxford
Draft: 11 November 2005
Word count: 6835
Competitive Altruism
2
Abstract
This chapter advances a new theory of altruism, competitive altruism, which might
account for the uniquely moral altruistic tendency of humans. The need to form
coalitions with non-kin for dealing with internal and external group threats created
selective advantages for people with altruistic reputations. We present evidence from
the anthropological, social psychological and nonhuman literatures, which by and
large support competitive altruism theory. Finally, we discuss some implications of
this theory for the establishment of reputation-based cooperation in modern human
society.
Competitive Altruism
3
Competitive Altruism:
Development of Reputation-based Cooperation in Groups
The greater the difficulty the more glory in surmounting it.
Skilful pilots gain their reputation from storms and tempests.
-- Epictetus (Greek Philosopher, 55 – 135 AC)
Humans are a remarkably moral social species. Humans engage in heroic acts to save
the lives of complete strangers in emergencies, sometimes at substantial risk to
themselves (Becker & Eagly, 2004). They cooperate with each other to help needy
others, for example, spending time doing volunteer work, donating money to
charitable causes, paying taxes, and contributing to a better environment (Van Vugt,
Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000). Furthermore, human societies often reward people for
their altruistic contributions through medals for bravery in wars, statues for political
and military leaders, and awards for nurses and teachers. At the same time, they
punish those who fail to consider the interests of others, for example, public
condemnation of cheaters, imprisonment of criminals, and execution of army
deserters in wars (Levine & Moreland, 2002; Van Vugt & Chang, 2005).
The moral altruistic disposition of humans is also demonstrated in research on
the prisoner’s dilemma, a game involving a conflict between private and collective
interests (Dawes, 1980). When this game is played in the laboratory among
anonymous strangers in single interactions, hence there is really no incentive for
altruism, between 40-60% of people still cooperate (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).
Furthermore, when game interactions are being observed by third parties that have no
Competitive Altruism
4
involvement in the game, they are keen to punish non-cooperators even when
punishing is costly (Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). It seems humans are distinctively moral.
They readily empathise and cooperate with strangers and harm those who fail to do so
(Boyd & Richerson, in press).
How can we explain this moral altruistic tendency of our species? First, we
must be clear about what we mean by altruism and morality. We define altruism in
terms of a design to benefit others at a cost to oneself (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). In
psychology, altruism is defined in terms of a motivation to help (Batson, 1998; Sober
& Wilson, 1998). It is often assumed that this motivation is conscious, although this is
by no means necessary. Research suggests that humans are often not aware of why
they behave as they do (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
Moral altruism is defined as a design to reward altruists and punish non-
altruists. Moral altruists go one step further. They not just offer help, they also reward
helpers by making resources available to them while punishing non-altruists by taking
resources away from them (Alexander, 1987). This is consistent with Alexander’s
(1987) views on morality: “To establish moral rules is to impose rewards and
punishments (typically assistance and ostracism, respectively) to control social acts
that, respectively, help or hurt others.” (p. 77).
1
Moral altruism is akin to the notion of
strong reciprocity as coined by Fehr and Gaechter (2002), and moralistic aggression
as coined by Trivers (1971). What then is the evolutionary basis for human moral
altruism?
Kin Explanations of Moral Altruism: The‘Big Mistake’ Hypothesis
Humans are unique in their propensity to cooperate with non-relatives,
sometimes in very large groups. In other ultrasocial species, like the social insects,
highly cooperative societies are based exclusively on kinship (E.O. Wilson, 1975).
Competitive Altruism
5
The reason for this is derived from the logic of inclusive fitness, which was first
developed by Bill Hamilton (1964). According to this logic, natural selection favours
traits and behaviours that benefit an individual’s direct fitness or the fitness of
genetically related individuals -- the theory of inclusive fitness or kin selection. This
is not the place for a detailed treatment of kin selection theory. For more information
on the conditions under which altruism towards relatives evolves, see any
evolutionary biology text (e.g., Alcock, 1998).
Kin helping accounts for a substantial part of altruism in human society today.
Especially when the costs of helping are substantial, humans turn to their families for
practical, financial, and emotional assistance regardless of whether they live together
in a village in the Amazon (Hames, 1978) or are dispersed over a large country such
as the US (Amato, 1993). We literally travel the world to see our relatives and when
we die we leave our possessions to our descendants whether or not we like them
(Smith, Kish, & Crawford, 1987). There is no doubt that kin selection is a major force
in the evolution of altruism but to what extent can it account for the unique aspects of
human sociality and morality?
Some researchers have argued that cooperation with strangers is a relatively
recent cultural phenomenon. The genus Homo is about two million years old and
during most of that time humans probably lived in relatively small groups of kin
rather like their nonhuman primate cousins (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002). The
social dispositions of humans evolved in a very different environment than today’s
world where social groups consist of a mixture of kin and non-kin. If humans behave
altruistically towards others, it is because they erroneously believe they are dealing
with kin, according to the big mistake hypothesis (Boyd & Richerson, in press). The
mistake hypothesis argues that kin detection systems are imperfect because, being
Competitive Altruism
6
around kin for much of human history, there was no need to improve them. Instead
humans use cues, which are sometimes fallible, to distinguish between kin and non-
kin such as physical cues like facial similarity, behavioural cues like habits, and
cultural cues like language. These cues are important in deciding who to help. For
example, people are more likely help a stranger in an Email study if they happen to
share the same surname (Oates & Wilson, 2002). And, students trusted more money
to strangers with whom they shared facial resemblance (DeBruine, 2002).
It remains to be seen whether or not such cues activate a kin detection system,
and exactly how this could be empirically verified (for a promising procedure see
Park & Schaller, 2005). Furthermore, the fact that most cultures have detailed kin
classification systems suggests that humans are well aware of who is kin or not.
Finally, a misfired kin system cannot really account for the moral aspects of human
altruism, because there does not seem to be any inclusive benefits associated with
rewarding altruistic or punishing non-altruistic relatives, especially in interactions
with strangers.
