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Lying and deception: A behavioral model
... Além da barganha competitiva tradicional, da coleta inadequada de informações e de falsas declarações ao oponente e sua rede de relacionamentos, propuseram o blefe como estratégia eticamente questionável. Esta última já havia sido proposta por outros autores, assim como o engano e a fraude (Lewicki, 1983;Anton 1990). Há, também, relato de falsidade (Anton, 1990), deturpação de valor à outra parte (Lewicki, 1983) e falsificação (Lewicki, 1983) como táticas eticamente questionáveis que usualmente são usadas em uma negociação. ...
... Esta última já havia sido proposta por outros autores, assim como o engano e a fraude (Lewicki, 1983;Anton 1990). Há, também, relato de falsidade (Anton, 1990), deturpação de valor à outra parte (Lewicki, 1983) e falsificação (Lewicki, 1983) como táticas eticamente questionáveis que usualmente são usadas em uma negociação. ...
... Esta última já havia sido proposta por outros autores, assim como o engano e a fraude (Lewicki, 1983;Anton 1990). Há, também, relato de falsidade (Anton, 1990), deturpação de valor à outra parte (Lewicki, 1983) e falsificação (Lewicki, 1983) como táticas eticamente questionáveis que usualmente são usadas em uma negociação. ...
Purpose – The purpose of this work is to evaluate the influence of self-efficacy in
negotiation on ethical behavior. Additionally, this research aims to identify a mediator
that justifies this effect.
Design/Methodology - The research was divided into two independent experiments.
Initially, self-efficacy in negotiation was manipulated, being half in high and half in low
self-efficacy. After that, in these two groups, ethically questionable behavior was
measured in a virtual interactive negotiation.
The second study had a 2x2 experimental design. Firstly, self-efficacy was manipulated.
Subsequently, moral disengagement was manipulated. So, as in the first study, ethically
questionable behavior was measured in an interactive negotiation.
Findings – We have shown that self-efficacy is negatively related to ethically
questionable behavior in negotiations. In addition, we have identified that ethically
questionable behavior in a negotiation is mediated by moral disengagement.
Research limitations - The main limitation of this research is that it is based on a virtual
negotiation. In addition, it is a distributive negotiation or bargain. Future research can
evaluate these results in a context of real interaction between individuals and in
integrative negotiations.
Practical implications - From these results, organizations can identify a potential cause
of ethically questionable behavior. Thus, acting in the self-efficacy of their
representatives in negotiations can deactivate mechanisms involved in the moral
disengagement of those with low levels of self-efficacy.
Social implications - By identifying sources of unethical behavior, organizations can
avoid dishonest behavior among their employees and contribute to more ethical
negotiations in the society. Additionally, they can reduce the probability of corporate and
social ethical scandals and, for instance, reduce the damage to their company.
Originality - To our knowledge, this is the first study that relates self-efficacy in
negotiations and ethics.
Keywords: Self-efficacy; Negotiation; Ethics; Business Ethics
Paper category: Master´s thesis/ Research paper
... Models of ethical decision making have largely neglected the role of emotion. Prior models have conceptualized ethical decision making as a product of economic incentives (Alingham & Sandmo, 1972;Holmstrom, 1979) or a mixture of incentives and cognitive factors (Jones, 1995;Jones & Ryan, 1997, 2001Lewicki, Saunders & Minton, 1999;Lewicki, 1983;Lewicki et el., 2003;Trevino, 1986;Grover, 1993;Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001, 2004Gneezy, 2004;Alingham & Sandmo, 1972;Schweitzer, Ordonez & Douma, 2004). For example, Lewicki (Lewicki, 1983;Lewicki et el., 2003) suggests that individuals make unethical decisions by weighing the perceived benefits and perceived costs of engaging in unethical acts. ...
... Prior models have conceptualized ethical decision making as a product of economic incentives (Alingham & Sandmo, 1972;Holmstrom, 1979) or a mixture of incentives and cognitive factors (Jones, 1995;Jones & Ryan, 1997, 2001Lewicki, Saunders & Minton, 1999;Lewicki, 1983;Lewicki et el., 2003;Trevino, 1986;Grover, 1993;Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001, 2004Gneezy, 2004;Alingham & Sandmo, 1972;Schweitzer, Ordonez & Douma, 2004). For example, Lewicki (Lewicki, 1983;Lewicki et el., 2003) suggests that individuals make unethical decisions by weighing the perceived benefits and perceived costs of engaging in unethical acts. ...
... First, envy increases the psychological benefits from using deception by inducing schadenfreude, Second, envy lowers the perceived costs of deceiving by facilitating belittling and self justification. This cost-benefit framework is consistent with Lewicki's model of deception (Lewicki 1983;Lewicki et el., 2003), which postulates that individuals make unethical decisions by weighing the perceived benefits and perceived costs of engaging in unethical acts. ...
In this paper we describe the influence of envy on the use of deception. We find that individuals who envy a counterpart are more likely to deceive them than are individuals who do not envy their counterpart. Across both a scenario and a laboratory study, we explore the influence of envy in a negotiation setting. Negotiations represent a domain in which social comparisons are prevalent and deception poses a particularly important concern. In our studies, we induce envy by providing participants with upward social comparison information. We find that upward social comparisons predictably trigger envy, and that envy promotes deception by increasing perceived gains and decreasing psychological costs of engaging in deceptive behavior. We discuss implications of our results with respect to impression management and emotional intelligence as well as the role of emotions in ethical decision making and negotiations.
... Past researchers in this domain have explored a variety of factors that contribute to a person's motivation to engage in unethical acts or behaviors (e.g. Lewicki, 1983;Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). One such factor is greed (e.g. ...
... Past researchers have documented a variety of factors that contribute to a person's motivation to engage in ethical transgressions (Bommer, Gratto, Gravander, & Tuttle, 1987;Lewicki, 1983;Schweitzer et al., 2004). Bommer et al. (1987) propose a model where a person's environment (i.e. ...
... personality, self-concept, goals, etc.) both contribute to the motivation for ethical transgressions. Lewicki's (1983) model of deception focuses on the outcome and how the cost-benefit analysis (rewards-risk ratio) influences people's degree of engaging in ethical transgressions. Schweitzer et al. (2004) discuss goal-setting (specifically unmet goals) as the motivating factor for initiating unethical behavior. ...
In three experiments, we show that a participant's parasocial relationship with a sports celebrity, ethical intent and regulatory focus orientation influence their forgiveness towards a celebrity's ethical transgression. First, people with a strong (vs. weak) positive parasocial relationship with a sports celebrity were more forgiving after a protective-intent motivated transgression, but were less forgiving after an acquisitive-intent motivated transgression. We then show promotion-focused individuals with a strong parasocial relationship in acquisitive-intent condition were more forgiving than prevention-focused individuals. Finally, even when subjects had a negative parasocial relationship with a celebrity, promotion-focused (vs. prevention-focused) individuals were more forgiving towards a protective intent-motivated transgression. Together, the results shed light on people's inclination to forgive sports celebrities that have committed ethical transgressions.
... Consistent with Lewicki's model of deception (Lewicki 1983), which proposes that a deception decision is the product of a decision-maker's perceptions of the costs and benefits of using deception, it can be assumed that people make unethical decisions by balancing the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in unethical behavior. Goal setting theory suggests that the presence of a goal increases and focuses attention, and creates a psychological reward for attaining the goal (Gellatly and Meyer 1992). ...
... In many organizations, the most salient type of economic benefit is derived from a variable financial reward: the proportion of pay from bonuses. Using Lewicki's (1983) framework, it can be expected that the perceived benefits of engaging in unethical behavior will be greater for people deriving more economic benefit from it, than for those deriving less economic benefit. ...
... Notwithstanding the fact that feasibility has a smaller effect than supportability, increasing the extent to which employees are enabled to act in an ethically responsible manner will decrease unethical behavior towards customers, vindicating managerial initiatives aimed to increase feasibility. It is most likely that unethical behavior towards customers will occur when its potential benefits outweigh its potential costs (Becker 1968;Lewicki 1983). As a reduction of potential benefits might also reduce other positive in-role behaviors, such as for example cooperation, competition, and general performance, it might be more prudent to increase the potential costs of unethical behavior towards customers through sanctions (see Balliet et al. 2011 for a meta-analysis). ...
In this study, we propose and test a model of the effects of organizational ethical culture and organizational architecture on the perceived unethical behavior of employees towards customers. This study also examines the relationship between organizational ethical culture and moral acceptability judgment, hypothesizing that moral acceptability judgment is an important stage in the ethical decision-making process. Based on a field study in one of the largest financial institutions in Europe, we found that organizational ethical culture was significantly related to the perceived frequency of unethical behavior towards customers and to the moral acceptability judgment of this type of unethical behavior. No support was found for the claim that features of organizational architecture are associated with the perceived frequency of unethical behavior towards customers. This is the first study to document the differential effects of organizational architecture and organizational ethical culture on perceived unethical behavior of employees towards customers, in wholesale banking. Implications for managers and future research are discussed.
... Several scholars have used a rational choice framework to conceptualize the deception decision process. In this framework, individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of engaging 1 3 in deception (Gino et al. 2009;Lewicki 1983). The benefits include the profit gained by using deception, and the costs include the likelihood of detection and the consequences of detected deception. ...
... Though this view of deception is extreme, scholars such as Akerlof (1970) have used the rational choice framework to undergird claims about markets, and experimentalists such as Tenbrunsel (1998) have found supporting evidence for important elements of this framework (e.g., economic incentives predictably influence the use of deception). Lewicki (1983) proposed a cost-benefit approach for understanding the decision to use deception that considers the importance of subjective perceptions. In this work, Lewicki (1983) postulated that perceptions of the costs and benefits of engaging in deception, even if incorrect, influence the decision to use deception. ...
... Lewicki (1983) proposed a cost-benefit approach for understanding the decision to use deception that considers the importance of subjective perceptions. In this work, Lewicki (1983) postulated that perceptions of the costs and benefits of engaging in deception, even if incorrect, influence the decision to use deception. He also postulated that individual and contextual factors will influence these perceptions and the use of deception. ...
Self-confidence is associated with many positive outcomes, and training programs routinely seek to build participants’ self-efficacy. In this article, however, we consider whether self-confidence increases unethical behavior. In a series of studies, we explore the relationship between negotiator self-efficacy—an individual’s confidence in his or her negotiation ability—and the use of deception. We find that individuals high in negotiator self-efficacy are more likely to use deception than individuals low in negotiator self-efficacy. We also find that perceptions of the risk of deception mediate this relationship. By identifying negotiator self-efficacy as an antecedent to unethical behavior, our findings offer important theoretical and empirical insights into the use of deception, the role of individual differences in ethical decision making, and the broader consequences of self-confidence in business and society.
... Negotiations are processes that resolve conflicts through the exchange of information regarding the interests and priorities of the negotiating parties (Lewicki, 1983;Rubin and Brown, 1975). In these processes, negotiators need to decide how much information they are ready to share with their counterpart (Aquino, 1998;Raiffa, 1982). ...
... One of the pioneers in the field of negotiation research, Lewicki (1983), discusses this ethical issue in more detail, introducing the term "unethical negotiation tactics": "Unethical tactics are tactics that either violate standards of truth telling or violate the perceived rules of negotiation" ( Lewicki and Robinson, 1998, p. 665). However, whether any given negotiation tactic is unethical depends on the observer's philosophical standpoint. ...
... By withholding (true) information or lying about the real value of various options of a contract issue, the bargaining party generates and makes use of an information advantage. As a form of deception, misrepresentation clearly aims at achieving more favorable agreements for the deceiving party itself (Lewicki, 1983;Shell, 1991). Extant research identifies teams as engaging more in this and other kinds of competitive behavior, also referred to as the "discontinuity effect" ( Schopler and Insko, 1992). ...
Purpose
This study investigates the use of deceptive negotiation tactics to explain why teams can attain higher negotiation profits than individual negotiators. The study distinguishes deception by commission (i.e., active misrepresentation of preferences) from deception by omission (i.e., passive misrepresentation).
Design/methodology/approach
The sample used to test the mediation hypothesis was made up of data from two electronically mediated negotiation simulations encompassing 75 negotiation dyads with 284 participants. The methodology involved coding deceptive negotiation tactics from the log files by counting utterances related to an indifference option that enabled negotiation parties to deceive.
Findings
The results show that teams do apply deceptive negotiation tactics more frequently than individual negotiators and that this behavior helps them increase their negotiation profits.
Originality/value
The findings are valuable for two reasons: (1) The study included controls for other important antecedents of deceptive behavior and negotiation outcome (e.g., negotiators’ nationalities, first bids). Consequently, our empirical results underline the importance of considering team size to understand its impact on profits through the use of deceptive tactics. (2) Although this study does show that deception increases negotiation profits, the absolute level of deception is rather small (on average just one deceptive statement per negotiation).
... Prior research has defined deception as the intentional misrepresentation of information or emotions (Boles et al., 2000;Fulmer et al., 2009;Gaspar, Levine, & Schweitzer, 2015;Lewicki, 1983;Murnighan, 1991). Deception can occur passively (through omission) or actively (through commission) (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999;Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). ...
... Early research on deception adopted an economic perspective to understand the deception decision process. In this perspective, the decision to use deception is a product of a negotiator's perceptions of the costs and the benefits of deception (Becker, 1968;Lewicki, 1983). In support of this perspective, Tenbrunsel (1998) found that economic incentives predictably influence deception, and Akerlof (1970) demonstrated that sellers of used cars will lie if it is in their self-interest. ...
... The Expanded Cost-Benefit Model Lewicki (1983) proposed a cost-benefit model of deception. In this model, the choice to deceive reflects a negotiator's perception of the costs and the benefits of deception. ...
Deception is pervasive in negotiation, and emotions are integral to the deception process. In this article, we review the theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation and introduce a theoretical model. In our review of the research, we find that emotions profoundly influence the decision to use deception. We also find that although negotiation is inherently interpersonal, theoretical and empirical research on deception has focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotion. For this reason, we integrate theory and research on the interpersonal effects of emotions into research on deception and propose a model—the Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model—that relates the emotions of a counterpart to the deception decisions of a negotiator. Our review and model expands our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process and provides a theoretical foundation for future research in the intrapersonal and interpersonal perspectives.
... We suggest that most ingratiating lies first transpires to establish a good interpersonal relationship and then subterfuge by such deceptive attitude. In numerous studies lying considered as an important and normal behaviour in relationships (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010;Bagheri et al., 2012;Boynton, Portnoy, & Johnson, 2013;Brinke, MacDonald, Porter, & O'Connor, 2011;DePaulo, 2004;DePaulo., Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004;Emma, Levine, Maurice, & Schweitzer, 2015;Evans, Xu, & Lee, 2011;Fu, Angela, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008;Goman, 2013;Grover, 1993;Hu, Chen, & Fu, 2012;Leavit & Sluss, 2015;Lewicki & Bazerman, 1983;Lillian, 2014;Masip, 2005;Molm, 1997;Morrison & Milliken, 2000 ;Serota & Levine, 2014;Sluss, Dick, & Thompson, 2011;Vigoda, 2000), so we utilize PSL (Prosocial lies) as dependent variable to check effects of various independent variables and mediators, we also analyses its impact on interpersonal relationship and its values in organizational obscurantism. On the contrary, deceptive attitude for advantages (DAFA), employee deceptive attitude (EMDA), management deceptive attitude (MGDA) and deception for good interpersonal relationship (DFGR) have taken independent variable. ...
... Most of the deceptive attitude we adopt for self-serving because they are lies that benefit them, employees who exaggerates his or her accomplishments does so to look more qualified for the advantages and promotions (Goman, 2013). Whilst, interpersonal relationships are generally considered to avoid any causal conflict between one's own interests and those of another party and deceptive attitude normally outperform those who are less deceptive (Lewicki & Bazerman, 1983). People are organization and are important part for the success of the organization. ...
... (Sluss et al., 2011). As such subterfuge and ingratiating lies are mostly used as tools for reaping sympathies and perceived control on the other party and, thus, a better payoff, also deceptive attitude within the interpersonal relationship context is inextricably knotted to the assumption that the individual will not interact with his/her adversarial counterpart (Lewicki & Bazerman, 1983). Further, it has been discovered that people engage in more ingratiating verbal and nonverbal behaviors when interacting with senior colleagues and member competitive organization rather than a mentor and colleagues (Bella et al., 1985). ...