Direct Reciprocity: From Small to Large Scale Cooperation
A different version of the big mistake hypothesis is that altruistic behaviours
in large groups are derived from adaptations for small group cooperation. The theory
of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) suggests that cooperation between two
individuals develops if they are able to “enlarge the shadow of the future” (Axelrod,
1984; p.126). Once people are locked in a relationship together, they can achieve
mutual cooperation by adopting a Tit-for-tat strategy whereby after an initial
cooperative move, each partner mimics the action of the other. Evidence shows that
direct reciprocity leads to a stable level of cooperation in both humans (Axelrod &
Competitive Altruism
7
Hamilton, 1981; Van Lange & Semin-Goosens, 1998) and other animals that live in
small stable groups such as vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984).
Some theorists have argued that adaptations for direct reciprocity could
account for the evolution of cooperation in large groups (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;
Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006). The main argument against this idea is that it does not
address the problem of free-riding. Statistically, large groups are more likely to suffer
from free-riders than small groups (Kerr, 1989). In small groups, free-riders can be
identified and kept in place through a Tit-for-tat strategy. Yet, in large groups, if
people respond to a non-altruist by withholding their contributions then others will
follow suit, pushing the group towards a non-cooperative equilibrium (Boyd &
Richerson, 1988). Further, direct reciprocity cannot explain why humans act morally
by altruistically rewarding and punishing othrs (Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). So the
question about the origins of human moral altruism remains.
Group Size, Indirect Reciprocity and Reputation Concerns
To understand the evolution of moral altruism, we must first understand why
humans formed alliances with non-relatives in ever larger groups. Extrapolating from
data on the relative neocortex size of modern humans, compared to early humans,
monkeys and apes, suggests that there has been a steady increase in average group
size in human evolution (Dunbar, 1992). There are different hypotheses regarding
selection pressures for an increased group size. One theory suggests that ecological
pressures forced humans onto the savannah where they were at risk from attacks by
predators (Dunbar, 2004). Furthermore, resources like food and waterholes would
have been distributed over larger areas, which forced kin groups to form alliances
with other groups. These ecological conditions consequently lead to the formation of
larger groups operating in so-called fission-fusion societies (like the Aboriginals in
Competitive Altruism
8
Australia). Another scenario is that competition between groups drove group size,
resulting in an arms race between groups to grow larger and larger (Alexander, 1987;
Diamond, 1997).
Engaging in coalitions with other individuals, kin and nonkin, would have
been paramount to cope with the pressures of living in large groups. For example,
male coalitions would be able to keep in place any single, aggressive individual, and
female alliances could protect women from sexual harassment by men -- much like in
modern hunter-gatherer societies (Chagnon, 1997). Pressures on groups to expand
therefore created new adaptive problems in terms of finding reliable and resourceful
coalition partners and advertising oneself as an attractive partner. Large groups
effectively became a market place in which individuals would trade as buyers and
sellers of cooperation in order to form the most successful coalitions (cf. Noe &
Hammerstein, 1994).
This dynamic group context might have created new opportunities for the
development of cooperation. To behave altruistically could now bring benefits, even
if it was not reciprocated directly, as long as there were observers who used this
information to form coalitions, leading to the formation of indirect reciprocity
networks (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). This is how it works: If A is
generous to B, and C is observing this, C expects A to also be generous to him, and
will therefore pick A in a future coalition. Equally, if A is being nasty to B, observer
C would want to avoid dealing with A in the future. Reputations matter a great deal in
these social exchange networks, and it might pay off to develop an altruistic
reputation because being seen as an altruist would create opportunities unavailable to
non-cooperators. It thus became possible for cooperators to team up in a “conspiracy
of doves” (Dawkins, 1976) and exclude non-cooperators from groups.
Competitive Altruism
9
Moral altruism could have spread via the same mechanism. Acting morally,
for example, punishing repeated offenders or rewarding heroes would be costly. Yet,
it might be viewed by others as something desirable, perhaps a sign of leadership,
which would increase opportunities for this person to engage in coalitions with others.
In sum, pressures to form large, flexible groups of both kin and non-kin kick-
started a competition for the most cooperative, valuable and resourceful allies. In turn,
this created selective advantages for individuals with (moral) altruistic tendencies. We
refer to this process as competitive altruism (cf. Hakwes, 1993; Miller, 2001; Roberts,
1998). Unlike kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, competitive altruism provides a
more promising account of the unique moral and altruistic attributes of humans. It has
no problems in explaining why people cooperate in large groups of strangers – in fact,
the larger the group the greater the audience. Further, it explains why people help if
there is very little chance of reciprocation such as volunteering to work with a
terminally ill patient, or they punish someone who has not harmed them personally
such as a judge, police officer, or traffic warden (Van Vugt et al., 2000).
Competitive Altruism: Theory and Conditions
Competitive altruism theory is based on two simple premises. First it assumes
that there are individual differences in altruism (for reasons that we outline below).
Second, in forming alliances there is competition for the most moral and cooperative
partners. As a consequence, people compete to behave more altruistically than others
and establish an altruistic reputation. Competitive altruism is just one of several
pathways to the development of cooperation in human groups. It is therefore
important to recognize the kind of altruism that is most likely to be explained by
competitive altruism theory. We therefore need to specify conditions under which
competitive altruism is likely to evolve and phenotypically expressed.
Competitive Altruism
10
Altruism as Costly Signal. First, if altruism is to act as a signal that makes the
receiver behave preferentially towards the altruist, then it must be a reliable indicator
of a person’s resources, motivations, and/or intentions. If it is cost-free and easy to
perform by anyone then observers would not be able to discriminate between people
who are genuinely altruistic and cheaters, thus making the signal unreliable. Because
altruism is by definition costly, altruism is particularly likely to have evolved into an
honest signal. According to costly-signalling theory (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997),
organisms sometimes engage in self-handicapping acts as a way of signalling honest
information about themselves. The peacock’s tail is often cited as an example,
because having a long and colourful tail is extremely costly for the animal as it makes
it difficult to move around an escape predation. This makes it impossible to imitate
for other animals that don’t have the “good” genes to grow such an ornament. Models
have shown that the same logic can apply in the case of altruism (Gintis, Smith, &
Bowles, 2001).