It is always an arduous task to prevail upon employees to talk about lying, subterfuge, ingratiation and deceptive attitudes at workplace. To find out deceptive attitude is existing, is difficult but to make people understood is more difficult. People lie for different causes, that can be determined and may be driven by greed, undue favours & advantages, promotions, fear, or even an organizational culture that encourages it. However, employees' trust embedded in perceptions of benevolence is not undermined by deception, which may likely to be improvised. Development of prosocial lies at workplace for the sake of interpersonal relationship is quite common in our sugar industry and it is connected with organizational policies to keep information obscure from organizational citizen. In this study we analyzed that how organizational obscurantism develops under prosocial lying, deceptive attitude for Advantages, employees' general deceptive attitude, Managements' general deceptive attitude and applied deception to maintain good relationships at workplace. We also verified that organizational obscurantism maintained in expectations of employees' euphemistic behaviors immaculately and we demonstrate that employees' prosocial lies, management deceptive attitude and organizational obscurantism is used for the reliance and establishment of interpersonal relationship at workplace.
... In our prior propositions, we predict that people high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use informational deception (Proposition 1), emotional deception (Propositions 2), and monitoring-dependent deception (Proposition 3) than people low in emotional intelligence. We now link these propositions with Lewicki's (1983) cost-benefit model of deception, which postulates that perceptions of the effectiveness of deception (e.g., the perceived benefits of deception, likelihood of detection, and consequences of detected deception) are an important input in the decision to use deception. Integrating this theoretical work, we postulate that people are more likely to engage in deception when their use of deception is less likely to be detected. ...
... First, in cooperative negotiations, which invoke strong moral, prosocial, and benevolence norms (Biel and Thøgersen 2007), people high in emotional intelligence are likely to experience more empathy toward their partner than people low in emotional intelligence, and prior studies show that feelings of empathy curtail the use of deception in negotiation (Cohen 2010;Yip and Schweitzer 2016). Second, compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to understand the potentially negative emotional and relational consequences (i.e., costs) of using competitive, unethical tactics (such as self-interested deception; Lewicki and Robinson 1998) in cooperative interactions, and prior research reveals that negotiators are less likely to use deception as the perceived costs of deception increase Lewicki 1983). ...
Deception is pervasive in negotiations and organizations, and emotions are critical to using, detecting, and responding to deception. In this article, we introduce a theoretical model to explore the interplay between emotional intelligence (the ability to perceive and express, understand, regulate, and use emotions) and deception in negotiations. In our model, we propose that emotional intelligence influences the decision to use deception, the effectiveness of deception, the ability to detect deception, and the consequences of deception (specifically, trust repair and retaliation). We consider the emotional intelligence of both deceivers and targets, and we consider characteristics of negotiators, their interaction, and the negotiation context that moderate these relationships. Our model offers a theoretical foundation for research on emotions, emotional intelligence, and deception and identifies a potential disadvantage of negotiating with an emotionally intelligent counterpart. Though prior work has focused on the advantages of being and interacting with people high in emotional intelligence, we assert that those most likely to deceive us may also be those highest in emotional intelligence.
... I thought trust is an important and critical element but everyone seemed to just wave their hands and postulate it. I became interested in understanding the impact of lies and deceptive behaviour on negotiation (Lewicki, 1983); intellectually, you can't get too far into that concept without running into trust and what deception does to trust dynamics. But even I didn't relate lying and deception to its impact on trust in negotiation. ...
... That is because the citation rate of books is lower and most promotion and tenure committees are not capable of judging seminal ideas, and so they rely on journal ranking lists to evaluate quality and don't count book chapters. As an example, Mayer et al. (1995), published in the same year as Lewicki andBunker (1995, 1996), have over 16,000 cites. While their paper has had a huge impact on trust research, where it appeared also gave it great initial credibility. ...
In this article, Roy Lewicki shares his experiences and reflections on trust research from the early seminal papers through to future research opportunities. We discuss his contributions and current thinking on trust development and repair, the forms of trust, the coexistence of trust and distrust, the mechanisms of trust repair, the relationship of trust with conflict, negotiation and in current affairs (e.g. ‘alternative facts’, climate change denial). Recurrent themes are the complex nature of trust development and repair processes, the methodological challenges inherent in studying trust and distrust dynamics over time, and the value of reflective practice and developmental forums for advancing trust research. Bridging the theory-practice divide, developing more sophisticated measurement tools, and conducting interdisciplinary scholarship are identified as rich opportunities for future trust research.
... La théorieéconomique classique suppose qu'un agent rationnel n'est honnête que si la récompense de l'honnêteté l'emporte sur celle de la malhonnêteté (Becker, 1968). Lorsqu'il est possible de punir, les agents mentent si les bénéfices du mensonge sont suffisammentélevés vii pour couvrir le coût de la punition en cas de détection (Akerlof, 1970;Bentham, 1789;Lewicki, 1983). ...
... Standard economic theory assumes that a rational agent is honest only if the reward for honesty outweigh the one associated with dishonesty (Becker, 1968). When punishment is available, agents always lie if the benefits are high enough to cover the cost of punishment upon detection (Akerlof, 1970;Bentham, 1789;Lewicki, 1983). ...
Standard economic models assume that individuals collect and process information in a way that gives them a relatively accurate perception of reality. However, this assumption is often violated. Data shows that individuals often form positively biased beliefs about themselves, which can have detrimental economic con-sequences. This thesis aims to explain the persistence of overconfidence in social interactions by showing the existence of strategic benefits of being overconfident that offset its social cost.Using a series of laboratory experiments, this thesis shows that (i) overconfidence emerges primarily when it provides an advantage in social interactions (Chapter2) and (ii) identify situations in which overconfidence is likely to be socially detrimental (Chapter 3 and 4). This thesis contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of the situational determinants of overconfidence in social interactions and lay the foundations to improve policies intended to prevent or limit its negative effects
... Scholars, who have addressed the above issues, have identified five unethical tactics that are more often adopted by negotiators (Al-Khatib, Malshe, and AbdulKader 2008;Lewicki 1983;Lewicki and Robinson 1998;Lewicki and Stark 1996): (1) Traditional competitive bargaining: exaggerating demands that are much broader than what the negotiator really wants to settle; (2) Attacking the opponent's network: compromising the opponent's confidence through his professional network, and threatening to embarrass him through his professional network; (3) False promises: promising actions, outcomes or future grants that he knows he would not deliver, in order to have concessions from the other party in the negotiation (4) Misrepresentation of information: denying the truth of the information, even if it is valid and approved, in order to strengthen his arguments or position; (5) Inappropriate information gathering: questioning for information about the opponent in a dubious way such as paying bribes or recruiting someone to bring sensitive information on the opponent. ...
... Similar results were reported by Chan and Ng (2016) and Kray and Haselhuhn (2012). These latter found that men were more likely to perceive the use of all practices proposed by Lewicki (1983) as appropriate. In a series of studies, Kennedy, Kray, and Ku (2017) studied the driving mechanism underlying gender differences regarding the endorsement of questionable negotiation tactics. ...
Purpose ; The study aims to examine the impact of a negotiator’s profile (personality, gender, age and experience) on his perception of unethical negotiation tactics.
Design/methodology/approach; A survey has been conducted among 220 middle manager employees and chief executive officers (CEOs) who are directly involved in the negotiation processes and activities for their organizations. A component factor analysis (CFA) was first performed. Then, a multiple regression analysis and ANOVA analysis were conducted to test the study hypotheses.
Findings; The study suggests that negotiators with a high level of ‘openness to experience’ perceive
the use of ‘traditional competitive bargaining’ and ‘inappropriate information gathering’ as ethical. However, ‘conscientious’ negotiators perceive the use of ‘misrepresentation of information’ and ‘inappropriate information gathering’ as unethical. In addition, negotiators with a high level of ‘agreeableness’ perceive the use of ‘misrepresentation of information’ as inappropriate. ‘Misrepresentation of information’ was perceived as more inappropriate for women than for men. Finally, older and highly experienced negotiators perceive ‘inappropriate information gathering’ as unethical more than younger and less experienced ones.
Research limitations/implications The study measures perceptions rather than actual behavior.
Practical implications The study findings could help firms to identify the more suitable profiles in terms of socio-demographic variables and also personality traits for positions related to negotiation with their stakeholders, especially for those with more long-term orientations.
Social implications; Recognizing the potential of businesses to provide an important contribution to society and the large influence of business ethics in people’s everyday lives, including business managers’, trigger a better grasp of the factors that help alleviate unethical practices and that nurture a business culture embedded in an increasing demand for business ethics worldwide. Negotiators are not the exception. Hence, identifying which personality traits are likely to predispose negotiators to endorse unethical negotiation tactics may help shape training programs suitable to produce favorable inclinations to comply with ethical negotiations’ principles. This seems to be possible, on the face of the recent findings suggesting the likelihood of personality traits changes, following the implementation of some particular actions.
Originality/value; To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the few that examine the impact of the negotiator’s personality traits and his socio-demographic variables on his perception of the appropriateness of negotiation tactics. This study is in line with calls to reconsider the role that personality plays in negotiation processes, ethical/unethical behavior and outcomes, after a long period of skepticism among scholars as to its significant impact.
... ables individuals to take advantage of others by manipulating the information that others use to make decisions (Lewicki, 1983). As a result, unethical behavior may provide an enhanced sense of control, which can increase positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990). ...
... People deceive one another about all sorts of matters from the mundane, such as opinions about appearance, to the essential, such as courtroom testimony. In addition, there are established streams of literature investigating "impression management" (e.g., Krauss, 1981), power and politics (e.g., Pfeffer, 1992), and negotiation behaviors (e.g., Lewicki, 1983;Pinkley, et al., 1995) in organizations -all forms of communication that often contain a deceptive component. ...
... However, many people actually deviate from social norms and perform the unethical behavior, such as dishonesty, deception, cheating, stealing, sabotaging, or breaking the law (Feldman et al., 2015). Traditional economic models (Lewicki, 1984;Smith, 1999) suggested that most people behave according to the prediction of a fully rational, selfish agent who is habitual, automatic, and often operating without conscious thought (Fehr and Gächter, 2000;De Dreu and Nauta, 2009). According to economic models, the participants in our study should accept any self-benefiting division, even though the division scheme is unfair to their counterparts. ...
Unlike other creatures, humans developed the ability to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers and a tendency to comply with social norms. However, humans deviate from social norms in various situations. This study used the modified ultimatum game to explore why humans deviate from social norms and how their prosocial behavior can be promoted. In Study 1, participants were asked to imagine working with an anonymous counterpart to complete a task and obtain a certain amount of money (e.g., ¥10). The computer divided the money randomly in favor of the participant (e.g., 9:1 or 8:2). Participants should decide whether to accept or reject such a self-benefiting division. In the non-risk condition, an absolutely fair redivision of money would take place if participants reject self-benefiting division (e.g., 5:5 or 6:4). By contrast, in the risk condition, other-benefiting redivision of money (e.g., 1:9 or 2:8) would take place if participants rejected the self-benefiting division. Results involving 40 college students showed the main effect of condition. The frequency of accepting self-benefiting division in the risk condition was higher than that in the non-risk condition. As such, compliance with social norms is based on the preservation of material resources. In Study 2, we used economic or moral rewards to compensate for economic loss following compliance with the norm. Results involving 28 college students revealed a significant effect of compensation. The rewards, including moral praise, effectively decreased selfish choices. These findings extend previous studies on social norm compliance by emphasizing the importance of internal, fairness-based balance between material and moral needs, as well as the role of moral praise in promoting prosocial behavior.
... The potential gain is assessed by the agent by comparing the benefits of cheating with the costs, such as the potential risk of getting caught and punishment. People are assumed to calculate whether the gains, balanced by the risks, exceed the potential penalty (Hechter, 1990;Lewicki, 1983). Nevertheless, rational calculations of gains versus costs have not been able to explain cheating in universities. ...
Decades of studies show that most students cheat at some point in their academic career. This has mainly been dealt with by surveillance and technical solutions. This paper shows that by signaling a reminder of moral conduct universities can create norms that lessen the chance of unethical behavior in tests. An experiment was conducted in a Finnish business school, where 99 students were tested with a mathematical quiz. All participants were given the opportunity to cheat by self-reporting the scores. Half of them received a reminder of moral conduct which decreased the reported math scores, thus indicating less cheating. The results indicate that male students cheat more than females. The findings support the use of primes to mitigate cheating. It is argued that reducing cheating in business schools has implications for graduates' future ethical business behavior.
... Perceived deception. Consistent with prior deception research (Barry, 1999;Lewicki, 1983), we asked sellers to rate the extent to which their counterpart had misrepresented their bottom line, preferences, emotions, intentions, and material facts (1: Definitely misrepresented, 5: Definitely did not misrepresent). We asked sellers to complete this scale both immediately following the negotiation (α = .94) ...
Scholars have assumed that trust is fragile: difficult to build and easily broken. We demonstrate, however, that in some cases trust is surprisingly robust—even when harmful deception is revealed, some individuals maintain high levels of trust in the deceiver. In this paper, we describe how implicit theories moderate the harmful effects of revealed deception on a key component of trust: perceptions of integrity. In a negotiation context, we show that people who hold incremental theories (beliefs that negotiating abilities are malleable) reduce perceptions of their counterpart’s integrity after they learn that they were deceived, whereas people who hold entity theories (beliefs that negotiators’ characteristics and abilities are fixed) maintain their first impressions after learning that they were deceived. Implicit theories influenced how targets interpreted evidence of deception. Individuals with incremental theories encoded revealed deception as an ethical violation; individuals with entity theories did not. These findings highlight the importance of implicit beliefs in understanding how trust changes over time.
... It is the process of reviewing, planning, and analyzing used by two or more parties to reach acceptable agreements or compromises. A negotiation situation usually encounters a conflict of interest (Lewicki, 1983). Accordingly, when a purchasing negotiation conflict happens, tension may occur between purchasing professionals' duty to both the employer and supplier. ...
... This prediction is grounded within longstanding models of ethical decisionmaking. Prominent models within the literatures on crime, academic dishonesty, and deception have proposed that people undergo cost-benefit analyses when deciding whether to behave unethically, weighing the perceived benefits of the behavior against the perceived costs (e.g., Becker, 1968;Eccles, 1983;Greve et al., 2010;Lewicki, 1983;Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Similarly, at the organization level, rational-choice perspectives posit that organizations weigh potential benefits and costs to their reputation in decisions to engage in misconduct (e.g., Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999;Kreps & Wilson, 1982). ...
This research investigates the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. We propose that people will bemore likely to engage in unethical behavior when competing against their rivals than when competing against non-rival competitors. Across an archival study and a series of experiments, we found that rivalry was associated with increased unsporting behavior, use of deception, and willingness to employ unethical negotiation tactics. We also explore the psychological underpinnings of rivalry in order to illuminate how it differs from general competition and why it increases unethical behavior. The data reveal a serialmediation pathway whereby rivalry heightens the psychological stakes of competition (by increasing actors' contingency of self-worth and status concerns), which leads to the adoption of a stronger performance-Approach orientation, which then increases unethical behavior. These findings highlight the importance of rivalry as a widespread, powerful, yet largely unstudied phenomenon with significant organizational implications. They also help to inform when and why unethical behavior occurs within organizations, and demonstrate that the effects of competition are dependent upon relationships and prior interactions between actors.
... Hiring professionals tend to agree that organizations should not hire applicants caught intentionally lying on their resumes and should terminate such employees because of their questionable moral character (Amare & Manning, 2009;Bachler, 1995). That is, resume fraud indicates a lack of integrity and it will more likely occur when applicants possess a deceitful personality (Lewicki, 1983). Accordingly, we propose that two integrityrelated traits, Machiavellianism and moral identity, are related to resume fraud. ...