So what does altruism signal? The most obvious answer is resources. By
engaging in costly altruism, people signal that they can afford to help others rather
than themselves. Hence, altruism conveys both resource potential and generosity, an
ideal combination in an exchange partner. In addition, it might signal self-control,
strength of character, or even intelligence. For example, people who cooperate in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma are seen as more intelligent (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991),
presumably because it takes brainpower to appreciate the long-term benefits of
cooperation. Moral forms of altruism could signal leadership potential, a desirable
trait in groups (Van Vugt & Hogan, 2005).
Attracting an Audience. For a particular act to be classified as a signal, it must
also be readily observable to others. Hence, there must be an audience for it who
Competitive Altruism
11
interprets the act (or the intention behind it) as altruistic, and uses this information to
form a judgment about the giver. Ideally, they would pass on this information to
multiple others in the form a reputation (Stiff & Van Vugt, in press). From this, we
predict that people are being more generous in public than in private situations, which
happens to be true. People are, for example, more likely to give to street beggars in
the company of a friend than alone (Goldberg, 1995). People are also extremely
concerned about making a favourable impression on others (impression management;
Schlenker, 1980) and they use flattery and praise to make themselves likeable to
others, particularly high status others (Vonk, 2002). Impression management might
explain why many people cooperate on the first trial of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
There should also be a preference for performing altruistic acts in large
crowds, but the evidence from bystander intervention experiments actually suggests
the opposite: People are less inclined to help in large groups than in small groups, but
this may be because in these experiments helpers always remained anonymous
(Latane & Darley, 1970). Social facilitation research (Zajonc, 1965) shows that
people perform better on tasks when evaluated by others, but whether this also applies
to cooperative tasks remains to be seen. The audience should, of course, be interested
in the act to pay attention. For acts of altruism there is likely to be an audience,
because there are benefits to be gained from being in the presence of an altruist. A
look around the modern media confirms this. Heroic acts of strangers helping in
emergencies, soldiers saving the lives of comrades, and philanthropic events like
Comic Relief and Live Aid attract large audiences. Finally, people spend a great deal
of their conversations gossiping about the moral aspects of others’ behaviour (Dunbar,
2004).
Competitive Altruism
12
Long-term Benefits of Altruism. Third, there must be a long-term benefit for
the altruist. An evolutionary analysis delineates that competitive altruism only evolves
if there are long-term benefits for the altruist (or their close relatives). We have
already suggested that access to coalitions is one such benefit. While cheaters and
non-reciprocators are at risk of being increasingly ostracized from groups, altruists are
in huge demand as coalition partners in future social exchanges like sharing food. But,
benefits may be more subtle. For example, altruists may recoup the costs of their
actions by increasing their attractiveness as a mate, thus being able to attract more and
better sexual partners (Miller, 2002; Roberts, 1998). Perhaps this is the reason why
males tend to be especially kind and generous in the presence of females (Campbell,
Simpson, Stewart & Manning, 2002; Goldberg, 1995). It is also possible that altruists
profit indirectly: Being in a group with altruists, their group would fare better in
competitions with groups containing fewer altruists (Alexander, 1987; Darwin, 1871;
Sober & Wilson, 1998).
Individual Differences in Altruism. Competitive altruism theory may explain
why moral altruism is widespread in humans, but it does not explain why there are
substantial individual differences (Kurzban & Houser, 2005; Van Lange, Otten,
DeBruin & Joireman, 1997; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995). One
explanation is the cost of altruism. Only people with substantial resources could
afford to be generous, as costly signalling theory suggests, and many people simply
cannot afford to forego a golden opportunity to cheat (Frank, 1988). Another reason is
that in some societies, it is easier to get away with cheating, for example, because the
society is large and mobile, putting limits on the importance of reputations. A third
reason is that a society might be so small that cooperation occurs primarily within
Competitive Altruism
13
family networks, and cooperating with strangers is too rare for people to invest in an
altruistic reputation (cf. Yamagishi, 1986).
Competitive Altruism: Anthropological and Nonhuman Evidence
Because of the novelty of the competitive altruism theory, there have not been
many tests on core predictions of this theory. Earlier we presented some anecdotal
results as well as results from research designed for a different purpose. We now turn
to evidence from studies carried out specifically to test predictions derived from
competitive altruism theory. We start with the anthropological and non-human
literatures.
There are various examples of costly displays of altruism found in this
literature. For example, among the Ache of Paraquay, individuals who share more
than average with others in good times, tend to receive more food from people when
they are sick or injured than those who have been less generous in the past (Gurven,
Allen-Arave, Hill & Hurtado, 2000). Thus, sharing food in good times serves as an
insurance policy to cover for bad times. Among the Shuar, individuals who take on
voluntary administration jobs, are rewarded with status and prestige (Price, 2003).
Such social benefits might be the main reason for killing large game in hunter-
gatherer societies (Hawkes, 1993)
On various Melanesian islands, a few years after someone’s death, the family
of the deceased puts on an elaborate feast to commemorate the dead person. All the
guests receive a bounty of food and gifts, with no expectation of reciprocation. One of
the dishes is turtle meat, which is very difficult to obtain. Giving out as much turtle
meat as possible serves as an honest signal of the physical quality of the family
members, increasing the family’s reputation and esteem (Smith & Bleige- Bird,
2000). Similarly, among Native American clans in the North-West Pacific, it is
Competitive Altruism
14
common for chiefs to organize large feasts -- a “potlatch” -- to which members of
neighbouring clans were invited to indulge in a bonanza of delicacies such as salmon.
This public display of generosity possibly serves to build and strengthen coalitions
between neighbouring clans in the face of threats from rivals (Bliege Bird & Smith,
2005).
Evidence from Nonhumans
These displays of generosity are paralleled by activities in nonhuman
primates, particularly chimpanzees. After killing a small animal, like a Colobus
monkey, chimpanzees sometimes share their meat with other members in their troop,
particularly females and possibly in exchange for sex (De Waal, 1996). There is also
evidence that individuals select grooming partners based on their reputation as a
reciprocator (Barrett, Henzi, Weingrill, Lycett, & Hill, 2000). Furthermore,
chimpanzees only solicit food from individual with a reputation as a food-sharer
(Russell & Dunbar, 2005). Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that in babblers, a
highly social bird species, individuals compete for prestige through being altruistic in
allofeeding and nestguarding (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997; but see Wright, 1997).