Resume fraud is pervasive and has detrimental consequences, but researchers lack a way to study it. We develop and validate a measure for empirically investigating resume misrepresentations purposely designed to mislead recruiters. In study 1, an initial set of items designed to measure three theorized resume fraud dimensions (fabrication, embellishment, omission) are rated for content validity. In study 2, job seekers complete the measure and its factor structure is evaluated. In study 3, another sample of job seekers is surveyed to verify the measure’s factor structure and to provide evidence regarding construct validity. In study 4, working adults who recently conducted a job search are surveyed to determine which individuals are more likely to commit resume fraud and whether resume fraud relates to critical work behaviors. We confirm the three-factor structure of our measure and offer evidence of construct validity by showing that socially desirable responding, Machiavellianism, moral identity, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and agreeableness are related to resume fraud. Additionally, we find that resume fraud predicts reduced job performance and increased workplace deviance beyond deceptive interviewing behavior. Resume fraud is rarely studied despite the negative impact it can have on job-related outcomes. Researchers can use this measure to explore further the antecedents and outcomes of resume fraud and to advise recruiters on how to minimize it. We develop a measure focusing on intentional resume misrepresentations designed to deceive recruiters. This is one of the first studies to examine the antecedents and outcomes of resume fraud.
... Importantly, because implicit beliefs create overarching " shalts and shalt nots " (Ferraro et al. 2005: 10) and serve as the foundation for theories that " people frequently feel compelled to live out " (Leavitt, Zhu, and Aquino 2011: 7), we expect that implicit beliefs in the morality of business will influence the deception decision process in a manner consistent with these beliefs. The deception decision process is interactive, however, and reflects the negotiator's personal characteristics — such as her or his implicit beliefs — and also the characteristics of the negotiation (Lewicki 1983; Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013). In this study, we considered a particularly important dimension of negotiations: whether the negotiator perceived the negotiation as competitive or cooperative. ...
Deception is pervasive in negotiations, and proponents of bounded ethicality propose that the decision to use deception reflects the influence of (unconscious) implicit processes. In this article, we empirically explore the bounded ethicality perspective. In the first experiment, we found that an implicit association between business and morality interacted with the competitive and cooperative characteristics of a negotiation to influence both negotiators' attitudes toward deception and their intentions to use deception. But in a second and third experiment, we found that these did not interact to influence negotiators' actual deception decisions. The results of our studies provide important insights into the deception decision process and complicate our understanding of bounded ethicality.
... In the bargaining context, if negotiators are convinced they will be offered inadequate deals unreflective of their inherent deservingness, they may be willing to endorse unethical or inappropriate tactics to claim what they feel is their due-for instance, making false promises, misrepresenting their position or interests and telling partial truths (e.g. Lewicki, 1983;Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). ...
In this paper, we extend the literature on psychological entitlement to the domain of negotiation. Psychological entitlement describes a tendency to demand excessive and unearned rewards. For negotiators, entitlement is associated with individually beneficial attitudes like aspirations, first offer intentions, and self-efficacy, but also with contentious and unethical approaches to bargaining. As such, we argue that entitlement in negotiation may function as a social trap: The functional negotiation attitudes it engenders are likely to result in personally favourable outcomes for the entitled negotiator, reinforcing and exacerbating those attitudes. But these advantages are simultaneously accompanied by a suite of dysfunctional attitudes (unethicality, a "zero-sum" mindset, and a contentious style) that lead the entitled to seek advantage at others' cost. In three cross-sectional studies of recalled, hypothetical, and planned future negotiations (n=615), we show both the functional and dysfunctional consequences of entitlement in negotiation. Importantly, we establish the ability of entitlement to predict these consequences above and beyond traits robustly situated in the personality literature (e.g., narcissism, low agreeableness, neuroticism). Our findings indicate entitlement may have pernicious effects for negotiation ethics. We close by addressing the methodological limitations of our study, and by proposing a research agenda for management, personality, and negotiation researchers interested in mitigating the effects of entitlement in negotiating.
... Furthermore, there are two levels of Machiavellianism, one is high Machs and another is low Machs (Christie and Geis, 1970). High Machs are more amoral and less interactive with social norms (Lewicki, 1983) whereas, low Machs are mainly less manipulative and somehow involved in societal norms with interactive behaviour (Geis, 1978). Christie and Geis (1970) originally developed the scale on Machiavellian leadership which was based on four major characteristics or facets of a Machiavellian leader. ...
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among the destructive leadership constructs and counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) in the tanners' sector of Pakistan. Destructive leadership is composed of three constructs, which are Machiavellianism, abusive supervision, and psychopathic behaviour. The study investigated the mediating role of information silence in these relationships. The data was collected from 353 respondents by using self-administered questionnaires to the tanners' sector of Pakistan. Data were analysed through structure equation modelling and test the hypothesised relationships. Quantitative results showed the 116 S. Younus et al. existence of destructive leadership lead to CWB in the tanners' sector. Information silence mediates the relationship among destructive leadership and CWB except the relationship of Machiavellianism with information silence and CWB. Tanneries should conduct different training sessions to reduce the effect of destructive leadership behaviour in workplace to reduce the CWB. Future studies may conduct on destructive leadership with horizontal violence and organisational politics.
... 109 At the same time, problems are being identified, such as impaired driving, public consumption, employment, and child custody cases. 110 Will insurance pay for Oklahoma's medical marijuana? Mike Rhodes, deputy commissioner of the Oklahoma Insurance Department says it is unclear if SQ 788 will require insurance to pay for medical marijuana. ...
Academic dishonesty undermines the integrity of a course, the veracity of an academic program, and the credibility of the degree. Instructors in higher education are concerned about the increasing number of student violations of academic integrity policies and often blame technological advances that make cheating easier, such as group messaging applications, online sharing sites, and the simple use of cut and paste. To help instructors understand viable precautions to prevent students from cheating, this article outlines why students cheat and how they rationalize their dishonest behavior. While society in general views cheating as a deviant behavior that violates the norms of integrity and honesty, students often perceive cheating as a normal behavior that they rationalize based on convenience. The purpose of this study was to survey university students about their perceptions of their university’s academic integrity policies and cheating. Deviance literature is employed to explain concepts associated with the culture of academic dishonesty.
... ables individuals to take advantage of others by manipulating the information that others use to make decisions (Lewicki, 1983). As a result, unethical behavior may provide an enhanced sense of control, which can increase positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990). ...
... Accordingly, followers tend to be inhibited from engaging in unethical behavior (Jordan and Monin, 2008) and need to be released of these inhibitions before they can engage in them (Treviño et al., 2014), both to benefit oneself (e.g., Vriend et al., 2016) and others (e.g., Chen et al., 2016). Ethical inhibitions can be released when the perceived benefits of unethical behavior outweigh its perceived costs (Becker, 1968;Lewicki, 1983). For pro-self unethical behavior, this is typically the case when personal gains can be ensured (e.g., Brief et al., 2001;Gino and Margolis, 2011) or when relationships can be maintained (El Akremi et al., 2010;Liu et al., 2013;Jawahar et al., 2018). ...
In this study, we use a social exchange perspective to examine when [i.e., high- vs. low-quality leader–member exchange (LMX)], why (i.e., positive vs. negative reciprocity), and how (i.e., pro-leader vs. pro-self unethical behavior) followers consider unethical behavior that either benefits the leader or the self. Across an experimental and a time-split survey study, we find that high-quality LMX relationships motivate pro-leader unethical intention as a means to satisfy positive reciprocity motives, and that low-quality LMX relationships motivate pro-self unethical intention as a means to satisfy negative reciprocity motives. Importantly, our studies demonstrate that it is crucial to incorporate both positive and negative reciprocity motives when studying the effects of LMX. Implications of these results for social exchange theory, LMX, and the broader literature of (self- and other-serving) unethical behavior are discussed.
... In the worst-case scenario, TM may incentivize employees to engage in risky and illegitimate behaviors in order to meet their goals (Schweitzer et al., 2004). Lewicki (1983) suggested that an individual's level of deception is determined by the costs and benefits that the individual anticipates for engaging in it. As such, in an exclusively winner-takes-all TM system, employees are more likely to underestimate the costs of deception since anticipated benefits are substantially large for employees who have been deemed "high-potential"even if they do not ultimately live up to the potential expected of them. ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical review of the literature on talent management (TM) and highlight the potential downsides of exclusive TM approaches and workforce differentiation.
Design/methodology/approach
A literature review of 32 theoretical and empirical studies published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals in the field of TM was conducted.
Findings
The review resulted in four overarching themes that highlight the dysfunctional aspects of exclusive TM approaches and workforce differentiation: (a) organizational justice, (b) ethics, (c) internal competition and (d) workplace diversity. Based on the four themes, the authors present a conceptual model that includes a feedback loop for reevaluating and improving on existing TM processes. Several research questions and propositions are also presented for consideration in future TM research.
Research limitations/implications
This paper highlights the need for more empirical studies and statistically rigorous evidence to demonstrate and justify the effectiveness of TM.
Practical implications
The authors suggest that the locus of TM practices should be shifted from managing individual job competencies to managing organizational capabilities.
Originality/value
This review illuminates the need to reevaluate existing TM approaches and minimize TM's potential downsides for long-term organizational health and competitiveness.
... Países ocidentais tendem a apresentar publicidade que reflete o individualismo enquanto orientais tendem a produzir peças publicitárias com valores coletivistas (Zhang & Neelankavil, 1997 (Hechter, 1990;Lewicki, 1984). ...
A presente pesquisa objetivou identificar anúncios brasileiros representativos do jeitinho e investigar se o conteúdo das peças publicitárias selecionadas influenciaria os participantes a se engajarem em comportamento desonesto. No Estudo 1, um total de 211 participantes (128 mulheres, 83 homens, idade média = 26,93 anos, DP = 7,81) assistiu a sete peças publicitárias e respondeu ao Questionário de Avaliação de Vídeos, ao Questionário Contextualizado do Jeitinho Brasileiro e ao inventário de personalidade Big Five. A partir desse estudo, selecionaram-se três peças publicitárias consideradas mais representativas do constructo. No Estudo 2, um total de 200 participantes (125 mulheres, 75 homens, idade média = 20,92 anos, DP = 4,56) participou de um experimento. Aos participantes, contou-se que realizariam um estudo de psicologia do consumidor, avaliariam anúncios publicitários e que concorreriam a um sorteio de um vale presente. Manipularam-se o priming de jeitinho (conteúdo dos vídeos: jeitinho ou neutro), bem como a privacidade do sorteio (com ou sem privacidade). Encontrou-se diferença estatisticamente significativa entre os grupos para manipulação de privacidade, indicando que os participantes que realizaram a tarefa de mensuração de desonestidade com privacidade tenderam a reportar valores menores do que os que realmente obtiveram no sorteio. Implicações são discutidas.
... We argue that although deception falls under the broader term of unethical behavior, in terms of its purpose and application, there are some differences between deception and unethical behavior. More specifically, while perpetrators engage in unethical behavior to fulfill their self-interest (Lewicki, 1983), they engage in deceptive behavior to cover or hide their self-interested unethical behavior from regulatory bodies (Halbouni, 2015;Petrucelli, 2013). We support those previous studies that suggest that when perpetrators decide to engage in unethical behavior, they know that they are risking their careers, reputation, and freedom by involving themselves in unethical behavior. ...
The purpose of this study is to examine whether deception influences unethical behavior, employee perceptions of threat, and their coping appraisal processes. It also examines the role of deception in influencing employees' threat appraisal and coping appraisal processing. Using the structural equation model (PLS-SEM), this study reveals a strong relationship between deception, unethical behavior, employees' perceived threat appraisal process, and the coping appraisal process. The empirical findings suggest that deception is a common practice in organizations and significantly influences unethical behavior. This study also finds that deception plays a crucial role in reducing employees' perceptions of threat regarding negative outcomes for engaging in unethical behavior while significantly influencing employees' perceived coping appraisal process, which suggests that deceptive behavior can protect them from the threat of detection their unethical behavior. The findings provide new insights into the relationship among deception, employees' perceived threat appraisal process, coping appraisal process, and unethical behavior and paves the way for further research in this area.
JEL Classification: L3, M1, M10, M14, M48
How to Cite:
Jannat, T., Omar, N. A., & Alam, S. H. (2021). Is Deception an Antecedent for Employees’ Cognitive Appraisal Proceses and Unethical Behavior?. Etikonomi, 20(1), 153 – 168. https://doi.org/10.15408/etk.v20i1.15433.
... Concerned with the adverse effects of self-serving dishonesty in economically relevant settings, the recently growing literature in experimental economics has been uncovering the determinants of lying behavior. 2 Traditionally, economists have considered lying to be inevitable as long as the material gains from a lie outweigh the risk and consequences of the lie being detected (Lewicki, 1983). However, the experimental literature on lying behavior has come to a different conclusion. ...
Lying involves many decisions yielding big or small benefits. Are big and small lies complementary or supplementary? In a laboratory experiment where the participants could simultaneously tell a big and a small lie, our study finds that lies are complementary. The participants who lie more in the big lie, also do so in the small lie and vice versa. Our study also finds that although replacing one dimension of the lying opportunities with a randomly determined prize does not affect the overall lying behavior, repeatedly being lucky on a high-stakes prize leads to less lying on the report of a low-stakes outcome.
... rial facts, and so forth (e.g., Schweitzer, 2001). In negotiations, deception can take many different forms (Lewicki, 1983;Robinson et al., 2000;Lewicki et al., 2007), including misrepresentation, bluffing, presenting false information, making false promises, selectively disclosing information, and manipulation of positive and/or negative emotions. Even routine behaviors in negotiations can influence deception. ...
While competitive situations such as negotiations are usually thought to involve some level of deception, the use of deception is inconsistent across negotiators. In this chapter, we examine the various paradigms, dependent variables, and situational moderators surrounding deception in negotiations – paying particular attention to the unique role of gender. We consider gender both as a predictor of whether a negotiator will deceive as well as a predictor of whether a negotiator will elicit deception from others. First, we begin this chapter by broadly reviewing the prior literature on deception in negotiations – discussing the various theories of deception, tactics, and consequences of deception. Next, we focus on the role of gender – considering the literature on the disparate ethical standards and use of deception between men and women negotiators. We then briefly consider the literature on individual and environmental factors that may assist in curtailing deception. Throughout we make recommendations for future research (both basic and applied) in the area of gender and deception in negotiations. We conclude the chapter by making practical recommendations for the classroom and for organizations to consider to curtail unethical behavior and deception in the workplace.
... More specifically, while perpetrators engage in unethical behavior to fulfill their self-interest Etikonomi: Jurnal Ekonomi Vol. 20 (1), 2021 (Lewicki, 1983), they engage in deceptive behavior to cover or hide their self-interested unethical behavior from regulatory bodies (Halbouni, 2015;Petrucelli, 2013). We support those previous studies that suggest that when perpetrators decide to engage in unethical behavior, they know that they are risking their careers, reputation, and freedom by involving themselves in unethical behavior. ...
The purpose of this study is to examine whether deception influences unethical behavior, employee perceptions of threat, and their coping appraisal processes. It also examines the role of deception in influencing employees' threat appraisal and coping appraisal processing. Using the structural equation model (PLS-SEM), this study reveals a strong relationship between deception, unethical behavior, employees' perceived threat appraisal process, and the coping appraisal process. The empirical findings suggest that deception is a common practice in organizations and significantly influences unethical behavior. This study also finds that deception plays a crucial role in reducing employees' perceptions of threat regarding negative outcomes for engaging in unethical behavior while significantly influencing employees' perceived coping appraisal process, which suggests that deceptive behavior can protect them from the threat of detection their unethical behavior. The findings provide new insights into the relationship among deception, employees' perceived threat appraisal process, coping appraisal process, and unethical behavior and paves the way for further research in this area.
... The traditional explanation for why people cheat, deceive, misbehave, or commit a crime, based on neoclassical economic theory (Becker, 2000), suggests that the extent to which people are dishonest or might commit a crime is that they undertake a psychological cost-benefit analysis by considering several external factors. In the theory of crime and punishment, the cost-benefit analysis specifies that the frequency and magnitude of an individual's dishonesty is dependent on the size of the payoff or reward (benefit), and the probability of getting caught and the degree of the punishment if caught (cost) (Lewicki, 1984). However, this model does not accurately describe why people with the ability to pay for certain items are dishonest in a range of life domains such as paying taxes and shoplifting. ...