These are just some nonhuman examples of behaviour that may be shaped
ultimately by competitive altruism tendencies. Humans have probably built on this
primordial tendency by extending the scale, variety, and intensity of these competitive
altruism displays in human societies.
Competitive Altruism: Laboratory Evidence
In recent years, researchers have tested various predictions derived from
competitive altruism theory in the laboratory, using data from computer simulations
and small group experiments. Although this research is ongoing, it is encouraging that
many of the predictions from competitive altruism theory have been supported so far.
Competitive Altruism
15
If the conditions outlined by competitive altruism theory are met, cooperation among
strangers is sustained in even large groups.
Computer simulation studies have revealed, for example, that when agents can
assess the altruistic “reputation” of other agents, and can use this information to
decide whether or not to cooperate with a given interaction partner then cooperation
can evolve. One reputation method, called image scoring, gives a score to individuals
based on their previous interaction history (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). If an
individual aids someone in a round a point is added to his reputation score, whereas if
he fails to give aid, he loses a point. In image scoring, building up a reputation as an
altruist is beneficial, because other agents use the image scores of other agents to
decide whether to cooperate or defect. There are other types of reputation strategies,
for example a good standing-strategy (Sugden, 1986) which takes into account the
context of a partner’s previous behaviour. This has been shown to be superior to
image scoring (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). Undoubtedly, there are other kinds of
reputation systems that could give an edge to altruists, but they still await further
investigation (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; but see Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).
Small group experiments have also provided support for various aspects of
competitive altruism theory. Such experiments are usually conducted with small
groups of students that are given a Prisoner’s Dilemma type task to study the
development of cooperation in groups. In one study, cooperation was achieved when
participants played against a stooge (a preprogrammed computer strategy) that
matched the investment of the participants, leading effectively to an escalation of
cooperation, as competitive altruism theory would predict (Roberts & Renwick,
2003). In another study, members of four person groups were more likely to
contribute to a public good if they knew that afterwards they could be selected to
Competitive Altruism
16
participate in a dyadic cooperative game with one of the other group members
(Barclay, 2004).
Essentially the same result was obtained in a set of studies by Hardy & Van
Vugt (2005). These researchers also found that public good contributions increased
when group members’ contributions were made public, which is entirely consistent
with the competitive altruism idea. A recent study shows that even a pair of artificial
eyes on a computer screen enhances people’s cooperation more in an otherwise
entirely anonymous situation (Haley & Fessler, 2005). Thus, there is abundant
evidence that reputational concerns lie at the basis of many altruistic activities even in
largely (but not exclusively) anonymous laboratory settings.
Some experiments have also showed some clear benefits for the altruists. For
example, members who contributed more to the public good were given more status
and prestige than other group members, and were more likely to be selected as group
leaders and representatives (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2005). In addition, altruists in the
public good game were chosen more often as coalition partners in a subsequent game
(Hardy & van Vugt, 2005). This resembles the results of a study by Milinksi,
Semman, and Krambeck (2002) who found that when individuals were involved in
two games at the same time, a public goods game and a reciprocity game (Wedekind
& Milinski, 2000), people in the later game donated more to people who acted
altruistically in the public goods game.
Taken together, these findings suggest that altruism is influenced by
reputational needs and that having an altruistic reputation brings benefits to
individuals.
Conclusions and Implications
Competitive Altruism
17
Competitive altruism theory proposes that altruism evolves once there are
selection pressures to form coalitions with other individuals, non-kin, in large groups.
In human evolution, coalition formation appears to be a major force in dealing with
group size, resource unpredictability, and intergroup competition (Alexander, 1987;
Dunbar, 2004). A general preference for more cooperative partners then creates a
competitive market in which people with prosocial traits are more likely to be chosen
as coalition partners, friends, or mates. Because having an altruistic reputation pays
off in such an environment, it is paramount for people to invest in it, which is best
achieved through public displays of morality and altruism. Could this theory explain
the peculiar moral aspects of human nature?
Several core predictions of competitive altruism theory are supported so far in
empirical research. For example, people are more generous in public than in private
settings. Altruistic individuals are selectively rewarded by observers and non-altruists
are selectively punished. Computer simulations show that if reputational information
is available, altruism becomes an evolutionary stable strategy. Finally, anthropologists
have documented numerous public displays of generosity, like funeral parties,
potlatches, charity and philanthropy, which could be accounted for by competitive
altruism theory.
Many aspects of competitive altruism theory remain to be tested. For example,
do altruists recoup the costs of their activities by entering in productive, cooperative
alliances, or do they benefit in other ways, for example, by attracting mates? Some
have suggested that altruism is an honest signal to convey one’s qualities as a sexual
partner (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), but there is no empirical evidence for this yet.
Furthermore, exactly what does altruism signal? Does it primarily signal resource
potential or also virtues like trust and benevolence, and possibly even intelligence.
Competitive Altruism
18
Finally, does moral altruism have a distinctive signalling quality, and, if so, what does
it signal; leadership potential perhaps? Also, competitive altruism predicts that people
should sometimes act altruistically to people who do not need it, and that potential
recipients should sometimes refuse help when they need it. This needs to be examined
in further research.
There are several theoretical issues to be resolved. First, we acknowledge that
competitive altruism is just one of the evolutionary routes to human cooperation. Kin
helping, direct reciprocity, and group-selected altruism probably account for a large
proportion of altruism in human society (Amato, 1993; Penner, Dovidio, Schroeder &
Piliavin, 2005; Sober & Wilson, 1998). Competitive altruism is probably most
suitable to explain more public displays of helping, like philanthropy, heroism,
bystander intervention, charity work, and volunteering. A strength of the theory is that
it has no problem in accounting for unreciprocated altruism because it presupposes
that there will be compensating long-term benefits. Equally, this kind of altruism does
not have to be enforced by groups because they can simply avoid interactions with
non-altruists; hence there is no second order free-rider problem.
Is altruism always a desirable trait? Being seen as an indiscriminate altruist,
for example, helping members of antagonistic groups may not be regarded as a
desirable quality in some coalitions, for example, in groups at war. Also, someone
who consistently helps defectors might develop a bad reputation (Nowak & Sigmund,
2005. Finally, could people not easily fake altruism in order to get access to desirable
groups or mates? If people could easily obtain an altruistic reputation it would be a
serious problem for the theory because it would make altruism a meaningless signal.
There are two arguments against this. First, altruism is by definition a costly activity,
and so it automatically excludes people who cannot afford to be altruistic (e.g., a poor
Competitive Altruism
19
individual cannot spend much on charity). Second, across all human societies, people
work extremely hard to invest in their reputations, and there are reputation systems in
place to constantly monitor whether people’s status and esteem matches their
contributions to the group.
There are a number of unique features of human societies facilitating
competitive altruism and reputation-based cooperation in groups. For example,
language is a unique human capacity that is believed to have evolved to build
alliances in large, dispersed groups (Dunbar, 2004). One of the most frequent
conversation topics is gossip about others, not present, and the gossip tends to revolve
around the status, achievements and failures of other people. So, it is perhaps not too
far-fetched to assume a relationship between language and the spread of competitive
altruism in humans.
Finally, there are a number of other unique aspects of human culture that
might have a basis in competitive altruism, such as philanthropy, religion, the
military, architecture, science, artistry and entertainment. In all of these domains,
there are individuals “showing off” their resourcefulness by contributing to public
goods that, once they are available, are free for all to use and consume. For example,
once the 19
th
century British engineer Brunel had created a design to build steam
boats, they could be built and used by anyone. In this regard, it is perhaps not
surprising to find that the highest status members in human society are scientists,
doctors, military and political leaders, artists, and entertainers, whose contributions
benefit all (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2005b). Competitive altruism may explain why social
hierarchies in human groups are built on status and prestige rather than dominance
and coercion as in many other social species (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). We should
be pleased about this.
Competitive Altruism
20
References
Alcock, J. (1998). Animal behaviour: An evolutionary approach (6
th
edition).
Sunderland, Mass: Sinauer.
Alexander, R. D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Amato, P. R. (1993). “Urban-Rural Differences in Helping Friends and Family
Members.” Social Psychological Quarterly, 56, 249-262.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 21,
1390-1396.
Barclay, P. (2004). Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the
“tragedy of the commons”. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 25, 209-220.
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being.
American Psychologist, 54, 462-479.
Barrett, L., Dunbar, R., & Lycett, J. (2002). Human evolutionary psychology. London:
Palgrave.
Barrett, L., Henzi, S. P., Weingrill, T., Lycett, J. E., & Hill, R. A. (2000). Female
baboons give as good as they get, but they do not raise the stakes. Animal
Behaviour, 59(4), 763-770.
Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behaviour. In D. Gilbert, S.
Fiske, & G. Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology (pp. 282-316). New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Becker, S., & Eagly, A. H. (2004). The heroism of women and men. American
Psychologist, 59, 163-178.
Bliege Bird, R. and Smith, E. A. (2005). Signalling theory, strategic interaction, and
symbolic capital. Current Anthropology, 46(2), 221-248.
Competitive Altruism
21
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1988). The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 132, 337—356.
Boyd, R, & Richerson, P. J. (in press). Culture and the evolution of the human social
instincts. In: Roots of Human Sociality, S. Levinson and N. Enfield, eds.,
Berg, Oxford.
Campbell, L., Simpson, J. A., Stewart, M., & Manning, J. G. (2002). Men's waist-to
-hip ratio, intrasexual competition, and interpersonal perception in leaderless
groups. Human Nature, 13, 345-362.
Chagnon, N. A. (1997). Yanomamo. London: Wadsworth.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.
In J. Barkow et al., The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the
generation of culture (pp. 163-28). New York: Oxford University Press.
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man. London: Murray.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169 193.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DeBruine, L. M. (2002). Facial resemblance enhances trust. Proceedings of the Royal
Society, 269, 1307-1312.
De Cremer, D., & Van Vugt, M. (1999). Social identification effects in social
dilemmas: A transformation of motives. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 29, 871-893.
De Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other
animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, germs and steel. London: Vintage.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1992). Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates.
Journal of Human Evolution, 20, 469-493.
Competitive Altruism
22
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2004). The Human Story. London: Faber.
Fehr, E., & Gaechter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137-
140.
Frank, R. (1988). Passions within reason. New York: Norton.
Gintis, H., Smith, E. A., & Bowles, S. (2001). Costly signalling and cooperation.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 213,103-119.
Goldberg, T. L. (1995). Altruism towards Panhandlers: Who Gives? Human Nature,
6, 79-89.
Gurven. M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K., & Hurtado, M. (2000). “It’s a Wonderful
Life”: Signalling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay. Evolution and
Human Behaviour, 21, 263-282.
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect
generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human
Behaviour, 26, 245-256.
Hames, R. (1978). A Behavioural Account of the Division of Labour among the
Ye'kwana. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Santa Barbara.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior, I, II. Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 7, 1-52.
Hardy, C., & Van Vugt, M. (2005). Giving for glory in social dilemmas. Unpublished
manuscript: University of Kent.
Hawkes, K. (1993). Why hunter-gatherers work – An ancient version of the
problem of public goods. Current Anthropology, 34, 341-361.
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001). The evolution of prestige. Freely conferred
Competitive Altruism
23
deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission.
Evolution and Human Behaviour, 22, 165-196.
Kerr, N. (1989). Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived
efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25,
287-313.
Kurzban, R., & Houser, D. (2005). An experimental investigation of cooperative
types in human groups: A complement to evolutionary theory and simulations.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(5), 1803-1807.
Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he
help? New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001). Evolution of cooperation through indirect
reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, 268, 745-
753.
Levine, J. L. & Moreland, R. (2002). Group reactions to loyalty and disloyalty. In E.
Lawler & S. Thye (Eds.), Group cohesion, trust, and solidarity (Advances in
group processes, Vol. 19, pp. 203-228). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Miller, G. (2001). The mating mind. London: Vintage.
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H-J. (2002). Reputation helps solve the
‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature, 415, 424–426.
Noe, R., & Hammerstein, P. (1994). Biological markets: supply and demand
determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating.
Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology, 35, 1-11.
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image
scoring. Nature, 393, 573-577.
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437,
Competitive Altruism
24
1291-1298.
Oates, K., & Wilson, M. (2002). Nominal kinship cues facilitate altruism.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: B, 269, 105-109.
Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. (2004). Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation
without the second-order freerider problem. Nature, 432, 499-502.
Park, J. H., & Schaller, M. (2005). Does attitude similarity serve as a heuristic cue for
kinship? Evidence of an implicit cognitive association. Evolution and Human
Behaviour, 26, 158-170.
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Schroeder, D. A., & Piliavin, J. A. (in press) Altruism
and prosocial behaviour. Annual Review of Psychology.
Price, M. (2003). Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village. Human
Nature, 14 (2), 191-208.
Roberts, G. (1998). Competitive altruism: From reciprocity to the handicap principle.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, 265, 427-431.
Roberts, G., & Renwick, J. (2003). The development of cooperative relationships: an
experiment. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, 270, 2279-
2284.
Russell, I., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2005, October). Image scoring in great apes. Paper
presented at the meeting “Understanding human altruism”, Brighton, UK.
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management: The self-concept, social identity,
and interpersonal relations. Monterey, C.A: Brooks-Cole.
Smith, E. A., & Bleige-Bird, R. L. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening:
public generosity as costly signalling. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 21,
245-261.
Smith, M. S., Kish, B. L., & Crawford, C. B. (1987). Inheritance of wealth as human
Competitive Altruism
25
kin investment. Ethology and Sociobiology, 8, 171-182.
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of
unselfish behaviour. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Stiff, C. E., & Van Vugt, M. (in press). The power of gossip: Reputation concerns in
social dilemmas.
Sugden, R. (1986). The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker’s paradox: Other
pathways to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. In W. G. Runciman, J.
Maynard Smith, & R. I. M. Dunbar (Eds.), Evolution of Social Behaviour
Patterns in Primates and Man. Proceedings of the British Academy, 88,
119-143.
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology,
46, 35-57.
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Liebrand, W. B. (1991). The influence of others’ morality
and own social value orientation on cooperation in the Netherlands and the
U.S.A. International Journal of Psychology, 26, 429-449.
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Semin-Goossens, A. (1998). The boundaries of reciprocal
cooperation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 847-854.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A. (1997).
Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations:
Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73, 733-746.
Van Vugt, M., & Chang, K. (2005). Group reactions to disloyal high status members.
Unpublished manuscript, University of Kent.
Competitive Altruism
26
Van Vugt, M., & Hogan, R. (2005). What evolution teaches us about leadership:
Some lessons from the past. Unpublished manuscript, University of Kent.
Van Vugt M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (in press). Psychological adaptations for
prosocial behaviour. In M. Schaller, D. Kenrick, & J. Simpson (Eds.),
Evolution and Social Psychology. New York: Psychology Press.
Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T., & Biel A. (2000) Cooperation in modern
society: Promoting the welfare of communities, states, and organizations.
London, UK: Routledge.
Van Vugt, M., Meertens, R. M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). Car versus public
transportation? The role of social value orientations in a real-life social
dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, 258–278.
Vonk, R. (2002). Self-serving interpretations of flattery: Why ingratiation works.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(4), 515-526 .
Wedekind, C., & Milinski, M. (2000). Cooperation through image scoring in humans,
Science 288, 850 – 852.
Wilkinson, G. S. (1984). Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature, 308,
181-184.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: the new synthesis. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Wright, J. (1997). Helping-at-the-nest in Arabian Babblers: Signalling social status or
sensible investment in chicks? Animal Behaviour, 54, 14391448.
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The structural goal/expectation theory of cooperation in
social dilemmas. In E. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in group processes
(Vol. 3, pp. 51–87). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The Handicap Principle: The Missing Piece of
Competitive Altruism
27
Darwin’s Puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. Science, 149, 269-274.
Competitive Altruism
28
Footnotes
1
This is not to imply that morality and altruism are the same. Some forms of altruism
may not be guided by moral principles, for example, helping one’s own child.
Furthermore, sometimes moral principles might lead to selfish rather than altruistic
behaviour, for example, when a person feels entitled to take money from others (for a
discussion of the relationship between altruism and morality, see Sober & Wilson,
1998).
... There is no national study investigating the effects of both utilitarian and self-expression benefits on green brand image in the green marketing framework, but Hartmann et al. (2005) stated that these benefits play an effective role in a brand's positioning as "green." In addition, it has been demonstrated by some international studies (Hawkes, 1993;Roberts, 1998;Van Vugt et al., 2007) that the utilitarian and self-expression benefits will affect the green brand image (Lin et al., 2017: 426). It has been determined that the concept of greenwashing, which is frequently encountered in recent times and which is intended to mislead the consumer, is perceived as a risk for the consumer. ...
... Companies that carry out these activities in line with the "green" expectations of consumers are deemed to have fulfilled the utilitarian benefits expected from them. In addition, based on the theory of altruism, it can be said that consumers will act in accordance with the desire to act together for a common benefit, to be approved socially and to be respected in society (Barclay & Willer, 2007;Hawkes, 1993;Roberts, 1998;Van Vugt et al., 2007). It can be said that this way of thinking will cause consumers to prefer the goods or services of green companies that adopt the green environmental movement and position themselves accordingly. ...
Article
Full-text available
RESEARCH ARTICLE In line with increasing environmental awareness, the effects of brands' utilitarian benefits and self-expression benefits on green brand image and brand loyalty have been investigated. In addition, it is aimed to reveal the effect of green brand image on brand loyalty and the effect of perceived green risk by the consumer on both brand image and brand loyalty. The fully structured questionnaire, which was easily applied by sampling, was announced to the students in the Iskenderun district via social media and 241 responses were received. The results show that utilitarian benefit and self-expression benefit are significant in the formation of green brand image and besides, utilitarian benefits, self-expression benefits, and green brand image have a direct effect on brand loyalty. No relationship was found among perceived green risk and green brand image and brand loyalty.
... Consistent with this notion, research has found that people are less inclined to deplete community resources when their reputation is at stake, and that conservationists are more likely to be chosen as group partners (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;Milinski et al., 2006). Altruistic Running head: LONELINESS AND COVID-19 9 acts, like complying with COVID-19 prevention guidelines, could help to catalyze and maintain social relationships by building on the individual's prosocial reputation (Roberts, 1998;Trivers, 1971;Van Vugt et al., 2007). As such, adhering to COVID-19 prevention guidelines may demonstrate that one is a cooperative, kind person who is willing to absorb the costs of altruism for the group's welfare. ...