Hotel guests are sometimes confused as to what they can take from their hotel room. Passengers are sometimes confused as to what they can take from their flight. When passengers take a flight and hotel guests pay for a room, what items are they entitled to? It is not so clear. This research explores this issue. The economic value of these items can be quite prohibitive and represents a direct economic loss to these tourism businesses. The focus of previous research on theft in the tourism and hospitality industry focuses on tourists being robbed or employees stealing from their employers. This research assesses the self-reported incidence of tourists taking items from hotels and airlines and investigates the relationship between tourists taking both free and not-complimentary items and self-reported ethical tourist behavior. Further, we segment and profile the types of tourists who take items from hotels and airlines. We achieve these research objectives by undertaking a quantitative survey through 538 completed questionnaires captured via an in-person intercept method in commonly frequented tourist hot spots in Hong Kong. The incidence of theft is relatively high for some items, but tourists generally know which items they are entitled to and which they are not. There are three segments of tourists in terms of their self-reported behavior of taking items from hotel rooms and off flights: Honest, Impulsive, and Habituals.
... High rewards and a low likelihood of being caught facilitate the commission of deceptive acts (Lewicki, 1983). If negotiators believe that employees of new ventures (compared to employees of established firms) are less experienced and thus less likely to detect deceptive acts, they should be more willing to deceive them. ...
This study builds on liabilities of newness theory and moral disengagement theory to investigate deceptive behavior in buyer–supplier negotiations that involve new ventures. Using two purchasing negotiation experiments, it contrasts how negotiators treat employees of new ventures, mature firms, and firms of unknown age. The first experiment examined the behavior of participants in their role as salespeople toward buyers, whereas the second one examined the behavior of participants in their role as buyers toward salespeople. Across experiments, participants shared the belief that their negotiation counterparts were less experienced when these counterparts worked for new ventures than when they worked for mature firms. Moreover, both groups were more likely to deceive negotiation counterparts working at new ventures, although this effect was stronger in magnitude in the first experiment. These findings contribute to the field of behavioral supply management by identifying a new situational variable (firm newness) that promotes deception in purchasing negotiations. Moreover, they provide implications for buyers and suppliers on how to leverage preconceptions associated with their firm's age to gain advantages (or avoid disadvantages) in buyer–supplier negotiations. Finally, we add to liabilities of newness theory by identifying an additional liability that affects new ventures – namely, the increased risk of being deceived.
... How do people choose whether or not to follow a moral course of action? Neoclassical economics suggests that people evaluate the opportunity of acting according to morals by comparing the expected material benefits and costs of a moral versus immoral action [1,2] and then choose the action that maximizes their interests [3,4]. Such a cost-benefit view of decisionmaking is at the core of the economic theory of crime, which forms the basis for most policy interventions aimed at curbing dishonesty. ...
Humans not only value extrinsic monetary rewards but also their own morality and their image in the eyes of others. Yet violating moral norms is frequent, especially when people know that they are not under scrutiny. When moral values and monetary payoffs are at odds, how does the brain weigh the benefits and costs of moral and monetary payoffs? Here, using a neurocomputational model of decision value (DV) and functional (f)MRI, we investigated whether different brain systems are engaged when deciding whether to earn money by contributing to a "bad cause" and when deciding whether to sacrifice money to contribute to a "good cause," both when such choices were made privately or in public. Although similar principles of DV computations were used to solve these dilemmas, they engaged 2 distinct valuation systems. When weighing monetary benefits and moral costs, people were willing to trade their moral values in exchange for money, an effect accompanied by DV computation engaging the anterior insula and the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC). In contrast, weighing monetary costs against compliance with one's moral values engaged the ventral putamen. Moreover, regardless of the type of dilemma, a brain network including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula, and the right temporoparietal junction (TJP) was more engaged in public than in private settings. Together, these findings identify how the brain processes three sources of motivation: extrinsic rewards, moral values, and concerns for image.
... O MOSCR, basicamente é o resultado entre uma equação dos benefícios adquiridos por certa atitude pelo risco de ser pego e a intensidade da punição que receberá. Para Hechter (1990) e Lewicki (1984), no comportamento humano, as pessoas consideram apenas três aspectos ao passar em frente a uma loja de conveniência: o valor total em dinheiro que poderiam ter se roubassem o estabelecimento, a probabilidade de serem flagrados e o tamanho da punição que receberiam caso fossem pegos. Assim, a atitude futura depende diretamente desta avaliação. ...
Evidências têm mostrado que praticamente todas as pessoas são desonestas, sendo que umas mais do que outras. As pessoas possuem uma bússola moral que define um limite de desonestidade baseado na sua percepção de diversos incentivos. Dois experimentos de campo investigaram o nível de desonestidade das pessoas. No primeiro experimento, os participantes se engajaram em uma olimpíada de matemática fictícia, onde havia a possibilidade de trapaça ao retornar a quantidade de respostas corretas da atividade. No segundo experimento, analisou-se a quantidade de pessoas que fizeram a devolução de troco excedente em uma situação de compra corriqueira. Os estudos testaram o quanto dois diferentes tipos de incentivos (moral e social) podem diminuir a desonestidade dos indivíduos. Os resultados do primeiro estudo mostraram que na possibilidade de trapacear, as pessoas foram desonestas, porém não muito. Já o segundo experimento mostrou que uma simples simulação de estímulo social, a presença de um cartaz com a ilustração de olhos ao lado do caixa, reduziu a desonestidade e fez com que as pessoas devolvessem mais o troco excedente. Em ambos os estudos, a presença de códigos de honra não apresentou efeito na redução da desonestidade.
... Reward goals involve distinctive economic benefits, such as sales target incentives, while mere goals involve no direct economic benefits, such as weight losing goal. Lewicki (1983) assumed that individuals will make ethical or unethical decisions based on perceived cost and benefits. Perceived rewards of unethical behaviour will be greater for reward goals and lower for mere goals. ...
Over the last four decades, the field of negotiation has become a fully recognized academic discipline around the world and negotiation courses and competitions have become increasingly popular. Although it is believed that negotiators may be trained and that negotiation is a skill that can be taught and evaluated, the question of how to assess negotiation performance systematically and comprehensively remains largely unanswered. This article proposes a negotiation competency model for evaluating negotiation performance. The model includes a set of selected negotiation competencies together with proficiency levels and their behavioral indicators. Our goal is to help scholars design more effective negotiation courses and fairer negotiation competitions, improve negotiation pedagogy, and train negotiators who are well prepared to handle conflicts in our increasingly complex society.
Consumers’ complaints about deceptive marketing tactics receive much attention over the internet and in the media. Therefore, it is crucial to learn more about consumer deception from a theoretical perspective. Academic literature mainly looks at objective consumer deception, whereas less is known about consumers’ perceptions of a deception. This research defines perceived deception which enables researchers and practitioners to understand the consumer’s perspective on deception better. Subsequently, a systematic analysis of 36 studies, which empirically investigated consumer deception, was conducted. Specifically, this research offers seven factors that explain the diversity in results (e.g. moderation and mediation processes, various manipulations, different measurements). By explaining the consequences of consumer deception, this article offers implications for marketers, researchers as well as public policymakers.
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Based on the social exchange theory, this paper explores the indirect impact of high-commitment work systems on employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior. Through the analysis of multisource data from 139 companies (including 139 human resource managers and 966 employees), a multilevel structuring equation model is used to verify the study’s hypotheses. The research results show the following findings: (1) High-commitment work systems are significantly positively related to employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior. (2) High-commitment work systems have indirect effects on the employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior through the relational psychological contract. The relational psychological contract plays a mediating role in this process. (3) Employees’ balanced reciprocity beliefs significantly enhance the positive effect of relational psychological contracts on employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior. It can also positively moderate the mediating effect of high-commitment work systems that affect employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior via relational psychological contract.
In the experiment we model all possible consequences from misreporting for both the shareholder and for the manager, since we are interested in patterns in reporting behaviour resulting from different motivations for potential misrepresentation. This allows for examining the stability of the (mis)reporting behaviour in different treatments. Agents are primarily driven by the consequences for themselves rather than by the consequences for the principal, while deciding on misreporting. Participants are willing to sacrifice a small gain for themselves in order to prevent a greater loss for the principal. If agents misreport, they do it in order to generate positive rather than negative consequences for themselves. Reports in favour of the principal, but fruitless or even costly for the agent are very rare. The experiment indicates also that pro-social agents report more truthfully than pro-self agents.