... This research extends our understanding of how loneliness relates to consumer decisionmaking by demonstrating why lonely consumers may be less likely to follow COVID-19 prevention guidelines. Specifically, we add to literature on reciprocal altruism theory (Roberts, 1998;Trivers, 1971;Van Vugt et al., 2007) by finding that loneliness can lead to a lower sense of obligation to reciprocate. Thus, by assessing how loneliness can impair a sense of obligation Running head: LONELINESS AND COVID-19 27 to reciprocate, we may be able to explain why some individuals are reluctant to follow COVID-19 prevention guidelines. ...
Article
Full-text available
Many individuals have been reluctant to follow the COVID-19 prevention guidelines (e.g., wearing a mask, physical distancing, and vigilant handwashing) set forth by the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) to reduce the spread of COVID-19. In this research, we use reciprocal altruism theory to investigate the role of loneliness and its impact on compliance with these guidelines. Our findings indicate that lonely individuals are less willing to comply with COVID-19 prevention guidelines than non-lonely individuals. Process evidence suggests that this occurs as loneliness can inhibit an individual’s sense of obligation to reciprocate to others. However, we demonstrate that framing information about COVID-19 through agentic (vs. communal) advertising messaging strategies can offset the negative impact of loneliness on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. Thus, marketers and policymakers may want to consider the important role of loneliness when tailoring messaging appeals that encourage compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.
... The competitive altruism hypothesis explains altruism toward all people, including strangers (Barclay & Willer, 2007;Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;Roberts, 1998). Studies indicate that costly altruistic behaviors signal the actor's favorable traits, such as possessing resources, generosity, self-control, and intelligence (Van Vugt et al., 2007). Consequently, individuals who display greater altruism obtain a more positive reputation, improve their social status, and are more likely to be chosen as social or romantic partners. ...
Article
Full-text available
The theory of competitive altruism suggests that (1) individuals displaying great altruism are likely to be chosen as partners by others, and (2) when there is a chance of being chosen as partners, people tend to behave more generously. Although many studies have empirically confirmed this theory, none have examined it in situations in which observers can benefit from choosing a selfish player as a partner. Thus, we developed and conducted a joint taking game in which observers could expect to benefit from choosing a selfish player as their partner to test the theory of competitive altruism, compared between generous and self-interested partner choice. Our preregistered online experiment with 221 participants found no evidence that players tended to make altruistic or selfish choices, nor were observers more likely to choose one of these players as partners. These findings suggest that establishing competitive altruism requires a structure in which observers gain from choosing altruistic partners.
... The presence of women tends to make men more aware of their status, and more eager to demonstrate that they can beat other men. For example, an experiment showed that men increased their cooperation in an economic game when observed by women (Iredale et al., 2008), reflecting competitive altruism: men compete with other men by being generous and foregoing individual benefits, and simultaneously impressing women with their ability to spend resources (Van Vugt et al., 2007). Behaving altruistically may improve one's reputation and social status: others often attribute charisma to those who sacrifice their own needs for those of others or the group (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004). ...
Chapter
Evolutionary social science is having a renaissance. This volume showcases the empirical and theoretical advancements produced by the evolutionary study of romantic relationships. The editors assembled an international collection of contributors to trace how evolved psychological mechanisms shape strategic computation and behavior across the life span of a romantic partnership. Each chapter provides an overview of historic and contemporary research on the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying the initiation, maintenance, and dissolution of romantic relationships. Contributors discuss popular and cutting-edge methods for data analysis and theory development, critically analyze the state of evolutionary relationship science, and provide discerning recommendations for future research. The handbook integrates a broad range of topics (e.g., partner preference and selection, competition and conflict, jealousy and mate guarding, parenting, partner loss and divorce, and post-relationship affiliation) that are discussed alongside major sources of strategic variation in mating behavior, such as sex and gender diversity, developmental life history, neuroendocrine processes, technological advancement, and culture. Its content promises to enrich students’ and established researchers’ views on the current state of the discipline and should challenge a diverse cross-section of relationship scholars and clinicians to incorporate evolutionary theorizing into their professional work.
... Competitive altruism also plays a role in business transactions (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004;Suh, 2017;Van Vugt et al., 2007). Companies can intend to exhibit their altruistic features to form an impression of being ideal business partners and to induce trust (Suh, 2017). ...
Chapter
Competitive altruism is the process through which actors attempt to appear better than others in terms of their generosity (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). To understand competitive altruism, a two-stage model of cooperative interactions proves helpful. In the first, so-called “assessment” stage, individuals build up reputations by competing with one another to appear as cooperative as possible. In the second, “partnered” stage, they actively select further interaction partners. If they succeed by attracting a partner who may bring profit, it can be assumed that the cooperativeness displayed in the first stage paid off (Roberts, 1998; Sylwester & Roberts, 2013).
... Nowhere did participants signal altruistic motives for adopting worse-performing BETs over ICE alternatives [29]. For example, no one identified BETs' potential prosocial impact, i.e., increased sales via improved customer perceptions [31]. There was also no mention of how other growers, family, or friends might perceive their decision to adopt BETs, despite studies showing that organic growers rely heavily on these networks to test unfamiliar or uncertain practices and technology [32]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Battery electric tractors (BETs) demonstrate considerable advantages over diesel-fueled tractors, including higher conversion efficiency, higher torque, less maintenance, and no tailpipe emissions. Converting to BETs also requires tradeoffs in the form of the batteries’ high cost, increased weight, limited energy capacity, finite charging cycles, and lengthy charging time. The extent to which small-scale organic vegetable, fruit and cut-flower growers are aware of these tradeoffs is unknown. Little research exists examining these growers’ perceptions, concerns, and willingness to pay for or adopt BETs. Here, we address that gap by conducting qualitative semi-structured interviews with 14 organic growers in the US Midwest, most operating in Michigan. We focus our questions on growers’ motivations, existing tractor-use patterns, and the evaluation of different configurations of a belly-mount open-station cultivating BET. Our results suggest interest in and potential for growers to transition to BETs, including an estimated willingness to pay 14 percent more for a BET compared to a diesel-fueled alternative. This premium is driven by most growers’ preferences for reduced noise, fumes, fuel, and greenhouse gases, as well as beliefs about BETs ultimately being a more sustainable long-term option than diesel-fueled tractors. Growers also identify significant concerns and uncertainty about the long-term performance, maintenance, storage, cost, safety, and weight of the tractors’ battery systems. While growers linked some environmental values and motivations to their interest in BETs, altruistic value signaling was absent, and growers focused considerably more on financial and instrumental concerns and motivations for BET adoption.
Article
A tanulmány Nagy József szociális érdekérvényesítő képességekre és azokon belül elsősorban a versengésre vonatkozó elméleti megfontolásait tárgyalja. Kiemeli Nagy József jelentőségét abban, hogy a versengést nemzetközi szinten is elsőként értelmezte az iskolában fejleszthető és fejlesztendő szociális készségként. A tanulmány kitér a versengési mintázatok különbségeire, és részletesen áttekinti azokat a strukturális, magatartásbeli és személyiségbeli feltételeket, amelyek alapján a versengés konstruktív vagy destruktív folyamattá válhat. A konstruktív versengésre vonatkozó elméleti ismeretek mellett az együttműködő versengés szituatív jellemzőire vonatkozó empirikus vizsgálatot ismertet, majd röviden tárgyalja a konstruktív versengés iskolai helyzetekben való előfordulását, illetve tanárok nézeteit arról, hogy mennyire kell és lehet a versengést iskolai környezetben fejleszteni. Utolsóként a tanulmány kitér az együttműködve versengő állampolgár iskolai nevelésének részt vevő megfigyelőként tapasztalt mindennapi gyakorlatára.
Chapter
The interface of sexual behavior and evolutionary psychology is a rapidly growing domain, rich in psychological theories and data as well as controversies and applications. With nearly eighty chapters by leading researchers from around the world, and combining theoretical and empirical perspectives, The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Psychology is the most comprehensive and up-to-date reference work in the field. Providing a broad yet in-depth overview of the various evolutionary principles that influence all types of sexual behaviors, the handbook takes an inclusive approach that draws on a number of disciplines and covers nonhuman and human psychology. It is an essential resource for both established researchers and students in psychology, biology, anthropology, medicine, and criminology, among other fields. Volume 2: Male Sexual Adaptations addresses theory and research focused on sexual adaptations in human males.
Article
The interface of sexual behavior and evolutionary psychology is a rapidly growing domain, rich in psychological theories and data as well as controversies and applications. With nearly eighty chapters by leading researchers from around the world, and combining theoretical and empirical perspectives, The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Psychology is the most comprehensive and up-to-date reference work in the field. Providing a broad yet in-depth overview of the various evolutionary principles that influence all types of sexual behaviors, the handbook takes an inclusive approach that draws on a number of disciplines and covers nonhuman and human psychology. It is an essential resource for both established researchers and students in psychology, biology, anthropology, medicine, and criminology, among other fields. Volume 1: Foundations of Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Psychology addresses foundational theories and methodological approaches.
Article
Darwin found that many animals had characteristics that were difficult to explain in terms of natural selection (i.e., the gradual process in which organisms better adapted to their environment survive and reproduce more successfully over sufficiently long time periods). He proposed a new selective force, sexual selection, which refers to the process generated by differential sexual access to opposite-sex mates. The process of sexual selection, in its classic conceptualization, consisted of two components: male–male competition, resulting in built-in weapons, and female choice, resulting in ornaments. Following Darwin, sexual selection is often divided into two forms: (1) intrasexual selection, in which members of one sex, most often males, compete with one another to gain sexual access to opposite-sex mates; and (2) intersexual selection, in which individuals of one sex, most often females, choose among individuals of the opposite sex as mates. The two forms of sexual selection have been investigated in humans across cultures, producing a large body of work on psychological similarities and differences between women and men in the context of mating. Post-mating sexual selection and its effect on sexual psychology have also gained increasing research attention in the last two decades. Two post-mating strategies in sexual selection are discussed: sperm competition (the competition between the sperm of two or more males to fertilize the egg(s) of a single female) and mate guarding (behaviors used to maintain reproductive opportunities and sexual access to a mate). Previous applications of sexual selection to sexual psychology and future directions in integration of multiple perspectives in evolutionary social sciences are discussed.
Article
Full-text available
The current research examines the role of social value orientation in determining the extent to which individuals are inclined to reciprocate cooperation exhibited by others perceived as either honest, intelligent, or unintelligent. Results revealed that individuals with prosocial orientation reciprocated high levels of cooperation regardless of other's characteristics. Individuals with proself orientation (i.e. individualists and competitors) exhibited some reciprocal cooperation toward others perceived as honest, yet took advantage of others perceived as intelligent or unintelligent. These results suggest that proselfs can be motivated to reciprocate cooperation by others if they have faith in others' benign intentions and trustworthiness. (C) 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Book
Why do so many people volunteer to help others in need in society today? What makes people give up the convenience of driving their car to benefit a better environment? And why are citizens, in general, quite prepared to pay taxes to ensure adequate health care, and support for the elderly and unemployed? These are examples of a more fundamental question addressed in this book: why do people cooperate for the welfare of their community, state, or organization? Cooperation in Modern Society is a unique collection of contributions from internationally reputed scholars across the social sciences.
Article
What was noted by E. J. Langer (1978) remains true today; that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of action. As did E. J. Langer, the authors question this assumption. First, they review evidence that the ability to exercise such conscious, intentional control is actually quite limited, so that most of moment-to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all. The authors then describe the different possible mechanisms that produce automatic, environmental control over these various phenomena and review evidence establishing both the existence of these mechanisms as well as their consequences for judgments, emotions, and behavior. Three major forms of automatic self-regulation are identified: an automatic effect of perception on action, automatic goal pursuit, and a continual automatic evaluation of one's experience. From the accumulating evidence, the authors conclude that these various nonconscious mental systems perform the lion's share of the self-regulatory burden, beneficently keeping the individual grounded in his or her current environment.
Article
A solution is suggested for an old unresolved social psychological problem.