Paltering is the active use of truthful statements to convey a misleading impression. Across 2 pilot studies and 6 experiments, we identify paltering as a distinct form of deception. Paltering differs from lying by omission (the passive omission of relevant information) and lying by commission (the active use of false statements). Our findings reveal that paltering is common in negotiations and that many negotiators prefer to palter than to lie by commission. Paltering, however, may promote conflict fueled by self-serving interpretations; palterers focus on the veracity of their statements ("I told the truth"), whereas targets focus on the misleading impression palters convey ("I was misled"). We also find that targets perceive palters to be especially unethical when palters are used in response to direct questions as opposed to when they are unprompted. Taken together, we show that paltering is a common, but risky, negotiation tactic. Compared with negotiators who tell the truth, negotiators who palter are likely to claim additional value, but increase the likelihood of impasse and harm to their reputations. (PsycINFO Database Record
Negotiations bring not only uncertainty but also ambiguity on what is morally appropriate or not to do. This paper sought to determine how appropriate SMEs managers perceive the use of ethically questionable tactics that are usually used in business negotiations and how culture may impact this perception. To achieve this, the study makes comparisons of this perception across demographic and personal characteristics like gender, age, negotiating experience, training, etc. In addition, it studies the causal relationship between cultural values and cultural intelligence with business ethics to analyse the potential of culture to explain the perception of appropriateness of using ethically questionable tactics. The results show that the traditional competitive bargain tactics are seen as the most appropriate ones by those in Greater Lincolnshire and the tactics concerning attacking the opponent’s network as the least appropriate. Culture has a significant impact on the perceived appropriateness of using ethically questionable tactics in negotiations. The relevant implications are discussed along with the limitations and future research directions.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of negotiation process and outcome on an individual’s desire to negotiate again with the same counterpart.
Design/methodology/approach
Data were collected from 115 dyads representing two companies negotiating an eight-issue property leasing agreement via e-mail. Desire to negotiate again was regressed on demographic/personality, process, and outcome measures.
Findings
Reaching an agreement was found to be significantly related to desire to negotiate again, while the number of messages exchanged and the mean number of competitive tactics employed were positively and negatively associated with reaching an agreement, respectively. Further, perceived honesty of self and counterpart were also associated with an individual’s desire to negotiate again.
Originality/value
This study focuses on an aspect of real negotiations often overlooked by researchers – the likelihood of future encounters with the same party – and examines three categories of factors that could affect a party’s desire to negotiate with a counterpart again – demographic/personality, process, and outcome (actual and perceived).
We conduct a natural field experiment in fish markets where sellers frequently cheat on weight and face negligible economic penalty. Exploiting exogenous variations in fish prices, an indicator of marginal economic benefit from cheating, we examine how dishonest behavior varies with rising economic benefit from cheating. We find that most sellers cheat but that cheating almost never exceeds ten percent of purchased quantity, and that the value of cheating is small. The data reveal a non-monotonic relationship wherein cheating initially increases and thereafter decreases in the fish price.
Täglich berichten Medien über Täuschung von Konsumenten. Bisher gibt es jedoch wenige marketingwissenschaftliche Analysen zum Thema Täuschung von Konsumenten durch Marketingkommunikation. Die vorliegende Arbeit begegnet diesem Mangel an wissenschaftlicher Einbettung dieses Themenkomplexes, indem sie bestehende Studien systematisiert und dadurch eine Integration dieser Studien in bestehende Strömungen des Konsumentenverhaltens ermöglicht. Ferner werden existierende Lücken im Literaturbestand zu dieser Thematik im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit durch eigene empirische Studien geschlossen. Der Fokus der Studien liegt dabei vor allem auf den Reaktionen von Konsumenten, die durch täuschendende Marketingkommunikation ausgelöst werden. Im Detail gibt die Arbeit anhand von elf Forschungsfragen neue Einblicke in divergierende Täuschungsdefinitionen, beschreibt unter welchen Voraussetzzungen Konsumenten in der Lage sind Täuschung zu erkennen und gibt Aufschluss über die zugrunde liegenden Konsumentenreaktionen, die bei der Wahrnehmung einer Täuschung stattfinden. Einen besonderen Stellenwert erhält dabei das Konstrukt der Food Literacy. Eine hohe Ausprägung von Food Literacy soll es Konsumenten ermöglichen eine Täuschung eigenständig zu erkennen und sich so vor den negativen Konsequenzen der selbigen zu schützen. Food Literacy wird in dieser Arbeit definiert, die Komponenten von Food Literacy werden in einer qualitativen Studie untersucht und das Konstrukt wird mittels einer quantitativen Skalenentwicklung messbar gemacht. Im Rahmen dieser Schritte zeigt sich, dass die Informationsverarbeitung von Konsumenten am besten geeignet ist, um das Konstrukt beim Konsumenten zu messen. Anschließend beschreibt die Arbeit anhand von vier umfangreichen Experimentalstudien, unter welchen Voraussetzungen Konsumenten in der Lage sind eine Täuschung zu erkennen und mit welchen Konsequenzen Anbieter rechnen müssen, wenn Konsumenten von einer Täuschung erfahren. Dabei wird ein Mediationsmodell vorgestellt, welches Anbietern aufzeigt, dass Täuschung zu verringerter Zufriedenheit, schlechterer Einstellung zur Marke und einer geringeren Kaufabsicht führt, sobald Konsumenten eine Täuschung wahrnehmen. Dieser Prozess konnte über verschiedene Kontexte hinweg gefunden werden und ist unabhängig davon, ob Konsumenten eine Täuschung selbst erleben oder über Dritte von dieser erfahren. Die Arbeit schließt mit einem Fazit, das Forschungsfelder aufzeigt und Unternehmen Handlungsempfehlungen gibt, um negative konsumentenbezogene, wirtschaftliche sowie gesellschaftliche Konsequenzen von Täuschung zu vermeiden. Schließlich wird Verbraucherschützern aufgezeigt, wie sie Täuschungsanschuldigungen überprüfen können und Verbraucher stärken können souveräner im Umgang mit Täuschung zu werden.
I argue that lying in business negotiations is pro tanto wrong and no less wrong than lying in other contexts. First, I assert that lying in general is pro tanto wrong. Then, I examine and refute five arguments to the effect that lying in a business context is less wrong than lying in other contexts. The common thought behind these arguments—based on consent, self-defence, the “greater good,” fiduciary duty, and practicality—is that the particular circumstances which are characteristic of business negotiations are such that the wrongness of lying is either mitigated or eliminated completely. I argue that all these “special exemption” arguments fail. I conclude that, in the absence of a credible argument to the contrary, the same moral constraints must apply to lying in business negotiations as apply to lying in other contexts. Furthermore, I show that for the negotiator, there are real practical benefits from not lying.
This chapter concerns itself with defining conflict and discusses the value it provides to organizations engaging in conflicts. The chapter is structured so that first we will provide a brief on the need to study conflict and negotiations in organizations. Then the discussion will move to the different drivers of organizational conflicts and will conclude with a typology of the different conflicts that exist within organizations. The third section will focus on the models (life-cycles) of conflicts that are available in conflict literature. The final section will focus on the different conflict handling techniques that are available. This section will include a discussion on the different conflict handling styles and negotiation tactics, and a brief on the process of alternate dispute resolution in conflict management.
Betrayal is a very common, but relatively under-researched, dark side phenomenon in inter-firm relationships that warrants investigation. We propose a conceptual model of the factors reducing betrayal intention in exporter-importer (E-I) working relationships and its resulting effect on actual betrayal. Using a random sample of 262 indigenous exporters of manufactured goods based in Greece, we confirm that betrayal intention in their relationships with foreign buyers is significantly and negatively affected by four key parameters, namely, trust, communication, long-term orientation, and social bonds. An importer’s betrayal intention is subsequently very likely to develop into actual betrayal in the relationship. However, this likelihood is lower in the case of older relationships, as well as those characterized by contractual obligation between the interacting parties.
Visceral states like thirst, hunger, and fatigue can alter motivations, predictions, and even memory. Across 3 studies, we demonstrate that such "hot" states can also shift moral standards and increase dishonest behavior. Compared to participants who had just eaten or who had not yet exercised, hungry and thirsty participants were more likely to behave dishonestly to win a prize. Consistent with the specificity of motivation that is characteristic of visceral states, participants were only more likely to cheat for a prize that could alleviate their current deprived state (such as a bottle of water). Interestingly, this increase in dishonest behavior did not seem to be driven by an increase in the perceived monetary value of the prize. (PsycINFO Database Record
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